Teoría e Historia Militares y Temas de Interés Permanente en los Conflictos y Crisis Modernos. Military Theory and History and Topics of Permanent Interest in the Modern Conflicts and Crisis.
Utilizamos esta Sección de Novedades para dar a conocer en avance los próximos artículos que irán apareciendo en las distintas «categorías» de temas de esta página, dedicada a los conflictos y crisis modernos.
Spain Fleet captures the British logistics Fleet in 1780.
LA GUERRA DE MANIOBRAS. EL CONCEPTO DE LA BATALLA AÉREO TERRESTRE MODERNA. UNA INTERPRETACIÓN DEL MARISCAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.
Un ejemplo poco conocido de la trascendencia omnipresente de la logística y de su línea de comunicación (más o menos ramificada) en las operaciones y muy importante por sus resultados finales, es la operación denominada DONBASS (la gran zona operativa) por los soviéticos, desarrollada entre el 29 de enero y mediados de marzo de 1943, al sudoeste del río Donetz. Ella forma parte de lo que los alemanes llamaron la batalla del DONETZ: el último éxito estratégico de Von Manstein, que fue malogrado por Hitler en Kursk.
THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.
Alittleknownexampleillustratestheomnipresenttranscendenceoflogisticsandthelineofcommunication(moreorlessbranchedout)inoperationsandtheirfinalresults.BetweenJanuary29andmid-March1943,theSovietsdevelopedanoperationcalledDonbassatthesouthwestoftheDonetz.ThisoperationformspartofwhattheGermanscalledthebattleoftheDonetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.
Valery Gerasimov, comandante militar ruso en Ucrania.
Con todas las derrotas acumuladas padecidas por el Ejército de la Federación rusa en su “operación militar especial” en Ucrania desde el 24 de febrero de 2022 hasta ahora, Vladimiro Putin no descansa, se irrita y no tiene paz.
Su último “as en la manga” es el general de ejércitoValery Gerasimov, nacido en la ciudad rusa de Kazan, hace 67 años y jefe del Estado Mayor General desde 2012.
Una edad casi ideal para el trabajo que se le viene encima. Definido por organización, cambios estructurales, disciplina, flujo suficiente de medios y mano dura.
Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine.
With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.
LA PSICOLOGÍA DE LOS TERRORISTAS ISLAMISTAS
La civilización y sus estructuras vital y social en sus interacciones con los individuos y su psicología.
El fallo de los yihadistas en integrarse en un «grupo con creencias y virtudes (los valores permanentes) compartidos». Que le den identidad, sentido y pertenencia a sus vidas.
¿Por qué se comportan así? ¿Cómo tratar a los recuperables? ¿Cómo combatir a los vitandos o recalcitrantes?
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIST TERRORISTS
The civilization and his vital and social structures , in his interactions with the individuals and their psychology.
The failure of the jihadists in joining a «group with shared beliefs and virtues» (the permanent values). That give to their lives identity, sense and belonging.
Why do they behave this way? How to treat the recoverable ones? How to attack the hatefuls or recalcitrant terroris
THE PERSECUTIONS TO THE MODERN CHRISTIANS.
There is taking place in the last months a real «planetary conjunction». It is about the «temporal coincidence» of a bloody and fierce pursuit of the Christians, whose «green outbreaks» are in the Arabic Islamic countries. That is coincidental with the solvent, quiet and cunning action of the European «trendies», against the virtues of the European societies. Both actions are surely a «cosmic part» of the so called «Mysterium iniquitatis» or agree to the Darkness.
Those were the times of the reign of the Bourbon King Carlos III, with Don José Moñino Redondo, Count of Floridablanca, Prime Minister of Spain since 1776, replacing the Marquis of Grimaldi.
Floridablanca, through the Count of Aranda, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, began systematic aid to the American war effort against Great Britain. The aid materialized first in money and supplies.
COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA
On
April 28, 1779, Louis XVI of France ratified the
renewal of the Family Pact between the two Bourbon
kingdoms. And war was declared between them and Great Britain.
This
is the century of the wars of kings. Since they are projected and
carried out by sovereigns and their ministers. They sought to change
the world map for dynastic interests and for the aggrandizement of
their Powers. Without even taking into account the feelings of the
people.
Background.
On July 9, 1780, a combined war fleet of 22 Spanish and 9 French ships had sailed from Spain, bound for the territorial waters of Great Britain. And in order to attack the enemies he could. An ambitious, broad and clear war mission.
Spain and France harassing the Royal Navy at home. To the Home Fleet, the enemy «home custody fleet».
Commanding our combined fleet was the general command of the Spanish Navy, Admiral Don Luis de Córdova y Córdova, 73 years old. At that age, Córdova was already back from Scholasticism, Thomistics, military or naval regulations, and the art of warfare of force against force.
LUIS DE CÓRDOVA Y CÓRDOVA.
Córdova‘s fleet was divided into a Spanish division and a French division of ships of the line. Supported by a flotilla of frigates, smaller in length and size than the other ships, but much faster at sea. Intended for exploration tasks (active, intuitive and daring) and security or screen tasks (discreet and hiding from enemy views) of the combined fleet.
The flagship of the Spanish Navy was then the imposing and majestic Santísima Trinidad, the most important sailing ship of the line ever built. She had 4 artillery decks and was launched in the shipyards of Havana, advanced in naval construction.
The Santísima Trinidad was also the flagship of Córdova‘s fleet, where he raised his personal flag. And, she will have a decisive role in the development of future war events
The allied ships were already in the English Channel, when they received the news from Floridablanca, informed by their spies in Great Britain, that two convoys with 52 cargo ships in total, had just set sail from the port of Portsmouth, in the south of England, to India and North America.
THE SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD MAIN SHIP
This
huge logistics fleet was in itself a necessary
and sufficient objective
for the tasks entrusted to the Admiral
against Great Britain.
Córdova realized that his success lay in calculating with the greatest possible probability, that is, estimating correctly, the strip or sector of course followed by the logistics fleet. With this, he worked out for the combined fleet an interception course for the enemy ships, well to the east of the Azores. That would be confirmed later by his flotilla of frigates on a long-distance reconnaissance mission.
Unfortunately,
most of the escort warships of the British
logistics fleet
returned to their bases, when it was already well under way in the
open sea.
Developing.
Towards the first light of dawn on August 9, 1780, dispersed enemy freighters began to appear on the horizon of the combined fleet.
Córdova could attack them, cause them great damage, scatter the rest towards his port and capture a certain spoils. And, thus achieve a great victory.
But, he thought better of fooling them with an «appearance«. And, thus, defeat them one by one, capture them and make an immense booty, which he would take to Spain. And, at a minimum cost of life and damage to ships and their cargoes.
The Admiral ordered a large lantern to be lit and placed on the foremast of the Santísima Trinidad. This was the signal the enemy used to rally their ships around his Captain ship. Appearances, to work for, must be believable and the most expected and natural thing in the world. The enemy will fool himself…
And, the British ships headed towards the Spanish lantern that illuminated them on the horizon, as moths do towards the light…
It is worth remembering that our warships carried a variable crew, depending on their sizes and tasks, from the Spanish Marine Corps. In charge of fighting at sea and on land against enemies as infantrymen. And, that the groups leaders and captains of Córdova were fully trained to carry out the decided maneuvers.
Ahead of the Santísima Trinidad, the ships of the combined fleet fanned out to either side of the horizon, following a rough line. And each one was covered by its port or starboard guns. To receive the British as they deserved when the imaginary bag was closed more.
Some allied ships began their attack on the British freighters, seeing that they abandoned their course and wanted to flee.
NAVAL BATTLE OF 9 AND 10 OF AUGUST OF 1780
From the Santísima Trinidad, they gave and transmitted the «combat order» to the allied groups ships, who transmitted them to the most distant ones. Thus, the rest of the allied ships closed on the scattered and sparse bundle of enemy cargo ships. Attacking them individually.
Let us remember that the cargo ships carried only a symbolic artillery for a minimum defense. Since its structure and displacement were intended to optimize its ability to carry loads for its destination. The artillery, its ammunition, gunpowder and the artillerymen greatly subtracted from its capacity, due to the effective specialization of the means. For its defense, they have the warships escorts.
The enemy, surprised and scattered, was overwhelmed and gave up quickly, once the allied ships were threatening them.
The three warships that were then escorting the British logistics fleet and a freighter escaped from the encirclement, heading for port. Some sources say that the three warships were seized by the allies. And they joined the Spanish Navy. And, they even give their new names as Spaniards.
