THE INFANTRY FIGHTING: EAST VS WEST.

The last tens of meters up to reaching a determined enemy or gullible in his positions, form the fighting zone of the infantry. And she has yet major validity and importance in the actual wars. With the approximation to the combat from the brigade, the last global direct human possible vision of the units and resources, and the division, the western doctrines tend to be fixed in the dominant characteristics of the area and of his transitability or ground ongoing throughout the day and of the years seasons and according to the climate, to realize his plans.

But they neglect the use of the microarea at the levels of squads, teams, companions pairs and weapon servants. In the microarea, by means of the cover, the patience, the secrecy and the concealment, those «combats groups» might use against the enemy, his capacities of resistance (to the surprise), of mobility or concealed tactical «activity» (in the defense), of initiative and of freedom of action. Operating over him in minuscule «action interphases» (or microsectors). This is specially actual and necessary in the fight against regular and irregular «nobody» enemy, which lack the modern military technological advances and the economic resources to provide them. And that search for need and/or idiosyncrasy, to compensate his asymmetries with the domain of this infantry fight, seeking to see this way the white of the eyes of the enemy.

The military American Doctrine for the modern Wars.

The news that are received since years from the war operations zones in the countries in conflict, proceeding from the journalists inserted in the fighting forces, of the correspondents detached in the different populations of those (Kabul, Baghdad, Saigon, Hue) and those that the armies in presence issue, are revealing a series of characteristics that are common to the forces of the different western modern armies. They all are following the trend initiated by the Americans of having the enemy less nearby, more seen and observed and more beaten by the heavy air and artillery fire. It is not looked with this, in increasing effects order, to blind it, to disturb it, or to neutralize it, but to destroy it. That is the costliest and improbabliest of his effects and that demands an increased and deficient expense of the resources. And the worse thing is that does not always exist his direct connection with the offensive maneuvers of the ground forces. That often do not come to beating the broken enemy after the fires blows. The ground deployments are «secondary» and, therefore, also are his movements, dispersions and concentrations. The heavy fire has turned into a «economic and industrial» substitute (it changes military effort into dollars) of the maneuvers and the assaults of the ground forces. And the reason of all that is known by the poor and asymmetric enemies of West: the horror to the risk in combat and to assuming falls.

Resultado de imagen de deep battle american doctrine MONGOLS SOUGHT FOR THE ENEMY DISRUPTION, ATTACKING ITS VULNERABILITIES, PENETRATING ITS EMPTY REARWARDS, MOVING FASTER AND CREATING APPEARANCES FOR THE ENEMY.

The massive employment of the heavy fire is the principal «argument» of the Pentagon. His doctrine (Field Manual of the US Army 100-5, Operations) does not emphasize the initiative and rests in enemy reacts to the «real or potential action» from protected positions in the whole operations zone. The USA has created a ground forces with few capacity and skill in his small units for the combat in the infantry fighting zone, where more risk take the men. The trend of the doctrine looks for a formation (knowledge, education and command) and an intelligence (as elaborated, sufficient and constant information) excellent and abundant for the chiefs and officials. They are the managers of conceptualize the combat and the persons in charge of the fulfillment of the mission of his units and small units. It is supposed that the soldiers will do well and will work well, being able to use his sophisticated equipments and those of his companions of unit and fulfilling the orders of his subofficials and officials. These are supposed elaborated at the sufficient level, to give them perspective and cohesion with the intention of the high controls.

Resultado de imagen de deep battle american doctrine GOOD AGAINST A II GENERATION ARMY AND MORE CENTRALIZED THAT OURS: THAT OF SADAM HUSSEIN.

One of the operation principles that gathers strength in this renewed doctrine is that of the simultaneity. This establishes to beat at the same time, with heavy fire of artillery and aviation, the first and second enemy attack echelons and even his reserve, using against her the aviation and the tactical rocketry. The infantry and tanks forces are designed to attack or to counter-attack this now beaten enemy in all his depth and to assure the battle decision. Here does not exist the detection and the assault to the enemy weak points. Nor the «general saving» (an essential, universal and original principle of the war, according to Fuller) of means and of human lives. Nor the skilful, risky and fruitful maneuvers of functional and/or positional dislocation of the enemy. In opened area, the infantry cannot attack without indirect and/or direct heavy fire support and without concealment (night, fogs, smokes, draggings). But this complementary support has been hypertrophying, up to turning into a «weapon» for itself (as decades ago it was tried to do with the tanks) in the mix of the military resources and in one supposedly «maneuvers warfare». About which speak, but not well applied, the updates of the FM 100-5 from 1985. The such promising, already omnipresent and wished “not driven planes” of exploration and/or bombardment or «drones» are not more than the global projection in scope, safety of employment for the user and game of possibilities of the heavy fire, about which we speak. The marshall von Hindenburg designed the adage: «A battle without Schwerpunkt (the place where or the unit that applies our “principal effort”) is like a man without character». The North American army acts generally evoking a heavy, forceful mace, hammering and excessive. The Afrika Korps, by the contrary, reminded us an elegant, agile, unforseeable, (almost) sufficient and effective foil.

The Employment of a IIIrd Generation Army in the “military asymmetric” Enviroment.

The wars of fourth generation are the counterinsurgency wars or guerrilla wars or irregular wars or armed revolts or national liberation wars or organized banditry, which always have existed, coexisting with the conventional variants where only regular forces combat. They are those that the USA has lost or not won lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (Marines’ peace disembarkation, then demolished in his barrack), Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» of the tribal masters of the war and the militias of the Islamic Courts, now of al-Shabab), Iraq and Afghanistan. They are very unequal wars against an enemy of lower technological military level man relative to the own regular forces, taken root almost always in the own or occupied civil population, militarily low intense and extensive or long in the space and the time. With awkward frequency, when the human (own or local agents) or technological Americans «sensors» detect some probable rebel activity of the yellow ones, muhaydins or hostile foreigners, they first devastate the building, the «block», the zone. What for them is really a surface target. And then they are going to wipe off and to do the corpses inventory, the «body count». Sometimes between the rubbles they can meet the corpses of a yellow, blackish or innocent and numerous Muslim family. It abuses of the attrition, when the enemy fuses with the civilians. It is careless the active, unexpected patrolling work, who needs proportionally less material and human means. But that bases In the military trade, the physical and moral courage, the freedom of action and the creativity in the low and intermediate commands and in the men.

Imagen relacionada OBAMA FIRED CENTCOM GENERAL MATTIS WITHOUT A PHONE CALL.

The western soldiers have exchanged or forgotten the «principles» or rules of the good to do in the war, for the simultaneity and the depth of the distant fire, covering the whole enemy highly probable zone. With it there is neither means economy, nor principal effort, nor the necessary discrimination between soldiers and the potentially enemy civilians. The armies look eagerly for the safety and the confidence in his decisions and missions. Precisely when the environment in which they are and act in the last 5-years periods, the guerrilla or asymmetric wars, is variable, fleeting, without definite limits, confused and hard to grasp. The uncertainty, the chaos, the mistakes, the friction and the failures, the scanty means and the partially fulfilled plans, the weariness and the fear are the «omnipresent demons», that characterize and concern this neutral «magma» of the war. And it is neutral because it leaves being drive and guide largely by the human superior «plans and actions». That are stimulated by the «correct sense» of the commands, the determination, the will, the physical and moral courage, the motivations (ideological, religious, ethnic, social…), the suitable training, the sufficient equipment, the commitment with the tasks and missions and the respectable and respected commands.

Resultado de imagen de obama got away from iraq and afghanistan SOME DEADLY RECORDS.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not tacitly accepted by both American parties, that the «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military equipment) were supported and necessary, to remove of the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the fundamentalist foreign terrorism of any origin, religion or ideology. It justified the ill-fated post war bad oriented occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with a fiscal and exterior deficits ran away and with a Democrat Administration, it is necessary for the USA to save in military resources. To dedicate them «to construct a nation here, at home», as defined Obama. This way, the USA lowered qualitatively the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only one violent not national enemy. This internationalist salafist terrorist «network», with delirious and impossible ideas, without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for his forces and means of «rapid punctual incursions». This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile areas, operations of assaults by elite units and small expeditionary forces and of Marines amphibious assault. These transported by «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and specific equipment for several years in an operations theatre, they are indefinitely rejected by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense».

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE TACTICAL FACTORS AND THE MILITARY SURPRISE.

THE TACTICAL FACTORS METT-TC OF THE RECEIVED MISSION FROM THE DIRECT COMMAND.

The Mission (M) determines the employ of the surprise, because it defines the «tactical environment«, over the merely spatial component, in which this one can apply and where it will be developed. The fulfillment of the received mission will determine decisively the possibilities of conception and application of the surprise. On having defined and express that one, the goal of the multiple and convergent actions of the efforts and means assigned by the superior command to a tactical chief. The detection by the exploration or the advanced “units of action” of a possible «interface of action» favorable over the enemy, does not authorize “per se” to a command to separate from the fulfillment of the mission of the top command.

The Enemy (E) is the essential and principal aim of a command. And the surprise is a multiplier essential factor of his potentials and means, to fulfill the received mission and to contribute to it. Surprise must then to look for: the spatial or functional dislocation of the enemy; or the economic wastage of his capacities; or a more rapid and effective fulfillment of the entrusted mission; or a positional advantage for the own deployment, for own immediate maneuvers; or the decisive assault or the counterattack to the critical or secondary vulnerabilities of the enemy, according to the plan of the top command.

The Terrain (T) and, for extension, the space is the essential support of the «tactical area» of the military action. This must use it always in its own profit, both in the assault and in the defense. In the rapid maneuvers, typical of the surprises, one will prefer using the favorable area for the employed weapon, in order that it favors the pace or tempo and the impulse or moment of them.

This way, the tanks (which fighting way is the attack) will use favorably in lightly wavy grounds and with great domain by the sights, without perpendicular cuts or water currents or rocky important outcrops. Nevertheless, the complete surprise can need the employment of tanks in difficult, not impossible ground, for them, so they are not waited by the enemy. Even, using in the spear of advance fewer armored units than the usual ones, which, with the surprise, would make feel with his presence equal fire power and shock.

The grounds provided with covers and/or concealments and the night and the atmospheric phenomena or meteors (rain, snow, hail), that reduce visibility and combative disposition in the defenders, favor the movement to the combat of the units and means of the surprise. Also, they allow their temporal concealment in the decided rest and departure zones. The inconvinient and/or disagreeable grounds facilitate the final approximation of the means of the surprise: gutters, edges of the streets close to the sidewalks, vertical walls that are practicable, cultivated fields, bushes, wetlands. In exchange for inconveniences and of time in the advance, we will win in the effective employ of the surprise.

In the defense, we will use the broken ground, with concealment relative heights (CRH) and covers for the small units (urban and industrial zones); partly resting on the rear slope and in natural obstacles (rivers, trees spots, etc.) that run parallel to the tracing of the defensive position; that impede or reveal the enemy movements, breaking his impulse, and facilitate the rejection from our own favorable positions. The counterattack from the depth of our tactical zone on the reverse or the flank of the enemy spears of advance, preferably after his determination, will be a very effective employ of the surprise. The fire traps (fire bags), the dispersed and small minefields, the fire blows from the defense points and resistance nests, retained up to the close distances with the enemy, are defensive surprises, but more waited by the enemy.

Being based on the ground characteristics and paying attention to the particularities of some part of the tactical area (enemy, mission, area, opportunity) the surprise will be planned and decided. And it will implement his assembly, deployment, support and unfolding, following a sufficient, protected and constant flow.

