The urban effective guerrilla war. Another principal domain for the swarming groups in the networks war theory.

It is not easy to use and defend the urban zones of repulse. Its employment demands high requirements to the rebel combatants:

An enough motivation, which encourages them to follow the arms way and risking their lives for their cause. And appeases and rationalizes them the inevitable fear of the fighting in the close distances with a superior enemy, until the seniority offers to them new impulses.

A good training in the infantry fighting, which gives them trade and confidence. A successful cooperation between the small units that garrison the zones, that guarantees them a cohesion without fissures in their tenuous and lean deployment. And that allows and facilitates the command conduction and the accomplishment of his plans. To get iron nerves tempered by everything previous, that accustom them to fight in solitary or in small groups, refusing to flee in face of the implacable threat of the military heavy fire. For all this, among the few tens of thousands of armed rebels existing, not more than 15% of them can in these moments use this kind of defensive fight. The military networks and the swarming of “small sections” have in these two operational characteristics, their major deficiencies.

These urban irregular enemies are protected extending their defensive positions beyond the necessary in a conventional defense, covering this way a major occupied surface. In the defense zone they establish delaying points, more or less reinforced. These protect the most critical positions of the zone, that incorporate in the defense the buildings with steel structure, specially resistant, and form fire bags to trap the enemy that gets through. The resistance nests have here more importance, provided that the occupation of the zone of defense is more tenuous, that they cannot strengthen the positions too much for covered reasons, the sights are more short and exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delaying points and to them they fall back if are invaded or destroyed. Numerous alternative or extras positions exist, more of the habitual in the urban fighting. This allows to deceive the military enemy about the forward limit of the defense position, its real extension, the limits of the sectors that form it, the intentions of the rebel command of the zone about its defense and to disperse the heavy fire of the attacker. In the edges of the urban zones they never establish these fixed positions. Those are occupied by combat advanced parties, which mission is to receive the possible explorers or civil observers, to avoid surprises and to deceive about the tracing of the defensive zone. The occupants of combat advanced positions, distributed in pairs of sentries and some very small mobile patrols, fall back in their moment towards the more interiors delaying points.

These “fortresses” are diffuse, secret and imperceptible to strangers. In a few hours the previous works are reinforced and occupied. Its communication routes need more working time to get done, but also are less evident. It is necessary to enter the houses to detect perforated walls and to find alleys under a furniture or a carpet. These positions are not complex. They need a few interlaced firing sectors, an immediate protection against the enemy irruption in mass or with elite commands, some covers against the heavy normal fire and a sufficient concealment that covers them from the sights of the enemy probable successive positions and his approximation avenues. The obstacles and the mines, even false in certain percentage and always distantly to not betray them, will serve to break the enemy assault and to offer to them more static targets, for example for the mortars, which will have registered its fires. The destruction that generates the wide heavy fire support without aiming a precise target, reinforces the rebel combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the accesses of the military, except when they are reached by a ordnance direct impact. To operate this defensive structure the rebels have prepared numerous and narrow tunnels, dragging trenches and gaps in garden walls and interior walls of the buildings. In such a way that, away from the enemy sights, allow them to occupy the combat and observation positions at wish, to defend them more or less time or not, to move among them and to reinforce the most threatened or pressed places.

Generally they try to shoot from the front, with isolated or couples snipers armed with the SVD or M-14 sniper rifles, at individual and small groups of enemies. And to attack from the flank or the rear at the enemy units that penetrate in their defensive zone, which already are disintegrated in squads or sections with one or two armored vehicles. Those prepared communications allow them to appear, always in small number, behind or at the flanks of the units, while these stop, regroup, ask or receive instructions, or decide where to advance, and to erode them, causing some casualties. For example, from a basement or a floor, through an irregular hollow in a yard or garden wall, under a parked or destroyed vehicle in the street, where it emerges a narrow tunnel with a covered and disguised exit. From these positions the armed rebels throw some RPG-7V rockets or several short blasts, always aiming, of the RPK light machine gun or the obsolete RPD. The interior houses courts serve them to place the mortars, which constitute their the only “heavy fire” source, protected by an infantry position. They fired them with the maximum angles on the abundant, large and always excessive military concentrations. The usual mortar is the 82 mm. Russian modern M-1937 model. Here that the attacker presents three times more men (in means the proportion must be 20 to 1) neither favors nor facilitates their labor. But this offers the persecuted defender more targets to be able to use his exiguous fire power. Especially because, in a given moment, is small the attackers’ proportion that are putting in real distress the defenders.

Also they possess an effective and increasing anti-aircraft defense of short range. From other courts and roofs, always protected by a nearby infantry resistance nest, several teams of light anti-aircraft rocket shoulder launchers carriers are arranged. Their location in the deployment is done depending on the most probable and most dangerous aircraft approximation directions for the defense. If they are sufficient and shoot skilful, they could use two nearby, but not contiguous launchers, whom form a team, and that shoot successively and rapidly (the SAM-18 flies at 2 Mach) against an aircraft or towards an enemy air formation in immediate approximation to its target. A typical rocket would be the SAM 7, called “grail” and “strela” (arrow) in not Cyrillic Russian. It had successive improvements and today is replaced in the military arsenals by the SAM 18 former mentioned, that has a useful attack height of 3,5 km (the double). And guides, a fuel rocket, an explosive head and a bait detector, all improved. The shoulder shooter limits himself to direct the launcher already loaded towards its target, wait until the missile confirms the target’s acquisition and then squeeze again the trigger. And to get hide.

The crucial moment for the defense comes when the zone commander decides to evacuate it, after having stopped and delayed the enemy for some time. Trying to cause him losses as high as possible, but without been exposed excessively to a fighting at the close distances, or to be outflanked or to lose his freedom of action. This is inexorably tied to the transfer of space to the military enemies. For it the rebels avoid in opportune moment the direct assault of their enemy, not his extensive or vague bombardment. The rebels must have sufficient exit tunnels directed to not very nearby buildings (often official and even respectable (mosques), offices, companies and some houses) or not evident dry riverbeds (wadis) and bushes in the open land. From there they could disperse through the ground in very small groups towards friends reception positions, in the first moments. The protection of the evacuation is therefore vital and both entrances or exits from these tunnels are always covered by resistance nests, which take to end their rigid defense.

All this cohesion, discipline, formation, training and firm and effective command of the irregular classic units, are distant of those of a military lax structure of networks or of the swarming of independent groups over an enemy or defending itself from him. Where are in this new theory, the center of gravity or the reiteration of efforts or the saving and optimization of the material and human means?

The effective operability of the units and small military units.

The war of networks tends to a too extensive subdivision of the military units. Turning out the “little group” or the net “knot”, as tactical independent effective unit (TIEU). With them they would seek to extend the front (so the actions) on a more awkward or passive enemy, to disturb to his command and to alter his plan of fires.

But this is not practical in the operational level of the war.