It
took a day to seize all the captured ships. The ring was not, nor
could it be, as closed as on land. And, the warships would not
surrender at first. Military marines and sailors are not intimidated
by a threat and are trained to fight. Theirs is that they fled to the
port, once they saw that they could do nothing to defend the
freighters. Only to increase the irreparable losses of their nation.
Spanish Marines boarded enemy freighters to subdue and disarm British Trading Companies «soldiers» being flown to colonial duty stations to reinforce garrisons there. And to take the “prey”.
And they would remain in them to control that his sailors carried out the maneuvers to go to the destination ordered by the Admiral of the fleet.
The
military operation was effective, clean, profitable and fast. Córdova
and his combined attack fleet returned to the Homeland
with a huge booty captured from the enemy.
The spoils of war seized by Córdova and his men amounted to:
1,800 “private soldiers” of the West India and East India Trading Companies.
Three
thousand British sailors who manned the 51 captured ships.
About 140 million reales (old Spanish coin worth) as the value of the ships, merchandise of all kinds for sale, goods and supplies, weapons and ammunition of the ships and the men of the Companies.
The loss of the logistics convoy destined for the 13 North American colonies dealt a heavy blow to Britain’s war efforts there, against the Native Americans fighting for their Independence.
By August 20, Córdova, his ships, his men, and his enormous booty were reaching Cádiz. Being received in triumph by the local authorities and the people of Cádiz.
Some
final considerations.
This Spanish naval feat has little resonance in the History books written since then. As an explanation, we could say that the «Efforts of arms» are always attributed «gunpowder and blood«. As notable, essential and instrumental Additions to them.
And, the Córdova combined fleet Action in the capture of the largest logistics fleet suffered by Great Britain in its history, was quiet (with little gunpowder) and unscathed (without much blood).
And therefore it is assumed to be with little military effort. In other words, without courage, brilliance, stripes, or warlike glory.
We don’t always have a Master Sun (Sun Tzu means that) on our way to understand us. And appreciating a complete victory taking advantage of the weaknesses and failures of the enemy.
Todos los Grupos Sociales, desde las tribus, con sus tótems, plumajes y coronas y panteones, hasta las complejas Sociedades Nacionales actuales, con sus himnos, banderas, condecoraciones y órdenes, edificios de los Poderes Públicos, tienen “Signos Externos de Identidad y Soberanía”.
Que buscan concretar y hasta definir, para propios y extraños, la Identidad, la Esencia y algunas cualidades sociales, de ese grupo social único.
Las cosas externas, la tela, los metales, los acordes y textos de dichos “Signos Externos” se Transfiguran en una “expresión real” de dicha esencia e identidad. Y esto es lo que suponen y valen para ese grupo social que los enarbola orgulloso.
Existe una fórmula definida para incorporar a unas personas a la categoría de ciudadano miembro del grupo social que se trate. En él se enfatizan todas las características y condiciones que deben cumplir y respetar dichas personas al incorporarse a dicho grupo.
Por ejemplo,
«Juro lealtad a la Bandera de (…) y a la República que a ella representa. Símbolo de la Nación, una e indivisible. En el Respeto a la Ley y a los Derechos de todos los Ciudadanos«.
Un ejemplo de la transgresión del respeto a los mismos.
El martes 21 de febrero de 2023, la diputada Española del partido catalanista secesionista JuntsPerCat. Excrecencia del partido disuelto del Benefactor de Cataluña y Padre de la Cataluña Nueva, Jorge Pujol. Miriam Nogueras ha retirado deliberadamente de un atril de oradores de la sala de Prensa del Congreso de los Diputados, la Enseña Nacional.
Su acción felona, impúdica, sin educación, ni respeto a la Nación que le paga el sueldo es un Acto de Traición de Lesa Patria.
Le pese a quien le pese de sus amiguetes, cómplices, conmilitones y copartidarios.
Y, la Presidenta del Congreso, sra. Batet, es cooperadora necesaria en dicha ofensa a la Nación que las paga.
La consecuencia descafeinada tipo Daladier y Chamberlain.
En otro Grupo Social que se Respetara más a Sí Mismo, las consecuencias para ellas hubieran sido más proporcionales a dicha Ofensa.
All Social Groups, from the tribes, with their totems, plumage and crowns and pantheons, to the current complex National Societies, with their anthems, flags, buildings of the Public Powers, decorations and orders, have «External Signs of Identity and Sovereignty ”.
