Books and experience are always neglected.

So, why did Hamas attack the villages, cooperatives and small military posts in central and southern Israel with an unleashed and ferocious venom and hatred in the early hours of Saturday, October 7, 2023 until the next day, when they withdrew or were evicted.

Because we don’t learn from books, because we are not born with experience and, what is worse, we have to earn it hard way. And, ultimately, because history repeats itself and you have to be very special to learn from the experience of others. Although, reasoning, we understand it well!!

But, there are those who believe that reasoning is the way or means to make a mistake with Conviction.

No guerrilla is harmless or irrelevant.

It is now worth dedicating a few paragraphs to a guerrilla “liberation conflict”, which could not win its war. But he managed to bring the conflict to a situation of impasse, stalemate, lack of commitment and loss of interest from his metropolis.

Where neither of the two combatants could militarily defeat the other. But, where the guerrillas could endure more time in arms than their metropolis. And time did not wear them down politically or socially. The British government was harassed by its people and by international public opinion to end the war. And, therefore, to give independence to its small colony in the eastern Mediterranean.

In 1925, Great Britain gave “colony” status to the small island of Cyprus, of Greek descent. Whose natives had “the illusion and identity purpose” of uniting socially and politically with Greece, in a political process called “Enosis”.

The Cypriots were good, rough and simple people, mostly peasants and without any military training. In 1955, Cyprus had about 550 thousand inhabitants and the island had only about 9,282 km2 of surface.

Its terrain did not offer special advantages in a guerrilla war. It has two mountainous areas, the Olympau and the Pentadaktilau, which are passable by paved roads everywhere by motor vehicles.

On the other hand, it does not have large and/or dense forests that host guerrilla bases that are welcoming, restorative, protective, and quiet. Where to indoctrinate the people and prepare for the combats and recover from them.

At the beginning of his war to liberate China, in the 1930s, Mao Ze Dong also declared that “a guerrilla focus needed to begin deep within a large country to prosper.” At the beginning of the communist rebellion, at the end of the 1920s, when he and the communists were even, the Kuomintang Chinese Army gave them a hard time and, in addition, Chiang Kai Shek was advised by German soldiers.

Finally, in October 1934, the communists left southern China and moved on a 12,500 km Great or Long March. and 370 days to Yenan, in the distant province of SiangXi, fighting along the way. Where 8,500 guerrillas and families arrived in October 1935, of the 150 thousand who left their crushed bases in southern China.

They were that disaster or annihilation.

Tactical Tables and Strategic Victory of Guerrillas.

From Nicosia, English troops can be transported by motor vehicle to any part of Cyprus within two hours. For the evacuation of the wounded or the transport of a patrol (a team or section), the English already had helicopters.

The limited size of the island allowed the English to thoroughly attack any part of it and at any time of the year.

In the early 1950s, Georgios Grivas, a retired colonel in the Greek Army, carried out a personal reconnaissance of Cyprus, to assess the possibilities of waging a guerrilla war against British domination of his homeland. In 1954, at the age of 56, he moved to the island, where he organized and led the E.O.K.A. ((Cypriot National Struggle Organization), using the code name “Dighemis”. The fighting began on April 1, 1955 and lasted 46 and a half months.

The strategy, tactics and methods or techniques of guerrilla warfare were adapted to Cyprus. And that is the reason for the success achieved in that theater of operations.

There were two main offensive actions used by the guerrillas: sabotage of government facilities and means and surprise attacks, limited in their power and carried out by forces trained in maneuver, against the English troops. Both actions were limited at the beginning, due to a lack of trained personnel and a shortage of materials. Soon mines or, rather, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) began to be used quite a bit.

Excellent preparation and complete surprise of the enemy, together with the skillful leadership of the guerrillas, were the necessary characteristics for the success of the actions.

The British troops found themselves faced with irregular guerrilla fighting, without the slightest preparation for it. And they were not up to the task either tactically or organizationally. Thus, they needed a long period of preparation and training before they could attack the guerrillas. Which was equivalent to enduring some failures for a while.

For example, the British thought that the guerrillas were hiding in towns. Actually, they were hiding in the countryside, the mountains, literally “under the stones.”

British exploration did not know how to detect guerrilla hiding places. And, its discovery could mean falling into a trap: receiving fire from an unknown nearby position, suffering an explosion in the position supposedly occupied by guerrillas.

The British Army worked in platoons. It was the minimum tactical unit, because it could maneuver and operate on its own in the Micro terrain. And it was made up (this is just an example of a large one) of a light machine gun with its shooter and one or two loaders/defenders, a light anti-tank rocket launcher and a loader/defender, a leader and a second leader and two teams of two. men each. United and compacted like this, marching and attacking, they only made themselves more vulnerable to the enemy.

To raise and/or attack the guerrillas, teams or pairs of soldiers have to act, which may or may not be commanded by a corporal.

The section (platoon, in English) or company is divided into a multitude of “small tactical units”, to extend over an area and cover it, through action on the micro-terrain. This is like a zoom and uses the “action unit” and attack distance as appropriate, depending on the enemy target.

By 1959, British forces had found themselves in a quagmire. It was very difficult for them to locate the guerrillas. And, they were not capable of attacking and defeating them either. But, the guerrillas were there, demanding the Independence of Cyprus and Enosis or incorporation into Greece. And, just their armed presence and their small successes represented a tremendous political and social setback for the British.

The guerrillas were like an odorless, colorless and tasteless gas, which permeated everything and reached everywhere.

And, the central reason: the English were not capable of knowing and preparing an effective counteroffensive against the Cypriot forces.

And, the British press accredited and contrasted all this:

The Observer newspaper wrote that Cyprus‘ civil and military authorities had declared EOKA unbeatable. In turn, Marshal Bernard Montgomery said that the EOKA was strategically unbeatable. And the Daily Herald recognized that a field marshal, three generals and 40,000 British soldiers were not capable of defeating the EOKA.

The British agreed to grant independence to their colony and Grivas left for exile in Greece. This was one of the British conditions for the Agreement of Independence. He returned in 1964 and was appointed Chief of the Armed Forces of Cyprus.

THE END.

Terrorists and guerrillas.

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Another thing is what the authorities decide. That they consider the armed irregular enemy little less than the Loose Demon. And they usually deprive him of almost all rights, even personal ones. And they legislate progressively harsher laws against them. Guerrillas or terrorists fighting against a constituted country are easier to outlaw.

The different International Conventions only consider irregulars who are deployed or supported by another national State as “legal belligerents.” And they have to be established in their own territory, even if it is minimal, have a clear and visible command, wear a uniform and some identifying insignia (a “patch”, a distinctive), with their weapons visible and act in accordance with accepted laws from the war.

These conditions were only met by Soviet partisans in the last World War.

And, of course, they are not fulfilled by the jihadists ganged up in Europe, the winnower and blind with anger marksmen and slashers from America, France or Norway, and those so-called, with little accuracy, lone wolves, since this animal is essentially gregarious and, more so for hunt.

These would all be “armed soulless men.” And the soul is the Spirit of Man.

Pursuing them is just another Police activity, not war.

Tito‘s partisans, quite effective and intermittently deployed, did not comply with the conditions. And the national “resistance” of France, Italy, Poland was almost laughable. An enormous risk and immense pain to achieve Isolated damage to their Axis enemies.

A function that is ignored, like so many, is that one of the most important functions of the irregular rebels is to fix numerous enemy forces (for example, German, Italian, Allied) in their “territory of influence.” Which would otherwise be used by the military enemy in other more decisive and important strategic actions of the armed struggle.

Almost everything is unknown here too. One of the most extensive, prolonged and harsh cases of the terrorist struggle was the anti-partisan struggle of the Nazis in the USSR occupied by Germany.

Counterguerrillas.

The Germans had a wide network of forts, which formed a “network support base”, where the nodes were the forts and the ropes marked the rough directions of action for small local combats against the partisans.

There were also “mobile patrols”, strong in at least twenty-odd men, which continually pursued the localized partisan bands. If necessary, several of these were sometimes gathered in a region to carry out a larger attack.

The forces stationed in the forts were around a section (between 8 and 12 men). On nights without activity in their area, a part of the meager garrison was expected to go out to reconnaissance partisans or to integrate with other units to carry out an attack or pursuit proportional to their means.

The strongest units, used on the war fronts, were not normally used in the fight against partisan gangs. Except in cases of attacking or surrounding a large partisan unit with a certain probability of success.

Many times, operations to encircle and annihilate guerrillas turned out to be a fiasco. Due to the lack of secrecy and the abundance of temporary concealment in the siege that was established. And the partisans dispersed, hid or slipped away, crawling in pairs.

Results.

Were the results useful, necessary or dubious for the then called Red Army of Workers and Peasants, the activity of the partisans of the USSR?

The realities that the main and vital activity of the “line of logistical communications” from the Reich with its rear in the USSR was able to maintain throughout the war, the military, logistical and social activity (the comings and goings of the soldiers, sometimes due to illness or leave, and the units) of the Germans in their war effort. Supplies, weapons and troops passed through it for the advance and occupation of the USSR to the west of an imaginary line that ran from Leningrad to Stalingrad, passing through the west of Moscow.

If the Germans retreated relentlessly to the west, after losing the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, it was due to the very costly push of the Soviet Fronts or Army Groups, led by the STAVKA or General Staff. And “advised/commanded” by Georgi Zhukov or Alexander Vassilevski, as “Stavka Delegates to the Fronts” for the different major Soviet military operations.

Philosophy and mental basis.

Anyone who has come this far, may think of the horror of the fighting between partisans and German security forces on the Eastern Front. Because of the “rise to the maximum” in the harshness of military actions. And that the difference in races, religion or its absence, and divergent interests also spurred the belligerents.

Well, it depends on the temperament and character that each one had. And, in this case, common sense and a complementary nature led the Germans to begin to soften the “conditions of confrontation” at the individual level. It was about not getting hurt both. I mean, everyone.

The Germans learned from bitter experience that the firm and stubborn resistance of the partisans was due to their fear of suffering in captivity. And that this could easily be weakened by more humane treatment of the prisoner partisans.

Thus, the (German) Manual for the War against Gangs of 1944 included all these principles and ideas to be applied by the German security forces.

And, the partisans also began to behave like more civilized and less heartless combatants. This procedure or technique of respecting the integrity and rights of prisoners became an appreciated principle in the future guerrilla campaigns.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Israeli Tsahal.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Tsahal, is a fairly capable national army, with modern military doctrine and well equipped and regularly trained. It has about 190 thousand professional personnel (permanent). Which can be increased in two or three days to near 750 thousand troops.

Mobilizing for this up to around 550 thousand men and women, who are in the active reserve. These have a varied combat training, depending on their age, profession, training and missions carried out. The first 300 thousand are the most outstanding to decisively join the fight. The other quarter of a million are called according to needs to update and finish training them effectively.

The ugdot or Israeli brigades (ugda is its singular name) of mechanized or motorized infantry are the main Israeli units to carry out a fight in enemy urban terrain. They fight against a much less capable enemy. But, with equal resolve and motivation, because they consider themselves muyahidin or warriors of Allah.

Let us see some aleyas or verses from the Quran, to realize the catechized and motivated Palestinian enemy:

“Oh, Believers, persecute the infidels (all others) until all Worship on Earth is given to Allah.”

“War has been prescribed for you and you shun it. Well, Allah will find another more obedient people and will disown you.”

The infantry ugda consists of 3 infantry battalions, another tank battalion, a field artillery group, 1 anti-tank fighting company, one motorized engineer company and 2 combat and tactical reconnaissance companies. The armored ugda consists of 3 tank battalions, one special forces battalion, one motorized engineer battalion, one armored reconnaissance battalion and a mixed artillery group.

The infantry ugdot are better known. Tanks are, however, the most effective weapon that Israel generally has in its wars. And, within the deliberate concealment and lack of precision of the data that reaches the public, which is practiced on these issues in Israel. Among the five infantry ugdot available, the “Givati”, “Golani” and “Kfir” stand out.

Characteristics of the fighting terrain.

Fighting in “urban or factory terrain” means that the combatants’ views are short in most directions. And, on the other hand, the enemy has a multitude of “relative hiding heights” that hide him and even, sometimes, cover him from opposing fire. This is a source of tension due to the uncertainty it creates.

Physical and mental loneliness also act here. The combatant is separated from the officers commanding him. And, he is part of the squad or crew of the organic support weapons. Whose members are as affected as he is.

Automatic and more precise fires allow and force extreme dispersion and camouflage of combat forces in presence. And, the terrain of struggle here is particularly empty and hidden.

The maneuvers here consist of relatively very short movements. This also affects the loneliness and uncertainty of the combatants. The operational movement capacity of the units in motor vehicles is almost unnecessary, if we discount the direct heavy fire support from their weapons to the combatants. Other marches are simply “marches to combat.

Hamas members and others have built an immense defensive “fortress”. It is a structure of tunnels at two levels of depth (circa 9 ms and 50 ms) studied and created over years. This structure qualitatively resembles those used by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese Vietcong in the Mekong area of southern Vietnam. But, it is more elaborate, larger and capable. Level A is used in the militants’ rejection fighting: here they fight, obtain shelter and temporary hiding place, allows them to move parallel and covertly to the ground of the Strip, use alternative delay positions against advancing or reorganizing soldiers, launch short and middle distance range rockets. Level B acts as a large refuge and general warehouse for Hamas forces and his men and relatives. Intermittently, there are direct paths between both levels of the structure.

This “main protective cover” cushions the heavy fire of Israeli attackers. And it forces soldiers to fight at close range with Hamas irregulars. Thus, the “combat capabilities” of both enemies are quite equal and the sum of military casualties will inexorably rise to figures not expected by the population of Israel. The Israelis’ attempts to flood some tunnels with sea water or a kind of propelled lightweight foam rubber inside them, did not meet expectations.

General situation.

More or less, so far, there is talk of about 6,000 militiamen and about 200 Israeli soldiers as total casualties in Israel’s attack on Gaza. Also, there are just over 23,000 Gazeti civilians dead and 250 inhabitants of Israel’s cooperatives, party places and small barracks captured as hostages, in an unnecessary massacre that is overdone by its cruelty and ferocity.

On Saturday, October 7, irregular Hamas forces launched a “swarm attack” on southern and south-central Israel. Supported by the prior and/or simultaneous launch of thousands of short and medium range ballistic rockets. And, the small “action units” of Hamas, strong in about 3 thousand militiamen employed in total, achieved their tactical objectives: the defeat and/or destruction of Israeli positions (cooperatives, villages and small military posts), causing about 1,300 total casualties to the population and the Tsahal and capturing the said precious hostages. And, producing a strong and general commotion in Israel and in the Tsahal, much greater than the sum of the individual effect of each small attack received.

We are not going to repeat now the operations to be carried out by the Tsahal in the Gaza Strip, since in our recent article “The Urban Defense of Hamas in Gaza” they are already described.

We are going to discuss some ideological and strategic positions of both enemies.

Israel has estimated more than 12,000 Hamas military targets destroyed. Which include command centers, medium and short tunnels and their accesses, communications centers, storerooms, military materials, unit locations and small militia units. Also, it has killed (according to Hamas’ Health Department) 23 thousand civilians and injured tens of thousands of people; not exactly from chafing, punctures and large scratches or fractures. Israel is carrying out not only a military liquidation of armed enemies, but an “ironing” of the Gaza Strip with blood and fire.

This has no signs of progressing towards a stable and secure solution.

The total annihilation of enemies is a devilish mission or total objective. That would require a long and very high commitment of human resources and material means. A close comparison would be between artillery fire to neutralize or destroy.

The Nazis were unable to eliminate the Jews of Central Europe and the West of the USSR in four years of presence in the territories of the Gehime Statz Policei and Himmler’s SS.

Nor could they eradicate Bolshevism from the USSR, inhabited, according to them, by “untermensch”, subhumans, an inferior race or severely degraded race by their vices. Which was supposed to be, therefore, affordable and easy.

The human soul, essential and shunned.

When you put a people, race, or large community under the threat of destruction, new “soul energies” emerge from it, generated in the depths of the human soul. They boost his “national morale” and lead him to fight fiercely. Recovering that certainty of survival that was taken from him.

Israel’s bombing has seriously damaged or destroyed more than a hundred buildings, including churches and mosques, some up to 4,000 years old. Belonging to the Gazan Arab cultural heritage. The attacks targeted the social cultural essence of Gazans, their identity. And the Israelis had to respect them, so as not to give serious arguments to the enemy.

Another characteristic of the social organization of these frontier semi independent tribes is that they stimulate a relative endogamy. With it they seek to isolate, to protect, to support or to increase their idiosyncrasy, influence and patrimony. But, without been biological harmful its use. As it would be between the members of the same family or small or nearby clan. In effect, the marriages not only suppose and carry individuals exchanges between the families of the married. They also produce exchanges and flows of gifts, visits, relations and power plots. In a few little evolved societies, living in a difficult way and, sometimes surrounded temporarily by hostile, the matrimonial relations produce a «revenue», an increases of social positions, influences and goods, which are very estimated by the families.

Taliban Operational.

The highland villages are numerous, small and spread for both sides of the common border. In them can be camouflaged a small group of «regulars» Taliban, waiting that the jerky military flood passes away. Apart, the Taliban enjoy a complicated system of natural caves, reinforced by communication tunnels, endowed with extended zones for waiting and the storage of all classes of goods. This system is used to facilitate the traffic between both countries, without having to use the frontier passages or the most habitual and known gorges, as «parts» of the complete journey. And as temporary refuge, when the Allies carry out reprisal or rebels searching operations, on Pashtun zones where they have been more active. Taliban are Pashtuns. Only are distinguished from the local tribes by their major religious proselytism and military activity. Some of the villagers whom the soldiers meet in their patrols and searches, could be «part-time» Taliban or sympathizers. Two or three men of a native group that pass along a rural way, can be a Taliban team moving across.

The operational key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform them, hide them and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operational development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present foreign Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes, assaults to very small enemy isolated units, harassment by medium range fire, kidnapping, short duration isolated incursions and the mined of ways and paths. Ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns.

Though they are willing to die for their ideals, with the promise of stay in one of the Seven Heavens of Islam, in the first of which resides Abraham, visited daily by 50,000 angels, the Taliban do not hesitate to retreat in the face of a decided attack or the determined and tenacious resistance of their military enemy.

Their usual procedure to assault a weak defended or without spirit position is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance in a broken line shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL grenade-launchers. Heavy weapons are fired from the sides of the sections and fire is directed from top to bottom or bottom to top or on verify target. To avoid own casualties by friend fire.

The struggle for the minds and wills.

The Taliban managed to implant their «global radical theocratic» regime by fighting the regional warlords and unifying Afghanistan. They established a lax and weak socio-political structure, but enough, to give the country some preence. Regionally and locally, they controlled the tribal organs of power and, at the same time, possessed small garrisons of irregulars and militia. That were enough to control and govern that state structure.

Displaced from power 20 years ago, their tenuous and sufficient religious political structure remains and their guerrillas and semi-regular forces operationally advance and retreat. Adapting plasticly to the fight against a national regular army of shoddy. That was supported by air and ground heavy fire from the forces of the NATO countries deployed in the country. And with the elite forces of those, for punctual actions of “search and destruction” of the Islamist guerrillas. Operations that were generally of mediocre effectiveness, below what was planned at headquarters.

There are no real academies of officers and non-commissioned officers in Afghanistan. In its Army, it thrives by adapting to the immediate commands. The salaries of the troops are squandered by their superiors. There his short pay and role as a uniformed soldier is a sign of prosperity and social power among his clans.

Chiefs, officers and non-commissioned officers lack a «national morale» that impels them to full defense of Afghanistan against the Black Death of the Taliban. There is no professional honor, a «corps spirit» that galvanizes them with their fellow unit members in a quest for victory.

In short, there is not in the entire administration an exemplary, honorable and suffered behavior (paradoxically, although the country is ruled by misery) on the part of the superior chiefs and the civil authorities. To urge them to fulfil all their professional and social duties towards their distant compatriots or towards the democratic Afghanistan. That today it is the shell of an empty, exhausted and sterile socio-political structure.

The Civil, Ideological and Military Campaign against the Bands.

Here, the enemy is evasive, dispersed, worse armed than military, bad trained, unruly. But, he is native, is tough and scanty, hides and disguises easily. He is a born predator, with an atavistic cunning and usually does not defend his positions. He uses them to wear down the regular enemy and will leave them at the least perceived danger; in the form of flanking movement, deliberate frontal or on the rear attacks.

The operations of the military great units and units let escape the guerrilla teams through the infinity tactical «interstices». It is necessary to operate with nearness at his microtactical military and social level. To the diffuse, tenuous, but omnipresent «swarm» of the Taliban is necessary to interpose a civic military «swarm«. Formed by voluntary elements, more qualified, professional and trained than the guerrillas.

It is necessary to create small «action units«, for combined “social military” actions. That are capable of reaching the Taliban habitat and to expel them from it, progressively and firmly. Interposing between them and the tribes, his real guerrilla habitat. Units that, in its basic model, would be formed by a platoon of light infantry local loyal trained forces, a squad of professional foreign infantries and a group of civil technical personnel for tribe promotion and education with suitable material. Its logistics and support will be based on ground units and helicopter-borne forces, centrally controlled from 2 or 3 near regional operational bases. And complemented by mobile columns in vehicles or of cavalry, forming a support patrols’ network in a region.

Once made firm these small flexible units, can arrive there major forces and brigades of work and education, to go garrison the zone and stimulating its social improvement. It is necessary to possess money to buy the will of collaborators and sympathizers. This can become facilitating work and social distinction to them. And to realize the necessary of development plans.

To eradicate the opium crops can be an independent strategic goal. And it is necessary to value very well its opportunity and possibility for every small zone. It is necessary to offer the natives an alternative of peace, progress and well-being, within their beliefs and ways, in order that they expel the Taliban. That are really for the Pashtuns, war mercenaries and exploiters of civilians, clans and tribes; foreign to the Popular Islam professed by the Pashtuns tribes.

Conclusion.

Liberal democratic values, which are supposed to sustain the legal government in Kabul, are «republican ideological convictions«. They are not felt, and they are not lived by almost anyone in Afghanistan. They are foreign to the Afghan people, to whom they bring neither prosperity, nor security, nor more desirable identity.

Americans and their local allies have erected and superimposed a «centralized administrative and political edifice» on the identity and social arena of Afghanistan. And that at the first blow of a serious economic or social setback or of the Taliban military battering ram, it will start to throw out of balance, crack and sink in the eyes of everyone.

In the last weeks, the Taliban are occupying border posts in northern Afghanistan and are conducting a partial, loose encirclement of some of the country’s largest populations. This allows them to intimidate the Afghan armed forces and send a message of determination and power into and out of the country.

In general, international analysts are pessimistic about the ability of the Kabul government and, more importantly, its military to withstand a determined and prepared onslaught, a flood, by the Taliban. To take political and social power in Afghanistan. The discrepancy between these analysts is only when the Taliban will launch that Unstoppable Flood.

The End.

Introduction.

After almost 20 years of US military presence in Afghanistan, its last troops will leave Afghanistan in a few days. Their «war and pacification effort» is condensed into about $800 billion spent in Afghanistan and more than 2400 military personnel killed in acts of service throughout this period. Germany and Italy have also recently withdrawn their last deployments in the country.

One of the targets of his attack on this Asian country was the overthrow of the Salafi jihadist regime of the Afghan Taliban.

Their radical ideology was studied in some madrasas or Qur’anic schools in Pakistan. Young Afghan Pashtun exiles were studying there. Taliban are the students of these radicalized madrasas. And in Pakistan there are now similar political social movements, such as the Terikh e Taliban Pakistan or the Pakistani Taliban Movement. Who have fraternal relations with the Afghan Taliban.

These, in turn, would have given shelter to al-Qaeda headquarters, in the form of a «safe guerrilla base«, with various locations in Afghanistan. And, with an extensive last «position of withdrawal«, located in the bordering mountains, by the so-called Line of Durand, among both Islamic countries. Their defense was based not only on the fighting form at difficult heights, but also on a capillary network of tunnels. That served as hiding places for the terrorists and that allowed them a hidden and protected communication by their area of deployment.

From the times before the Terrorist Network’s Suicide Attack on the New Yorker Twin Towers Complex to the Pentagon, in Washington, on September 11, 2001. And, in particular, Osama ben Laden and Aymar al-Sawahiri, an Egyptian doctor, who acted as an al-Qaeda’s «executive member«.

The capture and neutralization of these two individuals was another of the main objectives of the US invasion of Afghanistan.

And, having destroyed the weak, limited and poor social political structure created by the Afghan Taliban, the Americans had, as a corollary of their military actions, a third target. Distant, but surely more important and transcendent.

To seriously and actively help to create a «modern Muslim society» in Afghanistan, transcending the regime of regional and local tribes and clans. And, that will be refractory to the radical spells of the modern jihadits.

And finally, with a resilient social tissue that guarantees the rights, duties and freedoms of all citizens in this «modern Muslim society«.

Capriciously and unfortunately, the failure of this last mentioned objective will squander all the efforts, in species and blood, dedicated earlier. And it’s going to put all of us at the difficult and unwanted starting point of 2001.

Social anthropologic particularities of the Pashtuns tribes.

The internal relations of the groups, families and local families groups and clans, are characterized by incorporating into them certain rites, rules, attitudes and taboos. These gather, value and quantify their vital needs, their primary emotions and their beliefs. The Islam is followed in the wide zone we treat. They are all of the sunni branch, that accepts the Koran and the Prophet Sunna. The differences reside in the rigor with which they examine and accept the sources of the Sunna. This assumption forms a part of the social inculturation, strengthening and cohesion of these groups.

These societies agree and are ruled by an authority, more or less respected and obeyed.

The more be perfected and advance towards the exterior the society, the power of this authority will become strong and grow and will spread in influence areas. The smaller and isolated is the group, the authority power will be more moderating and integrating, acting as the first between the «equal ones». In these last cases, the meeting of the active members (men, hunters) of the clan in assemblies, “jurgas” (in its language), etc., has supreme and sanctioning value of the deviant or solvent conducts for the group. Evidently, in these local councils, the prestige and the power of each individual member count, and in them some are «more «equal» than others. These local chiefs or Maliks are like favored negotiators with the different governments, who enjoy a personal more than institutional authority, and whose agreements can be ignored by the adult males, if are not confirmed by the assemblies.

Their code of customs and honor is the Pashtunwali. It establishes to the individual certain rights and demands from him certain social duties towards the family, the clan and the tribe. The basic disputes on women, gold or valid money and lands are in the origin of the durable hatreds in these tribes. And that must be kept up to avenging the perceived affront. The own fragility and weakness of these society demands the appearance of the protective values.

These might be the hospitality, the loyalty, the friendship, the scorn of the strange as unknwon, the revenge of affronts and damages, the individual and collective honor. Each of them protects and enlarges in some measure or shade the small human group. As we will see, the relations are interpersonal, in the areas of the family, the clan and the region. They are projected by the opportunity, the nearness, the exchange of goods and the relation. And become strong with the loyalty, the respect of the accepted procedures and the treatment time. And depending on the accumulation of these elementary successive acts. A stranger can aspire this way to his integration, in a personal manner. And not for the quality or importance of his category or institutional position.

The hospitality takes implicit the reciprocity, when one travels, is alone and is not aggressive. This sometimes is perfected by the endowment of an escort to the traveler through insecure zones. The violation of this «escort» by an assault supposes a serious affront for the clan that provided it. The loyalty between the members of the group, sometimes very unstable, cohesion it. The honor inflates the self esteem and appearance before everybody. The revenge, in absence of a real justice, search to punish and then to repair the damages and affronts real or perceived. The scorn of strange, not adorned with good qualities or menacing the group, seeks to prevent a priori their integration in it, as a passive defense form. The friendship embraces the ties with the equals and within the group. If someone joins these elementary groups, he is object of loyalty and friendship in a personal way. These values would increase by his performance, ways and personal behavior. It would be the case of a native forces chief, accepted by them for the pays, the honor and the status that they offer and project on the regional clans. The acceptance is not with the position, but with the person.

(To be continued)

The author realizes a methodical and deep critique of the different fighting forms in each of the historical epochs.

It is specially hard and mordant with the form of fight of the Germans during the World War II. His aim is to degrade and minimize it, to reduce it importance and validity in the history of the ground operations. Depriving this way the evolution of the American theory on the those operations, of any intellectual influence or debt with the doctrine of the German war.

The one that the author considers to be more opportunist and tactics, that complete and scientific. And he thinks that it was favored in its results by the lacks and the mistakes of its enemies. It is possible that an academic analysis of the form of German fight, approaches to give this verdict.

But, the evidence is the touchstone of the reality without appearances. And the case is that the Germans triumphed widely and extensively with that one, during the first stage of the World War II in Europe: 1939 1942. During which, his enemies could learn of the tactics, technologies and the German operational strategy. Since it extended too much in the time, on having multiplied the theatres of the war.

And that, in the last phase of the war: 1943-1945, the Germans were exceeded, overwhelmed and, finally, defeated. To what contributed the qualitative and quantitative differences in the logistic flows, which supported both armed rivals; the enormous bleeding of the German commands and cadres, which turned out to be irrecoverable and reduced the qualities of his units; and the quantitative demography of the Allies.

