THE ART OF WAR OF GENGHIS KHAN. 2nd Part.

(Continuation)

The positional Dislocation of the Enemy.

Genghis and his army marched safely, crossing more than 500 km of the seemingly impenetrable Kizil Kum desert. And at the beginning of April 1220, Genghis Khan unexpectedly appeared in the city of Bukhara, some 500 km inside Transoxian territory, near the Amur Daria river.

Without having yet fought a major battle, the numerically inferior Mongol army had positionally dislocated the bulk of the Turkmen army and cut Mohamed II‘s line of connection with his western provinces, where many Turkish forces still remained immobilized for this war.

Idealized description of Lieutenant Subidai Bahadur

A “shock wave” swept through the Kharizmi field army, overwhelming it. Mohamed‘s troops remained in the various fortified positions and cities they occupied, defending them, but with a broken spirit. The operational unity of the forces, which is required for successive tactical battles to have significance, had disappeared. It was in the hands of the Great Khan to go waging the necessary combats to liquidate, as would happen in an «imaginary encirclement«, limited by the Sir Darya to the east, by its imposing and unexpected presence to the west, by the desert to the north and south, to the different enemy tactical groups in Transoxiana, already disjointed and disappointed.

Xenophon had already pointed out: “Whatever happens, pleasant or terrible, the less it has been foreseen, the greater joy or terror it causes. This is nowhere better seen than in war, where any surprise strikes terror into even the bravest.»

Mongolian combat idealization

Let’s see some passages from «My Reflections on the Art of War» by Marshal Mauritiusof Saxony, published posthumously in 1757. In them, a deep insight into tactics and human motivations is evident, greater than in any other work by a European author. since the Romans.

“Men always fear the consequences of danger more than the danger itself. I can give a multitude of examples. Suppose that column storms an entrenchment and its point reaches the edge of the ditch. If a handful of men (from the entrenched side) appear a hundred paces outside the entrenchment, it is certain that the head of the column will stop, or that it will not be followed by the elements of the ranks further back. Why? The reason must be sought in the human heart. In turn, let 10 men climb over the breastworks and everyone behind will flee and entire battalions will abandon their defending position”.

“When one has to defend entrenchments, all the battalions must be placed behind the breastworks, because if the enemy manages to gain a foothold on them, those battalions a little further back will think only of saving their lives. This is a general rule of war, which decides all battles and all actions. She is born in the heart of man and is what has led me to write this work. I do not believe that up to now nobody has tried to investigate the reasons for the lack of success of some armies”.

The Caedes.

Genghis and Subidai left one of the Bukhara gates uncovered. With this they sought to attract a large part of the garrison outside the city, to fight in the open field. Most of the garrison, made up of about 20,000 men, went outside, pretending that they were going to face the Mongols. But they really escaped to the southwest. The next day they were blocked on the Amur Daria and the Mongols overtook and destroyed them.

The rest of the Turkish forces locked themselves in the citadel, while the inhabitants surrendered the city. The Mongols advanced thousands of civilians ahead of them on the citadel and soon took it. During all the fighting, a large part of Bukhara burned and finally Genghis Khan ordered the demolition of its walls.

The aforementioned 3 Mongol armies then quickly converged on Samarkand, while Mohamed fled to the western confines of his empire. Some 50,000 men from the garrison of the capital went out to meet the Mongols and were isolated from it, which was left unprotected. And finally they were surrounded and massacred by the Mongols, who did not accept their requests to desert and join the forces of Genghis Khan, since he said that «whoever betrayed once, could do it again.»

Samarkand was inexorably at the mercy of the Great Khan, who took only 6 days to occupy it. Its remaining 20,000 defenders concentrated on the citadel, leaving all its inhabitants defenseless against Mongol looting. One night a group of about a thousand Turks slipped out and managed to flee. The Mongols soon stormed the citadel and killed the rest of the garrison.

After this, the fall of Transoxiana and the territory of Khorrasan (north of Persia) precipitated, without major combat, into the hands of Genghis Khan and with it hundreds of thousands of km2 of a great Islamic empire. This only survived until the year 1231, after its new defeat at the hands of the Seljuk Turks on its western borders.

A Mongolian special force under the command of Subidai went after Mohamed, who, abandoned by everyone, had become a fugitive and an outlaw. In January 1221 the Shah died of pleurisy on an island in the Caspian Sea, without the Mongols having been able to capture him.

Summary of the campaign and results.

In a rapid campaign of almost a year, the Mongols managed to defeat without great losses a seasoned army, which mobilized against them at least double the number of men, but which remained expectant in a static defense.

Employing a brilliant operational strategy, alternating their tireless capacity for operational movement with their proven and irresistible combat capacity and their terrifying techniques of consummate predator, Genghis Khan and his men maintained the initiative and freedom of action. Thus, they deceived their enemies about their plans, discovered their vulnerabilities and went eagerly for them. And dislocated enemy deployments, before attacking them or rendering them irrelevant and surrendering them.

(The End)

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

Introduction and Development.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

Only analysts freed from Scholasticism and field manuals are capable of placing themselves in the free, impartial and lucid mental state or position. To capture anomalous, complex and difficult enemy situations. Since they are paid for results and speed, which are contradictory variables, the luxury of putting an analyst agent in a “quiet position” for an unpredictable, indefinite period of time is not usually acceptable.

The new techniques for detecting, observing and tracking targets should not be underestimated. Based on computers, electronic sensors, Artificial Intelligence. But, the presence of field agents should not be suppressed, but rather supported and increased. Cyber monitoring can specify for our spy the precise area of investigation and study.

BRIEFING OF A FIELD AGENT

The field agent is an infiltrator in a neutral or hostile environment. Able to approach and penetrate the government, business or social media of the rival. And capture relevant, important information in a consistent and sustained manner. The field agent gives a seal of verisimilitude or even reality to the information captured from the enemy.

It is not easy to recruit, train and insert your own field agent. Hence, in an era of haste, superficiality and intellectual complexity, technological means have been favored over field agents for espionage work.

Afghanistan 2021.

We all remember the moments of the change of government in Afghanistan in August 2021.

During almost 20 years of staying there, the United States had spent enormous sums of money on said stay, providing various support to the Afghan State and to choosing, training and equipping the Afghan National Army. The Americans even boasted in their public communications, especially from the Defense Department, that they were making progress in the anti-terrorist fight against the Taliban.

MARINES GUARDING KABUL AIRPORT

This turned out to be like the “Potemkin villages.” That the Russian minister of that name prepared in the path that Tsarina Catherine the Great would follow on a trip. So that her trashy inhabitants would appear happy and shiny as her Imperial Majesty passed by.

As soon as the last American troops had to withdraw, the Afghan soldiers, who also turned out to be shoddy, began to surrender their weapons and escape the feared wrath of the Taliban. US forces were only able to secure a defensive perimeter of the Kabul airport. But, the “friendly Afghans” and their families had to get there to board a flight. Fleeing the tidal wave of the barbarity of the Taliban (scholars of the Koran).

As it had been negotiated with the Taliban to accept control of the airport by Western soldiers for a few days, this was not enough for many «collaborators» of the Westerners (translators, drivers, cleaners, etc.) and their families. Many had to make a painful journey to Pakistan to gain their freedom and their lives.

Vietnam War. American stage,

In the United States, during the Vietnam War, the “Igloo White” program was established, endowed with 1.7 billion US dollars, between 1966 and 1971, for the tasks of collecting information on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong supply routes in South Vietnam. The route started from North Vietnam, entering Laos, near the common border, and was the line of all kinds of supplies for the aforementioned forces, operating in South Vietnam. The route was strewn with devices that simulated a plant and were transmitters of information for US intelligence. They measured 1.2 ms. and their battery lasted 50 days. Many times an unmanned flying object, a drone, was used, which collected information from the ground and transmitted it via television to a distant plane.

A SECTION OF THE HO CHI MINH ROUTE

With the data collected from traffic on the roads, the Americans decided on interdiction bombing actions, carried out by their different aerial devices, including the invisible, inaudible and precise B-52 strategic bombers. In early 1971, data from aerial photos after the bombings, taken from planes flying after the attack formations, allowed analysts to assume that the “truck war” was causing a very severe strain on the industrial capacity of North Vietnamese suppliers (China and the USSR).

Historia Desterrada: La ruta Ho Chi Minh: Eje logístico clave en la Guerra  de Vietnam

But, if it was true that so many trucks and equipment were destroyed, how was it possible that the communists maintained the initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks and other materials that literally plagued many of the roads and logistics parks on the Ho Chi Minh Route? Who bothered to remove them?

A more primitive stretch of the Ho Chi Minh Route

Another embarrassing issue was that the total number of vehicles counted by the US aviation as destroyed, exceeded several times the total number of cargo transport vehicles that North Vietnam had, according to Intelligency.

The answer to this essential mystery was soon given by the young American officers (juniors): they were eaten by a monster called the “Great Laotian Truck Eater”; a horrendous scavenger that rose towards dawn and devoured the vehicles destroyed by aviation during the night, after the required photographs for the “wreck count”, the count of debris achieved. Because Americans are very scrupulous with statistics and consider lying a «social sin» that is almost unforgivable for officials.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Hamas attacks Israel in 2023.

General introduction.

Hamas commandos knew they would fight deep in Israeli territory. Very far from their supports, supplies and other Hamas units. Their targets were there: Israeli civilians and military personnel killed or taken hostage. And they knew that once 2 or 3 days had passed, the Israeli forces, superior in human and material resources, would attack, pursue, and ambush them. Their end, in general, was death. Since the Israelis would in this case still have a surplus of captured enemies. To interrogate and learn the parameters that Hamas used, to surpass them for a time: surprise them and establish combat superiority over their troops in many parts of Israel.

The various attackers carried out a “swarm attack” on positions in central and southern Israel. Several of the principles or norms of military forces in a conventional attack were disregarded. For example, the unity of the objective and the unity of command of the forces and the maintenance of a structure, of a deployment for all attacking forces. Here, each small Islamist “unit of action” had its own leader and its own objective. And, it is the set of actions of the “attacking swarm” that defines the strategy and complex real objective of Hamas.

YAHYA SINVAR, PALESTINIAN MILITARY CHIEF OF THE GAZA STRIP.

Here, Hamas forces attacked divided into a multitude of independent groups, small and sufficient, in charge of striking and/or destroying. Or occupy the Israeli military post, kibbutz or cooperative, and take Israeli or Western foreign hostages to send them to Gaza.

All of this reveals and shows us that the military effect sought by Hamas‘s multi-objective attack is an Internal Moral Shock, increased by the surprise factor of the action, already installed in the military establishment and in the populations of Israel. The aura of invincibility of the Israeli Armed Forces and the effectiveness attributed to Mossad and other affected security agencies, not so conspicuous, have been broken.

It is the set of «action units» of the militias, composed of variable weapons or branches of the FA: infantry, airborne, anti-tank, light armor, health, military police, which carries out, through these multiple and quasi-simultaneous actions on the Israeli Nation: The effect of shock, shattering, heartbreaking material and moral.

SEMI IRREGULAR HAMAS TROOPS PARADING

This multiple and general effect is inexorably transmitted to Israelis in arms through social mechanisms. The effects of damage to people and property not protected by the army, the invasion of cruel and vengeful Palestinian forces, which occupy and destroy different points in Israel, commotion and produce shock and disorientation of the troops.

Israel says it has mobilized almost 300,000 reservists to attack the Gaza Strip. They are not the best troops to maintain combat readiness and combat alert.

The geographical and military social scenario of the Islamist radicals.

The so-called Gaza Strip is a narrow, flat and small coastal corridor next to the Mediterranean Sea, located south of Israel. More than one and a half million people live crowded together in its approximately 363 km2 of surface. 99% of the inhabitants are Muslims and Christians number between 15 and 20 thousand souls. The strip reaches a demographic concentration of around 4,150 people per km2, which is one of the highest in the world. Its shape is that of an elongated rectangle, about 45 km long, measuring 12 km at its widest part. At the south is its border with Egypt of about 11 km, around the strategic city of Rafah.

To the east and north the Gaza border with Israel extends for about 51 km. The most important population of the strip is the one that gives it its name, Gaza, located in its northern third. The other prominent towns in the strip actually constitute “districts”, “peripheral neighborhoods” or “satellite towns” of the “ecumene” of Gaza. Among those not yet mentioned we will highlight Beit Hanoun (in the extreme north), Beit Layla, Sheikh Zaid, Dayral Balah (in the center), Jabalia and Kan Yunis (in the south, but not on the border with Egypt).