The subunits tactically related need to have and keep a strip of advance or, at least, the little ones, a direction; a protected and concealed support fires (antitank and anti-aircraft defense and for neutralization and blinding of the enemy); the operational and permanent nearness of a logistic vehicles team, at least for health and to re-put ammunitions; a depth of the deployment, with a certain reserves; and his protection towards the exposed flanks and rear. All this supposes a minimal “tactical entity united and commanded”, to keep both his security and resistance to the surprises, his combative efficiency, his deployment and his capacity of tactical movement.

And that they have to share with their companion units, a part of the fulfillment of the aim of their high command. And to have a combat mission directed on the enemy, as part of the gravit center of the efforts of the “major unit” of her. To avoid that these “group or nude” type units roam through the operational field, without a clear, effective and operatively transcendent intention.

All this reduces capacity and possibilities of employment to the networks and to the clusters of multiple “micro or small independent units”, within the spectrum of the “situations of efficiency” that are raised and offered by the theory.

Here is an example of the correct employ of modern conventional military units. Against a reinforced infantry position that has advanced antitank weapons, a typical defensive zone, if it cannot be outflanked, an enemy dismounted infantry can break through or destroy it. It can be follow by tanks advancing by covered bounds to offer protection and direct fire support. The defender’s antitank will look for a relatively large and protected target, that it can hit from covered positions or, at least, from well-camouflaged positions, that are flanking the armored vehicles. And will fire by batteries with dispersed guns, so that the same enemy heavy fire can not incapacitate them. The infantry’s heavy weapons (machine guns in tripods) neutralize by “sweeping and searching” a more or less narrow frontal zone, that is occupied in depth by small, soft, dispersed targets such as an infantry platoon.

Attacking tanks can use H.E. and H.E.S.H. shells to overcome infantry strong positions and their infantry squads can attack with light machine guns the enemy antitank weapons, to prevent them from sighting or fix a target. All this destruction and neutralization, once irruption is achieved, proceeds in worm-like movements deep into the tactical zone of the assault sector of the interarms unit. Other parts of the enemy’s position that could collaborate in the rejection are blocked by smoke and/or neutralized by indirect fire.

At the same time, advanced observers from artillery and aviation corps will be defining new targets to its units, in addition to those found by assault units along the flanks and deep (through combat exploration) in the advance sector. The criterion of the gravity center of the fire of support at least will be neutralize all the targets that are opposed to the advance towards the enemy position, to the irruption and to the struggle inside the defense position of in the assigned sector. This will facilitate the direct fire and shock produced by the ground attackers, by means of concentrated and precise fire blows.

This optimizes effective action in a given environment at the level of the tactical groups of action or combined arms systems, whose complementariness has been described. In broken, undulating, wooded or urbanized (housings and factories) areas (not necessarily mountainous), the lack of sight control and the abundant “concealing relative heights” reduce the sector of “interfaces of action” with the enemy.

The suitably-sized “combined arms system” continues to be the element of effective action. The action is effected by companies or reinforced interarms platoons, with heavy fire support provided by battalions (medium and heavy mortars). Except in areas that are very flat and with few “sight obstructions”, ground “transitability” (more than simply “ground on going”), which physically limits the possible “interfaces of action” with the enemy, can prevent the fight using concentrated resources that are beyond those of a company. The battalion role will be to reinforce the efforts and distributing supports.

In these cases, existing communication ways, especially those more or less perpendicular to the front, are critical to land actions. Blockading these ways affects tempo (the total speed of the operation) enormously, by the difficulty presented by sloping or obstructed areas that surrounds them (forests, gullies, constructions, un-reinforced fords). The advance slows down or the forces have to be dispersed onto parallel available routes, forcing them to enter other difficult bordering areas.

Otherwise, contingency plans for units must provide for overcoming four types of unforeseen situations that can impede or endanger a mission. These include:

a) Possible direct action by the enemy in using or recovering initiative. This might take the form of an interdiction bombardment or counterattack. The solution is to tactically neutralize his action, without compromising the mission.

b) Possible encounter with the enemy. This could occur during combat exploration patrols or could be confronted by sentries, advanced security forces and advanced detachments and deep exploration patrols. It is necessary to submit or push back the enemy and to rapidly and temporarily change positions or direction, to not compromise the mission.

c) Possible unforeseen obstacles. These could be ditches, slopes of more difficult soil, blown-up bridges, floods, and storms that affect an area’s transitability. It is important to overcome these as rapidly as possible, while maintaining security and extending exploration.

d) Possible defensive/passive action of the enemy. These can take the form of an ambush, minefield, reinforced cut defended by fire, rejection fires of a defense position or antitank obstacles. These must be overcome as soon as possible, as in the case of natural obstacles, to avoid being moved by the enemy in a direction that is favorable to a counterattack or toward a zone covered by artillery or by convergent fires (bag fires zones).

In general terms, including in the commander’s plan, these must always be pursued:

1) To overcome or repel the enemy and/or unforeseen obstacles which hinder one’s forces and provide information to the enemy.

2) Avoid losing resources (or resources that are neutralized, detached or repulsed) that are important for fulfilling the mission. The surviving enemy can use compromising information, but he may receive it too late to be effective intelligence for him.

3) Resources necessary for the mission must be available for its execution. This multiplies efficiency, after commotion and the incident losses, to maintain a high momentum of execution: this being the product of combat capacity by the average speed of movement in a given period and in a certain direction.

The example of the preparation and action of General Patton’s 3^rd American army in counterattacking the German penetration in the Ardennes illustrates the difficulties (its “incident” was a sudden change of mission, direction and execution) and the possibilities gave by the “momentum” of execution.

None of this is improvised. It is the result of practice and is the fruit of frequent training, the organization of work and the coordination of the H.Q. and all commands. These sayings remind us of this: “it is performed as it is trained” and “the man is an animal of habit”.

In practice the degree of general military obtained efficiency, will be determined by the idiosyncrasy of the nation, the character more or less gregarious or independent of her peoples, both her military doctrine and tradition, the defense budgets, her ” national moral”, which feeds and holds her “will of defense”, the political national and international situation, the integration of her institutions and national organisms in the regional or international area, etc.

El jueves 15 de diciembre de 2011 tuvo lugar en Bagdad la ceremonia de arriada y recogida de una bandera de los EEUU (“símbolo de la Nación, una e indivisible, en el respeto a la Ley y a los derechos de todos los ciudadanos”). Con ello se cerraban los fastos de la marcha oficial de las fuerzas militares de ese país en Irak. Tras cerca de 9 años de presencia allí, que costaron la muerte de más de 4800 militares aliados (casi 4500 estadounidenses), los EEUU dejan un Irak algo mejor de como lo encontraron. Pero también puede decirse que no dejan ninguna impronta, marchamo o huella permanentes en ese país. Que marcase o modelase la identidad sociocultural de Irak y que justificase tanta sangre (añadir unos 120 mil iraquíes muertos) y tanto tiempo y esfuerzo económico empeñado (estimado en más de un billón -un millar de millardos- de dólares).

Antecedentes sociales y militares de la guerra asimétrica de Irak.

Durante casi 400 años de dominio turco, el hoy Irak constituyó una de las regiones más atrasadas del Imperio. Estaba formado por tres provincias otomanas, centradas en torno a los centros administrativos y comerciales de Mosúl, Bagdad y Basora. Por el tratado de Sykes-Picot de 1916, ratificado por Churchill en El Cairo en 1922, se concedía a Francia la posesión de El Líbano y Siria, mientras que los británicos obtenían el control sobre Palestina e Irak. Ya en 1919, Arnold Wilson, el administrador civil británico en Bagdad, declaraba que “la unión de las citadas ex-provincias turcas para formar una nación, era una receta para el desastre, porque implicaba que se obligaría a tres grupos étnico-religiosos muy distintos a trabajar juntos, siendo bien sabido que se odiaban mutuamente”.

Las tensiones semipermanentes entre las tres comunidades se refrenaban y controlaban cuando en Bagdad existía un gobierno central fuerte y respetado. Esto equivale a “temible” en lenguaje iraquí. A ello ayudaba la compartimentación geográfica, al estar principalmente localizados, los kurdos en el norte, los sunnitas en el centro del país, con poblaciones en el centro sur, y los chiíes en el centro sur y el sur, con barrios en Bagdad. La falta de una infraestructura viaria y la ausencia de grandes intereses comerciales, consecuencia del subdesarrollo económico, que impulsasen los trasvases de la población rural, colaboraba a mantener firmes los límites demográficos de las distintas tribus en los espacios antes citados.

Quizás a alguno le parezca excesivo pormenorizar ahora en las entrañas del régimen de Saddam. Pero tan pronto como el martes 20 de diciembre, cuando el polvo de la columna estadounidense en retirada a Kuwait aún no había terminado de posarse, ya las estructuras de poder de Irak se conmocionaban. En efecto, algunos de los conmilitones del primer ministro chií Nuri al-Maliki le acusaban ya de “pretender instaurar una dictadura en el mejor estilo de Sadam Hussein al-Tikriti”. Y la violencia sectaria ha vuelto a salpimentar las ciudades de Irak, con una población no debidamente embridada o motivada por el gobierno central chií.

Saddam cumplió un papel integrador de la Gran Mesopotamia, el Irak moderno, durante casi 24 años, hasta abril de 2003. La lealtad de todos los árabes iraquíes estuvo de su lado durante la guerra con Irán de 1980 a 1988. Pero, a la usanza de casi todos los gobiernos islámicos, Saddam gobernaba como un déspota ilustrado moderno, reprimiendo y neutralizando o eliminando cualquier oposición interna, real o posible. Para pervivir y perdurar había que ser leal. Y esto se acreditaba continua y ampulosamente en los gestos, textos e iconografía empleados en el trato oficial y oficioso. El verdadero valor y sentido de las lealtades y los intereses, siempre relativos y aún oportunistas, de los iraquíes, reside en un complicado entramado de tribus y de clanes regionales y aún locales. Esta estructura social vetusta se aglutinaba y reforzaba en el régimen de Saddam con el clientelismo, la corrupción y el compromiso familiar o del clan, enhebrados por la superestructura socio política del laico y anticomunista partido Baaz.

El gran error político estratégico de Saddam fue intentar resarcirse por su papel auto asumido de “gendarme sunní del Golfo Pérsico” (conteniendo las ansias proselitistas radicales y expansivas del clero chií iraní), incorporando Kuwait a Irak por la fuerza en agosto de 1990. Se le puso en su lugar en la guerra de 1991, ya no se volvió a confiar internacionalmente en él y quedó proscrito. Por último, en abril de 2003 se le derrocó en una segunda guerra, para eliminar las armas de destrucción masiva que presumiblemente tenía. Aunque nadie habló de la capacidad real que podría tener para emplearlas: un arma de ese tipo necesita un vector protegido y de alcance suficiente para llegar a dañar a su objetivo. El no encontrarlas significó un fracaso más de los correspondientes servicios de inteligencia militares y para militares. Como lo es el que no hayan detectado la muerte del camarada Gran Líder Kim Jong-il, ya el sábado 18 de diciembre. Sin duda, un ejemplo palmario del “hombre nuevo” de la izquierdona más retrograda, sectaria, dinástica y antigualla internacional.

En aras de esto se sacrificó su capacidad para mantener unido, sin revueltas y funcionando a Irak. Pero hasta 2007 no encontraron los iraquíes y los estadounidenses una fórmula sustitutiva razonablemente eficaz. Ya que el problema creado con la falta de autoridad en Irak, se enconó y magnificó en una larga y dolorosa guerra de guerrillas multipolarizada, con el aumento del tiempo de ocupación foránea ineficaz.

El desarrollo de la ocupación estadounidense y aliada en Irak.

La guerra de 2003, iniciada el 20 de marzo, fue corta, precisa y muy asimétrica. Era un ejército de masas, fuertemente centralizado, aunque estuviera dotado de material y equipo modernos, el que se enfrentaba a un ejército de tercera generación, altamente tecnificado. Si al menos las divisiones iraquíes de los primeros escalones hubiesen tenido suficiente libertad de acción e iniciativa, habrían puesto en algunos aprietos tácticos a las divisiones estadounidenses de ciertos cuerpos de ejército, en su avance con los flancos expuestos y en columnas laxas. Tras la guerra, ganada el 15 de abril, los EEUU, con más de 250 mil tropas sobre el terreno, no saben qué hacer. Y se convierten bastante bruscamente de “liberadores” en fuerzas infieles de ocupación. Y es en estos primeros 4 años de ocupación, cuando se producen la mayor parte de las bajas de civiles y de combatientes irregulares iraquíes y de los aliados en esta guerra.

Los insurrectos iraquíes llegaron a constituir para primeros de 2007 una miscelánea extraña y no miscible. Que sólo permitía las colaboraciones espasmódicas, principalmente logísticas, entre ellos. Las facciones o grupos presentes eran: a) Grupos de al-Qaida con carácter cuasi autónomo, coordinados entonces por Abu Ayyub al-Masri. b) Baazistas (el partido tenía milicias que Saddam activó militarmente poco antes del ataque) y antiguos miembros leales de su ejército y administración. c) La red de resistencia nacional sunní, llamada “ahl al-thiga”, de la que se conocía muy poco, integrada principalmente por ex-miembros de la administración y del ejército anteriores y contrarios al ex-presidente. Que fueron despedidos con sabiduría excesiva por el estadounidense tecnócrata, metido a político, el cuestionable Paul Bremer. Sin mediar para ello ningún cargo o proceso penal contra los depurados tan abruptamente. A la que se unieron después patriotas y religiosos iraquíes y jóvenes desempleados, todos irritados ante la prolongación de la ocupación y el buen hacer de las fuerzas de la coalición. d) Las milicias socio religiosas locales y regionales de sunníes y chiíes. Una de las más renombradas era el Ejército del Mahdi, con menos de ocho mil hombres armados de muy variada y pobre formación militar, del clérigo chií Muqtad al-Sadr. e) Voluntarios islámicos de varios países, que formaron la principal cantera de los terroristas suicidas voluntarios, generalmente sunníes. f) Grupos locales de jefes de clanes y señores de la guerra, haciendo valer sus derechos político económicos. Por ejemplo, en la primavera del 2004, el gobernador iraquí de al-Qadisiya, más extensa que Extremadura y con unos 800 mil habitantes, donde estaban nuestras bases de Diwaniya, su capital, desertó y formó una banda de unos 40 seguidores, para hacer valer sus derechos. g) Miembros activos de las agencias de inteligencia de, al menos, Siria e Irán. h) También se detectaron bandas de criminales comunes.

A primeros de 2007, el general de 4 estrellas David Petraeus, con su cambio de estrategia político militar, comienza a pacificar el país. Se acerca a los insurrectos sunníes, mencionados en los apartados B, C y D y a sus tribus. Éstas eran ignoradas hasta entonces, por constituir “reliquias sociales superadas por la democracia inorgánica”, que no las necesitaba. Y los incorpora, en un gran esfuerzo social, a la vida del país. Las bandas de insurrectos son convertidas en “milicias de auto defensa” tribales regionales, patrocinadas por los EEUU, saltándose la cadena de mando política y militar iraquí. Su misión será principalmente controlar y sofocar en sus áreas demográficas, las acciones de los insurrectos citados en A y E, es decir, al-Qaida y sus recidivas terroristas. Y los sunníes, que habían rehuido siempre su participación en la política nacional, son convencidos de las ventajas de también hacerlo. Es el famoso “Despertar Sunní”. Y desde 2008, los muertos militares y civiles de la guerra irregular caen en picado y se mantienen controlados durante otros 4 años.

Este giro fundamental le brindó un respiro profundo a Obama. Y le permitió “maquillar” su retirada militar del país ante su opinión pública. La situación social está relativamente tranquila y el poder político queda en manos de un régimen bastante representativo del pueblo. Pero, como dijo el secretario de Defensa Leon Panetta en la ceremonia de retirada en Bagdad, “Irak va a ser puesto a prueba (ahora) por el terrorismo y por las dificultades económicas y sociales no resueltas”.

El lastre socio político militar de los estadounidenses en la guerra de guerrillas de Irak.

Para ellos, el dinero es una cuestión estratégica secundaria y fácil de dar. Y siempre ha sido así. En la II guerra mundial sufragaron en parte los esfuerzos de guerra de las otras naciones aliadas. En Irak compraron desde 2007 a clanes sunníes, con soldadas y contribuciones a fondo perdido. Para alejarlos de Al-Qaida y de la rebelión promovida por el Partido Baaz y por los funcionarios y militares iraquíes. En Vietnam apuntalaron durante años el régimen del Sur, incapaz de entusiasmar y arrastrar a su pueblo a la defensa firme y comprometida de un régimen libre nacionalista democrático (con todos sus defectos de gestación y parto), sobre el que pesó la incapacidad y la falta de probidad de sus políticos. Pero con dinero se compran voluntades, mientras fluye la liquidez. Pero nunca se adquieren lealtades, ni amistades, ni simpatizantes. Y ahora, el pueblo estadounidense, plagado con la adherente y compleja crisis económica, con la falta de mando político eficaz, con los costes de las guerras contra el terror (se habla de más $1,6 billones gastados hasta ahora en Irak y Afganistán), está cansado de las acciones exteriores y lo refleja continuamente en las encuestas. Como en los viejos tiempos, en otras crisis, un país que es casi un continente, se repliega hacia él mismo.

(CONTINUARÁ)

Los talibán matan por primera vez a un militar español en combate”. “El chaleco antibalas no salvó al sargento en la guerra afgana”. Eran algunos de los titulares de los periódicos españoles, a su desarrollo de la noticia de la muerte del sargento Joaquín Moya en un tiroteo con el enemigo el lunes 7 de noviembre. Los hechos ocurrieron al noreste de Ludina, en uno de los tramos más peligrosos de la ruta Lithium. Ésta une Qala-i-Naw con Bala Murghab, en la provincia de Badghis, siguiendo un trazado orientado al noreste por el interior de ella. Y cerrando un rectángulo con la vieja Carretera Circular, que une por el sur ambas poblaciones.

¿Qué pasó? ¿Qué está pasando? ¿Cómo reacciona nuestra “retaguardia de apoyo”?¿Apoyamos y apreciamos de verdad a nuestros militares?

Ante la muerte del sargento, también se habló de que la familia ha pedido al presidente Rodríguez Zapatero, que dé “explicaciones” por la muerte del único soldado que matan en un tiroteo en Afganistán. Así, “María Dolores, una cuñada de Joaquín Moya, se ha mostrado enormemente “dolida”. Y en declaraciones a ELMUNDO.es de Andalucía ha lamentado que el jefe del Ejecutivo apruebe que soldados españoles acudan a países como éste “a ayudar”, porque entiende que los llevan a “que los maten”. De ahí que haya exigido que el presidente del Gobierno ofrezca las “explicaciones” que entienda que ha de dar a una familia destrozada”.

Y estos casos variados y cambiantes en características, lugares y tiempos ocurren a diario. A mediados de diciembre pasado, una columna del Ejército Nacional Afgano, reforzada por fuerzas españolas, en marcha por la ruta Lithium, fue atacada por los talibanes cerca del desfiladero de Sang Atesh, al norte de la provincia de Badghis. Unos 40 tiradores talibanes les atacaron hacia 6 de la madrugada, desde posiciones fijas ligeramente reforzadas, en un punto situado a unos 60 Km. de la base española de Qala-i-Nao y a unos 110 de Herat. La sección española reforzada con ingenieros, fuerte en unos 50 hombres, que forma parte del llamado Equipo de Reconstrucción Provincial, tuvo que responder al enemigo con el fuego de sus vehículos ligeros blindados. La escaramuza duró una hora y terminó con la llegada de los helicópteros artillados Mangosta italianos, que hicieron romper el contacto al enemigo. Era cuestión de detener la misión y volver a la base. Y tras la retirada de los helicópteros, un grupo de media docena de insurrectos volvía tirotear a la columna en marcha retrógrada. Todos recordamos también el vídeo colgado de Internet y las fotos publicadas en Interviú, donde una patrulla de caballeros paracaidistas legionarios mandada por un sargento, fuerte en total en una sección, se atrincheraba y era hostigada a distancia por los talibanes, en un sector de esta carretera secundaria.

La propaganda constituye un objetivo estratégico básico de los insurrectos, al que colaboran entusiasmados las agencias y los medios occidentales. Cualquier ataque rebelde con éxito o llamativo es inmediatamente retransmitido al mundo. Esto debilita siempre la voluntad de permanencia de las fuerzas de la ISAF, los EEUU y sus aliados. Sus legiones, llamadas por sus casas, quieren regresar, para gozar del consumo variado y superfluo del mercado global y las vacaciones exóticas. Las madres espartanas, algo impensable hoy en día, les decían a sus hijos cuando salían de campaña, al llegar la estación benigna y abandonar los cuarteles de invierno: “vuelve con el escudo o sobre el escudo”. El escudo era suficientemente extenso y recio como para servir de camilla a un herido o a un muerto. Y cuando huían, el escudo grande y pesado de los hoplitas griegos, capaz de resistir las acometidas tremendas de las sarisas o largas picas de 5 m., armas principales de sus falanges, era un estorbo y lo desechaban.

