THE FIGHT OF LIGHT INFANTRY AGAINST SUPERIOR ENEMY

Introduction.

It is possible to bring «coherent collective microdirection» to the tactical microterrain, giving specific missions and orders at battalion or company level. The units used will be light infantry, reinforced with material and experts (engineers, mines, mortars, anti-tank, anti-aircraft). The lower tactical unit will be the section with 2 or 3 squads of 3 to 5 men and their supports. She will receive a direct and simple mission, however dangerous, difficult and laborious. The operating time and available equipment will necessarily be short and light, unless the equipment can be bring forward at a protected . From the time of departure or crossing our own lines until their extraction or disengagement should not pass more than 40 hours. And, it would be preferable not more than 24 hours for an individual mission.

Operations.

The combatant’s means are: the terrain, with which he must melt and blend for his basic operations: march, attack and defense; the grenades are a part of his organic «heavy fire». Completing or replacing the 60 mm mortar, when the combatant is at the distance of subreptitious penetration or infiltration.

And the mode or manner of actions must be guided by harmony in the system «friend, enemy and ground» and the serenity and silence of the combatants. Thus, for example, harmony requires that in the infiltration of an enemy position the effect of camouflage on the advance of the fighter be respected. A shrub or bush cannot move forward or change position in such a way that it is shocking to one of the elements of the enemy’s security or combat advanced.

The attack.

Rather than attacking from afar, favoring the use of enemy heavy fire (artillery, mortars, aviation), the combatant must subreptitiously slide to more or less depth in the enemy’s tactical rear. To attack there operational or tactical targets: command and communications centers; warehouses, trucks parks and vehicles and general logistics equipment; barracks, heavy weapons and observatories of all branches. Depending on the type and the entity of the enemy unit attacked.

In a major attack, the section can advance 2 or 3 teams or raid squads. And, for a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy position, it can send 1 or 2 groups or scouting squads. The advancing sector or band of the section can reach 150 ms.

The enemy, in this subreptitious attack, can defend itself by changing the structure of its security zone. By increasing surveillance positions, it will further strengthen it. But, its security will not have improved qualitatively. Effective protection will come from superimposing that network of sniper pits and defense nests, a network of patrols without a fixed route. To hinder or detect and prevent the work of concealed, patient and silent penetration of the attacking groups.

The defense.

In defense, the fighter will do the same, but almost the other way around. It will melt and blend with the surrounding micro-terrain. Hiding as much as possible their battle positions and fortifications to the more numerous and/or technological enemy. Dissipating the tactical trail of their strong positions, both for combat or support.

Japanese in Battle. Enemy Methods

If fortified redoubts are used, they must be camouflaged and covered and partially excavated in the ground. Around them, there will be a swarm of shooters or pairs of them, covering its approaches at the appropriate distances. It is good to be able to maintain a crossfire, which distracts the attention of the enemy on the origin of it.

In urban areas, the light infantry will create a series of defense positions articulated in defense zones. The use of sewers and tunnels shall be continuous for concealment, protection and subreptitious maneuvres. The positions of direct heavy fire (anti-tanks, machine guns, light guns) will be embedded inside the buildings, controlling the rebuffs.

FM 7-8 Chptr 6 URBAN OPERATIONS

On a block, some buildings will be defended by pairs of fighters and others by sections. The movement of the fighters between and across the floors for tactical opportunity will be decided by the defenders. Access to the lower floors from the streets shall be obstructed and protected by booby traps and/or fire from other positions. The courtyards and lots can be suitable for the deployment of anti-aircraft and indirect heavy fire positions.

The mines, barricades, cuts and obstacles will be «interruptions covered by fire«, which break the enemy impulse. The «relative hidden heights» of any urbanized area and the twists and turns of the streets and tracks hide us and break enemy units. Our indirect artillery can register approaching routes and parks and squares, to disrupt enemy advances, concentrations and deposits.

Our tactical actions will seek to: override the enemy impulse; prevent it from encircling and surpassing our units; erode their advances from various sides; destroy their armored and transport vehicles; block their entrances to buildings from terraces and top and bottom floors; and advantageously anticipate their intentions and attempts.

FM 7-8 Chptr 6 URBAN OPERATIONS

All our efforts seek to make that the enemy, with our defense deployment and with the technics and tactics we use to make it work, lose all its numerical, technological, and fire and tactical motion capabilities advantages over us.

If we can have a «detached mobile group» outside the urban perimeter, that is not located by enemy reconnaissance or its air or ground units. It could harass, ambush, erode or attack, as the case may be, the enemy in its tactical rearguard. Their offensive actions must have the operational objective of weakening and disrupting enemy tactical capability. And with this task in mind, the various opportunities to fight against small enemy units and their supports of all kinds will arise. Another premise of their action is that our «detached group» must keep its security, always avoiding an unwanted encounter with the enemy, its premature detection and being surrounded by it.

The marches.

There is a third category of actions that are marches. These would be to the combat, between our own near or far positions and retrograde, with enemy persecution or not. The march to the combat, especially at the near and medium distances, aims to reach the combat positions of each branch with the enemy. Protecting and maintaining the combat and tactical movement capabilities of all units. To make the enemy feel, without any reduction, all our fighting capacity: fire, shock, infiltration.

Here, it is also necessary to get melt and blend with the march terrain. It can be different according to the sections of the route. Protection is the primary condition of our march, as we have not yet begun combat with the enemy. And, without it, we will have squandered and thrown away our opportunities and scarce military means.

Every march with the possibility of an unwanted encounter with the enemy is a march to the combat. And that possibility will define the security and concealment needs of our «marching groups«.

Chindits: The British guerrilla warriors who crippled Japan - Americas  Military Entertainment Brand
CHINDITAS ADVANCING ON NONHOSTILE GROUND

The reconnaissance of our routes must be sufficiently advanced, depending on our knowledge of the route and the enemy and their characteristics. That reconnaissance will be supported by a “vanguard with fighting capacity”. And considering always that its mission includes avoiding the fight with the enemy, except our rejection in a suffered ambush. The hidden and silent features of our fight strongly advise it.

Protection is a necessary element of surprise. Which is a cheap and effective multiplier of the combat capabilities of our light and lean units. Since the enemy tends to not «combat readiness» for most of the time. But this is a desirable and natural thing: lions rest more than 2/3 of their daily available time. And since the enemy needs a «time of detection and alert» to prepare to fight, he has to maintain an advanced security in an effective deployment. That guarantees him to count on such «essential time«, so as not to be surprised by our attack incursion.

The technological weakness of our deployment will be amply compensated, with the concealment, the longer running time, the security of this, the careful and necessary reconnaissance and use of the ground, which gives us that desired fusion with it.

Employing the most favorable terrain to advance: its folds, unevenness and concealment; and dragging to cross over waterlogged lands or near to the enemy and difficult to cross terrain; and the creative and varied camouflage; and making use of the concealment that gives us the night, as a natural reinforcement of our actions. To leave as little tactical footprint as possible for the enemy.

In the cities, there are means of concealment, which gives us their layout, their elements and their construction, the parks, the ditches and the sidewalks. Along with the metropolitan railroad system, the general sewer system and the tunnels of circumstances that we can excavate or reinforce.

To advance through the slopes, it is important to use our side or slope of the relative military crests. Considering that, the enemy will deploy on its side. And, whether or not advance some security, branches observers or forces near them. The distance to the ridge is important and different for the types of fighting. If the defender is somewhat separated, he could be attacked with grenades. And if it is very separately, this means leaving the attacker the domain of the subreptitious approach. Somewhat close, may allow you to detect the assailant and beat and reject him with grenades.

The Command Conduction.

The conduction of these units must include and then inspire and reflect the complementary and continuous character of their «essential polarity«. And that it acts in its conception, development, doctrine, implementation, equipment and training, logistics and support, marches and execution of missions and tasks.

Let us remember, now, that they are regular or semi-regular units, which protect themselves and fight, in a characteristic and singular way, with a greater or better equipped technologically enemy. And, employing in its dialectic war any form of fight (attack, rejection, retardant defense) or maneuvers. And acting partially and to the appropriate degree, as an irregular unit, confusing and merging with the tactical terrain.

Whereas, if we insist too much on a form, conception and implementation, the dynamics of the processes underway can end up moving us away from good doing and even from success. All this has to do with quantum mechanics, Heissenberg’s indeterminacy principle and Hobber’s principle, as natural and ultimate regulators of processes.

Thus, the direction, mode and realization of our means and objectives must be guided as the pilot of a small boat guides it. With the objective on the horizon and employing small course corrections to resume the initial and successive intentions.

Flowgram and Balance processes, actions and facts in the fight of light units in an different or extraordinary way.

Centralization // Coordination // Delegation

Authority // Information

Terrain // Terrain and Micro terrain

Strategy and Operations // Implementation

Intentions // Contingencies

Means // Chances

Organization // Error’s correction and prevention

Reinforcements // Carrying out

Intelligence // Reconnaissance and Intelligence application

The Principle of the Objective, Today. 2nd. Part.

(CONTINUATION)

An Historical Application of the Principle of the Aim in the War.

A clear and simple example of the application of this principle in the operational strategy, we have in the campaign of Ulm. In May, 1805 broke out the war between France and the Third Coalition, formed by Russia, Austria and England, its promoter. The main body of the French army was deployed along the coast of the English Channel, preparing itself to invade England. But the threat for the French army in campaign, which was the real strategic aim in the Napoleonic wars (let’s remember that the occupations of Madrid, Vienna, Moscow, were not decisive), was arising in the East Europe, from the armies of the Russian and Austrian empires. In September, 1805 Napoleon moved his «Army of England» to the Rhine, deploying it between Mainz and Strasbourg and renamed the «Great Army». The Great Armée was formed by 145.000 infantrymen and 38.000 riders, joined 7 army corps. Each one at the orders of a French marshall, a great cavalry reserve, at the orders of the marshall Prince Murat, and the Imperial Guard, directly under Napoleon. To them 25.000 Bavarian allies were added.

Taking the initiative, as was habitual with him, Napoleon decides to give the first strategic blow against the army of 72.000 Austrians, which, at the orders of the general Mack and the archduke Fernand, son of the emperor Francis II, was advancing towards Ulm, without waiting for the arrival of the Russian help. Napoleon maneuvered his army corps in a centripetal spiral over Ulm. It supposes the joint action of all the means in his “lines of action”. Of the «branched out» activity of all the units and the services, not necessarily coincidental in the time, but convergent and resultant in his efficiency and in the result. By means of the different and coordinated,lines of advance or action, the uncertainty and insecurity is induced in a prepared enemy. And always his rejection capacity is dispersed and is disturbed his plan of defense and its systematic conduction.

Resultado de imagen de battle of ulm 1805

The general Mack went out at the doors of Ulm, to surrender to Napoleon, at the foothills of mounts Michelsberg.

In a wide advance of his independent army corps, the great Armée quickly crossed the center of Germany, from the Rhine to the Danube, between septiembre, 25 and October, 6. With this he operationally intervened between the Austrians and the Russian allied forces, still distant.

The Austrians did not understand the need of the rapidity of these movements. They were thinking only about the battle, as the only instrument of the decision. Their operational strategy did not exist. And they waited his enemies, centred on Ulm and expectant. The Frenchmen initiated the crossing of the Danube on the 7th. And, during the whole week, Napoleon made converge, on an enormous constrictive maneuver, the majority of his forces on Ulm. While, an army corp was monitoring the possible arrival of the general Kutuzov from the East. The trap was remaining closed in irresistible force.

The general Mack uselessly realized several attempts of breakthrough, with the major efforts in Haslach and Elchingen. Both Austrian commanders fought between them. And the archduke Fernand separated from the main body with his 6.000 riders and tried to escape in North-East direction. But, near Trochtelfingen, his forces were surrounded and defeated by the Murat’s corps cavalry. Other 12.000 Austrians gave up themselves in Neustadt. The general Mack and the rest of his men (around 27.000, after the combats and mentioned incidents), with Napoleon in scandalous majority at the doors of Ulm from October, 14, went out to surrender their weapon at the foothills of mounts Michelsberg. The general Mack signed the capitulation of the army on the 20th. The campaign, without battles in strict sense, cost to Austria more than 50.000 men, almost 70 % of his initial troops.

The Current Process of Definition and Follow-up of the Aim.

The retreat of the USA of Vietnam produced a readjustment and another appreciation of the principle of the aim. The later evaluations of the politicians and military men led to proclaiming the imperious need to give always to their armed forces in any future conflict: the support without fissures of the people; a few clear and expressly defined operational and strategic aims and the necessary means for its achievement. This «check list» of supports of the national strategy to the military strategy, appears today as a good summary of the moral and material commitment that the peoples and the controls have with their military men, when they send them to the war for reasons of «national interest».