Who seek to specify and even define, for their own and strangers, the Identity, the Essence and some other social qualities, of that unique social group.
The external things, the fabric, the metals, the chords and texts of said «External Signs» are Transfigured into a «real expression» of said essence and identity. And this is what they mean and are worth to that social group that proudly hoists them.
There is a defined formula to incorporate some people into the category of citizen member of the social group in question. It emphasizes all the characteristics and conditions that any people must meet and respect when joining that group.
As an example,
«I swear allegiance to the Flag of (…) and to the Republic that it represents. Symbol of the Nation, one and indivisible. In the Respect for the Law and the Rights of all Citizens.»
An example of transgression of respect for them.
On Tuesday, February 21, 2023, the Spanish deputy from the secessionist Catalan party JuntsPerCat. An Excrescence of the dissolved party of the Benefactor of Catalonia and Father of the New Catalonia, Jorge Pujol. Miriam Nogueras has deliberately removed the National Ensign from a speaker’s lectern in the Press room of the Congress of Deputies.
Her felony action, impudent, without education, nor respect for the Nation that pays her salary is an Act of Treason of Lesa Homeland.
It, despite whoever her friends, accomplices, comrades and supporters of hers.
And, the President of Congress, Mrs. Batet, is a necessary cooperator in the offense to the Nation that pays them.
The decaffeinated sequel type Daladier and Chamberlain.
In another Social Group that Respects Itself more, the consequences for them would have been more proportional to the Offense.
Between
plans for attaining objectives, and their actual accomplishment, is
the arena of execution, which is affected by errors, poor
interpretation and omission.
In
effect, with voluntary action (different from chaos) exist the
likelihood of avoidable and inevitable errors, the fundamental
actions and actions of secondary importance, foreseeable facts and
hypotheses and not to mention unexpected or imponderable actions that
carry with them opportunities for both contenders.
Friction works to remove plans from their complete execution and objectives, no matter how correctly and well-conceived they may be or how well-equipped the force with means, assistance and distribution. Friction derives from the natural, hyperfunctional complexity of military phenomena and can be expressed as the «inevitable” additional price that we must be paid to achieve certain objectives in an operation. When the «price» is higher – when there is a «supertax» – the problem is conceptually and qualitatively different: the «failure», the “mistake” appears in plans, their execution, the means used to pursue them, etc.
The
Mistakes or Failures.
Failuresor errors result from attitudes, procedures and basic ways of acting that are erroneous, inconvenient, weak, imperfect or mistaken. The existential imprint is what ensures their survival. Failures can occur at strategic, operational or tactical levels of military; they can cause “wears” more effectively than friction and can cause the annihilation of both rival forces and the complete failure of their objectives. Linking failures with friction, and not considering their unique effects, is always a mistake.
The main causes of errors and failures are:
1)
Poor planning or conceptualization of objectives, as well as the
operations and means to use to achieve them.
2)
Poor knowledge of the enemy; his plans, intentions and the various
means on which he uses.
3) Lack of consideration of the “transitability” (more than ongoing) of the operational grounds during times and levels of actions.
4)
Poor implementation plans at any level.
5) Poor conditions for logistics and communications at any level, as a function of the implementing operations and their decreasing yields.
6)
Implementing
superfluous or
mistaken
operations.
The greatestfailures must to be avoided or eliminated at all costs before or during the course of the plan, since, by their nature, they put at risk the achievement of objectives at all levels.
The greater failures are more probable in the tactical than in the strategic level but, on the other hand, they are of lesser importance to global plans. One example is fighting a battle without adequate intelligence. It is also «easier» to know if a strategic error is likely to occur (it is another thing if the error could be avoided), as fewer «elements» are a factor, although their importance is greater in action. For example, French military doctrine was mistaken when, in May 1940 they confronted Germany and lost the campaign, the French and their allies having enjoyed their greater (at least land-based) military means over the Germans.
This means that, at the tactical level, failures or errors must wait for, they are generally of less relative importance on a global level, and where and how they will occur is not known in advance. However, at the strategic level failures or errors are more decisive. Yet it is easier (at least for an alert minority at low levels of Command) to know what types of failures may occur, where they will occur and by whom will they be caused.
The
Compensations and Corrections of the failures and mistakes.