The unemployment rate of the population is between 35-40%. This makes it very dependent on external aid. And, furthermore, it excites their identity and social demands and defines as “solely” responsible for their evils the most visible, socially and culturally different, and close enemy, Israel. The search for a quick and utopian solution for this population necessarily requires a sufficient defeat of Israel, the oppressive and imperialist power. This makes its population very inclined to embrace “radical Islamist militants” doctrines and parties (the RIM). They allow them to glimpse and evaluate a solution, even in an indefinite and imprecise future. And at least they give them the hope they all need. Islamic Jihad and Hamas are the two main Islamist organizations with implant in Gaza.

Ideology of radical Islamist Palestinians.

Hamas, as a totalitarian socio-political-religious organization, exercises extensive power in all areas of civil coexistence of the inhabitants of Gaza. This power is also conditioned by the nature of the struggle in conditions of isolation, encirclement and hardship. This allows Hamas to invoke in its “general defense” the oppression to which the entire Palestinian population of Gaza is subjected, whether real, felt and/or magnified. Without, in practice, the tremendous suffering of the Palestinians being clearly distinguished from the victimhood wielded by Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. Between 100 and 200 thousand are the actual active militants of both radical organizations. In addition, there are their sympathizers and collaborators, with different degrees of involvement in the services and time dedicated to supporting Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

ISRAELI SOLDIERS DISCOVER FIRST HAMAS TUNNEL SINCE 2014 WAR

Hamas mesmerizes, tenses and grows due to the prospects of a more or less close confrontation with Israel. A people cannot be kept permanently in arms, much less in “combat readiness.” But, the reason for being of Hamas is to recover and imitate doctrinally, socially and militarily the epic and glorious times of the first century of Islam, which approximately coincides with our 7th century and the first part of the 8th. It was the era, after the death of Muhammad, extended in time beyond the first 4 caliphs, from Abu Baker to Ali, called by the Sunnis the Rashidun, the “rightly guided (by God)”.

Because its radical totalitarian ideologists have decided that, when Islam practiced armed Jihad and was rigorous in its faith and customs, Islam convinced, overwhelmed, spread prodigiously across three continents and was almost invincible… And they believe that by reproducing the “basic conditions” of that social context, of that booming civilization, today’s Muslims will once again be great, feared, respected and accepted. There is nothing more and nothing less.

We verify that every few years a “casus belli” occurs or is caused, worthy of its name and with its pernicious effects for the corresponding populations. Thus, there are not many possibilities of being able to truly dialogue with this, to reach common ground and reach peace agreements that are consistent and acceptable to all.

Operational considerations of the Defense of Gaza against Israel.

The land defense of Gaza is very difficult to sustain over time. The strip lacks geographical space to establish a flexible, mobile and echelon in depth defense. This is necessary to give power, solidity, continuity and support to the rejection struggle.

Furthermore, the external supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Hamas would be strangled by Israel. To ensure the sealing of Gaza, the Tsahal could establish “locks”, located transversely in the strip and occupied with reinforced mechanized infantry. They would prevent the transit of military equipment from Egypt. Iran‘s weapons and equipment have their hub or logistics center in Yemen. From here they are transported across the Red Sea to northern Sudan, from where they depart in caravans of trucks. They cross into Egypt halfway along its southern border and head to Rafah.

The Israelis sporadically carry out bombing raids on this “evil route”, concentrating on the intermediate depots along the route and on cargo vehicles. In October 2012, an unexpected explosion destroyed a weapons factory near Khartoum, the capital, and other times, truck convoys are destroyed. The naval persecution of this smuggling flow, through detection and exploration drone flights over the Red Sea, is carried out by the USA. And it is the scarce and reluctant collaboration of the three countries involved, Yemen, Sudan and Egypt, which does not allow the transit (traffic is merchandising) of heavy reactive artillery weapons to be made excessively burdensome for intermediaries and with little return for the end user.

(to be continued)

Spanish Fleet captures the British logistics Fleet in 1780.

Political Background.

Those were the times of the reign of the Bourbon King Carlos III, with Don José Moñino Redondo, Count of Floridablanca, Prime Minister of Spain since 1776, replacing the Marquis of Grimaldi.

Floridablanca, through the Count of Aranda, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, began systematic aid to the American war effort against Great Britain. The aid materialized first in money and supplies.

EL CONDE DE FLORIDABLANCA - RCMAGAZINE – Revista Cultural del Real Casino  de Murcia
COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA

On April 28, 1779, Louis XVI of France ratified the renewal of the Family Pact between the two Bourbon kingdoms. And war was declared between them and Great Britain.

This is the century of the wars of kings. Since they are projected and carried out by sovereigns and their ministers. They sought to change the world map for dynastic interests and for the aggrandizement of their Powers. Without even taking into account the feelings of the people.

Background.

On July 9, 1780, a combined war fleet of 22 Spanish and 9 French ships had sailed from Spain, bound for the territorial waters of Great Britain. And in order to attack the enemies he could. An ambitious, broad and clear war mission.

Spain and France harassing the Royal Navy at home. To the Home Fleet, the enemy «home custody fleet».

Commanding our combined fleet was the general command of the Spanish Navy, Admiral Don Luis de Córdova y Córdova, 73 years old. At that age, Córdova was already back from Scholasticism, Thomistics, military or naval regulations, and the art of warfare of force against force.

LA GRANDE Y FELICÍSIMA CAPTURA REALIZADA POR DON LUIS DE CÓRDOVA Y CÓRDOVA  | frquesada.com
LUIS DE CÓRDOVA Y CÓRDOVA.

Córdova‘s fleet was divided into a Spanish division and a French division of ships of the line. Supported by a flotilla of frigates, smaller in length and size than the other ships, but much faster at sea. Intended for exploration tasks (active, intuitive and daring) and security or screen tasks (discreet and hiding from enemy views) of the combined fleet.

The flagship of the Spanish Navy was then the imposing and majestic Santísima Trinidad, the most important sailing ship of the line ever built. She had 4 artillery decks and was launched in the shipyards of Havana, advanced in naval construction.

The Santísima Trinidad was also the flagship of Córdova‘s fleet, where he raised his personal flag. And, she will have a decisive role in the development of future war events

The allied ships were already in the English Channel, when they received the news from Floridablanca, informed by their spies in Great Britain, that two convoys with 52 cargo ships in total, had just set sail from the port of Portsmouth, in the south of England, to India and North America.

Pintura Militar y Naval: Navío Santísima Trinidad navegando en línea
THE SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD MAIN SHIP

This huge logistics fleet was in itself a necessary and sufficient objective for the tasks entrusted to the Admiral against Great Britain.

Córdova realized that his success lay in calculating with the greatest possible probability, that is, estimating correctly, the strip or sector of course followed by the logistics fleet. With this, he worked out for the combined fleet an interception course for the enemy ships, well to the east of the Azores. That would be confirmed later by his flotilla of frigates on a long-distance reconnaissance mission.

Unfortunately, most of the escort warships of the British logistics fleet returned to their bases, when it was already well under way in the open sea.

Developing.

Towards the first light of dawn on August 9, 1780, dispersed enemy freighters began to appear on the horizon of the combined fleet.

Córdova could attack them, cause them great damage, scatter the rest towards his port and capture a certain spoils. And, thus achieve a great victory.

But, he thought better of fooling them with an «appearance«. And, thus, defeat them one by one, capture them and make an immense booty, which he would take to Spain. And, at a minimum cost of life and damage to ships and their cargoes.

The Admiral ordered a large lantern to be lit and placed on the foremast of the Santísima Trinidad. This was the signal the enemy used to rally their ships around his Captain ship. Appearances, to work for, must be believable and the most expected and natural thing in the world. The enemy will fool himself…

And, the British ships headed towards the Spanish lantern that illuminated them on the horizon, as moths do towards the light…

It is worth remembering that our warships carried a variable crew, depending on their sizes and tasks, from the Spanish Marine Corps. In charge of fighting at sea and on land against enemies as infantrymen. And, that the groups leaders and captains of Córdova were fully trained to carry out the decided maneuvers.

Ahead of the Santísima Trinidad, the ships of the combined fleet fanned out to either side of the horizon, following a rough line. And each one was covered by its port or starboard guns. To receive the British as they deserved when the imaginary bag was closed more.

Some allied ships began their attack on the British freighters, seeing that they abandoned their course and wanted to flee.

Action of 9 August 1780 - Wikipedia
NAVAL BATTLE OF 9 AND 10 OF AUGUST OF 1780

From the Santísima Trinidad, they gave and transmitted the «combat order» to the allied groups ships, who transmitted them to the most distant ones. Thus, the rest of the allied ships closed on the scattered and sparse bundle of enemy cargo ships. Attacking them individually.

Let us remember that the cargo ships carried only a symbolic artillery for a minimum defense. Since its structure and displacement were intended to optimize its ability to carry loads for its destination. The artillery, its ammunition, gunpowder and the artillerymen greatly subtracted from its capacity, due to the effective specialization of the means. For its defense, they have the warships escorts.

The enemy, surprised and scattered, was overwhelmed and gave up quickly, once the allied ships were threatening them.

The three warships that were then escorting the British logistics fleet and a freighter escaped from the encirclement, heading for port. Some sources say that the three warships were seized by the allies. And they joined the Spanish Navy. And, they even give their new names as Spaniards.

It took a day to seize all the captured ships. The ring was not, nor could it be, as closed as on land. And, the warships would not surrender at first. Military marines and sailors are not intimidated by a threat and are trained to fight. Theirs is that they fled to the port, once they saw that they could do nothing to defend the freighters. Only to increase the irreparable losses of their nation.

Spanish Marines boarded enemy freighters to subdue and disarm British Trading Companies «soldiers» being flown to colonial duty stations to reinforce garrisons there. And to take the “prey”.

And they would remain in them to control that his sailors carried out the maneuvers to go to the destination ordered by the Admiral of the fleet.

The military operation was effective, clean, profitable and fast. Córdova and his combined attack fleet returned to the Homeland with a huge booty captured from the enemy.

The spoils of war seized by Córdova and his men amounted to:

1,800 “private soldiers” of the West India and East India Trading Companies.

Three thousand British sailors who manned the 51 captured ships.

About 140 million reales (old Spanish coin worth) as the value of the ships, merchandise of all kinds for sale, goods and supplies, weapons and ammunition of the ships and the men of the Companies.

The loss of the logistics convoy destined for the 13 North American colonies dealt a heavy blow to Britain’s war efforts there, against the Native Americans fighting for their Independence.

By August 20, Córdova, his ships, his men, and his enormous booty were reaching Cádiz. Being received in triumph by the local authorities and the people of Cádiz.

Some final considerations.

This Spanish naval feat has little resonance in the History books written since then. As an explanation, we could say that the «Efforts of arms» are always attributed «gunpowder and blood«. As notable, essential and instrumental Additions to them.

And, the Córdova combined fleet Action in the capture of the largest logistics fleet suffered by Great Britain in its history, was quiet (with little gunpowder) and unscathed (without much blood).

And therefore it is assumed to be with little military effort. In other words, without courage, brilliance, stripes, or warlike glory.

We don’t always have a Master Sun (Sun Tzu means that) on our way to understand us. And appreciating a complete victory taking advantage of the weaknesses and failures of the enemy.

The determining Parameters of Effectiveness in modern Warfare.

Essential Introduction.

This is obviously not a Treatise on the determining Parameters of Military Efficiency. Nor is it a Study on the Principles or Operating Systems of War. On which you have at your disposal enough articles on this Web Page, which you consult now.

It is a matter of making a brief explanation of the characteristics of these determining Parameters. That they should always work in Harmony and Cohesion.

So that, with this description in hand, you can easily define and know the Failures and Errors made by the Units in their most dangerous Job: War.

Doctrine and Regulations.

These determining Parameters must define and transmit the What and the How of the units and means in the war against the various possible enemies.

In other words, it supposes having good Principles of its Art-Science of War and Operating Systems suitable for modern, hybrid and cybernetic warfare.

And, they must do it in a broad, clear, creative, stimulating, flexible, participatant and decisive way.

The Determining Parameters and their full means of expression.

Those Determining Parameters are conceived and materialized by the Human Element of Weapons and War. Without it, they would only be more or less numerous sheets of letters. Waiting to obtain its meaning, always eminently practical, its full expression and its transcendent utility. They get it with their employment by the military.

Logistic chain.

Organizes and distributes the means to units. It could also participate more or less in its acquisition in the market. Generally includes health services.

It must be close, and it using various means: long-distance and delivery transport, warehouses or centers (hubs) or kitchens at various levels of action and with control and computer means. It must act informed, farsighted, proactive, organized and sufficient.

The Action Trilogy.

Units of the arms and services.

That they can integrate tactical and operational groups of Combined Arms with common tasks and missions. That they will be at one with each other, trained, also jointly, that they provide mutual support and a synergy of effects and that they have mutual respect.

Commands. officers.

They must be willing, empathetic, trained, motivated, decisive, respected, responsible and long-suffering.

Non-commissioned officer corps.

They must be close, trained, specific, capable, formed, loyal to the commands, soldiers and units and respected and highly regarded by the soldiers.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine.

Introduction.

With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.

The latest «ace up his sleeve» is Army General Valery Gerasimov, born in the Russian city of Kazan, 67 years ago and Chief of the General Staff since 2012.

An almost ideal age for the work that is coming up. Defined by organization, structural changes, discipline, sufficient flow of means and a strong hand.

Almost as USSR Marshal Georgi Zhukov had it. When he went to important battle places to preside, on behalf of STAVKA, the General Staff of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, the main offensives of his Front Groups against the Germans, A Front was the Western equivalent of Army Group, although the Red Armies were smaller in men and means than the Western ones.

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION GEORGI ZHUKOV, WITH ALL HIS AWARDS.

When Putin appears with his senior military commanders in the photos, his Defense Minister Shoigu is to his right and Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff of all the Armed Forces, is to his left.

As Assistants at his Main Command Post, probably in Crimea, Gerasimov will have the Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation, to which the vast majority of the troops present in that theater of operations belong, and the current deputy chief of his General Staff (his G-1, in our nomenclature).

At first there was talk that the appointment of Gerasimov was a maneuver by the top Russian military commanders. To see how an intellectual general, a modern hybrid warfare theorist, performed in the field. But, it is not true that he has no combat experience. He has enough of her.

Gerasimov already participated in his day in the two «anti-banditry wars» or counterinsurgency (Russian name) in Chechnya. That was fighting hard for his independence from Russia, as the heir of the USSR, the former imperialist oppressor. In the second, in 1999, he was the deputy head of the Russian armed forces in the campaign. He is accused of war crimes against Chechen populations for his direct action.

He also acted, already as Chief of the General Staff of the Russian forces, during Russia’s campaign in direct support for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, since 2015, making frequent trips to the Syrian theater of operations.

Based on his direct experiences and his ability to analyze and synthesize the issues of his profession, Valery Gerasimov developed his Theory of Military Doctrine, currently in force in Russia. It’s his Hybrid War Theory.

Although it is nothing more than a Compilation of diplomatic, heterodox foreign, economic and military action policies and their trends. In short, what Gerasimov advocates is to use against the enemy all the means of a modern State in a great centripetous and synergistic action: diplomats, heterodox exteriors (various support for internal enemy dissidents, including armed forces, boycotts, promotion of popular discontent), economic, military

Thus, Putin decided with his military leadership to replace the «butcher of Syria» Colonel General Surovikin, as military chief of the Ukrainian campaign, appointed just a few months ago. He was the fourth replacement for the Russian campaign manager in Ukraine.

The general of ideas and methods with a strong and intransigent hand and centralized orders, which were given from top to bottom, by a general with more flexible and fresh training and ideas.

Based on his direct experiences and his capacity for analysis and synthesis of the issues of his profession, Valery Gerasimov developed his Theory of Military Doctrine, currently in force in Russia. It’s his Hybrid War Theory.

Although it is nothing more than a Compilation of diplomatic, heterodox foreign issues, economic and military action policies and their trends. In short, what Gerasimov advocates is to use against the enemy all the means of a modern State in a great centripetous and synergistic action: diplomats, heterodox exteriors (various support for internal enemy dissidents, including armed forces, boycotts, promotion of popular discontent), economic, military

Thus, Putin decided with his military leadership to replace the «butcher of Syria» Colonel General Surovikin, as military commander of the Ukrainian campaign, appointed just a few months ago. It was the fourth replacement of the Russian campaign commander in Ukraine.

The general of ideas and methods with a strong and intransigent hand and centralized orders, which were given from top to bottom, by a general with more flexible and fresh training and ideas.

That adapted the stagnant and heavy working of the Russian Army to a war of IV (guerrillas) and V (hybrid) generations.

Fighting against a very well equipped enemy (with better equipment and materials than theirs, for a conventional war, in general), committed and determined in their fight, with highly trained officers and cadres, tremendously motivated.

And, educated, trained and mentalized for a modern war, both of «operational movement and combat» and of «guerrillas and counterguerrillas».

Some Problems for Gerasimov.

Many are the problems accumulated by the Army of the Russian Federation and not all of them are solvable in the short term. Probably because they are already structural.

Continuous, effective and sufficient military logistics.

One of the star, creaking, problems of the Russian military is to establish a modern and effective comprehensive military logistics. Even defining it is quite simple for a professional.

INDOCTRINATION IN A SOVIET STATE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE.

But, in the USSR and now in the Russian Federation, they have not been able to or did not know how to do it well.

In the USSR it was a classic that the potatoes collected in a kolkhoz or sovkhoz rotted in the field. Meanwhile, a few tens of km away, the urban people suffered from hunger or a nearby alcohol manufacturing industry did not receive the potatoes to produce it, from the starch of them.

Probably, the seminal error comes from the Marxist-Leninist economic doctrines, far from reality even in theory. In this case, the economy.

Where logistics is not considered, nor is «added value» attributed to it in the economy. Therefore, in the Budgets and the theoretical Soviet Five-Year Plans it was not taken into account.

The “total value” of a good comes from the “labor of the workers” and, later, of the peasants as well. And, amen.

As all the value of the good is attributed to the producers, the difference between the sale price and the production cost of the workers, the famous surplus value, is accused of being Appropriated (Stealed) by the bloody capitalists.

Capitalist production is not simply the production of commodities; it is essentially the production of surplus value.

This is one more theoretical fallacy of communism, with disastrous economic and military consequences for the country.

Although communism has already disappeared from Russia as a theoretical ruling force, many of its styles, ideas and methods, applied for 70 years, have penetrated and endured in the idiosyncrasies of society and its culture.

(To be continued)

THE ART OF WAR OF GENGHIS KHAN

Introduction.

The conquest by the Mongols between 1219 and 1220 of the Islamic Empire of Kharizm (or Khuarezm), in Turkestan, will serve as a model to present its operational and tactical characteristics. The rapid defeat of the Muslims at the hands of Genghis Khan and his men is an example of the synergistic use of the operational movement capability and combat capability of a highly efficient military system.

Frictions between neighbors.

The Kharizm empire was very recent. While Genghis Khan conquered Central Asia, up to his borders, Shah Mohamed II extended his domain to the south and east. He had inherited the territory of modern Iran (Persia), but had also added Afghanistan, almost to the Indus River, and had reached the Sir Darya, occupying all of Transoxiana.

Large Equestrian Statue of Genghis Khan near Dadal, his birthplace, Mongolia

The entire confrontation between the two empires began when Inalchik, the governor of the city of Otrar, on the Sir Daria river, about 200 km from the Aral Sea, stopped a caravan of merchants sponsored by the Great Khan and executed their chiefs, accusing them of spies. And possibly he was right, but that was very undiplomatic and damaged a very sensitive issue in the usual customs between states and hierarchs. Genghis Khan sent an embassy to the Shah, made up of a Kharizmi and 2 Mongols, requesting a punishment for Inalchik. Muhammad executed the Kharizmi and returned the 2 Mongols to Genghis, their heads completely shaved, a serious personal insult to those warriors. War was already inevitable.

Force preparations.

Genghis Khan prepared his army for a march of more than 1,500 km, from his Tien San mountains to the borders of Transoxiana.

The Mongolian army at the time numbered just over 100,000 men. His basic tactical-operational unit was the tuman or division, with about 10,000 men, divided into 10 mingans or regiments. The great army was divided into three parts: the army on the left or the east, the one on the right or the west, and the one in the center. The first two had a highly variable number of men, depending on operational and tactical needs; for example, one could have double the number of men than another. The army in the center was much smaller, made up of elite units and the guards of the Khan and the various Mongol princes; in them their basic unit was the mingan. A Mongol army corps consisted of one or two tumans.

Dead of Mohamed II of Kharizm

Mohamed II assembled a large, well-armed and equipped army, totaling between 200 and 300,000 men (some authors speak of up to 400,000 men, clearly exaggerating), to defend his empire from the expected Mongol invasion from the east. Many of his men were also horsemen from the Turkestan steppes, who were equipped and fought in a similar way to the Mongols. The Shah was sure that his soldiers could stop and repel the invader.

To this end he deployed most of the troops along the Sir Darya, his great natural barrier to the east, and established a fortified line of communications from his army’s deployment to his capital at Samarkand. Lastly, to the north of the empire and protecting it, between the Aral Sea and the Sir Darya stretched the formidable natural obstacle of the Kizil Kum desert, in the Turanian depression, hard and dry where they exist.

Thus, reassured with a good plan, he defensively hoped that he could defeat the Mongols in a major battle, by sheer numerical strength of his army. But, it was von Moltke, the old man, head of the German HHQQ. in the late 19th century, who said that «plans used to last until first contact with the enemy.»

Development of operations.

During the spring and summer of 1219 a Mongol army corps under Jochi, the eldest of Genghis’s sons, ravaged the land west of the great Lake Balkhash, near Otrar, leaving a landscape so devastated that it it was incapable of supporting an army without its own supplies.

Jebe Noyan.

According to the campaign plan drawn up by the orlok or lieutenant of the Khan, Subidai Bahadur, a Mongol army corps headed in the early 1220s towards the valley of the Fergana River, south of the Sir Darya, on the exposed flank of the Turkmen deployment, to carry out a force reconnaissance. It was commanded by Jebe Noyan, one of the Khan’s best orloks.

Part of the Turkish forces, under the command of Mohamed and Prince Jalal-ad-Din, advanced slowly to the east, over the valley. When the vanguards met, Mohamed vastly outnumbered the Mongols and ordered to form up for combat. Caught in narrow terrain, which did not favor his cavalry force, Jebe decided to attack anyway. The Mongols charged the Turks ferociously, inflicting heavy casualties on them. They counterattacked, trying to involve them up and almost succeeded. But the Mongols managed to break contact and escaped to the east.

Most decisive operations for success.

In February 1220, the 3 Mongol armies, under the command of Genghis, Jochi and Ogedei and Chagatai, two of his other sons, crossed the area previously devastated by Jochi and unexpectedly converged on Otrar, on the left flank of the defensive line of Sir Daria. After the assault on the city, the Mongols captured the governor Inalchik and executed him very cruelly.

The two armies commanded by Jochi and the other 2 brothers then headed south, following the Sir Daria, and began to harass during their march the fortified positions of the Turks along their planned great defensive line. Simultaneously, the army corps of the orlok Jebe Noyan, turned north, took the city of Kokand, in the upper Sir Daria, and headed to meet the 2 Mongol armies.

All these offensive operations helped to fix Mohamed’s attention on his fortified defensive line of Sir Daria. In the south, he had won the battle and repelled the invader, and in the north, although the Mongols had taken Otrar, they had not penetrated Transoxiana. The Turkish army maintained its boast of invincibility. Mohamed brought all of his operational reserves closer to Sir Daria. However, although in both cases the Mongols had suffered heavy casualties, their ratio to them was of great concern to the Turks.

For its part, after the capture of Otrar, the army under the command of Genghis Khan, with Subidai as his chief of staff, and made up of 4 tumans, headed north. There he took the Turkmen city of Zarnuk, with the sole purpose of capturing a man who, according to his informants, knew of a practicable path through the Kizyl Kum, following a chain of oases.

Then the Mongols delivered their decisive blow.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Fallen Russian Generals in Ukraine.

Russian Generals missing from their Battle Forward Post in Ukraine

Introduction.

There are hundreds of videos of Ukrainians neutralizing Russian air, naval and ground vehicles. That more than fighting at close distances, it seems that they pose as if they were shooting ducks at a town fair.

Cuatro generales rusos muertos en Ucrania en 20 días, tantos como en  Afganistán en 10 años

These videos are mostly produced by almost unknown film companies.

And sometimes even a supposed Russian general falls almost in the battle’s first rows.

Developing.

A general never accompanies or stands in combat with a platoon lieutenant or company captain or a battalion commander or lieutenant colonel.

His tasks are not to hit shots. Nor haranguing the men around him. Or drive them into combat by his example. That is done by the officers in charge of the units and the non-commissioned officers in immediate command of the soldiers. Who know their soldiers like nobody else. Or will it not be so here?

Ucrania mata en un mismo día a dos generales rusos y pone en evidencia el  grave problema del ejército de Putin

The task of the general officer is to conceive and conceptualize the combat and the maneuvers of his tactical units, fulfilling the Tasks and Missions of the Army in campaign.

And, facilitate the means in: combined arms units; anti-tank, artillery and air support for them and the logistics for it: from health to supplies of all kinds, from fuel to ammunition, through maintenance teams and removal of damaged vehicles and kitchens and food distribution to the collection points of the units.

Baja en el ejército ruso: muere el alto general Sukhovetsky - AS.com

He harangues and drives the commanders and chiefs of units dependent on him. And, to all the soldiers on rare occasions.

To fulfill Those, fulfilling the universal principle of the economy of human and material means. That is, following the best and most optimized use of it.

And, as I have said before, the death of a general is a national disaster. And, the death of a 4-star general, commander-in-chief of an army of many tens of thousands of soldiers, is a national catastrophe.

Simply because they are very important military assets.

The Russian-Ukrainian War six months later.

Situation.

Everywhere we get news of:

Missiles carrier ships, corvette, frigate, destroyer, light cruiser type, of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, sunk from the ground by Ukrainian guided missiles.

Moskvá (2000) - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre
Black Sea Fleet flagship «Moskva», sunk at beginning of the war.

Groups of Russian tanks, interspersed with fuel or ammunition logistics vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles, (where is their marching column or attack deployment or their security against the enemy?), that roam the combat zone erratically and disjointed.

Así es el T-90M, la joya de los tanques rusos también cae en Ucrania:  misiles a 10 km y armadura reactiva
Russian Main Battle Tank T-90

And that are destroyed by the Ukrainians, using personal anti-tank rocket launchers and artillery with very modern fire direction, of American or European manufacture. German 155mm self-propelled guns are especially good. Their entire direction of fire is automatic and the Ukrainians did not get used to it well.

Russian planes and helicopters are shot down by Ukrainian anti-aircraft positions on the ground, fixed or mobile, including personal manned.

🥇 Avión Sukhoi Su-57 (T-50 PAK FA) -【AvionesdeCombate.org】
Russian Fighter Sukhoi SU-57, but not shipped to Ukraine.

Putin continuously threatens his potential enemies, in short, the liberal West, with intercontinental ballistic missiles of hypersonic speeds and each carrying several warheads. They separate in the last phase of flight towards the target area, from the carrier missile.

They are the MIRV or multiple independent reentry vehicles.

Putin, de emperador romano

With all the hilarious and ineffective «destructive defensive potential» (DDP) of its weapons of ultramodern technology and extremely poor results. Why doesn’t Putin establish a modern, effective, Motivated and smaller army? Following the fashion of the Israeli army, as example, and of dimensions according to Russia’s own needs.

And, he abandons his echelons and his massive advance and attack tips. Where its deployment hinders itself. To move and to attack or retreat with agility, precision and effectiveness.

Results.

According to a summary of prestigious foreign journalistic media (The Economist, Forbes, The Washington Post) and the newspaper El Mundo, the Confirmed Casualties in this conflict by August 24 would be:

Tanks

Ukrainians 240

Russians 967

Aircraft and helicopters

Ukrainians 74

Russians 213

Ships of all kinds

Ukrainians 19

Russians 11

That number of Russian tanks would be the equipment of four tank divisions or five or six mechanized or motorized divisions, according to nomenclature, with their full order of battle. Also, in its war in Afghanistan, the USSR lost 147 tanks. And, furthermore, the number of Russian tanks lost so far is higher than the active tanks of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, combined.

If Russia cannot deal with Ukraine, which is much weaker militarily, how is it going to deal with a certain probability of success with the USA or the UK or France?

Promising Background.

Mijaíl Tujachevski – Edad, Muerte, Cumpleaños, Biografía, Hechos y Más –  Muertes Famosos del 12 junio - CalendarZ
Mikhail Tujachevski

Russia, formerly the USSR, was in the years 22 to 37 of the last century, an advanced power in military philosophy or «modern theory of military art and science«. Marshal Mikhail Tujachevski, Lieutenant General Vladimir R. Triandafillov and Brigadier Georgy S. Isserson shone there with their own light… with their teams of auxiliaries and collaborators. All scholars and advanced in the theory of the Deep Maneuver in the enemy tactical, operational and, even, strategic rearguard of modern armies.

Georgii Isserson (1898–1976) | Weapons and Warfare
Georgy S. Isserson

Which I believe was more solidly reasoned and argued than the German mechanized warfare theory. Which was more like “practical”.

Germany, with excellent commanders and officers, cadres (unparalleled in the world) and soldiers, some of the best in the world; and, for the moment, in 1939, all highly trained and motivated.

By the way, they call Blitzkrieg the German way of fighting. Name given by a journalist. And people think it’s because of the speed of their maneuvers.

Триандафиллов, Владимир Кириакович — Википедия
Vladimir R. Triandafillov

But, the specialists called it blitzkrieg, because of the continuous changes of direction of the tactical movements of the main forces. Following the weakest or least protected points or positions of the enemy. Changes tracing the paths of the beam on the surface of the combat area.

Only Triandafillov died peacefully and recognized, in 1931. Isserson was in jail when the Great Purge and his merits or contributions were not recognized. Tukhachevsky was shot in the 1937 great purge of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. To eliminate the military cadres that could overshadow the power of the Party, the excuse (or Stalin).

This sterilized the creativity and freshness of the surviving military commanders. Surveillance and denunciation among peers increased. The military ideas and concepts of those purged acquired their infamy and vituperation; this was fatal for the USSR and its military forces 4 years later in a foreign invasion. The commands and officers only cared about carrying out the orders without errors; so as not to be victims of purges or dismissals or transfers; which leads in war to not doing anything effective, forceful or decisive.

And it led the Army to assume the old doctrines of the Russian Civil War against the White armies. When the mechanization of the forces was still a desideratum, the Red army logistics used to survive the dispossession of the trodden territory, the sole command of the military chief was shared with the political commissar in the unit and the Red armies were hordes.

And this is how the USSR faced the German invasion of June 22, 1941, without able and trained senior officers, officers and non-commissioned officers and without adequate doctrine.

Are we now in a similar Stage or Phase of Decline in Putin‘s Russian Army, which has more than a million people enrolled at arms?

The Gravity Center of the Effort of the Joint Means

An Instrument of the Command.

Introduction.

The center of gravity is not an own physical unit, nor is its mission, neither a point in space or one with a predominant physical characteristic or an enemy unit.