The Troops (T) necessary to execute and fulfill the conceived and decided surprise, must be adapted for the mission by his characteristics. The surprise is an offensive action over the enemy, developed unexpected, rapid and thougtlessly, in general. The equipment of the men and the air and artillery support must be the necessary and sufficient, in conformity with the determined plan. Besides his general training, the men must receive the specific training, depending on the characteristics of the mission and the actions to develop. The characteristics of obedience and initiative, patience, resistance and sobriety, physical qualities, enthusiasm and spirit of group, commitment with the mission, must be the best in the men. As they will be an important part of the actions. And they will act as chiefs and persons in charge of themselves and of his mission companions, in certain moments.

It is important a complete real time training of the mission. There are devices that fail at the X hours of use. The tension on the men and his sustained efforts affect their comfort and their efficiency and rapidity of action. With repercussions in his combative disposition, his alert and the precision of answers.

Often the heavy fire will be used to conceal the enemy from our surprise. The coordination of different weapon in the same mission or sector, is a critical point of it. For example, units of infantry, reinforced by some squads of engineers and supported by a few tanks sections, crossing a thick forest to surprisingly reach an enemy important position in the depth of his deployment. Acting in the same sector of advance or assault, the coordination between the small units must be tested and confirmed.

The Time (T) of the mission is a decisive factor of his success. On one hand, it must be the opportune one. For other part, the time must be enough and accelerated uniformly in the «successive cycles of action» of the development of the mission. In order that the concentration, the sequence or the simultaneity of employs and the forcefulness of our actions demolish the enemy human aim at which they are applied, once gotten the surprise.

It is necessary to consider always that all the actions need to happen an estimated planned time plus a complementary corrector time. This will depend on the degree of complexity of the mission: units, logistic support, demonstrative helping actions, crossing distances, passage difficulties, presence and intention of the enemy, simultaneity or sequence of employs, coordination. And it originates in the failures that arise in all the human activities and in the small and medium mistakes that are committed by the commands and men. Some call these the tactical friction of war. A serious mistake would suppose that the surprise was badly calculated or executed and it is an operational serious mistake.

The civilians (C) must not be damaged in a surprising mission. Even when the enemy mixes and protects in a civil area, it is possible to define and to make concrete a purely military aim. To isolate, attack and extirpate it with military accurate and mopping-up. Here is necessary the employ of the organic weapon of the ground attacking unit, which limit the not wished hurts and make concrete his effects in the selected targets.

The heavy indiscriminate air and artillery fire is a weapon of merciless and spread results for the employ in urban areas. His aim is not to blind, to disturb or to neutralize the enemy. The excessive and insistent heavy fire seek to destroy it. That is the more uncertain and less economic goal of all. Both the Soviets and the western allieds have used it with profusion in the civil wars of the Southwest of Asia. His use has as goal to destroy from far off and before to the assault, the enemy positions in the villages. Avoiding as much as possible that the own ground forces fight at close distances with the islamist rebels.

THE MILITARY SURPRISE AS ART AND HETERODOXY

Almost all the technologies, tactics and operations directed to obtaining the tactical or operational surprise over the enemy, can be benevolent considered at the edge of the regulations and existing procedure. That are practised in the different countries and groups of them or supranational alliances.

Between other reasons, to fight only according to the «book» is usually too much acquaintance and predictable. In addition, many of the general «knowledge» gathered in them are shared by different blocs and nations, even antagonistic. And it is necessary, to respect the regulations and ordinances and to look for the aim indicated by the command, as the goal to obtaining.

But the creative and decisive action must follow the one that we call the «way of the surprise«. As guide, compass, of our decisions and actions. Looking for that fleeting and juicy opportunity that arises in the development of the mutual actions between the armed rivals; those careless or vulnerable enemy weaknesses, in conditions that we can create sometimes, equally more unforeseen and unusual. To obtain our goals with more forcefulness, efficiency, elegance and rapidity. Achieving it with fewer loss of time, of men and of means. Let’s remember the basic and universal principle of the economy of the means.

Sure that following always the «book» they will be able to approach and to take to good term the common operations. But, apart from the fact that the enemy has an essentially equal doctrine and regulations, a way of fighting will be first known and then learned or dominated and, probably, up to overcome finally by the enemy. The triumphant Germans in the first period 1939-1941, with the extension of the war, allowed the knowledge and the learning of his war of combined weapon by his enemies. That finally overcame them in technologies, tactics and operations and drove them to their thunderous defeat in 1945.

And this «guide» is of special need and affection in the bureaucratized and crystallized armies. Where the unforseeable, not guilty failures, are not only a contingency to be overcame by the set. But they can be also an administrative or political weapon against the persons in charge. And where the follow-up of the «book» and the superiors orders to the letter, armour and protect the low commands of the responsibility of their acts and results.

Martin Van Creveld said that was the anteroom, before the final unworkability and prostration, of «the military organizations that were not getting up-to-date and renewing». Martin Van Creveld was expelled as lecturer, many years ago, from Israel’s Military High College.

Then, the results will be obtained increasingly at the cost of the wear and the men means and materials losses. Tending to triumph then the rival that more demographic and economic capacity has.

There arises then a corollary of this way of thinking the military thing. The zeal to avoid human falls, extended to all the modern armies or of IIIrd generation, will lead to the preventive, protective and therapeutic employment of the own heavy fire. Looking that the own forces do not have to fight at close ranges. This is called military modern technology and is highly regarded by the national armament industries. This is not more than the perversion and trick of the heavy fire. Whose functions or tasks, in increasing order of action and efficiency, are: to blind, to disturb, to neutralize or cover and to destroy the enemy in the different fighting forms and situations.

And the action over the aim will tend to the physical destruction, as guarantee of the security of the men. In the actual civil wars in Iraq and Syria, we have the examples in the exagerate and methodical bombardments on the enemies. Armed and civilians; real and suspects.

The Military surprise, looking for the enemy dislocation and shock

During his operations, the enemy deployment is conforming in the direction and with the intention that he has decided and determined, for his military echeloned means and for his logistic routes. This way, he is showing his «cards» to his rival, depending on his action tempo and he is commiting, according to those.

Our surprise can create «per se» a new «exposed flank«, another more or less critical «vulnerability» in the enemy. That he was not considering yet, that he was not waiting, nor was prepared to defend her by some of the fighting forms. That are the attack and the defense, in their varieties and combinations.

Our surprise «penetrates» in the enemy deployment, seeking to shock and dislocate functionally or positionally it. And, at least, to cause him losses, to occupy profitable positions for our operational development, to diminish his tempo or operational pace and to confuse, delay and disturb him in his plans and deployments. Using for it, by our part, the minimal means expense and seeking to achieve the maximum possible effect on the enemy. With which we optimize the effort of our actions, following the general principle of the economy of the available means.

When the enemy reacts, to offset and overcome the effect of our surprising action, he is adapting necessarily to our intention. And, if that one is serious, he moves away more or less from his interests and plans. With his reacting movements for the rejection and the attack to our forces, the enemy is disregarding his intention and his mission. In relation to these, the enemy is removed from them and also unbalanced. This way, a right conceived, planned and realized surprise can «prepare» the enemy for us. So, he face in disadvantage, with fewer available resources and a worse deployment, our offensive principal action. That would be already more direct, massive and orthodox.

In such a way that exist a whole range of possible effects to obtaining over the enemy with our surprising actions. That will change also according to the means destined to obtain our surprise, the conception, the preparation and the accomplishment of it and the available time, considering also the set of our operations.

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. (SECOND PART).

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

 

(CONTINUATION)

 

Results of the German counterattack and its trascendence.

Nevertheless, the booty gained was scanty. Von Manstein declared that there were approximately 23,000 dead Soviet soldiers and 9,000 captured Soviet soldiers. The materiel captured were approximately 615 tanks (probably largely recovered), 354 campaign guns, 69 anti-aircraft pieces and more than 600 machine guns and mortars. It was not possible to encircle the enemy and Soviet soldiers took advantage of this by leaving the heavy equipment and retreating. Von Manstein said that, because the extreme cold, his soldiers were bunched into small, tight groups, leaving wide spaces and lines in his rearguard, without effective cover. This partly happened because they were elite troops and because the war was without mercy.

COLONEL JOHN BOYD, AN AMERICAN TEORIST OF ITS MANEUVER THEORY.

At the beginning of March, 48th panzer Corps pressed toward the east of Kharkov and the SS panzer corps of General Halder was entrusted with recovering the long-suffering city for the Germans.

At the middle of the month, the Germans had a defensive resistant front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported on the Mius and the Donetz. They also possessed in the south of Russia sufficient mobile reserves to push back possible Soviet operational breaks in the zone.

As late as 1944, the Soviets had 26 tanks Corps and 11 mechanized Corps. Part of them joined together to form 6 tanks Armies. Each of which had two tanks corps and a mechanized corps (bigger and more balanced inn infantry and artillery). Some mechanized Corps joined a cavalry Corps, forming a great unit similar in capacity to the tanks Army but with fewer armored vehicles and more mobility in areas of difficult transitability (marshes, mountains, woods). These were used to exploit the break in the swampy areas of the south of the Soviet Union, as that of the Pripet river in the north of Ucrania. Although never coexisted more than two or three in the order of battle of the Soviet Army.

WILLIAM LIND, A CIVIL TEORIST.

The destruction of 6 tanks Corps of the Southwest Front (especially equipped with mobile forces) and dismantled them from their “support masses, was an especially prominent, profitable and low cost operation for the Germans.

In addition, in its advance toward Kharkov between March 1st and 5th, the SS and 48º panzer Corps smashed from its flank and rearguard the Soviet 3rd tanks Army, led by general Pavel Semjonovic Ribalko. This Army was launched to relieve the forces of 6th infantry Army and had continued advancing toward Kharkov. This city that was by then, attracting all the attention and efforts from both sides.

As poor results and large losses mounted for the mobile Soviet forces, pessimism also grew in Stalin, who asked Sweden to mediate in seeking a solution to the war with Germany.

Nevertheless, the advance on Belgorod, outlining Kursk’s projection inside the territory occupied by Germany, sealed the aim for Germanys strategic summer Campaign. After all these events had passed, the strategic initiative returned to the Germans at the level of the theatre of operations.

But, beginning on July 5, delayed in relation with the victories of Von Manstein, their action gave the Soviets time to extensively strengthen themselves, to establishfortified regions” at the front level, and to assemble and organize a powerful counterattack force in the north and south of the projection. The allied landing in Sicily on the 10th of July, aborted the Wehrmachts already disastrous Operation Citadel. The Germans would never recover the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL DONN STARRY, HIGH COMMAND OF THE U.S. ARMY’S TRADOC.

Was it possible to avoid what happened to the Popov group and, thus, to the Soviets strategic plans for its 1942 winter campaign and to the Soviets strategic initiative, at least in the Southern theatre of the Soviet Union?

It was possible.

We have observed, in parallel and in a very second plane with some key facts, the getting absorbed (to get very much in), the delight (to be delighted with) and the fixation (to do without other rational arguments) of Stalin, in relation with the results that he promised himself with the impelled operations by the mobile corps of the Southwest Front of general Vatutin.

General Vatutin, one of the best field chiefs of the Soviet army, died before his time at hands of Ukrainian (anti-Soviet) guerrillas, only participated in this in a minor degree. Still, the delegate of the Stavka in charge of these crucial operations (Zhukov, Vasilevsky?) remembered him the transcendence that for the Supreme Commander and for the Soviet people they had.

A little time ago, Hitler also fixated on Stalingrad. This fixation led him to squander the capacity of his best Great Unit (the 6th infantry Army of general Paulus—yes, without the aristocratic Von) in a street struggle and a force-to-force confrontation. Their enemies were arranged on a static defense. A position that they were better able to defend and maintain than were the Germans, in the gigantic steel and cement fortress that was Stalingrad.Fight in which was not counting the German superb capacity of operational movement, which reduced the effort done to a confrontation between man vs. man and machine against machine. And, thus, causing a terrible attrition to the combat and movement capacities.

