Simultaneity seeks to directly and immediately shock the most enemy echelons allowed by one’s own combat capacity. But, it does not discriminate among objectives according to their importance, which violates the previous and universal principle of the economy of means (one of the most accepted by authors) and it does not create a center of gravity for one’s own efforts. Its action is purely and clearly focused on enemy attrition, demanding a proportionally high consumption of ammunition and missiles of different types, since the action does not look only to neutralize the enemy, but to destroy him. This action commits the equipment and maintenance logistics, demanding a greater number of substitutions of tubes, of ammunition, etc.

In any given moment, simultaneity gives equal preference to objectives such as tactical reserves in depth and obstacles to the advance in the forward edge of the enemy defense position (observatories, infantry combat positions, heavy infantry weapons firing positions, anti-tank positions in the infantry zone). Simultaneity also gives equal preference to objectives that are explored in depth, to objectives that flank one’s advance in the rupture (including an antitank bolt, which has enfilade and firepower cover).

Norman Schwarzkopf - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre


This simultaneity demands a combat capacity greater than that of the enemy. Since the principal task of our forces of containment and of maneuver is to strike at the same operational «time» all the depth of the attacking deployment. Seeking to shock it, to undo its coherence and to disintegrate it. And the theoreticians ones call «own synergy» to the simultaneously and linearly created effort over the enemies whole front and flank and/or rearguard. This “own synergy” is adding and rather meagre. And it would enrich with the operational indirect, not frontal, fighting, with the surprising action, with the application of the effort on enemy weaknesses. This way, it would be an exponential synergy.

Simultaneity is really a tactical principle. It collaborates in making a breakthrough in a battle, extending contact with the enemy or in taking advantage of different weapons ranges in a defense in depth, in order to beat the tactical echeloned forces of an attacker, for breaking the continuity of his effort by tactical isolating his different echelons. Its transcendence at the operational level is through planning of the battle and is achieved when a positive decision in battle is obtained.

On the other hand, complementariness, when focused on fire (heavy infantry arms, tanks, artillery and aviation), does not respect the combined-arms systems. That place the enemy deployment in a centripetal effort (derivative of different and complementary actions). That tend to place him in a “tactical defenseless dilemma”. We have already indicated that the destruction of an objective is always very onerous (goes against the saving of costs looked for in budgets). The difficult thing is to obtain this effect. If we use maneuvers of combined-arms groups, it will be sufficient the neutralization or temporary loss of the actuation capacity of the objective against us.

On the other hand, given the distance of most enemy objectives from one’s combat capacity, some are immediately attainable only by indirect heavy fire or aviation. This tends to trade one’s mobility and shock elements (including tanks and mechanized infantry) for heavy firepower units, in the mix of one’s available combat capacity. It is hoped that these produce the simultaneous destruction. In favor of this interchange of funds for the defense, is the psychological and politically preferred fact that the precise or the saturation heavy fire theoretically diminishes the “interfaces of action” with the enemy at close distance. The existence of a more than proportional heavy fire tends to favor its use as an attrition element on the enemy in the doctrines and regulations.

The two last reasons fix heavy fire as a key weapon in operations, enhancing mobility as its capacity to locate itself very quickly in successive and/or effective fire positions forces. That it is in fact a tactical mobility, measured at the rate of Kms/day in advance. This harms operational mobility and the main instrument for the decision in that level will be that of “successive combats”, which not always will be wished and transcendent. That is to say, the simultaneity and complementariness unbalancedly support the employment of attrition or pure destruction. And undesirably favor the interchangeability of mobility (operational mobility of troops) and shock for indirect heavy fire and/or aviation bombing.

The Center of Gravity:

In addition, the principles of means economy and of the systematic use of surprise (as a multiplier of combat capacity, even in defense, with reverse slope positions echeloned in depth, opportune counterattacks, fire bags) are directly related to the principles of the concentration of means and mobility in all operations (combats and movements, activity in the defense). Employing by the command the use of the “center of gravity” of the joint effort, as a factor of planning, actuation and direction of combined-arms systems.

That is to say, the center of gravity is the main integrator of the principles of war, in its conduction and execution and is a natural feature of it. As Marshal Von Hindenburg said: “A battle without Schwerpunkt (center of gravity) is like a man without character”.

Battle of Ulm - Alchetron, The Free Social Encyclopedia


As far as concentration goes, the so called “principal effort” expresses an effect of penetration in a given direction and sense, to be able to arrive at the rupture and exploit it. The combined-arms and aerial efforts of the units are concentrated on this. The main effort is exemplified by the «hammering strategy» of general Foch on the European Western Front, beginning in the summer of 1918. This strategy was used to overcome the Germans, purely by eroding their combat capacity in the theater of operations. And only shifting the direction of attack, when German resistance was excessive in a sector.

Batalla de Ulm - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre


The center of gravity has a more spatial and temporary sense, looking for an “operational convergence” of the “related effortstowards an objective. Those are not necessarily contiguous, simultaneous or sequential. But are synergic and resulting in the effects and outcomes. Which based on consideration of the optimal form (energy economic) of action of each weapon and service.

The center of gravity is more global or holistic; the main effort is more adding and cumulative. The effects of the main effort are more direct, predictable and evident. Those of the center of gravity are more subtle and unexpected, at least in the first phases of a military action. The ramified lines, in a final centripetal action, are peculiar to the center of gravity. The accumulation of forces in a sector, reiterating (inserted or successive units) or strengthening (adding tanks or engineers, narrowing the strip or sector or providing greater fire support) the effort is peculiar to the concept of main effort.

The center of gravity supposes a centripetal action of all the lines of performance, of the ramified activity of all the units and the services, not necessarily coincident, but convergent on the enemy objetive. The center of gravity directs, canalizes, gathers and orients the creation and the direction of the strike of different units and supports in each case. Its shift by the command allows the continuous adaptation to circumstances and the maintenance of focus on intermediate goals.

At the National Strategy Center of a Society, the center of gravity guide and drive all the different diplomatic, economic, military and social available or created means of a society in synergy and continued actions over the enemy and its allies, to get and produce our National Strategy Objectives (NSO). This is what discovered and found recently the theory of Asymmetric Warfare.

The Tactical or Operational Success. Its Signs. 2nd. Part.


The Signs of Tactical or Operational Success related to the Physical and Environmental Support:

Land transitability will be neutral or favorable to the operation.

Transitability is the geographical (superficial or spatial) dimension where military actions take place. It is principally framed by the superficial capacity of an area to support certain means or military capacities and their movements. It is completed today in a spatial dimension, by the range of heavy fire and aircrafts.

It has independent and absolute functions, as are the passing of specific points during a period of time, the time it takes to travel the distance between them and the not superficial simultaneity of military means. These refer on the transitability, related to how the Nature and obstacles interact with operations. Transitability also has relative functions that are generally dependent on geography. These are more concretely determined by the availability and quality of roads, railways and fluvial nets (urbanized geography), the climate, the hydrology, the orography, the season and meteorology and the hour of the day (physical geography). These functions change with different national and regional surfaces.

Transitability determines the facility or physical difficulty for rapidly maneuvering and, in consequence, determines the total time of an operation, in the phases of execution through the successive «cycles of action«. Roads and railroad networks are the most suitable physical support to obtain low times of execution in operations or high «tempos». Their transitability characteristics will be their availability in the operations zone, the road surface resistance, the traffic saturation conditions and the “narrow or critical” points existing in the ways networks and their “continuity traveling cuts”.

Roads that support a good advance pace are problematic, as outside of developed countries pave roads are uncommon. More often it is the case that a terrain is untransitable as an operational element and will require units to physically struggle in order to going on. The channels, the rivers, as continuity cuts, constitute another relative conditioner of the transitability of a zone. On one hand, they constitute an almost inevitable restraint of the impulse of maneuver. In effect, in almost any direction that follows an operational route during sufficient Kilometers, it ended up confronting the crossing of a natural or artificial water obstacle. The bridges that surpass them, as part of a road network, not always will exist or be at hand. Given the present amphibious means, the main obstacle to the transit will be offered by the water flows banks. It will be necessary to consider the slope of both banks and the characteristics of resistance, adherence, consistency, etc. of them and of their immediate approach grounds.

Resultado de imagen de MILITAR traveling grounds

One can try to use the superficial dimension, or even the spatial one, to improve transitability in different cases when good conditions do not exist. The first leads to employ a cross country mechanized formation, supported logistically. This was the imagined ideal of strategists and tacticians in the 1930s. On one hand, the best all-field or tracked vehicle moves better along a highway than across a field. For a given useful load weight, all-field or tracked vehicles have more tare than wheels vehicles. For total given weights, vehicles on tracks and on wheels that advance cross country have greater wears, more breakdowns and more fuel consumption than those that travel on highways.

Resultado de imagen de MILITAR river fording

This raises a double economic and logistic inconvenience, whose solution is very difficult. For this reason, it is ideal to operate along steady surfaces and using the railroad up to a bit more than one hundred kilometers to the front or the enemy. And to fight cross-country, taking advantage of shooting cover sectors, concealment and so on. Using the tactical characteristics of the field. Specially, rolling grounds that favor the mechanized fighting.

The spatial dimension also encompasses the impossibility, like that of saturated ground roads, of the simultaneous arrival of numerous aircraft at a given point. Or the airships fly in row, arriving at the same time, but laterally extended or they go in line to unload or arrive successively in a «single» operations point. The helicopters give more concentrated results than those of the airplanes, but these have more lifting and ordnance capacity.

Resultado de imagen de Military airborne falling

The effects of climate, season, hour, and hemisphere are superposed on these conditions, worsening or mitigating them. Orography affects transitability when it make difficult the construction of a road layout and when it increases the slope that military marches must cross. The cross-sectional passing of “height lines” can become impassable, except by defiles or mountain ports. Which create bottlenecks that collapse the maneuver impulse and prevent the deployments of the units that cross them. Fights at heights have a generic “gravity center” in order to control these passages.

Resultado de imagen de urban warfare city A RESOLUTE ENEMY  IS STILL WAITING YOU OVER THERE

When “height gradient” diminishes there exists a less evident, but more frequent and very important factor, which is the «drop». “Drop» refers to height variations of a few meters up to dozens of meters in relation to the surroundings. It appears in cross-country running, in areas of more or less waviness, in broken areas and even in roadways sections. It has also an expression in urban zones, both residential and industrial. As well as buildings, houses and facilities form «relative concealing heights«. These generate protection and danger, opportunities and risks. And are the urban expression of the «drop». The forest is a special variant of this case, with obstacles and shorts views for both enemy forces.

Urbanized or industrial zones shape numerous parallel, transverse and interweaving «drop» lines. They channel all military effort in the mentioned zones, generating innumerable «interfaces of action» with the enemy. That are frequently determined under surprise conditions. These zones definitively paralyze the impulse of the units and generate attrition (in military means) and wear (in logistical terms) disproportionate to the results obtainable by their occupation.


The Principle of the Objective, Today. 2nd. Part.


An Historical Application of the Principle of the Aim in the War.

A clear and simple example of the application of this principle in the operational strategy, we have in the campaign of Ulm. In May, 1805 broke out the war between France and the Third Coalition, formed by Russia, Austria and England, its promoter. The main body of the French army was deployed along the coast of the English Channel, preparing itself to invade England. But the threat for the French army in campaign, which was the real strategic aim in the Napoleonic wars (let’s remember that the occupations of Madrid, Vienna, Moscow, were not decisive), was arising in the East Europe, from the armies of the Russian and Austrian empires. In September, 1805 Napoleon moved his «Army of England» to the Rhine, deploying it between Mainz and Strasbourg and renamed the «Great Army». The Great Armée was formed by 145.000 infantrymen and 38.000 riders, joined 7 army corps. Each one at the orders of a French marshall, a great cavalry reserve, at the orders of the marshall Prince Murat, and the Imperial Guard, directly under Napoleon. To them 25.000 Bavarian allies were added.

Taking the initiative, as was habitual with him, Napoleon decides to give the first strategic blow against the army of 72.000 Austrians, which, at the orders of the general Mack and the archduke Fernand, son of the emperor Francis II, was advancing towards Ulm, without waiting for the arrival of the Russian help. Napoleon maneuvered his army corps in a centripetal spiral over Ulm. It supposes the joint action of all the means in his “lines of action”. Of the «branched out» activity of all the units and the services, not necessarily coincidental in the time, but convergent and resultant in his efficiency and in the result. By means of the different and coordinated,lines of advance or action, the uncertainty and insecurity is induced in a prepared enemy. And always his rejection capacity is dispersed and is disturbed his plan of defense and its systematic conduction.

Resultado de imagen de battle of ulm 1805

The general Mack went out at the doors of Ulm, to surrender to Napoleon, at the foothills of mounts Michelsberg.

In a wide advance of his independent army corps, the great Armée quickly crossed the center of Germany, from the Rhine to the Danube, between septiembre, 25 and October, 6. With this he operationally intervened between the Austrians and the Russian allied forces, still distant.

The Austrians did not understand the need of the rapidity of these movements. They were thinking only about the battle, as the only instrument of the decision. Their operational strategy did not exist. And they waited his enemies, centred on Ulm and expectant. The Frenchmen initiated the crossing of the Danube on the 7th. And, during the whole week, Napoleon made converge, on an enormous constrictive maneuver, the majority of his forces on Ulm. While, an army corp was monitoring the possible arrival of the general Kutuzov from the East. The trap was remaining closed in irresistible force.

The general Mack uselessly realized several attempts of breakthrough, with the major efforts in Haslach and Elchingen. Both Austrian commanders fought between them. And the archduke Fernand separated from the main body with his 6.000 riders and tried to escape in North-East direction. But, near Trochtelfingen, his forces were surrounded and defeated by the Murat’s corps cavalry. Other 12.000 Austrians gave up themselves in Neustadt. The general Mack and the rest of his men (around 27.000, after the combats and mentioned incidents), with Napoleon in scandalous majority at the doors of Ulm from October, 14, went out to surrender their weapon at the foothills of mounts Michelsberg. The general Mack signed the capitulation of the army on the 20th. The campaign, without battles in strict sense, cost to Austria more than 50.000 men, almost 70 % of his initial troops.

The Current Process of Definition and Follow-up of the Aim.

The retreat of the USA of Vietnam produced a readjustment and another appreciation of the principle of the aim. The later evaluations of the politicians and military men led to proclaiming the imperious need to give always to their armed forces in any future conflict: the support without fissures of the people; a few clear and expressly defined operational and strategic aims and the necessary means for its achievement. This «check list» of supports of the national strategy to the military strategy, appears today as a good summary of the moral and material commitment that the peoples and the controls have with their military men, when they send them to the war for reasons of «national interest».

In the practice, the development of the operational strategy will be defining new operational and tactical aims. That are the surveyor’s poles of the sinuous way that leads to obtaining the strategic aims raised to the military men. That can be so precise and so general as: the occupation of an enemy territory, the recovery of a some provinces pillaged by that one, his effective military defeat or his surrender with or without conditions. Let’s remember that Moltke the Old was saying that the own initial plans only were resisting or were viable up to the first contact in force with the enemy.

The western democracies are provided with extensive, direct and deep communications through all their social tissue. Everything appears easily at first sight. And all the persons take the right or the obligation to debate about everything. But, in the «political military area» that is great more unstable, insecure and opaque. This does not want to say that the operational requirements should not exist. And that the need to prescribe and keep the discretion and the security necessarily limit the «universal exhibition» to the mass media in the area of the national safety.

Resultado de imagen de senate of the us

The Senate of the United States controls the evolution of the wars objectives.

It is necessary to define and to give clear aims to the military men. It implies the need of that the politicians study and compromise themselves with the high or national strategy. And, as necessary and inevitable corollary, that they give the sufficient operational autonomy to his military men. In order that they do not waste lives, efforts and a material means. In order that they neither get entangled, do not even be distracting in unproductive or secondary actions. In order that they do not lose the respect and the support of his people and gain the scorn of the neutrals and potential enemies.