Aquí tenemos muchas decenas de miles de militares de todas las Armas, incluyendo la Guardia Civil. Pero, salvo con ésta, por su relación de cercanía y función de seguridad pública, parece que la sociedad española no sabe bien qué hacer o qué decir de sus militares. Los cuarteles están a mucha distancia anímica de nuestras casas. A los militares los admiramos por su gallardía, seriedad y disciplina, que solamente nos exhiben en los pocos desfiles que les permitimos. A sus muertos los despedimos rápida y oportunamente en dirección a su sepelio íntimo y la tumba familiar.

Esta disfunción social que rompe el verdadero tejido nacional, forma parte de la ideología decimonónica de la izquierdona más rancia, sectaria y rencorosa que aún se arrastra por la Europa, ya libre de doctrinas totalitarias inhumanas. Su “ideal” sigue siendo el Ejército Rojo de Obreros y Campesinos (en ruso RKKA, Raboche-Krestiánskaya Krásnaya Ármiya), controlado por los comisarios políticos, no por sus mandos naturales. Esto choca de frente con el principio del mando único y capacitado. Que es el que vertebra y ensambla toda la capacidad e idoneidad de las unidades, desde sus suboficiales a sus jefes y altos mandos. Aunque muy pocos europeos, salvo los del Komintern y de algunos países ocupados, se alistaron voluntariamente en sus filas durante la Gran Guerra de la Patria.

¿Cómo actúa el enemigo?

Las operaciones de combate de las guerrillas y bandas relativamente experimentadas tienen ciertas características distintivas. Una es la planificación detallada y cuidadosa de los combates decididos. En el plan se dan las instrucciones más o menos elaboradas y extensas para el ataque a los objetivos designados. También se suelen designar objetivos alternativos. Su función es permitir la flexibilidad de las subunidades irregulares, para adaptarse y aprovechar los cambios posibles, pero no previstos, en el desarrollo de la situación táctica. Incluso, a veces, se prevén otras operaciones destinadas a explotar y ampliar la ventaja adquirida. La inteligencia, que es la información detectada, elaborada y transmitida, iluminará y facilitará la planificación. En cada operación hacen un esfuerzo especial de exploración, para actualizar y precisar las condiciones tácticas objetivas. Que complemente y verifique el flujo normal de información que reciben de los observadores y los colaboradores “part time” o los civiles afines.

Esta planificación centralizada de los mandos regionales se plasma y concreta en una ejecución descentralizada todo lo posible. Las subunidades a cargo del mando táctico pueden ir desde un “arma automática de pelotón o SAW y su defensa de tiradores”, hasta una “sección reforzada” de éstos. Aquéllas “atacarán” el objetivo convergiendo desde sectores o fajas diferentes, enjambrándose en torno a él. Pero no todo son acciones “violentas”: en lontananza puede moverse un grupo más o menos sospechoso, mientras que un equipo ametrallador completo toma posiciones, enfilando los movimientos amplios y evidentes de la plétora de tropas regulares de patrulla o en “ejercicios” de entrenamiento de afganos o en prácticas propias.

La sorpresa, que es un multiplicador eficaz de la “capacidad de combate” específica de una unidad dada, es empleada continua y sistemáticamente por los combatientes irregulares. Así, ocurre que, “por este valle amplio, ocre y árido nunca nos han atacado”, porque las montañas que lo enmarcan están a 300 o 400 m. en el horizonte. Bueno, pues hoy te van a atacar con ráfagas cortas (2 o3 disparos) de ametralladora con bípode, cuando avances desparramado por aquél, ofreciendo múltiples blancos al enemigo tenaz, curtido y venenoso.

Otra característica típica de las guerras afganas es que los rebeldes irregulares no se empeñan en la defensa de sus posiciones detectadas. Una vez conseguido el hostigamiento del enemigo y extendidos el daño, la mutilación y el estupor sobre los militares, aquéllos se retirarán. No son tan tontos como para esperar impávidos el fuego pesado, preciso y arrasador regular. Ni para presumir de “bravos”, “corajudos” u otras “etiquetas consoladoras”, frente a enemigos con armas de alcance y características superiores y capaces de convertir un blanco de superficie en zona de destrucción. Estos gestos de valor (?) se los dejan para los soldados regulares.

Por último, están el tiempo y su corolario, la oportunidad. Los talibanes manejan muy bien los tiempos tácticos y operativos. Son maestros de la paciencia, la espera, la repetición de los ensayos, simples y sencillos. El tiempo, como variable universal independiente, tiene su complemento y realización práctica en la oportunidad. Sólo cuando las condiciones de una “correlación de fuerzas” muy elemental les son favorables, actúan tácticamente. Incluso se permiten realizar acciones sucesivas o simultáneas en un área dada, para saturarla con sus efectos. Del suicida no hablamos, porque es de un solo uso y casi siempre optimiza bien su tarea prevista.

El tiempo sicológico lo tienen ganado los rebeldes afganos. Los occidentales buscamos que los resultados sean fáciles y rápidos de conseguir. Para aquéllos, el tiempo como condicionante no existe. Viven en el aquí y el ahora, en unos momentos que se concretan en esperar, en andar, en pelear, en comer, en dormir. El tiempo estratégico también lo tienen ganado los afganos irregulares. Porque su enemigo principal y poderoso tiene fecha de caducidad: el 2014. Y el tiempo sicológico les hace más llevadera la espera, como resultante de infinidad de momentos vividos.

En cuanto al combate por el fuego de armas ligeras y medias, los guerrilleros no se acercan demasiado. Son gentes menos entrenadas y equipadas que los militares profesionales. Actúan hostigando al bulto. Sus armas personales más frecuentes, los AK en sus variantes 47 y M no son precisas más allá de los 150-175 m., en tiro filante. El fuego de morteros resulta impreciso y esquivable contra una patrulla montada. Sin embargo, para los civiles y para el tránsito de vehículos y mercancías estas técnicas de ataque son suficientes y eficaces. El arma más temida de los talibanes es el iluminado fanático suicida. Que busca como credencial para el Jardín de las Huríes, el llevarse consigo el mayor número de enemigos muertos y mutilados. El atacante podrá ser un loco religioso, pero no es un tonto. Los suicidas no atacan las posiciones militares preparadas. Dotadas en su perímetro defensivo de complicadas alambradas, fosos, paredes, espacios entre obstáculos, alarmas, deflectores de explosiones, patrullas fijas y móviles. Porque saben que la explosión se disipará en el aire y que no le dejarán acercarse a las garitas o a las torres de vigilancia, porque ya están esperándole. Las armas principales del suicida no son su cinturón o chaleco explosivo, son la sorpresa, la libertad de acción, la iniciativa y su desprecio de la vida por la causa.

El procedimiento para atacar una posición débilmente defendida o sin ánimos de lucha suele ser éste: Bombardean de madrugada con fuego pesado de lanzacohetes fijos, luego se acercan para emplear los morteros. Por fin, el asalto lo realizan varias escuadras independientes que convergen, avanzando y disparando ráfagas de AK y ametralladora RPD o PK y, desde algo más atrás, los lanzagranadas RPG y RL. Sólo disparan sobre blancos comprobados o desde arriba y desde abajo. Con ello evitan todo lo posible los daños del fuego amigo.

La Lucha contra los talibanes y las bandas no ideológicas.

El único modo de defenderse de estas partidas insurrectas es privándoles de la iniciativa, dislocando sus movimientos entre posiciones y hacia objetivos, esquilmando su retaguardia operativa, quitándoles la libertad de acción y demostrando al pueblo quiénes tienen los medios y la determinación para ganar la guerra, apoyando a su gobierno y autoridades. Defenderse no es dejarse reducir o arrinconar en las guarniciones, por la actuación y la extensión de las bandas. Guarniciones que se convierten en enormes y costosos “depósitos protegidos” de materiales y hombres sin utilizar. Esto es dejarse oxidar, desmoralizar y enervar por el enemigo móvil, activo y muy asimétrico.

En estos momentos, en Afganistán se están usando modernos sistemas de combate de infantería, no los mejores y más caros en todos los casos, en misiones de patrullaje rutinario y/o demostrativo, de enlace entre puestos y posiciones y de escolta o apoyo a las columnas de marcha del ejército afgano. Gran parte de las características de estos vehículos, sobran para estos usos. Ya que no son empleados siquiera para la exploración y el reconocimiento de las vías por delante de aquéllas. O como vanguardias de combate, para asegurar pasos y parajes comprometedores. Los VCI son buscados como habitáculos protegidos para escuadra o pelotón, dotados de suelos altos construidos como poliedros convexos, destinados a reflejar las explosiones de los artificios explosivos improvisados, y como plataformas de tiro rápido para rechazar a los irregulares hostiles.

Las sucesivas noticias que vamos recibiendo desde las zonas de operaciones de guerra en Afganistán, procedentes de periodistas insertados en las fuerzas combatientes, de los corresponsales destacados en Kabul y otras poblaciones y las que emiten los ejércitos en presencia, van destilando una serie de características que son comunes a las fuerzas de los distintos ejércitos. Todos van cayendo en la tendencia iniciada por los estadounidenses de tener al enemigo menos cerca, más visto y observado y más batido por el fuego pesado aéreo y artillero.

No se busca con éste, en orden creciente de efectos, perturbar, cegar o neutralizar, sino destruir. Que es el más costoso (bueno para el complejo industrial correspondiente) e improbable de sus efectos (al 100%), lo que exige un gasto incrementado deficiente de recursos. Y no existe siempre su conexión directa con las maniobras ofensivas de las fuerzas terrestres. Que muchas veces no acuden a batir al enemigo quebrado tras el golpe múltiple de fuegos. El fuego pesado se ha convertido en un sustituto económico (el esfuerzo militar se cambia por dólares) e industrial de las maniobras y los ataques de las fuerzas terrestres.

Y la razón de todo esto la saben los talibanes: el horror al riesgo y a asumir bajas.

An Innovation or a Rhetorical Redundancy?

In the last five-year periods diverse theories are appearing on the action of military units in networks, or forming a “cluster”, around a slower tactical aim This with minor combative alert and/or deficiencies in exploration or intelligence and with worse shooting sectors for his rejection fires. An analysis of his mechanisms and operations demonstrates that they really lack the structural originality and the wide combative efficiency that they raise and offer.

The operational of the “netwars” and the “clusters” of small units of action.

The “little groups” that would create the hived of erosive actions on the enemy or the “networks” that wrap, scourge and/or isolate the goal, not always are or have to be such “small units” “almost independent”. An example of the efficiency of the centripetal action of a whole Army, maneuvering on the enemy by Army Corps, in an dislocating and constrictive action, is the battle of Ulm.

In September, 1805 Napoleon moved his “Army of England” to the Rhine, deploying his 208000 men between Mainz and Strasbourg and renamed he the “Great Army”. The French “Grande Armée” was formed by 145000 infantrymen and 38000 troopers, joined 7 Army Corps, each one at the orders of a French marshal, a great cavalry reserve commanded by the marshal Prince Murat and the Imperial Guard, directly under Napoleon; to them 25000 allied Bavarians were added.

Taking as usual in him the initiative, Napoleon decides to give the first strategic blow against the army of 72000 Austrians that, at the orders of the general Mack and the archduke Fernando, son of the emperor Francisco II, was advancing towards Ulm, without waiting the arrival of help from their allied Russian.

Napoleon is going to use against the Austrians what we can call an operational effort of gravity center. It would form, if you like so, a network. But an immense network with very fat knots. Whose “singular functioning”, already was satisfactorily and profitably offering and explaining by the operational strategy. The characteristics of the process of establishment and functioning of it are the originality, the flexibility of the deployment, the consistency, its not predictability by the enemy and the efficiency.

The operational gravity center supposes the centripetal action of all the means and their lines of action, of the “branched out” activity of all the units and services. Not necessarily coincidental, but convergent and resultant in their synergy, in their efficiency and in the result. By means of the different and coordinated lines of advance or of action, we induce uncertainty and insecurity in the enemy, disperse his rejection capacity and disturb his Defense Plan and its systematic conduction by his commands.

In an ample advance of his independent Army Corps, the Grande Armée (around 210000 men) quickly crossed the center of Germany, from the Rhine to the Danube, between September, 25 and October, 6. With this, it operationally interposed between the Austrians (about 40000 men) and their allied Russian forces that went to help them. The Austrians did not understand the need of the rapidity of the movements, thinking only about the battle, as the only instrument of the decision. The French initiated the crossing of the Danube on October 7, 1805 and, during the following week, Napoleon converge most of his Army Corps in an enormous restricting spiral on Ulm, while a Corp with enough forces watched for the arrival from the east of Russian General Kutuzov.

General Mack made, in vain, several attempts at rupturing Napoleon’s forces, applying his greatest efforts in Haslach and Elchingen. Both Austrian commanders quarreled among themselves and Archduke Fernando, with his 6000 troopers, separated from the main force and tried to escape to the northeast. But Archduke Fernando’s forces were surrounded and beaten by the cavalry Corps of Murat, near Trochtelfingen. Another 12000 Austrians surrendered in Neustadt.

General Mack and the rest of his men (about 27000, after the mentioned battles), with Napoleon’s overwhelming forces at the doors of Ulm since October, 14, came out the city and laid down their weapons at the feet of mounts Michelsberg. The capitulation was signed by General Mack on the 20th. The campaign, without properly battles, cost Austria more than 50000 men (around 70%) of her initial forces of about 70000 troops.

The explanation of this Napoleon’s paradigmatic success, being served the habitual theories of the war, the exploitation of the human weaknesses (emotional intelligence) and the “correct sense” of the command, seems to us more natural, appropriate and established.

The subversive Islamic networks. The case of al-Qaida. His real “military” operational.

The operational actual characteristics are:

His unnecessary and indiscriminate brutality, which discredits them with his religion. We can mention a minimum of 4 important moral “aleyas”or verses, that they despise and disobey, without Allah had changed these for them. Sura 2, aleya 100 “We do not abrogate any verse of this book, or we will not make erase one alone of your memory, without replacing it by an equal or better other one”.

