THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. (SECOND PART).

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

 

(CONTINUATION)

 

Results of the German counterattack and its trascendence.

Nevertheless, the booty gained was scanty. Von Manstein declared that there were approximately 23,000 dead Soviet soldiers and 9,000 captured Soviet soldiers. The materiel captured were approximately 615 tanks (probably largely recovered), 354 campaign guns, 69 anti-aircraft pieces and more than 600 machine guns and mortars. It was not possible to encircle the enemy and Soviet soldiers took advantage of this by leaving the heavy equipment and retreating. Von Manstein said that, because the extreme cold, his soldiers were bunched into small, tight groups, leaving wide spaces and lines in his rearguard, without effective cover. This partly happened because they were elite troops and because the war was without mercy.

COLONEL JOHN BOYD, AN AMERICAN TEORIST OF ITS MANEUVER THEORY.

At the beginning of March, 48th panzer Corps pressed toward the east of Kharkov and the SS panzer corps of General Halder was entrusted with recovering the long-suffering city for the Germans.

At the middle of the month, the Germans had a defensive resistant front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported on the Mius and the Donetz. They also possessed in the south of Russia sufficient mobile reserves to push back possible Soviet operational breaks in the zone.

As late as 1944, the Soviets had 26 tanks Corps and 11 mechanized Corps. Part of them joined together to form 6 tanks Armies. Each of which had two tanks corps and a mechanized corps (bigger and more balanced inn infantry and artillery). Some mechanized Corps joined a cavalry Corps, forming a great unit similar in capacity to the tanks Army but with fewer armored vehicles and more mobility in areas of difficult transitability (marshes, mountains, woods). These were used to exploit the break in the swampy areas of the south of the Soviet Union, as that of the Pripet river in the north of Ucrania. Although never coexisted more than two or three in the order of battle of the Soviet Army.

WILLIAM LIND, A CIVIL TEORIST.

The destruction of 6 tanks Corps of the Southwest Front (especially equipped with mobile forces) and dismantled them from their “support masses, was an especially prominent, profitable and low cost operation for the Germans.

In addition, in its advance toward Kharkov between March 1st and 5th, the SS and 48º panzer Corps smashed from its flank and rearguard the Soviet 3rd tanks Army, led by general Pavel Semjonovic Ribalko. This Army was launched to relieve the forces of 6th infantry Army and had continued advancing toward Kharkov. This city that was by then, attracting all the attention and efforts from both sides.

As poor results and large losses mounted for the mobile Soviet forces, pessimism also grew in Stalin, who asked Sweden to mediate in seeking a solution to the war with Germany.

Nevertheless, the advance on Belgorod, outlining Kursk’s projection inside the territory occupied by Germany, sealed the aim for Germanys strategic summer Campaign. After all these events had passed, the strategic initiative returned to the Germans at the level of the theatre of operations.

But, beginning on July 5, delayed in relation with the victories of Von Manstein, their action gave the Soviets time to extensively strengthen themselves, to establishfortified regions” at the front level, and to assemble and organize a powerful counterattack force in the north and south of the projection. The allied landing in Sicily on the 10th of July, aborted the Wehrmachts already disastrous Operation Citadel. The Germans would never recover the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL DONN STARRY, HIGH COMMAND OF THE U.S. ARMY’S TRADOC.

Was it possible to avoid what happened to the Popov group and, thus, to the Soviets strategic plans for its 1942 winter campaign and to the Soviets strategic initiative, at least in the Southern theatre of the Soviet Union?

It was possible.

We have observed, in parallel and in a very second plane with some key facts, the getting absorbed (to get very much in), the delight (to be delighted with) and the fixation (to do without other rational arguments) of Stalin, in relation with the results that he promised himself with the impelled operations by the mobile corps of the Southwest Front of general Vatutin.

General Vatutin, one of the best field chiefs of the Soviet army, died before his time at hands of Ukrainian (anti-Soviet) guerrillas, only participated in this in a minor degree. Still, the delegate of the Stavka in charge of these crucial operations (Zhukov, Vasilevsky?) remembered him the transcendence that for the Supreme Commander and for the Soviet people they had.

A little time ago, Hitler also fixated on Stalingrad. This fixation led him to squander the capacity of his best Great Unit (the 6th infantry Army of general Paulus—yes, without the aristocratic Von) in a street struggle and a force-to-force confrontation. Their enemies were arranged on a static defense. A position that they were better able to defend and maintain than were the Germans, in the gigantic steel and cement fortress that was Stalingrad.Fight in which was not counting the German superb capacity of operational movement, which reduced the effort done to a confrontation between man vs. man and machine against machine. And, thus, causing a terrible attrition to the combat and movement capacities.

We can discuss about the strategic mistakes of high chiefs. As the line of communications (branched out) is so crucial, it is necessary to protect it adequately. But this fact is obscured and blurred by the desires of commanders.

What are the possibilities of defense for the advance sector that contains the communications line?

Independently of the advance deployment of mobile groups and their support mass (which must include the securities elements adapted for marches in enemy areas), «advanced detachments» must be brought forward.

These will be integrated by 15-30 % of the forces that bring them forward and will possess sufficient operational movement and combat capacities. The time it takes for the main group to join them is a function of the transitability of the terrain and of the capacities and intentions of the enemy in the operations zone. Its mission in defensive operations is to be used asstable hinges” between the deployments of Great units, facilitating and protecting the movement of forces and supplies between them.

If the mass of support is too slow for the mobile group to continue advancing at a reasonable rate, it will end up lengthening dangerously the distance between the units and their support. This situation is very vulnerable to a mobile assault by the enemy from the depth of his zone and the sector of advance would be under threat of being cut, depending on the means and intentions of the enemy. This probability would require that amechanized group” be placed between the mass of support and the mobile group to reduce the distance between all three deployments and reducing reaction times to respond to a crisis. This would reasonably stabilize the sector of advance after the mobile group.

The mission of the mechanized group, which has less capacity for operational movement than the mobile group, will be to carried out thesector mobile defense”. And will last until the forces of the mass of support arrive to relieve it. The anti-aircraft and antitank defense plan, the centralization of reserves and the defense of key points of the area, by means ofdelay positions” and together with necessary heavy fire support, will be characteristic of the fight to stabilize the sector.

That is to say, it is necessary to sacrifice speed for safety to consolidate the stability of the sector of advance in enemy territory. A territory that does not need to be all occupied in force. Because would be defended by a mobile defense for a limited period of time. Taking disproportionate risks would be reckless and would put men, materiel and the operation in danger.

But, men (in this case, Hitler and Stalin are two examples) continue to make mistakes when faced with such circumstances

THE END.

WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE.

Introduction.

The appearance of the IT treatment of the information supposed a revolution in the capture, production and transmission of the existing or caught information. Whose possibilities and transcendency are still far from know, even in his scope and his limits. The information generated in a battlefield or an operations theatre of is enormous, ephemeral in diverse times, almost immeasurably and fluid. The latter quality is fundamental for the production of the intelligence. That is the information caught by the units and sensors of all kinds and that is digested or prepared by the specific organs (G2, S2 and agencies of intelligence), to create a sufficient, effective, opportune and constant intelligence. That is used by the «advanced users» or commands in the different levels of military action (tactical, operative and strategic).

Since it could not be otherwise, in view of the brief exposed scheme, the IT industry soon found an enormous area of activity and possibilities in the military field. And the high military commands, often in «ad hoc» prepared meetings and coctails, received from the manager directors and chairmen of the branch corporations, animated, brief and exciting presentations of the enormous performances that might give to their units of all the branches, the designed, elaborated and installed softwares and hardwares by these vanguard technical companies. The battlefield or the operations zone (the area, the enemy and I), known, conveyed and controlled in real time by my men!!!

The Support of the military Information Systems.

It is not the case that these new technologies allow to elaborate a complex and integrated weapon system. This already existed before the information age and the electronic existing advances allowed his creation. For example, the AEGIS defense system for ships against aircraft, warships, missiles and submarines was designed, created and installed for the first time in 1973. It is equiped by destroyers and even frigates (in a simpler model) of the USA and his allied nations. And this way they are called the «shields or defenders of the Fleet». In effect, every «naval group» centred and escorting an aircraft carrier and every «naval combined force of strategic projection», rely on several ships provided with the AEGIS system. This consists of a powerful radar of several megawatts of power, capable of catching and continuing up around 200 potential targets, placed at distances of up to 350 km to the installed system.

The caught information goes to a computer center that reports to a decision center. Which arranges the launches of missiles depending on the mission of the group or naval force and the estimated danger generated for him by the target. The system is installed in front of the armoured control center of the ship. That gives the final permission for the launch of the missiles. These are arranged in rows of vertical silos (habitually, are four with 4 missiles each one) placed in the front cover, in the part that was occupying the conventional artillery. The silos are re-fed from the interior of the ship with other missiles after the launches. The missiles are propeled by solid fuel, which allows that they should be smaller than the land launched. And the adjustment of the system is studied for the destruction of the enemy ballistic missiles.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age

The activities that the military men realize in action in front the enemy are numerous, varied and some of them are complex. And all of them demand a sufficient attention from the controls and men. Let us see some of the most significant. Regarding the movement in the ground: to advance, to stop and to move back; so much running as walking, crawling or incorporated, and doing it by jumps or in zig zag. Regarding placing and valueing the environment, hostile or not: to observe, to detect, to process, to decide, to transmit or not the results and to act. Regarding the form of fight (rejection or attack): to hide, to cover and to be protected, to change position, to define well evasive detected targets, to receive the orders of the immediate chief, to attack them with deliberate, rapid, etc. fire, (if it is a question of an infantry). Regarding the communication with his “group” (team, weapon, squad, section): to receive orders and information, to send information and orders, to spread information. And they carry out all this under the uncertainty, the lack of comfort, the tension, the loneliness, even of his companion or buddy, and the fear … The constant and repeated sometimes audio-visual information, that is communicated by the modern digital systems can relieve this physical and psychic load of the soldiers? So to achieve it, would really be of great help for them.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age ARE THEY LOOKING, DECIDING OR FIGHTING?

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age IS IT USEFUL HERE?

To all that, it could join a flood of information, insignificant in this moment for his mission or his immediate action. This can generate an increase of the needs of the attention capacities of the military men. Through the more important senses, the sight and the ear. And to originate a diversion of his effective available attention (if there is), towards external not fundamental or neutral stimuli of the images and the conversations. The system is going to transmit them a clearer and detailed information of the targets, even defining some more ephemeral or veiled. But it will not give them information about the intentions and the mental conditions of the different located enemies and their group. Though the system is served with probabilities, previous experiences, alogarithms and reliable estimations…

A practical Application.

In the new model of fighting, the attacking force would be kept simultaneously dispersed, communicated and informed in real time and looking for and attacking the enemy. It would be the supposed advantages of the swarm and his concentric and simultaneous assault, which would count now with the knowledge of the ground and the enemy, thanks to the multiple sensors and systems and the real, caught and transmitted information (not intelligence) to the units of the force.

Are similar in capacity all the units of the force? Then we are demanding from them that each one acts as a «polyvalent» fraction of the unit, without specializing them. With what they will probably have some specific, quantitatively insufficient capacities. Are specialized the units of the force? Then they will have to rely on the simultaneous concurrence, in the defense and the attack, of several units. That should complement between all the necessary functions of this tasks «group». And if the enemy electromagnetic countermeasures work against the wireless communications and is established a communications «silence»? And if we now do not have the telephony circular network of the unit and do not possess double couriers for the transmission of “parts and orders” to the chief and from the chief?

And if the enemy deploys in the same way as us? So we would come to a general clash of weak individual forces against enemies weak forces individual. As the great units spread out for his fighting form. Clash that would be solved by multiple partial and isolate combats, using the attrition. They would be like the singular combats of champions and leaders, which happened in other times. And would gain those who were finally keeping a major number of valid units. It would be a clash won by pure material wear of means: men, military means and expensive and sophisticated IT material, almost without transcendent application.

THE NO “COMBAT AVAILABILITY” OF THE FORCES IN THE DEFENSE.

 

A variant exists of deficient or useless «combat availability» of a military force. And it happens when exists the «entrusted«, the «satisfaction» of the commands in the real state of alert of that one. Without assuming or to appreciate the failures in it.

The Development.

We know that the high limit of a characteristic or property is very difficult or impossible to reach. Some of them are the «total destruction» of the enemy and the absolute «public security» in a population or in a society. If you monitor the great public sites, airports, parks, they would attack a church or a mosque…There are always plenty of potential objectives and not enough security forces… But what is exigible and necessary is that the commands optimize the use of the received military resources, which always are insufficient, in the tasks at their charge. With it they will have made all the humanly possible for fulfilling them. Since the optimization of those is equivalent to his «good employment » and to everything what this involve.