In the practice, the development of the operational strategy will be defining new operational and tactical aims. That are the surveyor’s poles of the sinuous way that leads to obtaining the strategic aims raised to the military men. That can be so precise and so general as: the occupation of an enemy territory, the recovery of a some provinces pillaged by that one, his effective military defeat or his surrender with or without conditions. Let’s remember that Moltke the Old was saying that the own initial plans only were resisting or were viable up to the first contact in force with the enemy.

The western democracies are provided with extensive, direct and deep communications through all their social tissue. Everything appears easily at first sight. And all the persons take the right or the obligation to debate about everything. But, in the «political military area» that is great more unstable, insecure and opaque. This does not want to say that the operational requirements should not exist. And that the need to prescribe and keep the discretion and the security necessarily limit the «universal exhibition» to the mass media in the area of the national safety.

Resultado de imagen de senate of the us

The Senate of the United States controls the evolution of the wars objectives.

It is necessary to define and to give clear aims to the military men. It implies the need of that the politicians study and compromise themselves with the high or national strategy. And, as necessary and inevitable corollary, that they give the sufficient operational autonomy to his military men. In order that they do not waste lives, efforts and a material means. In order that they neither get entangled, do not even be distracting in unproductive or secondary actions. In order that they do not lose the respect and the support of his people and gain the scorn of the neutrals and potential enemies.

But, closing an ideological and practical «curl», the age of the communications also offers advantages of rapidity and constant, reasonably trustworthy and sufficient intelligence using the military information and his management. Even in the fleeting and delicate cases, with the wireless communications of several levels and accesses, it is possible to obtain a «virtual presence» of the military chiefs and of certain politicians, in the operational distant field. This would facilitate to these controls, a successive approximation and the graduation of the actions of the military means in presence, towards the operational action. And it would facilitate the dilution in the space and the time of the need to fix the successive secondary aims, already from the beginning of a “cycle of military operations”. Keeping always a constant acceleration of the «cycles of action» on the enemy, to dislocate his rejection capacity and to seek and to act on his operational weaknesses. Already those must seek to go successively forward to the enemy, progressively turning ineffective his actions and induce in his men the abandonment of not being capable of offsetting nor overcome our tactical actions guided by our “in real time” operational strategy.

(THE END)

The Principle of the Objective, Today.

The principle of the objective demands that every operation goes towards a decisive, clear and obtainable aim with the means at disposition. This principle is applicable to the four levels of the war: the tactical, the operational, the military strategic and the total strategic or of national politics. In this last level meet to collaborate the national diplomacy and economy, who would give him his category of «total». At first, it seems that this principle of «direction of the war» is of the easiest to conceive and apply. Nevertheless, it is in the highest level of decision, that of the great strategy or national strategy, where it has not been correctly or sufficiently applied this principle. We can remember, supporting revolts of Lybia, as the great powers of the anti Gaddafi Coalition had difficulties to define the essential aims of his military intervention in Lybia.

Origins and Appearance of the Principle of the Aim in the War.

This principle is always related with the general principle of economy (or the administration) of the means. So, we rationalize our efforts and means on having centred on a complete aim. And this way, the lives and other military available means, always scanty or, even, insufficient, for a campaign, can be squandered, if the national commands fail in applying the principle of the aim at his own level. This principle is directly related to that of concentration. Which seeks to assemble all the means, not necessarily present for the moment, well simultaneous or successive, in a common effort on the aim to get. This way, for example, a combined arms unit that covers the free flank of his main body or the units of tactical exploration deployed in advance, are also taking part with his missions in this complete and synergical effort.

In the classic ancient military men (Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great or Jomini) the knowledge of this principle arises more by what it is deduced from his works, that for its direct mention. That is to say, up to only a few decades ago, the principle of the aim was a second-class principle. How could be giving this paradox between his managerial importance and his carelessness? The principle of the aim was implicitly careless, when the military men expressly attended to the principles of surprise, of concentration and of protection. And it was so, because it was too evident. It was really, to defeat the enemy in the minor number of possible battles. We must remember that the principles of the war originally appear in the tactical field: as the advices and directives to follow to gain the battles.

Resultado de imagen de frederick the great

Frederick II, the Great, ruled the Kingdom of Prussia for 46 years. A practiced and theorist of warfare.

Initially and even until little ago, the state matters were not of the interest or of the consideration of the people. The kings and absolute princes, even the illustrated ones, were autonomous and sufficient in the direction of the war and were not using the principle. This changed with the establishments of the diets, the parliaments and the chambers. More or less representing peoples cosovereigns with the monarches. It was already necessary to explain the motives and the aims of the wars. This way, the principle of the aim began to take form and content. And it reached his importance and sovereign, when the tactics or the art of considering and gaining the battles, already cannot by itself to gain a war.

In any operation the aim is essential. Without it there can exist neither a definite and clear plan nor the coordination of efforts (or «mass»). The last military aim is the destruction of the enemy forces in presence (not necessarily the physical annihilation, it would be enough that they were giving up themselves). Considering only the military factors, the aims must be defined from the beginning and select them in agreement with the available means. And this way, appears the paradox which we nowadays live in many cases. There exist political, economic and still strategic factors, which conspire to delay and still gets dark the definition of the aims in the war, as the case of Lybia. And, on the other hand, with the forces already displaced there, before the friends, neutral and enemy’s look, existed the urgent need to clearly define them. With it is achieved a “joint effort” (today baptized synergy) for the best utilization of the resources on the enemy.

From middle of the 19th century, appear and are consolidated the rapid globalization of the interests of the States and the scopes and powers of their military, political, economic and diplomatic means. With them, the military principles of tactical origin fullly reached the area of the national and military strategy.

The Pernicious Interference of the Politicians in the Military Actions.

Also there always was coming a moment in which the politician had to be quiet and not to intermittently meddle in the military specific occupation. Sun Tzu is the real or supposed name of a Chinese author, who wrote The Thirteen Chapters of the Art of the War. The unit of style of the work and his originality allow to affirm that it is neither a collective work nor a summary of preexisting works. His work is dated between 400 and 320 B.C. In effect, the use of the cross-bow did not generalize until 400 and the cavalry was not incorporated into the army before 320. What Sun Tzu said on the military missions and the spurious interferences, more than 2 thousand years ago?

Resultado de imagen de Sun TzuThe Statue of Sun Tzu in Enchoen, Yurihama, Japan.

«Normally, when the armed forces are in use, the general receives, first, the general orders of the sovereign. Then he assembles the troops, makes the army an homogeneous and harmonious set and installs it in his cam «. Chapter 7, verse 1.

«It is necessary to know that for the sovereign there exist three ways of taking his army to the disaster. They consist of proceeding as follows:

To ignore that the army must not advance and order that it should advance, or, to ignore that it must not move back and arrange a retreat. This is what calls «to put the army in a difficulty». Chia Lin’s comment: «there is no major calamity that the orders of the sovereign that resides in the court «.

To ignore all the military matters and to take part in his administration. This disorients the officials. To ignore all the problems of the command and to take part in the exercise of the responsibilities. This destroys the spirit of the officials». Chapter 3, verses 19 to 22.

«The one that has competent general and protects them from the (solvent) interferences of the sovereign, will be the victor». Ibid, verse 29. Ho Yen Hsi’s comment: «In the war hundreds of changes take place in every stage. To say that a general must wait for all the orders of his Superiors, is like to have to inform a Superior of that you want to extinguish a fire. Before the orders come, the ashes will be cold. And it has been said that in such circumstances it is necessary to consult the general inspector of the army! To shortly tie a competent general, while he is asked to suppress a crafty enemy, is as holding the Black Greyhound of Han and then give him the order to catch unattainable hares».

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE RECONNAISSANCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE: A MILITARY OPERATIONAL SYSTEM. 2nd Part.

(FINAL)

The near future of tactical reconnaissance.

Major tactical reconnaissance weapons, tanks and low level flying aircraft tend to be vulnerable to modern infantry antiaircraft and antitank missiles. They appeared on the battlefield in the 1970s and have become more effective since then. Since the mid 1990s, these rockets have been incorporating various technologies such as double active heads, multiple search engines, which allow them to discriminate against enemy decoys and secure the target, and those that allow them to use variable flying heights. For example, upcoming infantry tank rockets will be able to locate, define and confirm their target by magnetic distortions of the environment (generated by the relatively large metal mass of the tank), acoustic signals, heat emissions (human and motor and weapons) and short wave emissions. Their way to the target will oscillate to circumvent possible weapons deployed against them.

Resultado de imagen de deep range combat and reconnaissance patrols NEW ZEALAND’S LONG RANGE RECON PATROL.

All this will tend to give greater importance in the reconnaissance of to the deep range combat and/or reconnaissance patrols. They are inserted by air or river means, as close as possible to its operations area and designed to stay longer in it.

Combat reconnaissance: The immediate and continuous contact with the enemy and determination of the capabilities of the fighting ground.

Combat reconnaissance conducts ground reconnaissance, the relation of his own army’s adjacent units in established contact points and the location of the enemy to help determine the enemy’s intentions and characteristics. This latter mission is subordinate to the goal of obtaining intelligence. Every unit must establish it always, without need for specific orders. It is important to advance the subunits as rapidly as possible; if only is conducted by infantry, it may be necessary use vehicles to transport troops, who can then continue on foot.

In open flanks and exposed wings, its range must be adequately extensive. By means of anticipated patrols, combat reconnaissance constitutes in its actuation a real security for units in the front.

 Its organs are armored reconnaissance companies and platoons, reconnaissance patrols of units in the different sectors, observatories and forward platoons of artillery, etc. The platoon at disposal of the H. Q. and services company can be useful in the battalion area for rapid action.

Combat reconnaissance has a basic function to detect resistances and weaknesses in the enemy deployment and weapons, and in the “interfaces of action” created on him. It needs to use tested skill, sufficiently intense and never superficial, that is knowledge about the weaknesses of tactical units and the fortresses of opposing deployments, as well as its efforts to present the illusion of such deployments. It is important to act according to the mission and the gravity center of the effort ordered by the high command. Colonel Tor made this point in his book “Infantry” (page 31 Madrid, 1943), “…advance through the enemy weak points and fight from one’s own strong points».

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol  A PATROL…

Information collected from various sources, becomes available intelligence and is transmitted to those interested.

The reconnaissance generates information on the different action levels and the ground, which it also recognizes. That must be converted into intelligence. This is the reasonably reliable and sufficient knowledge (never excessive or intoxicating) of the enemy, of his intentions and possibilities and of the terrain, in its possibilities of struggle, transitability (more than ground ongoing), etc. Received updated and without continuity solution.

The elaborating organs of intelligence are different for operational and combat reconnaissances, since also they both generate different types of information. The principal difference are their qualitatively different levels of actuation, in which they must give the set vision: enemy, area and possibilities. And that the need for combat intelligence is urgent and more continuous, and its transcendence, very fleeting, so it is much less elaborate and more direct to fighting units, from its reconnaissance.

Once intelligence is created, it is integrated by the superior command, G-2. It will then be transmitted to units and interested commanders. Transmission must be protected by all existing means, guaranteeing secrecy and its arrival to the addresses by means of double couriers, coding, etc.

Transmitted intelligence must assemble the suitable characteristics of the moment and ensure reliability, continuity, transmission security, and the wealth of content and its sufficiency. It must also be opportune and continuous. The security of transmission of intelligence affects plans and decisions that based on it. It must be sufficient, rich and trustworthy enough to give command, within a reasonable amount of time, as complete idea as possible of a situation and to plan for its possible evolution and factors that will affect that evolution. Sufficiency drastically limits the excesses of unnecessary information which disorients and tires those in command that try to use them.

G-2 is converted this way into the penetrating and lucid eyes of the operative command.

The security as “opposed complementary” of the reconnaissance.

The reverse of the own reconnaissance is the fight against the enemy reconnaissance and the intelligence. She has as purpose to blind the enemy about our intentions and deployments, depriving him of operational information on us or misleading them. Security is the “opposite” (complementary, not antagonistic) of our reconnaissance.

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol   COVERING A SECTOR…

One of the active ways of fighting enemy reconnaissance is employing our operations security. Other is to employ advanced detachments, type reinforced platoons, to push back the enemy’s reconnaissance by means of mobile fighting with its center of gravity” focused on where his reconnaissance have to operate. A pushed back reconnaissance can give erroneous information to its intelligence on the actual possibilities of possible axes of advance towards us, our real capacities or our defensive intentions.

One purpose of security is the immediate protection of units against surprises and the unforeseen, by keeping a sufficient “combat readiness” for such situations. Units must also keep necessary forces alert as part of maintaining a practical reaction time. The tasks of security are to protect units from direct fire of infantry heavy weapons, to detect and avoid surprises, ambushes and enemy incursions and to detect and reject enemy reconnaissance. Every unit establishes at all times the security sector, zone (brigade or regiment) and area (division), according to its size. Between 1/3 and 1/6 of the unit, according to the situation, carry out security functions; the organs of which are the different sub units of the branches employed.