The absolute absence of venerable and pious ulemas and muftíes at his side. These are the doctors of the Koranic Islamic Law and of the Sunna.

His great operational decentralization because the universality of the Umma, which comes out the idea of nation or race. This prevents them from obtaining permanent strategic aims. Though his punctual actions are important, painful and fearsome.

This way, his fighting area is tactical, using “actions of bite and flee”. Which, paradoxically are very similar to those of the regular armies who fight them. That, avoiding the personal risks and the close distances fighting, use their elite forces in “actions of hunt, capture and extraction or death”. And use their “drones”, as expression of their confidence in their technological support. This is the military reason of the lack of efficiency of the western soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan. And not mixing in a superior aim at operational level, the different and costly actions that carry out in these countries. Which deprives of real results the labors of education, social and civil development and pacification of their governments and the foreign military forces and expatriated civilians. Since those need the complementarity of the military victory and the progressive physical and/or social isolation of the radical rebels, to be effective and permanent.

The accumulated cost of the military American interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (so called “war against the terror”) was till now 2,2 trillions of dollars. This bleeding throughout a decade to the income of the USA Administration, has specially helped to increase the deficit of his National Debt. And to giving reasons to the Obama Administratiion to initiate an extraordinary political and strategic retreat, “to attend now to the things at home” and “to limit ourselves to the war against al-Qaida”. Without leaving our allies and friends, of course.

And his action primer element is the terror. This way, his victory is thanks to those they can terrify or, at least, worry very much. And in the plethoric and slightly effective mobilization of the economic and social resources of the enemy nations. And, because the major vigilance, capacity and means of the western countries, they do not hesitate to operate against other Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, etc.

His failure in active and firmly joining to a social wide group, which would gives coverage and permanent impulse to his movement. The most mentally ill activists are in the habit of being isolating progressively from society (at least, emotional and ideologically), though they “live” within her. For the sake of his violent methods, to which they sacrifice everything for the efficiency. They follow a process of segregation, purification (in his unexpected not orthodox rites they fast, use water of sacred places and green streamers with inscriptions of the verses that favor they), consecration and radicalization. Up to coming to the death and even to the suicide in his punctual actions.

His zeal for advertising, to which the West contributes insensitively, stupidly and tast.

His aim to strike all governments, as the radical and aggressive caliphate in “dar-el–Islam” (Muslim integrated independent lands) does not exist nowadays.

Al-Qaida is an Islamic radical movement organized vertically and from below to above, that spreads and makes concrete in his “franchise swarms”. His structure, flex, decentralized, release, makes that his “cells” do not know exactly which are the higher chiefs. They only know where they have to go to receive support or to send or receive information or to communicate with another “equal” cell. The high commands of this movement act by exception, not by presence or by deliberate action.. This way, they give doctrinal orientations, establish great lines of military and proselytizing action for the different territories and areas, they throw threats and notices to the enemy governments and indicate punctual important aims (seudo strategic) at the level of the whole organization, though they should be realized in a given area. This allows them to work enough good, without the intervention of their high commands. Among these chaps or “barons of the fanatical death”, are Addel Malek Droukdel, leader of al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghrib, and Abu Bakar Bashir, called the “clergyman militiaman”, founder of the Jeemah Islamiya or al-Qaida of Indonesia and condemned in June, 2011 to 15 years of prison in his country. The “martyrdom” of Ayman al-Zawahiri al-Masri (the Egyptian), former “managing director” of Bin Laden, in a bombardment with drones or ordnance, would affect little to their efficiency, at their current levels of military irregular action.

How work the networks and the swarms of small units and in which circumstances?

The battle of mount Majuba (February 27, 1881) was a case of effective employment of the “small independent units”. That hived on an enemy conventional unit, type battalion, and destroyed he, finishing with it the First Boer War.

At the end of this, general Colley directed a small British army to Transvaal territory. Here he decided to occupy Majuba’s extinct volcano with 600 m. height and that was dominating the right exposed flank of the camp of wagons (laager) of the Boers. The British force was consisting of approximately 650 men, integrated in 4 companies from different regiments, and lacking field artillery and machine guns. They occupied the flat summit, which was free and established positions in her, in his edges and in the south base of the height, to protect their retreat to the nearby base of mount Prospect.

Though surprised, when the Boers verified the absence of artillery of the British, they prepared to recover the mountain. To their favor they had the total knowledge of the area and their great mobility in it. The mount was formed by alternative strata of schists and limestone, with deep gullies and masses of rocks and thick bushes of dark mimosa. With what the sights of the different defensive British sectors were intermittent and of short range. All this was ought to the independent and irregular character of the Boers shooters and riders. That, even, were feeling free to move to any part of a battlefield, where they believed themselves more useful. Till then, the Boers were keeping a defensive strategy in the war.

The first group of 50 men came to the Majuba’s north slope and were taken by the “general” Smit round the hill, to its south side, to fix the British placed there. Boers’ clusters were appearing from all the sides and continued waiting for their chiefs’ arrival for directing them. Approximately 150 Boers began to climb over the hillsides in different moments, while a similar number was supporting them with a neutralization fire on the edges of the summit. The men who were rising were gathering in independent clusters. In them, a part of the Boers was climbing from a refuge or concealment to other one, whereas other part was offering to them a barrier of gunfire. The latter part, under the protection of the first one, was climbing then up to the last reached level. This work of approximation to the top extended for approximately 6 hours.

The British were kept under cover in the edges, but soon they realized that the enemy was approaching below them. The first assault crowned in the west side. The company of 92º infantry regiment of lieutenant Hamilton began to be attacked from the front and its reverse. Some subunits kept as reserves in the center of the small plateau were advanced to the west. The British were keeping their disciplined fire by volleys. The Boers were shooting individually, resting on ground and loading and began another shooting cycle. The British moved back towards the center of the position. Some Boers, which were coming almost to the top from the west, moved to the north and also attacked the right enemy flank. Others reached also the top from the south, also attacking lined up to the left flank.

The British tried then the break for the south side, lowering in a hurry and taking the way to mount Prospect. In the pursuit there took place the majority of his casualties. The British suffered 96 dead, 132 injured and 56 prisoners. The Boers had 1 dead and 5 injured men. Several are the operative and tactical mistakes of the Red Coats in this final campaign of the war: to lack campaign artillery to beat the camp of the Boers, that had served them to repel to the “clusters” enemy that were appearing in the top; his shooting technique was ineffective against fleeting and dispersed targets; they were not knowing and did not explore the area in which the battalion spread out; the Boers, as all the irregular soldiers, highly displease the close combat and/or by the bayonet, but, in this case, they did not avoid and used it, which surprised the enemy.

But also, this approximation work to the assault distances and without losses of the own combat capacity, can be perfectly realized by many military “action units”, without engineers’ training. Divided in teams and still in men pairs or buddy teams, they can take advantage of small drops, flooded fields, verges, ditches, bushes zones, ravines, etc., and even with the concealment of the night and/or the smokes. To close on the enemy and realize an non too deep incursion or to reach his flanks or his rear, even slipping between his combat positions. And though the enemy is strengthened and provided with heavy fires, it can be done by more upbringing and trained units. For it is necessary to have and to keep a previous exploration of the enemy, his movements and habits. The employment of the grenades and not the individual fires of is fundamental to confuse the sentries and the enemy combat positions, of the scope and intentions of the attacker.

Also the war networks and the military clusters can work in favorable circumstances with cavalry irregular mobile forces. An example is the battle Carras (in Latin, Carrhae, nowadays, Harran, in Turkey), where the Partian archers riders of the general Surena defeated the triunviro Marco Licinio Craso and his Roman legions in 53 B.C. The Roman army of approximately 39 thousand men, only was possessing 4 thousand light infantry or vélites and 4 thousand riders. Craso penetrated in the northen plains of Syria in pursuit of the enemy, who was refusing the fight. Finally, near Carras the battle raised up, in an area totally favorable to the cavalry.

The Romans formed a defensive rectangle, which was surrounded by the Partian cavalry, that only the Scitians overcame they in quality and capacity. After some initial skirmishes with the vélites, the Partians were hived on the formed infantry. And they began a long harassment from the effective shooting distance of their arrows and lances, out of the range of the Roman pila and gladius. The legionary deployment faced a dilemma: if they were keeping such closed formations, they would end hurt by the enemy missiles, and, if they were trying to charge on them, breaking a little their formation, simply they were avoiding by them. The Partians squadrons were attacking following a given direction. His riders were approaching by rows, were throwing his missiles and were moving back to his rear following their sides, in an endless and infernal cycle. The harassment lasted up to the dusk.

During the night, a part of the legions sheltered in Carras. The following day, they continued their retreat up to the nearby Armenian mounts, where the cavalry had a difficult area. Surena offered to negotiate to Craso. But, during the negotiations it arose a fight and Craso was dead. After this, the remains of the Roman army dispersed or gave up themselves. Only approximately 5 thousand men came back to their departing camps, approximately 10 thousand were caught and the rest was dead. After this experience, the Romans progressively increased the cavalry of their armies and legions. And at the beginning of the 4th century A.D., she supposed 25 % of their forces.

The one that believes that in similar circumstances, favorable to the mobile swarms and with direct effective fire capacity, these results always repeat, can be wrong. In effect, on the 27th and 28th of October, 1942 in the Egyptian desert a series of comat meetings took place between German and Italian units of the Afrika Korps and 2 º battalion of the brigade of Rifles of the British army. This one took fixed positions in an opened place called Snipe, at the west of the Kidney hill. With the reinforcement and concealment of the positions and the support of a group of 19 6 pounds (53 mm.) antitank cannons, the Britishs could surprise their enemies on their limits and location, reject several direct assaults of the tanks of the Afrika Korps and resist several bombardments of artillery and assault cannons.

At the end of the second day of combats, the Germans left their attempts of squashing and invading the Snipe position. They had lost in them more than 50 diverse armored vehicles. Snipe was resisting and was kept. Though a third of the garrison had fall and only had 6 useful antitanks. Almost all the Bren machinegun vehicles of the battalion were destroyed. Finally, the Britishs left the position and withdrew.

The circumstances and the epochs that can favor the “units clusters” or the networks war are very selective and exclusive. This way, the own theory, though correct, is at least insufficient and not much elaborated and, therefore, probably unnecessary. In effect, any new theory that looks for his implantation, respect and acceptance, must explain satisfactorily all the aspects known about a given phenomenon (the tactics, the logistics, the operational level, etc). This is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. And, here his innovation and principal value will reside, it must make clear new ways of approximation and advance to a major knowledge and domain of the mentioned phenomenon.

(to be continued)

¿Novedad o Redundancia Retórica?

¿Cómo funcionan las redes y los enjambres de pequeñas unidades y en cuáles circunstancias?

En la batalla del monte Majuba (27 de febrero de 1881) se dio un caso de empleo eficaz de las “pequeñas unidades” independientes. Que se enjambraron sobre una unidad enemiga convencional tipo batallón y la destrozaron, terminando con ello la 1ª guerra Boer.

Al final de ésta, el general Colley dirigió un pequeño ejército británico al territorio de Transvaal. Aquí decidió ocupar el volcán extinto de Majuba con 600 m. de altura y que dominaba el flanco derecho expuesto del campamento de carros (laager) de los boers. La fuerza británica se componía de unos 650 hombres, integrados en 4 compañías provenientes de regimientos distintos, y carecía de artillería de campo y de ametralladoras. Ocuparon la cumbre plana, que estaba libre y establecieron posiciones en ella, en sus bordes y en la base sur de la altura, para proteger la retirada a su base cercana de monte Prospect.

Aunque sorprendidos, en cuanto los boers comprobaron la ausencia de artillería de los británicos, se dispusieron a recuperar la montaña. A su favor ya tenían el total conocimiento del área y su gran movilidad por ella. El monte estaba formado por estratos alternativos de esquistos y caliza, con quebradas profundas y masas de rocas y de espesos matorrales de mimosa oscura. Con lo que las vistas de los distintos sectores defensivos británicos eran intermitentes y cortas. Todo ello se prestaba al carácter independiente e irregular de los tiradores y jinetes boers. Que, incluso, se sentían libres de trasladarse a cualquier parte de un campo de batalla, donde se creyesen más útiles. Hasta entonces, los boers mantenían en la guerra una estrategia defensiva.

Un primer grupo de 50 hombres llegó a las faldas norte de Majuba y fueron llevados por el “general” Smit alrededor del mismo, a su lado sur, para fijar a los británicos allí apostados. Racimos de boers fueron apareciendo por todos los lados y quedaron esperando la llegada de jefes que los dirigiesen. Unos 150 boers comenzaron a trepar por las laderas en distintos momentos, mientras un número similar mantenía un fuego de neutralización sobre los bordes de la cumbre. Los hombres que subían se agrupaban en racimos independientes. En ellos, una parte de los boers trepaba desde un refugio u ocultación a otro, mientras que la otra les brindaba una barrera de fuego de fusil. Esta última parte, bajo la protección de la primera, trepaba entonces hasta el nivel alcanzado último. El trabajo de acercamiento a la cima se prolongó por unas 6 horas.

Los británicos se mantenían a cubierto en los bordes, pero pronto se dieron cuenta de que el enemigo se acercaba por debajo de ellos. El primer ataque se coronó por el lado oeste. La compañía del 92º regimiento de infantería del teniente Hamilton comenzó a ser atacada de frente y de revés. Algunas subunidades mantenidas de reserva en el centro de la pequeña meseta fueron adelantadas al oeste. Los británicos mantenían su fuego disciplinado por salvas. Los boers disparaban individualmente, se recostaban y cargaban y comenzaban otro ciclo de tiro. Los británicos retrocedieron hacia el centro de la posición. Algunos boers, que llegaban casi a la cima por el oeste, se trasladaron al norte y atacaron también el flanco derecho enemigo. Otros alcanzaron también la cima por el sur, atacando también de enfilada al flanco izquierdo.