diciembre 2012 – Conflictos Modernos

The Taliban’ Military Operations in Afghanistan.

or The Expert Taliban Military Field Manual

In this epoch of scanty dissimulation, of powerful electronic sensors, even installed in the space, of spreads of the «intelligence», the enemy movements and hostile intentions are difficult to conceal to a military modern army. The means to achieve it are the dispersion, the geography (fogs, rainfalls, forests, orography, nights), the disguise (spoiling the reality) and the camouflage, concealing or adjusting reality. To avoid the detection and the heavy fire, to the enemy improved vision, is necessary to oppose the fleetingness, the smallness and imprecision of the images (few people, neutral clothes, conceal and dismantled weapons) and the insecurity in the apprehended «reality» (civil or armed and friends or enemies?). The enemy are difficult to be seen In the modern «empty» combat fields in combat availability at the nearby distances. Where the movements of the afoot infantry are not enfilade or by short and rapid jumps from concealment to concealment, preferably protected. And the «drones» or planes without crew of exploration and/or ground attack always will be able to lead to the murder of a few innocent smugglers or countrymen. By confusing them with enemy activists. Everything to do for losing the war to «gaining the hearts and minds of the enemy»!

The Taliban operational ways.

But, during a lot of time yet, the air and spatial means of the USA, as spy satellites, drones and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have great limitations in the detection and check of small ground, even regular, forces in the areas of difficult transitability and with concealment possibilities: as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized areas (industrial, warehousing and distribution, and housing). Those not only offer concealment, but also covered from enemy fire, up to the near combat distances. A slightly valued phenomenon here is the plethora of the «relative concealment heights», as determinant factor of the «transitability» («the good or bad ongoing» does not completely value and express it) of the units in this type of so abundant areas.

The operational key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands, at full or part time availability. They are in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and more or less temporarily occupying some of the numerous peasants settlements and hamlets. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform, hide and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operational development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present ISAF’s Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes; assaults to very small enemy isolated units, preferably natives, demoralized and/or tired; medium range fire harassment; kidnapping; short duration isolated incursions, helped or not by other nearby bands; and the mining of paths and ways (the fearful IED), usually travel by the enemy with their frequent, unimaginative and “showing” patrols. The sheiks or commands chiefs are ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns. In a minor and less extensive degree, operate the cells of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban «action units» type platoon must be unfolded in sections and even in «teams», for their large movements or with the possibility of the enemy presence. The extended march security helps to this secure deployment. The result is a network structure. Which nodes are the unfolded subunits and which “threads” indicate their horizontal and vertical relations, supports, communications and superposed protective shooting sectors. Even this network can be camouflaged, mixing or intermingling the “nodes” with pacific native groups. In this more yet empty battlefield, without permanent or consolidated lines, is necessary to accept the sporadic incursion in our own rear of military patrols of exploration and/or of combat. Their air abundant means facilitate them to realize surprising, rapid and powerful deep insertions, in charge of elite units. For it, in the haltings, rests and locations we have to keep the security, even in our rear and always deploying a tactical exploration.

This imposes a tremendous effort on the men and on the commands. Whose training, formation and discipline, motivation and religiousness and commitment with each mission must be complete. In this type of fighting, apart from the self-defence units, which dominate and monitor our own settlements and enclaves, the number of «select» soldiers, destined for the action units, it should be subordinated to their quality. These select fighters, as any other military mean of interest, always will skimp on. So, it is absurd to get involved in a clash, in which the Taliban’ combat capacity, is clearly lower than that of the enemy. Against the on board cannons and machine guns (both in ICV and airships), with their detection and fire control equipments, the ambushing Taliban, even protected in reinforced and/or covered positions, but in the forward slope to use their tense fire weapons, cannot support a duel.

The Taliban harassment operations on the military forces.

For the fire harassment to the patrols they don’t need to mobilize many fighters. The enemy will always call his tactical aviation or the helicopter gunships, which come fast, if he see a shooters spot or lunette in front of him. Even they sometimes overfly the marches of their columns and patrols, looking for opportunity targets. A small «selected» rebel unit can stop them. So forcing them to deploy, spend their ammunition as much as they follow their «engagement rules». And to regroup and, even, reequip, to continue their march. After the harassment the Taliban combatants, without being committed, will be scattered to gather on a main or alternative meeting point. And this can be repeated later by another «action unity». Fixed as they are to the tracks, the occasions for the Taliban will be numerous. And the results, enervating and frustrating, because they force the military men to the passiveness and to the moral wear.

Afghanistan almost lacks asphalt roads: there are only two. The most important gives itself a round turn all over the country, joining the principal populations, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, etc. So they called it Ring Road. Then there is the North-South Road, which follows this tour, at the east of the country. They are not great thing. The asphalt have between half and one inch of thickness; the heats soften it and potholes and bubbles are easily formed. But, under a protuberance can hide an explosive device. It is necessary to cross slow the roads and looking at the soil. The Taliban have not now the habit of recording on video the ambushes, to hang them on Internet. This does that the carelessness observers in horizon, highly vulnerable as acquaintances, are almost away from the limits of the landscape of the ambushes. And that do not use as alert sign of them. But, the explosive devices are constantly developing and perfecting. These give a certain anonymity, distance and impunity to his «placers». The devices detonated by cable cannot be neutralized by the inhibitors. They are not frequently using cables activators. These are expensive and weigh, and the rebels are in isolated zones and the logistics is weak, vulnerable and complicated. Some devices are activated by a frequency transmitter with a given range; even serves an electronic opening door device. With the frequency inhibitors, the soldiers try to offset the radio waves of the probable frequencies used in the zone. Being the most expensive and complicated transmitters, that with more range, power and frequencies range. It is the game of the cat and the mouse. The problem is that the guerrillas of an area receive a radio activator that uses an unforeseen frequency. The activated by pressure and wrapped in plastic, can be very effective if their hollow conical explosive charge covered with the fatal metal, is well enough. The multiple and complicated are increasingly used. For example, it is possible to place one of average credible load, which alerts the designated land observers in the vehicles. On having brought over or descend from these, some of them can be activated by cable. And even «throw» from the path flanks some hollow charge missile placed in fixed unexpected camouflaged launchers. If the soldiers dismount from the vehicles, also some mortar bombs can be thrown on the ambush area, having it registered from the deployment positions of the tubes.

The obligatory passing zones of the enemy (gorges, mountainous passes, ways bordered of rocky outcrops or with cut gutters and direct accesses to the hamlets) are adapted for their employment. It must be also used a certain number or percentage of trick «placements», keeping the scene and decoration, but without live charges or cable wastes, destined to harass, tease and tire the foreign enemy stroller. In the variety are the taste and the initiative. The effect on the enemy of the “explosive, real and fictitious, simple or multiple ambushes”, is not simply added. But is a potential function of those deployed.

A permanent harassment of the barracks is not normal, for unproductive and costly. Also, they are tremendously defended (sensors, pits, wire fences, patrols and fortifications) against the suicides bombs. But happens that the suicides, who are illuminated but not silly fanatics, usually attack “not sufficiently protected enemies groups”.

In order to remove the indirect fire origins, the military men can realize limited aim assaults, expelling the Taliban irregular mortars. With an active habitual patrolling, they can in these moments scare or beat and remove the hostile marauders. The Taliban usually explore, at least initially and also in fluid fighting conditions, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these reconnaissance positions. The patient observation is the way. Bearing in mind that if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes the observer must be replaced. Because he looks, but already not sees.

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended and/or without spirit position, preferable of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is this: at dawn they bomb with heavy fire from fixed missile launchers, then they approach to use mortars and finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance, shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL grenade-launchers. To avoid friendly fires, they would fire only to verified targets and from bottom to up or above to below.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY.

THE TANKS ARMIES AS THE SUMMIT WEAPON OF THE ART SCIENCE OF THE SOVIET WARFARE.

Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

From 1943, after the breakthrough of the German semi continuous fronts by the shock or infantry armies of the Soviet Fronts or «armies groups», these sent their more mobile great forces, the tank armies, to the interior of the enemy operational zone. To keep intact their combat and of operational movement capacities, it was tried that they were not taking part in the previous irruption, breakthrough and securing operations in the passing sector, at charge of the mentioned infantry or shock armies.

Prolegomena.

Everything approximately begins with Tujachevski’s «bad» experiences, as commander of the Western Front in the war of 1920 of the USSR against Poland. This way, inferred «the inability to destroy the enemy army in a wide modern front, with an alone blow, in a great battle. What was forcing to achieve this strategic goal by means of a series of battles». The guide of this battles succession would be the operational strategy. So giving coherence, strategic sense and joint in the time and space to the military efforts and decisions. Before the «costly» successes of industrialization of the Five-year Soviet Plans, until the 30s of the 20th century, the operational level remained limited to this successive series of battles. Because the Red forces were integrated essentially by infantry, artillery and cavalry. Weapons restrained, by their essential limitation in the advance speed, to always using this string of victorious battles towards his strategic goals in the military theaters.

Parallel, other Soviets theoretics were working on a new, «more «scientific» strategy, as would correspond with the country «new order», for the employment of the Red Army. So, V. K Triandafillov published in 1929 the book «The nature of the operations of the modern armies». And in the Field Manual (ustav) of the Red Army of 1929, coordinated by A. A. Svechin, many of his ideas were included. In February, 1933, the army issued his Provisional Instructions to organize the battle in depth, which were extended in March, 1935. And the Field Manual of 1936, prepared with Tujachevski’s supervision, which already had 44 years, and Yegorov, was establishing the basic principles for the deep battle and the variants of the operations in the enemy rear. Triandafillov died prematurely on July 12, 1931 in an aviation accident near Moscow. This saved probably him of suffered a few years later the politician paranoiac pursuit of Stalin. The Stalinist purge of the 37s and 38s materially liquidated a generation of high commanders and officials, that had devoted themselves to the study, definition and development of the military operational art. This way, Egorov, Kamenev, Svechin, Tujachevski, Uborovich and others less out-standing, were purged and executed. Their ideas and theories in development turned pale and were guarded, up to well entered the Great Patriotic War. The great units necessary for the employment of operational theory were dismembered in their basic components or units of every Arm, for their easier conduction and employment. And the frightened surviving commanders became much more conservative, stick on to the received orders as limpets, and unwilling to assume even the calculated risks. These insanities inconstancies and caprices of the envy and the poor self-esteem of a predator and distrustfully Red Fuehrer, incapable of the minor empathy, cost more than million casualties to the Red Army, in the first months of the war in the East.

Introduction.

The tanks armies, which only reached the number of sixIn the whole immense Soviet Order of Battle, were using principally in the most promising strategic or operational and even political directions, of the whole extensive war front in the European East. And according to the criteria of the Stavka or High Staff of the Soviet armed forces, under the direct control of the comrade Stalin. Therefore, many groups of Soviet armies or Fronts were not possessing them. They were the elite of the elite of the great Soviet units. And for their men’s endowment and equipments it was tried that were the best available ones and to full theoretical endowment, at least before their insertion in the enemy rear. This way, at the end of 1943, when the Soviet war machinery was acting in full sweeping offensive, only 320.000 men belonged to the mechanized or motorized forces, from the total of more than 4 million men of the Soviet Ground Forces. The need to provide them those, like the aviation, the navy and the artillery with the better educated and trained troops, was letting the infantry numerous forces (around 490 divisions, which were in stable number from 1943) with the most awkward men and the worse formed and equipped. Though the Red Army of the Workers and Peasants (RKKA, the Russian Рабоче-Крестьянская Красная Армия, Raboche-Krestianskaya Krasnaya Armia) was not called officially Soviet Army until 1946, for practical reasons we prefer calling him this way in this work.

The development of the mobile forces and their aims in the Soviet military doctrine.

When one speaks about the massive assaults, by successive big waves, of the Soviets, it is necessary to look for the tactical and human explanation of in the iteration of efforts that marks their doctrine. And in the military and yet imperfect school formation of their men, specially the infantries. Nevertheless, to the favorable and unfavorable characteristics of his national fighting for the survival, in the so called «Great Patriotic War», they could adapt all their social, economic and military efforts. Creating, for example, a number very limited of tanks and cannons of assault models, sobers, easy to handle, hard, rapid, with fuels more advantageous in their combustion Carnot’s cycle and with great fire power, already from the beginning. And that then made for many tens of thousands of units. Delivering a sub-machine gun to many infantries, forcing them this way to assault the enemy, to make him to feel the neutralization massive fire at their shooting effective distance (not more than 70 meters), to have some opportunity to live then. Towards the half of the war, the Soviets had working the incredible number of 310 officials’ schools, with more than 350.000 cadets, which formed during the war approximately 2.000.000 new officials. These were in charge, in their small units, together with the NCO, of giving a more or less military formation to the replacements that in them were received, proceeding from the successive levies of men and women of any age and condition.

The high Soviet commanders knew that, on an equal footing, their men were more worse soldiers than the Germans, especially in the offensive operations. Therefore, they had to win at least all the battles that were turning out to be transcendental in their effort of war. First to survive and, then, to conquer Germany and extend their recently established «political social order» in the Eastern Europe. The secret was residing in the exploitation of the enemy operational zone. That was badly defended by a first line without operational depth, chronically scanty of sufficient and effective antitank weapons, and, especially, chained to a rigid repulse, without transfer of space, by the myopic and distrustful top Nazi directives. And the designed weapon, from the doctrine of the deep penetration, developed by the ill-fared marshall Mikhail Tujachevski and others until 1936, and desperate taken again after the first great reverses in the war, was the top use of the select and scanty armies. That theoretically might reasonably penetrate several hundreds of km in the enemy rear.

In the rest of the large sectors of the front, the Soviets either were kept in the defense. And they were masters in the establishment and functioning of strengthened, almost impenetrable areas, zones and even «regions». Or their infantry divisions, with the support of their very scanty organic tanks or that assigned in tactical subordination and reinforced or not with some Katiuskas’s brigade and some heavy artillery regiment, to realize secondary assaults with limited aims. If the operation was more promising, the Stavka could assign to them some mechanized corps, the mobile more important great unit, always centralize controlled, or, at least, a tanks corps. Though during 1941 and 1942, 80 % of the heavy and campaign artillery was divisional, already at the beginning of 1944, 65 % was not divisional and was integrated to great independent units, the artillery divisions, formed by regiments. This organization was serving to concentrate it crushingly and very effectively in the most promising directions, decided by Stalin and his Stavka, and to facilitate and assure the break in.

The operational zone, its functions and weaknesses.

The operational zone, with a depth in this epoch from 18-20 km to 75-80 km from the front, is the geographical space where develops the process of turning the «mass of support» from the strategic rear (forces, supports, communications, logistic organization and HHQQ) into «units of action», specialized and qualified for their employment against the enemy, with the type of fight decided or imposed by him.

The critical elements of this zone, which is the physical support of that military activity, are: the communications of all kinds: the spaces of maneuvers and operations (zones of units unfolding, waiting, reorganization, re equipment, preparation, advance, provided with covers or non enfilade towards the enemy); the units of engineers and of operational reconnaissance (I include both them for their shortage, importance and universality of employment); the logistic means (centers of data processing and of operations control, warehouses and manipulation means, long distance and delivery transport and delivery areas); and the intelligence centers and those of the operational controls.

The operational zone must have the sufficient depth to be able to contain, deploy, drive, supply and direct the sufficient number of units close to the front, following the necessary spears of advance or attack. To repeat the efforts against the enemy and to obtain the tactical aim that raises or are decided. One differs very marked in the real depth (used) between the zones of the two antagonistic or enemy rivals, indicates a latent tactical weakness of one of them. Either for less military resources or for a slower advance or deployment for the combat of his strategic reservations, from his deep rear. This can be detected by the aviation of exploration. Deprived the active forces of a front of their operational zone, which makes able, supports and stimulates them, the survival of the whole front sector affected is impossible after a short time, for depletion or consumption. The moral effects of the loss of the positive expectations help to precipitate the collapse of this front. The forces will tend to move back or to be called towards the rear, to treat to protect the functional elements that allow them to operate tactically. In effect, for the defense of the operational zone, given the combative defenselessness of her “functional elements” and the scanty combat readiness and the lack of cohesion of the units that wait, reform and are re-equipped there, only we can possess in general the operational already prepared reserves, preferably mobile, and with the deepest and slower reserves of this sector or of the contiguous ones.

The presence in force of a tanks army, deployed in numerous more or less parallel routes of march, fulling all the available roads and paths, generates a great threatening «sector» and always unforeseen in the enemy rear. With an «operational efficiency» extended to his right, to his left side and towards the front. The «real threat» exercised by the mobile groups is a direct function of the distance to their possible aims, measure in «reaching times»; of their «operational movement capacity» to approach them and of their «combat capacity» to damage or occupy them. This creates an «influence», a gigantic «leverage» on the enemy affected zone, altering, dismantling, breaking it and, even, making it prematurely collapse, and without great attrition combats.

(TO BE CONTINUED)