Teoría e Historia Militares y Temas de Interés Permanente en los Conflictos y Crisis Modernos. Military Theory and History and Topics of Permanent Interest in the Modern Conflicts and Crisis.
All Social Groups, from the tribes, with their totems, plumage and crowns and pantheons, to the current complex National Societies, with their anthems, flags, buildings of the Public Powers, decorations and orders, have «External Signs of Identity and Sovereignty ”.
Who seek to specify and even define, for their own and strangers, the Identity, the Essence and some other social qualities, of that unique social group.
The external things, the fabric, the metals, the chords and texts of said «External Signs» are Transfigured into a «real expression» of said essence and identity. And this is what they mean and are worth to that social group that proudly hoists them.
There is a defined formula to incorporate some people into the category of citizen member of the social group in question. It emphasizes all the characteristics and conditions that any people must meet and respect when joining that group.
As an example,
«I swear allegiance to the Flag of (…) and to the Republic that it represents. Symbol of the Nation, one and indivisible. In the Respect for the Law and the Rights of all Citizens.»
An example of transgression of respect for them.
On Tuesday, February 21, 2023, the Spanish deputy from the secessionist Catalan party JuntsPerCat. An Excrescence of the dissolved party of the Benefactor of Catalonia and Father of the New Catalonia, Jorge Pujol. Miriam Nogueras has deliberately removed the National Ensign from a speaker’s lectern in the Press room of the Congress of Deputies.
Her felony action, impudent, without education, nor respect for the Nation that pays her salary is an Act of Treason of Lesa Homeland.
It, despite whoever her friends, accomplices, comrades and supporters of hers.
And, the President of Congress, Mrs. Batet, is a necessary cooperator in the offense to the Nation that pays them.
The decaffeinated sequel type Daladier and Chamberlain.
In another Social Group that Respects Itself more, the consequences for them would have been more proportional to the Offense.
I think this should be an attack on the Azov Sea from Zaporiya (+-) area.
Cutting the Crimean supply line with Russia. And, towards Melitopol (+-).
The spears points of the attack can be somewhat bifurcated. So that the enemy does not know exactly what our immediate objective is. And it can concentrate from the Crimea too many forces to repel them.
The Russian supply line leaves the Crimea, crosses the coast of the Azov Sea and enters Russia towards Rostov on the Don. Any point is good to cut it, as long as the supply is suppressed.
The closer to Crimea it is cut off, the more “influence”, a material and moral effect, its presence will have on the Crimean Russians. The closer it is to the Russian border, the easier it will be for the Russians to deploy forces to push them back. And further away would be the Ukrainians from their supply bases and the reinforcement of men and units.
To attack where the front is now, in an easterly direction, towards the Russian border, is to reiterate the military effort on a Russian front prepared for defense. The Ukrainians would attack where they are most prepared and where their enemies are waiting for them. It would be a very mediocre and expensive strategy; force against force. And, the Russians have much more physical human and military resources than the Ukrainians.
The plan to attack towards the south of Ukraine imposes the law of action on them, it is daring, creative, novel and possible. And it would leave the Russians out of place in plans and positioning of their means for defense. That they would be on the great strip of the Azov Sea coast, Donetz and Lugansk oblasts and the Russian border.
It would be a strategy of strength against Russian weakness.
Structural development.
Pointing out different towns as “essential milestones” in the layout of the fronts, with a view to their operational exploitation, offers a string of names that are almost impossible to understand. Which are very difficult to locate on the maps available to us. A Bajmut, a Buça are locations that can be very painful and shocking. But, they shipwreck and get lost on our usual maps.
The fact is that Bakhmut is the Ukrainian name for the town called Artemivosk, in Russian. And, in Russian it appears on almost all maps. And, of course, most reporters and envoys to the theater of operations do not have time to correct these «bulk errors.»
All this “outer shell”, at the east of the Donbass, the Russian defensive structure prepared for the defense without giving up space, supposes the crystallization of a defensive strategic intention of the Russians. Which makes explicit his debilitating, fearful desire to preserve his western border with Ukraine from any enemy proximity. Which would facilitate a limited-target attack by Ukraine inside Russia.
It is evident that on terrain prepared for rigid defense, the Ukrainian mechanized forward spears should not attack.
Already in the middle of 1943, in the so-called Kursk salient, Model‘s forces, attacking from the north, and von Manstein‘s, from the south, did not come together, nor did they even minimally cut the salient. Which was defended entirely by «fortified regions» arranged in deep in the salient.
Fighting in the defense trenches is a form of fighting abandoned some 105 years ago. When the artillery became the queen of the battle and the protective trenches of the soldiers lost their ability to hide and cover them from fire. The artillery fires could be precise enough to hit the trenches quickly. It was necessary to deprive the enemy of views and increase the direct defense of advanced weapons and men.
This was achieved by deploying the defense in combat outposts, fortified or not, and advanced detachments in mobile fighting well in front of the position And by dispersing and fortifying the following positions or redoubts in depth. And bringing the tactical reserves closer to the start of the artillery zone. And having pieces of it at the beginning of it, especially as counter-battery and harassment/neutralization of the enemy advance.
Theater of operations and possible attacks and movements.
La gran cuenca del Donbass, de terreno favorable al empleo de medios mecanizados atacando, es el área geográfica en la que en esta guerra han tenido lugar los principales combates. Existe una llanura costera señalada por las ciudades de Mariupol, a poco más de 50 km. desde la frontera rusa, Berdjansk y Melitopol, que conforman la línea de abastecimientos principal de Crimea desde Rusia, muy importante para los rusos.
The great basin of the Donbass, with favorable ground to the use of attacking mechanized means, is the geographical area in which the main combats have taken place in this war. There is a coastal plain marked by the cities of Mariupol, just over 50 km away. from the Russian border, Berdjansk and Melitopol, which make up the main supply line of Crimea from Russia, very important for the Russians.
The convex interior of the Donbass to the east supports the current Russian-Ukrainian war front.
On the outside are the Russians and from there they prepare and launch limited-target attacks against less-prepared Ukrainian positions. In a purely tactical exchange of efforts, without looking for an operational goal. What would it be like to reverse the enemy front in a sector, overwhelm it or break it for minimal exploitation. And, the Russian defense relies on well-prepared fortifications, which seem to exclude from the outset any moderately successful plan of attack or counterattack. That overcomes the usual tactical struggle with negligible gains in space. That, sometimes they are recovered by a Ukrainian tactical counterattack carried on by a nearby Ukrainian small unit.
The Ukrainian mowing stroke.
The best Ukrainian counterattack would start from the north of Zaporiya and would be directed at the coast of the Azov Sea, in the sector between Berdjansk and Melitopol. It is convenient to direct the effort towards a couple of different objectives. That will force the Russians to further disperse their rejection. And that they are just as important for the Ukrainians, because what it is about is to operationally cut off the Russian supply line. And establish in it, not necessarily on top, a strong Ukrainian defense position.
We call a “system” to a harmonic (with correspondence between them) and synergistic (acting together) set of different elements, but related in nature. That produce or generate a complex and essential function of the broader military activity. Its definition aims for systems to globally understand the variables or elements of their nature that intervene in operations. This would allow us to more easily and precisely focus our attention on them, in order to achieve control and direction of the entire complex phenomenon of war.
“Combat capacities” are the set of military means (men, installations, weapons and all supports) that a “closed military system” (in the case of an operation or campaign) or a society or state possess for its defense.
Development.
Its more complete expression is found in combined or inter arms groups which, even at the small units level, multiply and adapt the possibilities of military struggle in the interfaces of action with the enemy. Combined arms groups seek to accelerate the pace (tempo) or the speed of the elementary “cycles of action” against him. In fact, the incorporation of infantry heavy weapons as organic support elements in small units, forms, qualitatively, an inter arms system.