For camping units or in assembly areas of different classes, a safety line is established to delimit the protected units and at suitable points (accesses, etc.) double sentries are placed. At difficult to secure places (gorges, etc.) rapid mine barriers are placed. From this line, security units advance fixed and mobile patrols. Fixed patrols monitor critical security points (dominating points, enemy possible observatories, inevitable passing points, etc), relying on the mobile units to achieve always an active security.

Resultado de imagen de campos de minas militares  MINES BARRIER.

And, this so useful and simple, is always done? No, sir, not always.

«On June 10, 1944, soon after the midnight, the second battalion of the 29th division of infantry of U.S.A. was prepared to pass the night. The men had traveled approximately 25 kilometers over the last 20 hours. The official in charge of the battalion, Commander Maurice Clift, chose a zone of two meadows so that the troops were to spend the night in the open. The men entered the zone and set themselves up for sleep along terraced hedges. They were so tired that no one bothered to untie their rucksacks and personal equipment. The majority fell asleep at once. Some heard the noise of approaching engines but thought they were American vehicles.

However, the vehicles were actually German tanks and trucks belonging to the 352nd infantry division. Unknown to each side, the Germans had been withdrawing along the same route that the American battalion followed in its advance. When they stopped, the German explorers detected the North American movements encamped in the meadows. They quietly advanced and surrounded the meadows.

Suddenly, the Germans threw flares. Under the sinister light, almost as brilliant as the midday light, its assault cannons opened fire on the hedges against the Americans. Along one of the hedges a platoon got up and was cut down by the German machine guns. Many Americans, scared and disoriented, were running in search of a way out of the meadow while the German infantries continued knocking them down them with repetitive fire. The shells of the German mortars were falling all over the meadows. The Americans responded with weak rifle fire, directed at the opposite hedges, which ran the risk of hitting either the Germans or their own men.

«It was terrible”, a survivor told General Cota. «We crawled more than 90 meters out of the field when we heard from behind the shouts of our men. I thought that the Germans were launching a bayonet charge against them».

The commander of second battalion, Lieutenant Colonel William Warfield had his command post in a farm close to the highway. Warfield tried in vain to establish a defense. Those officials who ran from the house towards the field were brought down rapidly. A German shouted in English to the command group: «Give up, give up!». «We will certainly not give up!”, roared Warfield. He tried to lead a small group towards meadow where the rest of his men were, but was killed instantly.

The battle lasted around 20 minutes. The battalion had 150 casualties with some 50 dead, slightly more than one third of its effective force. Just before dawn a gravely injured young lieutenant who was reporting to his division commander, General Charles Gerhardt, fell down suddenly on his knees and struck the soil with his fists, sobbing that he was sorry that all his men were dead and that he had left them where they had fallen.

General Gerhardt was angry. “Without regard for safety, he shouted, The battalion simply came to the field to fall asleep».

THE RECONNAISSANCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE: A MILITARY OPERATIONAL SYSTEM.

The reconnaissance generates information of the different operational levels of military action. This must be turned into intelligence. That is the reasonably trustworthy and sufficient knowledge of the enemy, his intentions and capacities and the fighting possibilities and transitability of fields, etc. To enable us to take a “founded resolution”, based on the use of our means and fighting forms, in accordance with our objectives.

Concepts y Principles of the Reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance is one of the most important functions to be fulfilled by units during operations. The information it provides, how it is elaborated and transmitted and to whom is a fundamental part of intelligence. This, finally, is one of the key factors of decisive command.

Resultado de imagen de SDKFZ 263.    SDKFZ 263.

Reconnaissance can be divided into strategic, operational or tactical and combat, according to its mission and the area it encompasses. The strategic one seeks to uncover key information about the enemy in the operations deep theater: his concentrations of forces, his great movements, his important defensive lines and possible surface targets, etc. A surface target becomes a “destruction zone” by the effective action of heavy weapons of destruction, for example, reactive artillery or tactical nuclear devices.

The operational or tactical reconnaissance tries to define the situation and the intentions of the enemy in the operations area of the great units, type division, corps or army. It determines the movements of the enemy in the border zone between forces, his formations and deployments, his defense lines and possible surface targets. This reconnaissance is carried out by aviation, drones, specific reconnaissance units and the reinforced reconnaissance armored battalion of the corps. In this respect, a total connection and complement must exist in the missions of aviation and ground reconnaissance and keeping in mind that its task is never of fighting.  

The reinforced reconnaissance battalion operates in a sector of up to 60 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. Its advance over the parent unit must be at least 6 hours in order to utilize gathered information. On the basis of its reconnaissance order, battalion commander, keeping his companies always under control, can send up to 16 patrols of 3 vehicles to covering his sector, looking always for a gravitational center of the deployment. Having done this, he can send on the concentric center of the effort up to 2 patrols’ echelons, being relieved or being inserted, according to the used method. Finally, if the area to reconnoiter is occupied by the enemy, he can advance his companies as attack spears, under the screen of advance patrols. The battalion must not infiltrate very deeply inside the enemy deployment, if there exists a serious risk of being isolated.

Resultado de imagen de Panhard AML-245    PANHARD AML 245.

Not all Armies have given or given sufficient value to this last reconnaissance type, which depends on their military doctrine.

All the operational principles of reconnaissance could be summarized as follows: Always focus on the objective received from the command (its mission is to generate information, the combat will be done by others), seeking the maximum use of time and its means, getting and maintaining contact with the enemy and never losing the freedom of action. It will allow him to perform and to escape, without being caught by ever higher forces.

The tactical reconnaissance is also needed in the urban combats. Not always the tactical reconnaissance penetrates too much in the disputed or enemy area. The industrial or populated zones, full of «concealing relative heights» and staggered in depth, which offer protection from the enemy sights, even nearby, and covers against the light and heavy fire, «thicken» considerably the tactical maneuver of the contenders. Reducing this way, the depth of the fighting zone of the infantry. So, masses of the artillery, as batteries and medium groups of it, are deployed at very short distance to his enemy. In a artillery fighting zone then very next to the forward limit of the own defense position.

On October 9, 1942 a patrol of Soviet reconnaissance entered behind the German lines in Stalingrad, seeking to detect the enemy movements in his rear. The 4 men sheltered in an auxiliary railroad coach, torn and left, placed in a railroad between the workshops of the Red October factory (where before were made metallic pieces and small weapon), at North-East of the city. And the disputed Mamaiev hill, towards the geographical center of Stalingrad, which was offering grand sights on most of the city.

Resultado de imagen de Engesa EE-9 Cascavel brasileño. ENGESA EE-9 CASCAVEL.

During almost the whole day they remained in that hiding place, communicating by radio to his lines the German activity. They had located several dozens of German mortars and howitzers, accompanied by the trucks which were moving his ammunition, by the rear roads to some emplacements placed in the suburbs of Stalingrad’s west. Also they located numerous mortars and pieces placed in a glen at the north of the Mamaiev hill, doing fire against the Soviet positions in the city.

On having got dark, the explorers broke a telephonic cable of the fixed enemy network of communications and hoped that the Germans were coming to repair it. Very soon they observed the light of a lantern and when the soldier came closer, killed him to shots. One of the Soviets disguised himself with his uniform and placed close to the route of the railroad, hoping that another German came closer the cut cable. Soon another lantern started approaching by the way. The soldier fell in the ambush and the explorers made it unconscious. On having recovered, he met 4 Soviets of foot together near him. Pulled down the soldier Willy Brandt gave his name, range and unit of belonging. Psychologically they had already gained the hand on him.

Resultado de imagen de drones guerra Vietnam   DRONE AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, IN VIETNAM.

Immediately afterwards, the German told to the explorers that 94th German infantry division had come to the factories zone from the south of the city, that 24th panzer division was going towards there and that the Fuehrer had ordered that Stalingrad should be totally taken by October, 15. This confirmed to them the reason of the extensive movements estimated by them in the German operational zone.

For the small reconnaissance patrol, to take with it after his lines, a prisoner already interrogated, was more a nuisance and a danger that a minimal success. And, in spite of the hardness, even the brutality, of the combats in the city, they neither killed, nor mutilated him. The Soviets reported to Brandt that had revealed military secrets, took him to the railroad line and indicated the direction that he had to continue to reach his comrades and left him free”.

But, what is this of speaking about operational reconnaissance in the age of the electronics, the robotics and the computer science?

Almost 50 years ago, the North Americans had developed an arsenal of electronic devices, directed to the vigilance (surveillance) of his enemies in Vietnam. Already they had reconnaissance drones to monitor «from above» their guerrilla slippery enemy. That transmitted his images by television to the planes of detection and transmission, placed at dozens of km from the observed zone.

Resultado de imagen de sensor ADSID   ADSID SENSORS .

The principal sensor used in the remote vigilance was the ADSID (Air Delivered Seismic Intruder Device). It was thrown principally from the F-4 Phantom, following guidelines of navigation by radar, in order to cover adequately the observing zone, as a traffic route of men and vehicles, a parking or store. The device measured 91 cm. of length and 15 cm. of diameter. And on having fallen down was remaining almost buried, opening then a transmitting aerial of 120 cm. height, camouflaged as if it was a defoliated bush. His battery allowed it to issue during a month and half.

With these sophisticated artifices they were trying to observe the traffic of goods and men by the Ho Chi Minh Route, the route of supplies of the Popular Army of North Vietnam and the Vietcong in South Vietnam. It was a highly branched out and protected route that, departing from North Vietnam penetrated in Laos and crossed it. And then, detached diverse routes towards the different communist operations zones in South Vietnam.

The program «White Igloo» destined 1,7 thousands of million dollars between 1966 and 1971, for these tasks of compilation of information with the ADSID. With the information gathered from the traffic in the routes, the Americans were deciding the interdiction bombardment actions, using his different air devices, including the invisible and inaudible (with his cruise height) B-52 strategic bombardiers. At the beginning of 1971, the information of the aerial photos after the bombardments, taken by planes that were flying after the assault formations, allowed the analysts to suppose that the «war of trucks» was causing a very severe effort to the industrial capacity of the suppliers of North Vietnam (the USSR and China).

Resultado de imagen de Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System  A BOEING OF THE JSTARS SYSTEM.

But, if it was true that were destroying so many trucks and equipment, how was possible that the communists were keeping the tactical initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks that literally had to cover many of the ways and parks of the Route? Who were bothering to remove them? The response was given soon by the American junior officers: they were ate by a monster called the «Great Laotian Truck Eater»; a horrible rotten that was getting up towards the dawn and was devouring the vehicles destroyed by the aviation during the night, after the photography for «wreck count». Because the Americans are very scrupulous with the statistics and consider the lie an almost inexcusable social sin for his civil servants.

Up to today, almost 50 years later, the electronics, the robotics and the computer science have continued improving. But it does not seem that they are useful in Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria, to detect a “donkey bomb”; to avoid that group of cruel fanatics without God («as Allah does the Good, make you also the Good and do not promote the corruption (the “evil», the Noble Koran orders them), destroys great part of one of the principal mosques sanctuaries of the chiism in Samarra; to know if in an Iraqi or Syrian house are terrorists or only a terrified Arabic family, before demolishing her with heavy fire from a distance and extremely, according to his military operational doctrine.

In addition, during enough time still the air and spatial American means, as spy satellites, drones or not crewed planes and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have serious limitations for the detection and check of small ground, even regular, forces. In the areas of difficult transitability and with possibilities of concealment, as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized zones (industrial, of logistics, and of housings). Those not only offer concealment, but also coverings from the fire up to the near combat distances.

The Americans do not use the tactical reconnaissance, which demands some tactical characteristics of semi independent elite forces and a specific moral courage. And that is one of the most difficult tasks of the infantry. They use the combat reconnaissance and call her, expressively, reconnaissance.

(TO BE CONTINUED).

THE SOCIAL PROPAGANDA. CHARACTERISTICS AND MEANS.

Characteristics.

Being an eminently practical phenomenon, the praxis of propaganda is defined by «norms or principles of action«.

Propaganda must be «simple, easy.» Both in its structure and in its concept and transfer to its «objective.» Therefore, the basic concepts of our doctrine and interests must be sought and exploited with it. And state and present them in a clear, easy and appropiate manner. Both in the words (texts and slogans) and in the images we use for their diffusion and impregnation in the social group. And taking into account the means employed and the immediacy and depth that our ideas have to acquire in the group to which are directed.

Resultado de imagen de propaganda social CHINESE PROPAGANDA AGAINST TAIWAN.

Propaganda must be empathetic. That is, it must create and maintain adherence, loyalty and likings towards our ideas and interests in the social selected group. This way , several are the specific instruments to achieve this fundamental empathy of the group with us.

It can be praised the exterior or interior dangers that threaten us. And to highlight our role of «victim«, with the losses and the sufferings that it carries. This way, the Manicheism, which raises an incisive good-bad dilemma, which is gray and vague in the reality, can be used in our favor.

