THE MILITARY SURPRISE: concepts, effects, realization and types. 2nd. Part.

(CONTINUATION)

The three cavalry regiments of the brigade had a total of 27 officers, 228 N.C.O.s and 1,740 soldiers mounted on German horses. All those who could, carried sub-machine guns –either the MP-38 or MP-40- instead of the 7.92 mm K98 carbines. They were supported by 30 heavy machine guns (MG-34 on tripods) and 72 light machine guns (MG-34 with bipods). Their heavy support fire was provided by a battery of 6 light howitzers of 75 mm for each of three hippomobile regiments. As external support they would have artillery fire, either centralized or from the divisions placed in its flanks, for the attached observers and officers were accompanying it.

Resultado de imagen de carretas del país soviéticos Country wagons moving forward in a huge Russian plain…

They were also supported by an engineers company (pioneers) and a sanitary company. By means of a park of Russian country wagons, each dragged by a pair of native horses, the supplies, replacements, ammunitions, medical forces, etc. of the brigade would be carried to them. They also had a motorized supply column.

The nature, the structure of the brigade and its support were perfectly adapted to the mission and contributed to its simplicity. It even received the support of a tanks company (14 tanks) for the attack, when the reconnaissance saw the possibility for use it.

Another key aspect of the mission was intelligence, acting already before the conception of the operation. This provided the most complete knowledge of the enemy and operations zone. Intelligence was a combination of information acquired by all the units, that was continually updated. It allowed better definition of the mission, assignment of the means and units, and training preparation. It also allowed for more appropriate adjustments or changes in plans, etc.

Another indispensable factor in this extraordinary or heterodox operation was the training and trial of the mission. The brigade trained for 4 to 6 weeks before its activation, in areas similar to the future operations zone; this fulfilled the security factor.

The training with tanks was not done, because its employment was not foreseen. And one of the problems that arose during the operation was that communication between the cavalry and tanks was poor. In the thick wild forests the wireless radios did not work well and it was necessary to use the existing wire telephony. But these were not enough for adequate communications between all the small units.

Resultado de imagen de frente del este 1942

A characteristic of the training in these special missions is that that it must be as complete as possible, in agreement to its peculiarities. And a full trial, including the total foreseen time, is always necessary. For example, to verify the resistance of certain equipments and not only its good functioning, as would happen in a partial or incomplete test.

The brigade and 5th panzer division were in their departure positions 10 days before the start of the march towards the contact. The Soviets were not capable of detecting the activation of this unit, so the security factor remained fulfilled.

Immediately, the brigade, with the help of the tanks troops, carried out an intense reconnaisance of the intermediate area and the enemy positions (advanced combat troops and the forward limit of the defense). It was deduced that the tanks’ support in the attack was possible (in a narrow sector), if a necessary adaptation was effected in the tracks accessing the area. This innovation would add an important shock capacity and heavy direct fire to the assault, especially in the irruption, in the struggle for enemy fighting positions and in the interior of the defense zone (artillery, units in disorder or in retreat, transport, supplies, etc.)

The factor surprise was going to be achieved by the tactical innovation and the unexpected action in «field of action» chosen for the attack. It is important to remember that the Soviets were prepared and fortified against an attack that they knew was coming. In addition, since the beginning of the war the Soviets had shown themselves to be masters of defense and in disguising positions. Still, the Germans hoped that a strong attack on an unexpected place would dislocate the enemy’s combat capacity and means of defense. The German plan allowed no practical reaction time to the enemy.

Resultado de imagen de frente del este 1942

With this, the speed of action factor is obtained by the attacker. This allowed the Germans to overcome rapidly their principal vulnerability: the initial contact with the enemy in the decided «interface of action«, in which always can be produced unexpected setbacks in the face of potentially bigger forces, until the law of the action is imposed on the enemy.