Naveh grants wide quality and esteem to the military doctrine of the Soviets. That he considers to be scientific, because it was following a linear process of arguments, logic and results (that for a long time, were only longed for or foreseen). And that was adapting and guiding specifically and really, to an army of slightly educated masses and nourished by a resounding demography. That always had an insufficient logistic support, when it was not precarious. The mechanization of the infantry to collaborate with the tanks, was always a longing and a hope, more than an average real capacity.

At the first times after the Bolshevik revolution, even directed by the young theorist of the deep maneuver, general Mikhail Tujachevski, the Russian armies remembered «slow and exhausting hordes» in their marches. That were living for the sustenance from the own or strangly territory where they were advancing. The men more relatively educated, always scanty, were enlisted in the technical weapons: artillery, engineers, aviation. Or in the most effective and necessary branches for the penetration and the exploitation of the enemy operational rear: tanks, Guard infantry.

Finally, Shimon Naveh concentrates his efforts, summary and praises in the long process of development of the American AirLand Battle doctrine and his following updates. Whose kindness and efficiency got reality in the air and ground offensive against the Iraqi regime in the War of the Gulf of 1991, looking for the liberation of Kuwait from the power of Saddam Hussein. War that was the touchstone of that doctrine supposedly culminada.

Initiated the ground offensive, the American forces and his allies rapidity faced to practically all the Iraqi forces that were occupying and defending Kuwait. From the Persian Gulf operated the naval forces, that threatening with an amphibious disembarkation on the narrow coasts of the emirate. From the south, the American marines took charge in fixing the Iraqi forces of the south flank of the defense. Confirming this way, for the Iraqis, that the assault front of the allies would be the south and east.

THE SOVIET POLISH WAR OF 1920.

But, at the south of Iraq / Kuwait, the bulk of the Allies mechanized forces penetrated in whirlwind along the western front of the Iraqi deployment, blind and static. Immediately afterwards to be divided this allied deployment in several advance spears, over all the Iraqi units of this flank.

The campaign was a great atrition operation: of the strongest against the strong, for the major technological means and capacities of the Allies. Where a simultaneous assault was looked, to the Soviet style, to all the steps of the enemy order of battle and in the depth of his defensive rigid deployment. In the south of this one there existed armored or motorized Iraqi divisions, ready to counter-attack any allied penetration. Towards the center and north, there was the thickness of the Republican Guard, ready to counter-attack any operational Allied action.

Where a simultaneous attack was looked for, of the Soviet style, to all the levels of the enemy order of battle and in the depth of his defensive rigid deployment. In the south of this existed armored or motorized Iraqi divisions, ready to counter-attack any Allied penetration. Towards the center and north, was the bulk of the Republican Guard, ready to counter-attack any Allied operational action.

The concentrations, maneuvers and actions neither were searching, nor had, a gravity center of the efforts. That was successively defined and applied as the campaign was developing. But, using the already mentioned advantages, the allied forces were seeking to fix and crush the enemy units at their range, by a direct and almost joint form. Creating really this way, a battle of encircle and annihilation, of the family of Cannas and Tannenberg, where the liquidation of the siege was done by parts and was uniformly accelerated in the time.

SWEEPING THE RUSSIAN HORDES.

The Iraqi divisions at the east were submitted to the central and direct control of Saddam Hussein and his Central Staff. That depriving them of initiative, flexibility and freedom of action. If not, some Allies’s corps or divisions could have been put in difficulties by the action of some great Iraqi unit. After the beginning of the ground attack and having the Allies the air supremacy in the campaign, the Iraqis were deprived of the operational exploration. So, the surrounding maneuver of the Allies by the east and towards their rearward, was concealed to them.

The operational Strategy in the Irregular War.

Naveh, nevertheless, does not approach, far from it penetrates and analyzes, a type of war that already existed from a lot of time ago. Before the genesis and ripeness of the American operational strategy. And that is the guerrilla warfare, word taken from the Spanish by all the languages. The one that, pompously, the Anglo-Saxons called war of IVth generation. Though it is almost as ancient as the human conflict. The modern technological armies find difficulties to face this form of fight. Using the means, the doctrine and his regulations, the order of battle and the trainings with which they are provided.

The guerrilla war is synonymous of long and deeply rooted conflict in the civil society, where it appears and develops. It is of low military intensity, except in its last stage (if she reaches it) and of great ideological politicization and polarization of the rivals. These characteristics do that inevitably the civilians are involved in her and that the military conflict is arbitrary, hard and cruel. There face positions and antagonistic interests, which, in the use of the violence, derive towards her limits and that of the suffering of whom involve her.

The author might speak about the application of the operational strategy in the guerrilla warfare. Or used in the direction and the operations of the elite units (marines, rangers, SEALs, etc.), that realize counterinsurgency missions. Here, the gravit centers of the efforts, globally coordinated, include the economic, military, political and social areas. And will exist in these fields and will be applied in a harmonic, joint and coordinated way. Working for a common and convergent effort, using different combinations of means in the different cases that appear.

A central counterinsurgency command will exist, that must bring together and direct the efforts, means and actions. In agreement with the specialization of the means that act and the actions and the aims that are looked for in each of the mentioned levels or fields of action. A characteristic of the acts and their effects is that they must be convergent. Looking for the multiplication and increase of these and the synergy of the first ones. This way, in any action, from a level of forces, budget or looked for results, will act the Counterinsurgency Command.

As examples, in the military area will be gravity centers the semipermanent bases, the communications between the bands and with the countrymen, including the logistics, and the movements of the rebels groups. The static defense will be kept in the centers and means necessary for the effort of war. Others will have to defend by a system of garrisons for the defense of the territory. That will be supported by a military system of mobile patrols and of reconnaissance and of ground attack aviation. The special units will realize deep incursions of attack, exploration and harassment in the areas in dispute with the guerrillas or in power of these.

This doctrine spreads and concerns, across the NATO, the strategic aims of his allies and the assigned and specific means to reach them. The training with IT programs is an example of the new practices of military training. Instead of moving soldiers in the Boot Camps or the vehicles of the mechanized or motorized units in the maneuvers areas, the NATO is developing new artifices in the Network (online) to instruct the personnel. And, though it could not be the norm of formation or training, the project is illustrative of that the Alliance adapts to the new times of «financial global restrictions» for the Armies. But this goes against and impedes, almost for definition, the adjustment of the light infantries to the war against the regular and irregular “broken-down” enemies. And it goes against and prevents the use and the employment of the «maneuvers war» at the levels of the small units and men groups, entrusted to realize it in the fight zone of the infantry. Because the demanding and constant training of the men is here essential and is a condition necessary for his success in the combat.

Peculiarities of the modern Fight in the Infantry Zone.

Any assault aim of the small unit or group of action always will present a route of covered, defilade or secret approximation. That can be exploited to approach up to the close fight distance. This without losses of his combat capacity and without having an engineers’ high formation. So, the “routes” like that might be the curbs of the sidewalks or the sewers in the urban or industrial zones. For the distant or air (drones and crewed planes) observation these singularities do not exist and this way, the enemy does not detect the potential vulnerability of his positions.

In the rejection the same thing happens, but the other way round. A deployed company in his platoons for the usual circular defense, presents several tens of small exposed careless or not attended flanks. And these can be used by the trained enemy in the use of the microarea to approach and to slip between his combat positions, patrols and fox holes. And to be positioned to attack her by reverse a little later. Or to destroy some important assets (hangar, fuel deposits, vehicles parkings, artillery, aircrafts, arsenals, command positions). And these vulnerabilities and deficiencies are kept and, even, they increase almost unfailingly with the confidence and the carelessness that arise in the routine and current activities.

However much there exist protocols, regulations and theoretical advices that affect in the alert and the keeping of the vigilance and security. Because the permanent «combat availability» neither is kept, even does not exist. And it is not a question, as it is in the habit of doing, of creating any more procedure or of hardening those who exist. Because the bureaucracy and his evils will kill the initiative and the inventiveness of the bureaucratized soldiers. It is a question of carrying out those with interest, commitment with the missions and, the most difficult thing, banishing the mental stupor of the routine. Nor, and this is a deficiency derived from the most panoramic vision that is looked, these elementary “microunits” are trained for correctly and temporarily defend itself. If they are surrounded or overcome in number by the regular or irregular enemy, who exploits the “microarea” and knows the field. And, consistently, they also lack enough organic weapon, as to avoid to be surrounded by an enemy major unit.

In West this specific formation is tended to give to his elite units, whereas his «poor» enemies form in her all his infantry: elite, regular, light and irregular. These «bare» armies have to use more the human resources, on having lacked so many modern and sophisticated means. His men are educated in the control (physical and mental) of the risk and of the fear, to survive. And in the discovery and the development of his warlike potentials, turning one with his environment, to overcome the obstacles, to triumph in the mission and to continue living. Some of the personal characteristics that must be more developed in the western «small units», to obtain a «bonus», a complement, of security, surprise and efficiency in his «interfaces of action» on the enemy in the fight in the infantry zone are: motivation, formation and constant training; mobility, concealment and knowledge of the enviroment; safety, surprise and creativity; resistance, patience, quietude, silence, sobriety, calmness, alert of the senses (dulled by the withdrawal from the nature and the plethora of information that is received at all the levels) and self-sufficiency; freedom of action, initiative and decision at the level of his behavior and mission.

It is evident that, if the men fullly develop these military characteristics and tasks, we will be forming units of elite. But the certain thing is that the added ones or «adendum» of these qualities that they acquire, will give them major autoconfidence. And will qualify them to carry out better the infantry fight against «broken down» enemies armies, that have incorporated them into his usual form of combat.

During enough time still the air and spatial American means, as spy satellites, not crewed planes and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have serious limitations for the detection and the check of small ground, even regular, forces, in the areas of difficult ongoing and with possibilities of concealment, as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized zones (industrial, of storage and distribution, and of housings). Those also offer covered to the fire up to the close combat distances. It is paradoxical that the western armies, who try to take care and to protect his members, do not sufficiently form them in the fight that his «ragged» enemies realize. These «modern infantry» units would fight by means of the infiltration or the slide; the cover and the concealment; the rapid or imperceptible movements for the enemy observer, according to the case; and always silent; the dispersed and/or camouflaged of circumstances positions and in the later slope; the constant surprises; the countershocks and the ambushes; in both forms of fight: defense and attack.

As for the guerrilla war against the irregular enemies, we will treat the «wide zone» where the rebels do not dominate, but they keep the pulse with the military men and try to go snatching them the people and the areas. This is the zone where would have clearer and direct application the modern western infantry units, to fight against the irregular orientals. The only effective way of defending from these rebel groups is obtaining the initiative, dislocating his movements between positions and towards their aims, exhausting his operatonal rear, taking from them the freedom of action and demonstrating the people whom have the means and the determination to gain the war, supporting his government and authorities. To defend himself is not to be left to reduce or to corner in the garrisons, by the action and the extension of the bands. Garrisons that turn in enormous and costly «protected warehouses» of materials and men without using. This is to be left to oxidize, to demoralize and to enervate by the mobil, active and very asymmetric enemy. And was the “main way” used by the high commands in Afghanistan and Iraq. The “patrols and small military positions” network of in this «critical zone», it has as operational task to deny the initiative and the mobility to the guerrillas, cutting his communications with his bases, with his collaborators’ network and between them, and raise off them, like in the hunt, from his protective bases of civil character and from his isolated redoubts. The «official network», which covers operationally a wide extension, is also capable of catching sensitive information. The knowledge of the rebels, of the zone and of the neighborhood can be one of his major assets. The conviction of impunity of the rebels will disappear.

A necessary and forgotten complement of the regular network to fight against the guerrilla are the rebels «false bands». These would be destined to operate in zones inclined to the insurgency, from where several of his members come. And his action and concealment would be favored by the decentralized character of the rebel groups. His missions would be to obtain information, to prove the loyalty of the civilians and to annihilate enemy small groups or suicides. They should not be major of a reinforced squad, except in the special occasions of combat. This can seem to be imaginary or, at least, theoretically, and unrealizably. But the case is that in the definitive defeats of the Apaches bands in the southwest of the USA, between 1872 and 1886, after the changes effected in the deployments, the tactics and technics and the doctrine by the general Crook, was decisive the incorporation of numerous Apaches explorers in the US Army Cavalry. Not only to locate the hostiles bands, but to attack them specially and hardly. And the taciturn, distant, slightly nice and haughty or indifferent character of these Indians towards other Americans, that can be observed in an attentive visit to a reservation, was not making them precisely inclined to be «collaborationists» of the whites men.

THE END

But they neglect the use of the microarea at the levels of squads, teams, companions pairs and weapon servants. In the microarea, by means of the cover, the patience, the secrecy and the concealment, those «combats groups» might use against the enemy, his capacities of resistance (to the surprise), of mobility or concealed tactical «activity» (in the defense), of initiative and of freedom of action. Operating over him in minuscule «action interphases» (or microsectors). This is specially actual and necessary in the fight against regular and irregular «nobody» enemy, which lack the modern military technological advances and the economic resources to provide them. And that search for need and/or idiosyncrasy, to compensate his asymmetries with the domain of this infantry fight, seeking to see this way the white of the eyes of the enemy.

The military American Doctrine for the modern Wars.

The news that are received since years from the war operations zones in the countries in conflict, proceeding from the journalists inserted in the fighting forces, of the correspondents detached in the different populations of those (Kabul, Baghdad, Saigon, Hue) and those that the armies in presence issue, are revealing a series of characteristics that are common to the forces of the different western modern armies. They all are following the trend initiated by the Americans of having the enemy less nearby, more seen and observed and more beaten by the heavy air and artillery fire. It is not looked with this, in increasing effects order, to blind it, to disturb it, or to neutralize it, but to destroy it. That is the costliest and improbabliest of his effects and that demands an increased and deficient expense of the resources. And the worse thing is that does not always exist his direct connection with the offensive maneuvers of the ground forces. That often do not come to beating the broken enemy after the fires blows. The ground deployments are «secondary» and, therefore, also are his movements, dispersions and concentrations. The heavy fire has turned into a «economic and industrial» substitute (it changes military effort into dollars) of the maneuvers and the assaults of the ground forces. And the reason of all that is known by the poor and asymmetric enemies of West: the horror to the risk in combat and to assuming falls.

MONGOLS SOUGHT FOR THE ENEMY DISRUPTION, ATTACKING ITS VULNERABILITIES, PENETRATING ITS EMPTY REARWARDS, MOVING FASTER AND CREATING APPEARANCES FOR THE ENEMY.

The massive employment of the heavy fire is the principal «argument» of the Pentagon. His doctrine (Field Manual of the US Army 100-5, Operations) does not emphasize the initiative and rests in enemy reacts to the «real or potential action» from protected positions in the whole operations zone. The USA has created a ground forces with few capacity and skill in his small units for the combat in the infantry fighting zone, where more risk take the men. The trend of the doctrine looks for a formation (knowledge, education and command) and an intelligence (as elaborated, sufficient and constant information) excellent and abundant for the chiefs and officials. They are the managers of conceptualize the combat and the persons in charge of the fulfillment of the mission of his units and small units. It is supposed that the soldiers will do well and will work well, being able to use his sophisticated equipments and those of his companions of unit and fulfilling the orders of his subofficials and officials. These are supposed elaborated at the sufficient level, to give them perspective and cohesion with the intention of the high controls.

GOOD AGAINST A II GENERATION ARMY AND MORE CENTRALIZED THAT OURS: THAT OF SADAM HUSSEIN.

One of the operation principles that gathers strength in this renewed doctrine is that of the simultaneity. This establishes to beat at the same time, with heavy fire of artillery and aviation, the first and second enemy attack echelons and even his reserve, using against her the aviation and the tactical rocketry. The infantry and tanks forces are designed to attack or to counter-attack this now beaten enemy in all his depth and to assure the battle decision. Here does not exist the detection and the assault to the enemy weak points. Nor the «general saving» (an essential, universal and original principle of the war, according to Fuller) of means and of human lives. Nor the skilful, risky and fruitful maneuvers of functional and/or positional dislocation of the enemy. In opened area, the infantry cannot attack without indirect and/or direct heavy fire support and without concealment (night, fogs, smokes, draggings). But this complementary support has been hypertrophying, up to turning into a «weapon» for itself (as decades ago it was tried to do with the tanks) in the mix of the military resources and in one supposedly «maneuvers warfare». About which speak, but not well applied, the updates of the FM 100-5 from 1985. The such promising, already omnipresent and wished “not driven planes” of exploration and/or bombardment or «drones» are not more than the global projection in scope, safety of employment for the user and game of possibilities of the heavy fire, about which we speak. The marshall von Hindenburg designed the adage: «A battle without Schwerpunkt (the place where or the unit that applies our “principal effort”) is like a man without character». The North American army acts generally evoking a heavy, forceful mace, hammering and excessive. The Afrika Korps, by the contrary, reminded us an elegant, agile, unforseeable, (almost) sufficient and effective foil.

The Employment of a IIIrd Generation Army in the “military asymmetric” Enviroment.

The wars of fourth generation are the counterinsurgency wars or guerrilla wars or irregular wars or armed revolts or national liberation wars or organized banditry, which always have existed, coexisting with the conventional variants where only regular forces combat. They are those that the USA has lost or not won lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (Marines’ peace disembarkation, then demolished in his barrack), Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» of the tribal masters of the war and the militias of the Islamic Courts, now of al-Shabab), Iraq and Afghanistan. They are very unequal wars against an enemy of lower technological military level man relative to the own regular forces, taken root almost always in the own or occupied civil population, militarily low intense and extensive or long in the space and the time. With awkward frequency, when the human (own or local agents) or technological Americans «sensors» detect some probable rebel activity of the yellow ones, muhaydins or hostile foreigners, they first devastate the building, the «block», the zone. What for them is really a surface target. And then they are going to wipe off and to do the corpses inventory, the «body count». Sometimes between the rubbles they can meet the corpses of a yellow, blackish or innocent and numerous Muslim family. It abuses of the attrition, when the enemy fuses with the civilians. It is careless the active, unexpected patrolling work, who needs proportionally less material and human means. But that bases In the military trade, the physical and moral courage, the freedom of action and the creativity in the low and intermediate commands and in the men.

OBAMA FIRED CENTCOM GENERAL MATTIS WITHOUT A PHONE CALL.

The western soldiers have exchanged or forgotten the «principles» or rules of the good to do in the war, for the simultaneity and the depth of the distant fire, covering the whole enemy highly probable zone. With it there is neither means economy, nor principal effort, nor the necessary discrimination between soldiers and the potentially enemy civilians. The armies look eagerly for the safety and the confidence in his decisions and missions. Precisely when the environment in which they are and act in the last 5-years periods, the guerrilla or asymmetric wars, is variable, fleeting, without definite limits, confused and hard to grasp. The uncertainty, the chaos, the mistakes, the friction and the failures, the scanty means and the partially fulfilled plans, the weariness and the fear are the «omnipresent demons», that characterize and concern this neutral «magma» of the war. And it is neutral because it leaves being drive and guide largely by the human superior «plans and actions». That are stimulated by the «correct sense» of the commands, the determination, the will, the physical and moral courage, the motivations (ideological, religious, ethnic, social…), the suitable training, the sufficient equipment, the commitment with the tasks and missions and the respectable and respected commands.

SOME DEADLY RECORDS.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not tacitly accepted by both American parties, that the «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military equipment) were supported and necessary, to remove of the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the fundamentalist foreign terrorism of any origin, religion or ideology. It justified the ill-fated post war bad oriented occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with a fiscal and exterior deficits ran away and with a Democrat Administration, it is necessary for the USA to save in military resources. To dedicate them «to construct a nation here, at home», as defined Obama. This way, the USA lowered qualitatively the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only one violent not national enemy. This internationalist salafist terrorist «network», with delirious and impossible ideas, without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for his forces and means of «rapid punctual incursions». This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile areas, operations of assaults by elite units and small expeditionary forces and of Marines amphibious assault. These transported by «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and specific equipment for several years in an operations theatre, they are indefinitely rejected by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense».

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The American and European troops are prepared to fight against a regular military enemy provided with a masses army. Or even more modern, of the IIIrd generation, with more elaborated technologically means and better trained men, to support the lonelinesses and tensions of the awaited current battlefields. Definitively, his «way», his action space, is the direct and opened clash in presence of a great profusion of probable enemy targets. His instrument is the attrition, the destruction of the aims that the enemy presents and could be detected and acquired in all the depth of his march or assault deployment. The last two enemy echelons, nowadays increasingly remote or deep, are reached by the longe range support aviation or with the ballistic or autonomous missiles of medium range.

Which is here the role of the man? To detect and confirm the enemy targets, to try to fix them, if it is about a patrol or a small combat unit and to call his «ordnance» in order that it devastates them. Only his elite units, always scanty and, therefore, exceptional and precious, are formed in the nearby infantry fight using only his organic means.

In Iraq and in Syria the islamist bases are always in the cities and populations more favorable for the activity of his different bands. And they are surrounded or permeated by military local and foreign forces. Already initiated the war, the North American intelligence intercepted a memorandum of 17 pages written by Abu Musad al-Zarqawi, former chief of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, to Osama bin Laden. In it he was expressing his worry for his survival: «In Iraq there are not mountains where we could shelter, nor forests in whose thickness we could hide. There are spies eyes everywhere. Our backs are exposed and our movements are realized in view of all». And this geographical military space is similar in Syria.

The Action of the military Forces against the current Insurgency.

In the books on the guerrilla warfare, it is discused of the tactics of the siege to the military fixed or semipermanent positions. The guerrillas, deprived in the first phases of an ideological armed revolution (communists, of fight against the foreign occupant) of enough military capacity, have their guidelines to attack the mentioned military positions.

RUSSIAN REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN SYRIA

In the zones not dominated by the guerrillas, but bordering the areas under his control, it is where develops the fight of those for removing the military enemy. Seeking to also control these areas and to realize in them his ideological indoctrination of the populations. The guerrilla bases only can grow in space or increase his number, when the military enemy moves back. Or when his positions (advanced positions, barracks) are submitted to a more or less nearby and ferreous siege. That must be continuous in his effects: that is to say, controlling the approximation and exit routes of those. To threaten, harass, check and to attack in its moment the surrounded forces. And the reinforcement and supply columns of that come to help. Using limited attacks, ambushes and traps and registered fire bags.

In the regions infected by the guerrillas, not necessarily occupied by them, the military positions are protective, extensive and few fortress. His garrison is high. The military set evokes there a blind, awkward and low mobile bunker. The military men realize from them special forces operations of reconaissance and against guerrilla positions and of march to the combat on targets of zone, at charge of strong columns. To occupy and then defend them, according to the capacities of the military forces. In this, the commitment and moral of them is decisive.

GOVERNMENT CARPET BOMBING IN SYRIA.

In the irregular war against the bands of the Islamic State, the armed forces and his auxiliary ones use in his operational strategy, some of Mao Ze Dong’s 10 military principles to direct the tactics of the Chinese guerrillas and semi regulars. Those were enunciated by Mao on December 25, 1947 in his speech before the Central Committee of the PCC. Let’s see, in not necessarily original order: 1) To attack first the isolated and spread enemies and later the stronger enemy forces. 2) To take first the small villages and, finally, the big populations. 3) Not to fight combats, if you are little prepared for, nor present combats in which the victory is not sure. 4) To concentrate always for each combat forces absolutely superior to those of the enemy. 5) To destroy the enemy while it moves and is more vulnerable. 6) To use the intervals between campaigns to rest and to regroup and to train the troops…but not allow that the enemy have a pause, not even a breather. 7) Take first the populations low defended. And, when the conditions are favorable to us, those with medium defenses. And wait to increase our advantages, to assault the better defended cities.

This operational strategy outlined by Mao, using simple, didactic and efective procedure, is of a low military level. As corresponds to an insurrection that had to grow, to develop and to spread. And that was employing rural uncultured forces and was arming itself principally with the enemy captured weapon. Mao said that he «had a call option in the weapon of the British arsenals».

IRAQI TANK WITH SHIA BANNER…

But this same orthodox operational strategy of the weak rebel against the strong military, is that are going to use the Allied forces, agglutinate and supported by the USA and Russia (in Syria), to attack an islamist insurgency, entrenched in his urban bases. And keeping the massive, repeated and overwhelming employment of the modern air and ground heavy fire on the rebels. So much in the battles and combats that appear, as for the wear and interdiction of the islamist positions, his facilities and movements.

Seeking as strategic aims to defeat the rebels and to occupy his bases or positions. That would be finally select for a policeman’s labor. Bases that are the only hard, definite and static aims, which the guerrillas have. With a qualitative difference with the diffuse, evasive, fleeting and slippery aims that the guerrillas offer in movement. Bases that are directly attacked, using the military forces (to those that is supposed better trained and equipped and, at least, equally motivated, that the rebels) and his enormous power of direct and indirect fire.

RUSSIAN PARTISANS.

The military and social problem that exists here is that the Allied rebel Arabic groups, the Kurdish peshmergas and the Iraqi military men and his loyal militias, lack the military virtues of the National complete armies. And they have acquired not military habits on the preservation of his men in combat. Avoiding them at any price the mutilation and the death. In It have influenced decisively the religious and social origins of the different «allied» soldiers groups and his interests and divergent aims, at times even antagonistic, within these two civil wars. Social elements and parameters contaminated, spurious and, even strange, before the concept of the Umma or community of faithfuls of the same god, Allah.

 IRAQI SHIA MECHANIZED ARTILLERY AGAINST ISIS

They follow for it this operational strategy of going very little by little, first occupying the weakest islamist positions that surround and defend the biggest. Devastating with the heavy fire from the distance the islamist disclosed positions, which are intermingled with with the houses and refuges of the civilians. Because the war they do, so much the Americans as the Russians and all his allies, in the urban fighting areas that are the islamist occupied populations of Iraq and Syria. And the prolongation of the war, the major time that they will use to obtain his military aims, preserving his men in the combat, the civilians will pay it. With his blood, with the destruction of his material means and buildings and with his massive displacements, seeking to save already only the life and without knowing who will receive and help them.

Let’s see a historical example of the action of counterinsurgents forces, in high unfavorable conditions for them. The German forces antipartisans in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In his manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that “the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be answered».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, for the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His antipartisans troops were consisting always of variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German troops of security and policemen; security troops of his Allies in the front of the East, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of Allied «Russian» forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes, insafe. The hard core of the units were the Germans. The posts did not have homogeneous troops. In them, the men’s qualities were intermingled, in order that mop or novice was encouraging by the presence of the strong, and in him was removed the thoughts of weakness or desertion.

LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES GIVING SUPPORT TO AN ANTIPARTISAN OPERATION IN RUSSIA.

Before the inability to provide troops and security to his rearguard in the whole territory conquered to the USSR, at the west of an imaginary laid out between Leningrad and Stalingrado, the Germans had to select very well the points of garrison. These rarely had more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the post could be defended for a time. While, others, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor the vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of antipartisans forces, there were formed reconnaissance and combat patrols. Something like reconnaissance in force patrols, to locate and harass the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, against a guerrilla threat or the location of an important bands concentration, even there were temporarily brought troops from the forward line (of the operational zone), for the assault and destruction of that one, generally looking for his siege and annihilation.

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational aim of his antipartisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies were kept reasonably opened from Germany, Poland and Romania up to the rears of the German forces and his allies in the East. And the flow of men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods that received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Millions Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and towards there there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch, in his continuous rotations.

One of the principal tasks of the military men of the International Forces in Support of the Security, deployed in the Southwest of Asia, in the countries menaced by the islamist terrorism, is the motorized patrolling by the dusty ways that interlace the zone of influence of their barracks. These areas almost lacks Tarmac roads. When there exist they are not a great thing. The caps of asphalt have between one and two fingers of thickness; and the heats soften them and pot-holes and bubbles are easily formed. Usually, this is not an aggressive patrol. It is an exhibition, routine and of visual and logistic link patrolling, between their principal and secondary positions and with the nearby population centers.

When the military men think that there can be problems, they receive the support of the air observation. They are reconnaissance not manned planes (the UAV, in his initials in English), whose use spreads in these asymmetric conflicts. They can detect (in ideal conditions) at 5 thousand meters if a person is armed. The Americans use the Predator model (which is armed also) and the the Searcher (without attack capacity), being able both to operate up to 350 km from his base.

JAISHALADL SUNNIS IRAQIS GUERRILLA POSING…

In some cases the rebels and bandits have dared to attack some of the military marching columns. Fighting from fixed and spread, hasty fortified positions, forming a fringe like a half moon or crescent, which was embracing the march way. Their problem was that the rebel weapon were of tense fire and so their fighting positions were in the forward slope. So, the armed light armoured vehicles with foreign infantry, could combat profitably with the guerrillas in their reinforced fox holes, small trenches and folds of the ground. In effect, their targets acquisition and machine-guns fire control systems, were allowing them the selection and the precision of their fires against the punctual targets of the irregular rebels. And were forcing them to move back and to hiding in the near hamlets.