The center of gravity is a coordinated flow of ideas of variable application, that generate original actions for fulfilling the mission and objectives. Originality, flexibility, variability, consistency, difficulty to predict by the enemy and effectiveness are essential to its establishment. Actually, the center of gravity is the instrument of direction, distribution and concentration, impulse and work. That the command has to focus on and unify, with the goal of accomplishing objectives and missions, and employing the efforts of his subordinate units and supports.

The chief is centered in his objectives and missions by means of the created center of gravity and follows a methodology for applying the operational systems.

The Efforts Concentration.

As far as concentration goes, the so called “principal effort” expresses an effect of penetration in a given direction and a sense of being able to arrive at the rupture and exploit it. The combined-arms and aerial efforts of the units are concentrated on this.

The center of gravity has a more spatial and temporal sense, looking for an “operational convergence” of “related efforts” towards an objective. Those are not necessarily contiguous, simultaneous or sequential, but are synergic and result in outcomes based on consideration of the optimal form (means economic) of action of each weapon and service.

The center of gravity is more global or holistic; the main effort is more adding and cumulative. The main effort is exemplified by the hammering strategy of French Marshal Foch on the European western front beginning in the summer of 1918. This strategy was used to overcome the Germans purely by eroding their battle capacity in the theater of operations. And only shifting its direction when German resistance was excessive.

The effects of the main effort are more direct, predictable and evident. Those of the center of gravity are more subtle and unexpected, at least in the first phases of a military action.

The main effort is an instrument of the tactical level and is not necessarily generalized to the other levels. The center of gravity can be used in all dialectical activity where several means (either in number or in nature, near or distant) can be used. Within each level of military activity, beginning with the superior one, the center of gravity brings together and harmonizes all activities to obtain the most important effect or objective of that level.

Developing.

At the strategic level, these would be the critical vulnerabilities of the enemy within the theater of operations. The nature of these would be informed by an important political component. At operational level the center of gravity would be created over the critical vulnerabilities of the campaign. At tactical level it would be the objective that would make operational transcendental the battle. If this was correctly addressed, as necessary for the operational direction, the objective would be that which would be decisive in the battle and get the exploitation of victory.

The center of gravity supposes a centripetal action of all the lines of performance, of the ramified activity of all the units and the services, not necessarily coincident, but convergent in their efficiency and result.

Following the communications ramified lines, we take advantage of the departure situation of each force and the transitability of the land, looking for the optimal use of the combined-arms set, reserves and logistics. By means of the different lines of attack or action we induce uncertainty in the enemy, we disperse his defensive capacity and disturb his plans for, and execution of, defense.

The ramified lines, in a final centripetal action, are peculiar to the center of gravity. The accumulation of forces in a sector, reiterating (inserted or successive units) or strengthening (adding tanks, narrowing the sector or providing greater fire support) the effort, is peculiar to the concept of the main effort.

Strategy: Does the Center of Gravity Have Value? - War on the Rocks
ALLEGORY OF THE WORKING OF THE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE MEANS

An example of the use of the center of gravity following those ramified lines at the strategic level, is found in Napoleon’s operations to secure the surrender of Ulm held by the Austrian army of General Mack and Archduke Ferdinand.

In an ample advance of its independent army corps, the Great Armée (about 210,000 men) crossed the center of Germany, from the Rhein to the Danube. With this it operationally interposed between the Austrians (about 40,000 men) and the allied Russian forces that went to help them. The French initiated the crossing of the Danube on October 7, 1805 and, during the following week, Napoleon converge most of his army corps in an enormous spiral on Ulm. While a sufficient force watched the arrival from the east of Russian General Kutuzov.

Batalla de Ulm - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre
THE SURRENDER OF MACK AT ULM’S OUTSKIRTS

General Mack made, in vain, several attempts at rupturing through Napoleon’s forces, applying his greatest efforts in Haslach and Elchingen. Both Austrian commanders quarreled among themselves and Archduke Ferdinand, with his 6,000 riders, separated from the main force and tried to escape to the northeast.

On the other hand, General Mack and the rest of his men (about 27,000, after the mentioned battles) met Napoleon’s overwhelming numbers at the doors to the city of Ulm since October, 14 and laid down their weapons at the feet of the Michelsberg mount. The capitulation was signed by General Mack on the 20th. The forces of Archduke Fernando were surrounded and won by the cavalry corps of Murat near Trochtelfingen. Another 12,000 Austrians surrendered in Neustadt. The campaign, without properly battles, cost Austria more than 50,000 men of her initial forces of about 70,000 troops.

The center of gravity directs, canalizes, gathers and orients the creation and the direction of the strike of different units and supports in each case. Its shift by the command allows the continuous adaptation to circumstances and the maintenance of focus on intermediate aims.

The center of gravity has as effective factors the speed of operations and logistics. The first allows optimal actuation of the combat capacity of forces and the second diminishes or compensates for the inevitable wearing down of the mobility capacity of troops and posible combat capacity during operations.

Its negative factors are poor transitability, including caused by obstacles, cuts and minefields, and battles command did not wish to engage in. The first “wears away” the operational mobility of the troops and the second “exhausts” their potential combat capacity.

Without those capacities, the fluidity, synergy and the ramified activity of thecenter of gravity tends to revert in a main effort in an operational direction that is quickly known by the enemy. So, the “stunning waves” that are generated on the enemy, cross-sectional to our advance in his operational zone, diminish with it in intensity and frequency, perhaps in the end, even disappear.

The direct elements of performance in the center of gravity are the combined-arms sets, the own and superior level of reserves (even including those in the mass of support or operational rearguard) and logistics. Once the center of gravity is conceived, it is applied and developed by means of the operational systems.

The Development and the Future.

The Hybrid War, a scolium?

Well, but this concept for command can be useful for the wars of I, II, III and IV generation (according to the US denomination, widely «accepted»). But, now we approach the era of the war of V generation: the hybrid or miltifacetic or multifunctional war.

Employing, in addition, digital, computer methods, using the precision and discrimination that allow mathematical algorithms and the technology of radiations and electromagnetic pulses.

NATO Pushed to Upgrade Romania to 'Center of Gravity' for Russian  Deterrence by DC Think Tank - Sputnik International
NATO UPGRADING ROMANIA TO GRAVITY CENTER IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

But it is just that this model of dialectical confrontation with its variable component of physical strength, needs a harmonious and holistic integration of the available multidisciplinary means. By focusing them on achieving different objectives simultaneously or successively, that we want to achieve. And preserving the universal principle of optimization and saving means.

(TO BE CONTINUED)