As the mission begins, there is uncertainty or friction, due to the enormous number of individuals and units involved; mistakes, that are a function of the small failures that happen inevitably in all the human actions that comprise a mission; enemy action, until the fire supremacy and maneuver deprive him of initiative; opportunities, in the shape of favorable situations not foreseen by the Germans and which the commands of the small units must exploit in order to fulfill the mission.

To be able to act this way, the extraordinary or special troops must possess the commitment factor, which involves the acceptance and recognition of the entrusted mission, its important consequences and its real possibilities of success in these conditions.

A couple of days before the assault, the engineers were making progress through the forest boundaries with mechanical saws. They constructed a reinforced path and carpeted it with middle logs cut up “in situ” and arranged about a meter apart. This was to give sufficient firmness to a route up to the Soviet minefields which would support the tanks added to the hippomobile brigade in tactical subordination, which slowly initiated its advance a little later. The noise of the saws and the engines of the vehicles was drowned by the flight of reconnaisance planes at low level and sporadic harassment fire.

The joint assault began on July 2, 1942.

The hippomobile brigade had to cross 15 kilometers of forests and marshes to reach the Soviet positions. At its right was the 5th panzer division attacking, which acted as the normal force or mass of support for the assault. Its left flank was supported on this area of difficult ongoing, covered by weak infantry forces (about a company). Until, on the 3rd day, a German infantry division began its assault through this sector.

At 3 a.m. the tanks advanced close to the cavalry troops, taking advantage of the general artillery preparations. They were accompanied by engineers’ troops. The minefields were immediately detected and the engineers cleaned the area around the passing paths to extend its width. Suddenly, the forwards tanks and cavalry reached the limit of the Soviet position of defense in this decided «field of action» over them.

Resultado de imagen de 9º ejército alemán Rzhev Model saves the day for the 9th German Army.  Column of Soviet military prisioners.

In a single thrust they burst in, breaking the Soviets’ first lines of defense. After this, the tanks were kept in reserve, since the enemy position stretched through an unknown wooded area. That morning the cavalry managed to penetrate 6.5 kilometers inside the Soviet position.

The whole time the train of country wagons was capable of advancing supplies, replacements and munitions to the tired men.

For its part, the 5th panzer division could not advance despite its superior capacity of shock and means, and suffered heavy losses by very well camouflaged Soviet forces in depth.

Around midday, a hippomobile regiment turned to attack the principal enemy positions from the east. To reach them, it had to cross a swampy forests zone where the water was knee-high. At dusk, the brigade had control of a sector of the principal road inside the Soviet position, breaking the Soviets’ tactical cohesion and turned it untenable.

Just after midnight on the 4th, Soviet resistance was collapsing in the area of assault of the 5th panzer division and hippomobile brigade. This crossed another swampy forest area of 10 kilometers depth and emerged at the operational enemy rear. Here was a scene of chaos filled with abandoned vehicles and stroked columns and groups of troops and soldiers. Arrival of the panzer forces accelerated the decline of the 39th Soviet infantry army as an organized and effective force.

That same day the whole sector of this army collapsed and the German infantry divisions of Walter Model’s 9th army converged on its interior by all its assault sectors.

In the 11 days that the operation lasted, the Germans captured 50,000 Soviet prisoners, and around 230 tanks and 760 artillery pieces.

THE CREATION OF THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL SURPRISES.

Prolegomenon.

Military surprise is more a part of the art of war and its creation, than of military science, the doctrine, its regulations and the principles or «good-doing» rules of war. Of course, its scope and instruments are taken from military science. Military science has its logic and practice oriented towards applied theory.

Military doctrine forms the framework, the structure, the heart of all development and the wisdom that military science has been developing so far. The military doctrine of each state incorporates the idiosyncracy, history and civilization of the corresponding nation. The permanent virtues and the more temporary values of the former are also reflected in its military doctrine. All this channels it in one direction and one sense.

War art has in its conception and execution the characteristics of: variability; the unusual and singular conception; the different, unexpected and novel application and the relative ingenuity (naturalness and freshness) and freedom in its facts.

Resultado de imagen de general hermann balck General Hermann Balck, one of the finest German armored tactical Command.

If we are guided mainly by military science, which the enemy also knows, the results of the war dialectic will be obtained by maintaining a superiority in men and means, marches and maneuvers. And the cost will be the attrition of means and human wear in a greater proportion, and always undue, than with the use of surprise.

Thus, a defence deployed in depth and with sufficient reserves, probably deprives us of many opportunities for effective surprise. But, almost always, acting in the microfield, as using a tactical zoom, we can apply the tactical or operational surprise, unusual and unexpected.

Development.

The surprise becomes specify and materializes in an unexpected action on the enemy by fire and/or shock. That, taking advantage of the enemy’s habitual lack of combat availability, makes him the victim of an attack that he is not in a position to successfully reject.

Obviously, the units in charge of surprise must avoid enemy’s reconnaissance, advanced combat units and security. In charge of giving the units that detached them, enough time to get the combative disposition that allows the rejection of their attacker.

But, the mental surprise must not only be unexpected for the enemy. But, in order to be able to take full advantage of its potential and effects, it must also be unusual, special, infrequent. With an unquestionable tendency to be «unusual», as never seen. This unusual character, never occurred, extraordinarily reinforces the quality of unexpected and sudden use of surprise.

Imagen relacionada Soviet  T-34 /76 tank.

We don’t always have the unusual at hand. And surprise often favors, by employing the law of action, the most mobile and even only active rival.

Then, the use and manipulation of the “appearances”, the appreciated characteristics of the events and their circumstance, will allow us to establish and develop a new tactical or operational situation. Which will be surprising and unusual for the enemy. And it will give us an unexpected victory, at the beginning of the faced dialectic situation.

A Tactical example with Operational Trascendence.

Here is an example of an extraordinary force acting as a normal force and, in so doing, completely deceiving the enemy by manipulating appearances of the events.

In January 1943, with the Soviet advance threatening Rostov, the 4th Panzer Army of colonel general Hoth moved back from its positions on the banks of the Sal and established a defensive line south of the river Manich. Passing through that area were the supply and retreat routes of the 1st Panzer Army. Routes that had been kept open, if a disaster like that of Stalingrad was to be avoid. In Stalingrad, the Sixth German Army, the Army unit more powerful of the Wehrmatch, was caught. The 4th Panzer Army was assigned to protect this bottle neck in the communications of the Armies Groups Don.

Soon the Soviets reached the confluence of the Manich and Don rivers, took control of the small city of Manutchskaya that was only 30 kilometers from the mouth of the Don on the south bank, and sent advanced detachments in this direction. On January 23, the 11th panzer division and 16th infantry division counterattacked the Soviet advance spears and pushed them back to Manutchskaya.

Then, it was vital to restore the south front of the Don and Manich and to expel the Soviets from the city. Which was one of their bridgeheads (which, with much skill, could be rapidly reinforces once constituted).

The Germans made a direct assault from the southwest on the 24th, seeking to surprise the Soviets with the operation continuity. Instead, they found that the Soviets had created an antitank front in this entry to the city. Using tanks with their hulls partly buried and distributed between the buildings, along the streets, and in other difficult to see locations.

The 11th panzer division, a crack division with a magnificent tactician as chief, quickly stopped the assault when it detected the importance of defenses.

Imagen relacionada A Panther from the 11th panzer division circa summer 1943

On the 25th, the general Hermann Balck initiated an assault on the northeast sector of the city, which the Soviets identified as a main assault, similar to the previous one and following the orthodox criterion of «not insist on unsuccessful or frontal assaults» (not profitable). For it, they moved rapidly theirs antitank means (tanks are the most mobile) to the new threatened sector.

To make credible this assault (manipulation of the appearances), at the beginning the whole divisional artillery was used in its support. It was also the more dangerous direction of assault for the Soviets. Since that part of the city was nearest to the principal bridge over the Manich and its occupation would isolate the Soviet bridgehead on the south bank. These factors constituted the «primary evidences«.

The assault on the north-east sector was probably already considered by the Soviet defense as a German probably alternative assault and, because of this, they reacted rapidly to what happened.

Infantry half-track vehicles and reconnaissance light tanks executed the principal «virtual» assault, simulating the march of mechanized vehicles, concealed by smoke curtains. And seeking more to hide them from the enemy than to protect their advance. This gave a «secondary evidence» to the credibility of the «appearances«.

When the Soviet’s determination in the new defense was estimated, which confirmed the alteration of its original deployment and the attraction made by the normal «apparent» attack. The bulk of the divisional artillery threw a powerful fire blow on a sector of the southwest zone of the town. A single battery continued to support the ongoing false principal assault.

Most of the tanks of 15th panzer regiment immediately attacked the forward limit of the defense, entering the town and advancing on its interior. To attack from the rear the new defensive Soviet deployment, especially its tanks. The mechanized German infantry then closed in behind them.

The Soviet resistance crumbled. Its infantry ran to the bridge over the Manich river. But was chased by the 61th motorists battalion.

German casualties in liquidating Manutchskaya’s stronghold were, according to its own sources, one man dead and fourteen injured men. The Soviets had between 500 and 600 casualties and 20 destroyed tanks.

I believe, it is all clear and simple. Which are the characteristics of the practical and real ways to do.

THE MILITARY SURPRISE: concepts, effects, realization and types.

The common or general tactical surprise is that which is normally or frequently used and that is known and expected. There is one case we take as example, which is to ambush or hostilize enemy forces who come to help or rescue a group of their own immobilized and/or besieged by us. This attack is logical to do so, because the forces in march, and especially when the urgency drives them, are especially vulnerable: because of the weakness of their flanks, for their scant reconnaisance and greater ignorance of their marching grund to combat, and for their deployment or marching column more or less frayed.

The attack is to be made using sequential or simultaneously different techniques: ambushes, even employing small units; free shooters lines; shutts of the advance routes and his wings with mines; bombardments of the artillery and the unit’s organic mortars, using registered fire on the routes or its singular points; attacks of the own or allied aviation; appearances and assaults by an our «combat group» (of combined arms?) in his immediate rear or covering it in a flank of the itinerary that is favorable for our protection (heights line, edge of forests, industrial and urban areas).

It is necessary to use necessarily this common surprise. But, the attacker must not repeat his set of tactics and military technics during short periods of time. In order that our attack is not so predictable, also in the details and manners, which facilitates his rejection to the enemy. Since with our routine, we are announcing the enemy which is our game, showing him the cards. And, let’s know that, even with these precautions, we are teaching him to fight.

With the mentioned variety, his combinations and the opportunity of use, the enemy will not be able to take sufficient measurements for the rejection. Since the variants of action that we can use are sufficiently different and numerous.

This is a tactical surprise, in the same level in which we are unrolling ourselves. That will allow us to increase the attrition (on the means) and the wear (of the men) of the enemy. And, even, to place and move more favorably with regard to him. But the total results will depend on the development of the set of the raised operations. Based on the forms of fight, the movements and the involved men and means.

Resultado de imagen de walther model Colonel General Walther Model.

This way, this surprise less elaborated conceptually produces fewer fruits that have operational or decisive transcendency. Everything indicates that, in order that it should take place and increases qualitatively the transcendent efficiency in our actions, it is necessary that the quality of the surprise reaches another dimension in his action.

It is necessary, so, in the operational level of the surprise, that this would be an «ungrateful surprise» for the enemy. That has catastrophic effects, though they are local, on him, at the beginning. And that the «commotion waves» in the area or the affected sections, propagate for the enemy military system attacked. Damaging his capacities, his general and grupal moral (a section, the fighters of a weapon) and his intentions and perspectives. It would be equivalent, in the raised scene, to an «exploitation of the success» of our actions. That are encouraged and perfected by the operational surprise obtained.

The following battle during World War II illustrates the use of unexpected «field of action» on the enemy, and the use of ordinary and heterodox forces. That allowed General Walther Model to take the initiative and destroy a Soviet army inserted in his operational rear.

During the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942, the Soviet Union military had penetrated the operational rear of the 9th German army of Colonel General Model. It was integrated in the Central Armies Group, under the command of Fieldmarshal von Kluge. The Germans withdrew to positions near populated areas, tacked between them by its artillery fire and keeping open a few, precarious communications lines between the units. Thus helping maintain the operational stability of the army’s defensive area.

The Soviets had crossed the lines of the semi-continuous front, crushing weak German positions and setting up in the german rearwarsd the 39th infantry army and the XI cavalry corps (mobile forces for areas of difficult ongoing), a total of 60,000 men. Their deployment was protected in the semi wild forests and marshes between Boly and Rzhev, the principal regional city, and was supplied by a route that edged by Boly and continued to Nelidovo at the north of the zone. These Soviet forces were also in operational hibernation, waiting for the late thaw of the Russian spring.

This powerful enemy nucleus, in coordinated action with Soviet forces at the front, could compromise the German summer offensive (1942) by cutting the supply lines of the 9th army. For this reason, it was necessary to liquidate it before tackling a new campaign.

Under the instructions of General Model, a movil force was put together. This formed a hippomobile brigade with the reconnaisssance forces (a reduced battalion) of each eight divisions of infantry of 9th army, all of which had all ground transit capacity.

Resultado de imagen de batalla Rzhev The Rzhev’s projection was formed after the Soviet counter-offensive in defense of Moscow.

The mission of this brigade was to slip through enemy flanking sectors not covered by the security and principal positions of the enemy. Once in enemy territory, they were to wait for a principal important attack, to begin fighting in the enemy’s interior with the hope of occupying defense nucleus positions. The German aim was to severely unsettle the Soviets’ deployment and the conduction of their defense plan.

By using its forces in the unexpected «field of action«, the Germans hoped to recover the freedom of action to impose on the enemy the law of the action. The objective was simple, but its attainment was difficult.

The brigade, which was to penetrate the Soviet zone, was led by the 5th panzer division of Major General Gustav Fehn. That were the principal interarms forces and the mass of support or normal forces. They were to proceed following the principal reinforced surface road of the zone. Which passed from Olenino in the north and followed the western slope of the Luchesa river.

Soviet troops (39th infantry army), inside its defense zone clung to this road and had an antitank deployment (obstacles and guns). The Soviet flanks were thin but protected on each side by extensive minefields. Its right flank rested on the inhospitable and impassable woods and swamp lands of the deep valley of the Luchesa which, in the Soviets’ thinking, protected them against serious attack. The Soviet command foresaw what must be the German’s principal effort against them and deployed their forces with creativity and inventiveness.

Only healthy, strong, veteran soldiers who worked well together and whose units had cohesion could be used in this mission. It was not work for garrison troops brought from the German rear or the occupied countries. Because of this, Walther Model did not hesitate to deprive his infantry divisions of its only mobile units of maneuver to use in this battle.

THE SPANISH NACIONAL POLITICS.

A STERILE AND INEFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT

Introduction.

The dispersion and inefficiency that the authorities show in the complex labor of uniting the popular wills and in implementing clear policies of reinforcement of the national unity and of control of the hackneyed and unsuccessful ideas of dissolution and substitution of that one, have different original reasons.

A nation does not congregate and galvanize, re-joins and advances with procedure, laws and regulations. Called to juridically confine the public thing. A nation is not governed in times of dangers and incipient decadences only by the economic and accounting ideas and policies. That only serve to create and preserve the material wealth. But that at least nowadays can not avoid the hardness and the cruelty of the phases of crisis and decadence of the economic successive cycles. That literally can crush the collaboration between the social strata and deepen their differences. And these policies are bored, affected and pissquiets. Because the action of the money, which is his essence, has these natural qualities.

Resultado de imagen de montoro  SECRETARY MR. MONTORO.

This makes and defines a rachitic, defensive politics and without worthy horizons of the best efforts. And, also, serious and reliable of the duty. As serious and reliable were Cervera’s, when they sank his fleet in Santiago de Cuba and Montojo’s, when the same thing happened to him in Manila to his Spanish fleet of the Pacífico, presences.

The lack of virtues in the exercise and the example of the power and the leaders, have drained and withered the right of the country, as political national instrument.

The attempts of social politician secession.

In the secessionist case that we have opposite to the face and at this point of his process of break with the Spanish nation, there present several incognitos on what we would have to make or be doing. Would an effective preventive action be useful or counter-productive? The parsimony and uselessness, rested on the fulfillment of the procedure, which the national authorities exhibit, will allow us to take, at least, in exchange future profitable decisions?

The president has said to his party, that already there is no economic crisis to arrange. And the surveys are discounting them voters, who do not seem to want to reward indefinitely the past results. The memory that feeds the collective gratefulness is fragile, interested and changeable.

Then, the Spanish have to be convinced by the ideas and actudes in the PP, that they must vote also for the party when the things are OK. But it will be if they perceive a PP radically different from the one that has governed till now. Capable of credibly exciting and stimulating them, in unit and cooperation, towards the social immediate future in peace and prosperity.

Resultado de imagen de politica nacional española

That it is not said only that in these moments, using as protection, resting and covering in the law and his possibilities, the government is taking already legal measurements against the secessionists. Because those who are applying the law are the courts and district attorneys, since it corresponds to the Judicial Power. And the government, as Executive Power, executes very little, in trying his fulfillment and dispersing the hostile actions against the law. Also on November 1, 2014 the Catalan secessionists realized actions against the unit of Spain and the sovereignty of the Spanish, which were of equal separatist and illegal quality that these of now. And the attitude and the action of the Administration against the popular Catalan consultation of that day, was deplorable, scanty and ineffective. The lenience, the tolerance and the delay in opposite the rebels by the national executives, makes these also partial responsible and necessary, but not sufficient, cooperators, in the crimes of «nation, motherland and sovereignty» attacked and damaged by those villains.

The prudence, the aplomb and the position characterizing the public thing.

The saying «pissquiety, shits small«, indicates that you should not ask the troubled long, big or important doings. To those who look with fruition at the meters and the details of the court, do not lead them to walk many kilometres of trip.

The pissquietism has the prudence and the patience as protective shield and supposed banner of valor. But rarely a pissquiet will hurl himself or take the initiative, because he will want to cover all the bets or possibilities. The necessary and present risk in almost all the actions and enterprises is his essential distaste. And his intimate disability is the absence of charisma and leadership, fundamental for the drivers or leaders in the times of crisis that we live. But this, for shame, he will never accept it, nor will speak about it. The pissquiety is comfortable with the bridle of a society well controlled by laws and regulations. That facilitates him to walk for sure rails towards definite goals.

The professional public vocation of the pissquieties is not that of politician, though often they are. His temperamental aspirations are that of civil servants without major responsibilities, good executors of the written thing and of the ordered by their superiors. To defend his position and to use his arguments, the pissquiety is usually a good talker or announcer. He knows that all the positions are, at least, moderately defensible. And, using the word, as his instrument in the dialectics of wills with his competitors, he can impose them. In the vicissitudes of such a ruled and definite society, which does not admit improper remarks, blows in the table, suden accelerations or brusqueness.

The social and political Nation.

A nation is a society of individuals provided with one social political selfconscience. Collaborate to creating and to arrange it the history, the tradition and the customs, and the own language and moral sense. And secondly contribute to it the etnia and the own territory, that not always exist, specially the first one. This way, the territory of a country is not a nation. Nor it is not even the inarticulate population of a territory under an only government. When the nation is loved by his components and there exists in them the desire to serve it and to defend her in community, the concept of the mother land appears. Both ideas are interrelated essentially. And, the absence of the patriotism or the shame practise it by members of a «social politicalcommunity», leads to the defenselessness and to the dismemberment of their nation, in major or minor degree, forming then «groups of associate individuals». So, it is not of surprising that are the Defense Forces of a nation, as institutions and in his members, which hoist, teach and practise the patriotism as one of his essential virtues. The Forces of Defense of a nation are the specialized set of the «citizens or patriots» for the belligerent and complete Defense of his «motherland nation«.

Resultado de imagen de bandera española

Our ideologics and socials fortitudes.

The attacks of ideological external agents, far from crowding us together concerning the threatened motherland, face us and, even, divide more us. Because our Politics is mediocre, envious and shortseeing in aims. And our invertebrate society is a sum of beings and isolated groups, without a common north and many of them sorrowful of the foreign good.

Our majority civilization coexists with others in the same soil. But it does not want to say that we could not have several social common virtues. And, together with the beliefs that are practised, they are the definers parameters of a society. This way, his unanimous observance and respect promote largely the creation and the integration of the social group.

Of the social crises it is only possible to go out fortifying in the values and virtues. These are the «actions and qualities» of human reference, regarded and valued permanently by the human societies. The virtues are very stable in the time. The values are the human «qualities and actions», estimated only temporary and/or locally by some societies. And, principally, by virtue of his idiosyncrasy, living conditions and pressures received from the exterior. The cultural and social values are usually being evolving with the contingencies, the displacements and the fortunes of the human societies.

The virtues are provided principally by the elaborated religions, and by Cicero’s Speeches and Plato’s Dialogs, within our extensive western ideology. We mention the principal ones, which are absorbed and assumed in the human soul:

Appreciation of the family, the social group and the motherland and the friendship and the nice and curious strangers who come to our environment. It is the “vital environment” that sustains us, our «social humus» fertile and indispensable.

Need of punishment of the conducts that are separated sufficiently of the social rules. To avoid the free, excessive or untied revenge, to dissuade the possible infringer, to satisfy in justice the damages and the hurts and to reform the mistaken conducts. Cuando esta “virtud” es complaciente o deficiente, se abre inevitablemente el camino a la injuria personal o colectiva y a la necesidad imperiosa y vital de tomar venganza. Venganza que, por tender a los máximos (como diría Karl von Clausewitz) y estar alimentada por la injusticia y la cólera, se apoyará y seguirá la Ley del Talión.

Need of the education, as mark and seal of the good doing and of the social citizenship. And the formation as set of the knowledge and professional skills, necessary for the service to the family and the society, with the exercise of a way of life decent and sufficient.

Appreciation of the respect and the worship to the divinity, as recognition and veneration of the Necessary Being who creates and supports us, and, in some cases, helps us frankly and directly. And it makes concrete according to the ideology and the social environment lived.

Valuation of the different duties to fulfill as necessary, vital and social counterpart, of the several rights to receive. Valuation of the sobriety, the effort, the saving, the commitment, the study and formation and the work, as necessary factors and means for the progressive and just attainment of the personal and collective aims.

And are our values and virtues recognized, taken again and reaffirmed those who can give us the force and the illusion to overcome the decadence times.

And let’s not forget the essential function of «command, management, impulse and example» of the social leaders of all kinds, present in the homes, the schools, the churches, the political parties, the barracks, the trade unions, the working centers, the associations in general, etc. These are the cores of the collective activity of the society. Where the indispensable “illusion and enthusiasm» will settle themselves and bloom later.

In the hard times, those leaders must accentuate their example. Because, the values and the virtues cannot be seen and felt as something artificial and/or remote, without real connection with a practical and lived code. And they are not acceptable as impositions of “cold rules and regulations», dictated from a «supposed moral and intellectual apex» of the society.

Our commands manage, but the impulse that we receive from them is weak and ineffective. They give the orders weakly, deciding for it everything that collectivly can. And his example is not estimated, not taken as deserving of the emulation and the follow-up. Without biology there is no family, far from it society will exist. Are fertile and solid the families of the social chiefs?