There are more others cases in which the rebels use the explosive handcrafted artifices (in English, «improvised explosive devices») in the ways crossed by the military men in patrol. They usually place them setting off from the villages, as their improvised forward base, and taking advantage of the concealment and the protection of the nights. There is a high afraid to these artifices, already famous from the postwar period of Iraq. Because they are unexpected, unpredictable and hard to detect. Also, are enervating (the mental perspective of a possible, though improbable explosion, burdens much more than the real probability of the hurts in the attack) and they put the men in the passive defense and in the wait, knowing that active measurements to avoid them are not taken.

The explosive hollow charges that form the majority of these artifices, attack the “low guts” of the military foreign vehicles, their most vulnerable and less protected part. Down there, they cannot carry the reactive charges of repulsion or a multiple layers “shield” with ceramics, like the hulls of the main battle tanks. It is calculated that the Afghan Taliban and the members of the ISIL rebels can place and activate during a year, more 10 thousands of these handcrafted mines. Some correspondents call the artifices, the most effective weapon of the insurgency. Though they are, in their operational set, like an immense minefield; but that are not simultaneously placed and super widespread, improbable and without being covered by the enemy fire.

The Technologies and Tactics to eliminate the Danger of the Ambushes and Explosive Traps in the Tracks.

There are several, the passive or reactives and the actives, assuming that the initiative and the aggressiveness, against worse prepared and trained rebels, is with the military men. They all are «defensive». Since the Department of the War passed to be named long ago of the Defense, everything is “defense”.

Between the passive ones can be to increase the visual recognition of the tracks, observing protuberances and changes of color that should not correspond, in the soils of those. The «travel times» of the columns would diminish a lot. It is necessary to cross those more slow, looking at the soil and looking over the horizon, searching also for careless observers, not very distant. They do not use too much cable activators. These are expensive and weigh, and the rebels are in isolated zones and their logistics is weak and complicated.

The devices are activated generally by the pressure of the vehicle or by a transmitter of a given frequency and range; it can serve an opening doors device. With their frequency inhibitors, the military men try to offset the radio waves of the probable frequencies in the zone. Being the most expensive and complicated transmitters, that with more range, power and frequencies range of use. It is the game of the cat and the mouse. The problem arises when the guerrillas of an area receive a transmitter activator that uses an unforeseen frequency.

Also the columns might be harassed by registered mortar fire during the stops that they were doing to confirm or to eliminate some possible artifice, as some of them might be simulated.

GENERAL VALERIANO WEYLER.

Another way would be to move out of the tracks, cross-country running. For the wheel vehicles, this not always is possible. And, in addition, their wear of the pieces and the consumption of fuel increase very much, as also the march schedules. At the same time, it diminishes the comfort and increases the weariness of the travelers in missions of long range and routine patrolling.

That it is not said that it is impossible or very difficult to do. Since this was what the general Valeriano Weyler did, to frighten the Cuban mambises of the surroundings of the ways and tropical paths. On February 10, 1896, the general was taking charge of the government of Cuba and of the headquarters of the Spanish army deployed in her. The president of the Cabinet, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, restorer of the Bourbon monarchy, was supporting the politics of keeping the colonial domination in Cuba, up to «sacrificing the last man and the last peseta». And named Weyler for the mentioned positions, in substitution of the general Arsenio Martínez Campos, the peacemaker of the war from 1968 to 1978. Which this time failed in bringing positions over with the armed rebels.

GENERAL ARSELIO MARTÍNEZ CAMPOS.

The Cuban guerrillas, in this new war, were taking advantage of the concealment of the “manigua” (tropical jungle) and his nearness to the ways, to harass with rifle fire the Spanish columns and to cause them some falls, without getting involved in a fight. Weyler prompt designed the tactic of rejection the enemy. A reconnaissance with combat capacity was going suitably forward to the Spanish columns in march. It was moving by the jungles (autochthonous bushes) that were surrounding the routes of march, without moving away too much from the paths. The “mambises” or Cuban armed rebels, forming variable and scanty harassment forces, were this way raised from their ambushing positions and drove away from the principal Spanish forces.

Particularities of the mountainous zones and their inhabitants.

The mountainous areas of the geopolitical region of the Southwest of Asia are specially dangerous for the foreign military units of any size in maneuver. The spurs of the heights are frequently crossed by wadis or seasonally dry riverbeds of brooks and springs. In them it can conceal a group of men. That will not become visible until his opportunity of harassment by the fire arises, from rapidly reinforced and camouflaged positions, of the military units. Or have an encounter skirmish with some military group that comes out to the hollow without precautions.

Also it is easy to approach some rocky outcrop, adorned or not by a small thorny bushes, without detecting any enemies patiently crouched down behind it. That will attack the carelessness soldiers, using their knives or cutlasses. Even, when the men return to the principal way, after establishing and keeping a defense position to secure the march of the principal column, giving them the back.

The tribes who live there have as characteristics in their identity and customs, the belligerence and the intertribal brawls. The most important and widespread are the etnia pashtun and the baluchis.

The surprise, which is an effective multiplier of the «specific combat capacity» of a given unit, is constantly and systematicly employ by the irregular fighters. This way, it happens that, «in this wide, ocher and arid valley, they have never attacked us», because the mountains that frame it are at 300 or 400 m. in the horizon. Well, today they are going to attack you with short bursts (2 to 6 shots) of machine gun with bipod, when you advance gullible and spread in that dull and known valley. Without bothering for establishing the march security with pickets, which protect the principal column. And offering multiple small targets to the tenacious, thoughened and poisonous enemy.

Military Tactics in the counterinsurgency fighting.

Finally, some specific tactics and techniques exist for the fight against irregular rebels, that can be used here. It looks to keep the initiative, the creativity and the law of the action in our side. It is a question of the independent employment of light infantry small units (at first, type plattoon or section) in reconnaissance and attacks tasks of the enemy bands.

For the defense of the own communications, they can be used aggressively against the bands that scourge or that hinder them (the artifices are like more spread and selective mines). For example, they can advance and conceal in a sector where the terrorists or local bandits bands are active. In the night, when those are usually placing in the tracks their explosive artifices, they will attack thoughtlessness them (with the maxim surprise and for the major effect). This demands of all the men of the patrols and units: formation, motivation, commitment with the mission, specific training, initiative, creativity, self-sufficiency, sobriety, patience, serenity, alert of the senses, silence and quietude.

An advantage that will multiply the combat capacity of the military patrols, resides in that these bands usually neglect their security in what they think that it is their rear. As soon as a combat has taken place with the rebels, the patrol must be extracted or return to his barracks. To rest, report or brief, return to train, to be equipped and to move to another sector, when it be appropriated, in another mission.

Epilogue.

Any ambush that turns out to be effective involves a failure, a deficiency, a carelessness in the security of the attacked. The routine of the actions; the softness of the men; the sufficiency and conceitedness of the direct and top commands; the scanty formation of the soldiers; the insufficient motivation of all the military men and his lack of commitment with the tasks or missions. They constitute serious departure faults to the creation and the maintenance of an effective march security. In the reconnaissance and of combat patrols and in the movements of the units and small units.

And, though the security does not appear frequently in the «lists» of the principles of the war, specially in the most short, the security has come to remain. And the failure to keep this principle will concern in major or minor degree and extension the efficiency of other «companions or partners principles». Since the whole of the principles forms a holistic, synergic, concurrent and convergent group, on the military actions. Defining all simultaneously the «what to do» in the war or in the armed conflict.

The appearance of the IT treatment of the information supposed a revolution in the capture, production and transmission of the existing or caught information. Whose possibilities and transcendency are still far from know, even in his scope and his limits. The information generated in a battlefield or an operations theatre of is enormous, ephemeral in diverse times, almost immeasurably and fluid. The latter quality is fundamental for the production of the intelligence. That is the information caught by the units and sensors of all kinds and that is digested or prepared by the specific organs (G2, S2 and agencies of intelligence), to create a sufficient, effective, opportune and constant intelligence. That is used by the «advanced users» or commands in the different levels of military action (tactical, operative and strategic).

Since it could not be otherwise, in view of the brief exposed scheme, the IT industry soon found an enormous area of activity and possibilities in the military field. And the high military commands, often in «ad hoc» prepared meetings and coctails, received from the manager directors and chairmen of the branch corporations, animated, brief and exciting presentations of the enormous performances that might give to their units of all the branches, the designed, elaborated and installed softwares and hardwares by these vanguard technical companies. The battlefield or the operations zone (the area, the enemy and I), known, conveyed and controlled in real time by my men!!!

The Support of the military Information Systems.

It is not the case that these new technologies allow to elaborate a complex and integrated weapon system. This already existed before the information age and the electronic existing advances allowed his creation. For example, the AEGIS defense system for ships against aircraft, warships, missiles and submarines was designed, created and installed for the first time in 1973. It is equiped by destroyers and even frigates (in a simpler model) of the USA and his allied nations. And this way they are called the «shields or defenders of the Fleet». In effect, every «naval group» centred and escorting an aircraft carrier and every «naval combined force of strategic projection», rely on several ships provided with the AEGIS system. This consists of a powerful radar of several megawatts of power, capable of catching and continuing up around 200 potential targets, placed at distances of up to 350 km to the installed system.

The caught information goes to a computer center that reports to a decision center. Which arranges the launches of missiles depending on the mission of the group or naval force and the estimated danger generated for him by the target. The system is installed in front of the armoured control center of the ship. That gives the final permission for the launch of the missiles. These are arranged in rows of vertical silos (habitually, are four with 4 missiles each one) placed in the front cover, in the part that was occupying the conventional artillery. The silos are re-fed from the interior of the ship with other missiles after the launches. The missiles are propeled by solid fuel, which allows that they should be smaller than the land launched. And the adjustment of the system is studied for the destruction of the enemy ballistic missiles.

The activities that the military men realize in action in front the enemy are numerous, varied and some of them are complex. And all of them demand a sufficient attention from the controls and men. Let us see some of the most significant. Regarding the movement in the ground: to advance, to stop and to move back; so much running as walking, crawling or incorporated, and doing it by jumps or in zig zag. Regarding placing and valueing the environment, hostile or not: to observe, to detect, to process, to decide, to transmit or not the results and to act. Regarding the form of fight (rejection or attack): to hide, to cover and to be protected, to change position, to define well evasive detected targets, to receive the orders of the immediate chief, to attack them with deliberate, rapid, etc. fire, (if it is a question of an infantry). Regarding the communication with his “group” (team, weapon, squad, section): to receive orders and information, to send information and orders, to spread information. And they carry out all this under the uncertainty, the lack of comfort, the tension, the loneliness, even of his companion or buddy, and the fear … The constant and repeated sometimes audio-visual information, that is communicated by the modern digital systems can relieve this physical and psychic load of the soldiers? So to achieve it, would really be of great help for them.

ARE THEY LOOKING, DECIDING OR FIGHTING?

IS IT USEFUL HERE?

To all that, it could join a flood of information, insignificant in this moment for his mission or his immediate action. This can generate an increase of the needs of the attention capacities of the military men. Through the more important senses, the sight and the ear. And to originate a diversion of his effective available attention (if there is), towards external not fundamental or neutral stimuli of the images and the conversations. The system is going to transmit them a clearer and detailed information of the targets, even defining some more ephemeral or veiled. But it will not give them information about the intentions and the mental conditions of the different located enemies and their group. Though the system is served with probabilities, previous experiences, alogarithms and reliable estimations…

A practical Application.

In the new model of fighting, the attacking force would be kept simultaneously dispersed, communicated and informed in real time and looking for and attacking the enemy. It would be the supposed advantages of the swarm and his concentric and simultaneous assault, which would count now with the knowledge of the ground and the enemy, thanks to the multiple sensors and systems and the real, caught and transmitted information (not intelligence) to the units of the force.

Are similar in capacity all the units of the force? Then we are demanding from them that each one acts as a «polyvalent» fraction of the unit, without specializing them. With what they will probably have some specific, quantitatively insufficient capacities. Are specialized the units of the force? Then they will have to rely on the simultaneous concurrence, in the defense and the attack, of several units. That should complement between all the necessary functions of this tasks «group». And if the enemy electromagnetic countermeasures work against the wireless communications and is established a communications «silence»? And if we now do not have the telephony circular network of the unit and do not possess double couriers for the transmission of “parts and orders” to the chief and from the chief?

And if the enemy deploys in the same way as us? So we would come to a general clash of weak individual forces against enemies weak forces individual. As the great units spread out for his fighting form. Clash that would be solved by multiple partial and isolate combats, using the attrition. They would be like the singular combats of champions and leaders, which happened in other times. And would gain those who were finally keeping a major number of valid units. It would be a clash won by pure material wear of means: men, military means and expensive and sophisticated IT material, almost without transcendent application.

The civilization and his vital and social structures, in his interactions with the individuals and their psychology.

The failure of the jihadists in joining a «group with shared beliefs and virtues (the permanent values)». That give to their lives identity, sense and belonging.

Why do they behave this way? How to treat the recoverable ones? How to attack the hatefuls or recalcitrant terrorists?

Historical Antecedents.

These «fine ones» rescue and update a sinister personage that suffered many decades ago the adventurers, settlers and European authorities in the countries of the Islam. It was when «the flow and the reflux» of the currents of the History between the European and the Islamic civilizations, frontiers from the 8th century, was favorable to West. And different countries of the West, France, Great Britain, Russia and even the USA (when from 1898, after the war with Spain and ther occupation of the archipelago of the Philippines, they met the «Moors»), gave the geographical jump, sometimes overseas. And penetrated and settled themselves with more or less opportunity and right (apart from «that of the stronger», in force until ends of Modern Age). It was the Age of the Imperialism.

The «sworn-in» generally was a stout and slightly reflexive man. That counted between his mental parameters the Islamic basic beliefs: the 5 «pillars of the Islam», to which was added the Yihad against the unfaithful person or the kfar or apostate. These simple, strong and moldable men were indoctrinated by them by the iman of the village or population and his acolytes and by his companions. That convinced them that were destined by al-Allah to the paradise, «for following Allah’s path». That for them was to do the war to the «unfaithful foreigner» and to the » local apostates», who were collaborating with him in the governance of the country. This man or a small group of them was literally thrown against the designated target: civil or military authorities, a meeting of civilians or military men in a station, in a temple or in the square or the street market, etc.

THE MACHETE OF A MOOR «SWORN-IN»…

The sworn-in, that were taking his vulgar name, from the last rite that they realized before going to «his» combat, were fighters of one use. It was not necessary to instruct them in the tactics and technologies of the infantry combat. It was not hoping that they were returning from their mission. Only they had to dominate the use of the scimitar, cutlass or yagatan, common in their zone. Apart from his convictions as firm as scanty, the sworn-in were drugged to increase his physical resistance and to be able to murder with efficiency. It was common that they received several bullet impacts or blade wounds, before losing the spirits, to slacken and to fall down. Only the bayonet well fixed in full torso, chest, diaphragm or abdomen, and the bullets of great calibre or expansive, type «dum dum», for their «stopping power» and directed to the nervous system, encephalon, backbone, were managing to dispatch the injured sworn-in men for the Garden of the Houris.

PHILIPPINE MOORS…

Also there existed elaborated and institutionalized forms of the killer suicides in Allah’s name. At the end of the 11th century, Hassan-i-Sabbah founded between the Shiite ismaelits and in the North-East of Persia, the sect of the «assassins». These were seeking to secretly kill his enemies. This death with perfidy that they realized gave the name of «assassins» to all those who were practising it in the future. Though the murder is really the death of the innocent one. The «assassins” acted in Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria and Alamut’s mountain was his first center and sure refuge. They did a wide use of the hashish to encourage in his actions. They disappeared in 1256, when the Mongolians invade Persia and they were isolatedly and methodical destroying the different mountainous redoubts where the «assassins» were sheltering. Alamut’s fortress, which was surrendered without resistance by the «assassins», was destroyed up to the foundations, in order that it could not be used again.

Concept and structure of the external motivations (environment and social group) of the conduct. The identity of the individuals.

The Origin and the Sociocultural Meaning of the Civilizations.

The civilization is literally the art of living in great settlements or cívitas. That were originally the first human settlements. Where the man first sited himself and left strolling around as imperious and vital need. And could manage to generate «remaining benefits», in the form of cereals, cattles and all his derivatives. That would serve as reserves and for the trade with his neighbors. And that were offering to him safety, comfort and survival. This allowed him to start socially behaving as person. Establishing firm and extensive tides with his nearby similar ones, the close friends beyond his families, his “vital neighbor”.

The result of all this social activity were the first local, narrow, vulnerable and stammering civilizations. That were including: the development of the rights and the duties of the men, as individuals and with his collectivities; the arithmetic, to measure and contract the productions and his distributions; the language and his writing, to communicate between them and with the nearby settlements, leaving record, at least, of the important considered thing, etc. The civilizers inventions, As the bricks, the irrigated lands, the organic fertilizers, the plough, the writing, etc., arise in these human locations. And they had not been necessary, not possible, without the stable settlements. They arise when the development reaches an «initiation level», necessary in order that they appear and the civilization blooms. Level that supposes and implies a perspective of relative future and progress, the need to conquer the natural obstacles to them, a social internal enough coherence and the temporary absence of external, too powerful, greedy and excluding enemies.

The civilizations possess a bivalent, necessary and complementary character in his social global relations. This double quality is centrifugal, expansive and dominating towards his exterior. Inside his borders, the civilization is centripetal, enterprising and developing. In both cases, it is creative, innovative and civilizer or transmitter of his beliefs and shared values. Because of it, they stand out in both different and opposite, but not antagonistic activities. The balance between both trends, which canalize his better efforts and means, is indispensable for his constant, protected and beneficial development and impulse. The civilizations merely overwhelming and plundering, that expire as all, do not leave permanent and fruitful fingerprints in his passing along the conquered countries.

The civilizations that manage to bring together both vital drives, his diastoles and his efferent and driving systoles, manage to last more in the time. But also they impregnate from his style, his language and his culture the territories successively subdued. With it they transmit his essence to the posterity, much after his decadence, through the peoples civilized with his culture, his laws and his language and his historical paths. There we have the case of Rome, rapacious and imperialist as any other power. That only with the colds and the bad time quartered his legions in the winter barracks. Arranged during the Republic and the Empire to going out to conquest, repress the revolts or assure his borders, in his military annual campaigns, just that the good time allowed it. But that was also capable of transmitting his culture, his laws, came up until today as the Roman law, his vulgar Latin and his administrative system, to all the regions «extra Italy», that little by little were joining his Enpire or “res publica”. This cultural impregnation, which Lorenz would say, was sanctioned, integrated and dedicated with the generous, opportune and prudent concession of his citizenship to many of those cities and regions. The «Ius civitatis» was granted by conquest, depending on the degree of annexation, loyalty and assimilation of the submitted peoples. When they were turning into Roman provinces, the same rights of the metropolis were granting to them. It was the case of Roman Spain. But until they were not reaching this honor and quality, the dominated peoples had to pay his tax of conquest (ius belli) and were lacking many rights. Palestine, for example, never managed to have the condition of province.

Socio ideological Mechanism of the flow and reflux in the becoming of the Civilizations.

In the successive floods and undertows between the western and Moslem civilizations, only once coincided the periods of forceful civilization of both. That happened in approximately 125 years, between the halves of the XVth and XVIth centuries. This double exuberance of conflicting civilizations took form in a long period of invasions, reconquests, harassments and opened clashes in Europe, the north of Africa and the whole Mediterranean.

The observable facts that define the temporary decadence of a fulled civilization are: the vital national energy, which feeds the «national moral» and the healthy «will of defense», vanishes; the arts and the letters become formalist and sterile; the emplacements, colonies or peripheral partners are given up and the exterior politics turns coward, stammering and cautious. This setback of a civilization makes an existential emptiness, which attracts and externally gives impulse to other one. Forming a natural and cosmic swaying, because the Nature renounces and flees from the «emptinesses».

The commercial routes, the habitual contacts between both civilizations are his authentic lines of supplies and exterior communications. And, when these arteries are neglected in the periphery of the zone of influence of a civilization, the civil, religious and military experts of other one come to repair, to occupy and to vitalize her. The absorbent «aspiration» created by the decadence of other one, created by his vital «emptiness», attracts a foreign current of ideas, methods, words, inventions and styles. First appear in the debilitated and permeable foreign zone, the travelers, commercial and secret agents, cultural representations, missionaries, professors and diplomats of the thriving civilization. This way, often the military action is not more than the political confirmation of an existing and manifest superiority, which irresistibly emerges and appears from many fields of the human activity. And the territorial gains are consolidated with the arrival of the civil servants and administrators and the professions of growth and development: architects, engineers, land-surveyors, artists and a swarm of go-getters, unscrupulous opportunists and adventurers. From this human flow, specially the last mentioned, because their immediate future is a blank page, always arise decisive prominent figures for the new implantation.

Then, it might be thought that the stabilized societies and civilizations would be the culmination and desideratum in their development. As this way, they would be sure, beneficial and attractive. But, no. To a civilization, the development penury, the languor in her vital effort is already a decadence sign. If it does not flow, adapts, tackles and advances, it will be stagnating, losing the survival and rotting. As it would happen to a fresh water current, which pass was remaining repressed. This happens in periods measured in many years, which escape to the perception of the ephemeral man.

The Interaction between the Persons and their Society.

The identity of a man is his «natural card» of personal distinction and affirmation. She always refers to a comparison in essence and accidents with «something» similar. The man is, feels and differs, as such and in fullness, in a social «set». To which he belongs and that accepts him as full member and participant. And exist some «bonds», which unite, integrate, nourish and keep working the social healthy, active and resilience «union». And these are the rights and duties of both «personal and collective parts». That must be respected and reciprocal, in balance and parity of use and right, fulfilled and defended by all them.

The experiences as configurators and updating factors of the men.

When a social group places in the territory of other, it inevitably produces a socialcultural interaction between them. Whose results will be a function of his sociocultural characteristics and of the dialectics that appears between both actors. This way, for example, we have the most ancient case of the violent invasions. Imposed by a group on his «host», using a dialectics of confrontation by the weapon.

In the 376 A.D:, the Goths crossed the Eastern “limes” of the Roman Empire and they sheltered in his oriental territories. They were coming pushed by warriors furthermore fierce than them: the riders of the Asian steppes, the nomads of the jurgas and the compound arch, the Huns and also others, some Turkoman peoples from the Central Asia. Only two years later, on August 9, the Goths defeated the legions of the emperor Valente, which wanted to expel them from the Tracia, a territory that was approximately including the Bulgaria of today. In Adrianópolis died around 20 thousand of the 30 thousand Roman infantry men, including Valente. It was the major defeat of Rome, since about 369 years ago. And the Goths definitively settled themselves in these territories.

Only 98 years later, in the 476, the Roman army of Romulus Augustulo was squashed by the Ostrogoths. That established their kingdom in Italy, the south of the Galia and approximately Yugoslavia. This brought the inexorable fall of the Roman empire and the expansion of the Gothic tribes for his western lands, towards Roman Spain, the Galia and Italy.

Already, nowadays, enormous migratory movements take place, specially in Africa, in the Southwest of Asia and towards Europe. That are encouraged and facilitated by the development of the communications of persons and goods and by the revolution in the wireless communication of information. These migrations do not suppose in his determination the collective employment of the violence against the passing or final hosts. This way, both in France and in Great Britain, after the World War II and after the process of decolonization of the peoples, took place massive immigrations of persons proceeding from their former African and Asian colonies, who settled in these countries. And that were looking for a standard of living better than that of their countries, including a first class education for his children, a social safety and peace and an attainable future of improvement and prosperity.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Operational Characteristics of the Attacks with Elite Ground Forces.

Units and small units that attack with limited aims (a deep incursion, the temporal capture of a critical position, an ambush) constitute a military closed «system». This condition imposes specific characteristics on the “interfaces of action” with the enemy, which are sometimes different to those of great units, especially in the theme of available means and the time of action.

Attacks with limited aims have been operationally used along large fronts. Where the enemy’s defense lacked depth and enough reserves and was looking to minimize own wear and make use of the multiplier effect of the set’s efforts. This occurred with notable success when the forces of the 9^th German infantry Army of General Model sought to reform and consolidate its fronts in the Sychevka’s southwest zone between January and April of 1942.

The definitive characteristic of his use, adapted in these tasks, is that is used with criterion unity, by a kept and «concentric» in the result of his impulses “operational gravity center”. So that the limited efforts do not vanish in reconnaissance in force actions, in not suitable or out of opportunity sectors. It is to say, usiing unduly.

The field of action is the secret for applying freedom of action. By extending or decreasing the field of action, or by changing the field of action on the enemy, one can keep or recover the necessary freedom of action to act favorably and not simply reacting to the enemy.

«Field of action» is any «spatial-temporary-circumstantial» situation that allows for the suitable employment of an Army’s means and capacities in accordance or as part of that army’s intention. The field of action is formed by one or several «interfaces of action«, which are the very small sectors where direct contact occurs between the small units of action of each rival. Examples are when a deployed platoon attacks an enemy section, when a tank attacks infantry heavy weapons, when a section attacks by firing on an enemy’s strong position, when an engineering section opens a path in a minefield, etc.

The task is to find an optimal way in which, through successive «periods of action» applied in «fields or interfaces of action», one can gain the relative freedom of action to act and to carry out «quantum» or elementary units of the general intention. In addition, a general action can be divided into numerous partial actions to achieve in stages, momentary or minor «periods of action»; acting this way in the same «field», divided in minor interfaces of action.

Interaction in stages and situations suitable to advance one’s military means guided by the superior intention or orders is the general mechanism for applying, recovering and maintaining freedom of action in one’s favor.

A characteristic of the freedom of action is that is interactive with the enemy in the «interface of action» and is played out in fields of action that chosen by or imposed on an army. Passiveness means that freedom of action is not taken advantage of through lack of initiative. Thus, freedom of action can also have a result opposite to its intention and this can happen regardless of the type of fight engaged in, whether it is offensive or defensive.

The units had to gain combat superiority over the enemy, since obtaining a local and temporary supremacy would allow them to achieve their aims.

Essential to the mission’s conception are intelligence and simplicity. Essential to its preparation are security and training. The characteristics of the mission in action are surprise, tempo and the commitment of all the mission participants.

Simplicity allows the force to concentrate on a few related aims, using a limited number of men and means in the military closed system. If new tactics or different technologies are used, both the simplicity of the mission’s conception and the surprise of its execution will be enhanced.

On September 12, 1943, the captain of the S. S. Otto Skorzeny carried out the rescue of the Duce from his prison in the high mountain hotel Great Sasso located in the Apennines. Gliders were used to assault the position, fighting against the difficult cold draughts (these produced a delay in the arrival, as they landed at midday) and scarce sites for landing. That such a difficult assault would be attempted, higly surprised the on duty «carabinieri». The attackers took advantage of this by gaining access to the principal building while. At the same time, an acquaintance general of the «carabinieri» friendly landed with Skorzeny. Combat supremacy was rapidly achieved.

Intelligence supposes complete, up-to-date and timely knowledge of the circumstances and characteristics of the mission. Here, with so limited employing means, intelligence is facilitated by different agencies and units that intervene with the mission, even those at the level of the state. Specially the CIA, the National Security Agency or NSA, the Central Security Service or CSS, that links with the NSA, and the FBI.

Security refers principally to the stages of planning, preparation, training and, if appropriate, stage of transport or insertion. It has active and passive aspects. Giving off misleading information and concealing the force’s real intentions up until the stage of action on the objective. Each person must only know what is necessary for his actuation.

Training must be generic for actions and tactics and specific for those actions required for the mission. Independently of this, training is necessary to achieve coordinated actions among units taking part simultaneously in some part of the mission. A general rehearsal of the mission is also necessary, including its planning duration and margins for mistakes. It is also good to include some variant that represents a mistake, an unforeseen event or a loss of combat or movement capacity. And that the men train in correcting them or, at least, in neutralizing them with his effort. For example, a part of the helicopters is knocked down or lands at major distance of the foreseen in the theoretical disembarkation zone.

The final «training area» must be similar in general characteristics to the «target area». And it must be placed at safe of detections and filtrations of information (security), which onlookers and interested persons can catch. The independent variable of «time» introduces sometimes unexpected and not always welcome effects. For example, a vehicle presents problems after a number of hours of hard use, that was not foreseen in tests of «at scale» time.

Surprise supposes attacking an enemy (even if arranged in prepared defense) at a point or flank that is neglected by him at the moment, giving the attacker a favorable «interface of action» on him. It must suppose a “tactical innovation”. Though it could also contain technical differential or new elements. Examples of such “innovations” in the past are hollow load bullets or charges and flame-throwers.

The surprise is the sufficient and necessary multiplier of the combat capacity of the «small incursion force». That will allow him to compensate the scanty military resources that it has on the area. To it joins his inconsiderate and carefully applied with rapidity employment. To provoke an overwhelming effect on the enemy, achieving the temporary local superiority. As being an «isolated military system», the incursion force of will receive neither reinforcements, nor supplies. For its part, the time is not neutral, here is an enemy: because there is not more operation time. From his depletion, the unit will confront the pursuit and his annihilation…

Speed consists in firmnessly acting, ahead of the enemy, in the successive elementary «cycles of action» that define a performance or process. It also presupposes acting with opportunities and with pace (adapted speed, relative to the enemy). Remember that an action cycle includes a phase of observation, a phase of determining the situation, the decision phase and the accomplishment phase. If one’s speed is greater than that of the enemy, his actions will be in response to situations that have already just passed.