Combat capacities are that allow a force to achieve a favorable decision and, therefore, operational efficiency in the determined, sought after and transcendent combats, with the enemy. They also give credibility to group movement capacities in maneuvers through the real threat that they pose for the enemy. Simple movement is an empty decoration or an impotent sigh, if it is not paired with the capacity to damage the enemy and the will to do so.
Combat capacity and the capacity of operational movement form complementary and synergic «opposing but not antagonist couples» within the operational systems. Neither of them transcends without the other. Moreover, one of the two is only frustrated and fails without the other. Both systems procure and invigorate tactical actions and execute and fertilize operational maneuvers.
Quantitative studies.
Trevor N. Dupuy has tried to work out a way of quantifying combat capacities (which will always vary according to different units and weapons and countries). (1) Dupuy’s work quantifies units depending on their type and adds a factor depending on which army, war and campaign are under consideration, to obtain values of relative military power for each case.
These «powers» are a relative quantification (remember that there is a multiplier factor, which introduces the efficiency of army in the face of a concrete enemy in a given situation) of the combat capacities of land armies in different epochs or theatres of operations.
Simpkin proposes a similar, more qualitative formula that factors in the equipment of units (this formula is only suitable for mechanized armies). Being the extremes of the classification, an infantry unit and a tank unit of equal level. (2)
The applications, and possibilities of combat capacities are extensively discusses throughout our works.
(1) Trevor N. Dupuy. The Comprehension of the War. Study and Theory of the Combat. Madrid, 1990. Pages 123 to 172.
(2) Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift. London, 1994. Pages 79 to 85.
A minor issue arises, but of great importance due to the disagreements it creates in Moscow and with the troops in the campaign. It is the growing presence of the Wagner Group as a Russian fire extinguisher in the war in Ukraine.
WAGNER RECRUITS RUSSIAN CONVICTS.
It includes convicted criminals, Syrian and Libyan mercenaries «among other elements of bad living» and Russian volunteers. In general, they enjoy disparate salaries, depending on their experience, origin and life path; a convict is basically paid with his freedom, more or less garnished with a clean record.
Their boss is Prigozhin, a Russian plutocrat and Putin henchman. This man is in conflict with part of the Kremlin and with senior military leaders over the permanence of his «private mercenary armed group» in the Russian ranks in the campaign.
The implicit tolerance of the Russian military commands in Ukraine with the men of the Wagner Group generates enormous discomfort among the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers stationed there. And it greatly lowers their combat morale and their «esprit de corps«.
If Gerasimov comes with full powers as commander of the campaign and considers the previous arguments, in relation to the motivation and combative disposition of his Russian regular forces, he has to recompose the situation of the forces, in relation to the presence of the Wagner Group in the Russian ranks.
Unity of Action and Concentration of Efforts in the Campaign.
Another of the capital problems that Gerasimov will have to solve is the strategic and operational Integration of all the active Fronts of the Russian forces in presence.
To establish a strategic «Superior Effort Unit» that is coordinated, proportional and synergistic. To optimize in «effective times«, according to the «superior universal saving means» principle and the «military principle of the Objective», the distribution and coordinated use over time of the human and material capacities assigned to the different Fronts.
Thus, the Russians have several Fronts with different importance and presenting different opportunities.
The Kiev Northern Front is inactive. Lukashenko is Putin‘s due ally and with his bravado and maneuvers he causes uncertainty in Kiev. It offers an opportunity to drain mobile Ukrainian troops, to fix and protect the Front from possible Russian rapid raids.
Here the presence in Belarus of a mechanized Russian “task force” would suffice. Counting on tanks and infantry combat and transport vehicles, with support from artillery, engineers, defense against aircraft and ground support aviation and its escort. And integrating a couple of divisions. That moved around the south of Belarus, prowling.
The Crimean Front is active towards Kherson, Mariupol and Zaporiya and creates uncertainty towards Odessa. It allows the defense of the 4 territories annexed by Putin.
The Donbass Front, in southeastern Ukraine, is active in the oblasts or provinces of Lugansk, to the north, along the border with Russia, and Donetz, to the south. The Northeast Front, towards Kharkov is in hibernation. Both hold promise in theory in this new phase of the war.
The joint and coordinated action from both Russian Fronts, of «breaking shock forces» of the Ukrainian Tactical defense. Followed, after the irruption, by «armored mobile groups» with air support, advancing in the Ukrainian operational rear towards a town or small area. Forming a wide and double enveloping movement around the enemy. It can create a “pocket” of it or, at least, a serious threat of cutting off communications for the most active Ukrainian forces, and therefore equipped with heavy equipment, deployed in the east of the country. Russia has more than enough regular mobile forces for this.
The Ukrainian Counterattack.
The Ukrainians can counterattack by employing armored forces with sufficient punch, such as the more modern Main Battle Tanks. The “heavy” tanks that Zelensky claims from the US and Europe now. The Challengers (with their Chobham armor); Leopards 2 A5, of German engineering; Leclercs, the first type built of this new generation of tanks and the Americans Abrams.
Advancing rapidly from the depth of the Ukrainian deployment, on one flank of the Russian advancing points. Let’s remember that this territory is favorable ground for armored vehicles.
For this, Ukraine will need to have several battalions of such tanks. Distributed by their most important concentrations, each with about 50 tanks. Distributing or employing it by isolated companies is to waste its special and unique off-road forward speed, shock and firepower, protected by effective armor. Which is completely decisive in modern combat.
In all this theoretical filigree of maneuvers and combats, the most capable, equipped, motivated and prepared will win.
The denatured current Russian air front.
The goal of the current Russian air front is the weakening of Ukrainian morale. Through the successive attack on civilian facilities (energy, water and communications) and urban centers of some importance in Ukraine.
It should be noted that this rather criminal objective does not target the enemy military forces, but their unarmed rearguard populations. For more INRI, it began to be used shamelessly when Putin and his Kremlin bosses and henchmen realized that his “special military action” in Ukraine was a “bluff”. And that the Ukraine was a tough nut to crack for the Russian forces employed in it.
MASTER SUN.
Almost 2,500 years ago, Master Sun (Sun Tzu), in the Warring States Era, already warned that «when the general is already appointed by the sovereign, he should not interfere in his affairs» and «when the courtiers and ministers interfere in his command, they bring misfortune to the Kingdom”.
In addition, this objective has already been used in other cases and with zero effectiveness, by the way.
Japan was mercilessly bombarded by the US, when it had already managed to occupy the Japanese islands (e.g., Okinawa) close enough to insular Japan. The Japanese were already preparing their civilian population for a Numantine resistance to the invader. Creating an immense natural fortress on its islands, where each one was a fortified redoubt of it.
They were the two atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which represented an «ascent to the upper limits» in the fight against civilian rearguards. Because they were much more than a very large cannon shot. The ones that forced Japan to surrender unconditionally to the Americans. Because they threatened (although they didn’t have any more artifacts at the time), to destroy the essence and Japanese national identity.
In general, the use of the «indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian rearguards», what it achieves is to galvanize them around their government and their armed forces. Because they perceive from the enemy a demonic, fierce hatred towards them, which would seek the destruction of their identity, culture and idiosyncrasy.
Modernly, such bombing type was used by the US in North Vietnam. They left South Vietnam in 1973 and in 1975 the communist forces occupied it, almost without resistance.
Russia’s Air Support to its Ground Forces.
The Russian air front in Ukraine must be directed against enemy troop concentrations (reserves, attack preparations, marching forces), their ground communications and logistics network, command posts and communications centers, attack points of their forces, artillery and rocket and drones launch positions.
The opportunity arises from the play of dialectical actions between the opposing units. Opportunity is the tactical, even operational, weakness that arises in an enemy sector or is about to do so. We can act on it and even precipitate it with our combined weapons system in an «action interface» especially favorable to us. In opportunity always underlies an enemy error. If this was insurmountable for him, it would be due to the unforeseen, surprising circumstances that concurred. Opportunities are a useful and advantageous feature provided by the dialectic of actions in the chaos of war.