The variant of the deficient «combative availability» that we treat, arises in the defense. And it has several possible origins and reasons. This way, we have the deficient organization and deployment of the security zone. That will allow in major or less measured its secret, patient and multiple penetration by enemy groups. That will not have to possess necessarily sappers’ training. Also the dominant positions near the more or less permanent and important position of the forces, must be garrisoned by advanced detachments of, at least, a squad.

The approximation routes to the forces, from certain distance, must be registered by the mortars, the artillery and/or the aircrafts of support. In some sections ambushes can be established and, in others, obstacles and barriers covered by the own fires. Other sectors can be provided with cameras and sensors. The thermal and acoustic airborne sensors can track and detect small enemy units in the different phases of their approximation march to the combat. The intelligence should facilitate trustworthy reports, with sufficient information and updated with the enemy intentions and plans in our zone and their development.

Resultado de imagen de soldados indisciplinados THEY ALSO COULD BE IRREGULARS.

In the irregular war, the enemy is in the habit of reconnoitre, at least initially and also in fluid conditions of fight, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these «reconnaissance positions», which will never be fixed, but alternative and ephemeral. The own patient observation is the way. And bearing in mind that, if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes must be substituted the observer, Because he looks, but already he does not see. If additional means exist for it and as complement, it is necessary to use the patrolling against the armed or not native marauders, in the way of reconnaissances and attacks with limited aims.


Let’s remember that the correct security must prevent that our forces could be beaten by the fire of the enemy infantry weapons. Also, detecting the enemy, tactical surprises from him are avoided to those. And that the presence and/or the action of our forces in this zone, including the advanced detachments, have as a specific task, to win the sufficient time, in order that the forces that have advanced and deployed them, could reach the right «combat readiness» to reject the enemy. And for all this, the security is a irrenounceable part of our total “combat readiness”.

But, also the most experienced veteran or professional units can be «surprised» by the appearance in force of the unexpected enemy, in an assault against them. And it happens when they are entrusted or satisfy with a deficient security. That is another face, less evident and defined as such, of her not or insufficient own “combat availability«.

An Example from the Western Front in the Second World War.

On June 10 of 1,944, soon after the midnight, 2 º battalion of 29 ª division of infantry of U.S.A. was prepared to pass the night. The men had traveled approximately 25 Kms. during the last 20 hours. The executive official of the battalion, commander Maurice Clift, chose a zone formed by two meadows surrounded by hedgerows, in order that the troops were happening the night in the open. The men entered them and were left to fall down against the terraces of the hedges. So tired they were that nobody bothered to come untied the rucksacks and the personal equipment. The majority of they remained slept at once. Some few paid attention to the noise of a few engines coming closer, but they thought they were American vehicles.

They were actually German tanks and trucks belonging to 352 ª infantry division. Not known by none of two rivals, the Germans had been withdrawing and following the same route that the American battalion followed in its advance. When they stopped, the German explorers detected the North American movements in the meadows of encamped. The Germans advanced secretly and surrounded the meadows.

Suddenly, the Germans threw flares. Under the sinister light, almost as brilliant as the midday light, its assault cannons opened fire on the hedges against the Americans. Along one of the hedges, a platoon got up and was cut down by the German machine guns. Many Americans, scared and disoriented, were running across, looking for the meadows exit; the German infantries were knocking down them with its repetition fire. The shells of the German mortars were exploiting for all the zone of the meadows. The Americans were responding with a vague, jerky rifles fire, directed to the opposite hedges. Which could reach both the Germans and their own men in their strolling.

Resultado de imagen de soldados indisciplinados  WASTER SOLDIERS.

«It was terrible”, a survivor was indicating general Cota. «We had crawled more than 90 ms. out of the field, when we listened from behind, a shouting of our men. I thought that the Germans were launching a bayonet charge against them».

The commander of 2º battalion, lieutenant colonel William Warfield (ironically, camp of war), had his command post in a farm close to the highway. Warfield tried to establish a defense, but it was in vain. The officials who threw out the house towards the field, were brought down rapidly. A German shouted in English towards the command group: «Give up, give up!». «Of giving up, certainly not!», roared Warfield. He tried to lead a small group towards the meadows where his men were, but turned out to be dead immediately.

The battle extended about 20 minutes. The battalion had 150 casualties, including 50 dead, slightly more than one third of its effective. Little before dawn, a gravely injured young lieutenant who was reporting to his division commander, general Charles Gerhardt, was falling down suddenly on knees and was striking the soil with his fists. While was sobbing and was sorry that all his men were died and that he had left them to fall down.

The general Gerhardt got angry. «Without safety, shouted exalted. «Simply the battalion came to the field and threw to fall asleep».

An example of the modern counterinsurgency warfare.

The Bristish Complex Bastion in the province of Helmand.

Helmand is one of 32 provinces of Afghanistan. It spreads over 58.583 km ² at the southwest of the country and has a population around the million and half of inhabitants, of the pashtun and baluchi ethnias. The capital is Laskar Gah. In his Washer’s district, at the northwest of the capital, the Camp Bastion is installed. It is the principal military British base in Afghanistan. It can house between 20 and 30 thousand persons in all its facilities, British and American principally, depending on the Branch to which they belong and their missions, equipments and supplies. It occupies a total extension of 52 Km2, approximately 10 km per 5 km. It was designed to be the center of the logistic operations of the ISAF in Helmand. In addition, it is the major military British camp constructed outside their country after the II World War. Built by the British Engineers since the beginning of 2006, the Complex is placed in a desert zone and away from the populations and is provided with long clear sights in all directions.

The Camp is divided structurally in different «sections». Bastion 1 and 2 were first erected. Bastion 2 also contains the Camp Barber (USA) and the Camp Viking (Danish). Bastion 0 was added about 2010 and it houses the facilities of the external contractors. The Bastion 3 is used for the specific training of counterinsurgency. The Complex also includes Camp Leatherneck (of the USMC) and Camp Shorabak, of the National Afghan Army. Camp Bastion’s airport, which possesses two landing strips, attends more than 600 aircraft flights every day, in operations of combat, logistic and medicals. In the attached heliport are deployed the Westland WAH-6 Apache of multiple attack and the Boeing CH-47 Chinook of mixed transport. In these moments the Complex can handle and attend almost all the military and civil aircraft in use. The Complex also houses a great military campaign hospital. And large areas of this great base are protected by a nine meters high concrete wall, which spreads over a perimeter of more of 40km, inserted with special vigilance towers, with soldiers and high technology instruments.

Resultado de imagen de soldados indisciplinados SOLDIERS DRINKING IN THE JAIL.

The British base has been attacked in diverse occasions during his years of existence. The most “media” occasion has been this that we treat. In the assault were dead two Marines (of the attached Camp Leatherneck). And other nine persons, eight military men and a civil contractor, were hurt. Six McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II airplanes of the Marines Corps were destroyed and other two were very damaged. As for the logistic facilities, were destroyed three stations of fuels supply and damaged six aviation hangars not structurally reinforced.

The atack tactic of the Taliban.

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended or without spirit enemy position is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL hollow charge grenade-launchers. They only fire on verified targets or from above and from below them. When they try to keep the surprise, the initiative and the confusion, to lengthen the military reaction time and to obtain a very local and temporary superiority, they act without their meager heavy fire support.

E incluso avanzan arrastrándose lenta y pacientemente. Por ejemplo, para romper un perímetro defensivo y dirigirse y atacar los hangares y aparcamientos evidentes de grandes aeronaves.

A characteristic of the Taliban is that they do not get involved in the defense of their positions. Once obtained the harassment of the enemy and extended the hurt, the mutilation and the stupor on the military men, they will move back. They are not so silly to wait intrepid for the heavy, precise and devastate military fire. Nor to presume of courage, in front of enemies with weapons of superior range and characteristics and capable of turning a surface target into a destruction zone. Also, there are the time and its corollary, the opportunity. The Taliban handle very well the tactical and operational times. They are masters of the patience, the waiting, the repetition of simple and easy trainings. For the important attacks they manage to use scale models of the goal. And, to penetrate in a base and attack the heavy and evident war aircrafts, only need to represent part of the perimeter, the directional location of the target and its identification, as well as the rejection fighting positions of the irruption sector.

Its execution.

Enough hours before 12 pm of Thursday, the 13th of September of 2012, the Taliban forces began to approach from several directions to the air zone of the Complex. To keep a low tactical trace, they followed dragging techniques in their advance to and through the security zone of the area. And up to there got, without being detected, 45 to 50 insurgents that, in three convergent spears of advance attacked by midnight, supported by their squad organic weapons. Not to being detected up to the beginning of the assault, also helped them the scanty combative availability of the men. And the tedious and unproductive routine of the guards and patrols, which creates the passive defense of a great protective barrack. Around 15 Taliban from two of the groups, managed to get through Camp Bastion’s perimeter and to effectively attack the air zone. Finally the attacking group was wiped out (dead and injured men and prisoners).

It was a «significant» assault, the British Defense Department declared, as the insurgents should never have come so far away. It was, admitted the ISAF, a «good coordinated» attack. Organized in three assault groups, the Taliban managed to get through the defense perimeter of the base. «They were well equipped and trained, dressing USA Army uniforms and armed with automatic rifles, grenade-launchers and explosive jackets», continued the ISAF in his communique. This mission assured that during the assault, the international troops killed 14 insurgents and hurt other one, who is arrested.

The British correspondents in Afghanistan assured that Camp Bastion has an excellent visibility from all parts and is extremely strengthened. The defense correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, who has been for more than twelve times in Camp Bastion, wrote on Sunday, the 14th: «In spite of being in the center of the most dangerous province of Afghanistan, I always felt completely sure, undoubtedly, from an assault of the Taliban. And honestly I believed that there were more possibilities of dying knocked down by a military vehicle that murdered by insurgents». The Coalition’s forces, make clear the correspondents, ask themselves how the Taliban were capable of giving this surprise attack to a strengthened and isolated complex barrack. And a spokesman, Adam Wojack, said that the Friday assault «was a sign for the Coalition that it is necessary to give much attention to the popular, local and international state of mind about Afghanistan».

On Monday, the 10th of September Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman insurgent, declared to Reuters that the Taliban were trying to use all their resources to kill the prince Henry (also called «Harry the Nude», his name of war), third in the succession line to the British throne. After the facts, another Taliban spokesman underlined that they attacked in «revenge» for the American amateur movie which offends Mohammed. And that they choose to commit an attack against Camp Bastion, because the prince Harry was there, acting as co-pilot gunner in the Joint Air Group.

 

And other one of an unsuccessful army …

On Sunday, the 18th of December, 2016, the franchise of the Islamic State in the Republic of Yemen realized an assault against the barracks of the so called National Security in al-Saulaba. That is placed 20 km at north of the coastal city of Aden, at the south of the country and that is now his nominal capital. One first showy characteristic of these suicidal assaults of the EI is that from August of this year, three assaults have been realized against the same barracks. Whose commands obstinatly mantain an ineffective and deficient «combative readiness» of the forces of the garrison, to keep their security.

In the last assault, the most lethal, died 50 soldiers of the Army of Yemen, loyalist to the president Abdo Rabu Mansur Hade. Hundreds of soldiers were still in the exterior of the barracks, waiting to receive the permission to enter and to receive their pays. One thousand soldiers had acceded already in the military facilities. But the access was limited to avoid agglomerations in the courts and facilities. Then, sunni terrorist slipped between the soldiers who were waiting out. And detonated his explosives jacket. Possibly liberating the so called “detonator of the dead man”.

The security is one of so called “principles of the war». That define «what to do» to obtain militarily our aims. And though it does not appear in all the existing lists of principles, specially in the shorter ones, the security is here to remain. And of its not observance, the efficiency and the power of other accepted principles will get reduced or disabled in their application. Since the principles constitute a global, harmonic and synergic set of the procedures of the to do well, for a military operational system.

EPILOG.

The combination of the usual defense and the mobile proactive defense exercises a synergic and convergent effect, of perfection and securement of the security zone. To detect and reject the tactical surprises of the enemy and to alert the own forces of his appearance from behind horizon. And to blur him the tracing of our defense zone. Thanks to the combat and observation advanced positions and the actions from them and of the patrols and advanced detachments. That would allow the enemy to glimpse and estimate where there would be the «defense positions» in the rejection zone and where the heavy fires of the defense would preferably go, in front of the forward limit of the mentioned zone.

THE WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. Second Part.

(CONTINUATION)

 

Operational Characteristics of the Attacks with Elite Ground Forces.

Units and small units that attack with limited aims (a deep incursion, the temporal capture of a critical position, an ambush) constitute a military closed «system». This condition imposes specific characteristics on the “interfaces of action” with the enemy, which are sometimes different to those of great units, especially in the theme of available means and the time of action.