Speed also implies rapidly reaching a situation of active supremacy in combat capacity. The enemy’s reaction speed is initially very slow as he is in a stupor, trying to verify what is happening. This means his phase of determining the situation will be lengthened. Deceptive action in these moments will lengthen the time that passes and fog the determination of the situation. Ways of doing this include utilizing some of the enemy’s uniforms, equipment or language by certain parts or subunits involved in the action. Once supremacy over the enemy is attained, it must always be kept. As scanty resources make its recovery very difficult. Once supremacy in combat capacity is reached, the probability of a mission’s success increases exponentially and the vulnerabilities of one’s forces are dramatically diminished.

The commitment of men and officers and their selection qualities, lend moral and physical courage to the actions they undertake. This is necessary to overcome uncertainty, stress, mistakes, diversions, enemy actions, and to take advantage of the always fleeting opportunities. Commitment supposes full knowledge of the mission and the full, voluntary and enthusiastic support of all participants.

Execution is carried out by establishing at the level of the regiment, battalion or company a center of gravity for the common effort, which harmonizes and consolidates the «missions» of its subunits.

THE END.

]]> https://www.conflictosmodernos.com/2016/08/01/the-war-against-the-islamic-terrorists-second-part/feed/ 0 https://www.conflictosmodernos.com/2016/08/01/the-natos-rapid-reaction-forces/ https://www.conflictosmodernos.com/2016/08/01/the-natos-rapid-reaction-forces/#respond Mon, 01 Aug 2016 06:35:01 +0000 http://www.conflictosmodernos.com/?p=941 Sigue leyendo THE NATO’S RAPID REACTION FORCES.]]> George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established after the suicidal assaults of al-Qaeda in New York at 11 of September of 2001, that the «asymmetrical wars or of IVth generation» (irregulars and with low level of military means used) with the participation of the USA, would be supported overseas and without formal declaration of war. And that they were also necessary, to remove from the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the “foreign fundamentalist terrorism” of any origin, religion or ideology. It justified the ill-fated post war occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with a blowing up fiscal and exterior deficits and with a democratic renewed Administration, it is necessary for the USA to save in military resources.

The Strategic National Doctrine of the Americans democrats.

The new political philosophy is to dedicate now those recovered resources «to build a nation here, at home». This way, the USA lowered qualitatively the bar of the exterior terror, putting during the first mandate of president Obama, at al-Qaeda as almost the only one immediate “not national violent enemy”. This salafist internationalist terrorist «network», without own territory, with her operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in any normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable target for his «rapid punctual incursion» forces and means. This new “strategic national doctrine” justifies the increase of the use of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (not driven planes for exploration and recognition and of bombardment), spy satellites, own or local agents placed in the hostile territory, assaults by elite operational units and by small expeditionary forces and of Marine’s amphibious assault, these transported in «command and transport ships» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of dozens of thousands of military men and with his luggage and equipment for several years in an operations theater, are rejected indefinitely by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense».

This doctrine spreads and concerns, through the NATO, the strategic aims of his allies and the assigned and specific means to reach them. The training with IT programs is an example of the new practices in military training. Instead of moving soldiers by the Boot Camps or the vehicles in the maneuvers polygons of the mechanized or motorized units, the NATO is developing new “online artifices” to instruct their military personnel. And, though it could not be the norm of formation or training, the project is illustrative that the Alliance adapts to the new times of «financial global restrictions» for the Armies. In this scene of diminishing resources and threats still slightly valued or made concrete, the Defense Secretaries of the NATO, assembled at the end of February, 2013 in Brussels, decided to adopt some voluntary remedies. «It is a question of seeing if our nations resign their responsibilities because of the budgetary restrictions or if we demonstrate creativity and innovation and develop the necessary aptitudes to confront the threats in joint form», said Leon Panetta, American Secretary of Defense.

An Allied highly mobile «task force» for urgent missions.

The NATO will create shortly time a «sui generis» rapid reaction force (30 years ago were calling her of «rapid deployment»), that will form 13.000 cavalry and mechanized infantry soldiers, reinforced with artillery and engineers. It will be destined to be deployed in zones of conflict that are sensitive for their «global interests». Forget the Congo, Yemen, Somalia or Syria, which are not or are insufficiently interesting. This «great unit» will be formed by the Armies of the allied countries, who will incorporate into her their brigade or regiment type forces in a rotating form and for a minimal period of six months in duty tours. The experts of the Organization will design a “training plan” for them, which will last until 2020, until all the suitable units for these tasks have taken part in it.

«My call to the Allied Governments is that they stop the expenditure cuts (in Defense), that use better their resources (that already assigned) and, once the economy recovers, they begin to invest (in Defense) again. If the cuts continue, they will have a negative impact in our aptitude to provide defense and protection to our population», warned the secretary general of the NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at the beginning of the mentioned meeting. The most drastic reduction in topics of Defense corresponds to Greece, which in 2011 diminished a 25 % his military expense, after having reduced it in 20 % in 2010. So, in 2012 his Defense’s budget was only 60 % of that of 2009. There are other four minor countries, which also have done substantial cuts in military systems, men and re equipments for the Defense: Slovenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Below them, though also with reductions of two digits percent, is Spain, which military expense fell 11 % in 2011, after two years of very significant reductions. In general, almost all the countries save in their Armies, included the United States, which realizes the major military expense attributed in the world (4,8% of his GDP). The Chinese items, proceeding from a collectivized and directed centralized economy, are not homogeneous or comparable to ours, because many usable chapters by the Chinese Popular Liberation Army can be included in books as expenses or investments of other Chinese departments and services. But the total falls of the resources at the level of the Alliance get damped enough, thanks to exceptions as the German, who has increased the expenses in Defense in the years of this economic world crisis.

His uses, operational limitations and abuses.

The operative employment of the rapid reaction multinational forces will be as airborne or of disembarkation «detachments», supported by the tactical aviation and the national allied warships. Their action would be over «limited goals» and placed in not extensive areas and looking for an operative projection, not only tactical. Her employment would have to be in a relatively short time, due to the limitations in her combat and logistics capacities. A joint utilization of this “division (-) of combined arms” would allow to attack only one or two hostile brigades, which were isolated from their operational rears and / or deployed in areas of difficult access («bad ongoing» ground) by land. Reciprocally, his defense capacity and «resistance» are limited. Nothing of trying to appease (they also call it «to «stabilize») something similar to a «Gaza strip». That is the wasp’s nest of an network of irregular «units» of motivated and trained terrorists. Deployed in reinforced defense positions echeloned in depth. And using an unfavorable ground (a urbanized one) for the armored and / or motorized enemies means. That would be the principal resources and capacities of combat and of movement of this » special division light » (better to use the And using an unfavorable area for the armored means (not necessarily they have to be the heaviest cars of the Allies) and / or become mobile enemies. That would be the principal resources and combat and of movement capacities this light «special division» (is better to use the English meaning, in order that he does not resemble the light infantry).

The headquarters of these multinational forces, destined to act in «located conflicts», that concern the security or the interests of the Allies, will be probably in Belgium. Some great American units, which subunits might take part in his composition by turns, are the 24ª motorized division and the Marine¡s divisions. The small elite units of the Rangers, the SEAL or the battalions and the engineers’ companies, would remain detached in tactical subordination to the brigades or regiments of the Rapid Force, realizing their specific tasks in the missions and complementing those of them. The forces of rapid reaction will be able to protect an oil installation or a port and even to help to suppress riots. But they will not be able to face an insurrection or a generalized assault against a friend country. Their detachments will be always highly vulnerable to the encircle and the harassment. Their operational possibilities only might increase qualitatively if their missions are coordinated with those of a ground army which operates in the tactical or operational surroundings.

Politically, the offensive action of the rapid reaction division forces, on having lacked rooting in the peoples of his operations zones and of continuity his military intervention, will turn out to look more brutal and arbitrary. And it will be more alike a police action than a military orthodox operation. It is sure, in addition, that the neutral or hostile governments to the West in the geostrategic regions where she acts, will reject the right that the NATO has assumed, to act as gendarmes of his “partial interests” in a zones so distant from their national territories. This way, from a hypothetical military, problematic and excessively punctual and short action, the NATO appears directly as guardians of his own «new order», in an epoch of international soft and lightened action ways. Where to use the «big stick», as convincing argument for the decision and when the politics and the diplomacy have failed in obtaining a reasonable solution, it is very frowned upon by all the delicate stomaches.

 NOTHING CALMING…

Another great strategic preference of Moscow is to extend his influence and to enlarge the economic and diplomatic bonds with the nations in development, specially those who have «natural resources and primary crops», that are necessary for the manufacturing production, the feeding and the general development of the nations. She has taken them and will take them even far, beyond of her geographical borders of political influence or military strategic.

The loss of her «controlled allies» in the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, after the cold war, only leave Russia to geographically look for «new influences» towards the Central Asia, from Syria to the India and Vietnam. Turkey is a proverbial enemy of the Russians. In Afghanistan they could never have situated. Which is social political constant for other powers that have tried it in other moments. Also the Russians try to win and to keep in his «political and commercial sphere» the new Central Asiatic Islamic Turkoman republics and to the ex-Soviets Slavonic republics, these with almost none possibilities.

In the Turkestán Oriental, one finds a rosary of former Soviet socialist republics of approximately 2 thousand Kms of length, which reaches up to the oriental shore of the Caspian Sea. They are, from east to west, Kazajistan, Kirguistan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. That form a set of several ethnics, gathered in the names of them, but simultaneously extended over several countries. That are of Turkoman origin, from the central steppes of Asia, and agglutinated also by their belonging to the sunni Islam. These Turkoman Muslims are potentials allieds of Russia, in all that this puts a bit of dedication and neatness to attract and to attend them. And, till now, the Customs Union created by Russia includes only the White Russia or Byelorussia and Kazajistan. In addition, Russia has signed military agreements with Byelorussia, Armenia, Kazajistan, Kirguistan and Tajikistan. Established in the frame of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And that guarantee to these countries at the East of Europe and in the Central Asia a defense against external or internal aggressions. And they offer to Russia an extension of her international influence.

PRESIDENTS OF RUSSIA, BIELORRUSIA, KAZAJISTAN, KIRGUISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, ARMENIA AND TAJIKISTAN ASSEMBLED FOR ANTITERRORIST COOPERATION .

If Russia thinks that there are at stake her national interests or her national pride, it proves to be stuck-up and deigns and, even, aggressive. One of the neurotic tics of the exterior politics of Moscow is the dismemberment of the Soviet empire 25 years ago. That many attribute, not to her implosion, for lack of resources and economic expired structures, and of social motivation. But to international abuses, which benefited of her relating to the moment weakness.

When the Russians meet strategic international problems, they demonstrate more freedom of action, initiative, creativity and flexibility in his offers and actions. Russia uses the whole set of means and capacities of a modern State to go forward, to tease, to complicate and to deactivate the actions and the resources used by the West. This way, Russia uses the propaganda of State, employing: a great profusion of audio-visual communications, which we do not know in Spain; immediate refutations of the rivals’ arguments; employment of credible arguments to deny her relation with the observable facts; sending of humanitarian help in great and showy caravans to the zones in conflict. The diplomacy, where there faces John Kerry, a provisional struck politician, with Serguei Lavrov’s extensive career, and keeping meetings and visits with western chief executive agents and of the regional involved countries; doing declarations and agreements, which ended suspended, protested or broken; realizing attempts of bribe to European politicians of second level. The economy, as in the cases of China and of Spanish America. And answering to the western sanctions for her militar actions in Ukraine with measured suspensions and charges of her European imports, which are afraid by the Europe of the merchants. Military, sending: «paramilitary voluntary» forces; regular forces and military modern equipments, sometimes accompanied by the experts in their using or for their training; delivering weapon and military material to hier sponsored; and realizing «diffuse violations» of the air space of the countries at the west of her European border, more concretely in the Baltic sea and his coastal countries.

KERRY AND LAVROV.

Not they all are goodness and advantages in a super presidential regime. The concentrated and decisive power has to be administered in small doses, not to abuse, neither to damage, nor to fall down in the temptation of looking for his indefinite continuity. The despotism (that arises from the rotten conviction of the commands that «they» have «saved» a «his» mother land), the corruption and the clientelism, spread over the power circles and his boundaries, become manifest and customary in the society. The political and ideological opposition, with his critiques, parliamentary actions and street protests, can become almost unbearable. For whom are centered in planning, deciding and executing in altars of the people, but not with the people. The jail and the properties confiscation are reprisals used in all the times, which its origin gets lost in the night of the times, in the prehistory. Used against the dissidents, uncontrollable and disobedient and for all the potential (imagined or not) and real enemies of the regime.

In her relations with the West, Russia distinguishes two great «geopolitical spaces»: the USA and the European Union. The USA is the great rival, but not yet enemy. With that she tries to compete and whom she tries to erode in all the occasions to which she can reach. Russia follows the politic strategic theory of the multipolar world. That would possess several great «radiant centers» of influence and control. Where there would no be hegemonic global powers, which they could control and/or dominate more or less, according to their interests. This global strategy is well see by all the continental and, yet, regional powers, that possess sufficient capacities and international aspirations of projection and ascendancy.

Before the united Europe, Russia is seen herself as an equal. The first one exceeds her in demography and in economic capacity. And Russia has to her favor an AAFF, even the Branch of Strategic Missiles, sufficient and with only one Command. That are supported by her economy and diplomacy. Since she possesses a political, enough monolithic or integrated leadership. That, before a confrontation or an arisen opportunity, can operate with more major forcefulness and rapidity that the endogamic and paralyzed bureaucracy of the Union Europe. And opposite to the great geopolitical region of the Eastern Europe, formed by her former allied in the Warsaw Pact and the Comecom (the former economic communist union based in the specialization in national activities), has to act with a strategy of successive actions or of the artichoke. Because an excess of «pressure» over them, only would achieve that they agglutinate between them more; and link themselves more economic and militarily to the western nations…

But, also Russia uses the more or less veiled interference in the internal matters of her rivals. Seeking to create social problems and centrifugal trends, still heart-breaking, in their social fabric. Taking advantage for it of the freedom of expression, which is one of the values of the western civilization. This way, Russia acts against Europe supporting the most promising solvent movements. Some are populist and antisystem, which operate against the shared values and beliefs, which shape and form the western civilization. Others are nationalists and sovereignists, that fight against Europa’s multinational integration and his construction. This way, in Germany Police has materialized an «alliance» between the Youths of the Party Alternative for Germany (AfD) with the Young Guard of Russia. The man of connection between Moscow and the AfD is his vice-president, Alexander Garland. That re-joins regularly with Alexander Dugin, a man with the confidence of Putin. And the members and Euro MPs of the AfD support the movement of British euroexceptics and hinder the approval of the measures for the European construction in the Eurochamber of Brussels.

