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The Last Operational Projections opposite to the Most recent Threats.
The balance of the nuclear weapons between both great atomic hegemonic powers («guides and leaders» of their partners), is defined by the new START Treaty. This has been ratified on December 22, 2010 by the American Senate. And is hoped that the Russian Duma ratifies it, after her established by protocol study, in an only voting at the beginning of 2011. This new agreement replaces the START of 1991, which expired on Saturday, the 5th of December, 2009.
The START 2 supposes a qualitative and substantial limitation of the number of heads and nuclear strategic vectors of the USA and Russia. Far are the times in which the number of operational, stored and dismantled by pieces nuclear devices were reaching 50000 between both. By 2013, each country will deploy only 1550 strategic nuclear warheads and will have 800 carrying and multicarrying vectors for them: submarines, free flight rockets, ballistic rockets and planes. Also is established a new system of inspection of the arsenals and nuclear means.
Several are the deficiencies or topics not solved by the Treaty. One is the not limitation to developing the defense systems against the vectors. Also is kept the storage freedom of not operational warheads and of deployment of the atomic tactical weapons. Between both «models», each signatory power can have nowadays near 6000 warheads. The tactical nuclear weapon, destined to the battlefield, can be an intermediate step in a direct warlike confrontation between nuclear powers. Before using the nuclear strategic volleys against the operational or deep enemy rears. The USA claims that, at least, the last two topics been an object of a later treaty.
The rigorous limitations of the nuclear weapons do not eliminate them. No weapon has never been abolished, once acquired and extended the technology for his manufacture and use. It is necessary to learn to coexist indefinitely with them. An excessive control (very few explosive heads and vectors) does that they all are directed to attack the enemies population and industrial centers. This paradoxically goes in opposition with the pacifists aspirations. When the number of weapon systems overcomes a survival or practical threshold, it allows to follow an atomic flexible, variable and staggered strategy. In her, many of the vectors are pointed to destroy the enemy vectors in the diverse phases of his path to the goals: in and over the hostile territory or platform; in ballistic or autonomous flight towards the goal and over the own territory, both at high and very low level. This keeps limited the number of heads destined against populations and industries. Even it allows their tactical employment against profitable goals of military enemy concentrations, specially before reaching in force the forward limit of a principal defense position.
The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggressions are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.
In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, the Americans are called them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebellious and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.
In these irregular wars many of the parameters of the previous wars are absent. There is no declaration of war by the Legislative Power of the strong or military contender. The victory is not obtained occupying the enemy territory. The military means lose a part of his leading role, in favor of the social, economic and political means, necessary to gain the will and the fervor of the societies at the stack. The treatment and the care given by the contenders to the civil population of the guerrilla infected territory is fundamental in the development and the result of the conflict. The duration of these wars is major than that of the conventional wars. The time, necessary in order that the rebels make and develop their total war effort, works, in general, in favor of the weak or irregular contender. The military means are not adapted, at first, to the type of fighting that is asked to them. Neither exist clear goals, nor territories at stake, nor front lines or enemies deployments, nor strengthened positions. If the guerrilla are it sufficient skillful and steady, to not directly and unnecessarily confront her chronic weakness to the enemy strength.
The Great Operational Lines of the Counter Guerrillas Forces.
Nowadays, in West, in Europe, the exterior leading role of the conventional armed forces seems to center in them, throughout the time and in varied theaters. The military western action opposite to their exterior irregular global threats demands an effective, light and mobile counterinsurgency forces, specialized in not orthodox tactics and technologies, as part of the conventional troops. That must always operate in conjunction with the national forces of the countries infected by irregular hostiles and supported with decision by the own economy and the diplomacy. This will strengthen their missions and compounded role, The counterguerrillas forces must not be enslaved to the strategies and tactics of the conflicts of the second and third generation or classic contemporary ones. Though these could arise punctually in the armed conflicts with the «urchin States» of each time (for example, Iran, North Korea or Venezuela).
Some of the operational characteristics of this different type of war, but not new, are:
To always avoid a protracted war. With her the enemy organizes, spreads and strengths, sometimes irreversibly. While the military men lose way, get angry and weaken. The war of Afghanistan is squarely in this long critical period.