Resultado de imagen de dios lo quiere

It is important that the unanimity exists in our social group towards our reason and identity. And it must be so, at least, in the practical sense. Discordant active little “groups” cannot exist , in this social group.

All this must be repeated and canalized to keep the «propitious spirit» in the group, according to his idiosyncrasy. And to harmonize and orchestrate the actions and aspirations and the facts, to give them the maximum efficiency and extension in the «animated set» with a purpose.

It is necessary that the habitual religion in the group supports us or, at least, is benevolent with us. This reinforces extraordinarily our reason. Since the religion forms a part of the sense of personal and collective identity of the social group.

«God is with us«, was appearing in the clasps of the German soldiers during the World War I.

«In God we trust«, it says the American currency.

«We are the people of God«, say the Jews, the Hussite and the Umma or universal community of the Muslims.

«The Crusade in Europe«, so the Allies titled his campaigns against Germany and Italy. And it is the title of the memories book of his military chief in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

«God wants it«, were saying the Europeans crusades in his campaigns of recovery of Jerusalem and the Holy Land for the Christianity.

The Means used by the Propaganda.

— The word, in any form of used expression, is the creator and the vehicle of the concepts and the ideas. We think with the words, to elaborate our ideas and definitions. This explains also the need and the result of possessing an extensive and rich vocabulary for the cerebral and cognitive development. And, for his maintenance and conservation.

This way, the written documents of all classes favor the galvanization of the group and the integration in a common, monolithic and real identity.

Resultado de imagen de simbolos soviéticos THE SHIELD OF THE USSR.

The applied, general and sufficient education allows to create and transmit successively to the generations, an intellectual and moral commitment with the identity and interests and motivations of the group.

— The images, in the shape of cartels and assemblies, allow to expose to the uncultured ones the thoughts and common symbols.

— The symbols are essential in the exhibition of our personal and collective identity. In them are condensed and reflected many of our internal drives, of our lacks and of our aspirations, of our sense of group. The set of the symbols is called incompletely a «paraphernalia». The more a social group develops, the appearance and the importance of his symbols will go increasing for him.

The symbols of a group, which exhibit the reason, essence and belonging in it of the individual and of the group, are very varied:

Flags and banners; national and of a party and of group shields; badges, ranks and medals of belonging, category and of merits within the group; anthems and minor songs; prominent figures of diverse levels, in which the different sectors of a group or the community feel led and represented; statues of his great men, heroes and outstanding figures and sculptural compositions, which reflect essential or important moments of the social group.

Active participation in mass meetings increases the group’s sense of belonging and its unity.

Music is another highly used mean. Choral singing and instruments such as drum and trumpet are especially useful.

Architecture and sculpture also characterize a complex social idea and a civilization. They are a permanent expression of their essential or temporal beliefs. Over time, both adapt to them.

Cinema and radio are means of transferring thoughts, culture and belonging to the group. And, more modern, television is. That, at first, it did not have the effectiveness and the generality of employment of those.

Resultado de imagen de propaganda social

Internet is considered, as a means of propaganda, but for many, is a strange, unpredictable and negative mean. This is probably the case, because of its global, anonymous, free and controversial nature. On one hand, it is a channel of unverified information, almost by essence and definition. It is also, many times, a spokesperson for outbursts, even ruinous and vile, propagated by elusive elements and almost without responsibilities for it.

And the algorithms used in modern times make it possible to calculate and make various predictions, which are not verifiable. And already from the beginning of the phenomenon studied.

Nota bene. — This work is a complement to our study on the «Psychological War». We also recommend its reading in this «blog» to all those interested in the topic.

The Will of Defense of a Society. 2nd Part.

(FINAL)

And the Strategy, the Operational Strategy and the Tactics, as Levels of its Military Actuation.

 

The Levels of Military Actuation.

The first level of activity in the defense of a society is called national strategy or, also, in a some antiquated form, great strategy. In it are included the economic and diplomatic resources of the State. As part of the resources of a nation to get his great strategics aims in a war.

Resultado de imagen de montesquieu  THE BARON OF MONTESQUIEU.

 

Military Strategy, or simply Strategy, in a great second level of activity, refers to the definition of the larger aims of a war, of an operations theater or of a campaign, including the distribution of the generally scanty military resources used to fulfill them.

Tactics refers to the ideal execution of the combats with an enemy, who opposes with armaments, to the achievement of our strategic aims.

Between strategy and tactics exists an essentially practical space of prominent activity, called the operational level or operational strategy. Its mission is to optimize tactics and the means available in a campaign and in the theater of operations. As such, it defines and conceptualizes the battles, marches, etc., both the military operations and its correct succession, according to those decisive aims. It provides the tactics and the decision, a transcendence far beyond of the pursuit and the tactical exploitation of success. That is to say, operational strategy employs tactics as an essential instrument, combining them to achieve the ultimate objectives to which they are orientated and dedicated to achieving, forming then part of its strategic nature.

 

Thus, the operational strategy defines its own aims in the theater or in the campaign of action, which are the incapacity and disorganization of the enemy by exploiting his strategic and operational vulnerabilities. The first is orientated to reducing the enemy’s combat capacity, seeking to functionally or positionaly disable it, while protecting own’s combat capacity. The second is get by occupying or destroying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities in the operations zone.

Resultado de imagen de refinería de petróleo OIL REFINERY: SYMBOL OF THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF A MODERN SOCIETY.

 

The critics vulnerabilities of the enemy are those whose occupation or destruction produces his serious disorganization and/or the loss of his will of defense. They are those elements, characteristics, possessions that give sense to the fight that he maintains. Its loss instills inevitably in the enemy a sensation of hopelessness and a sense of uselessness in continuing the fight at those moments, except for accumulating more losses.

The critics vulnerabilities are different in each one of the levels of military action, although the effects produced in the superior levels are transmitted to the inferior ones.

A strategic critical vulnerability, handled capably by the Spaniards in century XVI during the conquest of America, was the capture of the great chief or emperor of the indigenous confederations of the great invaded countries (Moctezuma in Mexico, Atahualpa in Peru). But, once turned hostage, the symbolic representation of a leader of this type plummeted, because the social vitality of the community which he directed, demands his renovation, as if he had died.

In II World War, the occupation of the capital and the fall of the government were strategic critics vulnerabilities, to which was acceded through an operational strategy of mobile warfare: spring campaign of 1,940 in the Western Front. The same tried Hitler in 1941 in relation with Moscow in the East front. Probably in that total war, almost of extermination, its fall had not the political importance that was attributed to it. But Moscow constituted a great hub, a railway communications center vital for all the U.R.S.S. at the west of the Urales and, in this sense, it had been a critical operational vulnerability.

To achieve these strategic intermediate aims, the operational level has some specific operational means that are the intelligence, the imbalance and the incapacity of the enemy, the time or speed of the operations and combats, the logistic organization and his physical support or line of supplies and the correct sense of the own command.

It uses these means to drive and to use ideally (and without squandering) the tactical-operational means at his disposition.

Resultado de imagen de reuniones sindicales grandes  THE NATIONAL MORAL FLOURISHES IN ALL THE PLACES OF SOCIAL COEXISTENCE.

These are:

The ground transitability (in the whole geographical dimension of the nature of the areas, climate, station and hour of the day),

the combat capacity (military means made concrete in men, equipment, supports and combat vehicles) and the capacity of operational movement (transport of great and small tonnage, the supplies of all kinds and combustibles and the warehouses and accessible parks in the zone) owns available,

the freedom of action and the «favorable interfaces of action» with the enemy (that exist and that they can also be created always, by means of the extension or decrease of the «field of action» on that, as a tactical operational zoom, or by means of his change to another front sector or in the depth of the enemy zone). With these last 2 «systems» we can act always according to our criterion and interest and not simply react to the actions of the enemy.

This way, the mentioned «operational systems» realize the employment and the functioning of all the levels of the national defense. And they go from the conception and the great creation of aims, interests and available resources, received from the command and the nation, up to its practical final accomplishment. Involving in this also the necessary and the inevitable and imposed by the enemy, tactical employments of the military means, as stages for the ideal achievement of those commended aims.

THE END.

The Will of Defense of a Society.

And the Strategy, the Operational Strategy and the Tactics, as Levels of its Military Actuation

The Ideology or Concept and its Range.

The “will of defense” of a nation is its capacity to cause, create, develop and maintain defense forces. The strength of the defense forces, in turn, rely on the necessary support of the economy of the country and the diplomacy of the state. The will of defense is an expression of the will of being and the vital capacity, even biological, of a society. This concept overcomes and perfects the so called hybrid war or of V generation. That implies and supposes the employment of all his «orthodox and heterodox means of intervention» by the social belligerent group.

Resultado de imagen de GUERRA V generación  IMPRECISE ALLEGORY OF THE FIFTH GENERATION WAR.

 

As the term implies, will of defense is healthy, normal and sufficient when defense forces and the strength of the country’s economy and the quality of state leadership and diplomacy are proportional and adapted to the political objectives of society. These must also be adequate to the possible threats that the country may have to oppose, both within and out the country, within its geopolitical region or other sources of threat. This capacity and its performance in different situations stems from a correct “national moral”.

The will of defense is shaped normally in the Armed Forces, in its capacity of specific instruments of the defense function. The resources of the Armed Forces include the human resources, psychological and intellectual resources and material resources. The basis for the will of defense, the source from which these resources flow is the society itself.

At the level of human resources, troops must have suitable training, the combat readiness and a certain esprit de corps. Human resources are shaped by doctrine, military direction and military moral. So, they can carry out the military operations withstanding the effort and the wear of them, while maintaining their conviction in the missions to which they are assigned.

Resultado de imagen de fuerzas armadas

Materials resources must support the military theory of the Armed Forces and have the necessary technological sophistication to serve the military’s objectives. They include the weapon systems and all the military hardware. All of these resources flow from a society that provides, maintains and nourishes them.

Which is operational about this natural phenomenon of the society’s capacity of defense?

In a modern society, the chain of transmission of the popular will to the Armed Forces, passes through a series of intermediate sociological gears of authorities and institutions. In them, crystallize and fulfill the popular will, albeit with all the shades, errors and deviations, derived from the degree of imperfection of society’s institutional system and of some authorities.

Resultado de imagen de misiles nucleares CHINESE INTERCONTINENTAL DF-41 MISSILES.

 

This implies that a direct military attack on the civil populace, does not debilitate the will of defense already shaped within its Armed Forces. So, military action is better focused on undermining the will of defense of the enemy armies, not on the society from which it springs.

To do this, the immediate goal would be the enemy’s Armed Forces, followed by the political system of the enemy’s country including its political objectives, plans, and alliances, as well as its military and auxiliary industries. Only finally would the focus of attack or pressure be on civilians of the enemy country.

The civil population, which is not intrinsically organized but is dominated by the ideological and institutional apparatus of the state, is capable of absorbing tremendous military blows. Examples of this are the bombing raids that Germany and North Vietnam endured for years. Ultimately, only the invasion of Germany forced its surrender. There is also the case of Iraq which was submitted to a kind of military siege in which its people were impoverished. Still, the Iraqi regime was even stronger than at the end of the allied invasion in the winter of l991, having suppressed internal opposition from Shiites and Kurds and having attracted the support or admiration of its resistance in the Arab world. Despite the first war against Iraq and the following siege, Iraqi’s did not rise against their political institutions and the content and expression of Iraq’s national will of defense was not altered. In the most radical case of a nuclear war, great civilian losses would occur initially, yet if the Armed Forces remained relatively intact due to defensive deployment and protection measures, it could prolong the defense of its country and even win.

This brings us to time as the environment in which the will of defense is expressed, and whose “effective factor” is “national moral”.

In effect, the will of defense is constructed in the time. And to destroy it requires actions within time. Those engaged in insurrection come to understand this point well. That a prolonged war directed at the source of the will of defense, the country’s people, will in effect attack the country’s national moral.

The National Moral, source of the Will of Defense.

The “national moral” is the collective conviction of how best to live by following historically-proven trends of peace, progress, own satisfaction, service and justice. This certainty is assumed by a society as its own vision, or conception of its destiny.

When individuals or groups do not subscribe this vision, or when they pervert it, the quality of national moral can deteriorates and often produces messianism. But, without illusion and enthusiasm, societies cannot achieve or create beneficial enterprises. Enthusiasm is a force of spirit, which conquers moral and ideological entropy (that is inevitably generated in societies), enlightened by a «reasonable illusion«.

Resultado de imagen de lideres mundiales THE DOCTRINE OF XI JINPING «illuminating» Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. IT WAS INCLUDED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. ONLY MAO AND DENG XIAOPING DESERVED SUCH AN HONOR.

 

When leaders also are in tune with the right social trend, and with the wishes of their people, a moral community is established between leaders and their people, that harmonizes and promotes national and social feelings. This process is the origin and creator of the national moral of societies and is at a different qualitative level than that of purely biased, ethnically-based or group-based interests.

There is an ideological creation from the people and to the people, which reason is that it most be in favor the people. Still, this process remains subject to deviations and historical aberrations.

The process of creating the national moral are positive when leaders act collectively with honesty and inspire their people to follow «correct ways» of living, within all the possible ways of living available to them. This implies and demands a certain ideological control on the part of the state’s leadership, which is one of its main functions. Abuses of this responsibility are best represented by Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda, Mr. Goebbels; the political deputies and the party structure for the proletarian dictatorship with Stalin, etc.

Resultado de imagen de winston churchill

The natural organs for forming and transmitting the “national moral” are far removed from official propaganda offices. The reason is that the natural organs that generate national moral are found in the nuclei of society’s collective action and in its natural and institutional leaders. That is to say, the spaces in which national moral is created are homes, schools, churches, political parties, unions, working centers, and associations in general, etc.

After the battle of England, Churchill said that the future generations would say that «that one was our more glorious hour». This was possible thanks to an unbreakable social discipline, which was not ensuing from the study of manuals of civic education, but of the follow-up of a model spread by infinity of personal testimonies. The diffusion of the moral model of the citizen owed in a great extent to the educational labor of the Anglican Church.

The own Montesquieu admitted that the republican virtues only existed in the tales of the antiquity. This way, they were attractive to a leader minority, but his adoption by the citizens could not be done by legal or constitutional mandate. The moral theoretically proposed values, were seen as something artificial and remote. Without real connection with a practical and known moral code, highlighted with alive examples that could be follow.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

 

The modern Hybrid Warfare. 2nd Part.

 

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

(CONTINUATION)

The abuses against the civil population are always counter-productive in a counterinsurgency struggle and more in an internal revolt. Sometimes, the hurries to form new troops lead to a deficient or incomplete training of these. They are not vaccinated against the stress, specially here the mental one, nor against the frustration of the not fulfilled plans or of the enemy ungrateful surprises. This leads to discharge almost inevitably the anger and the enervating impotence in the civil population, intermingled voluntary or by force with the rebels.

Resultado de imagen de rusia guerra de siria Russians in Syria. First, they devastate and then his infantry advances to sweep away and occupy. The Syrian civil dead do not matter for them.

With embarrassing frequency, when the human or technological «sensors» of Russia, Arabia Saudi or the West countries detect some probable activity from Iraqi, Syrian, Huttis or Zaidies rebels or the foreign “muyahidin”, first they devastate the building, the «block», the zone. Then they go to sweep up and to do the «body count», for their statistics. Sometimes, among the rubbles, they can get the corpses of an Arabic innocent and numerous family. They abuses of the attrition, which is indiscriminate and perverse when the enemy fuses with the civil people. They neglect the unexpected active patrolling, which needs proportionally less material and human means, but more trade, moral courage, freedom of action and creativity in the low and intermediate commands and NCO and in the men.

 

A necessary complement of the regular net are the false rebels bands. These would be destined to operate in zones inclined to the insurgency, from where some of their members come from. Their activity and concealment would be favored by the decentralized character of the rebel groups. Their missions would be to obtain information, to prove the loyalty of the civil ones and to annihilate small enemy groups or lone suicidal terrorists. They should not be bigger than a reinforced squad or section, except in combat special occasions.ç

Cuenta regresiva: dos buques de guerra rusos, listos para zarpar rumbo a Siria  Two disembarkation vessels of the Black Sea’s Russian Fleet load troops for Tartus’s Syrian port. «To defend the national Russian interests in Syria».

There were prominent the practices of counter insurgency of the Portuguese in his immense colonies of Africa, between some of which there were a distance of 3 thousand Km. Raising great logistic problems like for a small nation, which was not possessing excessive resources or friends. It was important the politics of «national integration» (with mottoes as «Portugal is not an European nation» or «It is not a small nation»; «Portugal is a big multicultural nation»). And that was practiced by the Portuguese troops, on the basis of the respect the population, the lack of unnecessary or necessary not explained reprisals and the improvement or the development of the autochthonous civil population. Counting with the «economic, of education, of civil engineering, logistic means» available, always loins and in penury. That is to say, the Portuguese «means of intervention» were acting together in an operational «mix». Done in accordance with his capacities and the functions and national aims of this Hybrid War, directed by a central coordinating command.

But, the population understood the politics of «sincere approximation» and it reasonably helped the Portuguese troops to isolate and border on the «irregular bands» of the different rebel movements in the most distant or inhospitable regions of the different countries. That could not gain the battle for «the hearts and the minds» of the Angolans and other peoples.

 

Imagen relacionada Column of Portuguese troops on the verge of continuing the march.

This made a «impasse», a dead point, in the military development of the colonial classic «guerrilla wars». The rebels bands could not create stable «guerrilla bases». That could allowing them to have a cozy rear and a permanent and sure refuge. And to indoctrinate, to grow and fortify and to spread over the different regions of each country. Depriving the military enemy, little by little, of the domain over the native and their lands. And the Portuguese could not surround and annihilate the guerrillas placed in the remote zones of the territories. Which simply slipped and changed of sure location.

The first that saw this perspective of his future were the Africanists and the metropolis officials. And this led, finally, to the «revolution of the carnations» of April 25, 1974, to the overthrow of the Marcelo Caetano’s corporate salazarist regime and to the decolonization of Portugal. For whom the long wars meant an intolerable bleeding of humans and materials resources, in the perspective of an indefinite stagnation.

But, when the colonial independence came (Angola, Guinea and Mozambique), as consequence of this point of balance reached, the valid speakers to negotiate it with the Portuguese were relatively not much, badly prepared and with a weak and superficial organization, which was not supported without the foreign «socialist» help.

The diplomatic Warfare, the normal and the heterodox.

One of the «means of intervention» of a world or regional power to obtain his «national and strategic aims» are the «Foreign Relations«. That has a concept qualitatively more extensive than the Diplomacy. This refers to the State or government affairs, that treat 2 or more nations (alliances). And the diplomatic «function» is to negotiate by the political way what communicates to him his State. department or secretary. Asking and receiving successive instructions, if it was necessary, to support and continue the negotiation. And being kept or not in his execution and protocol relations, within the qualities of discretion, prudence and tact that characterize his trade.

Resultado de imagen de diplomacia internacional The international Diplomacy gets entangled.

The Foreign Relations also include other relations and more heterodox actions. That is necessary to look for, to keep and to support in the exterior to obtain our national aims. This way, a function of the foreign relations is to appear for it, new opportunities and more secondary ways or routes and «means of intervention«. The Foreign Relations collaborate directly, since always it has been done, using the means and the in force national strategy, with the Intelligence, the Economy and the national Armed Forces. That is to say, acting together in a «mix» of functions and means of intervention, the war always has been Hybrid from the Prehistory. Creating new opportunities and ways, to apply and use the whole creative and potential capacity of the State, to achieve his strategic and operational aims.

A succinct example between thousands of situations. The «central operational command of combined war» can request to Foreign Relations the search of dissident or domestic enemy in a potential enemy country. Located one o more of these, there are valued his capacities, circumstances, implantation and operational possibilities. This way, FF. RR. would present a report to the central command in the shape of a «founded resolution”, involving in it. That is, valuing schematically the existing cases and being decided by one or two, depending on his qualities and our general or punctual convenience.

Resultado de imagen de Metternich diplomacia Prince Klemens Wenzel Metternich (1773-1859). As diplomat was more important in his achievements, that Napoleon in his wars. 

These dissidents or enemies will be politicians or also armed rebels. In the first case, our nation might grant to them asylum, scholarships, economic support and advice to his groups. In the second one, in a phase of major confrontation, we could also send supply and armaments, advisers and trainers and «special operations» or of «foreign volunteers» units, to support and/or reinforce them in his insurgents activities.

The Propaganda as a «mean of intervention«.

At the beginning of the 16th century the «reformists and heretical» ideas of the priest Martin Luther propagated in the center and north of Europe, with the help of the press. The origin of the word propaganda arises during the Counter Reformation. It is a reference to the spread of the catholic faith.  With the Jesuits in the forefront of this task of catechizing. Facing to the deviations from the preexisting orthodoxy, taught by the Lutherans, Huguenots, Calvinists, Erasmists, etc. Today, the Propaganda Fide is the Vatican Catholic Congregation for the Evangelization of the Peoples.

It is not up to the I World war when the term acquires a negative or pejorative significance. It originates in the popular indignation towards the systematic efforts of the belligerent powers in that one, to manipulate in his favor the ideas and, with it, the attitudes of all, the neutral, enemies and its own population. This might be the certain modern origin of the “false news«, tendentious, insidious, sectarian, equivocal… That the Spanish-speaking snobs name «fake news» now .

This way, in the 30s of last century, the propaganda «of war» or «national» evoked in the majority of the persons the vision of malevolent forces, which were supposed strange and alienating, trying to wash their brains. The need arisen with the outbreak of the World War II, to cooperate to the effort of total war with all the available means, in an imposed conflict that was threatening the survival of the democracies, and the new advance in the sociological and psychological fields during the period between the wars, they will go progressively and firmly to the acceptance by the Western nations and his Armed Forces of the application of the psychological warfare.

Resultado de imagen de propaganda fide The Roman Palace of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide.

The propaganda always handles basic, essential information, that are easy and simple by definition. This is due to the fact that his «aim» (the «target») is always large and numerous: the population of a certain country or region, or a religious, economic, racial or socially different extensive group. They are those that it is necessary to inform, convince and, according with the cases, to protect.

The National Economy as a «mean of intervention».

The Economy is an important and classic “mean of intervention» of the State and of the Nation. It means and involves in the effort of war the capacity of obtaining and producing all kinds of goods and services, intermediates and finals, that the technologies and processes in effect in each stage are capable of get and obtain.

Resultado de imagen de reagan and gorbachev  Reagan and Gorbachev.

The Economy is tied here directly with the applied, specific education, of the skilled workforce, who is needed and could be achieved in a nation. The own aptitude to obtain goods or services (even with tourism, raw materials, trade) appetizing to other nations or social groups, will serve for the direct exchange or for barter of the goods and services in which a society is showing a deficit. As an example, energy or specifically qualified workforce.

Also, in cases of need and usefulness, a nation can decide to assign more productive resources to the production of a certain good. But, all more it is required specialization in the production, the performances, both neat and economic (as cost of them) will be minor. By virtue of the laws of the diminishing performance and of the increasing costs that suffer these «specialized reconverted productive processes«.

It is very easy to use the cement in producing military goods of static defense (bunkers, defensive armed lines) and not to raise buildings with it; it is relatively easy to convert the industrial vehicles factories of into armored vehicles plants. And it is very difficult to obtain great performances from a dairy changed in an arms plant.

It is evident that all this process of restructuring the capacity of production of a nation, will require the control by a political determined and firm command. And the confirmation and the support of a temporal laws of war, which decide and support it firmly. Approved by a sufficient majority of the Legislative Power.

Paradigmatic is the example of the USA and the Soviet Union, of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, in the decade of the 80 in the 20th century. The armament career that imposed the first nation collapsed the economy of the second one. That could not continue, with his economic capacity without competition (in the productive capital), nor incentives (to the workforce), the pace to which it was forcing to produce the goods and planned services. And a whole economic social politics system, as the “real socialism”, implosion and ruined. Taking with him, in a few years, the whole political military framework mounted by Moscow. In order that it was his influence sphere, his western tampons «defense» and his political social empire, after the World War II. Years later, a Soviet ex-diplomat opened his heart: «we did not have even to eat…»

The Cybernetic War, a characteristic “mean” of the modern Hybrid War.

A «mean of intervention» against the enemies or to change or to influence wills, which was not known, for unthinkable, until a few years ago, is The Cybernetic War.

The cybernetic attacks can go to the software or the hardware of the personal IT, managerial or institutional systems. The software is the «logical support» of an IT system, which makes possible the accomplishment of the different tasks. This «logical support» includes the operating system and the applications or IT programs that those realize. The hardware is the machinery or the set of physical components of the computer. This way, summarizing, the software generates instructions that are executed by the hardware or physical support of the system.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The modern Hybrid Warfare.

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

The modern Warfare.

Till now, the wars were making between big and small «nations». They were the only capable of generating a «will of defense». This made concrete in the Armed Forces and in the economy, the diplomacy and the people support of their societies. Looking for the defense of their strategic and national interests and their survival. A procedure or protocol existed for the war declaration and for the signature of the peace agreement. The one that was not respecting the honor procedure was considered to be infamous. And if he was turning out to be defeated, could wait for a severe punishment. President Roosevelt, on Monday, the 8th of December, 1941, at 12:30 pm. hour of Washington, in his speech before the American Congress assembled in Joint Session, and transmitted by radio to the nation, was declaring: «Yesterday was a day marked by the infamy…I request you declare the existence of a State of War between the United States of America and Germany, Italy, the Japanese Empire and all their Allies». And at the end were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Resultado de imagen de george clemenceau

The contemporary wars lasted a few years. After which, exhausted the industrial capacity and the will of defense of the defeated nations, not necessarily invaded or occupied, these were accepting their defeat and the peace was signed. When the armistice or the peace conditions were too leonine and humiliating, they were originating new vital defense «impulses or take-offs» in the defeated people. Seeking to overcome and avenge the received damages and offenses. Those were the sure germ of a future war within a generation, measured in around 25 years. Just remember the treaty of Versailles or «Diktat» against Germany, signed on June 29, 1919, promoted by Georges Clemenceau, called the Tiger. Whose last payments referred to interests of the already liquidated principal debt, the reunified Germany has just done at the end of September, 2010, approximately 90 years after accepted.