The political military extern action.

The operational strategy of Russia consists in acting by means of «emphasized» allies in a given geopolitical theatre. This way, she regionally uses these «interposed actors», more or less strong, independent and «sovereign». In order that they give her in the intervention in the conflict, (that her is seemingly foreign, as Russia is a middle-high continental power), a stamp of international category and legality and of reliability and seriousness before the international community, specially with the not western countries.

Also Moscow acts in the «diffuse external limits» of his former «imperial living space». She does it «supporting», with a great range of possibilities, almost made-to-measure, at different Russian or Christian communities, which are «separated» from the mother land. This way, there are some republics or «ethnic communities», apart from the two that we will mention in the case of Georgia, which receive the opportune help of Russia. They are the Transnistria, of etnia Russian, placed at the East of Moldavia, which is of Rumanian population, and Nagorno Karabaj, where live the karabajos Armenians, that is in the center of Azerbaijan, which is of sunni religion. Azerbaijan is frontier with Russia and with Turkey and receives the support of the last one.

Georgia:

In 2008, in her asymmetric and overwhelming war against Georgia, Russia was served by the «independents» of South Osetia and Abjasia (embraced at the North-East of the Black Sea), two «rebels» Georgian provinces. The pretext was to come to the defense of these nations, which had many Russian habitants, to defend them from the Georgian «arbitrarinesses and assaults». Already existed since years «Russian forces of pacification» in Ossetia of the South, which immediately took sides with the independents.

GEORGIAN TROOPS BAIL OUT A VEHICLE AT OUTSKIRTS OF GORI

Ukraine:

Following his direct, imperious and operating manners, in the middle of December, 2013, Putin threw a strong bet to Ukraine. In order that she was happening to form part of the Russian «sphere of coprosperity«: Putin offered her to lower 33 % the price of transfer of the Russian gas, of which Ukraine is recipient and reseller. And, to save her from the financial bankruptcy and she did not have to be thrown for it in hands of the Community Troika, he would yield her until $15 billions in beneficial credits. But, in Ukraine the social politics problems arisen have led to a strong polarization of the country, being formed two almost antagonistic halves. Where the part al the west of Crimea, wants to move away from Moscow and the half at the east of this peninsula, seeks to increase the bonds with Russia. Ukraine is for history and demography part of the Europe limited at the east part by the Urals. And Ukraine is by political opportunity and historical moment, part of the democratic and liberal western center Europe. That forms together with the United States, which operates as another fundamental «vibrant pole» at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the «Western Civilization «.

For Russia, Ukraine is something more than a strategic ally. Ukraine is a part of the national Russian essence. In Ukraine was born many hundreds years ago, the strong and promising germ of the Russian nation, the Rus. And Russia has bet high. Trying to return for his rights, traditions and influences. Or she will have to accept with turning into a «national state«, without «coprosperity sphere» dependent, participative and profitable for all. So, a «regional or second-class power», as named her the president Obama at the beginnings of this crisis.

From the spring of 2014, the opposition armed in the Novarussia (this way, the prorussians separatists autoname his territory in the basin of the Donbass and adjacent zones) is supported by the Russians. That openly send military equipments (intermingled sometimes with convoy of humanitarian help for the civil population of the region); groups of internationalists «volunteers»: Cossaks, Russians, even prorussians veteran Chechenians; specialists (engineers, gunners, instructors, servants of short range missils and of anti-aircraft weapons, elite forces) for the high level military tasks. And pressing the central Ukrainians in the common border with movements and parkings of her motorized troops, at the west of Rostov on the Don. It deserves indicating that Novarussia’s republic is not internationally recognized.

The «national rebels» and the central government of Kiev, with the president Petró Poroshenko at head, have followed till now an operational strategy of give and take, of the strategic «cachumbambe«. Where everything is enough measured and reasonably controlled. To be advancing each part by short and few steps. Without the beast of the open warfare between nations and alliances irreversibly runs away. And so we are and will continue for long time. This way, the points of the Agreements of Minsk are dissolved and in «stand by» or in neutralized wait. Looking that do not break them, for the continuous small violations of the truce agreed by the parts.

POROSHENKO AND PUTIN…

A great problem appears now, not only to Ukraine, but to his neighbors at the east and west parts. And it is to obtain that the today antagonists and irreconcilable forces, that face in Ukraine, crushing his mother land, turn into complementary and necessary forces between them. And it is a great joint, disinterested labor, with height sights and directed by statesmen, which is necessary to develop to obtain it. In the case of not be obtaining this «merger of interests», the alternative would be bad for all, nationals and nearby and distant neighbors. And the wound only would be falsely closed and for an unforseeable time.

Syria:

From the beginnings of July, 2015, the Russians have been increasing his military direct presence in Syria. His armed forces have established themselves principally in the Latakia, covering Tarsus’s surroundings, his only naval base in the Mediterranean and his military airport. They include fighter-bombers, assault and carrier and rescue helicopters (with a centener of machines always operational), not driven aircraft of reconnaissance and bombardment and the corresponding ground units of support and of security. And now, from the ends of September, they are bombarding the positions of the armed rebels to the regime of al-Assad, at Alepo’s southwest; in the Latakia; near to Hama, Homs and Damascus, in the basin of the Orontes; in Idlib’s province and in the Turkoman zone close to the border; in Raqqa and other positions of the IS, in the North-East of the country and in the great desert of Syria. Recovering Palmira at the end of March, 2016, which fell down in May, 2015 in hands of the Daesh or ISSI. A spokesperson of the Russian Defense Department declared that «they would not operate there indefinitely» and that they were calculating that they would need «approximately 100 days» of air assaults. These days have doubled, up to almost the spring of 2015, before Putin was initiating a partial and sufficient withdraw of his military means. The Kurdish peshmerrgas of the YPG, the national allies of the USA, deployed by the whole center oriental border with Turkey, have not been bothered by the Russians. Between those who have suffered his unexpected assaults are the irregular forces of the Front al-Nusrah for the Liberation of the Peoples of the East, the national subsidiary of al-Qaeda. So dangerous and ideologically radical as the muyahidines of the Islamic State, but less cruel and less capable militarily.

To the reproaches of some western countries against this intervention, Putin and Lavrov argued that the «multinational Coalition of the 60 allies» was coming bombarding the salafists jihadists from September, 2014, without having for it a mandate of the UNO. Sure that Obama’s coalition was attacking in Iraq, with the theoretic and «previous daily permission» of the Iraqi government. In fact, the general of four stars James Terry, who is the chief of the American forces in Iraq from November, 2014, acts as an undeserved speaker for his high graduation, with the government and the discredited armed forces and Iraqi militias. But the assaults on Syria of the allies were not possessing the consent of his regime. And were going operationally supporting the peshmergas and debilitating the ISSI. Let’s emphasize that the Russians, as the mentioned leaders have justified themselves, «are very polite and are operating in Syria for invitation of his government».

It is of remembering that Syria was during decades the allied one in the Middle East of the USSR, and today, of Russia. And that Syria was considered also during decades a terrorist antiwestern state. Of the style of North Korea. That literally flooded the whole geopolitical Islamic region with the assault rifles AK and the grenade-launchers of hollow load RPG, for the guerrilla groups of “popular liberation”.

FRIENDS FOR EVER…

Russia wants to recover her international protagonism and respect. In spite of her diminished demographic, economic and structural capacities. And her loss of prestige democratic and politic, gained with the conflict of Crimea and Ukraine. But, with the military intervention in Syria, Putin attacks the root of the problem of the “fled Syrians”: that is the pressure of a cruel and long civil war on them. And it allows him to calm the Europeans with the short-term containment of the massive and constant invasion of those. Looking for an attenuation of the economic sanctions of the European Union to the government of Putin for his shameless actions in Ukraine.

Russia also supports and gives a strong accolade to the Syrian regime with her intervention. After 5 years of war, the National Syrian Army is exhausted and weaked by a bleeding of more than 70 thousand dead men, suffering continuous desertions towards the different rebels groups (from the Free Syrian Army to the jihadists groups) and having great difficulties to mobilize recruits. The soldiers at arms in April, 2011, if still are suitable, have not been licensed of the service. The militias sent by Hezbola’s shiis in 2014 to support them have not been sufficient to change the course of the war against al-Assad. The government already did not have enough men to realize counterinsurgency effective operations, against the armed rebels. Who were harassing him from numerous and divided «attack strips» through the whole Syrian geography. Especially, he lacks the «specialists» and means of the artillery and of the ground assault aviation.

Obama said: «the moral leadership is a weapon much more powerful than the brute force». This is true, when the concerned speakers possess and exhibit the same civil virtues that a democrat. But, when it is a question of beasts, of selfish, of madmen, of unscrupulous opportunists, of peoples that still perceive the force as the instrument of the strongest, this is not useful. It does not matter in the social level in which they are. The leadership is to convince, to direct with the example, to attract the persons towards oneself, for pure pleasure, affinity or mission. To realize a joint labor in benefit of the social group to which one belongs.

And this social role is left out by Obama in Syria. And also some time ago that he ignores, for carelessness or disability and lack of conscience of his identity, the European Union. The one that is not waited in “these fights and by these homes”. But, the political thing, the res politica, has horror and abominates of the «emptinesses», of the «absences». And, this way, he has been attracted by the suction of both, the opportunist of Putin, anxious to lead another more international episode. For that his people, from the first of 2014, proudly endorses him. To compensate his impoverished national revenue and his diminishing demography, Putin gives them international protagonism and national pride.

On March 14, Putin began to dismantle his military deployment in Syria. But left it sufficiently capable, in order that the NSA could expel from Palmira, a few days later, the guerrillas of the ISSI. Possessing the support of the Russians elite infantry forces and heavy air fire for his ground motorized forces. With it, Putin partly removes himself of the peace conversations of Geneva for Syria. And stays, as the only speaker with the not miscible and schizophrenic miscellany of the rebels, the regime of al-Assad. Because, if not, with whom are the jihadists and the National Council of Syria going to negotiate? In this absurd mixture are, between others, the Army of the Conquest, the Muyahidines of Syria, the Army of the Islam, the local Kurds, the Islamist Front anti al-Qaeda and local groups of «partners» to someone. Only in Idbil’s province, at the North-East of the country, in the border with Turkey, there existed more than 100 «different» rebel «groups». And Putin saves himself to return, if he considers necessarily. As he only withdrew around a third of his air operational forces. And he goes forward the movements of the Coalition, which still has not put foot in land. Though Arabia and Qatar offered in February to send ground troops to the conflict. But, how were they going to coordinate and operate in a «polyhostile» territory and without authorization of his government?

Russia uses the Economy as one of the means of her National Strategy.

Using the economy, one of the forces of the national strategy or great strategy of a country, helped by the diplomacy, other one of the potentials of her, Russia seeks to create with the emergent countries «cores of action and shared prosperity». Those Initiated or cultivated in a world that Russia wishes that would be «multipolarized» in diverse «cores and centers of geopolitical power». That they necessarily reduce this way, for their mere existence, the great western powers, today «dependents of the world trade».

The relations with communist China:

China is for Russia a partner, competitor and rival, if serves this polyvalent definition, which does that none of the expressions used is in fullness. Both are «emergent powers», according to the new nomenclature. Determined in growing, in not be directly damaging for the moment and in eroding the hegemonic power and his Europeans allied. This way, the Chinese would not act directly, not by third interposed countries, in Syria or in Iraq, in the boiling cauldron of the Asia of the Southwest: scene of the global contest that sunnis and shiites develop for the control and the supremacy in the Islam.

But they will do it collaborating uo to a point with the interests and the diplomatic propositions of the Russians. Reinforcing this way a political common position of counterweight and neutralization of the influence of West in the zone. And in exchange for a certain Russian reciprocity in favour of the Chinese interests, in other countries in which do not collide the national influences of both.

PUTIN AND XI JIPING, AFTER SIGNED THE GAS AGREEMENT

With his habitual opportunity and operational agility, Putin signed with the president Xi Jinping on Wednesday, the 21st of May, 2014 a strategic contract (30 years of validity) to supply to China around 38 billions of ms3 of Russian gas every year. Certain it is that the negotiations of this transcendental contract have extended during a decade, but the opportunity of his signature for both partners is undeniable. Russia has determined his signature lowering a little the price of transfer, which has not leaked out, and that was the principal obstacle for the agreement between Russian State entity Gazprom and the National Corporation of the Oil of China. There will be begun immediately the installation of a new gas pipeline between Siberia and China, which will cost 55 $ billion and that will be operational in 4 years. China obtains this way a stable supply of part of his energetic primary needs (about 25 %), which will allow him to be reducing his strategic dependence of his national coal. Whose combustion is the principal generating factor of the massive pollution that suffer nowadays the great cities and the industrialized coast of China. It is calculated, according to the official estimations, that China will need 400 billions of ms3 of gas by the year 2020, doubling the current consumption of gas. Which opens the possibility for new extensions of the Russian supply In the frame of this agreement. By his part, looking for alternative markets for his primary energy, Putin reduces transcendency and efficiency with this commercial operation, to the babbling actions of the European Union. For replace part of the supply of the Russian gas, using other hypothetical suppliers of allende the seas. And, in addition, any strangulation of the current service by his buyers, will force the EU to increase his help to Ukraine, to compensate his «reduced income» for the passage of the gas by his territory.

This agreement of energetic supply between Russia and China untied on Thursday, the 21st of May of this year the fears of the European Union and stood out his disability of joint and efficient reaction. The president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, sent a letter to Vladimir Putin, demanding from the Russian president that ihe fulfills his commitments and assures «the supply to the European companies in the decided level». Barroso received the order from the European chiefs of Government of answering in their name to Putin. In spite of that this had gone directly to several members states, to indicate them the problem that they would untie with the establishment of economic sanctions to Russia. «I write you in name of the European Union and his 28 States members«, Durao Barroso headed his letter. «I ask you for a constructive approach» to the created situation. And it was useful to indicate him that the fact that Gazprom should assure «a responsible supply» goes «in interest of all», included Russia. In a conference that took place the same day in Poland, the president of the Commission (The Concil of European Commissioners or Secretaries) he said that Moscow exports 80% of his oil and 70% of his gas to the EU. And that «is by far the most attractive market for Russia».