To stop failures or errors before they occur is, at least theoretically, possible if a method and doctrine – that is, a basically correct style of behavior and command – is followed at all the military functional levels. This, combined with a sound strategy, can prevent failures or errors. Indeed it is this that all good commanders in chief must attentively and jealously execute, but doing so is very difficult, given that it requires concurrence, cooperation and obedience by so many levels, units and individuals in the military.
It
is therefore necessary to also prepare for the probability of
serious failures and errors by having means and procedures
for neutralizing and compensating for them. These
means and procedures should center on what steps would effectively
compensate for serious failures and errors.
Those made at the tactical and operational levels are economically compensated by actions taken in the operational and strategic echelons, which are qualitatively superior. Among others the most important ways of compensating for errors are: Enveloping and turning fronts operations in the same or contiguous sectors of advance. Opening other fronts, consistent with the overall strategic-operational direction. Using convergent sectors of advance for the same objective. Redoubling efforts by deploying echelons indepth. Pursuing alternative objectives within a larger line of attack, with the primary objective being enemy rather than geography. Using greater reserves, which must be continuously refreshed and reformed at all levels, etc.
More serious errors at strategic level are much more difficult to compensate for, given the importance of this level for operations and combat. Also, it is not wise to assume that militarymeans, for their specialized and scanty natures, will necessarily be too much at this level.
For these reasons, the best way to counter serious failures is to prevent them when at all possible. The carelessness is equivalent here to look for the defeat and to give the enemy the decision in the conflict. But, is it easy to modify, before a defeat, military doctrine? Is it possible before to replace a military cupola? Is it possible to establish a promotion mechanism, that reasonably preserves the integrity of the combined-arms groups, that also takes advantage of the tactical benefits of implicit communications between units that stems from common experience? Is it possible, after a victory, to revise the military doctrine that lay behind that success?
We
will consider
now errors
that do
not stem
from attitudes
or behavior
negligent or
foolish, to
be in
the same
category as
friction, that
is, “minor«.
How can
friction and
minor failures
be compensated
for?
This can occur by using greater “means” (forces, ability, plans and operations ramification, etc.) than the theoretically necessary, given the calculated “correlation of forces” needed for a particular tactical effort. This can mean: reiterating the effort; building up reserves or using of units of greater quality and training; using diverse sectors or axes of advance, seeking for alternative and/or simultaneous objectives within the overall direction of advance, etc.
Failuresorerrors can be
attenuated and diminished, but only exceptionally are they nullified.
Actually both phenomena of disorder are superimposed, stemming as they do from plans that are more or less deficient and the natural friction that arises from executing plans that are really exceptionally complicated. Both generate “practical frustration” in their implementation, that should be taken into account.
Entre
los planes para la consecución de unos objetivos y su realización
en la práctica, existe la ejecución, que está afectada por
errores, malas interpretaciones y omisiones.
En
efecto, dentro de las acciones voluntarias, diferentes del caos,
están los errores evitables y los inevitables, las acciones
fundamentales y las de trascendencia secundaria, los hechos
previsibles y estimables y los inesperados o imponderables, junto con
las oportunidades para ambos contendientes.
La
fricción tiende a alejar los planes de su completa
ejecución o de su objetivo, aunque sean correctos y estén bien
concebidos, dotados de medios, compartidos y estructurados. La
fricción se deriva de la complejidad
hiperfuncional natural del fenómeno militar. Y puede ser
expresada como el “precio” adicional inevitable que
tenemos que pagar para obtener unos objetivos dados en una operación.
Cuando
el “precio” es más alto, cuando tenemos un
“sobrecoste” mayor o menor, el problema es
conceptual y cualitativamente diferente: ha hecho su aparición el
“error”, en los planes, en su ejecución, en los
medios empleados, etc.
Los
Errores o Fallos.
Los
errores o errores surgen por actitudes, procedimientos
y modos de obrar básicos, estándares, que son erróneos,
inconvenientes, inconsistentes, imperfectos o equivocados. Esta
impronta existencial que poseen es la que les da su
pervivencia. Los errores pueden darse en
los niveles estratégicos, operativos o tácticos de la actividad
militar, llevan a “desgastes” muy superiores a los
de la fricción y pueden llegar al aniquilamiento de las fuerzas
comprometidas por una de las partes y al fracaso completo en el logro
de los objetivos. Enlazándolos con la fricción, el no
considerar la acción de ella es siempre un error.
Como
causas principales de los
errores están:
1)
La mala planificación de los objetivos, de las operaciones y de los
medios a emplear.