We can discuss about the strategic mistakes of high chiefs. As the line of communications (branched out) is so crucial, it is necessary to protect it adequately. But this fact is obscured and blurred by the desires of commanders.

What are the possibilities of defense for the advance sector that contains the communications line?

Independently of the advance deployment of mobile groups and their support mass (which must include the securities elements adapted for marches in enemy areas), «advanced detachments» must be brought forward.

These will be integrated by 15-30 % of the forces that bring them forward and will possess sufficient operational movement and combat capacities. The time it takes for the main group to join them is a function of the transitability of the terrain and of the capacities and intentions of the enemy in the operations zone. Its mission in defensive operations is to be used asstable hinges” between the deployments of Great units, facilitating and protecting the movement of forces and supplies between them.

If the mass of support is too slow for the mobile group to continue advancing at a reasonable rate, it will end up lengthening dangerously the distance between the units and their support. This situation is very vulnerable to a mobile assault by the enemy from the depth of his zone and the sector of advance would be under threat of being cut, depending on the means and intentions of the enemy. This probability would require that amechanized group” be placed between the mass of support and the mobile group to reduce the distance between all three deployments and reducing reaction times to respond to a crisis. This would reasonably stabilize the sector of advance after the mobile group.

The mission of the mechanized group, which has less capacity for operational movement than the mobile group, will be to carried out thesector mobile defense”. And will last until the forces of the mass of support arrive to relieve it. The anti-aircraft and antitank defense plan, the centralization of reserves and the defense of key points of the area, by means ofdelay positions” and together with necessary heavy fire support, will be characteristic of the fight to stabilize the sector.

That is to say, it is necessary to sacrifice speed for safety to consolidate the stability of the sector of advance in enemy territory. A territory that does not need to be all occupied in force. Because would be defended by a mobile defense for a limited period of time. Taking disproportionate risks would be reckless and would put men, materiel and the operation in danger.

But, men (in this case, Hitler and Stalin are two examples) continue to make mistakes when faced with such circumstances

THE END.

WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE.

Introduction.

The appearance of the IT treatment of the information supposed a revolution in the capture, production and transmission of the existing or caught information. Whose possibilities and transcendency are still far from know, even in his scope and his limits. The information generated in a battlefield or an operations theatre of is enormous, ephemeral in diverse times, almost immeasurably and fluid. The latter quality is fundamental for the production of the intelligence. That is the information caught by the units and sensors of all kinds and that is digested or prepared by the specific organs (G2, S2 and agencies of intelligence), to create a sufficient, effective, opportune and constant intelligence. That is used by the «advanced users» or commands in the different levels of military action (tactical, operative and strategic).

Since it could not be otherwise, in view of the brief exposed scheme, the IT industry soon found an enormous area of activity and possibilities in the military field. And the high military commands, often in «ad hoc» prepared meetings and coctails, received from the manager directors and chairmen of the branch corporations, animated, brief and exciting presentations of the enormous performances that might give to their units of all the branches, the designed, elaborated and installed softwares and hardwares by these vanguard technical companies. The battlefield or the operations zone (the area, the enemy and I), known, conveyed and controlled in real time by my men!!!

The Support of the military Information Systems.

It is not the case that these new technologies allow to elaborate a complex and integrated weapon system. This already existed before the information age and the electronic existing advances allowed his creation. For example, the AEGIS defense system for ships against aircraft, warships, missiles and submarines was designed, created and installed for the first time in 1973. It is equiped by destroyers and even frigates (in a simpler model) of the USA and his allied nations. And this way they are called the «shields or defenders of the Fleet». In effect, every «naval group» centred and escorting an aircraft carrier and every «naval combined force of strategic projection», rely on several ships provided with the AEGIS system. This consists of a powerful radar of several megawatts of power, capable of catching and continuing up around 200 potential targets, placed at distances of up to 350 km to the installed system.

The caught information goes to a computer center that reports to a decision center. Which arranges the launches of missiles depending on the mission of the group or naval force and the estimated danger generated for him by the target. The system is installed in front of the armoured control center of the ship. That gives the final permission for the launch of the missiles. These are arranged in rows of vertical silos (habitually, are four with 4 missiles each one) placed in the front cover, in the part that was occupying the conventional artillery. The silos are re-fed from the interior of the ship with other missiles after the launches. The missiles are propeled by solid fuel, which allows that they should be smaller than the land launched. And the adjustment of the system is studied for the destruction of the enemy ballistic missiles.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age

The activities that the military men realize in action in front the enemy are numerous, varied and some of them are complex. And all of them demand a sufficient attention from the controls and men. Let us see some of the most significant. Regarding the movement in the ground: to advance, to stop and to move back; so much running as walking, crawling or incorporated, and doing it by jumps or in zig zag. Regarding placing and valueing the environment, hostile or not: to observe, to detect, to process, to decide, to transmit or not the results and to act. Regarding the form of fight (rejection or attack): to hide, to cover and to be protected, to change position, to define well evasive detected targets, to receive the orders of the immediate chief, to attack them with deliberate, rapid, etc. fire, (if it is a question of an infantry). Regarding the communication with his “group” (team, weapon, squad, section): to receive orders and information, to send information and orders, to spread information. And they carry out all this under the uncertainty, the lack of comfort, the tension, the loneliness, even of his companion or buddy, and the fear … The constant and repeated sometimes audio-visual information, that is communicated by the modern digital systems can relieve this physical and psychic load of the soldiers? So to achieve it, would really be of great help for them.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age ARE THEY LOOKING, DECIDING OR FIGHTING?

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age IS IT USEFUL HERE?

To all that, it could join a flood of information, insignificant in this moment for his mission or his immediate action. This can generate an increase of the needs of the attention capacities of the military men. Through the more important senses, the sight and the ear. And to originate a diversion of his effective available attention (if there is), towards external not fundamental or neutral stimuli of the images and the conversations. The system is going to transmit them a clearer and detailed information of the targets, even defining some more ephemeral or veiled. But it will not give them information about the intentions and the mental conditions of the different located enemies and their group. Though the system is served with probabilities, previous experiences, alogarithms and reliable estimations…

A practical Application.

In the new model of fighting, the attacking force would be kept simultaneously dispersed, communicated and informed in real time and looking for and attacking the enemy. It would be the supposed advantages of the swarm and his concentric and simultaneous assault, which would count now with the knowledge of the ground and the enemy, thanks to the multiple sensors and systems and the real, caught and transmitted information (not intelligence) to the units of the force.

Are similar in capacity all the units of the force? Then we are demanding from them that each one acts as a «polyvalent» fraction of the unit, without specializing them. With what they will probably have some specific, quantitatively insufficient capacities. Are specialized the units of the force? Then they will have to rely on the simultaneous concurrence, in the defense and the attack, of several units. That should complement between all the necessary functions of this tasks «group». And if the enemy electromagnetic countermeasures work against the wireless communications and is established a communications «silence»? And if we now do not have the telephony circular network of the unit and do not possess double couriers for the transmission of “parts and orders” to the chief and from the chief?

And if the enemy deploys in the same way as us? So we would come to a general clash of weak individual forces against enemies weak forces individual. As the great units spread out for his fighting form. Clash that would be solved by multiple partial and isolate combats, using the attrition. They would be like the singular combats of champions and leaders, which happened in other times. And would gain those who were finally keeping a major number of valid units. It would be a clash won by pure material wear of means: men, military means and expensive and sophisticated IT material, almost without transcendent application.

THE WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. Second Part.

(CONTINUATION)

 

Operational Characteristics of the Attacks with Elite Ground Forces.

Units and small units that attack with limited aims (a deep incursion, the temporal capture of a critical position, an ambush) constitute a military closed «system». This condition imposes specific characteristics on the “interfaces of action” with the enemy, which are sometimes different to those of great units, especially in the theme of available means and the time of action.

Attacks with limited aims have been operationally used along large fronts. Where the enemy’s defense lacked depth and enough reserves and was looking to minimize own wear and make use of the multiplier effect of the set’s efforts. This occurred with notable success when the forces of the 9th German infantry Army of General Model sought to reform and consolidate its fronts in the Sychevka’s southwest zone between January and April of 1942.

The definitive characteristic of his use, adapted in these tasks, is that is used with criterion unity, by a kept and «concentric» in the result of his impulses “operational gravity center”. So that the limited efforts do not vanish in reconnaissance in force actions, in not suitable or out of opportunity sectors. It is to say, usiing unduly.

The field of action is the secret for applying freedom of action. By extending or decreasing the field of action, or by changing the field of action on the enemy, one can keep or recover the necessary freedom of action to act favorably and not simply reacting to the enemy.

«Field of action» is any «spatial-temporary-circumstantial» situation that allows for the suitable employment of an Army’s means and capacities in accordance or as part of that army’s intention. The field of action is formed by one or several «interfaces of action«, which are the very small sectors where direct contact occurs between the small units of action of each rival. Examples are when a deployed platoon attacks an enemy section, when a tank attacks infantry heavy weapons, when a section attacks by firing on an enemy’s strong position, when an engineering section opens a path in a minefield, etc.

The task is to find an optimal way in which, through successive «periods of action» applied in «fields or interfaces of action», one can gain the relative freedom of action to act and to carry out «quantum» or elementary units of the general intention. In addition, a general action can be divided into numerous partial actions to achieve in stages, momentary or minor «periods of action»; acting this way in the same «field», divided in minor interfaces of action.

Interaction in stages and situations suitable to advance one’s military means guided by the superior intention or orders is the general mechanism for applying, recovering and maintaining freedom of action in one’s favor.

A characteristic of the freedom of action is that is interactive with the enemy in the «interface of action» and is played out in fields of action that chosen by or imposed on an army. Passiveness means that freedom of action is not taken advantage of through lack of initiative. Thus, freedom of action can also have a result opposite to its intention and this can happen regardless of the type of fight engaged in, whether it is offensive or defensive.

The units had to gain combat superiority over the enemy, since obtaining a local and temporary supremacy would allow them to achieve their aims.

Essential to the mission’s conception are intelligence and simplicity. Essential to its preparation are security and training. The characteristics of the mission in action are surprise, tempo and the commitment of all the mission participants.

Simplicity allows the force to concentrate on a few related aims, using a limited number of men and means in the military closed system. If new tactics or different technologies are used, both the simplicity of the mission’s conception and the surprise of its execution will be enhanced.

On September 12, 1943, the captain of the S. S. Otto Skorzeny carried out the rescue of the Duce from his prison in the high mountain hotel Great Sasso located in the Apennines. Gliders were used to assault the position, fighting against the difficult cold draughts (these produced a delay in the arrival, as they landed at midday) and scarce sites for landing. That such a difficult assault would be attempted, higly surprised the on duty «carabinieri». The attackers took advantage of this by gaining access to the principal building while. At the same time, an acquaintance general of the «carabinieri» friendly landed with Skorzeny. Combat supremacy was rapidly achieved.

Intelligence supposes complete, up-to-date and timely knowledge of the circumstances and characteristics of the mission. Here, with so limited employing means, intelligence is facilitated by different agencies and units that intervene with the mission, even those at the level of the state. Specially the CIA, the National Security Agency or NSA, the Central Security Service or CSS, that links with the NSA, and the FBI.

Security refers principally to the stages of planning, preparation, training and, if appropriate, stage of transport or insertion. It has active and passive aspects. Giving off misleading information and concealing the force’s real intentions up until the stage of action on the objective. Each person must only know what is necessary for his actuation.

Training must be generic for actions and tactics and specific for those actions required for the mission. Independently of this, training is necessary to achieve coordinated actions among units taking part simultaneously in some part of the mission. A general rehearsal of the mission is also necessary, including its planning duration and margins for mistakes. It is also good to include some variant that represents a mistake, an unforeseen event or a loss of combat or movement capacity. And that the men train in correcting them or, at least, in neutralizing them with his effort. For example, a part of the helicopters is knocked down or lands at major distance of the foreseen in the theoretical disembarkation zone.