The threat of the use of the atomic weapon in the war between the industrial powers, removed indefinitely the historical and recurrent danger of a war of interests of any class between them. The civil and military leaders of all of them, have exhibited throughout more than 65 years an exquisite tact, supported by the nationals diplomacy and economy, in the international relations and in the resolution of the raised conflicts. No «minor» relative question was deserving to assume the risk of an uncertain, costly nuclear warfare and without clear «victors». In any case, the big hegemonic powers or the principal ones in a strategic zone, were solving regionally his ideological and of interests fighting. And they were doing it by means of regionally limited sectoral wars.

Resultado de imagen de cuba en etiopía Cuban «internationalists» Forces  supporting Ethiopia against Somalia in 1977.

Where were fighting their partners and like-minded, local, not atomic and subsidiary nations, even out of their strategic natural zone. There we have the case of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, after the decolonization of the first one. Also the fight in the Horn of Africa between Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia, Cuba and Siad Barre’s Somalia. The latter’s overthrow, after his defeat in the war for getting the Ogaden Desert in 1991, precipitated Somalia in the chaos in which still is. And we have the Israel and the Arabic bordering countries case, which threaten her from time to time with her elimination and with throwing to the sea the surviving Jews.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggression are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

Resultado de imagen de guerra guerrillas Vietnam North Vietnameses regular Forces equiped with Soviet design’s PPSh-41 sub machineguns.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, that the Americans call them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebel and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

Birth and Situation of The Hybrid Warfare.

The First Generation of wars would be marked by the development and consolidation of the State concept. The wars of The Second Generation would be characterized by the commitment of the societies in the Cause or the Mother land. His model is the French Revolution; there appear the manufacturer and transport revolutions, which made possible the extension of the operations theater, not so much the maneuvers speed, and they extended the spectrum of the objectives. In them were used literally armies of masses, where the shock had great importance and independently that the cavalry or the infantry was the principal weapon. In the wars of Third Generation, at the end of the 19th century and in the 20th, the modern technology supports and modifies the actions. And the factor that contributes to the definition of the wars of Fourth generation is the globalization and the return to the man as decisive actor.

Resultado de imagen de guerra guerrillas Afganistan contra URSS The Soviet tanks fight against an evasive and fleeting irregular enemy in Afghanistan. Who will win?

Russian Now, closing the historical and definer curl, the wars of V generation are called hybrid or multi functional wars, which, really, always have existed. With the major or minor participation of each one of the «available means of intervention» (Foreign Relations, regular and irregular Armed Forces, Economy, Cybernetics, etc) in the social group, to obtain the «functions of intervention» search for. Forming a “means” mix, adapted to all situations and confrontation theaters.

Not for nominating nowadays with an exotic and new word, preferably foreign, one makes this way a «mean or a function of intervention» fresh and promising. The problem is that the ignorance of the history, still the recent one, impoverishes the new concepts, ideas and situations of conflict. Without winning in application, efficiency and cognitive capacity with it. With this, only it falls or repeats the previous history, returning to learn it. And that, as in a spiral screw, only changes the phenomenon temporal «plane of execution«. Where are kept safe and now partly secret, the different «essential parameters» of the phenomena of the conflicts and fights.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet «experience» of fight against the insurgency between December, 1979 and January, 1989, as invading and oppressive military force, supporting a regime of his orbit, turned out to be a complete disaster for the U.S.S.R., on not having obtained any of his strategic or national aims. But, in Syria, the insurgents were settling themselves and controlling some nearly definite territories. And they were defending them well until the year 2016, after the intervention of Russia…

And the Russians from his successful, but very short experience there, praise nowadays the employment of a «center of coordinating control» in each operations theater. That would be entrusted to coordinate, in a convergent and global effort, the specific means at the disposal of the command of the theater. Every «mean of intervention» will be specialized here depending on the tasks to completing.

Resultado de imagen de rusia guerra de siria Russian Forces fight in Syria in support of al-Assad’s regime.

The tasks to coordinate in the theater, to stimulate the policies adapted to the interests of Russia and to the coexistence and the peace, would be: of military ordinary or special character and of advice; diplomatics; of cooperation with civil administrations and governmental forces or others present; of reconstruction and support of the population. Here would intervene the diplomats, civil engineers, technical personnel of administration, educators, units of rural policemen, economic advisers and sociologists. Forming mixed «functional packages» to integrate in the » coordinating center » of intervention and collaboration.

To all that the Russians call the Valery Guerasimov’s doctrine. Though it is not more than a collection of policies, trends and actions of before and now.

The military forces will be destined to the regular operations of assault and defense. Included the custody of sensitive aims, so much personal and industrial groups, as of structure and infrastructure; the establishment and defense of control positions, both fixed and itinerant; the assault to the bases, concentrations and movements of important enemy forces; the combat and/or recognnoissance patrolling that covers the territory in hands or threatened by the irregulars and the occupation of enemy taken positions.

The American multi subject doctrine is contained in the concept, the regulations and the updates of the Modern Air Land Battle. And they apply in his politics and actions the same «means of intervention» that all the great powers. The general James Mattis, Secretary of Defense until Thursday, the 20th of December, 2018, in which it was fulfilled the glass of his discrepancies with Trump. For his not consulted order of retreat of the contingent of 2 thousand American soldiers in Syria.

Mattis explained in his letter of resignation, in a condensed, easy and deep way the ideas of the Pentagon on the hybrid or multifunctional war. In order that Trump could understand it. «Our strength is joined to the strength of our system of alliances. And, in similar form, we must be unequivocal and decisive with the countries which interests and trends are opposite or are in tension with ours«.

Resultado de imagen de seal navy The SEALs.

Almost all the «means of intervention» of the State, used to obtain his national aims, already were present in the panoply of means at his disposition, a long before this new name of the Hybrid War. The «functions of intervention» were developed by «means» adapted to the real possibilities of his epoch. And they were obtaining the looked aims, though they were very specific. There we have the actions of the SAS (Special Air Service) as «special forces of punctual intervention with limited objectives” in the enemy rearguard. Fighting against this one and to support and help the local «forces of resistance to the occupant». In the USA we have to the SEALs, the Rangers, the Delta force and the Special Forces, among others. In Germany is the GSG 9 group. In Australia and New Zealand they have the same name that the British corps.

The strategic and tactical needs of the war and the functions of the «means of intervention» are slightly variable. And his variability is a function of the improvements in general training, scope, speed, capacity of shock and fire on the enemy, communications between «means», protection of these, etc. That offer the successive technologies applicable to the «means».

And all the colonial metropolis, fighting in the wars of liberation raised after the World War II, developed with variables degree and fortune, methods and policies of civil development, of link the overseas natives to the nation, of «gaining the hearts and the minds» of the autochthonous population.

The Guerrillas Wars.

The pompously so called fourth generation wars are the counterinsurgency wars or guerrilla warfare or irregular wars or armed revolts or liberation wars or organized banditry, which always have existed, coexisting with the conventional variants of warfare. They are those that the USA has lost or not gained lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (peace disembarkation of “marines”, then demolished in their barrack) and Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforeseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» by the local lords of the war and the Islamic militias). They are uneven wars (they call them now «asymmetrical warfare») against an enemy of lower technological military level, relative to the regular enemy forces, always rooted in the own or occupied civil population and slight militarily intense but very extensive in the space and the time.

The wars against the armed irregular are by its Nature long, painful and difficult. Its prolong character originates from the need that a popular force, departing almost from nothing, develops and spreads. Managing to moral or militarily defeat a regular own or of occupation army. The difficulty and the cruel evil arise from the high civil component that takes part in them. They are wars located in the home courtyard, in the own or occupied rear.

It is necessary, therefore, to avoid the prolongation of the conflict, which is mining the conviction of the own forces and allowing that the enemy should spread, strengthen and prevail.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

News on Modern Conflicts. Novedades en Conflictos Modernos.

Utilizamos esta Sección de Novedades para dar a conocer en avance los próximos artículos que irán apareciendo en las distintas «categorías» de temas de esta página, dedicada a conflictos y crisis modernos.

The Writing in the Study of the Military Themes.

There is something important in the writing, as instrument of fixation and reflection of the learned theme. Not simply to make a summary or a few notes of the well-read thing.

This is what has motivated me to preparing and presenting a brief summary of the function, which exercises the writing for the student of the Military Topics. As seal and final flourish of the preparation or the control of a text that his intelligent reader will make good use of it.

La Escritura en el Estudio de los Temas Militares

Hay algo importante en la escritura, como instrumento de fijación y reflexión de lo aprendido. No simplemente para confeccionar un resumen o unos apuntes de lo leído.

Esto es lo que me ha motivado a preparar y presentar un breve resumen de la función, que ejerce la escritura para el estudioso de los Temas Militares. Como marchamo y broche final de la preparación o del dominio de un texto que será aprovechado por su lector inteligente.

La campaña del Khalkhin-Gol (Mongolia) de 1939.

Zhukov detiene el expansionismo japonés hacia la URSS…

En 1939, en sus remotas fronteras orientales, la URSS sostuvo una corta y dura guerra con el Imperio japonés. En esa época la atención de Europa, el núcleo del mundo entonces, se centraba en la suerte inmediata que iban a correr Checoeslovaquia y Polonia. Además, los nombres de Manchuria o de Mongolia eran poco conocidos en Occidente. Sin embargo dicha guerra regional iba a tener una consecuencia trascendental para Europa y su destino. Gracias a la rápida y decisiva victoria de la URSS en ella, los soviéticos no tuvieron que sostener 2 años después una guerra en dos frentes convergentes y extensos, a cargo de sus dos grandes enemigos, los imperios japonés y alemán.

Ello permitió a la URSS resistir y sobrevivir a las poderosas y sucesivas embestidas estratégicas y operativas alemanas, hasta fines de 1942. A partir de Stalingrado y, sobre todo, Kursk, las tornas se volvieron. Y la vieja Rusia, que parece renacer y crecerse en la desesperación y con dificultades terribles, comenzó una crecida militar firme, sostenida, progresiva e irresistible, aunque muy costosa, hasta Berlín.

THE MILITARY SURPRISE: concepts, effects, realization and types.

This way, this surprise less elaborated conceptually produces fewer fruits that have operational or decisive transcendency. Everything indicates that, in order that it should take place and increases qualitatively the transcendent efficiency in our actions, it is necessary that the quality of the surprise reaches another dimension in his action.

It is necessary, so, in the operational level of the surprise, that this would be an «ungrateful surprise» for the enemy. That has catastrophic effects, though they are local, on him. And that the «commotion waves» in the area or the affected sections, propagate for the enemy military system attacked. Damaging his capacities, his general and grupal moral (a section, the fighters of a weapon) and his intentions and perspectives. It would be equivalent, in the raised scene, to an «exploitation of the success» of our actions. That are encouraged and perfected by the operational surprise obtained.

The following battle during World War II illustrates the use of unexpected «field of action» on the enemy, and the use of ordinary and heterodox forces. That allowed General Walther Model to take the initiative and destroy a Soviet army inserted in his operational rear.

LA SORPRESA MILITAR: conceptos, efectos, realización y tipos.

Así, esta sorpresa menos elaborada conceptualmente rinde menos frutos que tengan trascendencia operativa o decisiva. Todo indica que, para que se produzca y aumente cualitativamente la eficacia trascendente en nuestras acciones, es necesario que la calidad de la sorpresa alcance otra dimensión en su acción.

Es necesario, pues, en el nivel operativo de la sorpresa, que ésta sea una “sorpresa ingrata” para el enemigo. Que tenga efectos catastróficos, aunque sean locales, sobre él. Y que las “ondas de conmoción” en el área o las secciones afectadas, se propaguen por el sistema militar enemigo atacado. Dañando sus capacidades, su moral general y grupal (una sección, los servidores de un arma) y sus intenciones y perspectivas. Ello equivaldría, en el escenario planteado, a una “explotación del éxito” de las acciones propias. Que son animadas y perfeccionadas por la sorpresa operativa conseguida.

Veamos un ejemplo de cómo el empleo de un “campo de acción” inesperado para el enemigo y el uso apropiado de las fuerzas ordinarias y heterodoxas, con sus respectivas características de actuación, permitió al general Walther Model, tomar la iniciativa, crear una sorpresa ingrata y destruir un ejército soviético insertado en su retaguardia operativa.