The intermediate objectives foreseen in the plans are not opportunities. They are forecasts derived from the planning and the well-founded resolution of the command. When contacts with the enemy begin, its achievement begins to be tested, as Moltke said, in the dialectics play.
Functioning.
Of this play in a chaotic environment, independently of the greater or smaller deviations from plans, will arise the opportunities and the dangers. The dangers would be the enemy opportunities on us. Both are unexpected, but accessible and exploitable during a certain time. The reason of the unpredictably of the opportunities in the time is in the number almost infinite of variables and individual and collective actions that concur to define a “situation” and the successive cycles of action in which it develops.
The opportunity arises when the enemy fails to use his forces and means of support. It can originate in differences in the qualities of enemy forces and in the transitability of a given terrain, that debilitates a defense or the momentum of an attack. It also appears in the negligence of the enemy in presenting an exposed flank, that is, an interface of action real or potential favorable with us, not properly taken care of by him to face our available combined arms system. The opportunity is an emptiness in combat capacity that arises in a cycle of action for a unit, or a sector, that is unprotected and neglected for long enough allowing it to be detected and exploited by the enemy.
It is necessary to take advantage of opportunities quickly. The dynamics of interaction ina chaotic environment makes opportunities unattainable after a short time. The succession of cycles of action continually modify circumstances.
Developing.
To detect opportunities at any level of military activity, intelligence is necessary (elaborated the exploration and reconnaissance and converted into useful, continuous, sufficient knowledge) and the sufficient presence of the corresponding command. To take advantage of them, simple and vertical communication is necessary, supported by implicit communication between subordinate leaders and mobility, flexibility and combat capacity available in the units and commands involved. If the opportunity is transcendental, the tactical or operational center of gravity of the military means is transferred to it by the command. If it is important, their use must contribute concentrically to its creation and development.
The same characteristics just mentioned, but focused on ourselves, are the ones that, in turn, will protect us from enemy dangers or opportunities. This will prevent its appearance, compensate for the danger or mitigate its presence and reduce our time of vulnerability. If despite foresight and care, surprising or unexpected circumstances concur in its appearance, even due to a mistake on our part, the means to be used are the last two actions mentioned for its detection and use.
What is that sufficient presence of the commander? The one that allows him to take advantage of the opportunities that arise at his level of activity. All of this is directly related to the two different command styles or forms for carrying out the tasks of the different levels of command.
Tactical command must be exercised bySensing the “action interface” with the enemy, exchanging actions with him on the ground. The limit of tactical command is clearly in the brigade. And, in large operations or in the attack or in the armored forces, it probably reaches in greater or lesser degree to the division, whose commander must drive forward the march or the attack behind the first important marching force of the bulk of the unit.
The command of the army corps is clearly an corps’ operational management and must have a broader perspective of the whole. As well as a greater distance from direct contact with the enemy, which overcomes the interface of action and its immediate rear. This gives the command breadth, vision, serenity and security.
In the immense chaos that is created in a combat, the foresight of the command can impose and outline its evolution in a direction and sense.
Like the effective command, is capable of «searching» and «feeling» the enemy’s signs of weakness and discouragement. And then he prepares the forces that he will use in the persecution and the support that he will give them. Putting them under the command of an energetic, spirited, leading and lucid commander.
The command must prepare «rapidly available forces» in the units under its command. For example, a mixed company in the battalion; a combined arms battalion in the brigade. In such a way that the appearance of the opportunity, close and surprising, allows him to take advantage of it. Since the surprise will help the opportunity to be seized at first by a relatively small force of their own. And that may soon be reinforced by the bulk.
Example of the effective, non-physical presence of a High Command.