Exemplary leaders separated themselves from their public positions.

We will speak about leaders of the right, withdrawn from the public life for ideological disagreements with his companions. Or for estimating that did not exist then the sociopolítics conditions that were allowing them to carry out his beliefs and ideals. In the Spanish left, we think that to his commans only the chronic or serious disease and the unavoidable age have separated them from the duties of his post.

We only remember Gerardo Iglesias‘s case, which was elected general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party in November, 1982, defending then the reinnovating ideas of the comrades newly purged. For it, he faced the so called Eurocommunists of Santiago Carrillo, looking for the integration of the different communist existing groups. He took part in the creation of Left Joined in 1986, being chosen his general coordinator. In 1988, he resigned all his charges in the XII congress of the SCP, being progressively replaced in them by Julio Anguita. Iglesias, which was in extended leave for absence, joined later to his former miner’s work.

This selection, extracted of what we can detect and glimpse, is an example and summary. It represents what would be a rocky outcrop, the part not plunged of the iceberg, of all the innumerable persons who in politics strain for keep and show a coherent position with an exemplary and complete ideology.

Resultado de imagen de mayor oreja politico  MR. MAYOR OREJA.

Jaime Mayor Oreja is probably the paradigm of all the leaders that in the right have withdrawn from the public palaestra. His category are given by his characteristics: knowledge, exemplary and moral baggage, positions occupied in the public life, relations and age. Major Oreja has a solid political formation from Christian roots. Always he indicated and condemned ETA’S solvent, secessionist and communist strategy. That was acting, according to him, getting accommodated tactically to the changes of power in Madrid and using diverse attitudes and images.

Without never facing the power of the PP, he has supported a clear and serious political path. Condemning, this way, for example, the abortion, since «something proper of the Bolsheviks», and the euthanasia, which «is an old recipe of the totalitarisms that destroyed Europe in the first half of the 20th century». He never condemned the Franco’s regime in its entirety and on the occasion of the law of the Historical Memory, in the crisis of 2008, he alerted of the risks that already were threatening the concord and the unity of Spain. His ideology inspired the ideology of Maria San Gil, his companion of the Basque PP.

Alejo Vidal Quadras was president of the PP of Catalonia from 1991. In the autonomous elections of 1995 his formation obtained 17 deputies and the major number of popular suffrages up to today. By the agreement of the Majestic, in Barcelona between Convergence and Union and the PP, which allowed Aznar’s investiture as Prime minister of Spain (in the VI legislature of the current democracy, 1996 to 2000), he was immolated by the PP of his positions in Catalonia. Vidal Quadras was relocated as Eurodeputy of the PP. And he was a vice-president of the European Parliament. Nowadays is a militant of the small regeneracionist party VOX.

Maria San Gil initiates his political activity in 1991 in the of Guipuzcoan PP. When she was eating with Gregorio Ordóñez, the first lieutenant of mayor in San Sebastían, on January 23, 1995, she witnessed his murder by an ETA’S command in a restaurant of this capital. At the end of 2004, she was the chairwoman of the PP in the Basque provinces. In May, 2008, after the internal crisis of the PP on having lost the general elections, she presents her resignation as chairwoman and deputy of the PP in the Basque provinces. The motives were the strong discrepancies with the ideas and forms of Mariano Rajoy’s PP.

Jose Antonio Ortega Lara was a civil servant of prisons in the penitentiary center of Logroño. At the beginning of 1996, he was kidnapped in his house of Burgos by ETA. And he remained like that, in deplorable conditions, for more than 500 days. Until he was liberated in the last minute by the Spanish Civil Guard. He retired early at the end of 1997, initiating a political career in the PP. Always, he kept a line of defense of the democratic values of the family, the unity of Spain and of his strength and of fight against the terrorists of ETA. In the crisis of the PP in spring of 2008, he announced his march from the party for his ideological differences with him. In 2014, he joined the VOX party.