Qassem Suleimani, la Espada Desenvainada del Imperialismo Iraní

Hacia las 0:30 hora local del viernes 3 de enero de 2020, los EEUU mataron al general Quassem Suleimani cuando se retiraba del aeropuerto de Baghdad, a donde acababa de llegar en un vuelo directo desde el aeropuerto de Damasco. Se emplearon en el ataque dos drones Reaper, probablemente de la CIA, que lanzaron 4 cohetes Hellfire II AGM-114 de cabeza explosiva (H.E.), guiados por láser, (nombre, el “Fuego del Infierno”) sobre los dos vehículos sin especial blindaje, que los llevaban a él y a sus 9 acompañantes a Baghdad.

Introducción.

El Oriente Medio es la región geopolítica más convulsa y furente de nuestro mundo. Y por su cercanía, importancia energética y formar un nudo de comunicaciones entre tres continentes, es especialmente trascendente para nosotros. En esa región del Suroeste de Asia se dirimen varios conflictos armados y paralelos.

LA EXPLORACIÓN Y LA INTELIGENCIA COMO SISTEMA OPERATIVO.

La exploración y el reconocimiento del terreno generan información de los diferentes niveles de actuación militar. Entonces debe ser convertida en inteligencia. Ésta es el conocimiento razonablemente fiable y suficiente del enemigo, de sus intenciones y capacidades, y del terreno en sus posibilidades de lucha, transitabilidad, etc. Que nos permitan tomar una resolución fundada sobre el empleo de nuestros medios y de las formas de lucha, en función de nuestros objetivos.

THE SOCIAL PROPAGANDA. CHARACTERISTICS AND MEANS.

Being an eminently practical phenomenon, the praxis of propaganda is defined by «norms or principles of action«.

Propaganda must be «simple, easy.» Both in its structure and in its concept and transfer to its «objective.» Therefore, the basic concepts of our doctrine and interests must be sought and exploited with it. And state and present them in a clear, easy and appropiate manner. Both in the words (texts and slogans) and in the images we use for their diffusion and impregnation in the social group. And taking into account the means employed and the immediacy and depth that our ideas have to acquire in the group to which are directed.

LA PROPAGANDA SOCIAL. CARACTERÍSTICAS Y MEDIOS.

Al ser un fenómeno eminentemente práctico, la praxis de la propaganda se define por unas “normas o principios de actuación”.

La propaganda debe ser “simple, sencilla”. Tanto en su estructura, como en su concepto y transferencia a su “objetivo”. Por ello, se deben buscar y explotar con ella los conceptos básicos de nuestra doctrina e intereses. Y enunciarlos y presentarlos de una manera clara, fácil y oportuna. Tanto en las palabras (textos, consignas y lemas) como en las imágenes que empleemos para su difusión e impregnación en el grupo social. Y teniendo en cuenta los medios empleados y la inmediatez y profundidad que tengan que adquirir nuestras ideas en aquél al que van dirigidas.

La Voluntad de Defensa de una Sociedad.

Y la Estrategia, la Estrategia Operativa y la Táctica, como Niveles de su Actuación Militar

Llamamos “voluntad de defensa” de una nación a su capacidad para propiciar, crear, desarrollar y mantener unas fuerzas de defensa, que cuenten con el apoyo necesario y sinérgico de la economía del país y de la diplomacia del estado. La voluntad de defensa es una expresión de la voluntad de ser y de la capacidad vital, incluso biológica, de una sociedad.

Este concepto supera y perfecciona a la así llamada guerra híbrida o de V generación. E implica y supone el empleo de todos sus “medios de intervención” ortodoxos y heterodoxos por el grupo social beligerante.

Como tal expresión, será sana, normal y suficiente, cuando las fuerzas de defensa y el apoyo diplomático y de la economía nacional que se les brinde a aquéllas, sean adecuadas y proporcionales a los objetivos políticos de la sociedad. Y también, a las posibles amenazas que tenga que soportar, tanto desde el interior de su territorio como desde el exterior, bien de su región geopolítica como de otras.

Esta capacidad y su actuación en los diferentes casos brotan de una “moral nacional” correcta.

The Will of Defense of a Society.

And the Strategy, the Operational Strategy and the Tactics, as Levels of its Military Actuation

The “will of defense” of a nation is its capacity to cause, create, develop and maintain defense forces. The strength of the defense forces, in turn, rely on the necessary support of the economy of the country and the diplomacy of the state. The will of defense is an expression of the will of being and the vital capacity, even biological, of a society. This concept overcomes and perfects the so called hybrid war or of V generation. That implies and supposes the employment of all his «orthodox and heterodox means of intervention» by the social belligerent group.

As the term implies, will of defense is healthy, normal and sufficient when defense forces and the strength of the country’s economy and the quality of state leadership and diplomacy are proportional and adapted to the political objectives of society. These must also be adequate to the possible threats that the country may have to oppose, both within and out the country, within its geopolitical region or other sources of threat.

This capacity and its performance in different situations stems from a correct “national moral”.

The modern Hybrid Warfare. The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

Now, closing the historical and definer curl, the wars of V generation are called hybrid or multi functional wars, which, really, always have existed. With the major or minor participation of each one of the «available means of intervention» (Foreign Relations, regular and irregular Armed Forces, Economy, Cybernetics, etc) in the social group, to obtain the «functions of intervention» search for. Forming a “means” mix, adapted to all situations and confrontation theaters.

Not for nominating nowadays with an exotic and new word, preferably foreign, one makes this way a «mean or a function of intervention» fresh and promising. The problem is that the ignorance of the history, still the recent one, impoverishes the new concepts, ideas and situations of conflict. Without winning in application, efficiency and cognitive capacity with it. With this, only it falls or repeats the previous history, returning to learn it. And that, as in a spiral screw, only changes the phenomenon temporal «plane of execution«. Where are kept safe and now partly secret, the different «essential parameters» of the phenomena of the conflicts and fights.

La Guerra Híbrida moderna. La Guerra Multifuncional, Total o Multidisciplinar.

Ahora, cerrando el bucle histórico y definitorio llaman guerras de V generación a las guerras híbridas o multifuncionales, que, realmente, siempre han existido. Con la participación mayor o menor de cada uno de los “medios de intervención” disponibles (Relaciones Exteriores, economía, cibernéticos, Ejércitos regular e irregular, etc.) en el grupo social, para conseguir las “funciones de intervención” buscadas. Formando un «mix de medios», adaptado a los distintos teatros y situaciones.

No por nominar hoy en día con una palabra exótica y nueva, preferentemente extranjera, se crea así un “medio o una función de intervención” fresco y prometedor. El problema es que el desconocimiento de la historia, aún la reciente, empobrece los nuevos conceptos, ideas y situaciones conflictivas. Sin ganar en aplicación, eficiencia y capacidad cognitiva por ello. Con esto sólo se incide o se repite la historia anterior, para volver a aprenderla. Y que, como en una hélice helicoidal, sólo se cambia el “plano de ejecución” temporal fenoménico. Donde se mantienen incólumes y ahora ocultos en parte, los distintos “parámetros esenciales” de los fenómenos y epifenómenos de los conflictos y luchas.

Reflections about Spain and Catalonia

The nation is one and unique by essence. And it arises from the commitment of the citizens to live in community. And it is kept and preserves in the defense of this union, which is loved, against his enemies of inside and outside. A nation is provided with one social politics selfconsciousness. And collaborate to create and support it the history, the tradition and the customs, and the own language and moral sense. And contribute secondly to it the own ethnia and the territory, that not always exist, specially the first one. This way, the territory of a country is not a nation. Nor it is not the inarticulate population of a territory under an only one government.

Though the territory that occupies is necessary to give a nation the possibility of supporting a social administrative structure, that guarantees the exercise of his sovereignty. In a nation fit several not antagonists ethnias. Because his base is the life together conviviality, the respect and the rights and duties for all. And so long as they love this «harmonic set» of persons and his well-being, peace and jointly progress destinies.

When the nation is loved by his components and there exists in them the desire to serve and defend her in community, the concept of the mother land appears. Both ideas are interrelated essentially. And, the absence of the patriotism or the shame to practise it by members of a «social political community», leads to the defenselessness and the dismemberment of his nation, in major or minor degree. Being formed then «groups of associate individuals» with dissolvent ideas and interests of the naional group.

It is not of surprising that the Defense Forces of a nation are, as institutions and in his members, which hoist, teach and practise the patriotism, as one of his essential virtues. Because it is possible only to die for what is loved. The Defense Forces of a nation are the specialized set of the «nationals or patriots» for the belligerent and complete Defense of his «national country«.

Reflexiones sobre España y Cataluña

La nación es una y única por esencia. Y surge del compromiso de los ciudadanos de vivir en comunidad. Y se mantiene y conserva en la defensa de esa unión, que se ama, contra sus enemigos de dentro y de fuera. Una nación es dotada de una auto conciencia socio política. Y colaboran a crearla y vertebrarla la historia, la tradición y las costumbres, y la lengua y el sentido moral propios. Y contribuyen en segundo lugar a ello la etnia y el territorio propios, que no siempre existen, especialmente la primera. Así, el territorio de un país no es una nación. Ni lo es la población inarticulada de un territorio bajo un único gobierno.

Aunque el territorio que ocupa es necesario para darle a una nación la posibilidad de mantener una estructura socio administrativa, que garantice el ejercicio de su soberanía. En una nación caben varias etnias no antagonistas. Porque su base es la convivencia, el respeto y los derechos y deberes para todos. Y con tal de que amen ese “conjunto armónico” de personas y sus destinos de bienestar, paz y progreso en común.

Cuando la nación es amada por sus componentes y existe en ellos el deseo de servirla y defenderla en comunidad, aparece el concepto de la patria. Ambas ideas están interrelacionadas esencialmente. Y, la ausencia del patriotismo o la vergüenza de profesarlo por miembros de una “comunidad socio política”, lleva a la indefensión y a la desmembración de su nación, en mayor o menor grado. Formándose entonces grupos de individuos asociadoscon ideas e intereses disolventes del conjunto nacional.

Genesis and practice of the Russian strategy of deep attack.

The Soviets tried to have a scientific unbeatable study for his military art. Like his social economic doctrine was based on the supposedly scientific postulates of Marx and Engels. Taken to the practice by the Bolsheviks led by Lenin. And achieving an undoubted success in the stages of conquest of the Power and his indefinite and ferreous maintenance, the phases of force and oppression, by the central and inevitable postulate of the proletariat dictatorship.

One of the paradigms of his military doctrine was the attack to the deep rearguard of the enemy. That is the low abdomen of his military deployment. There, the units have his refuge, his site to rest and, also, to reform or to be equipped; from there they begin the marches to form his assault deployments near the lines.

To seek for the attack at these enemy areas, without combat availability and much more vast and vulnerable than that he presents near the front, was a characteristic of the military Soviet theory.

We will see here how this was generated and was implemented. Creating for it, the appropriate specialized units and the successive adjustment of the strategic previous ideas. Up to having, in 1944 and until the end of the war, 6 Tanks Armies in the order of battle of the Soviet Army, new name of the Red Army of Soldiers and Peasants. Those were endowed with the most prepared soldiers and the best equipments and logistics support of the USSR.

And we will see how the friction, the failures and the human mistakes, the exhausting efforts of the commands, the central direction without clear and elaborated criteria (inevitable initially to any doctrine) and the climatology, do that the studied and implemented plans are scarcely fulfilled in the practice, after the first days of operations.

Génesis y praxis de la estrategia de Rusia del ataque profundo.

Los soviéticos pretendían tener un estudio científico imbatible para su arte militar. Al igual que su doctrina socio económica se basaba en los postulados supuestamente científicos de Marx y Engels. Llevados a la práctica por los bolcheviques liderados por Lenin. Y logrando un éxito indudable en las etapas de conquista del Poder y su mantenimiento indefinido y férreo, las fases de fuerza y opresión, a través del postulado central e inevitable de la dictadura del proletariado.

Uno de los paradigmas de su doctrina militar era el ataque al interior de la retaguardia del enemigo. Que es el bajo vientre de su despligue militar. Allí, las unidades tienen su refugio, su sitio para descansar e, incluso, para reformarse o equiparse, desde allí comienzan las marchas para formar sus despliegues de ataque.

El buscar el ataque a estas áreas del enemigo, sin disponibilidad para el combate y mucho más extensas y vulnerables que las que presenta junto al frente, era una característica de la teoría militar soviética.

Veremos aquí cómo ésta se generó y se fue implementando. Creando para ello, las unidades apropiadas especializadas y el ajuste sucesivo de las ideas estratégicas previas. Hasta tener, en 1944 y hasta el final de la guerra, 6 Ejércitos de Tanques en el orden de batalla del Ejército Soviético, nuevo nombre del Ejército Rojo de Soldados y Campesinos. Aquéllos estaban dotados con los más preparados soldados y los mejores equipos y logistica de apoyo de la U.R.S.S.