To always attack the concentrations and the rebel bases. These are the hard and conventional goals that they offer to the military forces. To always defend and support the own communications and to attack those of the enemy. To take advantage for it of the light armored vehicles mobility and of the aircraft, which neutralize the information of the different enemy observers.
To keep the passive defenses of the war to the possible minimum. The big «protective» and costly barracks in relatively calm zones, only serve to socially and military isolate the regular forces, from the fluid and active environment of the irregular fight. If the military forces were initially not enough, is necessary to concentrate them temporarily in fewer zones and to promote between the population the self defense forces. To always use a constant, creative and energetic patrolling. So much for the exploration and the attack, as to hinder and isolate the guerrillas from the friends or neutral populations and to cut their communications. In both cases, is necessary to keep mobile, even airborne forces, to give them supports. To use the concentrations of regular military forces only to attack the guerrilla bases or to surround and chase his operational concentrations.
This will keep the initiative and the surprise, created by the regional network of small light “action units”, in hands of the military men. That by formation, training, means and vocation should clearly overcome the hostiles in the military operations. The principal goal is not to keep a “front line” or a «cultivated field» of barracks, redoubts and forts through a whole country or strategic region. But to active destroy the combat capacity and the operational movement capacity of the armed rebels.
And only the military «initial» and continued successes, will lay the foundations for a firm, irreversible and progressive pacification of the different regions of the country.
Let’s see now succinctly the possible distribution of the military bases depending on the enemy activity. In the enemy most favorable zones, the military positions must be solid and resistant, few and with a bigger garrison. In these areas must predominate the exploration of the bands and the major offensive operations against them, over their bases, concentrations, refuges and passages.
In the zones where the rebels try to settle, progress and manage to dominate the civilians, the military positions will be more numerous and with fewer troops. These are the more changing zones, of more irregular war, of combat meetings (the ambush is it) more frequent. Here is decided, first, the advance and the progress and, finally, the victory of one of both contenders. The enemy communications and the rebellious centers in these areas are the operative goals of the loyal forces, together with the defense of the populations. Resting, partly, on local self-defense forces, reinforced by highly mobile military patrols, even transported by helicopters. Assured the defense of an area in these zones, is possible to demand loyalty to the protected population. And to begin the labors of national economic support and civic rearmament.
In the most loyal or neutral and pacific areas is necessary to test the technologies and the methods of sincere and effective approximation to the population. The self-defense native forces, supported by military mobile patrols, in charge a manageable zone, must support here the weight of keeping their own security. In this zone can be located the helitransported and the mechanized sufficient reserves. To be sent to other 2 kinds of operational zones in support or assault operations. Also the brigades of economic support and of civic rearmament, can have here his stores and central big barracks.
When scanty military means are available and the enemy sustain an all-out war, is it possible to fight against armed and motivated rebels?
Let’s see a historical example of the action of military forces against insurgents, in unfavorable conditions for them. The German antipartisans forces in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In heir manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that » the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be replied».
The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, by the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His anti partisans troops were consisting of an always variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German security troops and policemen; security troops of his allies in the East Front, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of «Russian» allied forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes insecure. The hard core of the units were the Germans. In the positions usually were not homogeneous troops. In them the qualities were intermingled, in order that the more mope or novice was encouraging by the presence of the forte. And it remove from him the thoughts of weakness or desertion. Before the inability to garrison her rear in the whole territory conquered from the USSR, at west of an imaginary line between Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Germans had to select very well the points to garrison. These rarely were possessing more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the position could be defended for a time. While, the rest, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor their vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of anti partisans forces, they were formed exploration and combat patrols. Something like a reconnaissance in force forces, to locate and to scourge the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, before a guerrilla threat or the location of an important concentration, even were temporarily brought troops from the first line (of the operational zone) for the assault and destruction of those, generally looking for his encircle and annihilation. I
It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational goal of his anti partisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies from Germany, Poland and Romania were kept reasonably opened up to the rears of the German forces and their allies in the East Front. And the men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods flows that they received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Million Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and to there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch.