LA CREACIÓN DE LA SORPRESA MILITAR.

Prolegómenos.

La sorpresa militar forma parte más del arte bélico y de su creación, que de la ciencia militar, la doctrina, sus reglamentos y los principios o “normas del buen hacer en la guerra. Desde luego, su ámbito y sus instrumentos los toma de la ciencia militar. La ciencia militar tiene su lógica y su práctica orientada a la teoría aplicada.

La doctrina militar forma el armazón, la estructura, el corazón de todo el desarrollo y la sabiduría que la ciencia militar ha ido elaborando hasta el momento. La doctrina militar de cada estado incorpora la idiosincracia, la historia y la civilización de la nación correspondiente. Las virtudes permanentes y los valores, más temporales, de aquélla se reflejan también en su doctrina militar. Todo esto la canaliza en una dirección y un sentido.

El arte bélico tiene en su concepción y ejecución las características de: la variabilidad; la concepción insólita y singular; la aplicación diferente, inesperada y novedosa y la relativa ingenuidad (naturalidad y frescura) y libertad en sus hechos.

Resultado de imagen de general hermann balck General Hermann Balck, uno de los más finos tácticos de las fuerzas blindadas alemanas.

Si nos guiamos principalmente por la ciencia militar, que también conoce y puede dominar el enemigo, los resultados de la dialéctica bélica los obtendremos manteniendo una superioridad en hombres y medios, marchas y maniobras. Y el coste será la atrición de los medios y el desgaste humano en una proporción mayor, y siempre indebida, que con el empleo de la sorpresa.

Así, una defensa escalonada en profundidad y con suficientes reservas, probablemente nos prive de muchas oportunidades para la sorpresa eficaz. Pero, casi siempre, actuando en el microterreno, como empleando un zoom táctico, podremos aplicar la sorpresa táctica u operativa, insólita e inesperada.

Desarrollo.

La sorpresa se concreta y materializa en una acción inesperada sobre el enemigo por el fuego y/o el choque. Que, aprovechando la no disponibilidad combativa habitual del enemigo, le hace víctima de un ataque que no está en disposición de rechazar con éxito.

Evidentemente, las unidades a cargo de la sorpresa deben eludir a la exploración, a las avanzadas de combate y a la seguridad enemiga. Encargadas de dar al grueso que las destacó, el tiempo suficiente para adquirir la disponbilidad combativa que le permita el rechazo de su atacante.

Pero, la sorpresa mental no sólo debe ser inesperada para el enemigo. Sino que, para que se pueda aprovechar la totalidad de su potencial y efectos, debe ser también desacostumbrada, especial, infrecuente. Con una tendencia indudable a ser “insólita, nunca vista”. Este carácter insólito, nunca ocurrido, refuerza extraordinariamente el carácter al uso, inesperado y súbito de la sorpresa.

Imagen relacionada Tanque T-34 /76 soviético.

No siempre tenemos a mano la insolitud. Y la sorpresa favorece frecuentemente, al emplear la ley de la acción, al rival más móvil e, incluso, sólo activo.

Entonces, el empleo y la manipulación de las “apariencias”, las características apreciadas de los eventos y sus circunstancias, nos permitirán establecer y desarrollar una “situación” táctica u operativa nueva. Que, para el enemigo, resulte sorpresiva e insólita. Y que nos dé una victoria insospechada al principio de la situación dialéctica planteada.

Ejemplo táctico con Trascendencia Operativa.

Veamos un ejemplo de una fuerza extraordinaria actuando como fuerza normal, indu-ciendo al enemigo a un engaño completo, gracias a la manipulación de las apariencias de las circunstancias.

Con el avance de los soviéticos amenazando operativamente Rostov, el 4º Ejército panzer del coronel general Hoth se retiró en enero de 1.943 de sus posiciones en las riberas del Sal, estableciendo una línea defensiva al sur del río Manich. Por aquella ciudad pasaba la vía de abastecimientos y de retirada del 1er. Ejército panzer y debía mantenerse abierta, si se deseaba evitar un desastre cualitativamente similar al de Stalingrado. El Sexto Ejército atrapado aquí era la unidad tipo ejército más poderosa de la Wehrmatch. El 4º Ejército panzer recibió la misión de proteger este cuello de botella de las comunicaciones del Grupo de Ejércitos Don.

Pronto alcanzaron los soviéticos la confluencia del Manich con el Don. Apoderándose de la pequeña ciudad de Manutchskaya, en su ribera sur y situada a sólo 30 Km en dirección a la desembocadura del Don. Los soviéticos adelantaron entonces destacamentos avanzados en esa dirección. El 23 de enero, la 11ª división panzer y la 16ª división de infantería contraatacaron a las puntas de avance soviéticas y las rechazaron sobre Manutchskaya.

Ahora era vital restaurar el frente al sur del Don y del Manich, expulsando a los soviéticos de esa ciudad. Que constituía una de sus características cabezas de puente, que con enorme habilidad sabían reforzar rápidamente, una vez constituidas.

Los alemanes realizaron un ataque directo desde el suroeste el día 24, buscando sorprender a los soviéticos, con la continuidad de las operaciones. Pero se encontraron con el fenómeno citado. Los soviéticos ya habían creado un frente antitanque en esa entrada a la ciudad. Emplazando tanques con sus cascos semienterrados y distribuidos entre los edificios, a lo largo de las calles en profundidad y que eran de muy difícil localización.

La 11ª división panzer, muy veterana y con un magnífico táctico por jefe, el general Hermann Balck, cesó rápidamente el ataque al detectar la importancia de las defensas, sin empeñarse a fondo.

Imagen relacionada Panther de la 11 división panzer circa verano 1943.

El día 25, el general Balck inició un ataque sobre el sector noreste de la ciudad, que los soviéticos identificaron como el asalto principal, similar al anterior y siguiendo el criterio ortodoxo de “no insistir en ataques fallidos o frontales” (no provechosos). Por ello, trasladaron rápidamente sus medios antitanques (los tanques son los más móviles) al sector amenazado.

Para que ese ataque fuera creíble (manipulación de las apariencias) se empleó en un principio en su apoyo toda la artillería divisionaria. Se trataba, además, de la dirección de ataque más peligrosa para los soviéticos, ya que ésa era la parte de la ciudad más cercana al puente principal de carretera sobre el Manich y su ocupación aislaría la cabeza de puente soviética en la ribera sur. Esto constituirían las “evidencias primarias”.

Probablemente el ataque en el sector nordeste ya fue considerado por la defensa soviética como un ataque alternativo (una de las posibilidades) y por eso también reaccionó rápidamente al ocurrir.

El ataque principal “virtual” lo ejecutaban tanquetas de exploración y vehículos semi orugas de infantería, para simular la marcha de vehículos mecanizados, ocultos por cortinas de humo. Buscando más esconderlos de las vistas enemigas que proteger su avance por saltos observados. Esto prestaba una “evidencia secundaria” a la credibilidad de las “apariencias”.

Cuando el empeño soviético en la nueva defensa fue apreciado, lo cual confirmaba la alteración del dispositivo original y la atracción ejercida sobre él por el ataque normal “aparente”, el grueso de la artillería divisionaria lanzó un potente golpe de fuego sobre un sector de la zona suroeste de la villa. Una sola batería alemana quedó apoyando el falso ataque principal en marcha.

El grueso de los tanques del 15º regimiento panzer atacaron inmediatamente el límite anterior de la defensa y entraron en la villa. Avanzando por su interior, para atacar por la retaguardia el nuevo despliegue defensivo soviético, especialmente sus tanques. La infantería mecanizada alemana cerró tras ellos después de la irrupción.

La resistencia soviética se desmoronó. Su infantería se dirigió al puente sobre el Manich, siendo perseguida por el batallón de motoristas 61. Las bajas alemanas en la liquidación de la defensa de Manutchskaya fueron, según fuentes propias, de un muerto y catorce heridos. Atribuyéndoseles a los soviéticos entre 500 y 600 bajas y 20 tanques destruidos.

Creo, que toda la exposición es clara y simple. Que son características necesarias de las maneras prácticas y reales del buen hacer.

LA CAZA Y CAPTURA DE ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI.

Introducción.

Las “pequeñas unidades” atacando con objetivo limitado (una incursión profunda, la toma de una posición crítica, el rescate de una personalidad, una emboscada) constituyen un “sistema” militar cerrado. Esta condición impone unas características específicas en sus “interfases de acción” con el enemigo. Que no siempre son idénticas a las de la lucha de unidades y grandes unidades, sobre todo en la limitación de los medios y del tiempo de actuación disponible.

Las unidades así empeñadas deben imponer rápidamente y mantener una superioridad combativa sobre el enemigo. Para poder conseguir la supremacía local y temporal, que les permita conseguir dichos objetivos limitados.

Resultado de imagen de abu bakr al-baghdadi EN LOS COMIENZOS DE SU ACTIVIDAD YIHADISTA, TRAS LA INVASIÓN DE LOS EE.UU. A IRAK.

La característica o el factor de la concepción de su misión es la simplicidad. Las características de su preparación son la inteligencia, la seguridad y el entrenamiento. Las características de su acción son la sorpresa, la velocidad de acción y el compromiso de los participantes en la misión.

El caso “The Hunt for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” está tratado con profusión y difusión suficientes, en cuanto a sus características publicitarias, políticas, legales, humanas y técnicas. Ahora analizaremos las particularidades tácticas y operativas que lo caracterizaron.

¿Cómo se detectó la presencia de Abu Bakr y sus parientes en esa localización? Evidentemente, una vez destruídas y liberadas las bases de apoyo y refugio del califato sunní en Irak y Siria, los EE. UU. y los otros países presentes en la zona de guerra estaban interesados en al-Baghdadi y procuraban su captura. Al parecer, un miembro arrepentido del Estado Islámico, que conocía la red de mensajeros de Abu Bakr, se pasó a las filas de las Fuerzas Democráticas Sirias, coalición opositora a al-Assad, controlada por los kurdos del Y.P.G. y apoyada por los EE. UU. Este “arrepentido” se convirtió en agente doble de esa coalición. Y, por sus antecedentes, consiguió acceder al círculo íntimo de al-Baghdadi y sustrajo una prenda íntima de éste (al parecer, un calzoncillo). La cual sirvió para identificarlo con casi el 100% de seguridad. Otros medios de la inteligencia estadounidense confirmaron o no desmintieron esta identificación por el ADN. Lo cual confirmó la investigación y estableció el objetivo.

Desde mayo de 2019, al-Baghdadi se encontraba en Barisha. Y, ya estaba a punto de trasladarse a otra ubicación escondite, ya que cada 6 meses solía mudarse de refugio. Era ya un huido, un insurrecto errante, sin bases estables refugio, desde donde adoctrinar y expandir su territorio. E incapaz de realizar una defensa coherente de sus escondites. Su única técnica defensiva disponible era la ocultación, buscando que fuera eficaz e impermeable a la detección humana y electrónica enemiga.

Desarrollo de la Operación de Caza y Captura de Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

La unidad militar elegida para llevar a cabo la “Operación Kayla Mueller” fue la US Navy Seal. Ésta es la unidad de su Marina de Guerra encargada de las acciones puntuales especiales por mar (sea), aire, (a) y tierra (l). Los Seals se crearon al final de la década de los 50 del siglo XX. Al apreciarse por el Pentágono la necesidad de contar con militares polivalentes, extremadamente preparados y capaces de actuar en cualquier ámbito en condiciones exigentes.

 

A primeros de los 60 y por deseo del presidente Kennedy, comenzaron a actuar en Vietnam. La formación general de un Seal se prolonga durante años de duro trabajo. El Seal cobra entre 42 mil y más de 65 mil euros al año. Su trabajo duro, minucioso, preciso y peligroso, no se compensa económicamente. Satisfacer su amor a la milicia, su vocación de servicio (éste se le enseña), su amor a la patria y su compromiso con sus colegas y la unidad son su paga principal. La “unidad 6” de los Seals, un grupo de élite de una veintena de hombres, participó en esta misión, encargándose de los objetivos principales. Es posible que el almirante jefe dirigiera la operación, pero no hay confirmación oficial. La naturaleza de los Seals, la estructura de las subunidades aerotransportables participantes y de los transportes y apoyos eran elementos que contribuían a la simplicidad de la misión, ya que se adecuaban perfectamente a ella.

Resultado de imagen de abu bakr al-baghdadi EN MOSUL, A FINALES DE JUNIO DE 2014, PROCLAMÁNDOSE CALIFA DE TODOS LOS MUSULMANES.

El entrenamiento y el ensayo de la misión no fueron descuidados, a pesar de la enorme experiencia general de los hombres. Antes de la activación de la unidad en la Base al-Asad, en Irak, aquélla fue entrenada en un “modelo” que reproducía fielmente las instalaciones, la extensión y las características del complejo urbano de Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi y los terrenos aledaños. Éste estaba a las afueras de la pequeña población de Barisha, al norte de la provincia siria de Idlib y a unos 6 Km. o 4 millas de la frontera con Turquía. El “essay model” fue levantado probablemente en una de las bases de entrenamiento más o menos protegidas de los Seals. Y éste se prolongó por unas 6 semanas, con intervalos. Durante esta fase se mantuvo el factor seguridad de la misión, ya que los ensayos y prácticas que realizan los Seals son variados y cambiantes.

La unidad atacante, formada por un centenar de efectvos, se desplegó en su base de partida principal al menos unos 10 días antes de la operación, para no incrementar su tensión y facilitar su adaptación final. El factor seguridad se mantuvo incólume durante toda la gran fase de preparación de la misión.

En la madrugada del domingo 27 de octubre de 2019, el jefe de vuelo de la “fuerza de transporte” tomó el mando de la operación y ordenó el despegue de los helicópteros de su base de partida al-Asad. La fuerza de transporte procedía de alguna de las divisiones 82 0 101 aerotransportadas del US Army. El vuelo al objetivo se realizó siguiendo hasta 3 o 4 direcciones diferentes, para no llamar la atención de observadores o curiosos en tierra. Las trayectorias se orientaron al oeste-noroeste, evitando el cercano eje de poblaciones arracimadas en la gran cuenca del Eufrates. Con ello se protegían los factores de seguridad y de sorpresa de la misión, durante la fase de acercamiento.

La fuerza de operaciones utilizó entre 6 y 8 helicópteros. Entre 4 y 6 eran Chinook CH-47, bimotores, para carga pesada, que transportaban a los Seals, los equipos y a la unidad canina de apoyo. Y los otros eran su escolta: 2 Apache AH-64 de ataque y protección. Ésas aeronaves fueron suficientes para trasladar de vuelta a todos los hombres y perros, con su botín de información para la inteligencia, prisioneros y el cadáver de Abu Bakr.

Al llegar la expedición aérea a las inmediaciones del complejo yihadista, un grupo de hombres armados salieron de éste. Y se dispusieron a situarse en sus posiciones previstas, en torno a las edificaciones. No eran más de una veintena. Los helicópteros en vuelo abrieron fuego sobre ellos. Y la zona de su despliegue fue saturada de proyectiles de las armas pesadas de abordo.

Resultado de imagen de abu bakr al-baghdadi  DERROTADO, ESCONDIDO Y PERSEGUIDO.

Ya en el objetivo, el coronel jefe de la fuerza de ataque tomó el mando de la operación. Antes del asalto, los altavoces de los helicópteros conminaron a al-Baghdadi a rendirse. Pero, éste corrió a esconderse. En su lugar, salieron 2 adultos y 11 niños.

Las tripulaciones de los helicópteros, dotadas de medios de fuegos pesados, se encargaron de sellar el complejo de viviendas del exterior. Los Seals de asalto avanzaron sobre aquél por dos lados. Una fracción de ellos, formaron un “anillo” defensivo exterior, para aislar el complejo desde tierra. La entrada en el interior de la casa principal se realizó por una abertura practicada en una pared lateral. Por miedo a que en las puertas y ventanas existieran booby traps o trampas para ingenuos explosivas. La mayor parte de los hombres se encargó de neutralizar a los escasos escoltas yihadistas que quedaban y capturar a los civiles (mujeres y niños) de las viviendas. Todos los Seals estaban comunicados entre sí mediante una Intranet sofisticada.

Un grupo especial, el “hunting team”, a cargo del coronel, fue a por Abu Bakr. En él se integró la unidad canina de detección, neutralización y ataque. El equipo de identificación también formaba parte de este mini grupo de armas combinadas. Otro grupo, el “inteligence collect team” se encargó de recoger toda la información sensible existente en las varias instalaciones o casuchas. Ambos “grupos de misión” se dividían en subgrupos, para completar rápidamente sus misiones por el complejo. Asimismo, en las detecciones indicadas colaboraban todos los hombres dentro del perímetro.

Golpeada por el fuego pesado, toda la familia quedó aturdida y conmocionada. Al-Baghdadi escapó con dos o tres de sus hijos siguiendo un laberinto de túneles excavado bajo la casa. Que le permitirían, tras un recorrido de unos cientos de ms., alcanzar la superficie por una disimulada y protegida salida lejana.

En un momento dado del avance del “hunting team” por el laberinto, el coronel dio órdenes de adelantar a la unidad canina de los Seals. Su idea era preservar la vida de sus hombres de élite. Uno de los miembros de la unidad, una perra pastor belga malinois con identidad encriptada, por pertenecer a una unidad clasificada, se adelantó a los demás teams o grupos caninos y fue acercándose a Abu Bakr. Su nombre sería K-9, que responde a la nomenclatura usada en otras ocasiones en operaciones especiales. Sin embargo, la profusión de noticias dudosas, filtradas gota a gota, le atribuye el nombre de Conan, recogido en la revista Newsweek.

Cuando Abu Baker se vió atrapado, ya con los nervios rotos y derrotado, explotó su chaleco explosivo. Matándose él y sus hijos e hiriendo a la perra. El equipo de identificación se adelantó, buscó ADN entre los esparcidos restos y confirmó al 100% la identidad de al-Baghdadi.

La operación culminó en unos 60 minutos, pero los hombres estuvieron unas 2 horas más en la zona. Luego, ocuparon sus helicópteros y éstos partieron de regreso. El cadáver del jefe del EI fue depositado en el mar, dentro de las 24 hs. siguientes, siguiendo el rito islámico.

A continuación, aviones estadounidenses de ataque a tierra lanzaron 6 cohetes de HE, probablemente del tipo Maverick, a la zona de operaciones desalojada, convirtiéndola en “zona de destrucción”. El último refugio de Abu Bakr quedó convertido en un área de color gris claro laminada hasta las cenizas y con los escombros triturados.

THE HUNT FOR ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI.

Introduction.

The small units attacking with limited aim (a deep incursion, the capture of a critical position, the rescue of a personality, an ambush) constitute a military closed «system«. This condition imposes a some specific characteristics in his «interfaces of action» with the enemy. That not always are identical to those in the fighting of units and great units, especially in the limitation of the available means and of the time of action.

The units so committed must impose rapidly and keep a combative superiority on the enemy. To be able to obtain the local and temporary supremacy, which allows them to obtain the above mentioned limited aims.

Resultado de imagen de abu bakr al-baghdadi IN THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS JIHADIST ACTIVITY, AFTER THE U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ.

The characteristic or the factor of the conception of his mission is the simplicity. The characteristics of their preparation are the intelligence, the security and the training. The characteristics of their action are the surprise, the speed of action and the commitment of the participants in the mission.

«The Hunt for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi» is publicly treated by enough profusion and diffusion, as for his advertising, political, legal, human and technical characteristics. Now we will analyze the tactical and operational particularities that characterized it.

How was the presence of Abu Baker and his relatives detected at that location? Evidently, once the Sunni caliphate’s bases of support and refuge in Iraq and Syria, were destroyed and liberated, the U.S. and the other countries present in the war zone were interested in al-Baghdadi and sought his capture. A repentant member of the Islamic State, who knew the Abu Baker’s messenger network, reportedly joined the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition opposing al-Assad, controlled by the Kurds of the Y.P.G. and supported by the U.S. This «repentant» became a double agent of that coalition. And because of his background, he gained access to al-Baghdadi’s inner circle and stole an intimate garment from him (apparently, a underwear).

Which served to identify him with almost 100% surely. Other US intelligence means confirmed or did not deny the DNA identification. This confirmed the investigation and established the target.

Since May, 2019, al-Baghdadi has been in Barisha. And, he was about to move to another hiding location, since every 6 months he used to move to a different shelter. He was already a fugitive, a wandering insurrect, with no stable bases of refuge, from which indoctrinate and expand his territory. And unable to make a coherent defense of his hiding places. Its only available defensive technique was concealment, seeking to be effective and impervious to enemy human and electronic detection.

The Development of the Hunting Operation for Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi.

The military unit chosen to carry out the «Operation Kayla Mueller» was the US Navy Seal. This is the unit of the Navy in charge of the punctual special actions by (sea), air (a), and land (l). The Seals were created at the end of the decade of the 50 of the 20th century. On having appreciated the need to possess polyvalent military men, extremely prepared and capable of acting in any area in demanding conditions.

At the beginning of the 60 and for desire of president Kennedy, they began to act in Vietnam. The general formation of a Seal extends during years of hard work. The Seal receives between 42 thousand and more than 65 thousand dollars a year. His meticulous, precise, hard and dangerous work is not compensated economically. To satisfy his love to the military, his vocation of service (this one is taught to him), his love to the mother land and his commitment with his colleagues and the unit are his principal pay. The «unit 6» of the Seals, a group of elite with a score of men, took part in this mission, taking charge of the principal aims. It is said that the admiral in chief directed the operation, but there is no official confirmation. The nature of the Seals, the structure of the airborne subunits participants and of the transport and supports, were elements that contributing to the simplicity of the mission, as they were adapted perfectly to it.

Resultado de imagen de abu bakr al-baghdadi IN MOSUL, AT THE END OF JUNE 2014, HE PROCLAIMED HIMSELF CALIPH OF ALL MUSLIMS.

The training and the trial of the mission were not neglected, in spite of the enormous general experience of the men. Before the activation of the unit in the al-Asad Base, in Iraq, this was trained in a «model«, which was reproducing faithfully the facilities, the extension and the characteristics of al-Baghdadi‘s urban complex and its bordering areas. This was in the outskirts of Barisha, a little town in the north of the Syrian province of Idlib, al 4 miles from the Turquey’s border. The «essay model» was raised probably in one of the training bases of the Seals. And this extended for approximately 6 weeks, with intervals. During this phase the factor security of the mission was kept, because the trials and practices that the Seals realize are varied and changeable.

The attacking unit, with a hundred of men, deployed in her principal departure operational base at least 10 days before, to not increase her stress and to facilitate the final adjustment. The security factor was kept unscathed during the great preparation phase of of the mission.

In the early morning of Sunday, 27 October 2019, the flight chief of the “transport force” took command of the operation and ordered the helicopters to take off from their al-Assad forward base. The transport force came from one of the US Army airborne divisions 82 or 101. The flight to the target was made following up to 3 or 4 different directions, so to not attract the attention of observers or onlookers on the ground. The trajectories were oriented to the west-northwest, avoiding the nearby axis of populations bunched in the great basin of the Euphrates. This protected the mission’s security and surprise factors during the approach phase.

The operations force used between 6 and 8 helicopters. Between 4 and 6 were Chinook CH-47, twin-engined, heavy-duty load, that carried the Seals, the equipment and the canine unit in support. And the others were his escort: 2 Apache AH-64 for attack and protection. Those aircraft were enough to transport back all the men and dogs, with their intelligence information booty, prisoners and Abu Bakr’s body.

When the air expedition arrived in the vicinity of the jihadist complex, a group of armed men left the complex. And they set out to get their planned positions around the buildings. There were no more than twenty. The helicopters in flight opened fire on them. And the area of their deployment was saturated with bullets and shells from the heavy weapons on board.

Already at the target, the commanding colonel of the attacking force took command of the operation. Before the assault, the helicopter loudspeakers called on al-Baghdadi to surrender. But, he ran to hide. Instead, two adults and 11 children came out.

Resultado de imagen de abu bakr al-baghdadi  DEFEATED, HIDDEN AND PERSECUTED.

The helicopter crews, equipped with heavy firepower means, sealed the outer housing complex. Assaulting Seals moved on that one from two sides. A fraction of them formed an outer defensive ring, to isolate the complex from the area. The entrance to the interior of the main house was through an opening on a side wall. For fear of booby traps in doors and windows. Most of the men were responsible for neutralizing the few remaining jihadi escorts and capturing civilians (women and children) from the houses. All the Seals were in touch between themselves by a sophisticated intranet.

A task force, the “hunting group”, led by the colonel, went for Abu Bakr. The canine unit of detection, neutralization and attack was integrated in it. The identification team was also part of this mini group of combined arms. Another group, the “inteligence collect group” was in charge of collecting all the sensitive information existing in the various facilities or shacks. Both “mission groups” were divided into subgroups, to quickly complete their missions around the complex. All the men within the perimeter were also involved in the above-mentioned detections.

Struck by heavy fire, the whole family was stunned and shocked. Al-Baghdadi escaped with two or three of his sons following a maze of tunnels dug under the house. That would allow him, after a journey of a few hundred ms., to reach the surface by a disguised and protected exit far away.

At a moment of the advance of the “hunting groupin the labyrinth, the colonel gave orders to bring forward the SEAL canine unit. His idea was to preserve the lives of his elite men in so intricate situation. One of the members of the unit, a Belgian Malinois shepherd bitch with an encrypted identity, belonging to a classified unit, overtook the other canine teams or groups and approached Abu Bakr. His name would be K-9, which corresponds to the nomenclature used on other occasions in special operations. However, the profusion of dubious news, filtered drop by drop, gives it the name of Conan, published in Newsweek magazine.

When Abu Bakr was trapped, already with broken nerves and defeated, his explosive vest exploded. Killing him and his children and injuring the bitch. The identification team went ahead, searched the scattered remains of the body for DNA and 100% confirmed al-Baghdadi’s identity.

The operation ended in about 60 minutes, but the men were about two more hours in the area. Then, they occupied their helicopters and these left back. The body of the head of the IS was deposited in the sea, within 24 hs. following the Islamic rite.

Next, United States’ ground attack aircraft launched six HE missiles, probably of the Maverick type, into the vacated area of operations, converting it into a «destruction zone». The last shelter of Abu Bakr was turned into a light grey area, laminated to ashes and crushed rubble.

MOHAMMAD AND THE ISLAM.

Mohammad: Mystical and Religious; Soldier and Statesman.

 

 

The Origins and Youth of the Prophet.

Mohammad was born in Mecca in 570 A.D., or, in the year 52 before the Hegira, in the family of the Ben Hachim, of the Quraich tribe. This was the tribe most distinguished in the zone, though without many economic resources. Some of his members were the guardians of the Kaaba or the God’s house, constructed by Abraham and his son Ismael, had with his slave Agar, on order of the same God. And in her was guarded the Black Stone.

The Black Stone is an object of worship by the Muslims. It has a diameter of 30 cm. (a foot) and is placed in the east side of the Kaaba, at a height of 1,5 ms. The Arabic tradition says that it dates back to the times of Adam and Eve and is considered to be a stone from the Paradise. Also it says that when it descended from the sky it was white, and that the sins of the men turned it negress little by little. Mohammad kissed it repeatedly when he occupied in Mecca the 630 and in his last peregrination from Medina al-Nabi in 632. It was the only object of worship accepted by the Muslims, coexistent together with the idols in the Kaaba during the jahiliya or the epoch of the chaos and idolatry previous to the revealed Islam.

Resultado de imagen de abraham ABRAHAM, FATHER OF ALL THE BELIEVERS IN A UNIQUE GOD, ALMIGHTY AND MERCIFUL WITH ALL HIS CREATURES.

Mohammad was born orphan of father and, with five years, lost his mother. Four years later, his grandfather died. So, having only 9 years, his uncle Abu Taleb, father of Ali took charge of him. Ali would marry later the major and favorite daughter of the Prophet, Fatima, daughter of Jadiya. And of this marriage would be born the only descendants from Mohammad.

At the age of ten, Mohammad traveled with his uncle to the Great Syria, that the Arabs name al-Sham, and that comprises the actual territories of Syria, Palestine, the Jordan’s West Bank and The Lebanon. In Bosra’s suburbs, close to the Jordan, was a Christian convent. There, Mohammad knew a monk called Nestor, who spoke to him about the Christianity and his Revelation, and that estimated very much the qualities of the child. This experience was very deep in Mohammad.

The wants of the family did that Mohammad had to work as shepherd from child and, already in the adolescence, of camel-driver. At the age of 20, he entered to the service of Jadiya, widow in two occasions, which, encouraged by his father, was dedicating to the trade in Arabia and with the neighbors countries, and that was possessing a solid fortune. Finally, when he was 25 years old, Mohammad married Jadiya, who was already 40 years old. And that gave him 2 children, who died prompt, and 4 daughters.

Mohammad, Mystic and Religious.

Towards 610, Mohammad, that already took a comfortable and easy life by his marriage, began to move back to ponder in solitary, high and nearby sites. This would be already an essential and persistent interest in his life. His favorite place was a cave in the mount Hira, placed at 6 km from Mecca. Here he had the first revelation of the Qoran or Khoran in the so called Night of the Destination. A voice ordered him: «Read and recite». There, he continued going assiduously during more than three years and receiving little by little different chapters of the Khoran, called the suras of Mecca. In an occasion, he had in a vision the visit of the angel Gabriel, who said to him: «Oh, Mohammad, You are the Prophet of God”.

Till then, the year 613-614, only Jaliya was a believer of the God’s revelation. One day, Ali surprised them doing prayer and he turned into his second follower. The third was the freedman of Mohammad, Zaid ben Hantah and the fourth, Abu Baker al-Sidrique, a friend of the Prophet. Abu means «father of» and it refered to an important son or to the major one of a gentleman, when he was deserving it; indicating that it was extending in the time this familiar race.

From the beginning of the spread of the faith in the area near to the Prophet, there arose a strong and tenacious resistance from the mequinens to the idea of the only God and to the rites and obligations that the new religion asked. Which was condemning and rejecting the idolatry and his customs, that existed deeply in the city. The rites of the Salat were specially shocking and showy to them: The Muslim prayer divided and extended throughout the day, continuing the variable time of luminosity with the stations and using the positions of foot, sat, genuflect and humbled, in the recitation of the suras or chapters; that later will be established in the 5 actual moments. And the number of Muslims continued low and invariably.

Resultado de imagen de Al-Sham, la Gran Siria  AL-SHAM O THE GREAT SYRIA.

The Islam is not a religion of miracles. The miracle is the suspension or the overcoming of the laws of the Nature in an event and his circumstances. On them only has dominoes and legal authority the Necessary Being, who gave and established them with his characteristics and peculiarities. Whom we call God, in the different religions and languages. In many cases, the «advisers» and prophets sent by God to the different peoples and epochs, in order that they were turning of his unworthy life and were turning to the real God and his path, were asked by the peoples. In order that they give to them an unequivocal sign, which corroborates his ideas and the divine mandate.

Allah’s response, to the advisers for give to the idolaters and sinners, is: «I am the One that makes and supports all the works and the marvels of the world that you perceive». And, this way, chapter 30, aleya 37: «Is it that they do not see that Allah expands the provision whom he loves and restricts her to that he wants? It is true that in it are signs for people who believes»: chapter 35, aleya 27: «It is that you do not see that Allah makes that water falls from the sky and with her we do that go out fruits of diverse colors? And that there are mountains of white and red seams, of different shades and up to a dark black one?”, chapter 30, aleya 10: «Those that had committed evilnesse had the worst end, for having denied the veracity of Allah’s signs and have joked of them».

The visible head of the reaction against the Muslims is Abu Sufian, chief of the clan Amauin of the Omeyas’s tribe, which hold the power in Mecca and the privileges of the worship, accommodation, etc. The prolongation of this rejection, hard and progressively aggressive, will cause in the year 622 the «march towards» (Hegira) Medina of the Muslims.

At around the 615, in order to avoid the destruction of his small group of 40 followers, Mohammad divides them and arranges that they hide in Mecca or shelter in the rocky nearby hills. This is for the Islam a «stage of catacombs«, which will last until the 619.

We believe that between 616 and 617, (it is a date without making concrete and is within the limits of a decade, which the historic investigators indicate) Mohammad received, in one of the sites where he pondered, the visit of a group of persons of the tribe Jazrach, of Iazerib‘s city, at the north of Mecca. Attracted by his reputation, they came to ask for advice and help for the resolution of the litigious that they had with other Iazerib’s tribes, where the Jazrach had lost his prevalence.

The Jazrach were the Iazerib‘s most important tribe, until the Aus, a minor tribe, was allied by the Jews of the city. That were seeking to handle the trade and to gain political influence in her. The Jazrach saw in Mohammad, the leader who could join the Arabs and eliminate the influence of the Jews.

For Mohammad this was the promise of new converts for the Islam, which number was still despicable after so many years. It might be say that «the Islam was an ideology without force and the Jazrach were a force without ideology». And Mohammad woud be said, at least in his thoughts, «let’s gain the force of the Jazrach for our ideology (Islam)».

In effect, Mohammad‘s revelations found a good reception in Iazerib and, even, members of the Aus came to see him in his «mountainous retirement». These facts made increase in the mequinens and, specially, in the tribe Quraich his distaste to Mohammad and the Islam. This way, several years passed. And, finally, the quraichies decided to kill him and Mohammad had to flee of Mecca. It was the beginning of the Hegira.

Resultado de imagen de abu baker al siddique SEAL OF THE RASHIDUN CALIPH ABU BAKER AL-SIDRIQUE, FIRST SUCCESSOR OF MOHAMMAD.

MOHAMMAD, Soldier and statesman.

Mohammad and Abu Baker sheltered temporarily in Zaur‘s cave, at 5 km from Mecca. Mohammad ordered that the Muslim community should go in small groups to Iazerib, while was coming his moment to go, indicated by Allah. This night, Allah turned green a shrub that was at the entry of his hiding place, two birds nested in it and a spider wove his fabric in the opened remaining space. It was the summer beginning and these facts were normal. For 3 days and 3 nights they remained in the cave, hearing his mequinens persecutors crossing ahead, without noticing them.

A freedman and a guide came then, bringing camels and provisions and the 4 undertook the march to Iazerib, making a detour in the mountainous zone that surrounds the Red Sea. On July 12 of 622, they came to Iazerib and encamped in the suburbs, where the medinens come in mass to receive them. Finally, on July 16, date of the Hegira, Mohammad entered triumphantly in the city. It is the beginning of the Muslim Age and the end of the jahiriya or the preexisting idolatrous chaos to the Islam.

The medinens suras or chapters that Mohammad will receive here, are directed to a leader, a chief and defender of the Muslim community (the Umma). To establish the juridical and social procedure by which she will be ruled. And the Umma is born of the merger of the ansares or medinens assistant (in majority) with the mequinens muhayirun or emigrants.

In Medina, only the Jews opposed to the preaching and the action of the Prophet. On one hand, they were afraid to lose his social influence and his business. And neither they admit a prophet, foreign to the people chosen by Jehova. Reproaching Mohammad that many «revealed» suras were copying and interpreting falsely the books of the Torah or Old Testament.

This will do that Mohammad establishes from December of 623 the Kaaba (Mecca) as the direction towards which saying the Salat. Till then, Mohammad took Jerusalem as the sacred city towards which to pray. This decision was symbolizing, in addition, that the Islam was a religion of progress and loved by the Arabs. And that Mohammad perfected and sealed all the God’s previous revelations, the Torah and the Gospels.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

MAHOMA Y EL ISLAM.

Mahoma: Místico y Religioso; Combatiente y Estadista

 

Los Orígenes y Juventud del Profeta.

Mahoma nació en La Meca en el año 570 d.C., o sea, en el año 52 antes de la Hégira, en la familia de los Ben Hachim, de la tribu Quraich. Ésta era la tribu más distinguida de la zona, aunque sin muchos recursos económicos. Algunos de sus miembros eran los custodios de la Kaaba o la casa de Dios, construida por Abraham y su hijo Ismael, de su esclava Agar, por orden del mismo Dios. Y en ella se guardaba la Piedra Negra.

La Piedra Negra es un objeto de veneración de los musulmanes. Tiene un diámetro de 30 cm. (un pie) y está colocada en el lado este de la Kaaba, a una altura de 1,5 ms. La tradición árabe dice que data de los tiempos de Adán y Eva y es considerada una piedra del Paraíso. También dice que cuando descendió del cielo era blanca, y que los pecados de los hombres la volvieron negra poco a poco. Al ocupar La Meca en el 630 y en su última peregrinación desde Medina al-Nabi el 632, Mahoma la besó repetidamente. Era el único objeto de culto aceptado por los musulmanes, coexistente junto con los ídolos en la Kaaba durante la jahiliya o la época del caos e idolatría anterior al Islam revelado.

Resultado de imagen de abraham ABRAHAM, PADRE DE TODOS LOS CREYENTES EN UN DIOS ÚNICO TODOPODEROSO Y MISERICORDIOSO CON TODAS SUS CRIATURAS.

Mahoma nació huérfano de padre y, con cinco años, perdió a su madre. Cuatro años después, murió su abuelo. Así, teniendo sólo 9 años, se hizo cargo de él su tío Abu Taleb, padre de Alí. Éste se casaría más tarde con la hija mayor y preferida del Profeta, Fátima, hija de Jadiya. Y de este matrimonio nacerían los únicos descendientes de Mahoma.

A los diez años, Mahoma viajó con su tío a la Gran Siria, que los árabes denominan al-Sham, y que comprende los actuales territorios de Siria, Palestina, la Cisjordania y El Líbano. En las afueras de Bosra, junto al Jordán, había un convento cristiano. Allí, Mahoma conoció a un monje llamado Néstor, que le habló del Cristianismo y su Revelación, y que apreció mucho las cualidades del niño. Esta experiencia fue muy profunda en Mahoma.

Las estrecheces de la familia hicieron que Mahoma tuviese que trabajar como pastor desde niño y, ya en la adolescencia, de camellero. A los 20 años, entró al servicio de Jadiya, viuda en dos ocasiones, que, animada por su padre, se dedicaba al comercio en Arabia y con los países vecinos, y que contaba con una sólida fortuna. Por fin, cuando tenía 25 años, Mahoma se casó con Jadiya, que tenía ya 40 años. Y que le dio 2 hijos, que murieron pronto, y 4 hijas.

Mahoma, Místico y Religioso.

Hacia el 610, Mahoma, que ya tenía una vida cómoda y fácil por su matrimonio, comenzó a retirarse para meditar en sitios solitarios, altos y cercanos. Ésta sería ya una afición esencial y persistente en su vida. Su lugar favorito era una cueva en el monte Hira, situada a 6 Km. de La Meca. Aquí tuvo la primera revelación del Korán en la llamada Noche del Destino. Una voz le ordenó: “Lee y recita”. Allí continuó yendo asiduamente durante más de tres años y recibiendo poco a poco distintos capítulos del Korán. Son las suras mequinenses o de La Meca. En una ocasión, tuvo en una visión la visita del ángel Gabriel, que le dijo: “Oh, Mahoma, Tú eres el Profeta de Dios”.

 Hasta entonces, año 613-614, sólo Jaliya fue creyente de la revelación de Dios. Un día, Alí los sorprendió haciendo oración y se convirtió en su segundo seguidor. El tercero fue el liberto de Mahoma, Zaid ben Hantah y el cuarto, Abu Baker al-Sidrique, un amigo del Profeta. Abu quiere decir “padre de” y se refería a un hijo importante o al mayor de un señor, cuando lo merecía; indicando que así se prolongaba en el tiempo esa estirpe familiar.

Desde el principio de la propagación de la fe en el ámbito cercano al Profeta, surgió una fuerte y tenaz resistencia de los mequinenses a la idea de un único Dios y a los ritos y obligaciones que pedía la nueva religión. La cual condenaba y rechazaba la idolatría y sus costumbres, que existían arraigadas en la ciudad. Les resultaban especialmente chocantes y llamativos los ritos del Salat: La oración musulmana, dividida y extendida a lo largo del día, siguiendo el variable tiempo de luminosidad con las estaciones y empleando las posturas de pie, sentado, genuflexo y postrado, en la recitación de las suras o capítulos; y que posteriormente se establecerán en los 5 momentos actuales. Y el número de musulmanes continuaba bajo e invariable.

Resultado de imagen de Al-Sham, la Gran Siria AL-SHAM O LA GRAN SIRIA.

No es el Islam una religión de milagros. El milagro es la suspensión o la superación de las leyes de la Naturaleza en un evento y sus circunstancias. Sobre ellas sólo tiene domino y potestad el Ser Necesario, que las dio y estableció con sus características y peculiaridades. Al cual llamamos Dios, en las distintas religiones y lenguas. En muchos casos, los “advertidores” y profetas enviados por Dios a los distintos pueblos y épocas, para que se convirtiesen de su vida indigna y volviesen al verdadero Dios y a su sendero, eran requeridos por las gentes. Para que les diesen una señal inequívoca, que les corroborase sus ideas y el mandato divino.

La respuesta de Allah, para que los advertidores diesen a los idólatras y pecadores, es: “Yo soy el que crea y sostiene todas las obras y las maravillas del mundo que percibís”. Y, así, sura 30, aleya 37: “¿Es que no ven que Allah expande la provisión a quien quiere y la restringe a quien quiere? Es cierto que en eso hay signos para la gente que cree”, sura 35, aleya 27: “¿Es que no ves que Allah hace que caiga agua del cielo y con ella hacemos que salgan frutos de diversos colores? ¿Y que hay montañas de vetas blancas y rojas, de matices distintos y hasta de un negro oscuro?, sura 30, aleya 10: “Aquellos que habían cometido maldades tuvieron el peor fin, por haber negado la veracidad de los signos de Allah y haberse burlado de ellos”.

La cabeza visible de la reacción contra los musulmanes es Abu Sufian, jefe del clan Amauin de los Omeyas, que detentan el poder en La Meca y los privilegios del culto, hospedaje, etc. La prolongación de este rechazo, firme y progresivamente agresivo, causará en el año 622 la “marcha hacia” (Hégira) Medina de los musulmanes.

Hacia el 615, con el fin de evitar la destrucción de su pequeño grupo de 40 seguidores, Mahoma los divide y ordena que se escondan en La Meca o se refugien en las colinas rocosas cercanas. Ésta es para el Islam una “etapa de catacumbas”, que durará hasta el 619.

Creemos que entre el 616 y el 617, (es una fecha sin concretar y está dentro de los límites de una década, demasiado amplios, que señalan los investigadores históricos) Mahoma recibió, en uno de los sitios donde meditaba, la visita de un grupo de personas de la tribu Jazrach, de la ciudad de Iazerib, al norte de La Meca. Atraídos por su fama, venían a pedirle consejo y ayuda para la resolución del contencioso que tenían con las otras tribus de Iazerib, donde los Jazrach habían perdido su preponderancia.

Los Jazrach eran la más importante tribu de Iazerib hasta que los Aus, una tribu menor, se alió con los judíos de la ciudad. Que buscaban manejar el comercio y ganar influencia política en ella. Los Jazrach vieron en Mahoma, el líder que podía unir a los árabes y eliminar la influencia de los judíos.

Para Mahoma esto fue la promesa de nuevos conversos para el Islam, cuyo número era aún despreciable después de tantos años. Se podría decir que “el Islam era una ideología sin fuerza y que los Jazrach eran una fuerza sin ideología”. Y Mahoma se diría, al menos, de pensamiento: “ganemos la fuerza de los Jazrach para nuestra ideología (Islam)”.

En efecto, las revelaciones de Mahoma encontraron una buena acogida en Iazerib e, incluso, acudieron miembros de los Aus a verle en sus “retiros montañosos”. Estos hechos hicieron aumentar en los mequinenses y, especialmente, en la tribu Quraich su aversión a Mahoma y al Islam. Así pasaron varios años. Y, por fin, los quraichíes se decidieron a matarlo y Mahoma tuvo que huir de La Meca. Era el inicio de la Hégira.

Resultado de imagen de abu baker al siddiqueSELLO DEL CALIFA RASHIDUN ABU BAKER AL-SIDRIQUE, PRIMER SUCESOR DE MAHOMA

Mahoma, Combatiente y Estadista.

Mahoma y Abu Baker se refugiaron temporalmente en la cueva de Zaur, a unos 5 Km. de La Meca. Mahoma ordenó que la comunidad musulmana fuera marchando en pequeños grupos a Iazerib, mientras llegaba su momento de marchar, indicado por Allah. Esa noche, Allah reverdeció un arbusto que se encontraba a la entrada de su escondite, dos pájaros anidaron en él y una araña tejió su tela en el espacio abierto restante; era el inicio del verano y estos hechos eran «normales». Durante 3 días y 3 noches permanecieron en la cueva, oyendo a sus perseguidores mequinenses pasar por delante de la cueva, sin percatarse de ellos.

Llegaron, entonces, un liberto y un guía, llevando camellos y provisiones y los 4 emprendieron la marcha a Iazerib, dando un rodeo por la zona montañosa que rodea al Mar Rojo. El 12 de julio del 622 llegaron a Iazerib y acamparon en las afueras, adonde acudieron en masa los medinenses para recibirlos. Por fin, el 16 de julio, fecha de la Hégira, Mahoma entró triunfalmente en la ciudad. Es el inicio de la Era Musulmana y el final de la jahiriya o el caos idólatra preexistente al Islam.

Las suras medinenses que va a recibir Mahoma en Iazerib, están dirigidas a un gobernante, a un jefe y defensor de la comunidad musulmana (la Umma). Para establecer las normas jurídicas y sociales por las que se regirá ella. Y la Umma nace de la fusión de los ansares o auxiliares medinenses (en mayoría) con los muhayirun o emigrantes mequinenses.

En Medina, sólo los judíos se oponen a la predicación y la actuación del Profeta. Por un lado, temían perder su influencia social y sus negocios. Y tampoco admitían un profeta ajeno al pueblo elegido por Jehová. Reprochándole a Mahoma que muchas suras “reveladas”, copiaban e interpretaban falsamente los libros de la Torah o Antiguo Testamento.

Esto hará que Mahoma establezca a partir de diciembre del 623 a la Kaaba o casa de Dios (La Meca) como la dirección hacia la cual rezar el Salat. Hasta entonces, Mahoma tenía a Jerusalén como la ciudad sagrada hacia la que dirigirse. Esta decisión simbolizaba, además, que el Islam era una religión de progreso y querida por los árabes. Y que Mahoma perfeccionaba y sellaba todas las anteriores revelaciones de Dios a los hombres, la Torá y los Evangelios.

(CONTINUARÁ)

THE MILITARY SURPRISE: concepts, effects, realization and types.

The common or general tactical surprise is that which is normally or frequently used and that is known and expected. There is one case we take as example, which is to ambush or hostilize enemy forces who come to help or rescue a group of their own immobilized and/or besieged by us. This attack is logical to do so, because the forces in march, and especially when the urgency drives them, are especially vulnerable: because of the weakness of their flanks, for their scant reconnaisance and greater ignorance of their marching grund to combat, and for their deployment or marching column more or less frayed.

The attack is to be made using sequential or simultaneously different techniques: ambushes, even employing small units; free shooters lines; shutts of the advance routes and his wings with mines; bombardments of the artillery and the unit’s organic mortars, using registered fire on the routes or its singular points; attacks of the own or allied aviation; appearances and assaults by an our «combat group» (of combined arms?) in his immediate rear or covering it in a flank of the itinerary that is favorable for our protection (heights line, edge of forests, industrial and urban areas).

It is necessary to use necessarily this common surprise. But, the attacker must not repeat his set of tactics and military technics during short periods of time. In order that our attack is not so predictable, also in the details and manners, which facilitates his rejection to the enemy. Since with our routine, we are announcing the enemy which is our game, showing him the cards. And, let’s know that, even with these precautions, we are teaching him to fight.

With the mentioned variety, his combinations and the opportunity of use, the enemy will not be able to take sufficient measurements for the rejection. Since the variants of action that we can use are sufficiently different and numerous.

This is a tactical surprise, in the same level in which we are unrolling ourselves. That will allow us to increase the attrition (on the means) and the wear (of the men) of the enemy. And, even, to place and move more favorably with regard to him. But the total results will depend on the development of the set of the raised operations. Based on the forms of fight, the movements and the involved men and means.

Resultado de imagen de walther model Colonel General Walther Model.

This way, this surprise less elaborated conceptually produces fewer fruits that have operational or decisive transcendency. Everything indicates that, in order that it should take place and increases qualitatively the transcendent efficiency in our actions, it is necessary that the quality of the surprise reaches another dimension in his action.

It is necessary, so, in the operational level of the surprise, that this would be an «ungrateful surprise» for the enemy. That has catastrophic effects, though they are local, on him, at the beginning. And that the «commotion waves» in the area or the affected sections, propagate for the enemy military system attacked. Damaging his capacities, his general and grupal moral (a section, the fighters of a weapon) and his intentions and perspectives. It would be equivalent, in the raised scene, to an «exploitation of the success» of our actions. That are encouraged and perfected by the operational surprise obtained.

The following battle during World War II illustrates the use of unexpected «field of action» on the enemy, and the use of ordinary and heterodox forces. That allowed General Walther Model to take the initiative and destroy a Soviet army inserted in his operational rear.

During the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942, the Soviet Union military had penetrated the operational rear of the 9th German army of Colonel General Model. It was integrated in the Central Armies Group, under the command of Fieldmarshal von Kluge. The Germans withdrew to positions near populated areas, tacked between them by its artillery fire and keeping open a few, precarious communications lines between the units. Thus helping maintain the operational stability of the army’s defensive area.

The Soviets had crossed the lines of the semi-continuous front, crushing weak German positions and setting up in the german rearwarsd the 39th infantry army and the XI cavalry corps (mobile forces for areas of difficult ongoing), a total of 60,000 men. Their deployment was protected in the semi wild forests and marshes between Boly and Rzhev, the principal regional city, and was supplied by a route that edged by Boly and continued to Nelidovo at the north of the zone. These Soviet forces were also in operational hibernation, waiting for the late thaw of the Russian spring.

This powerful enemy nucleus, in coordinated action with Soviet forces at the front, could compromise the German summer offensive (1942) by cutting the supply lines of the 9th army. For this reason, it was necessary to liquidate it before tackling a new campaign.

Under the instructions of General Model, a movil force was put together. This formed a hippomobile brigade with the reconnaisssance forces (a reduced battalion) of each eight divisions of infantry of 9th army, all of which had all ground transit capacity.

Resultado de imagen de batalla Rzhev The Rzhev’s projection was formed after the Soviet counter-offensive in defense of Moscow.

The mission of this brigade was to slip through enemy flanking sectors not covered by the security and principal positions of the enemy. Once in enemy territory, they were to wait for a principal important attack, to begin fighting in the enemy’s interior with the hope of occupying defense nucleus positions. The German aim was to severely unsettle the Soviets’ deployment and the conduction of their defense plan.

By using its forces in the unexpected «field of action«, the Germans hoped to recover the freedom of action to impose on the enemy the law of the action. The objective was simple, but its attainment was difficult.

The brigade, which was to penetrate the Soviet zone, was led by the 5th panzer division of Major General Gustav Fehn. That were the principal interarms forces and the mass of support or normal forces. They were to proceed following the principal reinforced surface road of the zone. Which passed from Olenino in the north and followed the western slope of the Luchesa river.

Soviet troops (39th infantry army), inside its defense zone clung to this road and had an antitank deployment (obstacles and guns). The Soviet flanks were thin but protected on each side by extensive minefields. Its right flank rested on the inhospitable and impassable woods and swamp lands of the deep valley of the Luchesa which, in the Soviets’ thinking, protected them against serious attack. The Soviet command foresaw what must be the German’s principal effort against them and deployed their forces with creativity and inventiveness.

Only healthy, strong, veteran soldiers who worked well together and whose units had cohesion could be used in this mission. It was not work for garrison troops brought from the German rear or the occupied countries. Because of this, Walther Model did not hesitate to deprive his infantry divisions of its only mobile units of maneuver to use in this battle.

LA SORPRESA MILITAR: conceptos, efectos, realización y tipos.

La sorpresa táctica común o general es aquélla normal o frecuentemente usada y que es conocida y esperable. Hay un caso del que tomamos ejemplo, que consiste en emboscar u hostilizar a las fuerzas enemigas que acuden en socorro o rescate de un grupo propio inmovilizado y/o asediado por nosotros. Este ataque nuestro es lógico hacerlo, porque las fuerzas en movimiento, y más cuando la urgencia les acicatea, son especialmente vulnerables: por la debilidad de sus flancos, por su escasa exploración y mayor desconocimiento de su terreno de marcha al combate, por su despliegue o encolumnamiento de avance más o menos deshilachado.

El ataque de hacerse empleando secuencial o simultáneamente distintas técnicas: emboscadas, incluso empleando pequeñas unidades; líneas de tiradores libres; cerrojos de las vías de avance y sus laterales por minas; bombardeos por la artillería y los morteros orgánicos, empleando fuego registrado sobre las vías o puntos singulares del trayecto de aproximación; ataques de la aviación propia o aliada; apariciones y ataques de un “grupo de combate” (¿de armas combinadas?) nuestro en su retaguardia más o menos inmediata o cubriéndose en un flanco del trayecto que sea favorable a nuestra protección (línea de alturas, borde de bosques, polígonos industriales y edificaciones urbanas).

De esta sorpresa común hay que echar mano necesariamente. Pero, el atacante no debe repetir su juego de tácticas y técnicas militares en cortos períodos de tiempo. Para que nuestro ataque no sea tan predecible, también en los detalles y modos, que facilite al enemigo su rechazo. Ya que con nuestra rutina estamos anunciando al enemigo cuál es nuestro juego, mostrándole las cartas. Y, sepamos que, incluso con estas precauciones, se le está enseñando a luchar.

Con la variedad mencionada, sus combinaciones y la oportunidad de uso, el enemigo no podrá tomar suficientes medidas para el rechazo. Ya que las variantes de acción que podemos utilizar son suficientemente diferentes y numerosas.

Ésta es una sorpresa táctica, en el mismo nivel en el que estamos desenvolviéndonos. Que nos permitirá aumentar la atrición (sobre los medios) y el desgaste (de los hombre) del enemigo. E, incluso, situarnos y movernos más favorablemente respecto a él. Pero los resultados totales dependerán del desenvolvimiento del conjunto de las operaciones planteadas. Basados en las formas de lucha, los movimientos y los hombres y medios involucrados.

Así, esta sorpresa menos elaborada conceptualmente rinde menos frutos que tengan trascendencia operativa o decisiva. Todo indica que, para que se produzca y aumente cualitativamente la eficacia trascendente en nuestras acciones, es necesario que la calidad de la sorpresa alcance otra dimensión en su acción.

 Resultado de imagen de walther model Coronel General Walther Model.

Es necesario, pues, en el nivel operativo de la sorpresa, que ésta sea una “sorpresa ingrata” para el enemigo. Que tenga efectos catastróficos, aunque sean locales, sobre él. Y que las “ondas de conmoción” en el área o las secciones afectadas, se propaguen por el sistema militar enemigo atacado. Dañando sus capacidades, su moral general y grupal (una sección, los servidores de un arma) y sus intenciones y perspectivas. Ello equivaldría, en el escenario planteado, a una “explotación del éxito” de las acciones propias. Que son animadas y perfeccionadas por la sorpresa operativa conseguida.

Veamos un ejemplo de cómo el empleo de un “campo de acción” inesperado para el enemigo y el uso apropiado de las fuerzas ordinarias y heterodoxas, con sus respectivas características de actuación, permitió al general Walther Model, tomar la iniciativa, crear una sorpresa ingrata y destruir un ejército soviético insertado en su retaguardia operativa.

En el invierno de 1941-1942, durante su contraofensiva general de invierno, los soviéticos habían penetrado en la retaguardia operativa del 9º ejército alemán del coronel general Model. Éste se integraba en el Grupo de Ejércitos Centro, al mando del mariscal von Kluge. El repliegue de los alemanes a posiciones centradas en poblaciones, hilvanadas entre sí por el fuego de su artillería y el mantenimiento de unas líneas de comunicaciones suficientes, aunque precarias, entre ellas, mantenía, sin embargo, la estabilidad operativa de dicho ejército en la defensiva.

 Los soviéticos habían cruzado las “líneas” del frente semi continuo alemán, arrollado a su paso las posiciones débiles alemanas e insertado al 39º ejército de infantería y al XI cuerpo de caballería (fuerzas móviles para terrenos de difícil transitabilidad), que sumaban hasta 60 mil hombres, en dicha retaguardia. Su despliegue se protegía en los bosques semi salvajes y los pantanos situados entre Boly y Rzhev, la principal ciudad regional, y era abastecido siguiendo un camino que orillaba Boly y seguía por Nelidovo, al norte de la zona. Esas fuerzas sovié-ticas se hallaban también en hibernación operativa, a la espera de que pasase el tardío deshielo de la primavera rusa.

Este potente núcleo enemigo, en acción coordinada con las fuerzas soviéticas del frente, podía comprometer la ofensiva de verano (1942) alemana en el sector del 9º ejército, actuando contra las líneas de abastecimiento del mismo. Por ello era necesario liquidarlo antes de emprender una nueva campaña.

Con instrucciones expresas del general Model se constituyó una brigada hipomóvil con las fuerzas de exploración (un batallón reducido) de cada una de las ocho divisiones de infantería del 9º ejército, que tuviera capacidad de tránsito por cualquier terreno.

La misión de esta brigada era deslizarse por sectores no observados (por la seguridad y las posiciones principales) de la zona enemiga insertada. E irrumpir en ella, por donde menos era esperado un ataque importante, luchando en su interior e incluso ocupando núcleos de defensa. Con ello buscaban los alemanes desequilibrar severamente el despliegue y la conducción sistemática del plan de defensa soviético.

Resultado de imagen de batalla Rzhev El saliente de Rzhev se formó tras la contraofensiva soviética frente a Moscú.

Empleaban para ello sus fuerzas en un “campo de acción” adecuado e inesperado, que les permitiera recuperar la libertad de acción para imponerse al enemigo. Se trataba de un objetivo cuya simplicidad, que no dificultad, permitía su consecución.

Con esta acción de la brigada como fuerza extraordinaria se facilitaba la penetración en la bolsa soviética de las fuerzas principales interarmas o fuerzas normales, la 5ª división panzer del mayor general Gustav Fehn, a la que estaba subordinada la brigada. Esta últimas estaban sujetas en su tránsito a vías permanentes y avanzarían siguiendo el camino de firme reforzado principal de la zona, el cual transcurría desde Olenino, al norte, siguiendo la vertiente oeste del río Luchesa.

Las tropas soviéticas (39º ejército de infantería), dentro de su zona de defensa, se abrazaban a este camino principal, con un dispositivo antitanque (obstáculos y piezas) en profundidad. Los flancos estaban menos ocupados, pero se protegían con extensos campos de minas a derecha e izquierda, apenas cruzados por unas sendas. Su flanco derecho se apoyaba en las inhóspitas e intransitables tierras boscosas y pantanosas del valle profundo del Luchesa, que los soviéticos estimaban que les aseguraban contra cualquier ataque de importancia. Como vemos, el mando soviético previó con acierto por donde debía discurrir el esfuerzo principal alemán contra ellos, fuera de originalidades e inventivas, y desplegó sus fuerzas en consecuencia.

Solamente soldados sanos, fuertes y veteranos, que poseyeran la experiencia del trabajo en común, que cohesiona íntimamente a las unidades, en la confianza y el respeto entre los hombres, y con una clara afición por la naturaleza, podían ser empleados en esta misión. No era un trabajo para tropas de guarnición, traídas ex profeso de la retaguardia alemana o de los países ocupados. Por eso Walther Model no dudó en privar a sus divisiones de infantería de las únicas unidades móviles de maniobra, que tenían en esos momentos.

(CONTINUARÁ)

THE MONGOLS INVADE EASTERN EUROPE (1238-1241). 2nd. PART.

(CONTINUATION)

 

The Mongol Army Attacks Hungary.

Subodai concentrated his army in 3 groups of march. Each one would enter Hungary by a different route, across the mountain passes and valleys of the Carpathians. This deployment was given to the Mongols more resistance to the enemy surprises. And gave them an initial unfolding for the maneuvers of their 3 mobile corps, facilitating them to face the enemy. The Hungarians, for their part, did not dare to attack any of them, for fear of an advance of the other corps on their rear or to occupy anyone of their cities. The central column, which was under the command of the prince Batu, crossed Ruske’s mountain pass on March 12 and continued his advance for the valley of the Tisza. His vanguard with combat capacity came to the Danube on the 15th and 2 days later the principal corps did it. The vanguard had realized a march of 290 km in 3 days, crossing an hostile area and still covered by high snow.

On April 3, Subodai formed his 3 columns in front to Pest, in the east bank of the Danube. In Pest the king Bela had assembled his army of 100 thousand men. At another side of the river, joined both cities by bridges, was Buda. Subodai knew they were overcome in number by the Hungarians. Having also detached a tumen in Transylvania the left column of march, to assure that the Christians were not receiving reinforcements from Romania, the Mongols were now 70 thousand. Also, it was very dangerous for them to force a crossing of the Danube at the sights of the Hungarian deployed army.

On the other hand, the more time Subodai was taking in his calculations, decisions and preparations, the more time was giving to other European leaders to decide and to come to support the king Bela. The Mongol general applied then at strategic scale one of his tactic stratagems: his army moved back towards the East. The Hungarian chiefs supposed that the Mongols were not daring to fight against their army. And, spurred by their stagnation before the not hindered advance of the Mongols 3 marching columns, asked to initiate his pursuit. The Hungarians did not notice that Subodai was attracting them out of the protection of the Danube and of the support between detachments and the army corps.

The king Bela, commanded the great majority of the army, directed the pursuit. The Mongol retreat was calculately slow. They took 6 days in reaching the Sajo river, at 160 km at the North-East of Buda and Pest. And, at the west of the river, near its mouth in the Tiszna and in the plain in front of Mohi, the principal city of the zone, Batu and Subodai decided to confront their «persecutors». On April 9, the Mongols crossed a broad gorge, advanced by a heath, crossed a stone bridge and continued 16 km up to the bushes placed at the west of the hills and vineyards of Tokay. In them, they had numerous places where to camouflage or to hide. In effect, when a Hungarian reconnoissance detachment followed them that evening and came up to Tokay’s west, it did not find absolutely nothing. The Hungarian army, who realized a frontal pursuit, encamped in the heath, arranging his cars, joined by chains and ropes, closing a circle, where installed his tents and mounts. At the right of the camp, were the marshes of the bank of the Tisza, at his front, the heath of the Sajo was spreading and forests and hills were covering his left side.

Resultado de imagen de BATTLE of buda and pest 1241 FIGHTING ON THE BRIDGE.

At dawn of Wednesday, the 10th of April, 1241, Batu and 40 thousand men threw towards the stone bridge by its east side. The Hungarians defended it with all energy, until they had to withdraw for the fire bombs of that the Mongols catapults threw them, on having been in a very narrow fighting sector. The Mongols went on to the west side, but during more than 2 hours, were terribly pressed by the Hungarians charges and only the shots of their archers briefly restored their defense line. Little by little, the Hungarian army deployed to liquidate the Mongol bridgehead. Suddenly, the general Subodai, who also had crossed to the west side by a circumstances bridge stretched downstream of the Sajo, while the Hungarians were distracting with the threat in the bridgehead, appeared with 30 thousand Mongols on the Hungarian rear. Struck and stunned, but with guts and experience not to fall down in the panic, the Hungarians moved back in good order to their camp. But the Mongols threw to it, surrounding almost totally the camp and covering it with incendiary bombs and arrows. Which were burning the load coaches and the tents and frightened away the beasts, spreading chaos between their enemies and undoing the autoconfidence of the Hungarians.

The Mongols prepared to throw a charge on the uncohesioned groups of the Hungarian army. But they continued without finishing to cover with any detachment, the siege to the camp by the access gorge to the heath. The Hungarian knights with enough moral courage yet formed a wedge, to resist the charge; it was the last firm resistance of the Hungarian army. But the majority of them moved back by the existing «gap» in the siege, fleeing in small groups towards what they were thinking that would be their salvation. And really falling down In a mortal trap, which was spreading over the whole route of their flight towards Pest.

The Mongol light cavalry, without risking anything, softened from a distant with his arrows the driven to despair deployment of the knights and, later, taking his opportunity, the heavy cavalry charged to squash them. Numerous Mongol light detachments went out in pursuit of the fled ones. A part them was pressing on their rear, to increase their commotion, their chaos and their fear. While, other detachments realized the overflowing pursuit, reaching them from the sides and spearing them or throwing their arrows to them with their small and most powerful compound arches, which shot from the mounts. Along 50 km, in the way of return to Pest, spread the remains of the Hungarians, their mounts and their equipments. More than 70 thousand Hungarians knights and auxiliary died in the battlefield, in the camp and in the escape towards the southwest. After the battle of the Sajo, the Hungarian resistance collapsed.

The Mongols immediately attacked Pest and burned it. But they did not dare to cross to the west side of the Danube in the exploitation of the success. In spite of the moral and numerical supremacies that they enjoyed in these moments. Batu and Subodai gave rest to their army and consolidated the positions at the east of the great river. And so more than half a year passed, where the principal related event was a slightly spirited declaration of Crusade against them from the Pope, of which it was obtained little in the practice. In December, 1241 the Danube froze in this great region.

Resultado de imagen de king bela IV of hungary  MONGOL’S LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRIES.

The Mongols made good use of their time to plunder Buda, realized a reconnaissance in force in Austria and sent a detachment to the South, towards Zagreb, in pursuit of the king Bela. And on the 25th they assaulted Gran, the Hungarian capital and See of his archbishop, taking with them everything of value and antiquity they could.

A marvellous End for Europe. Who, What for?

Central and Western Europe were mature for a Mongol invasion. The Europeans did not have an army capable of facing this threat, which already was throwing them the breath in his napes. The strategic plan explained by Subodai to the Khan and to his generals seemed to be faithfully fulfilled up to his last parts. But, this was already only an illusion, the impossible one. An «appearance», which Sun Tzu would say. On December 11, 1241 they had received in the headquarters of Batu and Subodai an escorted messenger from Karakorum, the Mongol capital in the Eastern Asia. He was bringing the news that Ogadai, the Great Khan, had died and that his widow was acting as regent, until a new Mongol emperor was elected and promoting to the throne. The Mongol present princes were anxious to make worth their rights for the succession and decided to return to their capital, taking with them the imperial tumens.

Batu knew that without these select troops, he could not keep Hungary in his power. But he thought that with the Turkoman recruits, who already were experienced and taken part in combats, he might keep most of his territories. This way, the Mongols evacuated Hungary, without being hindered, harassed or pusued by their enemies. Though behind they left the land that was theirs. This was a symbol of their idiosyncrasy and exploiter character up to the extinguishment, land bandit and absolute predator. And without the minor aptitude to create, to keep, to develop, to extend and bequeath his successors, a civilization that was deserving this name. And not only to leave them the accumulated results of his outrages, bails, taxes, plunders and booties and the military educations to obtain them.

Batu returned to his departure field base, in Sarai, near the Volga and at scanty 100 km north of Astrakhan. And there established a Mongol subsidiary empire, which was known as the Golden Horde. The Mongols would not have another equal opportunity to invade Europe. After this aberrant nightmare suffered by the Europeans, these invented all kind of stories and myths, in which they narrated how they had defeated the «Tartar» invaders (this way they in general knew the Mongols) and had forced them to return to their lands.

This unthinkable, sudden and happened, in the last possible moments resulted… marvellous, Was it a matter of Destinity and of Europa’s Karma and his privileged Civilization? ¿Or was it the result of a Divine Intervention by the intercession of the Holy Virgin Mary? Certainly, humanly was an excessive and incredible chance. But the faith can never give some «evidences», because it would stop of being and would turn into the verifiable reality. The Divine effective intervention, in favor of Europe and his civilization, which without the Christianity operating from his marrow, would never look alike to what it went and to what is. But It is probable, because That is never thundering or overwhelming. God did not visit Elias in the beams storm or in the hurricane-force wind, but using a tenuous and soft breeze. And, to the esoteric and sincretists, the explanation might be «a cosmic action of the astral and akasic forces, in favor of the Light, the Peace and the human Civilization, towards the top levels of the Universal Conscience «.

Also, there exists a «rational» and common explanation of what happened, but that cannot specify the moment to begin this opportune retreat. The Mongols and the central Asiatic associate tribes were creating an Euro-Asian empire in the first half of the 13th century. But their material capacities and their ideological and religious resources were not corresponding with such important aim. As already we saw, for the peoples of the occupied countries, they did not have anything satisfactory and lasting to offer them. The Mongols were kept in these foreign lands by the threat of the known terror. As it would happen with other tyrants, that tried to become «worldwides», their necessary collaborators were ethnic or ideologically similar. But the Mongol etnia and his related ones were demographically insignificant, to be able to monitor and defend alone such vast empire. All this, in the decades of the invasion of Eastern Europe, had tightened up to the point of break their military capacities. This way, more early that late, the Mongols had to realize that retrograde general march, to assure and consolidate their lands in the East of Eurasia. Moving away from the contact with dynamic, Ideological and expansive civilizations, as the European. With whom the relations of vicinity and the first exchanges of merchants, explorers and adventurers would been solved by the military clash.

THE END.

THE MONGOLS INVADE EASTERN EUROPE (1238-1241).

After the death of Gengis Khan in 1227 his the second surviving son, Ogadai, succeeded him in the Mongol throne. The Mongol expansion eastward was limited by the Pacific Ocean and scarcely were staying free enclaves in China and Persia. But, towards the West, the great steppes of Russia were offering to the Mongols an enormous opportunity of conquests. Using these extensive areas, which were favorable to the advance and the maintenance of his rapid hippomoviles armies. These steppes had been awarded to the grandson of Gengis, Batu. The great Mongol general Subodai urged his conquest, to strategically protect the west flank of the Empire and as possible operational headquarters for the invasion of the green plains of Hungary. These natural plains might serve in its moment for the advance in north and west directions of the Mongols tumens («divisions»), towards the conquest of the core heart of the Christian Europe.

The Prolegomenons of Europe’s Invasion.

This «strategic panoramic» insight of Subodai filled with enthusiasm the court and the Mongolian chiefs. And, this way, Ogadai provided the general with around 50 thousand veteran men, under Batu’s nominal control, to conquer the steppes of the west Russia. In the winter of 1237, the Mongols crossed the frozen Volga and penetrated in Russia. The Mongol army was reaching 120 thousand light and heavy riders, with auxiliaries and luggages. Including their catapults for the heavy fire and the means of siege and to construct these. And it had increased with the recruitments of Turkoman realized in the advance route and authorized by Ogadai. The quality of this reinforcement for the Batu and Subodai’s army was deficient and variable, in comparison with the Imperial tumens.

During the following 3 years, the Mongols systematicly destroyed the feudal Russian kingdoms of the west. Using the frozen rivers as broad and long routes without obstacles to deeply penetrate in them and to positionally dislocate the enemy defenders forces. With the capture of Kiev in December, 1240, the rest of the Russian organized resistance disappeared. And the Mongols were reaching in force the Carpathians mounts, the natural obstacle that was protecting Hungary.

Resultado de imagen de BATTLE of buda and pest 1241

Though in this epoch, in the beginning of the Low Middle Ages, the European leaders did not know practically anything on the Mongols, both the general Subodai and the prince Batu were regularly informed about the difficult political European situation. In effect, in February, 122, Subodai and Jebe, at the command a corps army of 20 thousand Mongols initiated a reconnaissance in force of two years in the western Russian steppes, looking for advance routes for the Mongol armies towards Europe. There they recruited a permanent and well paid spies’ network in different nations. And they realized a secret alliance with Venice, for which, in exchange for relevant information about the geography and the always changeable politics of the European states, Venice would get a trade monopoly in the Mongol conquered territories.

In January, 1241, Subodai concentrated the army around Lvov and Przemysl, close to the river San, tributary of the Vístula. This «strategic departure base» was at the north of the Carpathians and at a distance of 300 km to the Hungarian Danube. To realize the invasion, the army only was possessing then 100 thousand men. The reason was that it had to keep occupation detachments in the Russian west and to protect its communications towards his base. The operational gravity center of these were the mountain passes of the Carpathians towards the south, towards Hungary.

That were defined by the Tisza and his tributaries network, which were forming the Carpathians valleys. But the advance of the Mongols towards Gran, the great capital at that time, at 40 km to the northwest of Buda and Pest, all on the Danube, would leave the invading army exposed to an operational counterattack of the Germans, Austrians, Bohemians or Poles. That might fall down on his right flank and eastward communications. Threatening them, this way, with serious losses or isolating them from their base, being able to surround some Mongol detachments.

The Mongol worry towards the enemy was generally strategic, thinking about their exposed flanks at the level of the occupied countries. This worry was originated in his always exiguous number of riders for the entrusted or looked aims. And also in the not tactical invincibility of his forces, if were meeting an organized, skilful enemy, who was using opportunely and effectively his heavy and light cavalries, and calm to resist their tricks and feints. The Europeans only were possessing the heavy cavalry. Where his nobles and chiefs fighted and around which, as main weapon, his infantry armed retinues and armies were articulated. This way, Gengis Khan, in 1221, after the conquest of the Moslem empire of Samarqand, placed approximately between the Sir Daria and the Amur Daria, systematicly plundered Afghanistan. And his son Tului killed most of the inhabitants of the north of Persia (Khorasan). With it they were protecting the south flank of the brand-new empire.

The Beginnings of the Invasion of 1241.

To defend this flank of the mentioned assaults, Subodai divided his army in 2 «very asymmetric army corps». The principal corps would carry out the invasion of Hungary and the auxiliary, small corps, would fulfill the double mission of clear the European threats to his advance on those Hungarian cities and his communications with the Carpathians. The auxiliary army, at the orders of the princes Baidar and Kadan and formed by 2 tumens, advanced first, in March, 1241 and, crossing the Vistula by Sandomir, surprised the Poles. But, to separate them from Hungary, «they» had «to allow» his mobilization and later concentration. This way, dividing his meager forces, Kadan advanced through Poland in northwest direction. Seeking to extend the alarm and the consternation for all his interior and «to threaten» the German States placed at the west of the Oder.

Resultado de imagen de Mongolians attack Pest

For his part, Baidar went in southwest direction, directly towards Cracow, the capital, burning and plundering everything what could at his passage, to attract on his detachment the enemy attention. And, suddenly, close to Cracow, the Mongols stopped and initiated in a short time their retreat, following the opposite direction to the previous advance. They were simulating this way to be a small incursion force, possibly explorer, already moving back to his base. The Polish cavalry forces, concentrated for the defense of Cracow, did not recognize the rapid retrograde enemy march as a tactical trick. And, filled of a warlike ardor that was inflaming their senses, they were thrown after what they thought that it was a great victory already in their hands. This way, they left their positions under the protection of the infantry and the walls of Cracow, to realize a frontal warm pursuit. Without before having really beaten their enemy and leaving in hands of the wind all the due precautions. On having seen them, the Mongols accelerated their march and even left their prisoners, with what the Poles saw insured the «reality» of his conjectures. But in Chmielnik, at 18 km from the capital, a very ungrateful surprise was waiting for them. The whole Mongol light cavalry, conceal for the distant sights and deployed forming a half moon with his checkered detachments, began to throw clouds of arrows with piercing punch arrowtips, that easily penetrated in the armors and protections of the Polish mounts and riders. The majority of these simply died. The inhabitants of Cracow, when the news came, terrified fled in mass, and the Mongols, reaching the Polish capital, set it on fire.

Baidar continued up to Breslau, the Silesia’s capital, where found that the population had lit fire to the city and sheltered in the citadel. There he knew that in Liegnitz, at 65 km to the west, Henry, the king of Silesia, had formed a very heterogeneous army of 25 thousand men to attack them. He also knew that the king Wenceslao of Bohemia was going with his army of 50 thousand men to meet Henry. Baidar decided to rapidly go to Liegnitz, to prevent the meeting of both enemy armies. In the way, Kadan and his mobile detachment, which already had completed his mission of general grieve the Poles and Eastern Germans, joined him. Both tumens reached Liegnitz on April 8, 1241. The 9th, the king Henry went immediately to facing them. He did not know that Wenceslao and his army were situated at only a day of march. In times of difficult and precarious communications, the ignorance, which is rash for its simplification, was replacing the lacks of information with own elaborations, based on the greed and the dread. His army deployed near the city in a plain.

Resultado de imagen de Mongolians attack Pest BATTLE OF LIEGNITZ

When the Mongol vanguard appeared in the horizon, Henry sent a small detachment to reject it. But a rain of arrows made it to move back to his rows. The king counter-attacked with all his cavalry. The Mongol vanguard, saw threatened, avoided the immediate contact and moved back. In what looked like to the knights an escape, after having kept the calm opposite to minor forces. The charge of the Silesian cavalry transformed in a career at full gallop, being disorganized and dispersed, looking for his prey. The Mongol archers were waiting for them in calmness, provided with their perforating cuirasses arrows. When the Silesian riders were inside their effective range, the Mongol archers covered them with arrows, knocking down many people and pulliing up sharply their clumsy assault. Already beaten the knights, the Mongol heavy cavalry charged against them and dissolved them. In turn, the light cavalry, screened by smoke bombs in his sector of advance, threw against the Silesian infantry, that were waiting at the end of the deployment. Behind, the Mongol heavy riders also charged, knocking down everything at their steps and killing the king Henry of Silesia.

When Wenceslao known about the disaster of the Silesians, stopped his march and moved back to protect Bohemia. Receiving for it reinforcements of the kingdoms of Saxony and Thuringia. The allied army formed in Klodzko, close to the gorges of the river Glatz, at 100 km to the south-east of Liegnitz. But, the Mongol reconnaissance detachments warned their princes of the dangers of those. In addition, the Mongol army corps had suffered enough losses in his raids and previous battles. In that moments, in less than one month of operations, 20 thousand Mongols had crossed around 650 km in enemy territory and gained 2 decisive battles. Poland was beaten and shocked and the Germans at the west of the Oder were moving back and preparing to defend their kingdoms.

The Bohemians, still intact, were at 400 km from the Hungarian defensive positions in the Danube. For what their army was operationally ineffective to achieve the decision in the Mongol attack to Hungary. To make sure of Wenceslao’s «intention», the Mongols realized a demonstration towards the west, inside Germany. Wenceslao pursued them. At a decided moment, the tumens deployed in small and slippery detachments. And, forming an almost invisible cloud for the enemy, they slipped for both sides of the Bohemian army and moved away from this.

In his retreat to meet Subodai, the Mongols crossed for Moravia, destroying his settlements, stores and fields. This way, they created a wide desert plateau, which would protect furthermore the right flank of the principal Mongol corps. On having left these lands unable to support for a time an army crossing it. In this secondary campaign Baidar and Kadan managed to eliminate any possibility that the Czechs, the Germans, the Poles and the Austrians were sending their troops in aid of the Hungarians. And they did it taking and keeping the initiative against a very numerous enemy, who was acting unco-ordinated. Whose principal weapon was the heavy cavalry, that acted only by the shock. And operating with a greater operational movement capacity, protected by the secrecy and the concealment, supported by a sufficient and constant information. And using in the combats decided by them the whole repertory of the tactics and technics of their cavalry, which were almost incomprehensible for the Europeans. And they could come in time of rejoining with Subodai’s corps at almost the end of the Hungarian campaign.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE RECONNAISSANCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE: A MILITARY OPERATIONAL SYSTEM. 2nd Part.

(FINAL)

The near future of tactical reconnaissance.

Major tactical reconnaissance weapons, tanks and low level flying aircraft tend to be vulnerable to modern infantry antiaircraft and antitank missiles. They appeared on the battlefield in the 1970s and have become more effective since then. Since the mid 1990s, these rockets have been incorporating various technologies such as double active heads, multiple search engines, which allow them to discriminate against enemy decoys and secure the target, and those that allow them to use variable flying heights. For example, upcoming infantry tank rockets will be able to locate, define and confirm their target by magnetic distortions of the environment (generated by the relatively large metal mass of the tank), acoustic signals, heat emissions (human and motor and weapons) and short wave emissions. Their way to the target will oscillate to circumvent possible weapons deployed against them.

Resultado de imagen de deep range combat and reconnaissance patrols NEW ZEALAND’S LONG RANGE RECON PATROL.

All this will tend to give greater importance in the reconnaissance of to the deep range combat and/or reconnaissance patrols. They are inserted by air or river means, as close as possible to its operations area and designed to stay longer in it.

Combat reconnaissance: The immediate and continuous contact with the enemy and determination of the capabilities of the fighting ground.

Combat reconnaissance conducts ground reconnaissance, the relation of his own army’s adjacent units in established contact points and the location of the enemy to help determine the enemy’s intentions and characteristics. This latter mission is subordinate to the goal of obtaining intelligence. Every unit must establish it always, without need for specific orders. It is important to advance the subunits as rapidly as possible; if only is conducted by infantry, it may be necessary use vehicles to transport troops, who can then continue on foot.

In open flanks and exposed wings, its range must be adequately extensive. By means of anticipated patrols, combat reconnaissance constitutes in its actuation a real security for units in the front.

 Its organs are armored reconnaissance companies and platoons, reconnaissance patrols of units in the different sectors, observatories and forward platoons of artillery, etc. The platoon at disposal of the H. Q. and services company can be useful in the battalion area for rapid action.

Combat reconnaissance has a basic function to detect resistances and weaknesses in the enemy deployment and weapons, and in the “interfaces of action” created on him. It needs to use tested skill, sufficiently intense and never superficial, that is knowledge about the weaknesses of tactical units and the fortresses of opposing deployments, as well as its efforts to present the illusion of such deployments. It is important to act according to the mission and the gravity center of the effort ordered by the high command. Colonel Tor made this point in his book “Infantry” (page 31 Madrid, 1943), “…advance through the enemy weak points and fight from one’s own strong points».

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol  A PATROL…

Information collected from various sources, becomes available intelligence and is transmitted to those interested.

The reconnaissance generates information on the different action levels and the ground, which it also recognizes. That must be converted into intelligence. This is the reasonably reliable and sufficient knowledge (never excessive or intoxicating) of the enemy, of his intentions and possibilities and of the terrain, in its possibilities of struggle, transitability (more than ground ongoing), etc. Received updated and without continuity solution.

The elaborating organs of intelligence are different for operational and combat reconnaissances, since also they both generate different types of information. The principal difference are their qualitatively different levels of actuation, in which they must give the set vision: enemy, area and possibilities. And that the need for combat intelligence is urgent and more continuous, and its transcendence, very fleeting, so it is much less elaborate and more direct to fighting units, from its reconnaissance.

Once intelligence is created, it is integrated by the superior command, G-2. It will then be transmitted to units and interested commanders. Transmission must be protected by all existing means, guaranteeing secrecy and its arrival to the addresses by means of double couriers, coding, etc.

Transmitted intelligence must assemble the suitable characteristics of the moment and ensure reliability, continuity, transmission security, and the wealth of content and its sufficiency. It must also be opportune and continuous. The security of transmission of intelligence affects plans and decisions that based on it. It must be sufficient, rich and trustworthy enough to give command, within a reasonable amount of time, as complete idea as possible of a situation and to plan for its possible evolution and factors that will affect that evolution. Sufficiency drastically limits the excesses of unnecessary information which disorients and tires those in command that try to use them.

G-2 is converted this way into the penetrating and lucid eyes of the operative command.

The security as “opposed complementary” of the reconnaissance.

The reverse of the own reconnaissance is the fight against the enemy reconnaissance and the intelligence. She has as purpose to blind the enemy about our intentions and deployments, depriving him of operational information on us or misleading them. Security is the “opposite” (complementary, not antagonistic) of our reconnaissance.

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol   COVERING A SECTOR…

One of the active ways of fighting enemy reconnaissance is employing our operations security. Other is to employ advanced detachments, type reinforced platoons, to push back the enemy’s reconnaissance by means of mobile fighting with its center of gravity” focused on where his reconnaissance have to operate. A pushed back reconnaissance can give erroneous information to its intelligence on the actual possibilities of possible axes of advance towards us, our real capacities or our defensive intentions.

One purpose of security is the immediate protection of units against surprises and the unforeseen, by keeping a sufficient “combat readiness” for such situations. Units must also keep necessary forces alert as part of maintaining a practical reaction time. The tasks of security are to protect units from direct fire of infantry heavy weapons, to detect and avoid surprises, ambushes and enemy incursions and to detect and reject enemy reconnaissance. Every unit establishes at all times the security sector, zone (brigade or regiment) and area (division), according to its size. Between 1/3 and 1/6 of the unit, according to the situation, carry out security functions; the organs of which are the different sub units of the branches employed.

For camping units or in assembly areas of different classes, a safety line is established to delimit the protected units and at suitable points (accesses, etc.) double sentries are placed. At difficult to secure places (gorges, etc.) rapid mine barriers are placed. From this line, security units advance fixed and mobile patrols. Fixed patrols monitor critical security points (dominating points, enemy possible observatories, inevitable passing points, etc), relying on the mobile units to achieve always an active security.

Resultado de imagen de campos de minas militares  MINES BARRIER.

And, this so useful and simple, is always done? No, sir, not always.

«On June 10, 1944, soon after the midnight, the second battalion of the 29th division of infantry of U.S.A. was prepared to pass the night. The men had traveled approximately 25 kilometers over the last 20 hours. The official in charge of the battalion, Commander Maurice Clift, chose a zone of two meadows so that the troops were to spend the night in the open. The men entered the zone and set themselves up for sleep along terraced hedges. They were so tired that no one bothered to untie their rucksacks and personal equipment. The majority fell asleep at once. Some heard the noise of approaching engines but thought they were American vehicles.

However, the vehicles were actually German tanks and trucks belonging to the 352nd infantry division. Unknown to each side, the Germans had been withdrawing along the same route that the American battalion followed in its advance. When they stopped, the German explorers detected the North American movements encamped in the meadows. They quietly advanced and surrounded the meadows.

Suddenly, the Germans threw flares. Under the sinister light, almost as brilliant as the midday light, its assault cannons opened fire on the hedges against the Americans. Along one of the hedges a platoon got up and was cut down by the German machine guns. Many Americans, scared and disoriented, were running in search of a way out of the meadow while the German infantries continued knocking them down them with repetitive fire. The shells of the German mortars were falling all over the meadows. The Americans responded with weak rifle fire, directed at the opposite hedges, which ran the risk of hitting either the Germans or their own men.

«It was terrible”, a survivor told General Cota. «We crawled more than 90 meters out of the field when we heard from behind the shouts of our men. I thought that the Germans were launching a bayonet charge against them».

The commander of second battalion, Lieutenant Colonel William Warfield had his command post in a farm close to the highway. Warfield tried in vain to establish a defense. Those officials who ran from the house towards the field were brought down rapidly. A German shouted in English to the command group: «Give up, give up!». «We will certainly not give up!”, roared Warfield. He tried to lead a small group towards meadow where the rest of his men were, but was killed instantly.

The battle lasted around 20 minutes. The battalion had 150 casualties with some 50 dead, slightly more than one third of its effective force. Just before dawn a gravely injured young lieutenant who was reporting to his division commander, General Charles Gerhardt, fell down suddenly on his knees and struck the soil with his fists, sobbing that he was sorry that all his men were dead and that he had left them where they had fallen.

General Gerhardt was angry. “Without regard for safety, he shouted, The battalion simply came to the field to fall asleep».

LA EXPLORACIÓN Y LA INTELIGENCIA: UN SISTEMA MILITAR OPERATIVO. 2ª PARTE.

(FINAL)

 

El futuro próximo de la exploración táctica.

Las principales armas de reconocimiento táctico, los tanques y las aeronaves de vuelo a bajas cotas, tienden a ser vulnerables a los cohetes antiaéreos y antitanques de la moderna infantería. Éstos aparecieron en el campo de batalla en los años 70 y han ido ganando efectividad desde entonces. En la última década, desde mediados de los 90, esos cohetes han ido incorporando diversas tecnologías como las cabezas activas dobles, los buscadores múltiples, que les permiten discriminar los señuelos enemigos y asegurar el blanco, y las que les permiten emplear alturas variables de vuelo. Por ejemplo, los próximos cohetes antitanques de infantería podrán localizar, definir y confirmar su blanco por distorsiones magnéticas del ambiente (generadas por la relativamente grande masa metálica del enemigo), señales acústicas, emisiones de calor (humanas y de motores y armas) y emisiones de onda corta. Su recorrido hasta el blanco oscilará para burlar las posibles contra armas desplegadas contra ellos.

Resultado de imagen de deep range combat and reconnaissance patrols NEW ZEALAND’S LONG RANGE RECON PATROL.

Todo esto tenderá a dar una mayor importancia en la exploración y el reconocimiento a las patrullas de infantería de largo recorrido (long range combat and/or reconnaissance patrols). Que son insertadas por medios aéreos o fluviales, lo más cerca posible de su zona de operaciones y diseñadas para permanecer un mayor tiempo en ella.

La exploración de combate: el contacto inmediato y continuo con el enemigo y la determinación de las capacidades del terreno de lucha.

La exploración de combate busca el reconocimiento del terreno, la relación con las unidades propias adyacentes en los puntos de contacto establecidos y el contacto inmediato con el enemigo, determinando sus intenciones y características. Su misión está subordinada a la obtención de inteligencia. Cada unidad debe establecerla siempre, sin necesidad de orden específica para ello. Es importante adelantarla lo más rápidamente posible, por lo que, si corre a cargo sólo de infantería, puede ser necesario acercarla en vehículos, para que luego continúe a pie.

En los flancos descubiertos y las alas expuestas su alcance debe prolongarse bastante. Mediante sus patrullas adelantadas, la exploración de combate constituye en su actuación una verdadera seguridad táctica para las unidades en el frente.

Los órganos de la exploración de combate son las compañías y secciones de exploración blindadas, las patrullas de exploración de las unidades en los diferentes sectores, los observatorios y pelotones adelantados de artillería, etc. La sección a disposición de la compañía de EE.MM. y servicios puede ser útil en el ámbito del batallón de infantería para la rápida actuación que decimos arriba.

La exploración de combate tiene una función primordial en la detección de las resistencias y las debilidades del despliegue y de las armas del enemigo, en las “interfases de acción” favorables que estamos creando con él. Ello requiere emplear una técnica de prueba, suficientemente intensa y nunca superficial, que permita conocer a las unidades tácticas, las debilidades y las fortalezas del despliegue contrario y las apariencias con las que intenta presentárnoslas. Para actuar en consecuencia, según la misión y el centro de gravedad del esfuerzo ordenados por el mando superior.

La información recolectada de diversas las fuentes, se convierte en inteligencia disponible y es transmitida a los interesados.

La exploración genera información de los diferentes niveles de actuación y de los terrenos, que también reconoce. Aquélla debe ser convertida en inteligencia. Ésta es el conocimiento razonablemente fiable y suficiente (nunca excesiva o intoxicante) del enemigo, de sus intenciones y posibilidades y del terreno en sus posibilidades de lucha, transitabilidad, etc. Recibida actualizada y sin solución de continuidad.

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol  PATRULLA…

Los órganos elaboradores de la inteligencia a partir de las exploraciones operativa y de combate deben ser diferentes, puesto que también lo son los dos tipos de información generados. La principal diferencia es que proceden de niveles de actuación cualitativamente diferentes, en cada uno de los cuales deben dar la visión de conjunto: enemigo, terreno y posibilidades. Y que la necesidad de la inteligencia de combate es urgente y más continua, y su trascendencia, muy fugaz, por lo que es mucho menos elaborada y más directa hacia las unidades en lucha, desde su exploración.

Una vez creada la inteligencia, es integrada por el mando superior existente de la misma, el G-2. Éste, mediante otros órganos, se encargará de transmitirla a las unidades y mandos interesados. Dicha transmisión debe ser protegida por todos los medios existentes, garantizando el secreto y su llegada a los destinatarios, mediante dobles estafetas, cifrados, etc.

La inteligencia transmitida debe reunir las características adecuadas en cuanto al momento, la fiabilidad, la actualidad y la continuidad, la seguridad de transmisión, la riqueza de contenido y su suficiencia. En cuanto al tiempo debe ser oportuna y continua. Su seguridad afecta a los planes y a las decisiones que a partir de ella se elaboren. Debe ser suficiente, rica y fiable para permitir a los correspondientes mandos, dedicándole sólo un tiempo razonable, hacerse una idea lo más completa posible de una situación y planear sus posibles evoluciones y los factores que a ellas concurrirán. La suficiencia limita drásticamente los excesos de información no necesaria, que desorientan o cansan al mando afectado por ellos.

El G-2 o el S-2 se convierten así en los ojos penetrantes y lúcidos del mando operativo.

La seguridad como opuesto complementario de la exploración.

El envés de la exploración propia es la lucha contra la exploración y la inteligencia enemigas. Ella tiene como finalidad el cegar al enemigo sobre nuestras intenciones, privándole de sus órganos detectores de información operativa sobre nosotros o incluso extraviándolos deliberadamente. La seguridad es algo así como el opuesto (complementario, no antagónico) de la exploración propia.

Una de las formas activas de combatir a la exploración enemiga es el empleo de la seguridad propia en todas las operaciones emprendidas. Otra es el empleo de destacamentos avanzados, tipo sección reforzada, para rechazar a las exploraciones operativa y estratégica enemigas, mediante la lucha móvil con centro de gravedad en los puntos donde dichas exploraciones tengan que operar. Una exploración rechazada puede dar informaciones erróneas a su inteligencia sobre las posibilidades reales de sus ejes de avance hacia su enemigo. Por ejemplo, puede valorar la capacidad de rechazo en una avenida de aproximación , por encima de nuestra capacidad real en ella o dar una información errónea sobre nuestras intenciones defensivas.

Resultado de imagen de soldiers on patrol CUBRIENDO UN SECTOR…

La seguridad tiene como finalidad la protección inmediata de las unidades frentes a las sorpresas e imprevistos, manteniendo un necesario y suficiente alistamiento de combate para esa situación. Sus misiones son la protección de la unidad frente al fuego directo de las armas pesadas de infantería, evitar e impedir las sorpresas, emboscadas e incursiones enemigas y la detección y el rechazo de la exploración enemiga. Cada unidad establece en todo momento el sector, la zona (brigada o regimiento) y el área (división) de seguridad, según su tamaño. Entre 1/3 y 1/7 de la unidad, según la situación general, realizan su seguridad, constituyendo sus órganos las distintas subunidades de todas las armas que en ella participan y la apoyan.

Para las unidades acampadas o en zonas de reunión de diferentes clases, se establece una línea de seguridad que delimita a las unidades aseguradas, en cuyos puntos adecuados (accesos, etc.) se colocan centinelas dobles. En los puntos conflictivos para aquélla (desfiladeros, etc.) se colocan obstáculos en forma de rápidas barreras de minas. Fuera de dicha línea, las unidades de seguridad avanzan patrullas fijas y móviles. Las primeras vigilarán los puntos críticos para la seguridad (puntos dominantes, posibles observatorios de la exploración enemiga, puntos de paso inevitables, etc), apoyándose en las otras para realizar siempre una seguridad activa.

Resultado de imagen de campos de minas militares BARRERA DE MINAS.

Y, esto tan simple y provechoso, ¿siempre se ejecuta? No, señor, no siempre.

El 10 de junio de 1.944, poco después de la media noche, el 2º batallón de la 29ª división de infantería de los EE.UU. se preparaba para pasar la noche. Los hombres habían caminado unos 25 Km. durante las últimas 20 horas.

El oficial ejecutivo del batallón, comandante Maurice Clift, escogió una zona formada por dos prados cercados, para que las tropas pasaran la noche al raso. Los hombres entraron en ellos y se dejaron caer contra los terraplenes de los altos setos que los enmarcaban. Tan cansados estaban los soldados que ni siquiera se molestaron en soltarse las mochilas y el equipo personal. La mayoría de ellos se quedaron dormidos de inmediato. Solamente unos pocos prestaron atención al ruido de unos motores aproximándose. Pero pensaron que eran vehículos norteamericanos.

Se trataba en realidad de vehículos blindados y camiones alemanes, integrados en una agrupación de marcha y pertenecientes a la 352º división de infantería. Sin saberlo ninguno de los dos rivales, los alemanes se habían estado retirando y siguiendo la misma ruta que el batallón americano recorría en su avance. Al detenerse éste, los exploradores alemanes detectaron los movimientos norteamericanos en los prados de acampada. Los alemanes avanzaron sigilosamente y rodearon los prados.

De pronto, los alemanes lanzaron bengalas de iluminación. Bajo la siniestra luz, casi tan brillante como la luz del mediodía, sus cañones de asalto abrieron fuego sobre los setos contra los norteamericanos. A lo largo de uno de los setos, una sección se incorporó y fue segada por las ametralladoras alemanas. Muchos norteamericanos, asustados y desorientados, corrían de un lado a otro, buscando la salida de los prados; los infantes alemanes los iban derribando con el fuego de repetición de sus fusiles de cerrojo. Las granadas de los morteros alemanes explotaban por todo la zona de los prados. Los norteamericanos respondían con un fuego de fusilería impreciso y espasmódico, dirigido a los setos opuestos, que podía alcanzar tanto a los alemanes como a sus propios hombres que deambulaban erráticamente.

Era terrible”, indicó un superviviente al general Cota. “Nos habíamos arrastrado más de 90 m. fuera del campo, cuando escuchamos desde atrás, un griterío de nuestros hombres. Yo pensé que los alemanes estaban lanzando una carga a la bayoneta contra ellos”.

El comandante de este 2º batallón, el teniente coronel William Warfield (irónicamente, campo de guerra), tenía su puesto de mando en una granja junto a la carretera. Warfield intentó establecer una defensa, pero fue en vano. Los oficiales que se lanzaron fuera de la casa hacia el campo, fueron abatidos rápidamente. Un alemán gritó en inglés hacia el grupo de mando: “¡Ríndanse, ríndanse!”. “¡De rendirse, ni hablar!”, rugió Warfield. Intentó llevar un pequeño grupo en dirección a los prados donde estaban sus hombres, pero resultó muerto inmediatamente.

La batalla se prolongó unos 20 minutos. El batallón tuvo 150 bajas—unos 50 muertos–, algo más de un tercio de sus efectivos. Poco antes del alba, un joven teniente malherido que informaba al jefe de su división, el general Charles Gerhardt, caía de pronto de rodillas y golpeaba con sus puños el suelo, mientras sollozaba y se lamentaba que todos sus hombres estaban muertos y que él los había dejado caer.

El general Gerhardt se enfureció. “Sin seguridad, gritó exaltado. “Simplemente el batallón llegó al campo y se echó a dormir”.

THE RECONNAISSANCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE: A MILITARY OPERATIONAL SYSTEM.

The reconnaissance generates information of the different operational levels of military action. This must be turned into intelligence. That is the reasonably trustworthy and sufficient knowledge of the enemy, his intentions and capacities and the fighting possibilities and transitability of fields, etc. To enable us to take a “founded resolution”, based on the use of our means and fighting forms, in accordance with our objectives.

Concepts y Principles of the Reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance is one of the most important functions to be fulfilled by units during operations. The information it provides, how it is elaborated and transmitted and to whom is a fundamental part of intelligence. This, finally, is one of the key factors of decisive command.

Resultado de imagen de SDKFZ 263.    SDKFZ 263.

Reconnaissance can be divided into strategic, operational or tactical and combat, according to its mission and the area it encompasses. The strategic one seeks to uncover key information about the enemy in the operations deep theater: his concentrations of forces, his great movements, his important defensive lines and possible surface targets, etc. A surface target becomes a “destruction zone” by the effective action of heavy weapons of destruction, for example, reactive artillery or tactical nuclear devices.

The operational or tactical reconnaissance tries to define the situation and the intentions of the enemy in the operations area of the great units, type division, corps or army. It determines the movements of the enemy in the border zone between forces, his formations and deployments, his defense lines and possible surface targets. This reconnaissance is carried out by aviation, drones, specific reconnaissance units and the reinforced reconnaissance armored battalion of the corps. In this respect, a total connection and complement must exist in the missions of aviation and ground reconnaissance and keeping in mind that its task is never of fighting.  

The reinforced reconnaissance battalion operates in a sector of up to 60 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. Its advance over the parent unit must be at least 6 hours in order to utilize gathered information. On the basis of its reconnaissance order, battalion commander, keeping his companies always under control, can send up to 16 patrols of 3 vehicles to covering his sector, looking always for a gravitational center of the deployment. Having done this, he can send on the concentric center of the effort up to 2 patrols’ echelons, being relieved or being inserted, according to the used method. Finally, if the area to reconnoiter is occupied by the enemy, he can advance his companies as attack spears, under the screen of advance patrols. The battalion must not infiltrate very deeply inside the enemy deployment, if there exists a serious risk of being isolated.

Resultado de imagen de Panhard AML-245    PANHARD AML 245.

Not all Armies have given or given sufficient value to this last reconnaissance type, which depends on their military doctrine.

All the operational principles of reconnaissance could be summarized as follows: Always focus on the objective received from the command (its mission is to generate information, the combat will be done by others), seeking the maximum use of time and its means, getting and maintaining contact with the enemy and never losing the freedom of action. It will allow him to perform and to escape, without being caught by ever higher forces.

The tactical reconnaissance is also needed in the urban combats. Not always the tactical reconnaissance penetrates too much in the disputed or enemy area. The industrial or populated zones, full of «concealing relative heights» and staggered in depth, which offer protection from the enemy sights, even nearby, and covers against the light and heavy fire, «thicken» considerably the tactical maneuver of the contenders. Reducing this way, the depth of the fighting zone of the infantry. So, masses of the artillery, as batteries and medium groups of it, are deployed at very short distance to his enemy. In a artillery fighting zone then very next to the forward limit of the own defense position.

On October 9, 1942 a patrol of Soviet reconnaissance entered behind the German lines in Stalingrad, seeking to detect the enemy movements in his rear. The 4 men sheltered in an auxiliary railroad coach, torn and left, placed in a railroad between the workshops of the Red October factory (where before were made metallic pieces and small weapon), at North-East of the city. And the disputed Mamaiev hill, towards the geographical center of Stalingrad, which was offering grand sights on most of the city.

Resultado de imagen de Engesa EE-9 Cascavel brasileño. ENGESA EE-9 CASCAVEL.

During almost the whole day they remained in that hiding place, communicating by radio to his lines the German activity. They had located several dozens of German mortars and howitzers, accompanied by the trucks which were moving his ammunition, by the rear roads to some emplacements placed in the suburbs of Stalingrad’s west. Also they located numerous mortars and pieces placed in a glen at the north of the Mamaiev hill, doing fire against the Soviet positions in the city.

On having got dark, the explorers broke a telephonic cable of the fixed enemy network of communications and hoped that the Germans were coming to repair it. Very soon they observed the light of a lantern and when the soldier came closer, killed him to shots. One of the Soviets disguised himself with his uniform and placed close to the route of the railroad, hoping that another German came closer the cut cable. Soon another lantern started approaching by the way. The soldier fell in the ambush and the explorers made it unconscious. On having recovered, he met 4 Soviets of foot together near him. Pulled down the soldier Willy Brandt gave his name, range and unit of belonging. Psychologically they had already gained the hand on him.

Resultado de imagen de drones guerra Vietnam   DRONE AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, IN VIETNAM.

Immediately afterwards, the German told to the explorers that 94th German infantry division had come to the factories zone from the south of the city, that 24th panzer division was going towards there and that the Fuehrer had ordered that Stalingrad should be totally taken by October, 15. This confirmed to them the reason of the extensive movements estimated by them in the German operational zone.

For the small reconnaissance patrol, to take with it after his lines, a prisoner already interrogated, was more a nuisance and a danger that a minimal success. And, in spite of the hardness, even the brutality, of the combats in the city, they neither killed, nor mutilated him. The Soviets reported to Brandt that had revealed military secrets, took him to the railroad line and indicated the direction that he had to continue to reach his comrades and left him free”.

But, what is this of speaking about operational reconnaissance in the age of the electronics, the robotics and the computer science?

Almost 50 years ago, the North Americans had developed an arsenal of electronic devices, directed to the vigilance (surveillance) of his enemies in Vietnam. Already they had reconnaissance drones to monitor «from above» their guerrilla slippery enemy. That transmitted his images by television to the planes of detection and transmission, placed at dozens of km from the observed zone.

Resultado de imagen de sensor ADSID   ADSID SENSORS .

The principal sensor used in the remote vigilance was the ADSID (Air Delivered Seismic Intruder Device). It was thrown principally from the F-4 Phantom, following guidelines of navigation by radar, in order to cover adequately the observing zone, as a traffic route of men and vehicles, a parking or store. The device measured 91 cm. of length and 15 cm. of diameter. And on having fallen down was remaining almost buried, opening then a transmitting aerial of 120 cm. height, camouflaged as if it was a defoliated bush. His battery allowed it to issue during a month and half.

With these sophisticated artifices they were trying to observe the traffic of goods and men by the Ho Chi Minh Route, the route of supplies of the Popular Army of North Vietnam and the Vietcong in South Vietnam. It was a highly branched out and protected route that, departing from North Vietnam penetrated in Laos and crossed it. And then, detached diverse routes towards the different communist operations zones in South Vietnam.

The program «White Igloo» destined 1,7 thousands of million dollars between 1966 and 1971, for these tasks of compilation of information with the ADSID. With the information gathered from the traffic in the routes, the Americans were deciding the interdiction bombardment actions, using his different air devices, including the invisible and inaudible (with his cruise height) B-52 strategic bombardiers. At the beginning of 1971, the information of the aerial photos after the bombardments, taken by planes that were flying after the assault formations, allowed the analysts to suppose that the «war of trucks» was causing a very severe effort to the industrial capacity of the suppliers of North Vietnam (the USSR and China).

Resultado de imagen de Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System  A BOEING OF THE JSTARS SYSTEM.

But, if it was true that were destroying so many trucks and equipment, how was possible that the communists were keeping the tactical initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks that literally had to cover many of the ways and parks of the Route? Who were bothering to remove them? The response was given soon by the American junior officers: they were ate by a monster called the «Great Laotian Truck Eater»; a horrible rotten that was getting up towards the dawn and was devouring the vehicles destroyed by the aviation during the night, after the photography for «wreck count». Because the Americans are very scrupulous with the statistics and consider the lie an almost inexcusable social sin for his civil servants.

Up to today, almost 50 years later, the electronics, the robotics and the computer science have continued improving. But it does not seem that they are useful in Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria, to detect a “donkey bomb”; to avoid that group of cruel fanatics without God («as Allah does the Good, make you also the Good and do not promote the corruption (the “evil», the Noble Koran orders them), destroys great part of one of the principal mosques sanctuaries of the chiism in Samarra; to know if in an Iraqi or Syrian house are terrorists or only a terrified Arabic family, before demolishing her with heavy fire from a distance and extremely, according to his military operational doctrine.

In addition, during enough time still the air and spatial American means, as spy satellites, drones or not crewed planes and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have serious limitations for the detection and check of small ground, even regular, forces. In the areas of difficult transitability and with possibilities of concealment, as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized zones (industrial, of logistics, and of housings). Those not only offer concealment, but also coverings from the fire up to the near combat distances.

The Americans do not use the tactical reconnaissance, which demands some tactical characteristics of semi independent elite forces and a specific moral courage. And that is one of the most difficult tasks of the infantry. They use the combat reconnaissance and call her, expressively, reconnaissance.

(TO BE CONTINUED).

LA EXPLORACIÓN Y LA INTELIGENCIA: UN SISTEMA MILITAR OPERATIVO.

La exploración y el reconocimiento del terreno generan información de los diferentes niveles de actuación militar. Entonces debe ser convertida en inteligencia. Ésta es el conocimiento razonablemente fiable y suficiente del enemigo, de sus intenciones y capacidades, y del terreno en sus posibilidades de lucha, transitabilidad, etc. Que nos permitan tomar una resolución fundada sobre el empleo de nuestros medios y de las formas de lucha, en función de nuestros objetivos.

Conceptos y principios de la exploración.

La exploración es una de las funciones más importantes a desempeñar por las unidades en operaciones. Sus datos, debidamente filtrados, elaborados y transmitidos a quien corresponda forman una parte fundamental de la inteligencia. Ésta, por fin, es uno de los factores eficaces del mando decisivo.

La exploración se puede dividir en estratégica, operativa o táctica y de combate, según su misión y el ámbito de obtención. La estratégica busca perfilar y definir los grandes datos sobre el enemigo en la profundidad del teatro de operaciones: las grandes concentraciones de fuerzas, sus movimientos, las líneas defensivas importantes, los posibles blancos de superficie, etc. Un blanco de superficie se convierte en zona de destrucción por la acción eficaz de armas pesadas de destrucción, por ejemplo, la artillería reactiva o los ingenios nucleares tácticos.

La exploración táctica u operativa trata de definir la situación y las intenciones del enemigo en el ámbito de las operaciones de las grandes unidades, tipo división, cuerpo o ejército. Determina los movimientos del enemigo en la frontera con la propia zona de operaciones, sus formaciones y dispositivos, sus líneas de defensa y los posibles blancos de superficie. Sus órganos son la aviación tripulada o no (los drones), la exploración específica de algunas unidades y el batallón reforzado de exploración blindado de la división o del cuerpo de ejército. En este sentido, deben existir una total conexión y un complemento en sus misiones entre la aviación y la exploración terrestre y considerar que su tarea no es de lucha.

Resultado de imagen de SDKFZ 263. SDKFZ 263.

El batallón de exploración reforzado actúa en una zona de hasta unos 60 Km. de ancho y hasta unos 120 Km. de profundidad. Su adelanto sobre la unidad mecanizada o motorizada debe ser al menos de 6 horas, para el aprovechamiento de la información recolectada. Sobre la base de su orden de exploración, el jefe de batallón, manteniendo siempre bajo su mando a las compañías, puede enviar hasta 15 patrullas de 2-3 vehículos a cubrir su sector. Buscando siempre un centro de gravedad de dicho despliegue. Creado aquél, puede mandar sobre dicho centro del esfuerzo hasta 2 escalones de patrullas, relevándose o intercalándose, según la técnica que sigan. Por último, si el terreno a reconocer preferentemente está ocupado por el enemigo, puede hacer avanzar sobre él a sus compañías en puntas de ataque, bajo la pantalla de las patrullas más avanzadas. Es de señalar que el batallón no debe infiltrarse tan profundamente en el interior del dispositivo enemigo, si existe en ello riesgo importante de ser aislado.

Resultado de imagen de Panhard AML-245 PANHARD AML 245.

No todos los ejércitos le han dado o le dan valor suficiente a estas dos últimas exploraciones, lo cual depende de su doctrina militar.

Todos los principios operativos de la exploración podrían resumirse así: Centrarse siempre en el objetivo recibido del mando (su misión es generar información, el combate ya lo harán otros), buscando el máximo uso del tiempo y de sus medios, consiguiendo y manteniendo el contacto con el enemigo, sin perder nunca la libertad de acción. Ésta le permitirá desempeñarse y escabullirse, sin ser atrapado por fuerzas siempre superiores.

La exploración táctica es también empleada en los combates urbanos. No siempre la exploración táctica penetra tanta distancia en el terreno disputado o enemigo. Las zonas pobladas o fabriles, llenas de “alturas ocultantes relativas” y escalonadas en profundidad, que brindan protección a las vistas enemigas, incluso cercanas, y hasta cubiertas contra el fuego ligero y pesado, “espesan” considerablemente la maniobra táctica de los contendientes. Reduciendo muchísimo sí, la profundidad de la zona de lucha de la infantería. Así, masas de la artillería, como baterías e inclusos grupos medianos de ella, se encuentran desplegadas a muy corta distancia de su enemigo, en una zona de lucha de la artillería entonces muy próxima al límite anterior de la posición de defensa propia.

El 9 de octubre de 1942 una patrulla de exploración soviética se adentró tras las líneas alemanas en Stalingrado, buscando detectar en su retaguardia los movimientos enemigos. Los 4 hombres se refugiaron en un vagón auxiliar de ferrocarril roto y abandonado, situado en una línea férrea entre los talleres de la fábrica Octubre Rojo (donde antes se fabricaban piezas metálicas y pequeñas armas), al noreste de la ciudad, y la disputada colina Mámaiev, hacia el centro geográfico de aquélla, que brindaba vistas grandiosas sobre la mayor parte de Stalingrado. Durante casi todo el día permanecieron en aquel escondite, comunicando por radio a sus líneas la actividad alemana. Habían localizado a varias decenas de morteros y obuses alemanes, acompañados de los camiones en los que trasladaban sus municiones, que se desplazaban por las carreteras de retaguardia hasta unos emplazamientos situados en los suburbios del oeste de Stalingrado. También localizaron a numerosos morteros y piezas situados en una hondonada al norte de la colina Mámaiev, haciendo fuego contra las posiciones soviéticas en la ciudad.

Al oscurecer, los exploradores rompieron un cable telefónico de la red de comunicaciones fija enemiga y esperaron a que los alemanes acudiesen a repararlo. Muy pronto observaron de lejos la luz de una linterna y cuando el soldado se aproximó, lo mataron a tiros. Uno de los soviéticos se disfrazó con su uniforme y se situó junto a la vía del ferrocarril, esperando que otro alemán se aproximara al cable cortado. Al poco otra linterna empezó a acercarse por la vía. El soldado cayó en la emboscada y los exploradores lo dejaron inconsciente. Al recobrarse se encontró con los 4 soviéticos de pie junto a él. Aterrado el soldado Willy Brandt dio su nombre, rango y unidad de pertenencia. Psicológicamente le habían ya ganado la mano. Seguidamente el alemán refirió a los exploradores que la 94 división de infantería alemana había llegado a la zona de las fábricas desde el sur de la ciudad, que la 24 división panzer se dirigía hacia allí y que el Fuehrer había ordenado que se ocupase totalmente Stalingrado para el 15 de octubre. Esto les confirmaba la razón de los extensos movimientos apreciados por ellos en la zona operativa alemana.

Resultado de imagen de Engesa EE-9 Cascavel brasileño. ENGESA EE-9 CASCAVEL.

Para la patrulla de exploración llevar consigo a un prisionero ya interrogado tras sus líneas era más un incordio y un peligro que un mínimo éxito. Y, a pesar de la dureza, incluso la brutalidad, de los combates en la ciudad, no lo mataron, ni lo mutilaron. Los soviéticos le comunicaron a Brandt que había revelado secretos militares, le llevaron a la línea férrea y le indicaron la dirección que debía seguir para alcanzar a sus camaradas y lo dejaron en libertad.

Pero, ¿qué es esto de hablar de exploración operativa en la era de la electrónica, la robótica y la informática?

Hace casi 50 años, los norteamericanos habían desarrollado un arsenal de artilugios electrónicos, encaminados a la vigilancia (surveillance) de sus enemigos en Vietnam.

Ya tenían drones de exploración para vigilar “from above” al enemigo guerrillero escurridizo. Las aeronaves no tripuladas, aún en sus albores técnicos, trasmitían sus imágenes por televisión a unos aviones de detección y transmisión, situados a unas decenas de Km. de la zona observada.

Resultado de imagen de drones guerra Vietnam DRONE AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, EN VIETNAM.

Resultado de imagen de sensor ADSID SENSORES ADSID.

El principal sensor utilizado en la vigilancia remota era el ADSID (Air Delivered Seismic Intruder Device). Se lanzaba principalmente desde los F-4 Phantom, siguiendo pautas de navegación por radar, con el fin de cubrir adecuadamente la zona a observar, bien una vía de tránsito de hombres y vehículos, bien un estacionamiento o almacén. El aparato medía unos 91 cm. de largo y unos 15 cm. de diámetro y al caer quedaba casi enterrado, desplegando entonces una antena emisora de 120 cm. de altura, camuflada como si fuera una mata deshojada. Su batería le permitía emitir durante casi mes y medio.

Con estos sofisticados artificios pretendían observar el tránsito de mercancías y hombres por la Ruta Ho Chi Minh, la vía de abastecimientos del Ejército Popular de Vietnam del Norte y del Viet Cong en Vietnam del Sur. Era una ruta muy ramificada que, partiendo de Vietnam del Norte se internaba en Laos y lo recorría, protegiéndose, y destacando entonces diversas vías hacia las distintas zonas de operaciones de aquéllos en Vietnam del Sur.

El programa “Igloo White” destinó 1,7 miles de millones de dólares de los de entonces entre 1966 y 1971, para estas tareas de recolección de información con los ADSID. Con los datos recogidos del tránsito en las vías, los norteamericanos decidían las acciones de bombardeo de interdicción, a cargo de sus distintos ingenios aéreos, incluyendo los invisibles e inaudibles (por su altura de crucero) bombarderos estratégicos B-52. A primeros de 1971 los datos de las fotografías aéreas tras los bombardeos, tomadas por aviones que volaban después de las formaciones de ataque, permitían suponer a los analistas que la “guerra de camiones” estaba causando un muy severo esfuerzo a la capacidad industrial de los suministradores de Vietnam del Norte (la URSS y China).

Pero, si era cierto que se destruían tantos camiones y equipos, ¿cómo era posible que los comunistas mantuvieran la iniciativa en Vietnam del Sur? Por otro lado, ¿dónde estaban las decenas de miles de restos de camiones que literalmente debían plagar muchas de las vías y parques de la Ruta? ¿quiénes se molestaban en quitarlos? La respuesta la dieron pronto los jóvenes oficiales norteamericanos: los comía un monstruo llamado el “Great Laotian Truck Eater”; un horrendo carroñero que se levantaba hacia el amanecer y devoraba los vehículos destruidos por la aviación durante la noche, después de la fotografía de rigor para el “wreck count”. Porque los norteamericanos son muy escrupulosos con las estadísticas y consideran a la mentira un pecado social casi imperdonable para sus funcionarios.

Hasta hoy, casi 50 años después, la electrónica, la robótica y la informática han seguido mejorando. Pero no parece que sirvan de mucho en Irak, para detectar a un burro bomba; para evitar que un grupo de fanáticos desalmados sin Dios (“al igual que Allah hace el bien, haced vosotros también el bien y no fomentéis la corrupción(el «mal”, les manda el Noble Corán), destruya gran parte de una de las principales mezquitas santuarios del chiismo en Samarra; para saber si en una casa iraquí hay terroristas o sólo una aterrorizada familia árabe, antes de demolerla de lejos y sobradamente, con fuego pesado, según su doctrina militar operativa vigente.

Resultado de imagen de Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System BOEING DEL SISTEMA JSTARS.

Además, durante bastante tiempo aún los medios aéreos y espaciales estadounidenses, como satélites espías, drones o aviones no tripulados y aviones del sistema Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), tendrán serias limitaciones para la detección y verificación de pequeñas fuerzas terrestres, incluso regulares, en los terrenos de difícil transitabilidad y con posibilidades de ocultamiento, como montañas, junglas y bosques, pantanos y zonas urbanizadas (fabriles, de almacenaje y distribución, y de viviendas). Aquéllos no sólo ofrecen ocultamiento, sino también cubiertas al fuego hasta las distancias próximas de combate.

Los norteamericanos no emplean la exploración táctica, que exige unas características tácticas de fuerzas semi independientes de élite y un coraje moral específico. Y que es una de las más difíciles tareas de la infantería. Ellos usan la exploración de combate y la llaman, expresivamente, reconnaissance.

(CONTINUARÁ)

THE SOCIAL PROPAGANDA. CHARACTERISTICS AND MEANS.

Characteristics.

Being an eminently practical phenomenon, the praxis of propaganda is defined by «norms or principles of action«.

Propaganda must be «simple, easy.» Both in its structure and in its concept and transfer to its «objective.» Therefore, the basic concepts of our doctrine and interests must be sought and exploited with it. And state and present them in a clear, easy and appropiate manner. Both in the words (texts and slogans) and in the images we use for their diffusion and impregnation in the social group. And taking into account the means employed and the immediacy and depth that our ideas have to acquire in the group to which are directed.

Resultado de imagen de propaganda social CHINESE PROPAGANDA AGAINST TAIWAN.

Propaganda must be empathetic. That is, it must create and maintain adherence, loyalty and likings towards our ideas and interests in the social selected group. This way , several are the specific instruments to achieve this fundamental empathy of the group with us.

It can be praised the exterior or interior dangers that threaten us. And to highlight our role of «victim«, with the losses and the sufferings that it carries. This way, the Manicheism, which raises an incisive good-bad dilemma, which is gray and vague in the reality, can be used in our favor.

Resultado de imagen de dios lo quiere

It is important that the unanimity exists in our social group towards our reason and identity. And it must be so, at least, in the practical sense. Discordant active little “groups” cannot exist , in this social group.

All this must be repeated and canalized to keep the «propitious spirit» in the group, according to his idiosyncrasy. And to harmonize and orchestrate the actions and aspirations and the facts, to give them the maximum efficiency and extension in the «animated set» with a purpose.

It is necessary that the habitual religion in the group supports us or, at least, is benevolent with us. This reinforces extraordinarily our reason. Since the religion forms a part of the sense of personal and collective identity of the social group.

«God is with us«, was appearing in the clasps of the German soldiers during the World War I.

«In God we trust«, it says the American currency.

«We are the people of God«, say the Jews, the Hussite and the Umma or universal community of the Muslims.

«The Crusade in Europe«, so the Allies titled his campaigns against Germany and Italy. And it is the title of the memories book of his military chief in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

«God wants it«, were saying the Europeans crusades in his campaigns of recovery of Jerusalem and the Holy Land for the Christianity.

The Means used by the Propaganda.

— The word, in any form of used expression, is the creator and the vehicle of the concepts and the ideas. We think with the words, to elaborate our ideas and definitions. This explains also the need and the result of possessing an extensive and rich vocabulary for the cerebral and cognitive development. And, for his maintenance and conservation.

This way, the written documents of all classes favor the galvanization of the group and the integration in a common, monolithic and real identity.

Resultado de imagen de simbolos soviéticos THE SHIELD OF THE USSR.

The applied, general and sufficient education allows to create and transmit successively to the generations, an intellectual and moral commitment with the identity and interests and motivations of the group.

— The images, in the shape of cartels and assemblies, allow to expose to the uncultured ones the thoughts and common symbols.

— The symbols are essential in the exhibition of our personal and collective identity. In them are condensed and reflected many of our internal drives, of our lacks and of our aspirations, of our sense of group. The set of the symbols is called incompletely a «paraphernalia». The more a social group develops, the appearance and the importance of his symbols will go increasing for him.

The symbols of a group, which exhibit the reason, essence and belonging in it of the individual and of the group, are very varied:

Flags and banners; national and of a party and of group shields; badges, ranks and medals of belonging, category and of merits within the group; anthems and minor songs; prominent figures of diverse levels, in which the different sectors of a group or the community feel led and represented; statues of his great men, heroes and outstanding figures and sculptural compositions, which reflect essential or important moments of the social group.

Active participation in mass meetings increases the group’s sense of belonging and its unity.

Music is another highly used mean. Choral singing and instruments such as drum and trumpet are especially useful.

Architecture and sculpture also characterize a complex social idea and a civilization. They are a permanent expression of their essential or temporal beliefs. Over time, both adapt to them.

Cinema and radio are means of transferring thoughts, culture and belonging to the group. And, more modern, television is. That, at first, it did not have the effectiveness and the generality of employment of those.

Resultado de imagen de propaganda social

Internet is considered, as a means of propaganda, but for many, is a strange, unpredictable and negative mean. This is probably the case, because of its global, anonymous, free and controversial nature. On one hand, it is a channel of unverified information, almost by essence and definition. It is also, many times, a spokesperson for outbursts, even ruinous and vile, propagated by elusive elements and almost without responsibilities for it.

And the algorithms used in modern times make it possible to calculate and make various predictions, which are not verifiable. And already from the beginning of the phenomenon studied.

Nota bene. — This work is a complement to our study on the «Psychological War». We also recommend its reading in this «blog» to all those interested in the topic.

LA PROPAGANDA SOCIAL. CARACTERÍSTICAS Y MEDIOS.

Características.

Al ser un fenómeno eminentemente práctico, la praxis de la propaganda se define por unas “normas o principios de actuación”.

La propaganda debe ser “simple, sencilla”. Tanto en su estructura, como en su concepto y transferencia a su “objetivo”. Por ello, se deben buscar y explotar con ella los conceptos básicos de nuestra doctrina e intereses. Y enunciarlos y presentarlos de una manera clara, fácil y oportuna. Tanto en las palabras (textos, consignas y lemas) como en las imágenes que empleemos para su difusión e impregnación en el grupo social. Y teniendo en cuenta los medios empleados y la inmediatez y profundidad que tengan que adquirir nuestras ideas en aquél al que van dirigidas.Resultado de imagen de propaganda social  PROPAGANDA CHINA CONTRA TAIWAN.

La propaganda tiene que ser empática. Es decir, debe crear y mantener adhesión, lealtad y simpatía hacia nuestras ideas e intereses en el grupo social seleccionado. Así, varios son los instrumentos específicos para lograr esa empatía fundamental del grupo con nosotros.

Se pueden magnificar los peligros exteriores o interiores que nos amenazan. Y resaltar nuestro papel de “víctima”, con las pérdidas y los sufrimientos que ello conlleva. Así, el maniqueismo, que plantea un dilema tajante bueno-malo, que es gris e impreciso en la realidad, se puede usar en nuestro favor.

Resultado de imagen de dios lo quiere

 

Es importante que en nuestro grupo social exista la unanimidad hacia nuestra causa e identidad. Y se pretende que lo sea, al menos, en el sentido práctico. No pueden existir “grupúsculos activos discordantes”, GAD, en ese grupo social.

Todo ello debe ser repetido y canalizado para mantener el “espíritu propicio” en el grupo, según su idiosincrasia. Y armonizar y orquestar las actuaciones y aspiraciones y los hechos, para darles la máxima efectividad y extensión en el “conjunto animado” con un propósito, “CAP”.

Es necesario que la religión habitual en el grupo nos apoye o, al menos, sea benevolente con nosotros. Esto refuerza extraordinariamente nuestra causa. Ya que la religión forma parte del sentido de identidad personal y colectiva del grupo social.

Dios está con nosotros”, figuraba en las hebillas de los soldados alemanes durante la II Guerra Mundial.

En Dios confiamos”, reza la moneda estadounidense.

Somos el pueblo de Dios”, dicen los judíos, los herejes husitas y la Umma o comunidad universal de los musulmanes.

La Cruzada en Europa”, titularon los Aliados sus campañas contra Alemania e Italia. Y es el título del libro de memorias de su jefe militar en Europa, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Dios lo quiere”, decían los cruzados europeos en sus empresas de recuperación de Jerusalén para la Cristiandad.

Los medios empleados por la propaganda.

La palabra, en cualquier forma de expresión usada, es la creadora y el vehículo de los conceptos y de las ideas. Pensamos con las palabras, para elaborar nuestras ideas y definiciones. Esto explica también la necesidad y el resultado de poseer un vocabulario extenso y rico para el desarrollo cerebral y cognitivo. Y, para su mantenimiento y conservación.

Así, los documentos escritos de todas clases favorecen la galvanización del grupo y la integración en una identidad común, monolítica y real.

Resultado de imagen de simbolos soviéticos ESCUDO DE LA U.R.S.S.

La educación aplicada, general y suficiente permite crear y transmitir sucesivamente a las generaciones, un compromiso intelectual y moral con la identidad e intereses y motivaciones del grupo.

Las imágenes, en forma de carteles y montajes, permiten exponer a los iletrados los pensamientos y símbolos comunes.

Los símbolos son esenciales en la exhibición de nuestra identidad personal y colectiva. En ellos se condensan y se reflejan muchas de nuestras pulsiones internas, de nuestras carencias y de nuestras aspiraciones, de nuestro sentido de grupo. Al conjunto de los símbolos se las llama incompletamente “parafernalia”. Cuanto más se desarrolla un grupo social, la aparición y la importancia de sus símbolos irá en aumento para él.

Los símbolos de un colectivo, que exhiben la razón, esencia y pertenencia en aquél del individuo y del grupo, son muy variados:

Banderas y estandartes; escudos nacionales, de partido y de grupo; insignias, grados y medallas de pertenencia, de categoría y de méritos dentro de la colectividad; himnos y canciones menores; personajes de diversos niveles, donde se ven liderados y representados los distintos sectores de un grupo y la propia colectividad entera; estatuas de sus próceres, héroes y personajes descollantes y composiciones escultóricas, que reflejen momentos esenciales o importantes del grupo social.

La participación activa en las concentraciones de masas aumenta el sentido de pertenencia y de unidad del grupo.

La música es otro medio muy empleado. Son especialmente útiles el canto coral e instrumentos como el tambor y la trompeta.

Resultado de imagen de arquitectura nazi

La arquitectura y la escultura también caracterizan a una idea social compleja y a una civilización. Aquellas una expresión permanente de sus creencias esenciales o temporales. Con el paso del tiempo, ambas se van adaptando a ellas.

El cine y la radio son medios de transferencia de los pensamientos, la cultura y la pertenencia al grupo. Y, más modernamente, lo es la televisión. Que, al principio, no tuvo la eficacia y la generalidad de empleo de aquellos.

Resultado de imagen de propaganda social

La Red o Internet es considerada, como medio de propaganda y por muchos, como extraña, impredecible y negativa. Probablemente, ocurre así por su naturaleza global, anónima, libre e instrumento de polémica. Por un lado, es un canal de información no contrastada, casi por esencia y definición. Es, también, muchas veces, un vocero de exabruptos, incluso ruines y viles, propagados por elementos escurridizos y casi sin responsabilidades.

Y los algoritmos usados modernamente permiten calcular y hacer predicciones varias, que no son comprobables. Y ya desde el principio del fenómeno estudiado.

Nota.– Este trabajo es un complemento de nuestro estudio sobre la “Guerra Psicológica”. Recomendamos también su lectura en este “blog” a todos los interesados en el tema.

The Will of Defense of a Society. 2nd Part.

(FINAL)

And the Strategy, the Operational Strategy and the Tactics, as Levels of its Military Actuation.

 

The Levels of Military Actuation.

The first level of activity in the defense of a society is called national strategy or, also, in a some antiquated form, great strategy. In it are included the economic and diplomatic resources of the State. As part of the resources of a nation to get his great strategics aims in a war.

Resultado de imagen de montesquieu  THE BARON OF MONTESQUIEU.

 

Military Strategy, or simply Strategy, in a great second level of activity, refers to the definition of the larger aims of a war, of an operations theater or of a campaign, including the distribution of the generally scanty military resources used to fulfill them.

Tactics refers to the ideal execution of the combats with an enemy, who opposes with armaments, to the achievement of our strategic aims.

Between strategy and tactics exists an essentially practical space of prominent activity, called the operational level or operational strategy. Its mission is to optimize tactics and the means available in a campaign and in the theater of operations. As such, it defines and conceptualizes the battles, marches, etc., both the military operations and its correct succession, according to those decisive aims. It provides the tactics and the decision, a transcendence far beyond of the pursuit and the tactical exploitation of success. That is to say, operational strategy employs tactics as an essential instrument, combining them to achieve the ultimate objectives to which they are orientated and dedicated to achieving, forming then part of its strategic nature.

 

Thus, the operational strategy defines its own aims in the theater or in the campaign of action, which are the incapacity and disorganization of the enemy by exploiting his strategic and operational vulnerabilities. The first is orientated to reducing the enemy’s combat capacity, seeking to functionally or positionaly disable it, while protecting own’s combat capacity. The second is get by occupying or destroying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities in the operations zone.

Resultado de imagen de refinería de petróleo OIL REFINERY: SYMBOL OF THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF A MODERN SOCIETY.

 

The critics vulnerabilities of the enemy are those whose occupation or destruction produces his serious disorganization and/or the loss of his will of defense. They are those elements, characteristics, possessions that give sense to the fight that he maintains. Its loss instills inevitably in the enemy a sensation of hopelessness and a sense of uselessness in continuing the fight at those moments, except for accumulating more losses.

The critics vulnerabilities are different in each one of the levels of military action, although the effects produced in the superior levels are transmitted to the inferior ones.

A strategic critical vulnerability, handled capably by the Spaniards in century XVI during the conquest of America, was the capture of the great chief or emperor of the indigenous confederations of the great invaded countries (Moctezuma in Mexico, Atahualpa in Peru). But, once turned hostage, the symbolic representation of a leader of this type plummeted, because the social vitality of the community which he directed, demands his renovation, as if he had died.

In II World War, the occupation of the capital and the fall of the government were strategic critics vulnerabilities, to which was acceded through an operational strategy of mobile warfare: spring campaign of 1,940 in the Western Front. The same tried Hitler in 1941 in relation with Moscow in the East front. Probably in that total war, almost of extermination, its fall had not the political importance that was attributed to it. But Moscow constituted a great hub, a railway communications center vital for all the U.R.S.S. at the west of the Urales and, in this sense, it had been a critical operational vulnerability.

To achieve these strategic intermediate aims, the operational level has some specific operational means that are the intelligence, the imbalance and the incapacity of the enemy, the time or speed of the operations and combats, the logistic organization and his physical support or line of supplies and the correct sense of the own command.

It uses these means to drive and to use ideally (and without squandering) the tactical-operational means at his disposition.

Resultado de imagen de reuniones sindicales grandes  THE NATIONAL MORAL FLOURISHES IN ALL THE PLACES OF SOCIAL COEXISTENCE.

These are:

The ground transitability (in the whole geographical dimension of the nature of the areas, climate, station and hour of the day),

the combat capacity (military means made concrete in men, equipment, supports and combat vehicles) and the capacity of operational movement (transport of great and small tonnage, the supplies of all kinds and combustibles and the warehouses and accessible parks in the zone) owns available,

the freedom of action and the «favorable interfaces of action» with the enemy (that exist and that they can also be created always, by means of the extension or decrease of the «field of action» on that, as a tactical operational zoom, or by means of his change to another front sector or in the depth of the enemy zone). With these last 2 «systems» we can act always according to our criterion and interest and not simply react to the actions of the enemy.

This way, the mentioned «operational systems» realize the employment and the functioning of all the levels of the national defense. And they go from the conception and the great creation of aims, interests and available resources, received from the command and the nation, up to its practical final accomplishment. Involving in this also the necessary and the inevitable and imposed by the enemy, tactical employments of the military means, as stages for the ideal achievement of those commended aims.

THE END.