Y veremos cómo la fricción, los fallos y los errores humanos, los esfuerzos agotadores de los mandos, la dirección central sin criterios claros y elaborados (inevitable al principio de toda doctrina) y la climatología, hacen que los planes estudiados e implementados apenas se cumplan en la práctica, tras los primeros días de operaciones.

THE HATE, THE  WAR  AND  THE  EVIL

The Hate is always an untidy passion. What might arise initially in the soul as competition and emulation, ultimately displays as distaste, repugnance or rivalry. It is a primary reptilian feeling of survival, compound or mixed with the dread and the rage towards other one, which is perceived as foreign, different and menacing. So, the hate expresses always as negative and destruction, still potential.

The mental Gordian knot of the hate, only can be cut by the collective overcoming. And this is carried out personally, exercising a broad mindness generosity and the personal effort of overcoming and oblivion the circumstances that shaped «that situation«.

The War arises in the armed collective clash. In the violent dialectics of two social rivals groups. That employ the weapons for the attainment of certain aims, which are exclusive for both.

Other one of the vices that the «civilized» members of the tribes have acquired is the excessive greed. And with her, her corollary and the easy way to satisfy her, the rampant corruption. The social equality in the tribes, his «ideological rough republicanism», was guaranteeing the use and reasonable enjoyment of the resources by all the members.

The Evil is conceptually the lack and the denial of the good, which is the only virtue or effort (as stable and permanent value) that is positive. And the primary negative force that generates the hate in a wide sense, not necessarily violent, is the one that gives force, life and permanency to the evil of the man.

The Evil as concept, as immaterial entity, needs from instrument, a vector, a vehicle, to display in our physical world. And this material vehicle is provided by the untid and uncontrolled passions of the men, already dominated and dragged by the hate and his corollaries passions. In which and by means of them, the Evil displays enslaver, overflowing and superhuman.

The putrid, inhuman, insane ideas come from the sewage, pits and black wells of the human intelligence and soul. And they are the valid, sure and permanent instrument for the periodic manifestation of the Evil within the humanity. This Evil, unattainable for the reason and the human capacities, is the temporal manifestation of the Misterium Iniquitatis.

EL ODIO, LA GUERRA Y EL MAL

El Odio es siempre una pasión desordenada. Lo que podría surgir inicialmente en el alma como competencia y emulación, se manifiesta al final como aversión, repugnancia o rivalidad. Es un sentimiento primario, reptiliano, de supervivencia, compuesto o mezclado con el temor y la ira hacia el otro, que se percibe como ajeno, diferente y amenazador. O sea, el odio se expresa siempre como negatividad y destrucción, aún potenciales.

El nudo gordiano anímico del odio, sólo se puede cortar con la superación colectiva. Y esto se lleva a cabo personalmente, ejerciendo la generosidad de miras y el esfuerzo personal de superación y olvido de las circunstancias que conformaron “esa situación”.

La Guerra surge en el enfrentamiento armado colectivo. En la dialéctica violenta de dos grupos sociales rivales. Que buscan por las armas la consecución de determinados objetivos, que son excluyentes para ambos.

Otro de los vicios que han adquirido los miembros “civilizados” de las tribus es la codicia desmedida. Y con ella, su corolario y su modo fácil de satisfacerla, la corrupción rampante. La igualdad social en las tribus, su “republicanismo ideológico”, garantizaba el uso y disfrute razonable de los recursos por todos los miembros. Y el zakat o limosna canónica musulmana y el apoyo de su colectivo suplían los casos de orfandad, viudedad, enfermedad, calamidades, etc.

El Mal es conceptualmente la falta y la negación del bien, que es la única virtud o esfuerzo (como valor estable y permanente) que es positivo. Y la fuerza primaria negativa que genera el odio en un amplio sentido, no necesariamente violento, es la que da fuerza, vida y permanencia al mal del hombre.

El Mal como concepto, como ente inmaterial, necesita de un instrumento, de un vector, para manifestarse en nuestro mundo físico. Y este vehículo material se lo proporcionan las pasiones desordenadas e incontroladas de los hombres, ya dominados y arrastrados por el odio y sus pasiones corolarias. En las cuales y mediante ellas, el Mal se manifiesta avasallador, desbordante y sobrehumano.

Las ideas pútridas, antihumanas y vesánicas provienen de las cloacas, de los pudrideros y pozos negros de la inteligencia y del alma humanas. Y ellas son el instrumento válido, seguro y permanente para la manifestación periódica del Mal en la humanidad. Este Mal, inasequible para la razón y las capacidades humanas, es la manifestación temporal del Misterium Iniquitatis.

THE SPANISH NACIONAL POLITICS

A STERILE AND INEFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT

The dispersion and inefficiency that the authorities show in the complex labor of uniting the popular wills and in implementing clear policies of reinforcement of the national unity and of control of the hackneyed and unsuccessful ideas of dissolution and substitution of that one, have different original reasons.

A nation does not congregate and galvanize, re-joins and advances with procedure, laws and regulations. Called to juridically confine the public thing. A nation is not governed in times of dangers and incipient decadences only by the economic and accounting ideas and policies. That only serve to create and preserve the material wealth. But that at least nowadays can not avoid the hardness and the cruelty of the phases of crisis and decadence of the economic successive cycles. That literally can crush the collaboration between the social strata and deepen their differences. And these policies are bored, affected and pissquiets. Because the action of the money, which is his essence, has these natural qualities.

This makes and defines a rachitic, defensive politics and without worthy horizons of the best efforts. And, also, serious and reliable of the duty. As serious and reliable were Cervera’s, when they sank his fleet in Santiago de Cuba and Montojo’s, when the same thing happened to him in Manila to his Spanish fleet of the Pacífico, presences.

The lack of virtues in the exercise and the example of the power and the leaders, have drained and withered the right of the country, as political national instrument.

LA POLÍTICA NACIONAL ESPAÑOLA

UN INSTRUMENTO ESTÉRIL E INEFICAZ

La dispersión e ineficacia que demuestran las autoridades en la compleja labor de aunar las voluntades populares y en implementar políticas claras de refuerzo de la unidad nacional y de control de las trasnochadas y fallidas ideas de disolución y sustitución de aquélla, tienen varias causas originales.

Una nación no se congrega y galvaniza, se reune y avanza con normas, leyes y reglamentos. Llamados a encorsertar jurídicamente la cosa pública. Una nación no se gobierna en épocas de peligros e incipientes decadencias solamente con las ideas y políticas económicas y contables. Que sólo sirven para crear y conservar la riqueza material. Pero que ni siquiera hoy en día pueden evitar la dureza y la crueldad de las fases de crisis y decadencia de los ciclos económicos sucesivos. Que literalmente pueden triturar la colaboración entre los estratos sociales y ahondar sus diferencias. Y esas políticas son aburridas, melindrosas y meaqueditas. Porque la actuación del dinero, que es su esencia, tiene esas cualidades naturales.

Esto crea y define una política raquítica, defensiva y sin horizontes dignos de los mejores esfuerzos. Y, también, seria y cumplidora del deber. Como serias y cumplidoras fueron las presencias de Cervera, cuando le hundieron su flota en Santiago de Cuba y de Montojo, cuando le ocurrió lo mismo en Manila a su flota española del Pacífico.

La falta de virtudes en el ejercicio y el ejemplo del poder y de los gobernantes, han drenado y agostado a la derecha cabal del país, como instrumento político nacional.

WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE.

Introduction.

The appearance of the IT treatment of the information supposed a revolution in the capture, production and transmission of the existing or caught information. Whose possibilities and transcendency are still far from know, even in his scope and his limits. The information generated in a battlefield or an operations theatre of is enormous, ephemeral in diverse times, almost immeasurably and fluid. The latter quality is fundamental for the production of the intelligence. That is the information caught by the units and sensors of all kinds and that is digested or prepared by the specific organs (G2, S2 and agencies of intelligence), to create a sufficient, effective, opportune and constant intelligence. That is used by the «advanced users» or commands in the different levels of military action (tactical, operative and strategic).

Since it could not be otherwise, in view of the brief exposed scheme, the IT industry soon found an enormous area of activity and possibilities in the military field. And the high military commands, often in «ad hoc» prepared meetings and coctails, received from the manager directors and chairmen of the branch corporations, animated, brief and exciting presentations of the enormous performances that might give to their units of all the branches, the designed, elaborated and installed softwares and hardwares by these vanguard technical companies. The battlefield or the operations zone (the area, the enemy and I), known, conveyed and controlled in real time by my men!!!

The Support of the military Information Systems.

It is not the case that these new technologies allow to elaborate a complex and integrated weapon system. This already existed before the information age and the electronic existing advances allowed his creation. For example, the AEGIS defense system for ships against aircraft, warships, missiles and submarines was designed, created and installed for the first time in 1973. It is equiped by destroyers and even frigates (in a simpler model) of the USA and his allied nations. And this way they are called the «shields or defenders of the Fleet». In effect, every «naval group» centred and escorting an aircraft carrier and every «naval combined force of strategic projection», rely on several ships provided with the AEGIS system. This consists of a powerful radar of several megawatts of power, capable of catching and continuing up around 200 potential targets, placed at distances of up to 350 km to the installed system.

The caught information goes to a computer center that reports to a decision center. Which arranges the launches of missiles depending on the mission of the group or naval force and the estimated danger generated for him by the target. The system is installed in front of the armoured control center of the ship. That gives the final permission for the launch of the missiles. These are arranged in rows of vertical silos (habitually, are four with 4 missiles each one) placed in the front cover, in the part that was occupying the conventional artillery. The silos are re-fed from the interior of the ship with other missiles after the launches. The missiles are propeled by solid fuel, which allows that they should be smaller than the land launched. And the adjustment of the system is studied for the destruction of the enemy ballistic missiles.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age

The activities that the military men realize in action in front the enemy are numerous, varied and some of them are complex. And all of them demand a sufficient attention from the controls and men. Let us see some of the most significant. Regarding the movement in the ground: to advance, to stop and to move back; so much running as walking, crawling or incorporated, and doing it by jumps or in zig zag. Regarding placing and valueing the environment, hostile or not: to observe, to detect, to process, to decide, to transmit or not the results and to act. Regarding the form of fight (rejection or attack): to hide, to cover and to be protected, to change position, to define well evasive detected targets, to receive the orders of the immediate chief, to attack them with deliberate, rapid, etc. fire, (if it is a question of an infantry). Regarding the communication with his “group” (team, weapon, squad, section): to receive orders and information, to send information and orders, to spread information. And they carry out all this under the uncertainty, the lack of comfort, the tension, the loneliness, even of his companion or buddy, and the fear … The constant and repeated sometimes audio-visual information, that is communicated by the modern digital systems can relieve this physical and psychic load of the soldiers? So to achieve it, would really be of great help for them.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age ARE THEY LOOKING, DECIDING OR FIGHTING?

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age IS IT USEFUL HERE?

To all that, it could join a flood of information, insignificant in this moment for his mission or his immediate action. This can generate an increase of the needs of the attention capacities of the military men. Through the more important senses, the sight and the ear. And to originate a diversion of his effective available attention (if there is), towards external not fundamental or neutral stimuli of the images and the conversations. The system is going to transmit them a clearer and detailed information of the targets, even defining some more ephemeral or veiled. But it will not give them information about the intentions and the mental conditions of the different located enemies and their group. Though the system is served with probabilities, previous experiences, alogarithms and reliable estimations…

A practical Application.

In the new model of fighting, the attacking force would be kept simultaneously dispersed, communicated and informed in real time and looking for and attacking the enemy. It would be the supposed advantages of the swarm and his concentric and simultaneous assault, which would count now with the knowledge of the ground and the enemy, thanks to the multiple sensors and systems and the real, caught and transmitted information (not intelligence) to the units of the force.

Are similar in capacity all the units of the force? Then we are demanding from them that each one acts as a «polyvalent» fraction of the unit, without specializing them. With what they will probably have some specific, quantitatively insufficient capacities. Are specialized the units of the force? Then they will have to rely on the simultaneous concurrence, in the defense and the attack, of several units. That should complement between all the necessary functions of this tasks «group». And if the enemy electromagnetic countermeasures work against the wireless communications and is established a communications «silence»? And if we now do not have the telephony circular network of the unit and do not possess double couriers for the transmission of “parts and orders” to the chief and from the chief?

And if the enemy deploys in the same way as us? So we would come to a general clash of weak individual forces against enemies weak forces individual. As the great units spread out for his fighting form. Clash that would be solved by multiple partial and isolate combats, using the attrition. They would be like the singular combats of champions and leaders, which happened in other times. And would gain those who were finally keeping a major number of valid units. It would be a clash won by pure material wear of means: men, military means and expensive and sophisticated IT material, almost without transcendent application.