2)
El mal conocimiento general del enemigo, de sus planes e intenciones
y de los medios próximos y remotos con los que cuenta.
3)
La no consideración de la “transitabilidad” del
terreno de operaciones en los distintos tiempos y niveles de
actuación.
4)
La mala ejecución de los planes a cualquier nivel.
5)
Las malas disposiciones para la logística y las comunicaciones a
cualquier nivel, en función de las operaciones a
emprender y de los rendimientos decrecientes de las
mismas.
6)
La ejecución de operaciones superfluas o equivocadas.
Los
errores mayores se deben eludir o eliminar por todos
los medios antes o en el propio plan, ya que, por su naturaleza,
pueden llegar a poner en peligro su realización a los distintos
niveles de actuación.
Los
errores mayores son más probables en el ámbito
táctico que en el ámbito estratégico, pero entonces serán de
menor trascendencia sobre unos planes globales. Por ejemplo, librar
un combate sin la inteligencia adecuada. También es más “fácil”
saber si vamos a tener un error estratégico (otra cosa es poder
evitarlo), al intervenir menos “elementos”, aunque
más importantes en su aparición. Por ejemplo, la doctrina militar
francesa erró frente a la alemana en mayo de 1.940 y así perdieron
fulminantemente la campaña, gozando los franceses y sus aliados de
mayores medios militares, al menos en tierra, que los alemanes.
Esto
quiere decir que en el nivel táctico los debemos
esperar, son de menos trascendencia relativa global y generalmente no
sabremos dónde y cómo ocurrirán. En cambio, en el nivel
estratégico son más decisivos, pero es más fácil saber “dónde”
y “qué o quiénes” los cometerán o producirán;
esto, al menos, para una minoría siempre alerta y presente y
generalmente en niveles menores del Mando.
Las
Compensaciones y Correcciones de los errores o fallos.
Para
eliminarlos de partida, teóricamente bastaría con tener y asumir
un método, una doctrina, un estilo de actuación básicamente
correctos de aproximación al “problema” a todos los niveles
funcionales. Si todos actúan correctamente, dirigidos por la
estrategia adecuada, se gana teóricamente o, al menos, no se pierde.
Pero esto precisamente, que es lo que todo buen general en jefe debe
perseguir celosamente, es también muy difícil que se cumpla a todos
los niveles y por tantas unidades e individuos.
Por
tanto, hay que abordar también la previsión de los errores
mayores y su control mediante la neutralización y la
compensación.
¿Cómo se pueden compensar los errores importantes?
Los
cometidos en los niveles táctico y operativo se compensan
económicamente por acciones tomadas en los escalones operativo
y estratégico, que son cualitativamente superiores en la
actividad militar. Entre otras las más importantes son: operaciones
envolventes y de frente invertido en el mismo sector de avance o en
los contiguos; apertura de otros frentes en una misma gran dirección
estatégico operativa; empleo de sectores de
avance convergentes para un mismo objetivo; reiteración de
esfuerzos con el despliegue escalonado en profundidad; dirigirse a
objetivos alternativos en una gran línea de avance,
con el objetivo principal puesto en el enemigo, no en la geografía;
empleo de mayores reservas, que deben ser continuamente recreadas a
los distintos niveles, etc.
Los
errores mayores a nivel estratégico son mucho más difíciles de
compensar, por el carácter de tono fundamental que tiene este nivel
sobre las operaciones y los combates. Tampoco es de esperar que los
medios militares, por su carácter de bienes especializados y
escasos, sobren especialmente en este nivel.
Entonces,
la corrección de estos errores mayores debe ser
profiláctica en todo lo posible. La dejadez aquí equivale a
buscar la derrota y a entregar al enemigo la decisión en el
conflicto. Pero, ¿es fácil modificar una doctrina militar, antes de
una derrota,?, ¿es posible sustituir una cúpula militar?, ¿se
puede establecer un mecanismo de ascensos, que preserve
razonablemente la integridad de los equipos interarmas, para
aprovechar los beneficios tácticos de las comunicaciones implícitas
y entre unidades, logradas en la experiencia en común?, ¿es
posible, tras una victoria, actualizar la doctrina que nos guió en
ella?
Consideraremos
ahora al error, cuando no procede de
actitudes y modos de obrar negligentes o necios, en el mismo orden
o categoría de la fricción, como “menor”.
¿Cómo se compensan la fricción y los errores menores?
Principalmente
con el empleo de mayores “medios” (fuerzas, habilidad,
ramificación de los planes y operaciones, etc.) de los necesarios
teóricamente según una pura correlación de medios para ese
esfuerzo táctico: con la reiteración del esfuerzo; con la creación
de reservas o empleo de unidades de mayor calidad y entrenamiento;
con la utilización de diversos sectores o ejes de avance, con
objetivos alternativos y/o simultáneos, contemplados en una gran
dirección de avance, etc.
Los
errores o fallos pueden ser
atenuados, disminuidos, pero sólo excepcionalmente serán
erradicados.
En la práctica se superponen los dos fenómenos de desorden: el plan y su ejecución más o menos deficientes y la fricción natural de toda ejecución hipercomplicada e hiperfuncional. Ambos suponen un grado de “frustración práctica” con el que hay que contar.
I think this should be an attack on the Azov Sea from Zaporiya (+-) area.
Cutting the Crimean supply line with Russia. And, towards Melitopol (+-).
The spears points of the attack can be somewhat bifurcated. So that the enemy does not know exactly what our immediate objective is. And it can concentrate from the Crimea too many forces to repel them.
The Russian supply line leaves the Crimea, crosses the coast of the Azov Sea and enters Russia towards Rostov on the Don. Any point is good to cut it, as long as the supply is suppressed.
The closer to Crimea it is cut off, the more “influence”, a material and moral effect, its presence will have on the Crimean Russians. The closer it is to the Russian border, the easier it will be for the Russians to deploy forces to push them back. And further away would be the Ukrainians from their supply bases and the reinforcement of men and units.
To attack where the front is now, in an easterly direction, towards the Russian border, is to reiterate the military effort on a Russian front prepared for defense. The Ukrainians would attack where they are most prepared and where their enemies are waiting for them. It would be a very mediocre and expensive strategy; force against force. And, the Russians have much more physical human and military resources than the Ukrainians.
The plan to attack towards the south of Ukraine imposes the law of action on them, it is daring, creative, novel and possible. And it would leave the Russians out of place in plans and positioning of their means for defense. That they would be on the great strip of the Azov Sea coast, Donetz and Lugansk oblasts and the Russian border.
It would be a strategy of strength against Russian weakness.
Structural development.
Pointing out different towns as “essential milestones” in the layout of the fronts, with a view to their operational exploitation, offers a string of names that are almost impossible to understand. Which are very difficult to locate on the maps available to us. A Bajmut, a Buça are locations that can be very painful and shocking. But, they shipwreck and get lost on our usual maps.
The fact is that Bakhmut is the Ukrainian name for the town called Artemivosk, in Russian. And, in Russian it appears on almost all maps. And, of course, most reporters and envoys to the theater of operations do not have time to correct these «bulk errors.»
All this “outer shell”, at the east of the Donbass, the Russian defensive structure prepared for the defense without giving up space, supposes the crystallization of a defensive strategic intention of the Russians. Which makes explicit his debilitating, fearful desire to preserve his western border with Ukraine from any enemy proximity. Which would facilitate a limited-target attack by Ukraine inside Russia.
It is evident that on terrain prepared for rigid defense, the Ukrainian mechanized forward spears should not attack.
Already in the middle of 1943, in the so-called Kursk salient, Model‘s forces, attacking from the north, and von Manstein‘s, from the south, did not come together, nor did they even minimally cut the salient. Which was defended entirely by «fortified regions» arranged in deep in the salient.
Fighting in the defense trenches is a form of fighting abandoned some 105 years ago. When the artillery became the queen of the battle and the protective trenches of the soldiers lost their ability to hide and cover them from fire. The artillery fires could be precise enough to hit the trenches quickly. It was necessary to deprive the enemy of views and increase the direct defense of advanced weapons and men.
This was achieved by deploying the defense in combat outposts, fortified or not, and advanced detachments in mobile fighting well in front of the position And by dispersing and fortifying the following positions or redoubts in depth. And bringing the tactical reserves closer to the start of the artillery zone. And having pieces of it at the beginning of it, especially as counter-battery and harassment/neutralization of the enemy advance.
Theater of operations and possible attacks and movements.