Attacks with limited aims have been operationally used along large fronts. Where the enemy’s defense lacked depth and enough reserves and was looking to minimize own wear and make use of the multiplier effect of the set’s efforts. This occurred with notable success when the forces of the 9th German infantry Army of General Model sought to reform and consolidate its fronts in the Sychevka’s southwest zone between January and April of 1942.

The definitive characteristic of his use, adapted in these tasks, is that is used with criterion unity, by a kept and «concentric» in the result of his impulses “operational gravity center”. So that the limited efforts do not vanish in reconnaissance in force actions, in not suitable or out of opportunity sectors. It is to say, usiing unduly.

The field of action is the secret for applying freedom of action. By extending or decreasing the field of action, or by changing the field of action on the enemy, one can keep or recover the necessary freedom of action to act favorably and not simply reacting to the enemy.

«Field of action» is any «spatial-temporary-circumstantial» situation that allows for the suitable employment of an Army’s means and capacities in accordance or as part of that army’s intention. The field of action is formed by one or several «interfaces of action«, which are the very small sectors where direct contact occurs between the small units of action of each rival. Examples are when a deployed platoon attacks an enemy section, when a tank attacks infantry heavy weapons, when a section attacks by firing on an enemy’s strong position, when an engineering section opens a path in a minefield, etc.

The task is to find an optimal way in which, through successive «periods of action» applied in «fields or interfaces of action», one can gain the relative freedom of action to act and to carry out «quantum» or elementary units of the general intention. In addition, a general action can be divided into numerous partial actions to achieve in stages, momentary or minor «periods of action»; acting this way in the same «field», divided in minor interfaces of action.

Interaction in stages and situations suitable to advance one’s military means guided by the superior intention or orders is the general mechanism for applying, recovering and maintaining freedom of action in one’s favor.

A characteristic of the freedom of action is that is interactive with the enemy in the «interface of action» and is played out in fields of action that chosen by or imposed on an army. Passiveness means that freedom of action is not taken advantage of through lack of initiative. Thus, freedom of action can also have a result opposite to its intention and this can happen regardless of the type of fight engaged in, whether it is offensive or defensive.

The units had to gain combat superiority over the enemy, since obtaining a local and temporary supremacy would allow them to achieve their aims.

Essential to the mission’s conception are intelligence and simplicity. Essential to its preparation are security and training. The characteristics of the mission in action are surprise, tempo and the commitment of all the mission participants.

Simplicity allows the force to concentrate on a few related aims, using a limited number of men and means in the military closed system. If new tactics or different technologies are used, both the simplicity of the mission’s conception and the surprise of its execution will be enhanced.

On September 12, 1943, the captain of the S. S. Otto Skorzeny carried out the rescue of the Duce from his prison in the high mountain hotel Great Sasso located in the Apennines. Gliders were used to assault the position, fighting against the difficult cold draughts (these produced a delay in the arrival, as they landed at midday) and scarce sites for landing. That such a difficult assault would be attempted, higly surprised the on duty «carabinieri». The attackers took advantage of this by gaining access to the principal building while. At the same time, an acquaintance general of the «carabinieri» friendly landed with Skorzeny. Combat supremacy was rapidly achieved.

Intelligence supposes complete, up-to-date and timely knowledge of the circumstances and characteristics of the mission. Here, with so limited employing means, intelligence is facilitated by different agencies and units that intervene with the mission, even those at the level of the state. Specially the CIA, the National Security Agency or NSA, the Central Security Service or CSS, that links with the NSA, and the FBI.

Security refers principally to the stages of planning, preparation, training and, if appropriate, stage of transport or insertion. It has active and passive aspects. Giving off misleading information and concealing the force’s real intentions up until the stage of action on the objective. Each person must only know what is necessary for his actuation.

Training must be generic for actions and tactics and specific for those actions required for the mission. Independently of this, training is necessary to achieve coordinated actions among units taking part simultaneously in some part of the mission. A general rehearsal of the mission is also necessary, including its planning duration and margins for mistakes. It is also good to include some variant that represents a mistake, an unforeseen event or a loss of combat or movement capacity. And that the men train in correcting them or, at least, in neutralizing them with his effort. For example, a part of the helicopters is knocked down or lands at major distance of the foreseen in the theoretical disembarkation zone.

The final «training area» must be similar in general characteristics to the «target area». And it must be placed at safe of detections and filtrations of information (security), which onlookers and interested persons can catch. The independent variable of «time» introduces sometimes unexpected and not always welcome effects. For example, a vehicle presents problems after a number of hours of hard use, that was not foreseen in tests of «at scale» time.

Surprise supposes attacking an enemy (even if arranged in prepared defense) at a point or flank that is neglected by him at the moment, giving the attacker a favorable «interface of action» on him. It must suppose a “tactical innovation”. Though it could also contain technical differential or new elements. Examples of such “innovations” in the past are hollow load bullets or charges and flame-throwers.

The surprise is the sufficient and necessary multiplier of the combat capacity of the «small incursion force». That will allow him to compensate the scanty military resources that it has on the area. To it joins his inconsiderate and carefully applied with rapidity employment. To provoke an overwhelming effect on the enemy, achieving the temporary local superiority. As being an «isolated military system», the incursion force of will receive neither reinforcements, nor supplies. For its part, the time is not neutral, here is an enemy: because there is not more operation time. From his depletion, the unit will confront the pursuit and his annihilation…

Speed consists in firmnessly acting, ahead of the enemy, in the successive elementary «cycles of action» that define a performance or process. It also presupposes acting with opportunities and with pace (adapted speed, relative to the enemy). Remember that an action cycle includes a phase of observation, a phase of determining the situation, the decision phase and the accomplishment phase. If one’s speed is greater than that of the enemy, his actions will be in response to situations that have already just passed.

Speed also implies rapidly reaching a situation of active supremacy in combat capacity. The enemy’s reaction speed is initially very slow as he is in a stupor, trying to verify what is happening. This means his phase of determining the situation will be lengthened. Deceptive action in these moments will lengthen the time that passes and fog the determination of the situation. Ways of doing this include utilizing some of the enemy’s uniforms, equipment or language by certain parts or subunits involved in the action. Once supremacy over the enemy is attained, it must always be kept. As scanty resources make its recovery very difficult. Once supremacy in combat capacity is reached, the probability of a mission’s success increases exponentially and the vulnerabilities of one’s forces are dramatically diminished.

The commitment of men and officers and their selection qualities, lend moral and physical courage to the actions they undertake. This is necessary to overcome uncertainty, stress, mistakes, diversions, enemy actions, and to take advantage of the always fleeting opportunities. Commitment supposes full knowledge of the mission and the full, voluntary and enthusiastic support of all participants.

Execution is carried out by establishing at the level of the regiment, battalion or company a center of gravity for the common effort, which harmonizes and consolidates the «missions» of its subunits.

THE END.

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE.

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

 

 

A little known example illustrates the omnipresent transcendence of logistics and the line of communication (more or less branched out) in operations and their final results. Between January 29 and mid-March 1943, the Soviets developed an operation called Donbass at the southwest of the Donetz. This operation forms part of what the Germans called the battle of the Donetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.

 

General Nikolai Fiodorovich Vatutin, commander of the Southwest Front, created a mobile corp (under the command of general Markian Mijailovich Popov) in the Soviet Front, to exploit the break its armies had achieved at the south-east of Kharkov. The Corp was like an Army of tanks (the Soviets had five Armies of tanks in their battle order). It was integrated by 4 tanks Corps of limited capacity (3rd, 10th, 18th and 4th of the Guard), each of which was reinforced by an infantry mobile division (in trucks). For support it had the mobile Front reserve, the tanks Corps (full up) 25th and 1st of the Guard. These reserves would, at the beginning of February, pursue a exploitation direction different from that of the Popov Group. Assimilating those tactical subordination divisions into the mechanized Corps, thus making them stronger in men and heavy equipment, was hoped to compensate for the specific lack of infantry and artillery of the Soviet tanks Corps.

GENERAL VATUTIN.

Popov Group initially crossed the Donetz from a southwest direction. Its 4th Guard tanks Corp reached Krasnoarmeiskaia on the morning of February 12, after a night march of 60 kilometers from Kramatorsk. During this march, the Corp used one of its tanks brigades, the 14ª of the Guard, as anadvanced detachment”, to eliminate the tactical rubbing” in its advance sector and thus maximize its speed of advance.

GENERAL POPOV.

On February 15, General Vatutin employed his two reserve Corps in the Pavlograd-Zaporozhe direction, towards the mouth of the river Dnepr on the Black Sea. Zaporozhe was the Headquarters for the Don German Group of Armies (this Group had been called South until February 1, 1943) and the 4th Air Fleet (led by Marshal Von Manstein and General Von Richtofen, respectively) which were located in the low Dnepr.

The efforts of the Russians were aimed at trying to reach the coast and to cut the Germansland communications. But the Russians also stubbornly insisted on boasting. Their supporting forces (the rest of the Armies of the southwest Front, especially the 6th infantry and 1st infantry of the Guard) were not defending the advance sectors of their mobile forces. And these forces, advancing as fast as they could toward their ideal operational-strategic aim, stretched their communications lines to the maximum. And made them increasingly vulnerable by extending its length and, thus, the coverage required by antitank and anti-aircraft weapons supported with infantry.

The Soviets acted as if the speed of reaching the objective could, by itself, unhinge the German deployment, by cutting it off from its general Order of Battle and lines of communications towards the West. In reality, they were not given full credit to their enemys maneuver capacity, his ability to create and improvise resources and his still relatively powerful combat capacities, especially among his mobile and crack forces, in the operational zone.

THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMANDER.

Yet much of the pressure for a rapid advance came from Stalin. Probably through the Stavka, Stalin incited Vatutin to spur on Popov and the other mobile corps. Ultimately, this led to Stalins disenchantment (to the point of leading him to request a peace through Swedish diplomats) when the planned operations concluded. See Gerhard L. Weinburg. A World at Arms. Cambridge, 1944.

For their part, the Germans had difficulties in containing the Soviets winter offensive concentrated at the south of Belgorod. In the operational strategic zone of the Don Group of Armies, the Soviet forces overcame the Germans at a proportion of 8 to 1, whereas, in the case of the German Center and North Groups of Armies, that ratio was only 4 to 1.

Von Manstein maintained a front that was 750 kilometers long with 30 divisions. This left him vulnerable to envelopment on the north flank, in a maneuver that could reverse his front or turn his forces back in his operational or strategic rear. Or his forces could be broken through by a forceful action in any zone and he would be left without sufficient available mobile forces to launch an operational strategic counterattack. It was necessary to readjust the front, anchoring it on natural obstacles; and to push back the Soviet offensives toward Kiev (north flank) and the Black Sea or the Azov Sea, creating for it the necessary mobile reserves. Hitler, probably affected by the fall of 6th Army at the end of January in Stalingrad, compromised with Manstein’s requests to yield land in order to gain safety and mobility.

IN THE COVER OF «TIME» NEWSMAGAZINE…

Thus, during the first fortnight of February, the Hollidt Army moved back from the low Donetz, following the Rostov and Tangarov route and dug in again along the river Mius, approximately 80 kilometers to the west of Rostov. The 48 panzer Corps that were in action at the east of Rostov, moved to the north of Stalino, to join the 4th panzer Army of General Hoth and to form part of the mobile counterattack force.

In the middle of February, despite Hitler’s orders to resist at any price, the SS Army Kempf (formerly Lanz) evacuated Kharkov, when its north flank was enveloped by the Soviets from the direction of Belgorod. Meanwhile, the 4th panzer Army was moving back from the low Don toward positions to Stalino’s northwest. This was a difficult march of more than fifteen days over poor road conditions and railroad connections and lines. For its part, the 1st panzer Army, formerly part of the A Group of Armies in the Caucasus, could have moved back through Rostov, thanks 4th panzer Army hold on the front in the low Donetz area. And was taking positions in a front from north-east of Stalino up to the north of the Mius river.

THE GERMAN FIELDMARSCHAL’S COMMAND BATON.

With these maneuvers the Germans left the projecting in their front formed by the Don and Donetz rivers, readjusted their defensive front and managed to create an important operational maneuver force, formed by all three mentioned armies. It is important to emphasize that the Germans were not reacting to the Russians; they were adapting to the general conditions and the forces relations existing, with the expectation that they would act positively when the opportunity arose. This is probably the secret behind their operational blow (like a scythe blow) and the operational and strategicstunning waves” that they were to unleash on the Soviet Armies, which reached the enemys Supreme Commander.

On February 22, the two armored Corps (48 at the right side and the SS panzer at the left side) of the 4th panzer Army of Hoth initiated an offensive movement in the northwest direction on the communications lines of Popov Group and both independent Soviet tanks Corps of the southwest Front.

The terrain was highly favorable for using armored vehicles. Its surface was slightly wavy, allowing for extensive sight control. The narrow creeks that interlaced it were frozen.

Simultaneously there was a convergent attack by the SS Army Kempf from the west, completing the operation of the other five panzer divisions (reduced). This Army also had to prevent the advance on the Dnepr of forces from other Soviet Fronts, either around Krasnograd and Dnepropetrovsk or around Poltava and Kremenchug. This soviet attack, that was aimed at Kiev, was of a larger scope and, therefore, had scantier prospects for success before the spring thaw. The army SS Kempf had limited capacity to reject it.

It is worth emphasizing that, at the time, the 4th Air Fleet of General Richtofen enjoyed air supremacy over the operations zone and his aircraft could support the objective of cutting the enemys communications with up to 1,000 daily sorties.

THE FÜHRER ADOLF VISITS HIM IN ZAPOROZHE, TO CALM DOWN.

The Russian armored vehicles and truck columns were moving back toward the north and north-east at a distance of between 15 and 20 kilometers from the Germans, making them prey to the German divisional and army Corps artillery and aviation.

It was not a question of thesurrounded bag”-style operations that the Germans had carried out in 1941. The area being covered was larger, the German combat capacity (mainly based on infantry forces with artillery and antitank weapons) was scanty and the Soviet forces were elite mobile units with great fire and shock capacities. And knew the danger presented by the loss of its logistical support, at least their commands.

On February 23 both armored army Corps (the SS and 48th) of the 4th panzer Army were converging on Pavlograd. They cut the communications line of the Popov group, which was situated around Grishino, and of the 25th and 1st of the Guard tanks Corps (the mobile reserve of the Southwest Front) which were already approaching Zaporozhe, although not yet in full force. Likewise, the Germans severely struck the 6th infantry Army (at the west of Isyum), following the Front’s mobile reserve, and the 1st infantry Guard Army, which was behind the Popov group, before they cross the Donetz, moving back to their rearguard.

This temporarily liquidated the combat capacity of the Southwest front (General Vatutin). Unless that front focused on reorganizing and re-equipping itself and covering its casualties. And also tried to revive its combat morale by encouraging cohesion and retraining its units and small units.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

 

THE COMBAT OF THE SMALL MILITARY UNITS.

Introduction.

Each small military unit, each «action unit» is a sub unit that is capable of carrying out a function in the superior unit to which it belongs or gets support. From its tactical integration will arise bigger units of action, capable of actuating in larger » fields of action».

The units of action can be of command, combat (of fire, of shock and mixed), organizational (H. Q. sections), logistics, communications and of intelligence (exploration, intelligence and counterintelligence and propaganda and psychological war). The smallest of combat would be the squad with its fire support (light machine gun and servants) and its 2 or 3 teams, capable of maneuvering or defending a firing line.

It keeps them united and makes possible the fulfillment of its functions, its interest (esteem, self esteem and shared aim of the unit, opposite to the wear and the certain or apparent danger, but assumed as such), the full deployment (that provides an organizational structure and that feeds its functions, to guarantee the union and the action), the command (that offers guide, cohesion, example and correct command sense) and the situation (that is friendly, neutral or threatening, in increasing order of dilution of the union and loss of the efficiency). These originate in turn the deployments and the combats and the maneuvers, which are the «form» decided by the command to apply the capacity of combat and a “tempo”, pace or speed of action, thanks to the freedom of action that is possessed; those offer, together with the evolution of the situation, the opportunities and the dangers.

FIRE SUPPORT BASE WITH 105 MM. HOWTIZERS.

It appreciates a rich multiplicity of interactions between the subunits, on the basis of its functions and the dependence between them, in relation with its integration in the unit, the maintenance of its cohesion and the fulfillment of its superior function.

The deployments make possible the success or the failure; they also guarantees the order against the environment chaos or negative interactions, always unpredictable and unproductive; the situation gives intrinsically to the unit the courage or the cowardice; the command and the interest drive the positive or effective action of the unit, in order to its cohesion and its function or aim in the all set.

The Combined Arms Performance Process. The Control Means.

The units of action face the enemy using a combined arms system. They go to the enemy keeping a direction (maneuver and shock) and with a fire support. And though it could be a unit as small as the squad, with its shooters or fusiliers and of support teams, are specializing subunits in the combined arms concept. Sometimes the van men must do something strange to the Americans, but very effective advancing to the contact or passing the flank an enemy group or position, crawling.

REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

They try to reach the effective combat distance, creating a favorable interface, a shooting enfilade or a position for grazing fire or an effective assault distance, without losing its combat capacity. For example, by fixation by the enemy fire, by important losses or what affects its cohesion or the command, and by wear). And protected by the natural concealment or artificial one (fogs, covering fire). They work quietly and unseen in the micro ground without limitation of time up to the effective distance. They can use hand grenades to disguise their action on intermediate obstacles (sentries, etc.), that appears as mortar bombs.

The supposed continuous line of the front is crumbled. There arise a multitude of unexpected new internal fronts, possible favorable “interfaces of action” for us. It is not an infiltration, because the front is diffuse (approximately 0,15 man/m) and emptiness (some 4.000 m2/man). But of the active creation of «action fields» adapted in successive stages of action, for the employment of the unit in favorable interfaces over the enemy. The characteristics of performance are the coordination and/or the convergent effort of the different weapons in «fields of action» where they act. That are different and can be superpose, as they are shooters, light and middle mortars, machine guns, grenade-launchers, direct fire cannons, etc. From our appearance in effective force, where less they wish us and without having being detected, the erroneously expressive concept that «we» «infiltrate arises. But that is a mere spatial consequence of the real operational concept followed.

Technologically a division of significance exists between the support or the firing base and the attack or the offensive advance, linked by its cooperation. The support weapons are the protectors, those of greater effective range. The offensive weapons are those of smaller relative range in the set. Sequential and practically, thus, the cannon (direct or indirect heavy fire) protects the machine gun, the grenade launcher, the medium or light mortar. And these three protect and impel the shooters, when their action is or is already going to be evident.

Evolution of the Actions in his Sector. The Retroinformation of the Commands.

As consequence of the interfaces of action with the enemy, there arise in the tactical zone multiple actions of the action units. With them, the information feedback to the command, tends to enlarge to saturation, to bunch in all kinds of communications links and to affect the functional interrelationships of the unit. So, hindering its synergy, and demanding the reinforcement and/or the decision of the command, if he has not delegated sufficiently or is not monitoring the situation changes.

LAV’s ATTACKED WITHOUT INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT, THROUGH A VERY NARROW LANE, A BRIDGE…

This «undue plethora» is a structural generator of rubbing, a squandering of efforts and means. And it is the measurement of the trend to the loss of the cohesion, of the principal sense and the goal, which suffers a tactical combined arms unit.

The key to manage this «undue plethora», containing it reasonably, resides that everyone must observe, control and drive the necessary for the fulfillment of its mission, below its level in the hierarchy. For it the commander must share his intention and aims (mission type orders), establish a gravity center of his combined effort in every situation and guarantee the cooperation between and the support to his units. All this relying on the operations order and the updated intelligence received.

As parts of a complex system (hierarchy, specialization and aims and intentions), the units of action can be all autonomous (mission type orders, gravity center, different or shared operational sectors) and all specialized (engineers, antitank, anti-aircraft, exploration, chemistry, etc.) as is needed. To be able to fulfill, this way, with flexibility, rapidity and efficiency its functions in the interfaces of action with the enemy. It kept with all this, the structural hierarchy (integration in a major unit and its support) and functional (in the area of the intention and on support of this one).

The effective performance of the units of action resides in its aptitude to actuate flexible and semi independently from the section or platoon level in fulfilling the received mission. For it, they also will have to know and consider the capacities and needs of other weapon and supports. And acting the men looking for themselves and for other companions in the unit. Its officers and NCO must be capable of taking and drive decisions based on the mission and on the evolution of the situation.

Evidently, the desideratum is to work this way. And this one must be the trend to continue in the selection, formation, training and utilization of the men and the units. In the practice. the “degree of general efficiency” obtained, will be determined by the idiosyncrasy of a nation, the character more or less gregarious or independent of its peoples, its military doctrine and tradition, the defense budgets, the national moral, the national politics and the international situation, the integration of institutions and national organizations in the international sphere, etc.

An example attack of a combined arms unit.

Lets see an example. Against an infantry position more or less prepared, with advanced antitank means, a typical defensive zone, we can use in the breakthrough or in its destruction, if we can not pass outflanking it, the dismounted infantry followed in covered bounds by tanks for the protection and the direct fire support of it.

The antitank defender will look for a punctual, relatively big and protected target, from covered positions preferably or, at least, well camouflaged and flanking, and will act in batteries. With the pieces dispersed in order that the same enemy heavy fire can not incapacitate them. The infantry heavy weapons (machine guns in tripods) neutralize, «sweeping and searching», a more or less narrow zone of the front, occupied by a dispersed, small and smooth target, an infantry platoon.

The attacking tanks will beat with H.E. and H.E.S.H. shells those infantry strong positions. And the infantry squads will attack with its light machine guns the servants of the antitank pieces, hindering to acquire a punctual target. All this destruction and neutralization labor is spreading, once achieved the irruption, as a worm movements, in the depth of the tactical zone of the assault sector of the combined arms unit. Other parts of the enemy position that could collaborate in the defense rejection are blocked up by smoke and neutralized by indirect heavy fire.

GOING OUT TO CLOSE FIGHTING.

Besides, the artillery and aviation advanced observers will be defining to these support weapon the new targets that the own assault is discovering in the depth and in the flanks (combat exploration) in the advance sector. The criterion of the gravity center of the fire of support will be neutralize, at least, all the targets that are opposed to the advance towards the enemy position, to the irruption and to the struggle inside the position of defense in the assigned sector. Facilitating this way the direct fire and the shock of the land attackers. And that, by means of concentrated and punctual blows of its fire.

With it, the effective action in the given environment, «interfaces of action» essential characteristic, are optimized at the level of the tactical groups of action or combined arms systems, whose complementariness we have stood out.

In broken, very wavy, wooded or urbanized (housings and factories) grounds, not necessarily mountainous, that have scanty “sight control” and with abundant “relative concealing heights”, the “interfaces of action” reduce its sector.

The element of effective action continues being the combined arms system suitable sized. The action is effected by companies or reinforced interarms platoons, with the heavy fire support provided even by the battalion (medium and heavy mortars). Except in the most flat areas and of scanty obstructions to sight, the transitability, which limits physically the possible interfaces of action, prevents the fight using concentrated means beyond the company. The battalion role will be of reinforcing the efforts of their companies and canalizing the supports.

Always are critical in the land action the existing rivers, streams and channels, especially the more or less ones perpendicular to the front. The blockade of these waters flows affects enormously the tempo, the total speed of the operation, for the difficulty of the more or less sloping or obstructed area that surrounds them (forests, gullies, constructions, not reinforced fords). The advance slows down or the means have to be dispersed in the available parallel routes, forcing to enter other difficult bordering areas.

General Plans and Forecasts of the Command.

The contingencies plan of the units must include overcoming essentially four types of situations not foreseen, that intervene in the fulfillment of the mission and that can manage to compromise it.

These would be:

a) Possible direct action of the enemy, in use of the initiative or claiming recover it. It might be an interdiction bombardment, a counterattack. The solution is to tactically neutralize its action, without compromising the mission.

b) Possible encounter with the enemy. It would be a theme of patrols and sentries, advanced security forces and advanced detachments and reconnaissance patrols. It is necessary to submit or push back them and change positions rapidly and even direction temporarily, to not compromise the mission.

c) Possible unforeseen obstacle. They would be a ditch, a slope of more difficult soil, the blowing-up of a bridge, a flood, a storm, which affect the transitability of the area. It would be a matter of overcoming it as rapidly as possible, keeping the security and extending more yet the reconnaissance.

d) Possible action defensive/passive of the enemy. These are the cases of enter an ambush, a minefield, a reinforced cut covered by fire, the rejection fires of a defense position, an antitank obstacle. Is necessary to overcome it as soon as possible, as the natural obstacle case, avoiding besides to be canalized by the enemy in a direction he wished, favorable to a counterattack or at zone beaten by the artillery or by convergent fires.

In general lines, including in the commander plan, must always be foreseen:

1) To overcome or to repel the enemy and/or the obstacle, which hinder and which will present without being able to be foreseen, avoiding facilitate own information to the enemy.

2) Lost or detached means to overcome, to neutralize or to repulse are means deprived to the fulfillment of the mission. The surviving enemy can facilitate compromising information, which will be late a term in to be an effective intelligence.

3) It is necessary to continue the execution of the mission, with the necessary means to fulfill it. It is a multiplier factor of the efficiency, after the commotion and the incident losses, to keep a high execution «momentum»: the product of its “combat capacity” by its average movement speed in a period, at a given direction and sense.

The example of the preparation and the action of 3er. American Army of the general Patton, counter-attacking the German penetration in the Ardennes, is significant of these difficulties. Its «incident» was a sudden change of mission and of direction and sense of performance and the possibilities of their «execution momentum».

All this is not improvised. It results in the practice only as fruit of the frequent training and the organization work and the coordination of the H.Q. and all the commands and me. We shall remember the sayings, «it is actuated as it is trained» and «the man is an habit animal».

The Elite Military Units.

These units receive a more complete and effective training in the modern times. That is applicable to a personnel that clearly enjoys the exercise of his profession. And not only it enlists to fulfill a civic duty, to collaborate with the companions (up to the level of battalion), though the immediate ones are those of the piece or squad, and to come back home. In general, they act rapidly and hard, even inconsiderately, against his aim.

Resultado de imagen de ranger de texas A TIPICAL TEXAS RANGER OF THE XIX CENTURY.

It is a question of a military closed «system», that it is vulnerable to the encircle and the ambush and whose limited means are only the assigned for the mission. So, it is difficult to receive reinforcements, including when they operate in the surroundings of the own “supporting mass” or great units. The intelligence for the mission must be elaborated from confirmed, constant, sufficient and updated informations. Since she will protect them from the surprises and the setbacks in destination, which are the «critical difficulty» that they can find and the major danger for all men.

His combat experience has advised them to never surrender the weapons and to always continue the effort, the fight. What has saved them from more than one failure, since the enemy was surrendering before they: for not paying the high cost of conquering them. They largely accept the discipline as a necessary quality for the cohesion and efficiency of his unit. Here, more that in other branches, the commands have to be authentic leaders, directing with the example. And of proven formation, in order that his men admit that his «life insurance» in the missions is the fulfillment of the orders of his commands and with the flexibility degree that grants the order for the mission.

THE MOTIVATION OF THE MILITARY MEN.

Introduction.

At the beginning of June, 2014 around 30 thousand Iraqi soldiers quartered in Niniveh’s province, capital Mosul (2 million habitants), left their positions and put feet in dusty towards Baghdad. To rapidly realize this «retrograde march» not foreseen by the command, towards the sure refuge of the great Iraqi city, they left behind their heavy equipment, tanks and artillery. What real or supposed threat suffered these professional uniformed soldiers, to get frightened that way? So, the advance to the combat over the province of several hundreds of salafists jihadists muyahidins of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. That were moving in Toyota pick up vehicles, without shielding and lightly armed with heavymachine guns and some rapid fire cannons (20 mm). Though it is true that the muyahidins were approaching the thousand…

ISIS’ IRREGULARS TRAINING…

The Iraqi soldiers were trained by the Americans and his methods and were equipped with modern weapons. The jihadistas had almost autotrained from last/first of 2012/2013 and their weapons were those of a light irregular infantry. Singularly the AK, machine guns and assault rifles, and the light grenade-launchers RPG-7V, casually of Russian patent design. The muyahidins were integrating then a useful force lower than 20 thousand men in Iraq and Syria.

The Iraqis were uniformed, more or less trained in the boots and maneuvers fields, fed, dressed and paid. According to the duke of Wellington, this was sufficient to demand dedication and selflessness from the men: «Soldiers, you are well fed and kept, fulfill now your duty». Though part of their pays were harvested by his direct commands, NCOs, officials and chiefs. For example, as a «bribe» in order that they were not occupying dangerous positions. Furthermore, many enlisted were only nominally, on the paper, and the pays of these “ghosts” were distributed the commands. This way, in November, 2014 there was a special meeting of the Iraqi Parliament to study this plague. That continues destroying his armed forces: that of the «enlisted absentee».

 SHIIS TRAINING…

But the result of this mix of military formation and equipment was an appearance, an entelechy. The Iraqi army was a sham of a national army. That was serving to patrol for benevolent zones; to parade; to support the public order against bandits and delinquents, over that which was acting using an overwhelming superiority of means; and getting idle in the quarters, much better than the majority of the familiar Iraqi houses of adobe and masonry. The number of his troops was the mesmeric, infallibly and omnipresent of approximately 200 thousand, in the flowchart of the battle order of the army. That are the same prescribed by for the American military high commands and ratified by the president, to effectively integrate and serve in the National Afghan Army.

But, neither the training, nor the equipment, nor the wages are enough to turn the men into complete soldiers. His officials’ corp is not nourished by the university, or by an official accredited school and with certain tradition or from a meritorious ascent of the excellence of the NCOs. And his NCOs’ corp is nourished from among the best of a little formed, clumsy and half-hearted general recruit and of the most related to the local clan. This way, the structuring of the soldiers around and with their natural commands, to realize the missions and to support the effort, the penuries, the uncertainty and the dangers in the exercise of his profession, is impossible to manage. The soldiers and the subofficials are not sure that «they» are not going to be «squandered» by his chiefs, before the dangers and according to his conveniences, opposite to armed, brutal and ready to die enemies. They do not even trust in the professionalism of his respective commands. To have the certainty that, obeying them and following them, it is as they would assure their lives in the danger situations and might triumph.

The fact that this is a chronic evil, of very difficult uprooting and correction, can be corroborate in the example of the occupation of the capital of Anbar’s province in May, 2015 by the Islamic State. Here also, in a rapid and forceful assault action, Allah’s muyahidins occupied al-Ramadi at a few hours of sporadic gunfires. Gaining in them the fire supremacy and slipping by the flanks of the tacked positions of the Iraqi army. Finally, a sand storm, with similar effects to the smokes and fogs of the modern fight, concealed them from the sights of the soldiers. And it must have turned the irregular yihadists into «phantasmagoric beasts» for them. This way, all the soldiers also went out, like in Mosul, feet in dusty from al-Ramadi, looking for the refuge and the salvation in the near Bagdad.

The first request of help from the shii government of Iraq to the Americans was for sending 1500 individual antitank launchers. But, we do not know well why, since the Islamic State lacks armoured forces as such. And his Toyotas pick up are vulnerable to the simple fire of the machine guns, which have a major effective range that the above mentioned manual launchers of hollow load. This new Eastern salient or projection of the Islamic State towards the west of Baghdad had to be held back by a new force sent by the Americans to the 4 stars’ general James Terry, of 400 marines. That formed a defense position, a “bolt” perpendicular to the possible advance of the muyahidins, in Taqaddum, at around 25 km at the east of al-Ramadi. Where the Iraqi army says to be training and concentrating forces to recover then this capital.

MARINES TRAINING…

As part of an army made keen to measuring everything (what cannot measure up, it does not exist), the American military men observe and control (monitoring), measure and register the «progress» of the Iraqi soldiers in formation. There exist more than 75 examined in detail, precise and identified individual skills, which are necessary in order that the soldiers recover correctly his functions and could survive the dangers, recklessnesses and combat conditions. They use for it «check lists» and the checkings and verifications adapted to the case. Which they have been developing and perfecting with his own recruits. The problem is that these adjustments can determine the mechanical behavior of a man as a part of the military group and his «marksmanship in the range”. But they will never reflect how they will endure in combat, before the pressure of the enemy, the unexpected evolution, the uncertainty, the fear, the isolation and the loss of comfort. Which is his loyalty to his chiefs and to the small unit or how much are mental motivated to fulfill his new military duties.

Modern methods of impregnation and motivation of the men.

Many modern companies in the great western countries, having finished the wars of the 20th century, recruited or received in his personnels numerous chiefs and officials. And some of them think that these stamped on the enterprises cultures a pertaining to barracks style, of direction from above, without a moderating feedback. That implicitly was that facilitated a so called culture of the death (sic). In order that the enlisted people could do things in opposition to his nature. As killing, without feeling a disturbing emotion. A consultant of Blanchard International suggests exactly this in her book «Why to motivate the persons does not work». But, I think that she is mistaken. That her postulates are a mix of liberal thoughts, psychological simplifications and antimilitarists prejudices. And that does not know well the «ideological» horizon of the great capitalist modern corporations, with his own many contradictions and missed ways.

The «managerial military theory» of the consultant remained stuck and then anchored in the 18th century, in the epoch of Federico the Great. But here, the precision and the mechanical rapidity of the military techniques (load and fire of the muskets) and of the maneuvers, necessary to apply a powerful shock force as rapidly as possible on the enemy, demanded to the men a strong discipline. Together with a great discipline and a training of almost gruelling repetition, to obtain consistently his effects. And, this way, the authoress has not take in mind the evolution of the war in the Contemporary age.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE CHINDITS: FORCES OF DEEP INCURSION.

AN OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF THE ENEMY REAR

A process that we will call of «cascade surprise» was created at the south of the operations theater of the Far East by the British general Orde Wingate at the beginning of 1.944. For it he used the deep incursion force, type light reinforced division, called the Chindits. This name is taken from the Burman god Chinthe, the protective god of the religion (or of the State), that could attack the enemies from nine different directions… His principal mission was to cut the internal communications of units (advance and retreat) and supplies (supports, substitutions and replacements) of the Japanese forces, that were opposed to the advance, at the north of Burma, of the Americans Chinese forces of general Stilwell. These were advancing from China towards the south, with the aim to conquer the Burman populations of Mogaung and Myitkyina and also to occupy and assure the zone at the south of these railway knots, so creating for them an area of stable rear. With it, they were seeking to be able to permanently open and extend a road and a pipeline from the north of Assam, in India, to Yunan, in China.

THEIR PATCH, FROM CINTHE GOD.

This would allow to supply a fleet of American bombardiers and their fighters escorts with base in Yunan. That would be destined to reinforce the effort of war of the wrecked Chinese, who were fighting from 1.937 their own war, against the Japanese expansionism in the continental Asia. And that were now unmotivated up to a point, that Chiang Kai Check wanted to go out of the war. This hypothetical armistice would liberate around 25 Japanese divisions, that were situated in China, operating and placed, to be destined where the Imperial High Staff considers to be suitable. For example, to accelerate the invasion of India, to include it in the «Co prosperity’s Asian Zone» that the Empire of the Japan was praising for the “Oriental and the Pacific Asia”. Under his politician and economic influence, opposite to the Western alien Powers.

OPERATIONS ZONE.

A conventional advance from India, by the Fourteen British Indian Army of the general Slim against this deep Japanese rear and from an expected and protected flank, was impracticable. Due to the distance to cross; to the area to winning and assuring; to the tenacity of the Japanese infantry soldiers; to the number of the Japanese deployed forces «in the same way and opposed direction”, as the Nippon were trying to reach the already nearby border of India with Burma, and to the difficulty of the the jungle fighting. That was a «thick» enviroment for the movements of the ground forces of both rivals, with obstructed and very nearby sights and where were abounding the tropical diseases.

 

The Development of the Operations.

The «second Chindit expedition» was inserted in March of 1.944, on the basis of the operational experience acquired the previous year with the first one. Where Wingate verified two essential parameters for the foreseen operations: that British Indian «line forces”, specifically trained for these tasks of deep incursion, could fight the Japanese in the jungle; and that these forces could indefinitely be supplied by air, as the Allies had the air supremacy in his operations zone and possessed enough air transport capacity for the task. They took part as incursion forces, the brigades 16, that from the first of February advanced afoot around 1.000 km towards Indaw, 77 and 111 of the British Indian Army, strong in more than 12 thousand men. That were joining in the 3th British Indian Division, of his «battle order». In April of 1.944 the 14 brigade joined it, landing in Aberdeen’s base, close to the way obstruction of White City, and immediately attacked several Japanese supplies depots. Wingate always thought in the employment of regular units, not about elite troops. And that their replacements were coming from the different units of the Army, specially the Fourteen Army of Slim. But did not count with the «perverse» trend of the units commands, of preferably being doing without the idlers and the problematic men, handing them over to other units. This way, the Chindits’ recruitment units had to reject at part of the candidates, as well as also those that were overcoming 40 years. Which is really an age very advanced to begin in the difficulties of the war in the jungles.

MARCHING ON: CROSSING A STREAM…

The gliders, freight planes and light aircrafts, due escorted, began to come to Broadway, in the north, and to Picadilly, in the south, of the chosen landing zone. It was a question of establishing a “fortified bolt” over the railroad and the road between Indaw, at the south, and Mohyen, towards the north, in the rear of the Japanese forces that were advancing towards the north, to China, and eastward, to India. The location of the place of the promising operational obstruction was discovered in the air reconnaissance done by Wingate, which chose her opposite to another alternative, because in the small valleys included in his perimeter, could be established, cover from the sights, all the auxiliary services of the defensive zone, as the mules, the health, the exterior communications, the stores, etc. White City, the defensive position, was due fortified by the engineers and equipped with 40 mm. anti-aircraft Bofors cannons, 75 mm. mortars and 25 pounds cannons (> 11 Kg and > 90 mm.) and Vickers 7, 7 mm. heavy machine guns. Between the hills that were framing the enclosure and that were integrating it, was installed even a runway for small airplanes.

A PACK OF MULES…

For the transport in broken and jungle ground, the Chindits were using packs of mules in all his marching columns. Each animal was in charge of a given muleteer, entrusted of his guide, care and subsistence. And not always, specially at the end of their operations, the muleteers were due trained for his trade. The packs were transporting the ammunitions, the provisioning, the heavy weapons, the supplies, the radio devices and other equipments and consumables. The train of mules of every unit was very vulnerable to a Japanese assault. Also, the animals of the redoubts, where it was difficult to bury them or to due protect them under covers, were vulnerable to the Japanese heavy fire. With it, the mules trains was turning into a serious vulnerability of the units. Since without it the operations of march and attack, consubstantial with the Chindits ethos, were impossible in this fighting ground of so difficult transitability. Bad going is not as precise definition and concept.

In the operations zone, the climate was hard, the comfort, which relieves the efforts of the war, was scanty, the life was rough and the woodland diseases seriously and repeatedly affected the men and the beasts, in high percentage and intensity, during the few months of operations in the Burma jungles. And the general task of harassment and weakening of the Japanese forces in their communication and supplies lines of towards Chinese and Indian fronts was carried out. The strategic operational concept that sublied was the exploitation of the Japanese deep rear, where were abounding his tactical and operational vulnerabilities and the absence of combat availability or readiness, on having been removed his forces from the combats fronts. The Chindits managed to fix indefinitely in this rear around two and half Japanese divisions, dedicated to their control and pursuit, or, around 2,5 times their own combat capacity.

Analysis and Interpretation of the Chindit Second Campaign.

The Chindits operations are exploitation actions in the enemy rear by enough and mobile forces. These are inserted deeply in it by their own aviation. This is not the usual case of the attack and breakthrough of a sector or strip of the enemy front. And then the irruption of “mobile corp”. That advances within the enemy rear to exploit his vulnerabilities; to destroy his units in reform or in march to their initial bases; to turn up the fighting fronts of his units at the defensive, so collaborating in annihilating them; to capture or destroy all kinds of logistic enemy means; to attack his valuable and vulnerable units (artillery, engineers, command and control, communications); to temporarily occupy ground communications hubs, defiles, mountain ports and riverheads and lakeheads, etc.

The necessary coordination of the “mobile corp” with his «support mass” or “immediate supporting rear”, is realized in this campaign by a stable, sufficient and not bothered airway. Whose link of union with the Chindits operational brigades (-) and battalions (+) are the fortified blocking bases (White City, Broadway, Aberdeen, Blackpool) established within the Japanese zone. And that were acting as “initial bases of depart” of their attack operations.

It was calculated that the Chindits caused more than 12 thousand losses to the Japanese forces, with their loss in combat of only a few hundreds of men. But the Chindits neither defeated decisively any Japanese great unit, nor conquered any relevant enemy position. So his transcendence, for the Allied military plans and the importance of the actions against the enemy, remained dispersed, appeased and darkened by the great maneuvers of the war in this South Asian theater and for the strategic and operational interests of the three great actors in it: British and Indians, American and Chinese.

GENERAL ORDE WINGATE.

After Wingate’s unexpected death in a plane crash, his successor, general Lentaigne, established in Blackpool, at around 100 km at north of White City, another fortified obstructionist position, as alternative and reinforcement of this. And since the Chindits operations and the interest of the war was moving more towards the border with China, the Chindits stayed already under the command of the Americans. And Stilwell, gave to them the task of a “great light conventional unit”, coordinated with the effort towards Birmania of the American Chinese forces. With the missions to attack in force from the south the positions over which those were advancing. It is of indicating that the same Lentaigne, which did not have the creativity, the ancestry, the respect between his equals and the will of Wingate, managed to partly accepted Stilwell’s conventional and orthodox points of view, in relation to the operational employment of the Chindits.

At the beginning of 1.944 Stiwell had one unit of «deep raiders”, the so called «Merrill’s Marauders». But they did not have the scope, the projection, the capacity and the operational conception that the Chindits had from the beginning, in his second incursion of this year. In addition, without the substitutions and replacements needed, used as another American Chinese advance spear in the Burma campaign and plagued by the infectious diseases, the combative efficiency of the Chindits plummeted very soon. And, a few months later, in 1.945, they were already totally demobilized.

On the Personality of the Military Command.

The personality of the command is shaped by a series of personal and mental qualities that, outlined and composed by the specific education, voluntary study and training and employment, are going to produce a command capable of knowing, decide and drive the actions most adapted in the different levels of the military activity.

The correct sense crowns, perfects, governs, directs and stimulates the activity of all the other operative systems of maneuver, of all the organs of the military activity towards the attainment of the aims. And it does it in the most suitable possible way, according to its means and the military concrete situation.

GENERAL PAUL EMIL VON LETTOW-VORBECK.

The wisdom is the first quality to get. The wisdom is an habit for which we judge straightly of the military and human things, under a special instinct, which makes us knowing and savoring them with certain connaturality. Here wisdom means simultaneously to know and savor.

The wisdom includes the military understanding, which is a penetrating and deep intuition of the military things in the shape of “apprehension”, that is to say, without expressing judgments or disquisition on them. The intuition is a form of direct knowledge, which is characterized by its immediacy and contemporaneousness on the topic which is. To the wisdom are opposed the stupidity or foolishness, not to know what is possible and due to know, as opposite things, and the fatuity, as the pure denial of it.

  GRAND MASTER JEAN PARISOT DE LA VALLETTE, ORDER OF ST. JOHN, MALTA.

The serenity is another quality. The serenity allows the command to keep calm, without physical or moral confusion that affects him, though the tension and the problems are present and pressing. The serenity protects and keeps lucid the reflexes and power mental, where the wisdom rests.

Two of the gravest and ridiculous failures in which the command can fall down is the pride and the vanity.

Pride is the oneself full satisfaction.

GENERAL DANIEL MORGAN.

The vanity is to believe that we are deserving objects of the others admiration. The conceited is like an “aestilite” (an ascetic who lives upon a column, solitary and looking from upon), which is satisfied thinking about the feelings he believes is waking up in others. Any sign of approval that receives, serves him as reaffirmation in his idea.

In others articles in this “blog” you could see situations that exemplify the useful thing that is to have a specially haughty or conceited enemy.

The humility, adjusting in a difficult balance, to the real and relative value of oneself, is the best antidote for these possible “mental vulnerabilities” of the chief. The humility includes the moderation. We must remember that the false humility is an allotropic form of the pride.

GENERAL HERMANN BALCK.

The moral courage, as courage and spiritual entirety, which allows him to offset the uncertainty, the weariness, the effort and the frustration or difference between the plans and the means and the successive realities of the evolving situation, is another characteristic of the “correct sense” of the command. And not only to win his demons, in such a way that his serenity does not weaken. But to stimulate also the others, so that they overcome theirs own apprehensions and weaknesses in the trials in march. Which is also converted into an effective factor of the leadership capacity. Which supposes to connecting, motivating and direct from mental qualities, his group and not only from the authority of his ranking.

Another factor is the empathy as affective, not necessarily emotional, participation in the personal needs. In this bridging, the command will find a personal human enrichment. That will be another more resort to manage to fill with enthusiasm his men. The enthusiasm is the human energy capable of conquering the entropy of the weariness, the fall of the moral, the lack of comfort, the fears and the apathy in the important and decisive moments of the military activity.

JAN ZIZKA.

The will is the power of the spirit. It is rooted in the moral courage, it informs from the wisdom and interacts with the serenity, feeding her and resting on her. The will allows the command to overcome the demons of the uncertainty, the fears, the effort and the weariness, the lack of comfort and the frustrations. The will is thrown towards the opportunities, appreciated by the wisdom and decided by the moral courage, which removes the tactical and operative doubts.

The discipline and the will are rooted in the personal education, through the fulfillment of the duty towards the society, the military institution and the commanded men. The discipline nourishes the moderation and the humility of the command, giving them a human and militant sense, but removed from mystical connotations.

CHARLES FLANDREAU.

The institutional authority comes from the delegation received of the superior command. It gets about itself to fulfill the ordinances and the aims that are assigned. But the personal conduct and the professional capacity of the command generate his prestige and his example among the men. Who give to the received authority, his personal and concrete quality.

The military education is the control of the trade. Its knowledge is giving by the study in schools and academies and in its permanent update through the later readings. Its application is in the doctrine and the regulations. The mastery comes from the application of the knowledge in the games of war or simulations, in the seminars of discussion and spreading, in the maneuvers and fields exercises and in the real situations which he has to face. We remember that the military specific trade tends to not practice in the life…

They are not here all those who are…

THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAK AND SYRIA III.

(CONTINUATION)

Between the minor international branches of the salafist jihadist terror, that also have recognized the supreme authority of al-Baghdadi, emphasize the al-Shabab Somali militias. This is an excretion of the extinct Union of the Islamic Courts, which spreads over the south and east of the country. Al-Shabab follows a strategy of generalized terror, that resembles that practiced by Boko Haram against the black Christians of the fulani and yoruba etnias in the provinces of the North-East of Nigeria, where he has the bases. From time to time and with increasingly sickening efficiency, the al-Shabab bands penetrate into the neighboring Kenya, even they have come up to Uganda, looking for Christians «hunting trophies». And this in spite of the USA commands assaults with limited aims, directed by his regional command for Africa (Africom), which has forces in Uganda. And of the presence in Somalia of an important African pacification military force, that forms the Mission of the African Union in Somalia (Amisom), principally integrated by Ethiopians and Kenyans troops.

The Evolution of the Conflict.

After the retreat of the DAESH of Kobane, the jihadists have again begun to  kidnap Christians in Hasaka’s Syrian province, in the Jabur valley, a tributary of the high Euphrates. The attrition air raids over opportunity targets or locally supporting and with different fortune, the Syrian or Iraqi peshmergas, as in Tikrit, the Sinyar mount, Kobane or Mosul, and the successes achieved by these, based on time, enormous caution and great effort, finally have done notch in the military capacities of the ISSIL. That now seek to reinforce against the bombardments and the ground attacks and to renew his varied financing sources. In these moments, the influence zones of the Syrian jihadists are in the basin of the Euphrates and in the mountains of the north of Syria. And they try to create them in the Orontes wide basin, with incursions in the Latakia.

The Christians captured as sheep, have in the hands of the ISSIL two hard and exchangeable destinations: to serve as hostages, looking for the rescue price, preferably paid by international organizations or to be used as human shields of the positions, fortifications, formation and training centers, mosques and marching columns of the jihadists against the aircrafts of 60 Allied nations of the Americans against the DAESH. This is the acronym of his name «al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham «, that use the majority of the Arabic countries to refer to the salafist jihadist group that operates in Iraq and Syria. And whose use allows not to call them State in the European languages.

Around the Jabur and up to the population of Qamishli, in the mountains of the Syrian Kurdistan, the jihadists are gathering hundreds of Christians, clustered by families and neighbors. To serve to his harmful and genocidal aims. Father Yatroun Colliana, from The Lebanon, has denounced, how not, in Naharnet’s local newscast, the passiveness of International Community, that limits herself to silently look in the face of the violations to the local Christian community. Finally, we will indicate that are the Arabic local chiefs, the negotiating intermediaries with the humanitarian organizations, the Christian Assyrians, the Kurdish peshmergas and the local self-defense militias, which are like policemen, only capable for labors of vigilance, parade and demonstration.

And now, in the middle of March, the Pope Francisco has not could less that to support the use of the civilized military force against these dressed in black vermin, which offend even their own religion. We will indicate, also, that, in the last months, several dozens of American former military men and civilians have gone to Iraq or to Syria, to help the Kurdish or Christian minorities chased by the ISSIL. Concretely, between December and February a small group of former soldiers trained a «battalion» of Christian Assyrians at the west of the Iraqi Kurdistan. They were approximately 300 civilians, who were joining the Christian self-defense of the territory forces and who received a basic formation in techniques and military tactics. Four voluntary American «advisers» already returned to home, as reports 35-year-old Matthew VanDyke. «We are where the governments fail. We need neither possess the vote of the Congress, nor to surrender to his limitations. And we can work very rapidly», concludes him.

At the beginning of June, 2014, the ISSIL threw a strategic offensive in Iraq, destined to consolidate his dispersed Iraqi enclaves (al-Ramadi, Faluyah, etc.) of the northern and center provinces in an only and extensive territorial unit. After assaulting Samarra, burst into Mosul and threw an «area action» in the provinces of Saladin and Diyala, in which the terrorists also appealed to their «sworn suicides». The assault of the ISSIL to Mosul added to the successively happened in several populations of Nineveh’s province. Confirming with all this the military and organizational capacities and the aggressiveness every day more clear of the salafist imperialist group and the governance and the leadership of his leader, Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. The expansion of the territory that the ISIS controls, so much in Iraq as Syria, are the accomplishment of the intention of al-Baghdadi of displacing the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, not as chief of al-Qaeda, but as the authentic successor of Osama Ben Laden in the modern jihadism.

The Middle East is the most convulsed and burning geopolitical region of our world. And for his nearness, energetic importance and forming a communications hub between three continents, is specially transcendent for us. In this region of the Southwest of Asia are solving several armed and parallel conflicts. Some, as the so called Arabic Israeli conflict extends for more than 66 years, three generations, between the Muslims, singularly the Arabs, and Israel, for a minuscule chunk of highly wished land. Which is a war between States, independently of his functional, religious and social asymmetry. It is also the » open war» between the Shiite and Sunnis branches of the Islam, some incredible «separated conflicting brothers», for the political social and religious hegemony in this religion. This makes concrete nowadays in the Near East in the civil wars of Syria and Iraq.

THE PASDARAN DISPLAY THEIR FLAG.

At the eastern end of the Southwest of Asia is the anti western Shiite theocracy of the mummied ayatollahs. These, when want important and rapid results against his neighbors, use commands or units of the Republican Guard. Also, they are called the Pasdaran, Persian for Guards. Which is training, equipping and supporting in diverse ways his allies co-religionists of Syria and Iraq. The Republican Guard is overlapped in the Iranian regime, forming the unconditional and effective military wing of the Islamic Republic of Iran, acting as the modern “Immortal of the Shas of Persia». She, as the Egyptian military men, possess an own very wide support economic. That guarantees them the operational independence and that generously rewards their dedication and loyalty in the fulfillment of his tasks and missions. The al-Quds brigades are a special elite group of the Republican Guard. He devotes to the espionage and to realize military actions with incursion forces. He exhibits the whole panoply of capacities for the surreptitious or dirty war between enemy nations. His commander in chief is the general of division 57-year-old Qassem Suleimani, of middle stature, beard and white hair, and is included in the list of the terrorists most looked for by the USA. A detail: the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ali Jamenei, considers him to be a «living martyr of the revolution», to which he incorporated in 1.980, when was 23 years old, in an incipient Republican Guard.

HE WILL BE A FATHER FOR YOU AND YOU WILL BE A SON FOR HIM…

After the advance of the Islamic State in June of 2.014 in the north and center of Iraq and the call of the ayatollah chií Ali Sistani to the fight against him, Suleimani was sent by Teheran to Iraq, to support the activation of the shiits militias, dispersed after the sectarian war. This way, Suleimani has obtained in the latter months the unity of action of all the Iraqi militias against the IS. It has been the IS that who extracted general Suleimani from the shades. And now he appears and there conforms the ideological military clash between the Sunniss followers of the Drawn Sword of the Islam and the foreign mercenaries of the al-Quds Brigades of Iran and the Shiites militias, that they encourage, support and train. At the end of August he appeared in Amerli, Saladino’s province, where he forced the jihadists to move back. Iran immediately distributed photos of his general operating. After the setback of the ISSIL, the shiies militias devastated dozens of Sunniss villages of the zone, as collaborators or sympathizers with the enemy.

Tikrit is a city of approximately 270 thousand habitants, which lengthened embraces both Tigris‘ banks, where from it takes his name, at approximately 140 Kms. from Baghdad. It is the capital of Saladino’s province and was occupied at the end of the June‘s offensive of the IS. In March, Suleimani threw to his conquest with a combined force of 30 thousand men, formed by disconstructed Iraqi military men, who contribute with heavy weapons, Shiites militias (now called Popular Units) and the Anbar‘s Sunniss militias, enemies of the IS, and supporting forces of the Iranian Pasdaran. It is not easy that the EI keeps there more than 5 thousand men for a rigid defense, with which Suleimani’s victory was sung. The Shiites attacked on March 6 at the north of the city and by Saturday, the 13th, already only were resisting 3 principal neighborhoods and a luxury urbanization. The Coalition did not give air support to these operations until the end.

ENCOURAGING THE MEN AND POSING FOR THE NEWS MEANS…

The treatment that they give to Saladino’s Sunnis and of other areas will be an acid test to avoid another sectarian civil war in Iraq. It is not lawful to demand a loyalty due to the civilians, if the authorities are not capable of protecting them from the abuses of his enemies. The secretary of the Army of the Mahdi paramilitary organization, the militias of the clergyman Muqtada al-Sadr, Hadi the-Amari, asked his militias that were trying to save the habitants of Tikrit and that take care of them. But, Sadam Hussein’s extravagant mausoleum, placed near Tikrit, was reduced to a heap of rubbles. Saudi Arabia already has protested for this arrival in force of Shiites militias supported by the Iranian Guard, and the prince Saud al-Faisal, his Secretary of State, has accused Iran of militarily meddling » to take control of the country». Also the Council (Sunni) of Cooperation of the Gulf (Persian), formed by Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar (Bahrain, which is Shiite, does not integrate it), has protested for the entry of foreign ground sectarian military forces in the Iraqi conflict. Iran, for his part, does not conceal his participation in the recovery of the Iraqi forces and constantly transmits photos of the general Suleimani in activity. Before this intervention, the general only was appearing in public photos taken during his prayers.

The Destruction of the Bases of the EIISL.

The areas of this great geopolitical region lack in general of concealments and natural covers, in the shape of forests, extensive bushes and mountains. This does that the only refuges and temporary stays for the rebels bands are in the villages and populations and the nearby grounds. Which are gathering, forming elongated rows, which luminous are appreciate in the night from the sky, along the rivers, which relieve his thirst, and theirs banks. For their defense and cover they have to disperse for them, forming «mujahidins squads» of not more than 35 or 40 men. This group is the major one that can be coherently led by a local «sheikh». Throughout this environment are spies eyes. And the guerrilla movements are realized in view of all. In addition, not all the populations are defensible against the powerful military means, not even the rebels have the intention of doing so, in a rigid defense.

These bases are the geographical locations indefinitely controlled by the jihadists. They physically found on the bases to reform, consolidate, train and increase their forces. From them, operating as their principal «departure bases», they throw incursions and assaults with limited aim on their enemy, seeking to scourge or to expel him from the immediate territory that he occupies. The creation of these jihadists permanent cores depends on the measure in which the armed enemy is defeated and expelled from them, with consistency and certain duration. From the bases are carried out the captivation of sympathizers and militants of the revolutionary group, which is scarcely effected among the settlers, but, in its most, they already come motivated and decided from out. And this is like that though a part of their effort in the area of action and propaganda is realized producing videos, interviews, gazettes and papers for audio-visual wireless varied means: the edition, the production and the emission is located in the bases. In the bases, the socio politics action of the ISSIL is as intense or more than the formation and the military training of » mujaidines of Allah». She is necessary to establish and assure the motivation and the loyalty of the fightiers to the jihadist cause in the hostile mean that surrounds and harasses them.

The salafists jihadists groups have failed in active and firmly joining to a social wide group, which gives coverage and permanent impulse to their «social religious imperialistic movement». Their «violence catechizing» allows them to be mental prepared for the glorious and in peace death, and, even for the suicide, in the accomplishment of their military actions and goals. But this insane sermon is not a method for the conversion of social groups. And there is a fundamental reason for it: his radical «creed» lacks possibilities of acceptance, victory and permanency between the all masses, out of the needs in the temporary vicissitudes of a war. The jihadists groups act with an unnecessary and indiscriminate brutality, which discredits them before the Islam, the Koran and the Sunna or Islamic tradition, gathered in the Hadithes or Mohammed’s «comments and facts» wrote. This lack of religious legitimacy, provokes the absence of venerable, respected and pious ulemas and muftis at their side. His supposed «Islamic original ideology» is only based on a few favorable verses of the Koran (this has approximately 4.200 verses, which varied with the versions; the only exact and precise are his total of Arab letters) and on some historical favorable facts and not on the integrity and the intention of the message of the Islam. This socio emotional withdrawal from the local masses unfailingly does that the support of the neighbors to the occupants terrorist groups is involuntary, not attractive, always interested and dismotivated. With it the bases of the ISSIL lose their function of education of the settlers masses, to catch, create and incorporate new volunteers and active sympathizers to the groups; to practice and perfect the methods of action, education and propaganda; to assure to the active groups a strategic protective and received rear, in which they should not need to also be in guard towards those of inside.

The bases are social military forms with «regular and firm structure» of the jihadists. They present continuous and numerous targets to the action of the heavy means of their enemies, the aviation and artillery. Some are “opportunity targets», as all kinds of movements of the terrorists and the discovery of new positions. And others are «hard targets», known or to be reconnoitered: roar or railroad infrastructures, stores, refuges, meeting or command or communications centers, war material warehouses, infantry, heavy fire and defense against aircraft combat positions, observatories, goods transport, crude oil distilling, etc.

Traditionally, the guerrilla or rebellious bases have been protected from the assault of the military men by the distance, as in China; the inaccessibility (mountains, jungles) or the difficulty of the fighting forms (the fight inside a village presents immense secret islands to the sights and protected by all classes of walls, which are reinforced by their partial destruction and the debris accumulation). These jihadists bases are the only substantial, still and definite target that the terrorist bands offer. Where to be able to make them feel all the superior and available military power. Where it is possible to isolate them by sectors, to beat them by parts, without them could collaborate in the decided defense plan. Nor to flee, if the village siege is firm. And where they might act, if they had another spirit and other motivations, which neither offer the trainings, nor the military equipments, the peshmergas, Shiites and Sunnis militias and the national armies of Iraq and Syria.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE ARROGANCE OF THE COMMAND IN COMBAT II.

(CONTINUATION)

Then, the dragoons of the right British flank ran in a “beheading charge”, to ruin the militiamen’s rush, pushing them up. And that in their flight, already in panic, run over and dissolve the formations of the line of regulars. Morgan sent his orders to Washington with an assistant. The American dragoons advanced from their waiting positions near the right hill and, forming two shock lines, charged on the right flank of Tarleton’s dragoons, destroying their formation. Her troopers turned into a fugitives’ tumult, escaping individually from the rebel sabers. The sight of the British dragoons altered the militiamen. And Pickens and Morgan had to use thoroughly to retain their officials. And in order that them achieve that the militiamen were calming down, were recovering and forming in their companies and battalions in the rear slope. While this happened, the British line was coming at the close distance of combat with the last rebel line. This developed with an fire exchange. The British line hesitated and descended to reform. They had successively charge against 3 rebel lines… Then, Tarleton insisted with his infantry reserve: the Highlanders’s battalion initiated his march to attack the enemy right flank, trying to run over from there all his line. Little later, a militia’s company of Virginia at the end of this line was moving back and turning towards right, seeking to refuse his flank to the Highlanders and to receive them abreast. Morgan received then messengers of Pickens from the rear slope, indicating him that his militiamen were ready. Morgan ordered them to go round the defense position towards his right and attack the British who were in front to the Continentals right flank.

The British line was advancing, for the fourth time and without any rest, already unconnected and turned in a crowd. Though the men were attacking, they were physic and mentally exhausted and had lost a too big number of officials and NCO. Without realizing it, the British were beaten and mature for a forceful counterattack. The cavalry of Washington prepared to charge on their right flank, from his waiting position. Meanwhile, the rebel regular infantry was receiving the British with another volley from approximately 27 ms. of distance. It was a devastating blow for the British, who stopped dead, stunned. The lieutenant colonel Howard gave his order to the men: «bayonet charge». The American dragoons also were charging with their sabers over the units of the right British flank. In this occasion, the British dragoons, placed behind, did not intervene, simply they dispersed and fled towards the forest. The remains of the British light infantry, the line infantry of the Legion and of the 7th regiment moved back dispersed and running, and were stopped and got prisoners by the Washington’s dragoons. In turn, in the rebel right flank, the militias of Virginia and the regular were facing the Scotch battalion of the Highlanders. For their part, Pickens’s militias in closed formation appeared surpassing this position and attacked them on flank and rear. Overwhelmed by this ungrateful surprise, the Scots hesitated in their lines, but continued the fight. The British cavalry reserve, the dragoons of the Legion, commanded by Tarleton in person, came in aid of the Highlanders. But, a volley from the militiamen of Pickens, took away the spirits from them and, already without expectations, they turned round and fled. The Highlanders were surrounded, except for their right flank, and to avoid destruction, mayor Mc Arthur gave up his sword. Only remained useful and in their positions the British gunners. Then, Howard’s infantry assaulted the pieces and beat them. Washington tried Tarleton’s pursuit, without result. Everything was finished.

Analysis and Lessons from Cowpens’s Battle.

Morgan’s falls were 12 dead and 61 injured men, equivalent to 7% of his force. The British had 110 dead and 830 prisoners, of which around 200 were injured, that supposed 85% of their force. And they also lost 2 regimental flags, 2 artillery pieces, 800 muskets, 35 load wagons, all the instruments of their music band and approximately 60 black slaves. Tarleton in his later memories declared: «some unforeseen fact (happened), that could throw the terror between the most disciplined troops and to resist the better thought plans». To this the experts call “surprise” and is an effective multiplier of the combat capacity applied.

In a small battle and of little more than one hour of duration, we see how a commander, at 24 days of his definitive fall because of rheumatism, could extract from the weakness and the lacks of his troops, renewed «forces», successive useful «combat capacities». And he recreates at his insignificant measures a small Cannas, without been he an Aníbal… Without the characteristics of his men had changed nothing at all. And so well he does it and so brave, direct, obstinate and sure is his arrogant enemy, that the results overcome his expectations and the orders received from General Greene. As Morgan was only trying to reject the intense pursuit that the impulsive British was submitting him.

In Cowpens, Morgan used the successive retreat of his slightly effective forces of free shooters and of the militiamen’s first line. It was logical and expected. Nevertheless, a regular force that moves back, without coming to the close fire or to the near threat of the bayonets, appears as a trick. The militiamen were stimulated in their moral and in their survival instinct. And no impossible emotional or an effort over their training and aptitudes were asked them, which generate some strong mental tension and enervation. This is going to be sufficient to seriously harm the assault and shock capacities of Tarleton’s regular infantry. And, in addition, without his «epaulettes» and NCOs noted it, since the regular troops were advancing on militiamen’s lines, which were behaving as was expected from them, that is to say, avoiding the shock and moving back. Tarleton launches, sure of possessing a remaining potential, being based on his comparison man to man. His linear logic is crushing. Nevertheless, after the second or third successive assaults, the best men suffer a general weariness: they get careless, their combat moral becomes neutral, have fallen too much officials and NCOs and their vulnerability is at maximum. The attackers have exhausted their combat capacity, though they continue instructively advancing.

Of this phenomenon also Sun Tzu treats. «He chooses his men and they take advantage the better possible of the situation«. Li Ch’uang comments this way: «The brave can fight; the prudent, defend itself; the wise person, advise. The talent of anyone is not wasted» and Chang Yu says: «Then the real method, when it is necessary to give orders to men, consists of using the greedy and the idiot, the wise person and the brave and in giving everyone the responsibility that are convenient for them in the situations. Do not entrust to the people tasks that cannot fulfill. Do a selection and give everyone responsibilities adapted to his qualities». «The one that bears in mind the situation, uses his men in the combat like who makes roll trunks or stones. Since it is in the nature of the trunks and of the stones to be in balance in a firm soil and to roll in an unstable soil. And if they are squared, they stop and if they are round, roll «.

After using them successively, without exhausting or allow that they are swept or come in panic, Morgan does not reject his men. He is incorporating them in reserves, with the moral grown by the effort supported over the regular British. he does not exhaust their potentials, but preserves and recovers them, recreating reserves. Though it is a question of little trained troops, they have a combat capacity applicable and operable on the enemy. The brigadier prevents that the shock or the depletion affect the inferior capacity of his men. Morgan avoids the wear, but uses it to the maximum against his enemy. The result would be less manifest and showy, if Tarleton had given rest and rotation to his different battalions. With it he would compensate very much it and might act more effectively on his opposite, using his reserves. This possibility presents a wealth-producing perspective of the holistic, global vision, of the treated phenomenon.

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THE ARROGANCE OF THE COMMAND IN COMBAT

On January 17, 1781, the American brigadier 45-year-old Daniel Morgan, faced in Cowpens, in a small battle without operational transcendence, with the British regular forces of the lieutenant colonel 27-year-old Banastre Tarleton. Both were possessing similar forces. But half of the large thousand men of Morgan were territorial militias. The shock with the regular British would ruin them, as the fixed bayonets in closed formation terrify the militiamen. These, nevertheless, were good shooters, accustomed hunt, having a great personal initiative. Only the 200 militiamen of Virginia had received training of regular. And together with the Delaware, Maryland and Virginia Continentals, might form part of an infantry line, to resist the assault of the more than 1000 regular British. Morgan neither came to a very reflexive deduction, nor planned too much. He simply guided by his instinct and experience and used his men successively, according to their qualities. And he bore in mind Tarleton’s behavior with the rebels in other occasions, thinking in slowly wearing out the British. In Cowpens acted a capable, impulsive and haughty enemy. That was an example of the arrogance of the command. This is one of the best characters to face him in a dialectic of wills. Showing convincingly him a fodder and a weakness, these «invincible controls» grow bolder and thoroughly insist, mentally and tactically, up to the sink.

Precedents of Cowpens’s Battle.

The mission given to Daniel Morgan by the general Nathanael Greene, commander of the South Department of the Continental Army, was as simple as wide and vague. And had a high degree of interpretation, of adjustment and of possibilities of use of his scanty and unlike resources. «Your force and all those who could join you, will operate at the west of the Catawba river, as much defensive as offensively, according to your prudence and discretion, acting with all care and precaution to avoid surprises and stumbles with the enemy. Your aim is to protect this zone of the country, to raise the spirit of her inhabitants and to be a nuisance (to scourge) in it to the enemy». Morgan, who already had fought in the Indian and French wars of last times of the Colonies, was put by George Washington in 1777 in charge of a select light force of 500 infantrymen with rifles, which were known as «Morgan’s Shooters». This unit played a principal role in Saratoga’s American victory, which was an inflexion point of the Independence War. The post of the brigadier general Morgan was Commander of the Southwest Department. Though his initial forces were only approximately 300 regular infantrymen from Maryland, Delaware and Virginia, under the control of the lieutenant colonel John Howard, approximately 200 militiamen of Virginia, commanded by the major Frank Triplett and around 80 dragoons commanded by the lieutenant colonel William Washington (second cousin of George Washington).

From his part, the British commander of the territory, Lord Cornwallis, was planning to return to North Carolina and lead the invasion postponed after his defeat in King’s Mountain. And the force of Morgan was a vague threat on his left flank. To defeat her and protect the British fort in Ninety Six, that his intelligence indicated erroneously him that Morgan was going to attack, Corwallis called lieutenant colonel Banastre Tarleton to the west of the Catawba. Tarleton’s troops were the «taskforce» called the British Legion, a combined unit of infantry and cavalry formed by some of the best British troops in the Carolinas. The Legion had gained important victories in Monck’s Corner and in Fishing Creek. But Tarleton had acquired an odious and irrevocable reputation of cruelly and merciless among the «patriots» after Waxhaws’s battle, when he allowed his men to massacre the rebellious soldiers who had given up. Tarleton asked Cornwallis more regular and went after Morgan with a reinforced force, trying to corner him in the Broad river.

The Preparations for the Battle.

In the cold and moist morning of Friday, the 16th of January, 1781, the Morgan’s regular went out of his night camp in Burrs Mill towards the Broad river. The rebels were in South Carolina, near her border with North Carolina. In both Carolinas, the Americans had suffered several reverses the previous year: In the siege of Charleston they had to surrender an «army» and lost another one in Camden’s battle. And great part of South Carolina was in British hands, commanded by Lord Cornwallis. The column was advancing following paths and gullies, framed by low still defoliated bushes, at the west of the Catawba river. Daniel Morgan known be followed by the British forces of Tarleton, placed behind at only 4 hours of march. The successive reports of his cavalry explorers, who were keeping visual contact with the enemy explorers and vanguard, were confirming that this distance in time» was not changing. But brigadier Morgan was thinking that it might diminish very much this night, if Tarleton, as it was his custom, was deciding to continue the pursuit during part of it, to fall at the dawn over the «rebels». The principal danger was to be reached by 300 Tarleton’s dragoons during the crossing of the Broad, which was flowing then in flood and was impeding furthermore its passage. At middle of the evening, the Americans were approximately 16 km to the river and only were remaining 4 hours of the languid winter daylight. Already they could not realize the passage this day. Morgan knew about the existence of an opened area of pastures, sprinkled with trees, at half way to the river. It was the Hannah’s Pasture (Cowpens), where the local farmers give up freely their cattle. Furthermore, this night he would receive the support requested to colonel Andrew Pickens, chief of Carolina and Georgia‘s militias, which also were at south of the Broad and which were directing to their meeting. Morgan decided to go toward him and take his decision, after realizing a visual reconnaissance and know his chiefs‘ opinion.

At the end of the evening, the regular rebel forces reached the pasture, placed 8 km south of the river, by its southwest side. It was a softly rolling or flat ground, provided with small dispersed spots of walnuts, pines or oaks. On having lacked low bushes, the high natural grass provided good pastures to the cattle. Morgan and his chiefs could estimate this way their defense area from the sights that the British would have. The ground opposite to them was ascending up to a long ridge that closed it, placed at 375 ms. of distance and with not more than 20 ms of high with this base. Beyond that, partially covered by the rear slope, 2 nearby hills were outlined at the right. It was a favorable area for the cavalry, where Tarleton might move at pleasure his dragoons, maneuvering, threatening, attacking or finishing off the task of his regular infantry. For it, it was of hoping that the British would not avoid a combat presented on it. Morgan decided to face the British there. Establishing in this great meadow chunk a defense in depth position, reserving his dragoons to reject assaults at his exposed flanks and using his men according to his qualities and real possibilities.

One of the means of the command to conquer the «combat laziness» of the men, is to use always the forces according to their real capacities. And allowing that the phases of the «cycles of action and recovery» are always fulfilled. As example, «national militias» could neither be the advance point in an assault or breaking through, nor permanently and aggressively operate far from their support bases. But they could defend established positions, «redoubts», against professional units and even come to locally countershocking them successfully, if they were well directed. Their aims had to be simple, easy and, even, staggered. In such way that they were not swept by an enemy higher combat capacity and could fulfill them. And that the gratifications for the successive obtained stages, supported them and were reinforcing their moral and confidence in themselves.

This night Morgan was joined by 600 state and local militiamen of Colonel Pickens. Morgan establishes with the militias a dispersed first line of expert shooters for the harassment, placed at the beginning of the gentle slope. And another second line, in closed formation, at 135 ms. behind, to receive the first one. He only asks the men of both lines to realize two deliberate aimed shots. Allowing them then to retreat at rearward, close to both nearby hills, slipping through the left flank, without waiting the close combat with the British. Morgan removes them from the bayonets and takes advantage of their attrition capacity by the fire at many dozens of yards of targets, even small. Neither he forgets to stimulate their survival instinct. He remembers them that if the enemy infantry charges triumph, the pursuit and their annihilation will be almost inevitable: they have at their back the Broad and the British possess a majority of regular cavalry of 3 to 1. Morgan’s third line, his only regulars line, is deployed a bit below of the military ridge. His right side is formed by the Virginia militiamen of Triplett and the center and the left side is formed by the Continental infantry, with Howard in command of the whole line. The Americans rested this night near their positions. And their direct commands and Daniel Morgan approached them with interest, to encourage and to clear them the doubts. At dawn, they took there the breakfast.

The Battle of Cowpens.

At sunrise and beyond the rebels positions, the first British dragoons were outlined between the line of trees that was framing the horizon. As Morgan thought, the British had use several night hours to continue the march to reach them at the first morning. The dragoons advanced at front, forming a clumsy vanguard, and were surprised by the running fire of the riflemen of the first enemy line, concealed between the trees. Morgan and Howard, observed the result from the height: 15 dragoons had fallen from their mounts. The rest went back and urgently penetrated between the trees. Very soon, all the units of the combined force of Tarleton went out the forest and began to form their assault line. In each end placed a dragoons company (<50 men). Together with that in the left side, as her a little behind, deployed the Scottish Highlanders' 71 battalion (the infantry reserve).

The principal British line was formed, from left to right, by the 7 infantry regiment (of recruitment), the regular infantry of the Legion, and her light infantry in compact guerrilla line. Inserted between these 3 units, were two small artillery pieces of 3 pounds, transported on horse and known as «grasshopper», due to the typical jump that they gave on having shot. Behind the Legion deployed her two dragoons companies (> 250 riders), forming the mobile reserve of the British detachment.

The British line began to advance at the pace of his drums. Little later, could be observed the smoke puffs from the rifles of the rebel free shooters. These got up and ran towards the line commanded by Pickens, retreating through the spaces between the formed companies. The British leveled muskets to bayonet charge. When his line was less than 40 ms. to the militias, his officials gave the order of open fire. The volley struck the British, whose discipline allowed them to rapidly close rows and to answer in turn with a volley. But, instead of continuing a determined advance, the British lost their impetus, on having decided to recharge the weapons. It was an opportunity for the rebels: the enemy was detained inside the range of their muskets. And another volley went out of their line, beating the whole British line and knocking down many «epaulettes». Again the British recovered and arranged to a bayonet charge. Fulfilled their orders, the militiamen broke formations and ran towards the left flank, looking for theit rear.

(TO BE CONTINUED)