But, closing an ideological and practical «curl», the age of the communications also offers advantages of rapidity and constant, reasonably trustworthy and sufficient intelligence using the military information and his management. Even in the fleeting and delicate cases, with the wireless communications of several levels and accesses, it is possible to obtain a «virtual presence» of the military chiefs and of certain politicians, in the operational distant field. This would facilitate to these controls, a successive approximation and the graduation of the actions of the military means in presence, towards the operational action. And it would facilitate the dilution in the space and the time of the need to fix the successive secondary aims, already from the beginning of a “cycle of military operations”. Keeping always a constant acceleration of the «cycles of action» on the enemy, to dislocate his rejection capacity and to seek and to act on his operational weaknesses. Already those must seek to go successively forward to the enemy, progressively turning ineffective his actions and induce in his men the abandonment of not being capable of offsetting nor overcome our tactical actions guided by our “in real time” operational strategy.


The Principle of the Objective, Today.

The principle of the objective demands that every operation goes towards a decisive, clear and obtainable aim with the means at disposition. This principle is applicable to the four levels of the war: the tactical, the operational, the military strategic and the total strategic or of national politics. In this last level meet to collaborate the national diplomacy and economy, who would give him his category of «total». At first, it seems that this principle of «direction of the war» is of the easiest to conceive and apply. Nevertheless, it is in the highest level of decision, that of the great strategy or national strategy, where it has not been correctly or sufficiently applied this principle. We can remember, supporting revolts of Lybia, as the great powers of the anti Gaddafi Coalition had difficulties to define the essential aims of his military intervention in Lybia.

Origins and Appearance of the Principle of the Aim in the War.

This principle is always related with the general principle of economy (or the administration) of the means. So, we rationalize our efforts and means on having centred on a complete aim. And this way, the lives and other military available means, always scanty or, even, insufficient, for a campaign, can be squandered, if the national commands fail in applying the principle of the aim at his own level. This principle is directly related to that of concentration. Which seeks to assemble all the means, not necessarily present for the moment, well simultaneous or successive, in a common effort on the aim to get. This way, for example, a combined arms unit that covers the free flank of his main body or the units of tactical exploration deployed in advance, are also taking part with his missions in this complete and synergical effort.

In the classic ancient military men (Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great or Jomini) the knowledge of this principle arises more by what it is deduced from his works, that for its direct mention. That is to say, up to only a few decades ago, the principle of the aim was a second-class principle. How could be giving this paradox between his managerial importance and his carelessness? The principle of the aim was implicitly careless, when the military men expressly attended to the principles of surprise, of concentration and of protection. And it was so, because it was too evident. It was really, to defeat the enemy in the minor number of possible battles. We must remember that the principles of the war originally appear in the tactical field: as the advices and directives to follow to gain the battles.

Resultado de imagen de frederick the great

Frederick II, the Great, ruled the Kingdom of Prussia for 46 years. A practiced and theorist of warfare.

Initially and even until little ago, the state matters were not of the interest or of the consideration of the people. The kings and absolute princes, even the illustrated ones, were autonomous and sufficient in the direction of the war and were not using the principle. This changed with the establishments of the diets, the parliaments and the chambers. More or less representing peoples cosovereigns with the monarches. It was already necessary to explain the motives and the aims of the wars. This way, the principle of the aim began to take form and content. And it reached his importance and sovereign, when the tactics or the art of considering and gaining the battles, already cannot by itself to gain a war.

In any operation the aim is essential. Without it there can exist neither a definite and clear plan nor the coordination of efforts (or «mass»). The last military aim is the destruction of the enemy forces in presence (not necessarily the physical annihilation, it would be enough that they were giving up themselves). Considering only the military factors, the aims must be defined from the beginning and select them in agreement with the available means. And this way, appears the paradox which we nowadays live in many cases. There exist political, economic and still strategic factors, which conspire to delay and still gets dark the definition of the aims in the war, as the case of Lybia. And, on the other hand, with the forces already displaced there, before the friends, neutral and enemy’s look, existed the urgent need to clearly define them. With it is achieved a “joint effort” (today baptized synergy) for the best utilization of the resources on the enemy.

From middle of the 19th century, appear and are consolidated the rapid globalization of the interests of the States and the scopes and powers of their military, political, economic and diplomatic means. With them, the military principles of tactical origin fullly reached the area of the national and military strategy.

The Pernicious Interference of the Politicians in the Military Actions.

Also there always was coming a moment in which the politician had to be quiet and not to intermittently meddle in the military specific occupation. Sun Tzu is the real or supposed name of a Chinese author, who wrote The Thirteen Chapters of the Art of the War. The unit of style of the work and his originality allow to affirm that it is neither a collective work nor a summary of preexisting works. His work is dated between 400 and 320 B.C. In effect, the use of the cross-bow did not generalize until 400 and the cavalry was not incorporated into the army before 320. What Sun Tzu said on the military missions and the spurious interferences, more than 2 thousand years ago?

Resultado de imagen de Sun TzuThe Statue of Sun Tzu in Enchoen, Yurihama, Japan.

«Normally, when the armed forces are in use, the general receives, first, the general orders of the sovereign. Then he assembles the troops, makes the army an homogeneous and harmonious set and installs it in his cam «. Chapter 7, verse 1.

«It is necessary to know that for the sovereign there exist three ways of taking his army to the disaster. They consist of proceeding as follows:

To ignore that the army must not advance and order that it should advance, or, to ignore that it must not move back and arrange a retreat. This is what calls «to put the army in a difficulty». Chia Lin’s comment: «there is no major calamity that the orders of the sovereign that resides in the court «.

To ignore all the military matters and to take part in his administration. This disorients the officials. To ignore all the problems of the command and to take part in the exercise of the responsibilities. This destroys the spirit of the officials». Chapter 3, verses 19 to 22.

«The one that has competent general and protects them from the (solvent) interferences of the sovereign, will be the victor». Ibid, verse 29. Ho Yen Hsi’s comment: «In the war hundreds of changes take place in every stage. To say that a general must wait for all the orders of his Superiors, is like to have to inform a Superior of that you want to extinguish a fire. Before the orders come, the ashes will be cold. And it has been said that in such circumstances it is necessary to consult the general inspector of the army! To shortly tie a competent general, while he is asked to suppress a crafty enemy, is as holding the Black Greyhound of Han and then give him the order to catch unattainable hares».





The Mongol Army Attacks Hungary.

Subodai concentrated his army in 3 groups of march. Each one would enter Hungary by a different route, across the mountain passes and valleys of the Carpathians. This deployment was given to the Mongols more resistance to the enemy surprises. And gave them an initial unfolding for the maneuvers of their 3 mobile corps, facilitating them to face the enemy. The Hungarians, for their part, did not dare to attack any of them, for fear of an advance of the other corps on their rear or to occupy anyone of their cities. The central column, which was under the command of the prince Batu, crossed Ruske’s mountain pass on March 12 and continued his advance for the valley of the Tisza. His vanguard with combat capacity came to the Danube on the 15th and 2 days later the principal corps did it. The vanguard had realized a march of 290 km in 3 days, crossing an hostile area and still covered by high snow.

On April 3, Subodai formed his 3 columns in front to Pest, in the east bank of the Danube. In Pest the king Bela had assembled his army of 100 thousand men. At another side of the river, joined both cities by bridges, was Buda. Subodai knew they were overcome in number by the Hungarians. Having also detached a tumen in Transylvania the left column of march, to assure that the Christians were not receiving reinforcements from Romania, the Mongols were now 70 thousand. Also, it was very dangerous for them to force a crossing of the Danube at the sights of the Hungarian deployed army.

On the other hand, the more time Subodai was taking in his calculations, decisions and preparations, the more time was giving to other European leaders to decide and to come to support the king Bela. The Mongol general applied then at strategic scale one of his tactic stratagems: his army moved back towards the East. The Hungarian chiefs supposed that the Mongols were not daring to fight against their army. And, spurred by their stagnation before the not hindered advance of the Mongols 3 marching columns, asked to initiate his pursuit. The Hungarians did not notice that Subodai was attracting them out of the protection of the Danube and of the support between detachments and the army corps.

The king Bela, commanded the great majority of the army, directed the pursuit. The Mongol retreat was calculately slow. They took 6 days in reaching the Sajo river, at 160 km at the North-East of Buda and Pest. And, at the west of the river, near its mouth in the Tiszna and in the plain in front of Mohi, the principal city of the zone, Batu and Subodai decided to confront their «persecutors». On April 9, the Mongols crossed a broad gorge, advanced by a heath, crossed a stone bridge and continued 16 km up to the bushes placed at the west of the hills and vineyards of Tokay. In them, they had numerous places where to camouflage or to hide. In effect, when a Hungarian reconnoissance detachment followed them that evening and came up to Tokay’s west, it did not find absolutely nothing. The Hungarian army, who realized a frontal pursuit, encamped in the heath, arranging his cars, joined by chains and ropes, closing a circle, where installed his tents and mounts. At the right of the camp, were the marshes of the bank of the Tisza, at his front, the heath of the Sajo was spreading and forests and hills were covering his left side.

Resultado de imagen de BATTLE of buda and pest 1241 FIGHTING ON THE BRIDGE.

At dawn of Wednesday, the 10th of April, 1241, Batu and 40 thousand men threw towards the stone bridge by its east side. The Hungarians defended it with all energy, until they had to withdraw for the fire bombs of that the Mongols catapults threw them, on having been in a very narrow fighting sector. The Mongols went on to the west side, but during more than 2 hours, were terribly pressed by the Hungarians charges and only the shots of their archers briefly restored their defense line. Little by little, the Hungarian army deployed to liquidate the Mongol bridgehead. Suddenly, the general Subodai, who also had crossed to the west side by a circumstances bridge stretched downstream of the Sajo, while the Hungarians were distracting with the threat in the bridgehead, appeared with 30 thousand Mongols on the Hungarian rear. Struck and stunned, but with guts and experience not to fall down in the panic, the Hungarians moved back in good order to their camp. But the Mongols threw to it, surrounding almost totally the camp and covering it with incendiary bombs and arrows. Which were burning the load coaches and the tents and frightened away the beasts, spreading chaos between their enemies and undoing the autoconfidence of the Hungarians.

The Mongols prepared to throw a charge on the uncohesioned groups of the Hungarian army. But they continued without finishing to cover with any detachment, the siege to the camp by the access gorge to the heath. The Hungarian knights with enough moral courage yet formed a wedge, to resist the charge; it was the last firm resistance of the Hungarian army. But the majority of them moved back by the existing «gap» in the siege, fleeing in small groups towards what they were thinking that would be their salvation. And really falling down In a mortal trap, which was spreading over the whole route of their flight towards Pest.

The Mongol light cavalry, without risking anything, softened from a distant with his arrows the driven to despair deployment of the knights and, later, taking his opportunity, the heavy cavalry charged to squash them. Numerous Mongol light detachments went out in pursuit of the fled ones. A part them was pressing on their rear, to increase their commotion, their chaos and their fear. While, other detachments realized the overflowing pursuit, reaching them from the sides and spearing them or throwing their arrows to them with their small and most powerful compound arches, which shot from the mounts. Along 50 km, in the way of return to Pest, spread the remains of the Hungarians, their mounts and their equipments. More than 70 thousand Hungarians knights and auxiliary died in the battlefield, in the camp and in the escape towards the southwest. After the battle of the Sajo, the Hungarian resistance collapsed.

The Mongols immediately attacked Pest and burned it. But they did not dare to cross to the west side of the Danube in the exploitation of the success. In spite of the moral and numerical supremacies that they enjoyed in these moments. Batu and Subodai gave rest to their army and consolidated the positions at the east of the great river. And so more than half a year passed, where the principal related event was a slightly spirited declaration of Crusade against them from the Pope, of which it was obtained little in the practice. In December, 1241 the Danube froze in this great region.

Resultado de imagen de king bela IV of hungary  MONGOL’S LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRIES.

The Mongols made good use of their time to plunder Buda, realized a reconnaissance in force in Austria and sent a detachment to the South, towards Zagreb, in pursuit of the king Bela. And on the 25th they assaulted Gran, the Hungarian capital and See of his archbishop, taking with them everything of value and antiquity they could.

A marvellous End for Europe. Who, What for?

Central and Western Europe were mature for a Mongol invasion. The Europeans did not have an army capable of facing this threat, which already was throwing them the breath in his napes. The strategic plan explained by Subodai to the Khan and to his generals seemed to be faithfully fulfilled up to his last parts. But, this was already only an illusion, the impossible one. An «appearance», which Sun Tzu would say. On December 11, 1241 they had received in the headquarters of Batu and Subodai an escorted messenger from Karakorum, the Mongol capital in the Eastern Asia. He was bringing the news that Ogadai, the Great Khan, had died and that his widow was acting as regent, until a new Mongol emperor was elected and promoting to the throne. The Mongol present princes were anxious to make worth their rights for the succession and decided to return to their capital, taking with them the imperial tumens.

Batu knew that without these select troops, he could not keep Hungary in his power. But he thought that with the Turkoman recruits, who already were experienced and taken part in combats, he might keep most of his territories. This way, the Mongols evacuated Hungary, without being hindered, harassed or pusued by their enemies. Though behind they left the land that was theirs. This was a symbol of their idiosyncrasy and exploiter character up to the extinguishment, land bandit and absolute predator. And without the minor aptitude to create, to keep, to develop, to extend and bequeath his successors, a civilization that was deserving this name. And not only to leave them the accumulated results of his outrages, bails, taxes, plunders and booties and the military educations to obtain them.

Batu returned to his departure field base, in Sarai, near the Volga and at scanty 100 km north of Astrakhan. And there established a Mongol subsidiary empire, which was known as the Golden Horde. The Mongols would not have another equal opportunity to invade Europe. After this aberrant nightmare suffered by the Europeans, these invented all kind of stories and myths, in which they narrated how they had defeated the «Tartar» invaders (this way they in general knew the Mongols) and had forced them to return to their lands.

This unthinkable, sudden and happened, in the last possible moments resulted… marvellous, Was it a matter of Destinity and of Europa’s Karma and his privileged Civilization? ¿Or was it the result of a Divine Intervention by the intercession of the Holy Virgin Mary? Certainly, humanly was an excessive and incredible chance. But the faith can never give some «evidences», because it would stop of being and would turn into the verifiable reality. The Divine effective intervention, in favor of Europe and his civilization, which without the Christianity operating from his marrow, would never look alike to what it went and to what is. But It is probable, because That is never thundering or overwhelming. God did not visit Elias in the beams storm or in the hurricane-force wind, but using a tenuous and soft breeze. And, to the esoteric and sincretists, the explanation might be «a cosmic action of the astral and akasic forces, in favor of the Light, the Peace and the human Civilization, towards the top levels of the Universal Conscience «.

Also, there exists a «rational» and common explanation of what happened, but that cannot specify the moment to begin this opportune retreat. The Mongols and the central Asiatic associate tribes were creating an Euro-Asian empire in the first half of the 13th century. But their material capacities and their ideological and religious resources were not corresponding with such important aim. As already we saw, for the peoples of the occupied countries, they did not have anything satisfactory and lasting to offer them. The Mongols were kept in these foreign lands by the threat of the known terror. As it would happen with other tyrants, that tried to become «worldwides», their necessary collaborators were ethnic or ideologically similar. But the Mongol etnia and his related ones were demographically insignificant, to be able to monitor and defend alone such vast empire. All this, in the decades of the invasion of Eastern Europe, had tightened up to the point of break their military capacities. This way, more early that late, the Mongols had to realize that retrograde general march, to assure and consolidate their lands in the East of Eurasia. Moving away from the contact with dynamic, Ideological and expansive civilizations, as the European. With whom the relations of vicinity and the first exchanges of merchants, explorers and adventurers would been solved by the military clash.



After the death of Gengis Khan in 1227 his the second surviving son, Ogadai, succeeded him in the Mongol throne. The Mongol expansion eastward was limited by the Pacific Ocean and scarcely were staying free enclaves in China and Persia. But, towards the West, the great steppes of Russia were offering to the Mongols an enormous opportunity of conquests. Using these extensive areas, which were favorable to the advance and the maintenance of his rapid hippomoviles armies. These steppes had been awarded to the grandson of Gengis, Batu. The great Mongol general Subodai urged his conquest, to strategically protect the west flank of the Empire and as possible operational headquarters for the invasion of the green plains of Hungary. These natural plains might serve in its moment for the advance in north and west directions of the Mongols tumens («divisions»), towards the conquest of the core heart of the Christian Europe.

The Prolegomenons of Europe’s Invasion.

This «strategic panoramic» insight of Subodai filled with enthusiasm the court and the Mongolian chiefs. And, this way, Ogadai provided the general with around 50 thousand veteran men, under Batu’s nominal control, to conquer the steppes of the west Russia. In the winter of 1237, the Mongols crossed the frozen Volga and penetrated in Russia. The Mongol army was reaching 120 thousand light and heavy riders, with auxiliaries and luggages. Including their catapults for the heavy fire and the means of siege and to construct these. And it had increased with the recruitments of Turkoman realized in the advance route and authorized by Ogadai. The quality of this reinforcement for the Batu and Subodai’s army was deficient and variable, in comparison with the Imperial tumens.

During the following 3 years, the Mongols systematicly destroyed the feudal Russian kingdoms of the west. Using the frozen rivers as broad and long routes without obstacles to deeply penetrate in them and to positionally dislocate the enemy defenders forces. With the capture of Kiev in December, 1240, the rest of the Russian organized resistance disappeared. And the Mongols were reaching in force the Carpathians mounts, the natural obstacle that was protecting Hungary.

Resultado de imagen de BATTLE of buda and pest 1241

Though in this epoch, in the beginning of the Low Middle Ages, the European leaders did not know practically anything on the Mongols, both the general Subodai and the prince Batu were regularly informed about the difficult political European situation. In effect, in February, 122, Subodai and Jebe, at the command a corps army of 20 thousand Mongols initiated a reconnaissance in force of two years in the western Russian steppes, looking for advance routes for the Mongol armies towards Europe. There they recruited a permanent and well paid spies’ network in different nations. And they realized a secret alliance with Venice, for which, in exchange for relevant information about the geography and the always changeable politics of the European states, Venice would get a trade monopoly in the Mongol conquered territories.

In January, 1241, Subodai concentrated the army around Lvov and Przemysl, close to the river San, tributary of the Vístula. This «strategic departure base» was at the north of the Carpathians and at a distance of 300 km to the Hungarian Danube. To realize the invasion, the army only was possessing then 100 thousand men. The reason was that it had to keep occupation detachments in the Russian west and to protect its communications towards his base. The operational gravity center of these were the mountain passes of the Carpathians towards the south, towards Hungary.

That were defined by the Tisza and his tributaries network, which were forming the Carpathians valleys. But the advance of the Mongols towards Gran, the great capital at that time, at 40 km to the northwest of Buda and Pest, all on the Danube, would leave the invading army exposed to an operational counterattack of the Germans, Austrians, Bohemians or Poles. That might fall down on his right flank and eastward communications. Threatening them, this way, with serious losses or isolating them from their base, being able to surround some Mongol detachments.

The Mongol worry towards the enemy was generally strategic, thinking about their exposed flanks at the level of the occupied countries. This worry was originated in his always exiguous number of riders for the entrusted or looked aims. And also in the not tactical invincibility of his forces, if were meeting an organized, skilful enemy, who was using opportunely and effectively his heavy and light cavalries, and calm to resist their tricks and feints. The Europeans only were possessing the heavy cavalry. Where his nobles and chiefs fighted and around which, as main weapon, his infantry armed retinues and armies were articulated. This way, Gengis Khan, in 1221, after the conquest of the Moslem empire of Samarqand, placed approximately between the Sir Daria and the Amur Daria, systematicly plundered Afghanistan. And his son Tului killed most of the inhabitants of the north of Persia (Khorasan). With it they were protecting the south flank of the brand-new empire.

The Beginnings of the Invasion of 1241.

To defend this flank of the mentioned assaults, Subodai divided his army in 2 «very asymmetric army corps». The principal corps would carry out the invasion of Hungary and the auxiliary, small corps, would fulfill the double mission of clear the European threats to his advance on those Hungarian cities and his communications with the Carpathians. The auxiliary army, at the orders of the princes Baidar and Kadan and formed by 2 tumens, advanced first, in March, 1241 and, crossing the Vistula by Sandomir, surprised the Poles. But, to separate them from Hungary, «they» had «to allow» his mobilization and later concentration. This way, dividing his meager forces, Kadan advanced through Poland in northwest direction. Seeking to extend the alarm and the consternation for all his interior and «to threaten» the German States placed at the west of the Oder.

Resultado de imagen de Mongolians attack Pest

For his part, Baidar went in southwest direction, directly towards Cracow, the capital, burning and plundering everything what could at his passage, to attract on his detachment the enemy attention. And, suddenly, close to Cracow, the Mongols stopped and initiated in a short time their retreat, following the opposite direction to the previous advance. They were simulating this way to be a small incursion force, possibly explorer, already moving back to his base. The Polish cavalry forces, concentrated for the defense of Cracow, did not recognize the rapid retrograde enemy march as a tactical trick. And, filled of a warlike ardor that was inflaming their senses, they were thrown after what they thought that it was a great victory already in their hands. This way, they left their positions under the protection of the infantry and the walls of Cracow, to realize a frontal warm pursuit. Without before having really beaten their enemy and leaving in hands of the wind all the due precautions. On having seen them, the Mongols accelerated their march and even left their prisoners, with what the Poles saw insured the «reality» of his conjectures. But in Chmielnik, at 18 km from the capital, a very ungrateful surprise was waiting for them. The whole Mongol light cavalry, conceal for the distant sights and deployed forming a half moon with his checkered detachments, began to throw clouds of arrows with piercing punch arrowtips, that easily penetrated in the armors and protections of the Polish mounts and riders. The majority of these simply died. The inhabitants of Cracow, when the news came, terrified fled in mass, and the Mongols, reaching the Polish capital, set it on fire.

Baidar continued up to Breslau, the Silesia’s capital, where found that the population had lit fire to the city and sheltered in the citadel. There he knew that in Liegnitz, at 65 km to the west, Henry, the king of Silesia, had formed a very heterogeneous army of 25 thousand men to attack them. He also knew that the king Wenceslao of Bohemia was going with his army of 50 thousand men to meet Henry. Baidar decided to rapidly go to Liegnitz, to prevent the meeting of both enemy armies. In the way, Kadan and his mobile detachment, which already had completed his mission of general grieve the Poles and Eastern Germans, joined him. Both tumens reached Liegnitz on April 8, 1241. The 9th, the king Henry went immediately to facing them. He did not know that Wenceslao and his army were situated at only a day of march. In times of difficult and precarious communications, the ignorance, which is rash for its simplification, was replacing the lacks of information with own elaborations, based on the greed and the dread. His army deployed near the city in a plain.

Resultado de imagen de Mongolians attack Pest BATTLE OF LIEGNITZ

When the Mongol vanguard appeared in the horizon, Henry sent a small detachment to reject it. But a rain of arrows made it to move back to his rows. The king counter-attacked with all his cavalry. The Mongol vanguard, saw threatened, avoided the immediate contact and moved back. In what looked like to the knights an escape, after having kept the calm opposite to minor forces. The charge of the Silesian cavalry transformed in a career at full gallop, being disorganized and dispersed, looking for his prey. The Mongol archers were waiting for them in calmness, provided with their perforating cuirasses arrows. When the Silesian riders were inside their effective range, the Mongol archers covered them with arrows, knocking down many people and pulliing up sharply their clumsy assault. Already beaten the knights, the Mongol heavy cavalry charged against them and dissolved them. In turn, the light cavalry, screened by smoke bombs in his sector of advance, threw against the Silesian infantry, that were waiting at the end of the deployment. Behind, the Mongol heavy riders also charged, knocking down everything at their steps and killing the king Henry of Silesia.

When Wenceslao known about the disaster of the Silesians, stopped his march and moved back to protect Bohemia. Receiving for it reinforcements of the kingdoms of Saxony and Thuringia. The allied army formed in Klodzko, close to the gorges of the river Glatz, at 100 km to the south-east of Liegnitz. But, the Mongol reconnaissance detachments warned their princes of the dangers of those. In addition, the Mongol army corps had suffered enough losses in his raids and previous battles. In that moments, in less than one month of operations, 20 thousand Mongols had crossed around 650 km in enemy territory and gained 2 decisive battles. Poland was beaten and shocked and the Germans at the west of the Oder were moving back and preparing to defend their kingdoms.

The Bohemians, still intact, were at 400 km from the Hungarian defensive positions in the Danube. For what their army was operationally ineffective to achieve the decision in the Mongol attack to Hungary. To make sure of Wenceslao’s «intention», the Mongols realized a demonstration towards the west, inside Germany. Wenceslao pursued them. At a decided moment, the tumens deployed in small and slippery detachments. And, forming an almost invisible cloud for the enemy, they slipped for both sides of the Bohemian army and moved away from this.

In his retreat to meet Subodai, the Mongols crossed for Moravia, destroying his settlements, stores and fields. This way, they created a wide desert plateau, which would protect furthermore the right flank of the principal Mongol corps. On having left these lands unable to support for a time an army crossing it. In this secondary campaign Baidar and Kadan managed to eliminate any possibility that the Czechs, the Germans, the Poles and the Austrians were sending their troops in aid of the Hungarians. And they did it taking and keeping the initiative against a very numerous enemy, who was acting unco-ordinated. Whose principal weapon was the heavy cavalry, that acted only by the shock. And operating with a greater operational movement capacity, protected by the secrecy and the concealment, supported by a sufficient and constant information. And using in the combats decided by them the whole repertory of the tactics and technics of their cavalry, which were almost incomprehensible for the Europeans. And they could come in time of rejoining with Subodai’s corps at almost the end of the Hungarian campaign.




The near future of tactical reconnaissance.

Major tactical reconnaissance weapons, tanks and low level flying aircraft tend to be vulnerable to modern infantry antiaircraft and antitank missiles. They appeared on the battlefield in the 1970s and have become more effective since then. Since the mid 1990s, these rockets have been incorporating various technologies such as double active heads, multiple search engines, which allow them to discriminate against enemy decoys and secure the target, and those that allow them to use variable flying heights. For example, upcoming infantry tank rockets will be able to locate, define and confirm their target by magnetic distortions of the environment (generated by the relatively large metal mass of the tank), acoustic signals, heat emissions (human and motor and weapons) and short wave emissions. Their way to the target will oscillate to circumvent possible weapons deployed against them.

Resultado de imagen de deep range combat and reconnaissance patrols NEW ZEALAND’S LONG RANGE RECON PATROL.

All this will tend to give greater importance in the reconnaissance of to the deep range combat and/or reconnaissance patrols. They are inserted by air or river means, as close as possible to its operations area and designed to stay longer in it.

Combat reconnaissance: The immediate and continuous contact with the enemy and determination of the capabilities of the fighting ground.

Combat reconnaissance conducts ground reconnaissance, the relation of his own army’s adjacent units in established contact points and the location of the enemy to help determine the enemy’s intentions and characteristics. This latter mission is subordinate to the goal of obtaining intelligence. Every unit must establish it always, without need for specific orders. It is important to advance the subunits as rapidly as possible; if only is conducted by infantry, it may be necessary use vehicles to transport troops, who can then continue on foot.

In open flanks and exposed wings, its range must be adequately extensive. By means of anticipated patrols, combat reconnaissance constitutes in its actuation a real security for units in the front.

 Its organs are armored reconnaissance companies and platoons, reconnaissance patrols of units in the different sectors, observatories and forward platoons of artillery, etc. The platoon at disposal of the H. Q. and services company can be useful in the battalion area for rapid action.

Combat reconnaissance has a basic function to detect resistances and weaknesses in the enemy deployment and weapons, and in the “interfaces of action” created on him. It needs to use tested skill, sufficiently intense and never superficial, that is knowledge about the weaknesses of tactical units and the fortresses of opposing deployments, as well as its efforts to present the illusion of such deployments. It is important to act according to the mission and the gravity center of the effort ordered by the high command. Colonel Tor made this point in his book “Infantry” (page 31 Madrid, 1943), “…advance through the enemy weak points and fight from one’s own strong points».

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol  A PATROL…

Information collected from various sources, becomes available intelligence and is transmitted to those interested.

The reconnaissance generates information on the different action levels and the ground, which it also recognizes. That must be converted into intelligence. This is the reasonably reliable and sufficient knowledge (never excessive or intoxicating) of the enemy, of his intentions and possibilities and of the terrain, in its possibilities of struggle, transitability (more than ground ongoing), etc. Received updated and without continuity solution.

The elaborating organs of intelligence are different for operational and combat reconnaissances, since also they both generate different types of information. The principal difference are their qualitatively different levels of actuation, in which they must give the set vision: enemy, area and possibilities. And that the need for combat intelligence is urgent and more continuous, and its transcendence, very fleeting, so it is much less elaborate and more direct to fighting units, from its reconnaissance.

Once intelligence is created, it is integrated by the superior command, G-2. It will then be transmitted to units and interested commanders. Transmission must be protected by all existing means, guaranteeing secrecy and its arrival to the addresses by means of double couriers, coding, etc.

Transmitted intelligence must assemble the suitable characteristics of the moment and ensure reliability, continuity, transmission security, and the wealth of content and its sufficiency. It must also be opportune and continuous. The security of transmission of intelligence affects plans and decisions that based on it. It must be sufficient, rich and trustworthy enough to give command, within a reasonable amount of time, as complete idea as possible of a situation and to plan for its possible evolution and factors that will affect that evolution. Sufficiency drastically limits the excesses of unnecessary information which disorients and tires those in command that try to use them.

G-2 is converted this way into the penetrating and lucid eyes of the operative command.

The security as “opposed complementary” of the reconnaissance.

The reverse of the own reconnaissance is the fight against the enemy reconnaissance and the intelligence. She has as purpose to blind the enemy about our intentions and deployments, depriving him of operational information on us or misleading them. Security is the “opposite” (complementary, not antagonistic) of our reconnaissance.

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol   COVERING A SECTOR…

One of the active ways of fighting enemy reconnaissance is employing our operations security. Other is to employ advanced detachments, type reinforced platoons, to push back the enemy’s reconnaissance by means of mobile fighting with its center of gravity” focused on where his reconnaissance have to operate. A pushed back reconnaissance can give erroneous information to its intelligence on the actual possibilities of possible axes of advance towards us, our real capacities or our defensive intentions.

One purpose of security is the immediate protection of units against surprises and the unforeseen, by keeping a sufficient “combat readiness” for such situations. Units must also keep necessary forces alert as part of maintaining a practical reaction time. The tasks of security are to protect units from direct fire of infantry heavy weapons, to detect and avoid surprises, ambushes and enemy incursions and to detect and reject enemy reconnaissance. Every unit establishes at all times the security sector, zone (brigade or regiment) and area (division), according to its size. Between 1/3 and 1/6 of the unit, according to the situation, carry out security functions; the organs of which are the different sub units of the branches employed.

For camping units or in assembly areas of different classes, a safety line is established to delimit the protected units and at suitable points (accesses, etc.) double sentries are placed. At difficult to secure places (gorges, etc.) rapid mine barriers are placed. From this line, security units advance fixed and mobile patrols. Fixed patrols monitor critical security points (dominating points, enemy possible observatories, inevitable passing points, etc), relying on the mobile units to achieve always an active security.

Resultado de imagen de campos de minas militares  MINES BARRIER.

And, this so useful and simple, is always done? No, sir, not always.

«On June 10, 1944, soon after the midnight, the second battalion of the 29th division of infantry of U.S.A. was prepared to pass the night. The men had traveled approximately 25 kilometers over the last 20 hours. The official in charge of the battalion, Commander Maurice Clift, chose a zone of two meadows so that the troops were to spend the night in the open. The men entered the zone and set themselves up for sleep along terraced hedges. They were so tired that no one bothered to untie their rucksacks and personal equipment. The majority fell asleep at once. Some heard the noise of approaching engines but thought they were American vehicles.

However, the vehicles were actually German tanks and trucks belonging to the 352nd infantry division. Unknown to each side, the Germans had been withdrawing along the same route that the American battalion followed in its advance. When they stopped, the German explorers detected the North American movements encamped in the meadows. They quietly advanced and surrounded the meadows.

Suddenly, the Germans threw flares. Under the sinister light, almost as brilliant as the midday light, its assault cannons opened fire on the hedges against the Americans. Along one of the hedges a platoon got up and was cut down by the German machine guns. Many Americans, scared and disoriented, were running in search of a way out of the meadow while the German infantries continued knocking them down them with repetitive fire. The shells of the German mortars were falling all over the meadows. The Americans responded with weak rifle fire, directed at the opposite hedges, which ran the risk of hitting either the Germans or their own men.

«It was terrible”, a survivor told General Cota. «We crawled more than 90 meters out of the field when we heard from behind the shouts of our men. I thought that the Germans were launching a bayonet charge against them».

The commander of second battalion, Lieutenant Colonel William Warfield had his command post in a farm close to the highway. Warfield tried in vain to establish a defense. Those officials who ran from the house towards the field were brought down rapidly. A German shouted in English to the command group: «Give up, give up!». «We will certainly not give up!”, roared Warfield. He tried to lead a small group towards meadow where the rest of his men were, but was killed instantly.

The battle lasted around 20 minutes. The battalion had 150 casualties with some 50 dead, slightly more than one third of its effective force. Just before dawn a gravely injured young lieutenant who was reporting to his division commander, General Charles Gerhardt, fell down suddenly on his knees and struck the soil with his fists, sobbing that he was sorry that all his men were dead and that he had left them where they had fallen.

General Gerhardt was angry. “Without regard for safety, he shouted, The battalion simply came to the field to fall asleep».


The reconnaissance generates information of the different operational levels of military action. This must be turned into intelligence. That is the reasonably trustworthy and sufficient knowledge of the enemy, his intentions and capacities and the fighting possibilities and transitability of fields, etc. To enable us to take a “founded resolution”, based on the use of our means and fighting forms, in accordance with our objectives.

Concepts y Principles of the Reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance is one of the most important functions to be fulfilled by units during operations. The information it provides, how it is elaborated and transmitted and to whom is a fundamental part of intelligence. This, finally, is one of the key factors of decisive command.

Resultado de imagen de SDKFZ 263.    SDKFZ 263.

Reconnaissance can be divided into strategic, operational or tactical and combat, according to its mission and the area it encompasses. The strategic one seeks to uncover key information about the enemy in the operations deep theater: his concentrations of forces, his great movements, his important defensive lines and possible surface targets, etc. A surface target becomes a “destruction zone” by the effective action of heavy weapons of destruction, for example, reactive artillery or tactical nuclear devices.

The operational or tactical reconnaissance tries to define the situation and the intentions of the enemy in the operations area of the great units, type division, corps or army. It determines the movements of the enemy in the border zone between forces, his formations and deployments, his defense lines and possible surface targets. This reconnaissance is carried out by aviation, drones, specific reconnaissance units and the reinforced reconnaissance armored battalion of the corps. In this respect, a total connection and complement must exist in the missions of aviation and ground reconnaissance and keeping in mind that its task is never of fighting.  

The reinforced reconnaissance battalion operates in a sector of up to 60 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. Its advance over the parent unit must be at least 6 hours in order to utilize gathered information. On the basis of its reconnaissance order, battalion commander, keeping his companies always under control, can send up to 16 patrols of 3 vehicles to covering his sector, looking always for a gravitational center of the deployment. Having done this, he can send on the concentric center of the effort up to 2 patrols’ echelons, being relieved or being inserted, according to the used method. Finally, if the area to reconnoiter is occupied by the enemy, he can advance his companies as attack spears, under the screen of advance patrols. The battalion must not infiltrate very deeply inside the enemy deployment, if there exists a serious risk of being isolated.

Resultado de imagen de Panhard AML-245    PANHARD AML 245.

Not all Armies have given or given sufficient value to this last reconnaissance type, which depends on their military doctrine.

All the operational principles of reconnaissance could be summarized as follows: Always focus on the objective received from the command (its mission is to generate information, the combat will be done by others), seeking the maximum use of time and its means, getting and maintaining contact with the enemy and never losing the freedom of action. It will allow him to perform and to escape, without being caught by ever higher forces.

The tactical reconnaissance is also needed in the urban combats. Not always the tactical reconnaissance penetrates too much in the disputed or enemy area. The industrial or populated zones, full of «concealing relative heights» and staggered in depth, which offer protection from the enemy sights, even nearby, and covers against the light and heavy fire, «thicken» considerably the tactical maneuver of the contenders. Reducing this way, the depth of the fighting zone of the infantry. So, masses of the artillery, as batteries and medium groups of it, are deployed at very short distance to his enemy. In a artillery fighting zone then very next to the forward limit of the own defense position.

On October 9, 1942 a patrol of Soviet reconnaissance entered behind the German lines in Stalingrad, seeking to detect the enemy movements in his rear. The 4 men sheltered in an auxiliary railroad coach, torn and left, placed in a railroad between the workshops of the Red October factory (where before were made metallic pieces and small weapon), at North-East of the city. And the disputed Mamaiev hill, towards the geographical center of Stalingrad, which was offering grand sights on most of the city.

Resultado de imagen de Engesa EE-9 Cascavel brasileño. ENGESA EE-9 CASCAVEL.

During almost the whole day they remained in that hiding place, communicating by radio to his lines the German activity. They had located several dozens of German mortars and howitzers, accompanied by the trucks which were moving his ammunition, by the rear roads to some emplacements placed in the suburbs of Stalingrad’s west. Also they located numerous mortars and pieces placed in a glen at the north of the Mamaiev hill, doing fire against the Soviet positions in the city.

On having got dark, the explorers broke a telephonic cable of the fixed enemy network of communications and hoped that the Germans were coming to repair it. Very soon they observed the light of a lantern and when the soldier came closer, killed him to shots. One of the Soviets disguised himself with his uniform and placed close to the route of the railroad, hoping that another German came closer the cut cable. Soon another lantern started approaching by the way. The soldier fell in the ambush and the explorers made it unconscious. On having recovered, he met 4 Soviets of foot together near him. Pulled down the soldier Willy Brandt gave his name, range and unit of belonging. Psychologically they had already gained the hand on him.

Resultado de imagen de drones guerra Vietnam   DRONE AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, IN VIETNAM.

Immediately afterwards, the German told to the explorers that 94th German infantry division had come to the factories zone from the south of the city, that 24th panzer division was going towards there and that the Fuehrer had ordered that Stalingrad should be totally taken by October, 15. This confirmed to them the reason of the extensive movements estimated by them in the German operational zone.

For the small reconnaissance patrol, to take with it after his lines, a prisoner already interrogated, was more a nuisance and a danger that a minimal success. And, in spite of the hardness, even the brutality, of the combats in the city, they neither killed, nor mutilated him. The Soviets reported to Brandt that had revealed military secrets, took him to the railroad line and indicated the direction that he had to continue to reach his comrades and left him free”.

But, what is this of speaking about operational reconnaissance in the age of the electronics, the robotics and the computer science?

Almost 50 years ago, the North Americans had developed an arsenal of electronic devices, directed to the vigilance (surveillance) of his enemies in Vietnam. Already they had reconnaissance drones to monitor «from above» their guerrilla slippery enemy. That transmitted his images by television to the planes of detection and transmission, placed at dozens of km from the observed zone.

Resultado de imagen de sensor ADSID   ADSID SENSORS .

The principal sensor used in the remote vigilance was the ADSID (Air Delivered Seismic Intruder Device). It was thrown principally from the F-4 Phantom, following guidelines of navigation by radar, in order to cover adequately the observing zone, as a traffic route of men and vehicles, a parking or store. The device measured 91 cm. of length and 15 cm. of diameter. And on having fallen down was remaining almost buried, opening then a transmitting aerial of 120 cm. height, camouflaged as if it was a defoliated bush. His battery allowed it to issue during a month and half.

With these sophisticated artifices they were trying to observe the traffic of goods and men by the Ho Chi Minh Route, the route of supplies of the Popular Army of North Vietnam and the Vietcong in South Vietnam. It was a highly branched out and protected route that, departing from North Vietnam penetrated in Laos and crossed it. And then, detached diverse routes towards the different communist operations zones in South Vietnam.

The program «White Igloo» destined 1,7 thousands of million dollars between 1966 and 1971, for these tasks of compilation of information with the ADSID. With the information gathered from the traffic in the routes, the Americans were deciding the interdiction bombardment actions, using his different air devices, including the invisible and inaudible (with his cruise height) B-52 strategic bombardiers. At the beginning of 1971, the information of the aerial photos after the bombardments, taken by planes that were flying after the assault formations, allowed the analysts to suppose that the «war of trucks» was causing a very severe effort to the industrial capacity of the suppliers of North Vietnam (the USSR and China).

Resultado de imagen de Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System  A BOEING OF THE JSTARS SYSTEM.

But, if it was true that were destroying so many trucks and equipment, how was possible that the communists were keeping the tactical initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks that literally had to cover many of the ways and parks of the Route? Who were bothering to remove them? The response was given soon by the American junior officers: they were ate by a monster called the «Great Laotian Truck Eater»; a horrible rotten that was getting up towards the dawn and was devouring the vehicles destroyed by the aviation during the night, after the photography for «wreck count». Because the Americans are very scrupulous with the statistics and consider the lie an almost inexcusable social sin for his civil servants.

Up to today, almost 50 years later, the electronics, the robotics and the computer science have continued improving. But it does not seem that they are useful in Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria, to detect a “donkey bomb”; to avoid that group of cruel fanatics without God («as Allah does the Good, make you also the Good and do not promote the corruption (the “evil», the Noble Koran orders them), destroys great part of one of the principal mosques sanctuaries of the chiism in Samarra; to know if in an Iraqi or Syrian house are terrorists or only a terrified Arabic family, before demolishing her with heavy fire from a distance and extremely, according to his military operational doctrine.

In addition, during enough time still the air and spatial American means, as spy satellites, drones or not crewed planes and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have serious limitations for the detection and check of small ground, even regular, forces. In the areas of difficult transitability and with possibilities of concealment, as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized zones (industrial, of logistics, and of housings). Those not only offer concealment, but also coverings from the fire up to the near combat distances.

The Americans do not use the tactical reconnaissance, which demands some tactical characteristics of semi independent elite forces and a specific moral courage. And that is one of the most difficult tasks of the infantry. They use the combat reconnaissance and call her, expressively, reconnaissance.


The modern Hybrid Warfare. 3rd. Part.


The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

In general, the attacks are realized to the software of a system, looking for a «weakness» of this one. And using the malicious codes, the back entrances, etc. A penetration or attack to the software is prevented in general with an antivirus adapted to the received virus. To attack the hardware is necessary to act on the «physical component» of the computer. And his detection, with the nowadays existing miniaturization, turns out to be very improbable and long in the time, until the devastation is detected. The best way of acceding to the hardware is realizing the intrusion in the factories of components and of assemblies. But these are protected by control measures of components and external equipment, based on the nationality and the producer of them.

The cyberattacks go to cybernetic networks of the society, both public and private, to the communications and means of control of equipment and networks. Becoming concrete definite in the facilities of different out-standing or strategic sectors of a country or alliance; like, industrial centers, military communications, administrative public negotiations, social opened networks, energy distributors, intranets of banks and economic means. And they seek to paralyze or to disturb the functioning of them or to distribute in them more or less opened tendentious information, to alter or to direct the public or particular general opinion in favor of the interests not always evident of the attackers.

Resultado de imagen de ataques ciberneticos mas famosos

The cyberattact is a «total attack» of swarm type; that is, of multiple and simultaneous or sequential character. It is directed on the economic, administrative, civil and military structures, which hold and allow that a «social group» should work. It is a «form of fight» in the cybernetic area. Where «one» seeks «to occupy» tactical or strategic «advantageous positions«. And «to damage» the enemy, preventing him from keep his pace, his «habitual tempo» of functioning and stealing and depriving him sometimes of the costly goods of research and development created by him. And that were allowing him to keep a competitive advantage in national «intervention means» in the industrial, economic and military fields. A branch of the cyberattack is the industrial espionage.

With them is achieved to seriously concern and debilitate the diplomatic, economic, military and civil sectors of a society. In the civilian is the original humus, the social essence, as creator of the «national morale» and the «will of defense» of the social group. Being those sectors the «means of intervention» with which a State counts for his global, holistic defense, against the aggression and external and internal dangers.

It is known the supposedly American attack using an advanced virus against the software of the Iranian centrifugal machines. That were operating to separate the isotopes of the Uranium 235 and Uranium 239 (not fissionable), using his different “molecular mass”. Seeking to obtain U235 enough pure to create «self fissionable critical masses«, the explosive of the atomic bombs, for his supposed nuclear devices. As the % of purity between an industrial use, to generate electricity, for example, and the great purity that needs a «critical mass», both «activities of successive enrichment» are perfectly recognizable by the foreign intelligence. In May, 2010 it was detected by the Iranians a malicious virus, called Stuxnet, in the of Nataz’s nuclear station. And that gave to a thousand of them the «order» of self-destructing. But, already in January of this year, the inspectors of the Atomic International Energy Agency (the AIEA) and the Iranian technical personnel had detected that many centrifugal machines were working slowly or badly and without a certain motive.

Resultado de imagen de ataques ciberneticos mas famosos

China takes a privileged singular position as a «great universal factory» in the global economy. And the same sells cheap products of immediate consumption on a large scale, that compete principally in price, which makes already products of high added value with the most modern technologies. This allowed him to lead one of the most significant and consistent cases of cyberattacks on a large scale against a country or coalition. The history was published by Bloomberg.

The agents of a unit of espionage and cybernetic war of the Chinese Popular Army managed to place some malicious «components» in the motherboards of IT equipment of the Supermike company, of San Jose, California. Who buys to Chinese factories, which have, in turn, subcontracts and suppliers of components in China. This way, the IT equipment with this «Trojan horse» allowed the cybernetic Chinese spies to accede for 3 years to industrial and governmental secrets of the EE. UU.

The anomalies emerged in 2015, when Elementary Technologies, who was designing software to compress files, reported of them in the baseplates of his cybernetic servants. Around 30 technological companies existed, between them Amazon and Apple, and diverse agencies of American intelligence, «invaded» in the Chinese attack. It was verified that the cybernetic servants of Elementary were mounted by Supermike, which is the major world producer of cybernetic servants.

It was found that some plates of the cybernetic servants had installed a «perfected component» that did not appear in his design and that it was not a chip. This multifunctional «foreign corps» would have been placed in 4 factories of China that mount the cybernetic servants of Supermike.

Resultado de imagen de ataque chino al hardware THE SUPPOSED CHINESE COMPONENT INTRODUCED IN THE HARDWARE.

The physical interventions in the hardware are more difficult, because all customers theoretically verify the equipment that they make or buy. Attack to the other people’s hardware foreign are doing usually during his traffic from the manufacturer to the client. That is the method that the American agencies use. But this malicious and comfortable manipulation of the Chinese spies can be effected because China is the great manufacturer (with license or without her) of hardware (computers, mobiles). And the directors and controls of his factories collaborate of well or badly degree with the «requests of the authorities», in a wide sense.

And, finally, some days ago was important the recidivist case, still not close, of the Chinese giant of the telecommunications Hua Wei. This way, the agencies of intelligence of the U.S.A- has warned that must not be used the products and services of Huawei and ZTE. Accusing that the terminals of these brands might be working as «cybernetic concealed agents«, spying for the Chinese government. Also, the Pentagon has prohibited to his personnel to introduce in the military bases the products of these brands.

China, as a great power example, of realizing his own and adapted «combinations» of means of intervention in his different stages.

Imagen relacionada CHINA’S ASPIRATIONS…

One first Chinese national foreign objective is to promote the multipolarity in the world structure of the great powers and his allies. Looking that does not exist a world hegemonic power, like the USA, that hinders him in the extension of his influence and power from his «nodal center«.

For it, he will create alliances and will establish agreements with others countries in detriment or in substitution of that hegemonic power. And he will be a «obstructionist intransigent actor» in all the actions that that power promotes unilaterally in the international forums (UNO, Atomic International Energy Agency). This way, the actions of the western nations in the Syrian conflict were frustrated and limited by the systematic veto of China to his approval in the Security Council. Though the Chinese communists consider to be out of the fight for the direct influence in the Moslem Middle East. And, the Chinese decision to renew his relations with the Sub-Saharan Africa, it was partly a strategic corollary of the «war to the terror» of the USA and the NATO in Middle East, as supplier region of crude oil and gas to the whole world.


China is for Russia and Russia is for China a partner, competitor and rival, if it is worth this polyvalent definition, which does that none of the expressions is in fullness. Both are «emergent powers«, according to the new nomenclature, determined in growing, in not get damage directly for the moment and in eroding the hegemonic power and his Europeans allied.

This way, the Chinese would not act directly, not by third interposed countries, in Syria, in the boiling cauldron of the Asia of the Southwest, scene of the global contest that sunnis and Shiites develop for the control and the supremacy in the Islam. But they will do it collaborating up to a point with the interests and the diplomatic propositions of the Russians. Reinforcing this way a political common position of counterweight and neutralization of the influence of West in the zone. And in exchange for a certain Russian reciprocity in favor of the Chinese interests, in other countries in which do not shock the national influences of both. Resultado de imagen de china Paracelso y Spratly. A CHINESE NAVAL BASE OF MISILES IN A SMALL ISLAND OF THE PARACELSO’S ARCHIPELAGO .

A strategic exterior Chinese preference goes towards the Indian subcontinent and to the nations of the first Asian circle of terrestrial and maritime nearness. The India is a radical rival at his measure, with whom it beared several frontier wars in the middle of the 20th century. The India has a political structure more advanced than China, the liberal participant democracy, still in spite of all his contradictions, ethnic, religious and social discrimination and lacks of all kinds. And it possesses a demographic strength that overcomes China’s people grow. Though lately the Chinese begin to realize the irrational of his «pseudo scientists» methods of the control of the birthrate. That the communist China applied in altars of a material rational progress. Progress which only enjoys in diverse degrees at the present, the members of the communist party and his families, the technical personnel who design, stimulate and develop it, the chiefs and officials of the armed forces and a minority of entrepreneurs and men of business. That have prospered at the shade of an institutional inveterate clientele of the mentioned public elites.

At the west of China, close with his Sinkiang’s immense region (Xinjiang), in the Oriental Turkestan, there is a rosary of former soviet socialist republics of 2 thousands Km long, that get until the Caspian Sea. They are, from east to west, Kazajistan, Kirguistan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. And there form these countries a monolithic set of several etnias, gathered in the names of them, but extended over several simultaneously, of Turkoman origin, of the central steppes of Asia. And agglutinated also by his belonging to the Islam sunní. All this form a multinational defensive and refractory shield to the expansive activity and to the significant presence of the Chinese in his internal matters or in his exterior trade, always with effects of political guardianship. These Turkoman Muslims are rather potentials allied of the Great Russia, with only she puts a bit of care and dedication to attract and to attend them.


Another great strategic preference of Beijing is to extend his influence and increase the economic and diplomatic bows with the development nations, specially those who have «natural resources and primary cultures«, that are necessary for the manufacturing production, the supply and the general development of the nations. She has taken it even far beyond his geographical borders of political influence or strategical military.

With the interminable income of his exports and with the knowledge of the development in many areas, China does intelligent and massive strategic national «landings» in diverse countries of Africa and Spanish America. With them it establishes «binding alliances» of backing, advising and support. Trying to anchor firmly and creating allies or «friends» by all this world in development. 

Going firmly by the political, economic, diplomatic and military way of turning to what China really seeks to be:

one (or the) hegemonic power in the 21st century.

 The litigious, even violent, and, at least, very menacing, that China keeps with the countries of the East Asian, demonstrate how awkward, despotic and subjecting can be his presence in the short distances. When China thinks that com into play his national interests or his national pride. Whose loss in hands of the «foreign powers» until almost middle of last century, is one of the neurotic tics of the exterior politics of Beijing, from October 1, 1949.

In the Sea of the South of China, this power is expansive and hegemonic. And keeps litigious more or less important with the rest of the Asian countries bathed by this sea. That are The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

This sea has 3500 thousands Km2. And China thinks that it is his «Second Persian Gulf«, for the sub aquatic oil and natural gas deposits, existing and estimated. For comparison and perspective, the Mediterranean Sea only has 2500 thousands Km2 and his coasts bathe to 24 countries in three continents. None of which is hegemonic or expansive.

In order to settle itself in the «disputed archipelagos«, China follows a strategy of small and consolidated advances. Installing in them, in islands and rocky islands, military air or naval bases and extending the logistic capacities of some of them, substracting area to the sea. This has forced to some coastal countries to realize occupations in the islands of his regional seas. Destined, rather, to indicate his presence and sovereignty.

Two of the most showy cases are the archipelagos of Spratly and Paracelso.

The Spratly has hundreds of islands and rocky islands spread by more than 400 thousand Km2, near the Philippines. In relation to this archipelago, the Court of Arbitration of The Hague already pronounced that does not exist a legal base for the Chinese claims. And that the Spratly are not islands with economic projection. But, China, simply, does not recognize it.

The Paracelso’s archipelago, at 700 Km south of Hong Kong, is placed at the west of the southern Sea of China, in the entry of Tonkin’s gulf (Vietnam). There, China has crude oil platforms in dispute with the Vietnamese government. Near the Chinese facilities have been diverse incidents between the Vietnamese fishing boats and patrols and the Chinese ships of escort. That have dispersed them using water cannons.

The Tactical or Operational Military Success. Its Signs.


It is not a question of defining how to act, thing that already we try to do in other published articles or that they will be in a future. But that, perceiving in the operations development certain facts, guidelines or behaviors of the conflicting parts and of the objective conditions (of the ground, etc.), we will be able to diagnose a very probable forecast for the culmination of those operations.

This way, we will be able to trust in and to rest on these favorable forecasts. And to reinforce mental and physically our signs of the Tactical and Operational Military Success. To control better the fears, worries, assignments of the scanty forces, uncertainties, endless lacks, unexpected bad understanding, recoverable frustrations and the partial crises. Which will arise inevitably during the operations development.

The main Signs of the Tactical or Operational Military Success to look for:

The Signs of Tactical or Operational Success about Us:

The operational military plans will be simple, flexible and with capacities of alternative developments. They must be capable of adjusting to the unforeseen and the contingencies. And endlessly incorporating intelligence updates about the intentions and possibilities of the enemy and ground reconnaissance. This is specially important in maneuver operations.

There will exist an operational own initiative, that will allow us to develop our plans. Always using us the activity, even in the defense. And keeping endlessly the action freedom and given priority to its recovery, in case of its loss.

The own exploration and intelligence are fundamental, the more creative and risky is the operation to realizing. Reciprocally, the enemy exploration and his perceptions will be pushed back and/or be disturbed systematically. Will be included in this repulse and mixtify, the security of the units, false positions, advanced detachments and combat patrols, fogs and smokes, the combat for the wireless communications, etc.

The knowledge of the enemy and his actions will be always incomplete and imperfect. And will be extended with the evolution of the situation in relation to him. They will not be known temporarily, even positions, movements, combat readiness, deployments or fundamental units. But not those that affect us direct and tactically in our operation under way. On those we will place the gravity center of our exploration. That will be even “in force” against certain enemy hard objectives.

The own combat capacity for the propose operation will be sufficient and will be equipped, distributed and protected. Considering the friction and inevitable minor errors, derivatives of our own military activity in the hyperfunctional chaotic environment, and the necessary reserves. Our security will inexorably be kept during the operation and in the consolidation of occupied terrain. And specially defending, with combat detachments, the advance sectors of our “mobile groups” operating in the enemy operational rear.

Decisions on which tactical battle areas will be engaged, will consider: accessibility (whether they offer neutral or favorable transitability); vulnerability, whether one’s forces can apply sufficient combat capacity against an enemy, in an area that had not attracted much of his attention; transcendent, the action will produce the decision or will contribute decisively to her and the tactical result will have operational efficiency.

One example is the operational counterattack of the German Armies Group Don of Marshal Von Manstein. That was carried out between February and March of 1943 in the Donbass river basin and around the city of Kharkov. Let us remember the development of this counterattack, its tactical combats and their effect on the “sui generis” Tanks Army of General Lieutenant Popov (Group Popov), the Infantry Armies and both Tank Corps as the mobile reserve of the Southwest Front of General Vatutin and, apart and also, the 3rd Tanks Army of Lieutenant General Ribalko.

The logistics is an essential piece of the victory. When the armies are modern, mechanized and technical. And they are, this way, highly dependent on the fuels, the spares, the supplies of all kinds and on the rotation or reinstatement of units. It is supposed tactic and operationally that the means of all kinds are available and more or less nearby. To support the impulse, the fire and the operative efficiency of all the “units of action”, it is necessary to guarantee them a constant and sufficient flow of the mentioned means. Therefore, the commands must take the actions to defend the «physical support» of the logistic structure. Specially against assaults from the enemy depth or in sensitive and critical points or in the routes most far from our units. Constituted by all the “supplying routes”, from the units up to our operational rear. And that are still more important that the so called “retreat routes”. Though they could coincide in some sections. Among other things, because the modern forces must count with remaining isolated for a certain time. And keeping in this period their tasks, in agreement with the entrusted missions.

The Signs of our Tactical or Operational Military Success about the Enemy:

There will be a passiveness or operational delay in the enemy. Generally he will act with an intention that is not convergent with our own. And, at least, not harmful for our operation, especially in the first stages of the process. When she develops her impetus or push or movement quantity (combat capacity X average sustainable speed, in every stage). This sign of the tactical or operative success is a «pear in sweet», that not always will give itself so clearly, as in the following example.

It is worth to remember the development of the Blitzkrieg in the West and invasion of France by Germany in the spring of 1940. The main part of the French maneuver troops, their three more modern armies, and the British Expeditionary Force rushed toward Holland and Belgium to stop the German scythe-like advance. That was supposed directed at the interior of France and the rear of her Maginot line. The Allied High Commands, whose doctrine had not evolved, were thinking that in May 1940 Germany would repeat their “Schlieffen modified plan” of 1914 in their new invasion of France.

Resultado de imagen de INVASION francia 1940 THE OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

Resultado de imagen de INVASION francia 1940 ITS RESULT

In agreement with the new plan of General Erich Von Manstein, really the “blow of scythe” was given by the Armies Group A of colonel general Von Rundstedt. Which was possessing as spear lance the Panzer Group of general Von Kleist. His five Panzer and five Motorized divisions, integrated in three Panzer Corps, were going to cross the Ardennes and to carry on a wide break in the French line around Sedan. Turning then rapidly towards the west and pressing finally on the flank and the rear of the Allied forces in Belgium. Which would find operationally isolated, with their line of communications, support of their logistics of supply, cut off.

The tactical enemy activity is inevitable. It will be permanent, harmful and even it will be unexpected and will partially affect us. But it will not be fundamental for our plans. Remember that we are looking for signs of our success, not those of the enemy. The best sign of maturity will be that it does not worry excessively to our tactical or operational commands. If this activity did not exist, it would be because the enemy was not there. To overcome and to get used to these tactical accessory crises and not be left to drag by them, harming our principal operation, is the touchstone of the serenity of the commands. Always we must bear in mind the possibility that the enemy appears tactically in «the moment and in the zone» more inconvenient and difficult for us. If it does it operatively it is that we have incurred a mistake of intelligence or of the valuation of the correlation of forces and of the enemy capacities or intentions.

Napoleon, without getting to exhaust the reserves, but without they were exceeding, attended to the different local tactical crises that appeared in Austerlitz’s battle. After the occupation of Pratzen’s heights by two infantry divisions of the Army Corp of marshal Soult. This sealed the destruction of the joint Russian Austrian army and his Austerlitz’s victory.


Let’s see the process of development of the tactical containment of the Allied enemy. With the enemy forces concentration attacking the supposed tactical and operative (without protecting the line of retreat towards Vienna) Frenchmen deployment weakness. The grenadiers of Oudinot were sent from the Zurland hill to support the south flank, where the principal battle was getting away. Bernadotte advanced up to Blaswitz village, to cover the Soult’s north flank. The Murat’s cavalry reserve, in the Santon hill, the left flank (at north) of the French deployment, had to fight against Liechtenstein’s cavalry, to support the novices of Lannes’s Corp who were defending it. Kutusov managed to bring towards Pratzen part of the forces of his left wing (at south). And Soult, attacked by three sides, had to employ part of the general artillery reserve to contain the enemy with its wearing fire. Around 1 p. m. Constantine and the imperial Russian Guard counter-attacked the already tired Frenchmen in Pratzen. Their first line yielded. The cavalry of the French Imperial Guard, who had been advanced by Napoleon, supervised by marshal Béssiers and general Rapp, attacked the Russians and put them in escape. And Bernadotte, from Blauswitz, sent a division in support of the center of the punished French deployment.







Results of the German counterattack and its trascendence.

Nevertheless, the booty gained was scanty. Von Manstein declared that there were approximately 23,000 dead Soviet soldiers and 9,000 captured Soviet soldiers. The materiel captured were approximately 615 tanks (probably largely recovered), 354 campaign guns, 69 anti-aircraft pieces and more than 600 machine guns and mortars. It was not possible to encircle the enemy and Soviet soldiers took advantage of this by leaving the heavy equipment and retreating. Von Manstein said that, because the extreme cold, his soldiers were bunched into small, tight groups, leaving wide spaces and lines in his rearguard, without effective cover. This partly happened because they were elite troops and because the war was without mercy.


At the beginning of March, 48th panzer Corps pressed toward the east of Kharkov and the SS panzer corps of General Halder was entrusted with recovering the long-suffering city for the Germans.

At the middle of the month, the Germans had a defensive resistant front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported on the Mius and the Donetz. They also possessed in the south of Russia sufficient mobile reserves to push back possible Soviet operational breaks in the zone.

As late as 1944, the Soviets had 26 tanks Corps and 11 mechanized Corps. Part of them joined together to form 6 tanks Armies. Each of which had two tanks corps and a mechanized corps (bigger and more balanced inn infantry and artillery). Some mechanized Corps joined a cavalry Corps, forming a great unit similar in capacity to the tanks Army but with fewer armored vehicles and more mobility in areas of difficult transitability (marshes, mountains, woods). These were used to exploit the break in the swampy areas of the south of the Soviet Union, as that of the Pripet river in the north of Ucrania. Although never coexisted more than two or three in the order of battle of the Soviet Army.


The destruction of 6 tanks Corps of the Southwest Front (especially equipped with mobile forces) and dismantled them from their “support masses, was an especially prominent, profitable and low cost operation for the Germans.

In addition, in its advance toward Kharkov between March 1st and 5th, the SS and 48º panzer Corps smashed from its flank and rearguard the Soviet 3rd tanks Army, led by general Pavel Semjonovic Ribalko. This Army was launched to relieve the forces of 6th infantry Army and had continued advancing toward Kharkov. This city that was by then, attracting all the attention and efforts from both sides.

As poor results and large losses mounted for the mobile Soviet forces, pessimism also grew in Stalin, who asked Sweden to mediate in seeking a solution to the war with Germany.

Nevertheless, the advance on Belgorod, outlining Kursk’s projection inside the territory occupied by Germany, sealed the aim for Germanys strategic summer Campaign. After all these events had passed, the strategic initiative returned to the Germans at the level of the theatre of operations.

But, beginning on July 5, delayed in relation with the victories of Von Manstein, their action gave the Soviets time to extensively strengthen themselves, to establishfortified regions” at the front level, and to assemble and organize a powerful counterattack force in the north and south of the projection. The allied landing in Sicily on the 10th of July, aborted the Wehrmachts already disastrous Operation Citadel. The Germans would never recover the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.


Was it possible to avoid what happened to the Popov group and, thus, to the Soviets strategic plans for its 1942 winter campaign and to the Soviets strategic initiative, at least in the Southern theatre of the Soviet Union?

It was possible.

We have observed, in parallel and in a very second plane with some key facts, the getting absorbed (to get very much in), the delight (to be delighted with) and the fixation (to do without other rational arguments) of Stalin, in relation with the results that he promised himself with the impelled operations by the mobile corps of the Southwest Front of general Vatutin.

General Vatutin, one of the best field chiefs of the Soviet army, died before his time at hands of Ukrainian (anti-Soviet) guerrillas, only participated in this in a minor degree. Still, the delegate of the Stavka in charge of these crucial operations (Zhukov, Vasilevsky?) remembered him the transcendence that for the Supreme Commander and for the Soviet people they had.

A little time ago, Hitler also fixated on Stalingrad. This fixation led him to squander the capacity of his best Great Unit (the 6th infantry Army of general Paulus—yes, without the aristocratic Von) in a street struggle and a force-to-force confrontation. Their enemies were arranged on a static defense. A position that they were better able to defend and maintain than were the Germans, in the gigantic steel and cement fortress that was Stalingrad.Fight in which was not counting the German superb capacity of operational movement, which reduced the effort done to a confrontation between man vs. man and machine against machine. And, thus, causing a terrible attrition to the combat and movement capacities.

We can discuss about the strategic mistakes of high chiefs. As the line of communications (branched out) is so crucial, it is necessary to protect it adequately. But this fact is obscured and blurred by the desires of commanders.

What are the possibilities of defense for the advance sector that contains the communications line?

Independently of the advance deployment of mobile groups and their support mass (which must include the securities elements adapted for marches in enemy areas), «advanced detachments» must be brought forward.

These will be integrated by 15-30 % of the forces that bring them forward and will possess sufficient operational movement and combat capacities. The time it takes for the main group to join them is a function of the transitability of the terrain and of the capacities and intentions of the enemy in the operations zone. Its mission in defensive operations is to be used asstable hinges” between the deployments of Great units, facilitating and protecting the movement of forces and supplies between them.

If the mass of support is too slow for the mobile group to continue advancing at a reasonable rate, it will end up lengthening dangerously the distance between the units and their support. This situation is very vulnerable to a mobile assault by the enemy from the depth of his zone and the sector of advance would be under threat of being cut, depending on the means and intentions of the enemy. This probability would require that amechanized group” be placed between the mass of support and the mobile group to reduce the distance between all three deployments and reducing reaction times to respond to a crisis. This would reasonably stabilize the sector of advance after the mobile group.

The mission of the mechanized group, which has less capacity for operational movement than the mobile group, will be to carried out thesector mobile defense”. And will last until the forces of the mass of support arrive to relieve it. The anti-aircraft and antitank defense plan, the centralization of reserves and the defense of key points of the area, by means ofdelay positions” and together with necessary heavy fire support, will be characteristic of the fight to stabilize the sector.

That is to say, it is necessary to sacrifice speed for safety to consolidate the stability of the sector of advance in enemy territory. A territory that does not need to be all occupied in force. Because would be defended by a mobile defense for a limited period of time. Taking disproportionate risks would be reckless and would put men, materiel and the operation in danger.

But, men (in this case, Hitler and Stalin are two examples) continue to make mistakes when faced with such circumstances


The Russia of Putin. 2nd. Part.


In the great core of the Russian Federation, Putin practises an internal centripetal strategy. It is the complement of the expansive exterior strategy that we have just seen. Both form another pair of “complementary but not antagonistic opposites”. That can stem from the philosophy of the “dialectical materialism” (his core of ideas) and the historical one (his practical application and his evolution). This internal social strategy seeks to keep and extend the hegemony of the Slavonic oriental etnia, which is more than 85% of his population, and his centenial civilization. And incorporate into her everything possible of the ethnic and religious minorities of his geographical periphery. The Turkoman are 8,5%, the inhabitants of the Caucasus rise to 3% and those of the Urals, 2% of the population. Russia combines very well the strategic means at the disposal of the State, realizing with them combinations, «mixes», adapted to every external conflicting situation. For example, to uncontrollable countries with the USA, as some Spanish-American nations, he can offer them modern armament.

Putin bet for the Economy and the Diplomacy in Spanish America.

The president Putin is using all the resources and means of the global world, to extend with surprise, skill, conviction and security the influence of Russia all over the world. This way, in August of 2012 Russia stopped being the only world power out of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and turned to be the 156th partner of the institution. Which mediates in the conflicts between countries and establishes the basic procedure of the international trade. The equipment of the president Putin bet for the integration, to be between whom formulate the rules of game. And to have legal instruments against the protectionism, which stops the Russian exports to the European Union and the USA. The Russian secretary of Economic Development, Andrei Belousov, declared that the WTO gives instruments against the monopolies and the disadvantageous contracts and facilitates the participation in international projects. This way, he said, «it gives stability to the exterior trade and makes predictable the juridical conditions of the operators».

The central idea of this commercial penetration and his perspectives is that the USA never trusted in the Spanish-American armies, they did not even collaborate seriously with them. The applied cliche, even after pompous «Alliance for the Progress» of the president Kennedy, is that the Spanish-American armies are «minor partners» of the Pentagon. And, these armies must fulfill police-military local functions: to attack the insurgency, to monitor the borders, to control the territory. In the conference of Defense Secretaries of the countries of the Western Hemisphere celebrated in 2002 in Santiago of Chile, Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of Defense of the USA, declared: «One of the principal threats for the national security of the USA consists in the fact that the «Latin-American» governments cannot control his own territory, especially the remote, frontier territories. Of what the terrorists take advantage. Because of it, the task of every country of Latin America lies in strengthening the control of their own borders».

Resultado de imagen de Putin Erdogan Maduro in World Congress of the Energy in Istanbul

Till now, the Pentagon does not even propose to debate with the Spanish-American military men the creation of a system of regional security. The Inter-American Agreement of Reciprocal Assistance does not work, when it would be more important: in the conflicts of interests between the “high contracting parties», supposedly equal and associate. This remained demonstrated in the War of the Malvinas between Argentina and Great Britain. In that occasion, the USA and Chile supported Great Britain. Russia found this way a commercial and ideological niche, neglected by his more serious and nearby competitors. And where he is presenting a wide, interesting and permanent offer for an opened collaboration with his clients during an indefinite time.

The modern trade of Russian weapon and complex systems, his partial local manufacture, the temporal transfer of equipments and supplies, while this is not in march and the integral and constant formation of the users are the characteristics of the way decided by Putin, to increase the influence and the rooting of the Russians in Spanish America. A geopolitical zone that is distant and is very different of Russia in civilization. This way, the Russian vice-minister of Defense Anatoly declared that «Our external politic, is not only to sell products and finished equipments in the exterior, but to go to the joint production and develope the technician-military cooperation». He added that, » We are for it finalizing several documents, including the protection of the rights of intellectual property. The worry is that we will share reserved information. And the strategic association implies a major volume of the confidence, a major degree of cooperation, included the supply of weapon and special sensitive equipments. And this needs a certain level of the relations between both countries». Russia is the second weapon systems seller in the world.

The pirouettes of Vladimir, the new Czar of the «Only Russia».

The civil war of Syria was dangerously languishing from the last quarter of 2014. After three years and a half of the beginning of the conflict, the course of the war was determined by several different, simultaneous and synergics parameters.

Resultado de imagen de syrian army SYRIAN SOLDIERS SALUTE TO CAMERA.

The National Syrian Army of al-Assad was physics and morally exhausted. No more than 50 thousand men are now in his ranks.

The USA had intervened with few results, less opportunity and scanty commitment and decision in the conflict. Using the air ground support in favour of the moderate insurgents; facilitating them intelligence and punctual supports with limited aims of his elite forces. And successively training several groups or contingents of those, which were finishing, the majority of the times, joining the islamist radical insurgents. As the Front al-Nusrah for the Liberation of the Peoples of East, of Mohamed al-Golani, the delegate of al-Qaeda in Syria, now called Front Fatah al-Sham; the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria of al-Baghdadi; the Islamic Front anti al-Nusrah; the Army of the Conquest, who was operating at the east of Damascus, etc. And the USA was not daring to imply more in the civil war.

 Resultado de imagen de russian bombers in syriaRUSSIAN AIR BASE (SYRIA)

The unsteady and elusive politics of the USA in Middle East and concretely in Syria, created an «emptiness of power» that the Russian autocrat proposed to occupy. This time, he waited to assure him that the USA was not and they were not even waited there. In effect, the Americans neither had consistent allied rebels (with duration, stability and solidity, in conjunction) on Syria, nor were possessing own deployed forces. And the hereditary tyranny of al-Assad was, since the epoch of daddy Hafez, a systemic enemy of Israel and the USA. That included it in the list of destabilizing States of Middle East and sponsors of terrorists (Black September, Yasser Arafat’s al-Fatah, Hezbollah, etc.)

Fatah flag.jpg AL-FATAH’S COAT OF ARMS

Russia was seeking to justify a mediating and relevant paper in the damned board of the regional powers in the Southwest of Asia. Also his military intervention was going to assure an increased sponsorship on Syria, with the elevation of his military bases in the country to permanent. And neither the life, nor the personal and familiar sufferings of the Syrians were mattering for him, if they were converting into an obstacle to his political or military operational strategy in the defense of Bachar al-Assad.

This demonstrated, in a brutal and sociopath way, the degraded use of the heavy fire support that Russia gave to the attempts of al-Assad for recovering Alepo «at all costs». A siege without fissures (operational, not physical) of the city was not realized, nor an attack of combined forces to the irregular rebel forces that were surrounding and partially occupying her. The military Russian doctrine would praise this. But, the easy and sure thing was to shell up to the exhaustion the supposedly rebels positions. That were firmly intermingled with the houses of the upset neighbors of Alepo. But, destruction is almost metaphysically impossible. The buildings, walls and squares turn by the heavy fire in accumulated debris; these are grinded little by little in smaller debris; and, then, in stones and smaller stones. The same thing happens with the human bodies. And the rebels can slip away by tunnels, trenches and alleys between the walls of the buildings. But they do not take the civilians with them. And largely it is for the enormous logistic hindrance that they suppose for them.


Putin also receives «in kind» for the «favors and helps» that he grants. Russia is planing to increase the capacities of his naval base in Tartus, Latakia, Syria. That Russian will turn this way into a «naval permanent base» in the Mediterranean, fulfilling this way the dream of the Great Russia, previous to the USSR. The documents of transfer and installations are already prepared for his signature. The superstructure will possess docks, systems of detection, control and command and of anti-aircraft defense (against planes, drones and rockets) and antiships (of surface and submarines), stores, quarterings, etc. To all it is necessary to add the ground defense units of, his quarterings and warehouses, the fixed and of mines barriers, the network of roads and the advanced mobile and in prepared positions defense. This way, already at the beginning of October, 2016 there came equipments of the S-300 anti-aircraft Russian system, that deploys for the first time out of Russia. Also the nearby air Russian base in Hmeydin, one of that integrate the «network of bases for the air operations» in Syria, will be turned into an «air permanent base». To allow to increase the air sheltered fleet, her installations and her contingent for crew, support and defense.

 Resultado de imagen de russian bombers in syriaRUSSIAN BOMBERS HIT USA SPONSORED GROUND BASE IN SYRIA.

The meeting of the XXIII World Congress of the Energy in Istanbul, initiated on Monday, the 10th of October, 2016, allowed the bilateral meeting of the presidents Vladimir Putin and Erdogan. Russia and Turkey, from the middle of last July have brought over positions, smoothed the previous pitfalls and increased their collaboration bonds. Both presidents signed there the agreement for the construction of the Turkish Steam gas pipeline, which will join both countries across the Black Sea. And that will supply Turkey up to 63 billion m² of natural gas annual, when it is operative. The president Maduro, whom the president’s position and to exercise the succession of a «chavism» without Hugo Chávez are too great for him, did all possible during the summit conference to tie personal and institutional bonds with both chief executive men.

Erdogan assured that «Turkey will reinforce all the economic, energetic and of tourism bonds with Russia». His relations with the USA. and the European Union have substantially weakened in the last months. In spite of being Turkey a strategic ally of both within the NATO and of being a (eternal) candidate for the entry with full right in Europe.

Also Maduro celebrated his personal meeting with Putin. When in November, 2015 a Russian bomber was beaten on the northwest of Syria, close to the Turkish border, the Venezuelan governmental press took sides for Russia. Echoing the speculations on the incident and the accusation of Moscow that Erdogan was supporting in certain ways the ISIS. Given his systemic hatred with the Kurds of the YPG (the Kurdish Syrian party, to which he systematicly accuses of relations with the terrorist Kurdish PPK of the southeast of Turkey) and his pursuit of his «peshmergas» or Kurdish soldiers, who join the militias of self-defence of the Syrian Kurdish territory.

Resultado de imagen de Putin and Maduro Istanbul PUTIN WILL HELP MADURO AGAINST BAKERIES’ MAFFIAS…

The meeting was ending on Wednesday, the 12th of October. And, so much Putin as Maduro were waiting that in his conclusions and final record, was remaining clear a producers’ new alliance of crude oil («emergent countries»), which was seeking to stabilize the production of crude oil and his prices during a sufficient period of time. Some projections were overcoming a five years period.

These totalitarian, subsidiary States of Russia, need to affirm his identity, for questionable and/or perverse. And they do it replacing, in his cases, the real capacities of his mentor (military power, natural resources, armament industry) for a major radicality and a fervent enthusiasm in his attitudes and actions in the public thing or res publica. What takes them, in some moments, to flee ahead, without knowing well were they will come. The doubtful and/or contradictory attitudes and actions, in some moments, prove this. It suits to examine the erratic Turkish exterior politics in the last 4 years, in relation to al-Assad, the Kurds of the YPG and of the Autonomous Kurdish Region of Iraq, al-Qaeda, the collaboration with the USA and the Islamic State.

Only Putin keeps a line and a conduct enough constant and coherent in the public topics, exterior specially.

Resultado de imagen de russian bombers in syriaRUSSIA USES CARPET BOMBING IN SYRIA.

The implication of the political and strategic interests of Russia in Syria has taken him to veto in the Security Council of the UNO, the recent offer of France for a ceasefire in Syria. Presented after the failure of the agreement of September, 2016 between the USA and Russia. That was aborted by the Russian bombardment of a marching group of humanitarian help from the Turkish border towards Alepo’s northwest. And by the bombardment of the USA to positions of the Syrian National Army (SNA) at the south-east of Zeir er Zour, the capital of province placed at Palmira’s North-East. And also motivated by the qualitative and quantitative accumulation of misdeeds against the civilians. Realized by the ground support aviation of Russia and Syria and by the Syrian heavy artillery. Against the neighborhoods at the west of Alepo and over the approximation routes to her, from the North-East (Idlib’s province) and the Turkish border, used by the rebels who fight in the city.

On the other hand, France insisted on treating with Russia the ceasefire in Syria. Which was out of the programmed topics for the visit of Putin to Paris at Wednesday, the 19th of October. And Russia answered on Tuesday, the 11th, by the spokesman of the Kremlin, that Putin «decided to annul the visit … and he will go to Paris when the president Hollande feels comfortable».

The Russia of Putin.

Russia reappears after the Dismemberment of the URRS.

The new Russia of Putin, after the difficult and undifferentiated parenthesis of Boris Yeltsin, is waking up from a traumatic transition to a formalist democracy. Not reflected yet in his structures of power and administration. After Yeltsin, the authorities had to be liberated of the «neocapitalist mafia oligarchy«. Which was looking for a political amorphous and of wide apex, specific «form», which was governing the country and was controlling the alternation of the parties, in more or less free elections. Into these ad hoc structures is transmuting the whole superviser and bureaucratic apparatus of the USSR, created throughout 70 years of ferreous dictatorship of the CP. For what it is not chance the professional origin and the mega presidentials manners of Vladimir Putin.

But that give to the new Russia an international creativity and an operational flexibility, that do not have his competitors more «calmed, formal and super regulated». He is what we would say of a good stylist boxer: «he has a great waist». Only to remember the «day of prayer and fasting for the peace in Syria», that proclaimed the Pope Francisco for September, 7, 2013. He accompanying for 4 hours the prayer in the Saint Peter Square that Saturday. Within a few hours, Putin proposed to the international Powers (including the inoperative UNO, which in the international conflicts only serves to give a hypocritical stamp of legality to the public things) the destruction «in situ» of the chemical arsenal of the Syrians of Bashar al-Assad and not his air bombardment. This took France and the USA with the changed foot. And to the Nobel prize of the Peace Mr. Obama, which had asked the support of the Congress for his Air Raid («necessary for the brutality of the Syrian Government with his population»), looking in anguish for supports between the legislators. Because he saw that they would rejecting up even his more moderate plans of intervention.

Resultado de imagen de putin helps al-Assad PUTIN HELPS AL-ASSAD’S REGIME…

The loss of his «controlled allies» of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, after the cold war, only left Russia to a geographically look for «new influences» towards the Asia Central, from Syria to the India and Vietnam. Turkey is a proverbial enemy of the Russians. Though now Erdogan, after knocking down a Russian ground attack plane on the northwest of Syria, has become a very friend of Putin. But this is relating to the moment, for not saying only anecdotal. China is a «partner, competitor and rival (not enemy)» of Russia, if serves this polyvalent definition, which does that none of the expressions are in fullness. In Afghanistan, the Russians could never have settled from the Modern Age. Also the Russians try to win and keep in his «political and commercial sphere» the new central Asiatic Islamic Turkman republics and the ex-Soviets Slavonic Republics. Till now, the Customs Union created by Russia includes only the White Russia and Kazajistan.

Resultado de imagen de putin xi jinpingCHINA IS A «PARTNER, COMPETITOR AND RIVAL» OF RUSSIA.

Following his direct, imperious and operating manners, in the middle of December, 2013, Putin threw a strong argument to Ukraine. In order that she was happening to form part of this Russian Turkoman «sphere of coprosperity»: he offered her to lower 33% the price of transfer of the Russian gas, of which Ukraine is recipient and reseller. And, to save Ukraine from the financial bankruptcy and did not have to be thrown for it in hands of the European Community Troika, he would give her up to $15 billion in soft credits. While, in Ukraine the newly arisen social politic problems have led to a strongest polarization of the country. Two almost antagonistic halves being formed: where the part at the west of Crimea, wants to move away from Moscow and the half at the east of this peninsula seeks to grow the bonds with Russia.

Ukraine is for history and for demography a part of the Europe limited at the East by the Urals. And Ukraine is for political opportunity and historical moment part of the democratic and liberal Center Western Europe. That forms together with the United States, which operates as the other fundamental «vibrant pole» placed at the West side of the Atlantic Ocean, the «Western Civilization». A great problem appears now, not only to Ukraine, but to his neighbors in its eastern and western frontiers. And it is to obtain that the today antagonists and irreconcilable forces, that face in Ukraine, crushing his motherland, turn into complementary and necessary forces between them. And it is a great joint, disinterested labor, with broad-mindedness and directed by statesmen. Which is necessary to develop to achieve it and to remove the scarecrows that glimpse in his political social horizons. If there not be obtaining this «merger of interests», which is the mission of the Politics, the alternative would be bad for all, natives and nearby and distant neighbors. And the wound only would be falsely closed up and for an unforseeable time.

Resultado de imagen de novarrusia soldiersUKRAINE’S INFANTRY FORCES.

For Russia, Ukraine is something more than a strategic ally. As would be the Japanese Empire, the Western Europe or the Great Britain for the USA. Ukraine is a part of the national Russian essence. In Ukraine was born many hundreds of years ago, the strong and promising germ of the Russian nation, the Rus. From the fall of the USSR in 1989, Russia did not face a major disruptor cataclysm, potentially rupturist, that the Orange Revolution of Julie Timoshenko in 2004. Russia must have digested and neutralized or assimilated it, slowly and pacifically. But, the Ukrainian natives and his Russian allies chose to contain and to extinguish it.

It was the easiest thing, but they left a powerful embers under the cap of ashes. And the latent problem has re-arisen now, virulent and almost out of control. The «irresistible offers» of the European Union to Ukraine neither make concrete, certainly, they nor materialize. Beyond the reports and briefings of the European bureaucracy of Brussels and other cities, paralyzed, without imagination, or moral courage, which is selfprotected and automanages. By February 19 or 20, 2014 was generalized the use of “free shooters” or snipers of the police and the special security forces against the most uncontrollable demonstrators or emphasized from the popular revolts, specially in Kiev.

Resultado de imagen de novarrusia soldiers EAST UKRAINE IS IN DANGER…

Since then, the armed opposition of the Novarussia (this way the prorussians separatists autoname their territory in the Donbass’ basin and adjacent zones), supported by the Russians with military equipments (intermingled with convoy of supposed humanitarian help for the civil population of the region) and «groups» of voluntary internationalists, even veteran prorussians Chechenian; and the central government of Kiev, with the president Petro Poroshenko at its head, have followed an operational politic strategy of the “give and take”, of the cachumbambé or balancing pole. Where everything is enough measured and reasonably controlled, to be advancing each part by few and measured steps. Without they irreversibly get run away the animal of the open warfare between nations and alliances. And this way we are and we will continue for long time…

After realizing the armed manly act in Ukraine, the popularity of Putin raised in Russia. And it is kept consistently since then over 80 %… This is not normal in the democracies, if do not exist exceptional situations. Which are those in Russia? Putin has turned into a political social vibrant hub for the Russian people. To which he has recovered the national honor and the category of world power. At less, that is what Russians feel and caught… And though it would not be such, according his demographic and macroeconomic dates, if he was lacking the nuclear arsenal inherited from the USSR. But the emotions and then the feelings are those that create and send out the psychic energy. And they are capable of overcoming the dismay and the vulgarity of a little hard and gray life. And the Russian people wishes and bets for it. And Putin is now his leader, commander, great chief and guardian.

The National Strategy of Putin.

But, not all are kindness and advantages in a super presidentialist regime. The concentrated and decisive power has to be administered in small doses, to not abuse, nor damage, nor to fall down in the temptation of looking for his indefinite continuity. The despotism (that arises from the rotten conviction of the controls from which «they» have «saved» «their» Motherland), the corruption and the clientelism spread over the circles of the power and his outskirts. And they become manifest and customary in the society.

The political and ideological opposition, with his critiques, parliamentary actions and street protests, can become almost unbearable for those who center in planning, deciding and executing in altars of the people, but not with the people. The jail and the confiscation of goods are reprisals of all the life. Which origin gets lost in the times night, in the prehistory, for the dissidents, uncontrollable and disobedient and for all the potential (imagined or not) and real enemies of the regime.

Another «appearance» of democracy that the Russian government exhibits: when the exercised power is almost all-embracing, it is not balanced or compensated by other public independent powers and is held during too much time, turns out to be almost inevitable the appearance of the self-complacency, the corruption, the indifference and the arrogance in many controls that were originally correct.

Russia, at least during a time, will try to recover his rights, traditions and influences. Or it will have to content with turning into a “nation State», without dependent, participative and profitable for all partners «coprosperity spheres”. That «regional or second-class power», as Obama named her at the beginnings of this crisis at the beginning of 2014.

Russia, once known himself as the Second Rome, follows a national, centrifugal, expansive strategy towards the exterior, from her «vibrant European space«. Leaving from that great «national center of the Slavonic etnia» and acting in “waves of communication, influence and domain”, in this order, Russia is straining in extending his presence and ascendancy all over the world, going towards all the possible countries.


One of the first national exterior aim of Putin is to promote the «multipolarity in the world structure» of the great powers and his allies. Looking that does not exist a world hegemonic power as the USA, which hinders him in the extension of his influence and power from his «core center». For it, Russia will create alliances and will establish agreements and treaties with third parties in detriment or in substitution of that hegemonic power. And he will be a «intransigent obstructionist actor» in all the actions that that one unilaterally promotes in the international forums (UNO, Atomic International Energy Agency). This way, the actions of the western nations in the Syrian conflict are frustrated and limited by the systematic veto of Russia to its approval in the Security Council of the UNO.

Another great strategic preference of Putin is to extend his influence and enlarge the economic and diplomatic bonds with the nations in development, specially those who have «natural resources and primary crops», that are necessary for the manufacturing production, the supply and the general development of the nations. This has taken them and will take them even far beyond of his geographical borders of political or strategically military influences. Using the economy, one of the forces of the national strategy or great strategy of a country, helped by the diplomacy, another one of her potentials, Russia tries to create with the emergent countries «cores of action and shared prosperity». Initiated or cultivated in a world that Russia wishes and search that is «multipolarized» in diverse «cores and centers of geopolitical power». That reduce this way necessarily, by his mere existence, the influence of the great western powers, today «depending of the world trade «.

This national and civilizer geocentrism places Russia as central piece of the Eurasia megacontinent. Where only China might hinder him in his plans of recovery of the lost influences. At the west of China, next with his Sinkiang’s immense region (Xinjiang), in the Eastern Turkestan, is a rosary of ancient Socialist Soviet Republics of 2 thousand Kms of length, which reaches up to the oriental shore of the Caspian Sea. They are, from east to west, Kazajistan, Kirguistan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. And these countries form a monolithic set of several etnias, picked up in their names, but extended simultaneously over several countries, of Turkoman origin, of the central steppes of Asia, and also agglutinated by his belonging to the sunni Islam. All this forms a multinational defensive and refractory shield to the expansive activity and to the significant presence of the Chinese in his internal matters or in his exterior trade, that have political guardianship effects. These Turkoman Muslims are rather a potentials allied of the Great Russia. In all that he puts a bit of dedication and neatnessI in attract and attend them.


With his habitual opportunity and operational agility, Putin signed with the president Xi Ji Ping on Wednesday, the 21st of May, 2014 a strategic contract (30 years of validity) to supply China with 38 billions of ms3 of Russian natural gas each year. Certain is that the negotiations of this transcendental contract have extended during a decade, but the opportunity of his signature for both partners is undeniable. Russia has determined his signature lowering a little the price of transfer, which has not leaked out, and that was the principal obstacle for the agreement between the Russian state entity Gazprom and the National Corporation of the Oil of China. It will be begun immediately the installation of a new gas pipeline between Siberia and China, which will cost $ 55 billion and which will be operative in 4 years. China obtains this way a stable supply of part of his energetic primary needs (about 25 %). Which will allow him to be reducing his strategic dependence of his national coal. Whose combustion is the principal generating one of the massive pollution that suffer nowadays the great cities and the industrialized coast of China. It is calculated, according to the official estimations, that China will need 400 billions of ms3 of gas by 2020, doubling the current consumption of gas. Which opens the possibility for new extensions of the Russian supply in the frame of this agreement. For his part, looking for alternative markets for his primary energy, Putin reduces transcendency and efficiency with this commercial operation to the stuttering actions of the European Union, to replace part of the supply of the Russian gas, using other hypothetical suppliers of across the seas. And, in addition, any strangulation of the current service to his buyers, will force the EU to increase his help to Ukraine, to compensate his «reduced income» for the passage of the gas along his territory.





In France more than 4,5 million Muslims are settled, specially of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian origin. The European metropolis practised an «asymmetric multiculturalism», to first accept in his society and to next integrate, their emigrants. But, they cannot direct and regulate the social movements with the compass and the set square. The social emigrant groups were established in the periphery of the cities of reception. Where the habitability was cheaper. Neighborhoods, districts or distributions were formed, principally lived by clustered groups of these foreign cultures. That were serving for his support and protection and also for his isolation and compartment. The prime minister Valls declared that in France exist more of 450 of these not integrated and «isolated suburbs». Using a more wide and lax name, the country possesses around 750 Urban Sensitive Zones.

The personal evolution.

The first generation of emigrants and part of the second one was formed by docile, laborious and long-suffering individuals. That obtained the respect of his French neighbors (each time they were less) and a relative prosperity. They lukewarmly practised the Islam, overwhelmed as they were in the zeals of this world. And for his distance to Dar-al-Islam, the lands of political domain of his religion. They were wishing and tried for their descendants, a future without so many difficulties and penuries as they had his lives.

But the descendants received the worse of both separated civilizations, to form his «personal identity». On one hand, they received «from birth» the belonging to a minority culture and little known in the country, the Islam. So, his «exhibition» between his different neighbors, was not attractive, not honourable. Which was a source of personnel and colective frustration, sorrow and revenge (relative).

Of the hostess culture, essentially European and western, they received a lay culture, when it was not laicist. That minusvalued the religion and claimed for its private practise. When all the religions, and more the Islam, have a social principal component. Enclosed in the mosques, pantheons and sacristies, the religions suffocate and die. Neither they were educated in the virtues of the Western Civilization: Valuation of the different duties to carry out, as necessary, vital and social counterpart of the several rights to receiving. Appreciation of the sobriety, the effort, the saving, the commitment, the delay of the reward, the study or the formation, the possible frustration and the work, as necessary factors and parameters for the progressive and just attainment of the human personal and collective aims. Definitively, to form them in the affability, the social communication and the resilience, to be able to overcome the successive vicissitudes of the life.

And a great majority lacked solid, profitable and identity beliefs and virtues. That significantly were helping them, from his mixed origin, to create his necessary, personal, satisfactory and respected identity.

It might think that the insufficiency of this «social contribution» in the formation of the individual identity, does not justify the appearance of a asocial or sickly conduct in them. But we do not try to say it. We are exposing different facets of the phenomenon, bringing over the pieces to compose this psychological puzzle, trying to form a matrix with the different factors that meet. To express a «multicolored panorama», which allows us to gather in it the parameters of the situation. The failure of the social humus, of the original substratum of the individual will amplify his lacks and failures. And it will not contribute base and wealth for the creation of his resilience (development and overcoming of the adversities, going out experienced and strengthened) and of his reference parameters for his personal and social balance.

The disperse and partitioned French agencies of intelligence, in spite of the only antiterrorist command, calculate that in the country are around 8250 potentials mujahidins. That principally settle in the zone of Paris, the Provence, the Alps and the Côte d’Azur (centred on Marseilles and Nice). But, given the mass of existing believers, I calculate that his number would not go down the 20 to 25 thousand persons.

In a social group, the individuals capable of violently acting, without that a disturbing emotion affects them in his efficiency, are less than 4 %. And this does not want to say that all the so «endowed», should be going to exercise in his life the violence against his neighbor. In the Moslem French group would be more than 150 thousand persons, of whom 30-40 % would have the suitable age to realize this activity.

The politicallly active Islam, of salafist jihadist ideology, offers to these social «disoriented» an exit, a Moslem identity, the incorporation to a simple religion practised in community (the Umma). And gives them a mission and an intention: the Jihad. And makes them «oversized persons», but only before themselves, who believe it. In exchange for the suicide or the prison, it offers them the wished identity. That they never well developed. The identity that we could not help to give them, being members of our centenary nations.

The conversion in suicidal or not «attacker», demonstrates and confirms when the individual looks for his separation of the «unfaithful persons» and his ideology is focused in the radical branches of the Islam and in the Yihad. Some specialists astonish that the transubstantiation of the person in a madman carries out rapidly. Without need that his companions collaborate in the process, not that it is long in the time. Let’s remember the famous cases of «brain washing» against religious and politicians dissident, that needs some time. But, the mutation in «furious violent» of the 17-year-old Muslim Afghan refugee in Germany and received by Würzburg’s family, a small city of Bavaria, was cuasi instantaneous. The young person received the news of the violent death of a friend in Afghanistan. And it reacted arming itself with an axe and a knife and attacking the passengers of a regional train in the proximities of his city, on Monday, the 18th of last July. There ensued three serious and a slight injured men and the aggressor was brought down. What is true is that this young man already had forged his potential destination, for his mental lability, the lack of social virtues, included the distance from the “Islam of the People”, and his uprooting. And the death of the friend was only the «OK, forward». Because Nature does not do jumps in the emptiness.

The Degradation of the Violence in the Societies.

The vulgarization of the violence against the others is a recurrent phenomenon in the different civilizations and epochs. Not in vain the Roman adage says that «the man is a wolf for the man». Leaving apart the cases of social excluded and chased persons, the developed modern societies are disturbed by a widespread neurosis. That becomes established and produces in the personal neurosises. This affection does not turn us violent directly. But it makes us unstable and more inclined to yield before the external and internal tensions. The neurosis attacks ours resilience: for survive and keeping going.

And a way of escape before these «psychological traps» that we suffer, is the violence exercised against that we think culprits of our perceived “evils». That sometimes is the whole vicinity. And the range of possible forcing acts has an extensive gradation. But, these «chests of distress» suffered, are solved overcoming them, not keeping a malignant cycle of action and reaction.

The depraved and sinister character of the islamist terrorism.

This phenomenon has some specific results of death, desolation and helplessness. Totally different, in extent and power, with that an assassin in serie can produce. And that spread, from the terrorist «area of action», forming concentric commotion waves, over the whole attacked society. It is not a question only of the killer deliriums of some misdirected illuminated. It is not a thing of the failures of the multicultural society in joining a nation of races, which are united by the national virtues of the democracy and the freedom. They are not produced «per se» by the «exterior assaults» that the yihadistas promote and claim; when they realize that his social political structure is that of a persecuted, unsuccessful (and degraded) caliphate .

This is a concrete and clear manifestation of the «mysterium iniquitatis» in the History. That, as such, is not in the habit of appearing. Since his disgusting nature can, in these singular cases, be caught and understood by many persons. It is not the temptation of a «temporary illusory good» for the jihadists. It is the appearance, without veils, of the Evil in the World.

Some Solutions through the time.

The fight against the islamist terrorists has different fields of activity. Because his manifestation is multiple and synergic. And this way of integrated and effective, must be the varied answers.

The Destruction of the islamist Bases.

Their bases are the geographical locations indefinitely controlled by the salafists jihadists. They physically bond on the bases, to reform, to consolidate, to train and to increase their forces. From them, operating as his principally «departure base», they throw incursions and assaults with limited aim on his enemy. Seeking to scourge or to expel him from the immediate territory that occupies. The creation of these permanent jihadists cores depends on the measure in which the military enemy is defeated and expelled from them, with consistency and duration. From the bases are carried out the reception of sympathizers and militants of the revolutionary group. Which is scarcely effected between the settlers, but, in his most, they come already motivated and decided from outside. And this is so, though a part of their effort in the action and propaganda area is realized producing videoes, interviews, gazettes and papers for audio-visual wireless varied means: the edition, production and emission is located in the bases. In their bases, the social politics salafist action is so intense or more than the formation and the military training of «mujahidines of Allah «. She is necessary to establish and assure the motivation and the loyalty of the soldiers to the jihadist cause in the hostile environment that surrounds and harasses them

The bases are social military forms with «regular structure» of the jihadists. They present continuous and numerous aims to the action of the heavy fire means of his enemies, the aviation and the artillery. Some are «opportunity targets«, as all classes of movements of the terrorists and the discovery of new positions, and others are «hard targets«, known or reconnoitre: varied infrastructures, stores, refuges, meeting or of control and of communications centers, positions of combat, of supporting fire and of defense against aircraft, observatories, transport of goods, distilling of crude oil, etc.

And these jihadists bases are the only substantial, still and definite target that the terrorist bands offer. Where to make them feel all the superior and available power of the military fire. Where is possible to isolate them in sectors, to beat them by parts, without these could collaborate in the decided defense plan; nor to flee, if the siege of the settlement is firm. And where they might act, with another spirit and other motivations that do not offer the trainings, the peshmergas, shiies and sunnis militias and the national armies of Iraq, Lybia, Nigeria, Syria and Somalia.

The doctrinal failure of the jihadists terrorists.

The salafists jihadists groups have failed in active and firmly joining to a social large group, which gives coverage and permanent impulse to their «social religious imperialistic movement». Their «catechizing of the violence» allows them to be mental prepared for the glorious and in peace death, and, even for the suicide, in the accomplishment of their military actions. But this insane sermon is not a weapon for the conversion of social groups. And there is a fundamental reason for it: his radical «creed» lacks possibilities of acceptance, victory and permanency between the masses, out of the needs in the temporary vicissitudes of a war. The jihadists groups act with an unnecessary and indiscriminate brutality, which discredits them before the Islam, the Koran and the Sunna or Islamic tradition, gathered in the hadices or «comments and facts» Mohammed’s writings. This lack of religious legitimacy, provokes the absence of venerable, respected and pious ulemas and muftis in his side. Their supposed «Islamic original ideology» is based on a few favorable verses of the Koran (it has around 4.200) and on some historical favorable facts and not on the integrity and the intention of the message of the Islam. This social emotional separation from the local masses unfailingly does that the support of the neighbors to the terrorist groups is involuntary, not attractive, always interested and desmotivated.

The location of potentials jihadists in the lands of dar-el-Amn.

We can identify potentials jihadists with certain sureness and after a specialized and methodical work. But we cannot detain them, while do not commit an offence during their activities: to try to arm and to train them; to conspire with others in his actions; to create bands structures to commit offences; to spread the exaltation and the use of the violence as ideological weapon; militants’ recruitment for their ideological and armed radicalization; to gather funds for the organizations with intention of committing offences; to collaborate in the movements of politicallly active and possible militants in his trips towards the interior Yihad (countries of the Southwest of Asia, the Magreb and the Sahel) or exterior (enemy western countries: the «crusaders»).

As for the intelligence labors, great difficulty exists in the penetration of the islamist networks by own agents or collaborators. In general, the mujahidins, the sympathizers and collaborators: usually speak Arabic; do not belong to European or Spanish Americans races; the Moslem civilians do not collaborate in the tasks of espionage and reconnaissance against the armed islamist organizations.

On the other hand, the glamorous exhibition of pairs or groups of armed military men by the streets of the cities is operationally useless. Since they do not have a definite aim. His mission is the ostentatious and indefinite patrolling. Seeking to calm the pedestrians parishioners with their menacing presence.

What do we still have? The information turned into intelligence. That must be contrasted, taken part to all the authorized agencies and user groups (including foreigns), constantly updated and necessary and sufficient. Excluding the undue plethora of excessive, routine information, not elaborated as intelligence. That is a way of poisoning and boring the own commands at all levels.

The redemption of the jihadists and of the activists and frustrated individuals.

When the individual has done the psychological and volitional step (the «decision»): already has broken the sufficient bonds with his vital environment; including the family. And his mind is absorbed and directed to his new “situation” and to the offered and assumed identity. This way, it is almost irrecoverable for him, for his family, for the society.

If the individual is one more of the «disoriented», emotionally confused and not integrated. That are mental besieged by the resentments produced by the long-suffering or believed as such «offenses»: it is possible to recover him, is relatively simple to do it and is enormously laborious to obtain it.

The enormous necessary work, prolonged in the time, does that it could not rehabilitate all. It is necessary to fight against the inequalities that have mentioned. To look for temporary works is more rapid. To give them an education and a labor formation is slower. But it is indispensable in the medium and long term. To separate them of the «rotten suburbs» and of the pernicious influence of environment, friends and relatives, is very complicated and long. Because the «chunks» extracted from these, have created the poor and only identity that they have. That takes them to the personal and social failure and to the frustration.

The Community integrated by his upright members.

And now comes the result that they join the nation. Nowadays, ethnic group is not synonymous of nation. Many nations of the Earth are really «crucibles of races». They are the United States of North America, the Spanish-American nations, the great African nations… Where coexist in sufficient peace and harmony different races and cultures. That are shaped by not exclusive beliefs and by the virtues and national values.

A nation is a society of individuals, provided with social politic selfconsciosness. Collaborate to creating and support it the history, the tradition and the customs, and the language and the own moral sense. And secondly contribute to it the ethnias and the own territory, that not always exist, specially the first ones. This way, the territory of a country is not a nation. And it is not even the inarticulate population of a territory, under an only government.

When the nation is loved by his components and exists in them the desire to serve and to defend her in community, the concept of the motherland appears. That is the motherland that we love and defend. Both ideas are essentially interrelated. And, the absence of the patriotism or the shame for practise it, by members of a «social community«, leads to the defenselessness and the dismemberment of their nation, in major or minor degree, forming «groups of associate individuals».

This way, it is not surprising that are the Defense Forces of a nation, as institutions and in his members, which wave, teach and practise the patriotism as one of his essential virtues. The Defense Forces of a nation are the specialized set of the «natives or patriots» for the belligerent and complete Defense of his «country nation».



The global war against the organized terrorism, proclaimed by the president Bush after September 11, 2001, has gone flat. And with it, the military strategy of attacking the many-colored islamist jihadism, always threatening, in his nests and in his infected areas. Without existed for them neither bases, nor sure refuges in the world. Seeking to suffocate this certain, threatening, watched and already long-suffering danger. And to remove it from home, from the territory of the USA. Mr. Obama qualitatively and substantially cut down in 2011, the antiterrorist aims in the exterior American politics.

The new National Strategy of the USA.

For it, the Stategic Plan establishes aims more political than military in the Islamic Central Asia. «This one has been a difficult decade for our country. (Now) we can be glad to know that the pressure of the war is yielding». Is admitted that the Americans are not capable of «leave a perfect Afghanistan». Neither the western democracy is perfect. But it is comparatively the least unjust of the political known systems. And, due regulated by the play of the public powers and the honesty of his agents, it was the one that allowed the advent of the middle, numerous, polite, laborious and progressive classes. This way, they bet for the political negotiation with the moderate Taliban, to lower the activity of the armed groups. Bringing over the possibilities of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. But the major premise fails. The moderate Taliban do not exist. This name is disgusting to the logic. Since it is a contradiction in the used terms. Like the «negative growth», of which some politicians speak to us. The Taliban apply rigorously the sharia. That are the civil laws and penal social derivatives of the literal and rigid application of the Koran and Sunna or tradition, in the profane matters. And they impose it by the force. And with a foreign yielding enemy, without firm convictions, with internal contradictions; why the Taliban are going to negotiate, having the victory already smelling them as the aromatic flowers of Allah’s garden?

Obama proclaims, with fiscal and exterior deficits running away, the need to save in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, he qualitatively lowers the strip of the exterior terror. Putting the Base (al-Qaeda) and the IS as the violent not national enemies of the USA. The salafista internationalist terrorists with his known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, operational chiefs, is a more attainable and manageable aim for the schemes, the budgets and the aspirations of the «diminishing American defense». And it stays within range of the actions: of the CIA and of the Pentagon’s flaming spies; of the not crewed airplanes (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) of reconnaissance and atack; of the military punctual actions of the elite forces of the Pentagon; of the assaults of small expeditionary forces and/or of amphibious assault of the Marines, transported in «control and/or transport warships» with his naval escort; of the penetration of the terrorist groups or, at least, the approximation, the observation and the information, by local related elements, paid by the espionage of the USA. The deployments of tens of thousands of American soldiers and their complex equipment and specific supply for several years in a theatre of operations, are indefinitely rejected by the new «doctrine». The American people infected with the adherent and complex economic crisis, with the lack of political effective control, with the costs of the wars against the terror (it speaks about 1,6 $ trillions – not thousand millions – spent till now in Iraq and Afghanistan and around $60 million per month en the deployment of Libia, without taling part in offensive actions), is tired of the exterior actions and constantly reflects it in the surveys. As in the old times, in other national crises, a country that is almost a continent, partially withdraws towards himself.

The Need of a new formal and international “Legal Setting».

The laws give juridical character and institutionalizing for what the needs, the customs and, finally, the social norms have been looking and establishing in the evolution of the societies. There does not exist in the History an example similar to the operational, legal and institutional picture that that pose the USA and the islamist violent rebels in their antagonistic armed dialectic by the whole global world. Therefore, almost all the laws of the countries where develop episodes of this war, the international laws in use and the social existing norms, lack practical meaning and aptitude to establish an operational sufficient frame for this warlike conflict. Both great conflicting rivals use more or less freely the whole world bullring, included the space, as local «fields of action» to realize all kinds of operations against his enemy, his allies and his means and properties.

The real terms of application of this violent dialectics are changed, are new or different: total internationalization of the warlike scene. Will mention some of the significant or more known: the borders and the operations strips or sectors are diluted or are not significant in these. The operations precede and mark the combats or small battles. Violent, dispersed, slightly decisive, unexpected, discontinuous in the time actions; which obtain their transcendence by accumulation, not by successive or simultaneous concatenation. There take place large movements of units or small units in very short time. Great concentrated and rapid firepower capacity used by the rivals: the explosive vehicles manage to have the demolition capacity of a “smash block bomb”. The employment of these small units, which do not constitute a «useful target», protects them from the enemy heavy support fire. The digital capacities of the wireless communications and of the treatment and custody of the information are a new weapon in the fighting field for the sensitive information. This has taken the enemy to the employment of old means, which were put away: couriers, manuscript or typewritten reports, heads of local reports, which successively deliver the orders, etc. Qualitative increase of the importance of the dissimulation, concealment, disguise, mishap and enemy disinformation capacities.

This demands the creation of a new legal and normative frame, which gathers and regulates the new warlike conditions that are appearing, they are maturing and are developing since several decades. And everything, having a sufficient vision of future, in order that the evolution of the rivals and of the circumstances and the events do not invalidate the legal and moral means, at not much time of being defined and accepting by a majority of countries and persons. Because, the agents and the units and the reconnaissance means cross and will constantly cross the space and/or the territory of the rivals and of numerous foreign countries in their conflict. Because, the enraged contenders will continue skipping the borders, to realize their harassment punctual actions. They are of harassment because they suppose the destruction and/or the punctual abduction of persons and/or units. Without with them the operational capacity is significantly altered in the theatre or area.

The Use of Drones in the War against the Islamic Terrorists.

The drones are used in the irregular war in reconnaissance tasks and follow-up and in assault actions against small targets. The US Air Force of the Pentagon has more than 1300 pilots of drones, being employed at 13 air bases of the USA. And calculates that at end of 2015, will have around 2000 pilots of drones. Already she is training more pilots for remote-controlled planes that for the conventional flights: around 350 in 2011. From 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters, to pass to learn to direct a drone. The equipment in the air base for the guide and control of the drones is very simple and highly elaborated: the control or helm of the drones, several television screens, surrounded with numerous auxiliar visual indicators and controls and a pedal. Everything arranged in pairs in front to both ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit in live time their sights to his pilots. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the camera controller of the, which form a «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during long time, verifying his environment and his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, the possibility of not wished human hurts («collateral damages») was minimal. The plane is capable of, once caught and authorized by the pilots an aim to beating, initiating by itself the assault, but this function has never allowed it.

The reconnaissance of the enemy and his exact location, both units and commands and local chiefs, and the recognition of the operations area is an old dream of the commands of all the times, to free themselves of part of their dreads and uncertainties. Because the modern maneuvers, even at the close distances, are changeable and plastic for the rivals commands. If we add the possibility of a constant follow-up of that one, this is “honey on small leaves of cereal”. In these tasks, the capacities of the drones allow his deep insertion in the enemy territory, without any danger for the reconnaissance specialized own forces and a clear, fluid and effective transmission of the results that they catch. It might say that they are a weapon designed with fortune to fulfill the opportune missions, if his employment is reasonable, controlled and shown restraint.

Because, the use of «not crewed planes» in reconnaissance missions of the enemy, raises a problem of difficult solution for the Americans Intelligence agencies and the Pentagon. Is thought that only the CIA can be receiving daily near 2000 photographies and 2000 hours of recordings of video from his spìes «drones». And all this nonsense informative, this undue plethora of images, only can drive to the clogging of the transmission, processing and valuation channels of the information. And to the tedium and disorientation of the intermediate commands. All this, though are used powerful computers and «key images and signs» to discriminate them in the process of selection. This result only can drive to a few routine and shallow analyses in «importance content» and to a profusion of non asked reports.

That they would be late years in turning in real intelligence, because here it is necessary to think for it. That one is the confirmed and valued information for the different operational and strategic controls. That clear and sufficiently orientates them of a situation, of his probable evolutions and changes and of the own possibilities of action, in agreement with the military strategy and the operational one or the received mission. With the abuse, already it is not a question of «obtain relevant and sufficient information». But the information that is obtained is overflowing, relarge and indigestible. And it is an information that poisons and disorients all. The essential and decisive criterion, is that the efforts go to the sectors and the most sensitive and important aims of the complicated process of the massive espionage. Which allows to discriminate the gathered information with unit of criterion and respecting the Universal war principle of the saving of the means. And that, continuing proven and effective alogaritms, other aims and neutral topics are chosen and sift with a given periodicity.

The destructive capacity of the explosive charges that carry the not driven assault plane is limited in his number and in his total power. The essential characteristic of his use is that is destined to limited goals, well in his size (a small number of not very spread enemies) or in his protection (not fortified targets). Nevertheless, they are useful to beat combat armoured vehicles, included the main battle tanks, with his hollow load missiles, which attack them in their vulnerable parts or zones (tracks, roofs).