The Ideology and the Power in China.

The Historical Materialism in China

In the 18th century, the Jesuits missionaries that arrived to China (singularly, Mateo Ricci), deepened into his civilization and manners of life, and informed Rome in his letters, of the existence in the Middle Kingdom of a political regime based on the absolute government of an emperor, through a hierarchy, extensive and educated organized bureaucracy. But this scheme, which was idealized and simple, benevolent and Confucian, was not fulfilled in the reality. The Chinese emperors and still his dynasties were overthrowed once and again; the internal war was intermittent and recurrent in his history; the necessary and powerful bureaucracy was elitist and closed and it was endemicly falling down in the vice of the corruption, the conceitedness and the auto satisfaction for his works and services.

Resultado de imagen de chi huang ti SHI HUANG TI, CHINESE FIRST EMPEROR

And what is more, the root and the character of this style of governance, to be and to power remains nowadays. Over the Chinese revolution of the 30s and 40s; of the World War II and the short civil war (1946-1949), after the Japanese occupation of great part of his oriental territory; of the economical and social “Great Forward Jump” of the beginning of the 50s, using microsteel mills and small factories in the production, at charge of innumerable groups of not due qualified neighbors, trying an “industrial communal revolution” and of the “cultural revolution” of Mao Zedong. This was an ideological radical reconduction of the Chinese revolutionary process, anticipated and praised in the “permanent revolution” of Trotsky. That, paradoxically, with eyes of the Chinese communists, was a “doomed revisionist”. All mentioned constitutes a stage, an attempt, one more historical episode, that, for more revolutionaries and radical that were, would end up by being swallowed, absorbed and incorporated in the civilization and the Chinese idiosyncrasy, on having been accessories and temporaries in the develop of the long history of the Middle Kingdom.

As the emperor only accepted the loyal submission of his subjects, the communist leaders do not admit the most minimal critique of owns or foreigns. They have the monopoly and the “scientific” certainty of the materialistic and dialectical interpretation of the social facts of the History. Though they constantly correct their “course” in long tacks to the advance. And the nomenclature, the aparatichik, the bureaucracy of the Chinese PC and of the State are clannish and distant to the negotiations and to the different, deviant or divergent opinions. In what is refered to his orientation, his collective and personal power and to the objections to his taken decisions. It is in this closed area of the modern “mandarinate where also are settled the power quotas and the interests at stake of chiefs, controls and regions.

Resultado de imagen de mao zedong MAO ZEDONG, FATHER OF THE PEOPLE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

This way, when a difference exists between the people and them, they do not think and talk, but they repress directly the discrepancies that appear. In 1989, the “liberalizing” Deng Xian Ping sent the army to squash and disperse the civil student protest in the square of Tiananmen, in Pekin. And Zhao Zuyang, was ceased as the first secretary of the Chinese P.C., for simply posing to negotiate in the first moment with the students. These “incidents” arise constantly in the whole China and add several thousands in a year. But, about them, scarcely one speaks, because they are not known. The regime and his oppressor apparatus take charge making them invisible, or, non-existent. This is connected with the political classic Chinese past. This way, when a difficulty, a claim, a deviation exist, one was coming and comes today to the high authority. And the present Constitution recognizes this right of popular and social request. But, nowadays the petitioners are easily struck and imprisoned. These “incidents” are in the habit of happening with the local and regional authorities of the towns and societies. Which operate in the same form that the central leaders and the high commands of the Party, which are their counselors, teachers and examples.

This style of governance would be useful and commendable when the social internal and external flows of a society were stopped by the geographical compartment of the groups, the absence of persons’ movements for the lack of roads and the shortage of means and reasons for them and the penury of the public information, only personally conveyed. But in the actual times, this constrainer governance does that the vivacity and the audacity, the creativity and the naturalness in the management of the public thing, get lost. And that the administrators hide down the procedure and the papers, acting like a bureaucracy of zero faults. But, the mistakes and deficiencies generate others, because this is “the use and the way” chosen. Because, the mistakes can be used by some superior or enemy, always with something of opportunism and/or convenience for a “group of collaborators or companions”, to reprimand, to punish, to accuse or to cease someone. This way is created a philharmonic orchestra lacking in unit, which can work with uproar, but without interpreting the melodies.

Resultado de imagen de deng xiaoping reformas THE GENERAL ARCHITECT OF THE REFORM OF CHINA

And it falls in the enthronement of the chiefs, which leads to his exoneration of all his failures, to the tolerance of all his faults and to the exaltation of all his thoughts, decisions and acts. In the absence of real contact with the reality, they go after the accumulation of safeguards, distances and privileges in his posts and functions. Looking for the need to feel safes. Without understanding that the reality is always more benign and hospitable that what is afraid. So, it incurs in one of the political social evils that the president Mao already indicated long ago and that, extracted from his original writings, is summarized as appointment in his Red Book, a real Marxist Leninist catechism of the Cultural Chinese Revolution (1966-1976): “the bureaucratic rigid tasks supplant the attention and dedication to the people and to his needs and opinions, necessary to realize the real revolution, being based on an exchange of thoughts between the people and the Party”. Since it is the ideological feedback from the people to the authorities, which keeps these in the historical correct course.

The political action in China.

The own structure and composition of the Chinese P.C. reveal his elitist and exclusive characteristics. Administratively it is an emulator of the illustrated and despot “madarinate” of the imperial times. Scarcely his members are 70 million Chinese. But his ubiquity, penetration and range extend it as a “social fluid” for all the corners, sectors and turns of the led Chinese society. This “total presence” includes the principal and more active leaders of the country, in all the areas and caps of the social action. All that contrasts and differs qualitatively from the general attitude of the P.C., in relation with his compromised militancy: his doors are opened for all the sympathizers in all the countries where they do not govern. That are the immense majority of they, exempting a handful of old and already expired exceptions, relics of an overcome social and political past from ends of the 20th century.

In these countries they seek to reach a “critical public mass” of presence and activity, which is variable according to the societies, but that is between 10 and 15 % of his population. That turns out to be necessary in order that the actions of these “politicallly active lay orders get reputation and transcendency in his society. Where they would act as his “social revolutionary yeast”, towards thoughts and radical attitudes. And even, at the end of the process, taking the weapons to finish off and suppress the emptied and unstable governments, when his institutional weakness is clear.


From his part, president Xi Jinping already excluded any political deviation of the communist regime towards the modern freedoms: “The democracy is not Chinese“. That is to say, the Chinese democracy does not exist as such political system. Nevertheless, the Party granted the economic capitalist freedoms: “Let’s keep the ideology, the political orientation and the structure of the State (and, certainly, of the Party). And let’s perfect the production way and the distribution of the goods and obtained services, cheapening the costs of the productive factors as possible, seeking to improve the economic productivity and the efficiency, the volume of production and the wealth and his extension”.

On having embraced the capitalism forms specialized in the creation of goods and without applying the central necessary regulation, this has brought erroneous or perverse deviations in the assignments of the means and the distribution of the produced goods. Probably to stimulate these capitalist activities and to control them simultaneously, it is more an “object” of social philosophy and suppose asking too much to some not knowledgeable leaders, not experienced on the topics. This way, the economic high and middle classes were created, that form a new social active and powerful base of the Party. One prospers with the Party and never without the Party. Because his members trust between them and the belonging to it gives them a stamp of guarantee and loyalty to the great lines or parameters designed and planned from the leading members. That belong so much to the thoughts and the general actions centers, as to the most prosaic areas of the economic capitalist activity and the direction and the management of sectors and companies. They want to be rich communists and to enjoy goods of immediate and lasting consumption in property and exclusive. It is a way that serves, always there is one, to distinguish and to be outlined over the others, specially of the acquaintances, neighbors and relatives.