Erich von Manstein directed the counterattack operation of the German Armies Group Don, mainly against the Soviet Southwestern Front of General Vatutin, from his headquarters in Zaporiya. By mid-March1943, the Germans had eliminated six tank corps in the order of battle of Vatutin, recovered Kharkov and settled a resistant defense front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported in the Mius and the Donetz. They also had enough mobile reserves in the south of Russia to reject possible soviet operational ruptures in the zone. And, after the setback of Stalingrad, they had recovered the strategic initiative, at least in the southern theater of operations.
HITLER, WORRIED, VISIT MARSHAL VON MANSTEIN AT ZAPORIYA, UKRAINE.
An attack against the Kursk salient, completed its formation by von Manstein‘s advance on Belgorod, which would have begun in April, then had a chance of success due to the lack of Soviet preparation.
This same offensive, which began in July 1943, determined that no more mistakes by the German High Command (Hitler) were of any importance: then, the subjet of total strategy or state strategy was no longer who would win the war, but how long it would take to do so.
A Failure in the effective presence of command.
Let’s see an example of an inadequate presence of the commander, in relation to the echelon that he is supposed to command. It starred Rommel in North Africa in November 1941.
Rommel’s advanced command post in the desert.
Mistakenly believing that the British armor was dispersed after some fighting, Rommel ordered to concentrate his Panzers on the Libyan-Egyptian border. Directly dedicated to it, acting as a regimental commander, he was involved in the repulse of a British attack. He was even isolated with his command vehicle, due to a mechanical problem, for half a day at the front.
This temporarily deprived him of control of operations in Tobruk. This was Rommel’s main operational objective, while resisting the German siege was the main objective of the English. Due to this unjustified distraction, Rommel had to abandon the attempt to take that fortified port, located in his operational rear, which he could have consolidated for his defense of his won territory.
In less than a month, the advances of the English tanks and infantry forced him into a long retreat towards Tunisia. He had to give up almost all the ground he had gained since March, when he arrived in Africa, until he recovered and was able to fight back, as British pressure lightened.
Russian Generals missing from their Battle Forward Post in Ukraine
Introduction.
There are hundreds of videos of Ukrainians neutralizing Russian air, naval and ground vehicles. That more than fighting at close distances, it seems that they pose as if they were shooting ducks at a town fair.
These
videos are mostly produced by almost unknown film companies.
And sometimes even a supposed Russian general falls almost in the battle’s first rows.
Developing.
A
general never accompanies or stands in combat with a platoon
lieutenant or company captain or a battalion commander or lieutenant
colonel.
His tasks are not to hit shots. Nor haranguing the men around him. Or drive them into combat by his example. That is done by the officers in charge of the units and the non-commissioned officers in immediate command of the soldiers. Who know their soldiers like nobody else. Or will it not be so here?
The task of the general officer is to conceive and conceptualize the combat and the maneuvers of his tactical units, fulfilling the Tasks and Missions of the Army in campaign.
And, facilitate the means in: combined arms units; anti-tank, artillery and air support for them and the logistics for it: from health to supplies of all kinds, from fuel to ammunition, through maintenance teams and removal of damaged vehicles and kitchens and food distribution to the collection points of the units.
He
harangues and drives the commanders and chiefs of units dependent on
him. And, to all the soldiers on rare occasions.
To
fulfill Those, fulfilling the universal principle of the
economy of human and material means. That is, following the
best and most optimized use of it.
And, as I have said before, the death of a general is a national disaster. And, the death of a 4-star general, commander-in-chief of an army of many tens of thousands of soldiers, is a national catastrophe.
Simply
because they are very important military assets.
Reactive artillery has changed a lot since the Soviet times of World War II. That the so-called Soviet Katiuskas rockets scattered fear among their enemies. For its persistence, simultaneity and its fire wake and noise when flying. Its range was 4 to 5 km. and the carrier truck weighed about 5 tm.
It consisted of a military truck on which was placed a battery of 10 or 12 tubes rocket launchers of caliber of the order of 80 to 122 mm. The battery was fixed in the direction of the front of the truck and it was oriented towards the target. Several rocket trucks formed the smallest tactical support unit.