The final «training area» must be similar in general characteristics to the «target area». And it must be placed at safe of detections and filtrations of information (security), which onlookers and interested persons can catch. The independent variable of «time» introduces sometimes unexpected and not always welcome effects. For example, a vehicle presents problems after a number of hours of hard use, that was not foreseen in tests of «at scale» time.

Surprise supposes attacking an enemy (even if arranged in prepared defense) at a point or flank that is neglected by him at the moment, giving the attacker a favorable «interface of action» on him. It must suppose a “tactical innovation”. Though it could also contain technical differential or new elements. Examples of such “innovations” in the past are hollow load bullets or charges and flame-throwers.

The surprise is the sufficient and necessary multiplier of the combat capacity of the «small incursion force». That will allow him to compensate the scanty military resources that it has on the area. To it joins his inconsiderate and carefully applied with rapidity employment. To provoke an overwhelming effect on the enemy, achieving the temporary local superiority. As being an «isolated military system», the incursion force of will receive neither reinforcements, nor supplies. For its part, the time is not neutral, here is an enemy: because there is not more operation time. From his depletion, the unit will confront the pursuit and his annihilation…

Speed consists in firmnessly acting, ahead of the enemy, in the successive elementary «cycles of action» that define a performance or process. It also presupposes acting with opportunities and with pace (adapted speed, relative to the enemy). Remember that an action cycle includes a phase of observation, a phase of determining the situation, the decision phase and the accomplishment phase. If one’s speed is greater than that of the enemy, his actions will be in response to situations that have already just passed.

Speed also implies rapidly reaching a situation of active supremacy in combat capacity. The enemy’s reaction speed is initially very slow as he is in a stupor, trying to verify what is happening. This means his phase of determining the situation will be lengthened. Deceptive action in these moments will lengthen the time that passes and fog the determination of the situation. Ways of doing this include utilizing some of the enemy’s uniforms, equipment or language by certain parts or subunits involved in the action. Once supremacy over the enemy is attained, it must always be kept. As scanty resources make its recovery very difficult. Once supremacy in combat capacity is reached, the probability of a mission’s success increases exponentially and the vulnerabilities of one’s forces are dramatically diminished.

The commitment of men and officers and their selection qualities, lend moral and physical courage to the actions they undertake. This is necessary to overcome uncertainty, stress, mistakes, diversions, enemy actions, and to take advantage of the always fleeting opportunities. Commitment supposes full knowledge of the mission and the full, voluntary and enthusiastic support of all participants.

Execution is carried out by establishing at the level of the regiment, battalion or company a center of gravity for the common effort, which harmonizes and consolidates the «missions» of its subunits.

THE END.

THE WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS.

The global war against the organized terrorism, proclaimed by the president Bush after September 11, 2001, has gone flat. And with it, the military strategy of attacking the many-colored islamist jihadism, always threatening, in his nests and in his infected areas. Without existed for them neither bases, nor sure refuges in the world. Seeking to suffocate this certain, threatening, watched and already long-suffering danger. And to remove it from home, from the territory of the USA. Mr. Obama qualitatively and substantially cut down in 2011, the antiterrorist aims in the exterior American politics.

The new National Strategy of the USA.

For it, the Stategic Plan establishes aims more political than military in the Islamic Central Asia. «This one has been a difficult decade for our country. (Now) we can be glad to know that the pressure of the war is yielding». Is admitted that the Americans are not capable of «leave a perfect Afghanistan». Neither the western democracy is perfect. But it is comparatively the least unjust of the political known systems. And, due regulated by the play of the public powers and the honesty of his agents, it was the one that allowed the advent of the middle, numerous, polite, laborious and progressive classes. This way, they bet for the political negotiation with the moderate Taliban, to lower the activity of the armed groups. Bringing over the possibilities of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. But the major premise fails. The moderate Taliban do not exist. This name is disgusting to the logic. Since it is a contradiction in the used terms. Like the «negative growth», of which some politicians speak to us. The Taliban apply rigorously the sharia. That are the civil laws and penal social derivatives of the literal and rigid application of the Koran and Sunna or tradition, in the profane matters. And they impose it by the force. And with a foreign yielding enemy, without firm convictions, with internal contradictions; why the Taliban are going to negotiate, having the victory already smelling them as the aromatic flowers of Allah’s garden?

Obama proclaims, with fiscal and exterior deficits running away, the need to save in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, he qualitatively lowers the strip of the exterior terror. Putting the Base (al-Qaeda) and the IS as the violent not national enemies of the USA. The salafista internationalist terrorists with his known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, operational chiefs, is a more attainable and manageable aim for the schemes, the budgets and the aspirations of the «diminishing American defense». And it stays within range of the actions: of the CIA and of the Pentagon’s flaming spies; of the not crewed airplanes (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) of reconnaissance and atack; of the military punctual actions of the elite forces of the Pentagon; of the assaults of small expeditionary forces and/or of amphibious assault of the Marines, transported in «control and/or transport warships» with his naval escort; of the penetration of the terrorist groups or, at least, the approximation, the observation and the information, by local related elements, paid by the espionage of the USA. The deployments of tens of thousands of American soldiers and their complex equipment and specific supply for several years in a theatre of operations, are indefinitely rejected by the new «doctrine». The American people infected with the adherent and complex economic crisis, with the lack of political effective control, with the costs of the wars against the terror (it speaks about 1,6 $ trillions – not thousand millions – spent till now in Iraq and Afghanistan and around $60 million per month en the deployment of Libia, without taling part in offensive actions), is tired of the exterior actions and constantly reflects it in the surveys. As in the old times, in other national crises, a country that is almost a continent, partially withdraws towards himself.

The Need of a new formal and international “Legal Setting».

The laws give juridical character and institutionalizing for what the needs, the customs and, finally, the social norms have been looking and establishing in the evolution of the societies. There does not exist in the History an example similar to the operational, legal and institutional picture that that pose the USA and the islamist violent rebels in their antagonistic armed dialectic by the whole global world. Therefore, almost all the laws of the countries where develop episodes of this war, the international laws in use and the social existing norms, lack practical meaning and aptitude to establish an operational sufficient frame for this warlike conflict. Both great conflicting rivals use more or less freely the whole world bullring, included the space, as local «fields of action» to realize all kinds of operations against his enemy, his allies and his means and properties.

The real terms of application of this violent dialectics are changed, are new or different: total internationalization of the warlike scene. Will mention some of the significant or more known: the borders and the operations strips or sectors are diluted or are not significant in these. The operations precede and mark the combats or small battles. Violent, dispersed, slightly decisive, unexpected, discontinuous in the time actions; which obtain their transcendence by accumulation, not by successive or simultaneous concatenation. There take place large movements of units or small units in very short time. Great concentrated and rapid firepower capacity used by the rivals: the explosive vehicles manage to have the demolition capacity of a “smash block bomb”. The employment of these small units, which do not constitute a «useful target», protects them from the enemy heavy support fire. The digital capacities of the wireless communications and of the treatment and custody of the information are a new weapon in the fighting field for the sensitive information. This has taken the enemy to the employment of old means, which were put away: couriers, manuscript or typewritten reports, heads of local reports, which successively deliver the orders, etc. Qualitative increase of the importance of the dissimulation, concealment, disguise, mishap and enemy disinformation capacities.

This demands the creation of a new legal and normative frame, which gathers and regulates the new warlike conditions that are appearing, they are maturing and are developing since several decades. And everything, having a sufficient vision of future, in order that the evolution of the rivals and of the circumstances and the events do not invalidate the legal and moral means, at not much time of being defined and accepting by a majority of countries and persons. Because, the agents and the units and the reconnaissance means cross and will constantly cross the space and/or the territory of the rivals and of numerous foreign countries in their conflict. Because, the enraged contenders will continue skipping the borders, to realize their harassment punctual actions. They are of harassment because they suppose the destruction and/or the punctual abduction of persons and/or units. Without with them the operational capacity is significantly altered in the theatre or area.

The Use of Drones in the War against the Islamic Terrorists.

The drones are used in the irregular war in reconnaissance tasks and follow-up and in assault actions against small targets. The US Air Force of the Pentagon has more than 1300 pilots of drones, being employed at 13 air bases of the USA. And calculates that at end of 2015, will have around 2000 pilots of drones. Already she is training more pilots for remote-controlled planes that for the conventional flights: around 350 in 2011. From 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters, to pass to learn to direct a drone. The equipment in the air base for the guide and control of the drones is very simple and highly elaborated: the control or helm of the drones, several television screens, surrounded with numerous auxiliar visual indicators and controls and a pedal. Everything arranged in pairs in front to both ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit in live time their sights to his pilots. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the camera controller of the, which form a «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during long time, verifying his environment and his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, the possibility of not wished human hurts («collateral damages») was minimal. The plane is capable of, once caught and authorized by the pilots an aim to beating, initiating by itself the assault, but this function has never allowed it.

The reconnaissance of the enemy and his exact location, both units and commands and local chiefs, and the recognition of the operations area is an old dream of the commands of all the times, to free themselves of part of their dreads and uncertainties. Because the modern maneuvers, even at the close distances, are changeable and plastic for the rivals commands. If we add the possibility of a constant follow-up of that one, this is “honey on small leaves of cereal”. In these tasks, the capacities of the drones allow his deep insertion in the enemy territory, without any danger for the reconnaissance specialized own forces and a clear, fluid and effective transmission of the results that they catch. It might say that they are a weapon designed with fortune to fulfill the opportune missions, if his employment is reasonable, controlled and shown restraint.

Because, the use of «not crewed planes» in reconnaissance missions of the enemy, raises a problem of difficult solution for the Americans Intelligence agencies and the Pentagon. Is thought that only the CIA can be receiving daily near 2000 photographies and 2000 hours of recordings of video from his spìes «drones». And all this nonsense informative, this undue plethora of images, only can drive to the clogging of the transmission, processing and valuation channels of the information. And to the tedium and disorientation of the intermediate commands. All this, though are used powerful computers and «key images and signs» to discriminate them in the process of selection. This result only can drive to a few routine and shallow analyses in «importance content» and to a profusion of non asked reports.

That they would be late years in turning in real intelligence, because here it is necessary to think for it. That one is the confirmed and valued information for the different operational and strategic controls. That clear and sufficiently orientates them of a situation, of his probable evolutions and changes and of the own possibilities of action, in agreement with the military strategy and the operational one or the received mission. With the abuse, already it is not a question of «obtain relevant and sufficient information». But the information that is obtained is overflowing, relarge and indigestible. And it is an information that poisons and disorients all. The essential and decisive criterion, is that the efforts go to the sectors and the most sensitive and important aims of the complicated process of the massive espionage. Which allows to discriminate the gathered information with unit of criterion and respecting the Universal war principle of the saving of the means. And that, continuing proven and effective alogaritms, other aims and neutral topics are chosen and sift with a given periodicity.

The destructive capacity of the explosive charges that carry the not driven assault plane is limited in his number and in his total power. The essential characteristic of his use is that is destined to limited goals, well in his size (a small number of not very spread enemies) or in his protection (not fortified targets). Nevertheless, they are useful to beat combat armoured vehicles, included the main battle tanks, with his hollow load missiles, which attack them in their vulnerable parts or zones (tracks, roofs).

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE.

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

 

 

A little known example illustrates the omnipresent transcendence of logistics and the line of communication (more or less branched out) in operations and their final results. Between January 29 and mid-March 1943, the Soviets developed an operation called Donbass at the southwest of the Donetz. This operation forms part of what the Germans called the battle of the Donetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.

 

General Nikolai Fiodorovich Vatutin, commander of the Southwest Front, created a mobile corp (under the command of general Markian Mijailovich Popov) in the Soviet Front, to exploit the break its armies had achieved at the south-east of Kharkov. The Corp was like an Army of tanks (the Soviets had five Armies of tanks in their battle order). It was integrated by 4 tanks Corps of limited capacity (3rd, 10th, 18th and 4th of the Guard), each of which was reinforced by an infantry mobile division (in trucks). For support it had the mobile Front reserve, the tanks Corps (full up) 25th and 1st of the Guard. These reserves would, at the beginning of February, pursue a exploitation direction different from that of the Popov Group. Assimilating those tactical subordination divisions into the mechanized Corps, thus making them stronger in men and heavy equipment, was hoped to compensate for the specific lack of infantry and artillery of the Soviet tanks Corps.

GENERAL VATUTIN.

Popov Group initially crossed the Donetz from a southwest direction. Its 4th Guard tanks Corp reached Krasnoarmeiskaia on the morning of February 12, after a night march of 60 kilometers from Kramatorsk. During this march, the Corp used one of its tanks brigades, the 14ª of the Guard, as anadvanced detachment”, to eliminate the tactical rubbing” in its advance sector and thus maximize its speed of advance.

GENERAL POPOV.

On February 15, General Vatutin employed his two reserve Corps in the Pavlograd-Zaporozhe direction, towards the mouth of the river Dnepr on the Black Sea. Zaporozhe was the Headquarters for the Don German Group of Armies (this Group had been called South until February 1, 1943) and the 4th Air Fleet (led by Marshal Von Manstein and General Von Richtofen, respectively) which were located in the low Dnepr.

The efforts of the Russians were aimed at trying to reach the coast and to cut the Germansland communications. But the Russians also stubbornly insisted on boasting. Their supporting forces (the rest of the Armies of the southwest Front, especially the 6th infantry and 1st infantry of the Guard) were not defending the advance sectors of their mobile forces. And these forces, advancing as fast as they could toward their ideal operational-strategic aim, stretched their communications lines to the maximum. And made them increasingly vulnerable by extending its length and, thus, the coverage required by antitank and anti-aircraft weapons supported with infantry.

The Soviets acted as if the speed of reaching the objective could, by itself, unhinge the German deployment, by cutting it off from its general Order of Battle and lines of communications towards the West. In reality, they were not given full credit to their enemys maneuver capacity, his ability to create and improvise resources and his still relatively powerful combat capacities, especially among his mobile and crack forces, in the operational zone.

THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMANDER.

Yet much of the pressure for a rapid advance came from Stalin. Probably through the Stavka, Stalin incited Vatutin to spur on Popov and the other mobile corps. Ultimately, this led to Stalins disenchantment (to the point of leading him to request a peace through Swedish diplomats) when the planned operations concluded. See Gerhard L. Weinburg. A World at Arms. Cambridge, 1944.

For their part, the Germans had difficulties in containing the Soviets winter offensive concentrated at the south of Belgorod. In the operational strategic zone of the Don Group of Armies, the Soviet forces overcame the Germans at a proportion of 8 to 1, whereas, in the case of the German Center and North Groups of Armies, that ratio was only 4 to 1.

Von Manstein maintained a front that was 750 kilometers long with 30 divisions. This left him vulnerable to envelopment on the north flank, in a maneuver that could reverse his front or turn his forces back in his operational or strategic rear. Or his forces could be broken through by a forceful action in any zone and he would be left without sufficient available mobile forces to launch an operational strategic counterattack. It was necessary to readjust the front, anchoring it on natural obstacles; and to push back the Soviet offensives toward Kiev (north flank) and the Black Sea or the Azov Sea, creating for it the necessary mobile reserves. Hitler, probably affected by the fall of 6th Army at the end of January in Stalingrad, compromised with Manstein’s requests to yield land in order to gain safety and mobility.

IN THE COVER OF «TIME» NEWSMAGAZINE…

Thus, during the first fortnight of February, the Hollidt Army moved back from the low Donetz, following the Rostov and Tangarov route and dug in again along the river Mius, approximately 80 kilometers to the west of Rostov. The 48 panzer Corps that were in action at the east of Rostov, moved to the north of Stalino, to join the 4th panzer Army of General Hoth and to form part of the mobile counterattack force.

In the middle of February, despite Hitler’s orders to resist at any price, the SS Army Kempf (formerly Lanz) evacuated Kharkov, when its north flank was enveloped by the Soviets from the direction of Belgorod. Meanwhile, the 4th panzer Army was moving back from the low Don toward positions to Stalino’s northwest. This was a difficult march of more than fifteen days over poor road conditions and railroad connections and lines. For its part, the 1st panzer Army, formerly part of the A Group of Armies in the Caucasus, could have moved back through Rostov, thanks 4th panzer Army hold on the front in the low Donetz area. And was taking positions in a front from north-east of Stalino up to the north of the Mius river.

THE GERMAN FIELDMARSCHAL’S COMMAND BATON.

With these maneuvers the Germans left the projecting in their front formed by the Don and Donetz rivers, readjusted their defensive front and managed to create an important operational maneuver force, formed by all three mentioned armies. It is important to emphasize that the Germans were not reacting to the Russians; they were adapting to the general conditions and the forces relations existing, with the expectation that they would act positively when the opportunity arose. This is probably the secret behind their operational blow (like a scythe blow) and the operational and strategicstunning waves” that they were to unleash on the Soviet Armies, which reached the enemys Supreme Commander.

On February 22, the two armored Corps (48 at the right side and the SS panzer at the left side) of the 4th panzer Army of Hoth initiated an offensive movement in the northwest direction on the communications lines of Popov Group and both independent Soviet tanks Corps of the southwest Front.

The terrain was highly favorable for using armored vehicles. Its surface was slightly wavy, allowing for extensive sight control. The narrow creeks that interlaced it were frozen.

Simultaneously there was a convergent attack by the SS Army Kempf from the west, completing the operation of the other five panzer divisions (reduced). This Army also had to prevent the advance on the Dnepr of forces from other Soviet Fronts, either around Krasnograd and Dnepropetrovsk or around Poltava and Kremenchug. This soviet attack, that was aimed at Kiev, was of a larger scope and, therefore, had scantier prospects for success before the spring thaw. The army SS Kempf had limited capacity to reject it.

It is worth emphasizing that, at the time, the 4th Air Fleet of General Richtofen enjoyed air supremacy over the operations zone and his aircraft could support the objective of cutting the enemys communications with up to 1,000 daily sorties.

THE FÜHRER ADOLF VISITS HIM IN ZAPOROZHE, TO CALM DOWN.

The Russian armored vehicles and truck columns were moving back toward the north and north-east at a distance of between 15 and 20 kilometers from the Germans, making them prey to the German divisional and army Corps artillery and aviation.

It was not a question of thesurrounded bag”-style operations that the Germans had carried out in 1941. The area being covered was larger, the German combat capacity (mainly based on infantry forces with artillery and antitank weapons) was scanty and the Soviet forces were elite mobile units with great fire and shock capacities. And knew the danger presented by the loss of its logistical support, at least their commands.

On February 23 both armored army Corps (the SS and 48th) of the 4th panzer Army were converging on Pavlograd. They cut the communications line of the Popov group, which was situated around Grishino, and of the 25th and 1st of the Guard tanks Corps (the mobile reserve of the Southwest Front) which were already approaching Zaporozhe, although not yet in full force. Likewise, the Germans severely struck the 6th infantry Army (at the west of Isyum), following the Front’s mobile reserve, and the 1st infantry Guard Army, which was behind the Popov group, before they cross the Donetz, moving back to their rearguard.

This temporarily liquidated the combat capacity of the Southwest front (General Vatutin). Unless that front focused on reorganizing and re-equipping itself and covering its casualties. And also tried to revive its combat morale by encouraging cohesion and retraining its units and small units.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

 

THE COMBAT OF THE SMALL MILITARY UNITS.

Introduction.

Each small military unit, each «action unit» is a sub unit that is capable of carrying out a function in the superior unit to which it belongs or gets support. From its tactical integration will arise bigger units of action, capable of actuating in larger » fields of action».

The units of action can be of command, combat (of fire, of shock and mixed), organizational (H. Q. sections), logistics, communications and of intelligence (exploration, intelligence and counterintelligence and propaganda and psychological war). The smallest of combat would be the squad with its fire support (light machine gun and servants) and its 2 or 3 teams, capable of maneuvering or defending a firing line.

It keeps them united and makes possible the fulfillment of its functions, its interest (esteem, self esteem and shared aim of the unit, opposite to the wear and the certain or apparent danger, but assumed as such), the full deployment (that provides an organizational structure and that feeds its functions, to guarantee the union and the action), the command (that offers guide, cohesion, example and correct command sense) and the situation (that is friendly, neutral or threatening, in increasing order of dilution of the union and loss of the efficiency). These originate in turn the deployments and the combats and the maneuvers, which are the «form» decided by the command to apply the capacity of combat and a “tempo”, pace or speed of action, thanks to the freedom of action that is possessed; those offer, together with the evolution of the situation, the opportunities and the dangers.

FIRE SUPPORT BASE WITH 105 MM. HOWTIZERS.

It appreciates a rich multiplicity of interactions between the subunits, on the basis of its functions and the dependence between them, in relation with its integration in the unit, the maintenance of its cohesion and the fulfillment of its superior function.

The deployments make possible the success or the failure; they also guarantees the order against the environment chaos or negative interactions, always unpredictable and unproductive; the situation gives intrinsically to the unit the courage or the cowardice; the command and the interest drive the positive or effective action of the unit, in order to its cohesion and its function or aim in the all set.

The Combined Arms Performance Process. The Control Means.

The units of action face the enemy using a combined arms system. They go to the enemy keeping a direction (maneuver and shock) and with a fire support. And though it could be a unit as small as the squad, with its shooters or fusiliers and of support teams, are specializing subunits in the combined arms concept. Sometimes the van men must do something strange to the Americans, but very effective advancing to the contact or passing the flank an enemy group or position, crawling.

REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

They try to reach the effective combat distance, creating a favorable interface, a shooting enfilade or a position for grazing fire or an effective assault distance, without losing its combat capacity. For example, by fixation by the enemy fire, by important losses or what affects its cohesion or the command, and by wear). And protected by the natural concealment or artificial one (fogs, covering fire). They work quietly and unseen in the micro ground without limitation of time up to the effective distance. They can use hand grenades to disguise their action on intermediate obstacles (sentries, etc.), that appears as mortar bombs.

The supposed continuous line of the front is crumbled. There arise a multitude of unexpected new internal fronts, possible favorable “interfaces of action” for us. It is not an infiltration, because the front is diffuse (approximately 0,15 man/m) and emptiness (some 4.000 m2/man). But of the active creation of «action fields» adapted in successive stages of action, for the employment of the unit in favorable interfaces over the enemy. The characteristics of performance are the coordination and/or the convergent effort of the different weapons in «fields of action» where they act. That are different and can be superpose, as they are shooters, light and middle mortars, machine guns, grenade-launchers, direct fire cannons, etc. From our appearance in effective force, where less they wish us and without having being detected, the erroneously expressive concept that «we» «infiltrate arises. But that is a mere spatial consequence of the real operational concept followed.

Technologically a division of significance exists between the support or the firing base and the attack or the offensive advance, linked by its cooperation. The support weapons are the protectors, those of greater effective range. The offensive weapons are those of smaller relative range in the set. Sequential and practically, thus, the cannon (direct or indirect heavy fire) protects the machine gun, the grenade launcher, the medium or light mortar. And these three protect and impel the shooters, when their action is or is already going to be evident.

Evolution of the Actions in his Sector. The Retroinformation of the Commands.

As consequence of the interfaces of action with the enemy, there arise in the tactical zone multiple actions of the action units. With them, the information feedback to the command, tends to enlarge to saturation, to bunch in all kinds of communications links and to affect the functional interrelationships of the unit. So, hindering its synergy, and demanding the reinforcement and/or the decision of the command, if he has not delegated sufficiently or is not monitoring the situation changes.

LAV’s ATTACKED WITHOUT INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT, THROUGH A VERY NARROW LANE, A BRIDGE…

This «undue plethora» is a structural generator of rubbing, a squandering of efforts and means. And it is the measurement of the trend to the loss of the cohesion, of the principal sense and the goal, which suffers a tactical combined arms unit.

The key to manage this «undue plethora», containing it reasonably, resides that everyone must observe, control and drive the necessary for the fulfillment of its mission, below its level in the hierarchy. For it the commander must share his intention and aims (mission type orders), establish a gravity center of his combined effort in every situation and guarantee the cooperation between and the support to his units. All this relying on the operations order and the updated intelligence received.

As parts of a complex system (hierarchy, specialization and aims and intentions), the units of action can be all autonomous (mission type orders, gravity center, different or shared operational sectors) and all specialized (engineers, antitank, anti-aircraft, exploration, chemistry, etc.) as is needed. To be able to fulfill, this way, with flexibility, rapidity and efficiency its functions in the interfaces of action with the enemy. It kept with all this, the structural hierarchy (integration in a major unit and its support) and functional (in the area of the intention and on support of this one).

The effective performance of the units of action resides in its aptitude to actuate flexible and semi independently from the section or platoon level in fulfilling the received mission. For it, they also will have to know and consider the capacities and needs of other weapon and supports. And acting the men looking for themselves and for other companions in the unit. Its officers and NCO must be capable of taking and drive decisions based on the mission and on the evolution of the situation.

Evidently, the desideratum is to work this way. And this one must be the trend to continue in the selection, formation, training and utilization of the men and the units. In the practice. the “degree of general efficiency” obtained, will be determined by the idiosyncrasy of a nation, the character more or less gregarious or independent of its peoples, its military doctrine and tradition, the defense budgets, the national moral, the national politics and the international situation, the integration of institutions and national organizations in the international sphere, etc.

An example attack of a combined arms unit.

Lets see an example. Against an infantry position more or less prepared, with advanced antitank means, a typical defensive zone, we can use in the breakthrough or in its destruction, if we can not pass outflanking it, the dismounted infantry followed in covered bounds by tanks for the protection and the direct fire support of it.

The antitank defender will look for a punctual, relatively big and protected target, from covered positions preferably or, at least, well camouflaged and flanking, and will act in batteries. With the pieces dispersed in order that the same enemy heavy fire can not incapacitate them. The infantry heavy weapons (machine guns in tripods) neutralize, «sweeping and searching», a more or less narrow zone of the front, occupied by a dispersed, small and smooth target, an infantry platoon.

The attacking tanks will beat with H.E. and H.E.S.H. shells those infantry strong positions. And the infantry squads will attack with its light machine guns the servants of the antitank pieces, hindering to acquire a punctual target. All this destruction and neutralization labor is spreading, once achieved the irruption, as a worm movements, in the depth of the tactical zone of the assault sector of the combined arms unit. Other parts of the enemy position that could collaborate in the defense rejection are blocked up by smoke and neutralized by indirect heavy fire.

GOING OUT TO CLOSE FIGHTING.

Besides, the artillery and aviation advanced observers will be defining to these support weapon the new targets that the own assault is discovering in the depth and in the flanks (combat exploration) in the advance sector. The criterion of the gravity center of the fire of support will be neutralize, at least, all the targets that are opposed to the advance towards the enemy position, to the irruption and to the struggle inside the position of defense in the assigned sector. Facilitating this way the direct fire and the shock of the land attackers. And that, by means of concentrated and punctual blows of its fire.

With it, the effective action in the given environment, «interfaces of action» essential characteristic, are optimized at the level of the tactical groups of action or combined arms systems, whose complementariness we have stood out.

In broken, very wavy, wooded or urbanized (housings and factories) grounds, not necessarily mountainous, that have scanty “sight control” and with abundant “relative concealing heights”, the “interfaces of action” reduce its sector.

The element of effective action continues being the combined arms system suitable sized. The action is effected by companies or reinforced interarms platoons, with the heavy fire support provided even by the battalion (medium and heavy mortars). Except in the most flat areas and of scanty obstructions to sight, the transitability, which limits physically the possible interfaces of action, prevents the fight using concentrated means beyond the company. The battalion role will be of reinforcing the efforts of their companies and canalizing the supports.

Always are critical in the land action the existing rivers, streams and channels, especially the more or less ones perpendicular to the front. The blockade of these waters flows affects enormously the tempo, the total speed of the operation, for the difficulty of the more or less sloping or obstructed area that surrounds them (forests, gullies, constructions, not reinforced fords). The advance slows down or the means have to be dispersed in the available parallel routes, forcing to enter other difficult bordering areas.

General Plans and Forecasts of the Command.

The contingencies plan of the units must include overcoming essentially four types of situations not foreseen, that intervene in the fulfillment of the mission and that can manage to compromise it.

These would be:

a) Possible direct action of the enemy, in use of the initiative or claiming recover it. It might be an interdiction bombardment, a counterattack. The solution is to tactically neutralize its action, without compromising the mission.

b) Possible encounter with the enemy. It would be a theme of patrols and sentries, advanced security forces and advanced detachments and reconnaissance patrols. It is necessary to submit or push back them and change positions rapidly and even direction temporarily, to not compromise the mission.

c) Possible unforeseen obstacle. They would be a ditch, a slope of more difficult soil, the blowing-up of a bridge, a flood, a storm, which affect the transitability of the area. It would be a matter of overcoming it as rapidly as possible, keeping the security and extending more yet the reconnaissance.

d) Possible action defensive/passive of the enemy. These are the cases of enter an ambush, a minefield, a reinforced cut covered by fire, the rejection fires of a defense position, an antitank obstacle. Is necessary to overcome it as soon as possible, as the natural obstacle case, avoiding besides to be canalized by the enemy in a direction he wished, favorable to a counterattack or at zone beaten by the artillery or by convergent fires.

In general lines, including in the commander plan, must always be foreseen:

1) To overcome or to repel the enemy and/or the obstacle, which hinder and which will present without being able to be foreseen, avoiding facilitate own information to the enemy.

2) Lost or detached means to overcome, to neutralize or to repulse are means deprived to the fulfillment of the mission. The surviving enemy can facilitate compromising information, which will be late a term in to be an effective intelligence.

3) It is necessary to continue the execution of the mission, with the necessary means to fulfill it. It is a multiplier factor of the efficiency, after the commotion and the incident losses, to keep a high execution «momentum»: the product of its “combat capacity” by its average movement speed in a period, at a given direction and sense.

The example of the preparation and the action of 3er. American Army of the general Patton, counter-attacking the German penetration in the Ardennes, is significant of these difficulties. Its «incident» was a sudden change of mission and of direction and sense of performance and the possibilities of their «execution momentum».

All this is not improvised. It results in the practice only as fruit of the frequent training and the organization work and the coordination of the H.Q. and all the commands and me. We shall remember the sayings, «it is actuated as it is trained» and «the man is an habit animal».

The Elite Military Units.

These units receive a more complete and effective training in the modern times. That is applicable to a personnel that clearly enjoys the exercise of his profession. And not only it enlists to fulfill a civic duty, to collaborate with the companions (up to the level of battalion), though the immediate ones are those of the piece or squad, and to come back home. In general, they act rapidly and hard, even inconsiderately, against his aim.

Resultado de imagen de ranger de texas A TIPICAL TEXAS RANGER OF THE XIX CENTURY.

It is a question of a military closed «system», that it is vulnerable to the encircle and the ambush and whose limited means are only the assigned for the mission. So, it is difficult to receive reinforcements, including when they operate in the surroundings of the own “supporting mass” or great units. The intelligence for the mission must be elaborated from confirmed, constant, sufficient and updated informations. Since she will protect them from the surprises and the setbacks in destination, which are the «critical difficulty» that they can find and the major danger for all men.

His combat experience has advised them to never surrender the weapons and to always continue the effort, the fight. What has saved them from more than one failure, since the enemy was surrendering before they: for not paying the high cost of conquering them. They largely accept the discipline as a necessary quality for the cohesion and efficiency of his unit. Here, more that in other branches, the commands have to be authentic leaders, directing with the example. And of proven formation, in order that his men admit that his «life insurance» in the missions is the fulfillment of the orders of his commands and with the flexibility degree that grants the order for the mission.

THE ARMED DEFENSE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OR DAESH.

Introduction.

The Islamic State has the strategic advantage of his territorial unity, which allows him to support the fights following his interior communication lines. His enemies are dispersed by his borders and operate in multitude of combats sectors or strips. This advantage can be used to fix and keep his enemies, dispersed and operationally unconnected for the different countries and zones. This way, IS preventing them any concentration to attack him.

So, in his Mosul’s operational center, with approximately 2 million habitants, the major city under his power, and the third of Iraq, he keeps the Erbil’s peshmergas fixed, the capital of the Iraqi autonomous Khurdistan. These are not capable of throwing an individual offensive, to go snatching cities and zones from the ISIL and are kept at the defensive. They are Sunnis Kurds, that do not want to coordinate with the army of Iraq and the sectarian Shiites militias.

 ABU BAKER AL-BAGDADI.

In Anbar, the ISIL occupied al-Ramadi, its capital, where the Iraqi army went out, here also, at the disbandment, in an unforeseen and accelerated retrograde march. Los iraquíes culparon de sus desventuras operativas a una gran tormenta de arena, que facilitó la “marcha al combate” de los muyahidines del DAESH. And he threatens the western flank of Baghdad, which says to be training and concentrating forces to recover her, departing from the new base in Taqaddum, at 25 km from al-Ramadi, where are a reinforce of 450 new American soldiers of the four stars American general James Terry. Which acts as a bolt, a ground perpendicular obstruction, against the projection of the ISIL over Baghdad.

The Islamic State has now three great operational areas.

The first great zone includes all the south of the Caliphate, from Aleppo’s south-east up to al-Ramadi, following the course of the high Euphrates. In her, the ISIL is spreading and being consolidated, occupying Palmyra city, finishing the expelling of the National Syrian Army from Dar-ez-Zour’s province (his last troops in her are surrounded at the west of the capital) and the Iraqi soldiers and the Shiites militias from Anbar’s province. At the west of Palmyra are Tiyas and the military airports of the Shayrat, occupied by the NSA, which are vulnerable targets for the ISIL, capable of attacking them from two marching directions. With it, a western defensive flank, directed to Damascus, might be established.

In the north of Iraq, the ISIL keeps his positions in Nínive’s province and part of Saladin’s province, so being consolidated also in the high Tigris.

In Syria, at Aleppo’s north and north-east, along around 400 Kms. of the border with Turkey, up to Hasaka’s frontier province, the ISIL keeps a strategic base, using small offensives and tactical retreats, in a zone of great operational instability. Trying to debilitate the Front al-Nusrah (near the frontier Azaz), the Syrian peshmergas (in Kobani) and other opponents groups and to keep open the narrow frontier sectors, Ras al-Ayn, between others, where he realizes his exchanges of crude oil and derivatives, seized goods, armaments and new supporters. Also he wants to stop the offensive of the opposition in Aleppo, since the ISIL does not have now free means to exploit any destabilization in Aleppo, that would be produced this way. But in Hasaka he wants to be consolidated, to increase his geographical continuity, to protect his frontier passages with Iraq and Turkey, here is Tel Abyad, and to increase his strategic rear, reinforcing this way the Palmyra’s projection over Damascus.

 AN EXECUTION IN PALMIRA.

Turkey, which wants to keep in his south border a difficult military politic balance of power, suspects so much of the (Syrian) Kurds of the YPG and of the ISIL, both approaching in force to his territory. And Erdogan is considering to establish a safety zone of 10 Km. in depth in Syrian territory from the common border, occupying her with around 12 thousand Turkish soldiers. From her, the Turks might also partially control other more 25 or 30 Km. in depth, using his heavy artillery. It is a thorny and controversial topic, of international indefinite transcendence, so the command of the Turkish AA.FF. has asked Erdogan for a formal wrote order, that the President still has not granted.

The air bombardments of the Coalition of the 60 nations, assigned to the Operation «Inherent Resolve», erode and cause casualties to the Islamic State during almost one year. But they do not stop his military principal operations of fixation of his enemies and of increasing the territory of the Islamic State. At less that the western countries, including the USA, the NATO and the European Union, in any degree and practical necessary national combination, are ready and resolve to put on the Syrian and/or Iraqi territories a “sufficient investment of their own soldiers”, in the form of combined ground forces, distributed in the combinations adapted for the tasks that they will assume, the ISIL will not be beaten by his enemies of these Arabic infected countries. And it seems that the ISIL will possible be indefinitely defend from his frontier enemies. In the air raids in Syria take part Arabia, the USA, Bahrain, Canada, the Arab United Emirates and Jordan. In Iraq, asking for the authorities permission attack Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the USA and Great Britain.

The Geographical Scene of the Islamic State (ISIL).

This organization acts in a diffuse, not occupied, but controlled strip, of 300 thousand Km2., that spreads over Iraq and Syria, from Baghdad up to Aleppo and the mountains of the center west of Syria. The width changes along the route. The pillaged territory begins in Faluya, at 60 km to the west of Baghdad, and includes the nearby cities of Habbaniya and al-Ramadi and and Anbar’s extensive and desert province. And, following the Euphrates towards the northwest, it reaches the riverside cities of Haditha and Âna, before penetrating in Syria by Abu Kemal, leaving behind Níniveh and part of Saladin provinces. In the middle of the south and eastern desert of Syria, only relieved by the river, is Dayr al-Zawr. And continuing by the river, we come first to Raqqa, close to the river mouth of the river Belikh in the Euphrates. And then to the artificial lake al-Assad in the great meander of the Euphrates, to continue up to Aleppo and the Kurdish mountains of the center west, in the border with Turkey. Up to 10 million persons might be controlled by the ISIL in this territory.

EXECUTIONS OF ENEMIES OF THE DAESH

It is not easy to move by these lands, which are infertile, beyond the irrigations of the Euphrates and of the artificial lake of al-Assad, without leaving a «tactical fingerprint» of the march. The lands of this great strip lack concealments and natural covers, in the shape of forests, extensive bushes and mountains. This does that the most frequent refuges and stays for the yihadists groups are the villages and populations along his backbone: the Euphrates, his aluentes, as the Jaipur in Hanaka’s province, and his banks. For his defense and more lasting cover they have to disperse by them, forming one or several «muyahidins squads» of not more than 40 men each one.

Operational decisive possibilities.

In any case, the fight in the occupied territories by the Islamic State is an urban fight. It is not an area for a movements warfare. It was so in June, 2014, when the Islamic State spread out, uncontrollably and overwhelming, by the north and north-east of Iraq. And the 30 thousand Iraqi soldiers of the Niniveh and Saladin provinces, went out, afflicted and in stampede, towards Baghdad. Looking for protection and refuge between the walls of the gigantic city and his al-Sadr shii neighborhood, at the east of the Tigris (known as al-Sadr city). And it before the simple «march to the combat» of several hundreds muyahidins. Mounted in Toyotas pick-ups, half “roof opened”, without any armoured and armed with light cannons and heavy machine guns. Certainly, who does facilitate the always present Toyota vehicles to the muyahidines? Some neoconverted concessionaire to al-Bagdadi?

THEY LOVE TOYOTAS, WHOSE PAY IT?

The operational strategy of the irregular bands of the Islamic State centres on never let been got in combat by the Armies or other great forces in «lost in advance» combats. His technics and tactics are the constant and far-sighted mobility; the dispersion and the infiltration in the urban fight, going forward in a flexible and wearing out defense, with space cession; the small, dispersed and more or less simultaneous or sequential actions in an area; the flight by covered bounds; the fight with limited goals and in profitable temporaral conditions; the systematic giving up of positions, forcing the enemy to redeploy and to be prepared every time. They can win to the ISIL the necessary time to survive.

In the temporaral occupations of great populations, they extend his defensive positions beyond what it is necessary in the conventional defense. Covering this way a major surface. His «delaying points» are diffuse, secret and imperceptible to the strangers. It is necessary to enter the houses to detect perforated walls and to find alleys under a furniture or a carpet. The destruction that generates the vague heavy fire, reinforces his combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the accesses of the enemy. Except when they are reached by one direct impact. The “resistance nests” have more importance in this fighting form. Because the occupation of the defense zone is more tenuous, they cannot strengthen too much the positions, the sights are more short and there exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delaying points, to which they return if they are invaded or destroyed. Numerous “alternative positions” exist. This “resistance structure” allows to deceive the enemy, who attacks and burst, on the forward limit of the defense position: about his real extension, the limits of the sectors that form her and the interest of the rebel commands in the defense of the zone; and manages to disperse the heavy fire of the attacker.

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REGIONAL PRECEDENTS

The Organic Structure of Social Power in the Arabic Countries.

The internal relations of the families and the groups of local families and clans, are characterized by incorporating into them certain rites, rules, attitudes and taboos. This set of «social procedures» gather, value and quantify his vital needs, his primary emotions and his beliefs. The Moslem religion is followed in the wide geopolitical zone that we treat. Almost all they are of the sunni branch. This accepts the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet, his facts and sayings (hadithes) due gathered by the disciples, as the orthodox sources of Allah’s revelation to the men. The differences between they reside in the rigor with which they examine and accept the sources of the Sunna. And this assumption of the Islam forms a part of the social inculturation, affirmation and cohesion of these groups.

The social code, which receives different names according to the countries, establishes certain rights for the individual and demands of him certain social duties, towards the family, the clan and the tribe. The disputes on women, gold or valid money and lands are in the origin of the sustaiined hatreds between the tribes. And they must be sustained up to avenging the perceived affront. The own fragility and weakness of the society demands the appearance of the protective values. These might be the hospitality, the loyalty, the friendship, the scorn to the foreigns, the revenge of affronts and hurts, the individual and collective honor. Each of them protects and enlarges in some measure the human group. The relations are interpersonal, in the areas of the family, the clan and the region. They are projected by the opportunity, the nearness, the exchange of goods and the relation. And they become strong with the loyalty, the respect of the accepted procedures and the time of treatment. And depending on the accumulation of these elementary successive acts. The hospitality takes implicit the reciprocity, when one travels, is alone and is not aggressive. This sometimes is perfected by the endowment of an escort to the traveler in insecure zones. The violation of this «escort» by an assault supposes a serious affront for the clan that provided her. The loyalty between the members of the group, for very unstable that is sometimes, cohesions the group. The honor inflates the autoesteem and the appearance before everybody. The revenge, in absence of a real institutional justice, looks for punishment and then repair of the hurts and affronts real or perceived. The scorn of the foreigns not adorned with good qualities or menacing to the group, seeks to prevent them “a priori” his integration in him, as a form of passive defense. The tied friendship tightens the bouns with the equals and the group. If someone joins these elementary groups, it is an object of loyalty and friendship in a personal way. These values would increase by his action, modes and personal behavior.

TWO SELFISH «ALLIES»…

The natural tribal authority is organic, born from himself, structured in his familiar units or social cells. The smaller and isolated is the social group, the power of his natural authority will be the more moderating and of integration, acting as the first between the «equal ones». In these cases, the meeting of the active members (men, hunters) of the clan in assemblies, yurgas, etc., have the supreme and decision-making value. And it is sanctioning of the deviant or solvent conducts to the group. The local chiefs are like favoured negotiators with the different regional and national governments. They enjoy a personal authority more than institutional. And, sometimes, his decisions can be ignored by the adult males, if they are not confirmed by these assemblies. The more be perfected and advance towards the exterior the society, modernizing and being complicated, the power of this authority will become strong and grow and will spread in economic and political areas of action.

This natural tribal structure gives the real practical value and sense to the loyalties and the mundane interests, always relative and still opportunists, of the Arabs. Graphical, paradoxical (for going abreast against the educations of the Islam) and still excessively, we might express it this way: «My tribe and I, against the world; my clan and I against the tribe; my family and I, against the clan; my brother and I, against the family; I, against my brother».

The acelerated Development of the Syrian Civil war.

From the pacific multitudinous manifestations for almost the whole country that was realized at the beginning of 2011, the social revolt has given an important qualitative step in his development and extension. It has become more radical and has «taken the weapons» against the regime. Extending his «social commotion waves» all over the country, to all the participants, to the neighboring countries and up to the foreign powers

Far there already are the manifestations of the young opponents, which did not see to the violence as an acceptable option of national liberation. Nevertheless, some analysts defend that the illegal executions of soldiers, policemen and civilians sympathetic with the regime began almost from the beginning of the widespread protests. And others attributes this radicalization of positions to the selective and progressive repression of the regime.

  PESHMERGAS IN KOBANI (A CANADIAN VOLUNTEER)

To this joins the increasing islamization of the armed opposition. Initially the manifestations were beginnig from mosques or central places. And then, worship was begun to give to the «martyrs» and using the islamist rhetoric in the communications and declarations and in the name of the irregular revolt groups. From the shout in the first videoes hung on the Network or sent outside the country «the people wants the fall of the regime», they have passed to «the people wants the proclamation of the Yihad by the ulemas and mufties». This raising is not lay. It is a raising led by more or less practicing Muslims of the Islam. Lay is the corrupt and greedy regime of the Assad, where the not Islamic confessions were respected and protected. And that has lost the aptitude to defend and to represent the people. This is the “social justification” of supporting and respecting an exclusive dictatorship, almost always dynastic, in exchange for his class privileges.

IRAQIS TRAINING TO FIGHT HOUSE TO HOUSE.

The government of the Assad and his political equipment have left forming a lot of time ago a socialist and national regime. Since they neither represent, neither defend, nor integrate the particular and collective interests of his nation. Now they only lead and protect the members of the wide social religious oligarchy, that monopolizes and distributes in different degrees the institutional, social and economic power of Syria. The Syrian regime is crystallized, without fluency, so much socially, as ideologically and administratively. And is turning into the rind of a «political social fruit», withered, sterile and empty.

For the schemes of the foreign, calm television viewers in his houses at many Km. from the violent facts, the combats are ferocious. But it resides in that to the enemy who tries to kill or to mutilate you from covered and reinforced positions, first he is softened by the direct heavy fire, you cut his retreat occupying a crossing street beyond and his defensive position is assaulted from the ceiling or from the soil, by successive assured bounds, if he has managed to last so much (very strange). Unfortunately here are of no use the romantic resources of «shoot you first, gentlemen rebels». To obtain the decision and to come to the end, the better thing is to show the teeth from the beginning and acting with determination. Though neither the military men nor the rebels have the doctrine or the experience of the urban fighting…

THE INTERVENTION OF THE FOREIGN POWERS

American Initiatives against the EI.

In September, 1914, the USA coordinated a global alliance of western and Arabic nations to stop militarily the sweeping advance of the Islamic State, before the urgent request of help of Iraq. For it, the allies would not deploy combat ground units. It has passed a year of daily dedication to the air selective bombardment, producing more than 7 thousand air attacks to him over individual targets in Iraq and Syria (combat and of heavy fire positions, command or communication buildings, vehicles, training centers) and a vague number of effective falls, between 5 and 8 thousand militants of the EI, with diverse degrees of training and implication. But, the conceptual and operational coherence of the air allied action, has not managed «to debilitate, nor to degrade, and not even, to destroy», paraphrasing the president Obama, the Islamic State with his actions. Which has counter-attacked lately in al-Ramadi, the Anbar’s capital, removing, by the fault of a sandstorm, the glorious armed forces of Iraq; in Palmira, establishing a projection towards Damascus; in Deir ez Zour, occupying the capital and surrounding the Syrian military forces deployed at the west; in Hanaka, disputing the great frontier northeastern Syrian province to the peshmergas of the YPG and relieving the pressure that the EI receives at the east of Alepo and on Raqqa.

MR. ASHTON CARTER.

The artillery, the aviation, with his heavy and precise fires, allow to blind, disturb, neutralize and still to destroy the groun enemy, in increasing order of hurts and effects. The heavy fires support the ground forces, in an employment of combined arms. And to beat the fortifications, the positions of combat, of heavy fire and of antitanks, the enemy bolts, perpendicularly established to the own advance, and the enemy reserves in the different levels of action and to realize the fight counter batteries. The ground forces are those that occupy, clean, clear and keep in the own hands, the attacked enemy positions. Frustrating the reappearances of the enemy between the rocky debris or the nearby bushes and rejecting forceful and definitively his local counter shocks and his more deliberate counterattacks.

THE HEROE OF THE GREAT TASK, GEN. JAMES TERRY…

In the summer of 2014, the United States began to train to Syrian sunnis young volunteers to integrate them, at a beginning, in the weaken and demoralized Free Syrian Army (FSA). His tasks were to attack so much the military forces of Bashar the-Assad, the National Army of Syria (NAS), as the salafists yihadists of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, in the Syrian zones where they were deployed. Reinforcing, this way, the order of battle of the FSA. The training fields of this light irregular infantry were placing in the oriental center of Jordan. Before the recruits’ acceptance, it was established an ideological political filter, directed to detecting possible yihadists or governmental volunteers and that turned out to be a fiasco, for its results. In this training of several weeks also took part, according to the sources, France and Great Britain, and even, apparently, Israeli commands. The initial plan was to manage to train up approximately 5 thousand men, using several batches of recruits. But the attempt got reduced to graduate from the » boots camp» around 3 thousand men, of which, the majority simply deserted. And the rest of the mediocrely formed joined different radical rebel armed groups in Syria.

IRAQIS WILL FIGHT FINE AGAINST THE WIND…

Another attempt of forming Syrian soldiers of lay or moderate ideology was based on a training plan of «up to 15 thousand Syrians voluntaries » on Turkey. Other sources talk of forming 5 thousand soldiers. But both numbers turn out to be ridiculous for the magnitude and complexity of the tasks that would entrust them and for his poorly «combat specific capacity», which would say the expert colonel Trevor N. Dupuy. The date of ending of his «plan» never was ventured by the American oficials in charge. In view of the «deficiencies» previously detected, a very high level of exigency was established in the selection of the men to forming. As consequence of it, only a few dozens of volunteers have been trained since then. And we think that they possess a conviction and motivation flaccid and blurry. It is of indicating the case of the «so called» 30 ª division of the FSA, formed by less than 80 soldiers and that entered Alepo’s zone on July, 2015. In less than one week of «operations», 12 were kidnapped and 18 were hurt, by the irregular of the Front al-Nusrah. It was the first group or batch of Syrian rebels that Washington instructed in the neighboring Turkey. Also was get prisoner by the yihadists, the commander of 30 ª division, Naim Hassan. Al-Nusrah also attacked his barrack at the north of Aleppo, and the rest of the divisional force, around 30 terrified soldiers, ran to sheltering in Afrín, a Kurdish enclave in the north of the province. We think, simply, that the rebels trained by the USA refused to face the salafists yihadists of the al-Qaeda’s franchise and simply broke and got dispersed.

NOBODY IS SHOOTING AT THEM…

This way, the ground forces with could count the USA and his Coalition in this geopolitical zone, to attack the EI in his controlled territory, are: the Iraqi army, who in the spring of 2014, before the Great Disaster, was possessing 200 thousand theoretical men in his battle order; the peshmergas of the Syrian YPG and of the autonomous Kurdish government of Iraq, and the sectarian shiis Iraqi militias, theoretically obedient to the government of Baghdad, but trained and guided by the Iranians. The Iraqi peshmergas received permission of Turkey to cross his territory to attack from the north Kobane’s frontier city, occupied by the IS. Managing to liberate it in a joint effort, including the allied aviation. But, in February, 2015, they were unable to at least harass the «wreckers escorted squads» of the Islamic State, who were demolishing Nimrud’s archaeological deposit, in Niniveh’s province, placed half a way between Mosul and Erbil, his capital.

IN AMERLI, BEFORE THE SUNNIS VILLAGES’ MASACRE, AUGUST 2014…

The shiis militias were activated from the summer of 2014 by the general Qassem Suleimani, sent urgently by Teheran, in support of the shii government of al-Maliki. To compose a rapid containment dike to the advance of the sunnis of the IS. After Mosul’s capture and his appearance in force for all the north and center of Iraq in June and July, 2014. And to realize the enormous task of giving these militias, supported by units of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran (the pashdaran: the army of the guardians of the Islamic revolution), a sufficient action unity and a combat motivation. And to try, by measured, short and successive steps, to be defeating and displacing the yihadistas of the IS, in hard combats, which will be fundamentally urban.

Russia takes an Initiative in Middle East.

From around the beginning of July, 2015, the Russians have been increasing his military direct presence in Syria. His armed forces have principally established in the Latakia, covering Tarsus’s surroundings, his only naval base in the Mediterranean. They include fighterbombers, assault and of troops movement and of rescue helicopters, not driven aircraft of exploration and bombardment and the ground corresponding units of support and of security. And now, from the ends of September, they are bombarding the positions of the armed rebels to al-Assad’s regime, at the southwest of Aleppo; in the Latakia; close to Hama, Homs and Damascus, in the Orontes basin; in Raqqa and other enclaves of the IS, in the north-east of the country and in the great Syrian eastern desert. A spokesman of the Russian Defense Department declared that «they would not indefinitely operate there» and that they were calculating that they would need «approximately 100 days» of air assaults. The Kurdish peshmerrgas of the YPG, the national allies of the USA, deployed by the whole center eastern border with Turkey, have not been bothered. Between those who have suffered his unexpected assaults are the irregular forces of the Front al-Nusrah for the Liberation of the Peoples of the East, the national subsidiary of al-Qaeda. That are so dangerous and ideologically radical as the muyahidines of the Islamic State, but less cruel and less militarily capable.

THE USELESS AND SECTARIAN IRAQ’S EX-PRIME MINESTER.

To the reproaches of some western countries against this intervention, Putin and Lavrov argued that the «multinational Coalition of the 60 allies» was bombarding the salafists yihadists from September, 2014, without having for it a mandate of the UNO. Sure that Obama’s coalition was attacking in Iraq, with the theoretical «previous daily permission» of the Iraqi government. In fact, the four stars’ general James Terry, who is the commander of the American forces in Iraq from November, 2014, acts as an undeserved speaker for his high graduation, with the government and the Iraqi discredited armed forces and militias. But the assaults on Syria of the allies were not possessing the consent of his regime and were operationally going to supporting the peshmergas and debilitating the IS. Let’s stand out that the Russians, as the mentioned leaders have justified themselves, » are very polite and are operating in Syria with invitation of his government».

  OF WHOM ARE THEY LAUGHING…?

It is of remembering that Syria was during decades the allied in the Middle East of the USSR, and today of Russia. And that Syria was also considered during decades a “terrorist antiwestern state”. Of the style of North Korea. Literally flooding the whole geopolitical Islamic region with the assault rifles AK and the grenade-launchers of hollow load RPG, for the guerrilla groups of “popular libration”…

Russia wants to recover his international protagonism and respect. In spite of his diminished demographic, economic and structural capacities and his democratic and political loss of prestige, gained with the conflict of Crimea and Ukraine. With the military intervention in Syria, Putin attacks the root of the problem of the fled Syrians: that is the pressure of a cruel and long civil war on them. And it allows him to calm the Europeans with the short-term containment of the massive and constant invasion of those. Looking for an attenuation of the economic sanctions of the European Union to the government of Putin, for his shameless actions in Ukraine for more than year and a half.

Russia also supports and gives a strong accolade to the Syrian regime with his intervention. After 4 and a half years of war, the NSA is exhausted and impoverished by a bleeding of more than 60 thousand dead men, suffering continuous desertions towards the different rebel groups (from the FSA to the yihadists groups) and having great difficulties to mobilize recruits. The soldiers in ranks in April, 2011, if still are suitable, have not been licensed from the service. The militias sent by Hezbola’s chiíes in 2014 to support them have not been sufficient to change the course of the war against al-Assad. The government already did not have sufficient men to realize a few effective operations of counterinsurgency, against the armed rebels who were harassing it from numerous and different fronts or «assault strips» in the whole Syrian geography.

Obama said: «the moral leadership is a much more powerful weapon than the brute force». This is true, when the concerned speakers possess and exhibit the same civil virtues that a democrat. But, when it is a question of beasts, of selfish, of madmen, of unscrupulous opportunists, of peoples that still perceive the force as the instrument of the strongest, this does not serve. It does not matter in the social level in which they are. The leadership is to convince, to direct with the example, to attract the persons towards yourself, for pure pleasure and affinity. To realize a joint labor in benefit of the social group to which one belongs.

And this social role has been left by Obama. And also some time ago is ignored, by carelessness or disability, the European Union. That is not waited in “these fights in these homes”. But, the “political thing” has horror and abomina of the «emptinesses», of the «absences». And, this way, the opportunist of Putin has been attracted by the suction of both, anxious to lead another more international episode. For which his people, since the first of 2014, endorses it proudly. To compensate his impoverished national revenue and his diminishing demography.

The intervention of Iran in this Middle East conflict.

At the eastern end of the Middle East is the mumified Shii theocracy of the ayatollahs. These, when they want important and rapid results against his neighbors, use the commands or units of the Republican Guard (the Pashdaran). Which is training, equipping and supporting by diverse ways his coreligionists allies of Syria and of Iraq. The Republican Guard is overlapped in the Iranian regime, forming the unconditional and effective military wing of the Islamic Republic of Iran. She, as the Egyptian military men, possess an economic own very wide support. That guarantees them the operational independence and that generously rewards her dedication and loyalty in the fulfillment of his tasks and missions. The “al-Quds brigades” are a special elite group of he Republican Guard. He devotes himself to the espionage and to realize military actions as “deep incursion forces”. And they exhibit the whole capacities panoply for the surreptitious or dirty war between enemy nations. His commander in chief, the general of division 58-year-old Qassem Suleimani, is included in the list of the most sought terrorists by the USA. A detail: the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ali Jamenei, considers him to be a «living martyr of the revolution». Whom he incorporated in 1980, whith 23 years, in the incipient Republican Guard.

«YOU WILL BE A FATHER FOR HIM. HE WILL BE A SON FOR YOU».

After the advance of the Islamic State by the north and center of Iraq and the call of the Iraqi shii ayatollah Ali Sistani to the fight against him, Suleimani was sent by Teheran to activate the shiis militias. That were dispersed after the sectarian war. And Suleimani has obtained in a few months the vertebration of all the Iraqi militias against the IS. It has been the IS that who has extracted from the «shades and underground of the State» the general Suleimani. At the end of August, 2014 he appeared in Amerli, Saladino’s province, where it forced the yihadistas to move back. Iran immediately distributed photos of his general operating. But, after the setback of the IS, the shiis militias devastated dozens of sunnis villages of the zone, as collaborators or sympathizers of the enemy. Which is not a good omen for an evolution without sectarisms of the conflict in Iraq.

Likewise, units of the Pashdaran are also operating in Syria against the sunnis enemies os Bashar al-Assad. Reinforcing the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the weared out and insufficent Hezbola iregular forces.