But the enormous inflation of prices of the real-estate assets, created by an excessive and/or speculative demand, opposite to a limited offer by the wished and/or preferential locations and the available surface, has to lead to the depreciation of these “deposits of value and saving“. Fitting them to his more moderate real value. But, numerous Chinese have prospered very much on having invested his savings in the urban construction. Also, it is possible that this one is not the only upward deviation of prices that is in preparation in other “value deposits”, the stock exchange, for example. And it is possible that the immense majority of the Chinese tolerate the political halter, relieved by the consumer consolations.


But they there will sting enormously the loss of great part of his savings and of his expectations of progress and wealth. Machiavelli said that the men were tolerating better the violent loss of his father than that of his goods (ruin, confiscation). Curiously, a theoretically communist regime and that considered the USSR of the 60s and 70s as “deviationist” of the Marxism Leninism and of the revolutionary pure tradition, will fall down, for edging them, in the cyclical inevitable deviations of the most old-fashioned capitalism. Those that the great Europe already checked, from 80 years ago, creating and perfecting gradually an economic doctrine corps of social liberal nature, with which he eluded, relieved and overcame them with efficiency and rapidity.

And, on having modified radically and sharply the relations between the productive agents (work, capital, management and cadres and administration), it also must modify the previous social relations between them. In effect, the knowledge and the application of the modern technologies of all the fields in the manufactures of multitude of goods, lead to the qualitative increase of the training and the formation of the producers. Which will claim, more soon that late, the recognition by the Chinese State of diverse civil rights , still not contemplated. The concentration in his hands and in the controls of the factories of increasing quantities of assets (savings, participations, lasting consumption goods, essential knowledge) will lead them to demanding from those, new ways and forms of participation in the public Chinese life. Acting this way, as would say Mao, “a need demanded by the people towards the Party and the leaders “.

All this will create contradictions between the new caps or social “subclasses” so formed, breaking and removing this way the idealized monolithic unit of the people and the Party in the State. Contradictions that not necessarily have to get to be antagonistic, to resolving by the violent action between the rivals. But that will demand his dialectical “resolution” and, therefore, will lead to the appearance of a new social stable balance. In which the more retrograde, stagnant, parasitic or bureaucratic “sectors” will have to open the way for: a sensitive, flexible and effective administration in wide sense; a different control from the managements and the controls of the companies and services; a sectorial and individual management progressively different from those; a system of access to these positions, based on the capacity, the efficiency from time to time measured and the merits; and to the a major and freer participation of the producers of all kinds in the social areas to developing: education, playtime, trips, consumption, social protection, health and access to the public life. And this is the historical materialism in action…

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Enrique Alonso nació en La Habana. Tras el establecimiento del régimen comunista se trasladó a España, licenciándose en Ciencias Químicas en la Universidad de Oviedo.

Es titulado por la Universidad Complutense en Química y Tecnología del Petroleo (dos cursos) y en Logística por la Cámara de Comercio de Madrid (un curso). Ha realizado su labor profesional durante más de 30 años en REPSOL y empresas anteriores, absorbidas posteriormente. Su trabajo se centró en la investigación de lubricantes (Centro de Investigación de la calle Embajadores), el área comercial y la logística de lubricantes (unas 100 mil Tm. al año de productos a granel y envasados, con un presupuesto total de unos 1000 millones de ptas).

Ha sido colaborador en la década de los 80, del diario Pueblo y, a través de la agencia EFE, de diversos diarios españoles e hispanoamericanos en temas de política internacional y militares.

Es autor de la novela “Operación Elefante”, publicada en 1982, que trata minuciosa y extensamente de las operaciones y tácticas de las guerrillas y contraguerrillas en la Angola socialista prosoviética de Agostinho Neto, apoyada desde 1975 por tropas cubanas. 

En 2005 publicó en inglés el ensayo “On the Nature of War”, que es una teoría de la guerra basada en el desarrollo y la aplicación práctica de 10 “sistemas operativos”.

Actualmente es colaborador permanente de la revista española War Heat International.

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