Lanzacohetes Katiusha
«No matter how long a man is exposed to bombing. He will never be immune to fear of it. Machine gun or rifle fire can be frightening, but it cannot be compared to the sensations that fill the throbbing hearts of men, when the sounds and whistles of aerial and terrestrial bombs are perceived approaching». F. Mowat. The Regiment. Toronto, 1955. pp. 162-163.
Another example of a weapon designed both to demoralize with this said effect, and to cause damage and casualties, was the Junkers-87, known as the Stuka. Their sirens were placed to produce a terrifying high-frequency screech as they dive over the target at high speed. A British officer described the effect of the weapon during a dive bombardment received by his men in the spring of 1940, which caused only ten injuries and destroyed three trucks: «The boys were completely broken. After the bombardment, the officers and some sergeants got up and tried to restart the activities. But, the men were lying or sitting in complete daze. And it was necessary to push or drag them to wake them up.” L. Deighton. Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk. London, 1979. Page 247.
Well, but what you are telling us happened a long time ago, with normal forces.
Well, let us point to the repeated case of a battalion-type or multi-company infantry unit, dismounted, deployed, and advancing to the attack. That, in several cases, they were units such as the Guards or the Highlanders, considered among the best in the world. As soon as it was subjected to effective fire from the enemy and suffered some casualties, especially if they were some officers and non comissioned officers, it would freeze on the ground and stick to it. It immediately transmitted that it had been pinned down and requested reinforcements to get out of trouble, unable to react on its own. General Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift. London, 1994. Page 214.
Tactical utilities.
The advantage with conventional artillery is that its barrels have to withstand the tremendous explosion of smokeless powder. This initial push along the barrel is what propels the bullet throughout its mileage travel up to target. Those rifled barrels require advanced metalworking and the explosions and bullet paths coming out of the barrels wear them down quickly and need to be replaced.
In reactive artillery, the cannon is replaced by the launcher or rail that directs the rocket towards its target. This is impelled by propellant at the rear, behind the warhead. The fiery trail of the booster is perfectly visible during launch and part of the flight.
Sistema BM-21
This flight was governed by ballistic physical laws. There was no direction of flight, once the rocket was flying off the ramp.
These reactive artillery fires were not very precise. They were really designed to neutralize the enemy located on a surface target, which generally became a zone of destruction. The fires were directed at open, non-urban land.
Soldiers placed in individual or group positions with adequate cover or fortifications survived well.
Evolution.
The Soviets liked this artillery, which was part of their doctrine of using abundant and overwhelming heavy fire in breakout operations of the enemy fronts.
The Katiuskas were replaced by the Soviets with the BM-24 reactive launchers, first, with about 7 km. range, and BM-21, from 1964, with a range of 15 km. The configurations were the same, a bank or batteries of free-flight rocket launchers loaded in the back or gondola of a truck.
HIMARS system.
Other nations began to be interested in this type of weapon. Looking for more precision and combat readiness of vectors. To obtain a plus of efficiency and utility against the Russian armament.
We see that in the name they mention its improved mobility and they do not do it with its precision. When it is what stands out to crush very sensitive enemy targets and, above all, specific ones, such as parts of the logistics system, communications, command posts and concentrations of enemy offensive means.
The HIMARS launcher of high mobility
The secrets of success are multiple and act in synergy to achieve their effectiveness. One is that the rockets have a modern and sophisticated MILITARY GPS system. That allows the rockets to be directed precisely to the indicated target, in a directed flight. The effective range of simple multiple rockets is about 90 km.
Then there is the suspension system of the all-terrain trucks, with less than 11 tms of weight, which allows the rapid movements of the truck on not very rough terrain. And the handling is clean and fast. The reloading of the 6 rockets of a mobile platform is completed in 10 minutes.
The Russians in the Ukraine try, usually in vain or too late, to locate the Ukrainian HIMARS batteries using drones. To annoy the Russians, the Ukrainians use fake HIMARS launchers and continually change the location of the real ones.