La gran cuenca del Donbass, de terreno favorable al empleo de medios mecanizados atacando, es el área geográfica en la que en esta guerra han tenido lugar los principales combates. Existe una llanura costera señalada por las ciudades de Mariupol, a poco más de 50 km. desde la frontera rusa, Berdjansk y Melitopol, que conforman la línea de abastecimientos principal de Crimea desde Rusia, muy importante para los rusos.
The great basin of the Donbass, with favorable ground to the use of attacking mechanized means, is the geographical area in which the main combats have taken place in this war. There is a coastal plain marked by the cities of Mariupol, just over 50 km away. from the Russian border, Berdjansk and Melitopol, which make up the main supply line of Crimea from Russia, very important for the Russians.
The convex interior of the Donbass to the east supports the current Russian-Ukrainian war front.
On the outside are the Russians and from there they prepare and launch limited-target attacks against less-prepared Ukrainian positions. In a purely tactical exchange of efforts, without looking for an operational goal. What would it be like to reverse the enemy front in a sector, overwhelm it or break it for minimal exploitation. And, the Russian defense relies on well-prepared fortifications, which seem to exclude from the outset any moderately successful plan of attack or counterattack. That overcomes the usual tactical struggle with negligible gains in space. That, sometimes they are recovered by a Ukrainian tactical counterattack carried on by a nearby Ukrainian small unit.
The Ukrainian mowing stroke.
The best Ukrainian counterattack would start from the north of Zaporiya and would be directed at the coast of the Azov Sea, in the sector between Berdjansk and Melitopol. It is convenient to direct the effort towards a couple of different objectives. That will force the Russians to further disperse their rejection. And that they are just as important for the Ukrainians, because what it is about is to operationally cut off the Russian supply line. And establish in it, not necessarily on top, a strong Ukrainian defense position.
Yo creo que éste debería ser un ataque sobre el mar de Azov desde Zaporiya (+-).
Cortando la línea de abastecimientos de Crimea con Rusia. Y, hacia Melitopol (+-).
Se pueden bifurcar algo las puntas de avance del ataque, para que el enemigo no sepa bien cuál es el objetivo inmediato de ellas. Y pueda concentrar desde Crimea demasiadas fuerzas para repelerlas.
La línea de suministro rusa sale de Crimea, cruza la costa del mar de Azov y penetra en Rusia hacia Rostov sobre el Don. Cualquier punto es bueno para cortarla, con tal de suprimir el abastecimiento.
Cuanto más cerca de Crimea se corte, más “influencia”, efecto material y moral, ejercerá su presencia sobre los rusos de Crimea. Cuanto más cerca sea de la frontera rusa, más fácil será para los rusos desplegar fuerzas para rechazarlas. Y, más lejos estarían los ucranianos de sus bases de aprovisionamiento y del refuerzo de hombres y unidades.
Atacar donde está ahora el frente, en dirección este, hacia la frontera con Rusia, es reiterar el esfuerzo militar sobre un frente ruso preparado para la defensa. Atacarían los ucranianos donde más preparados están y donde lo esperan sus enemigos. Sería una estrategia muy mediocre y costosa; de fuerza contra fuerza. Y, los rusos tienen muchos más medios humanos y militares físicos que los ucranianos.
El plan de atacar hacia el sur de Ucrania les impone la ley de la acción, es osado, creativo, novedoso y posible. Y dejaría a los rusos descolocados en planes y posicionamiento de sus medios para la defensa. Que estarían en la gran franja costa del mar de Azov, oblasts de Donetz y Lugansk y la frontera rusa.
Sería una estrategia de fuerza contra la debilidad rusa.
Desarrollo estructural.
El señalar a distintos pueblos como “hitos imprescindibles” del trazado de los frentes, de cara a su explotación operativa, ofrece una ristra de nombres casi imposibles de alcanzar a entender. Que son muy difíciles de localizar en los mapas asequibles para nosotros. Un Bajmut, un Buça son localizaciones que pueden ser muy dolorosas e impactantes. Pero, que naufragan y se pierden en nuestros mapas habituales.
El caso es que Bajmut es el nombre ucraniano de la población llamada Artemivosk, en ruso. Y, en ruso figura en casi todos los mapas. Y, claro, la mayoría de reporteros y enviados al teatro de operaciones no tienen tiempo para corregir estos “errores de bulto”.
Toda esa “cáscara exterior”, al este del Donbass, la estructura defensiva rusa preparada para la defensa sin cesión de espacio, supone la cristalización de una intención estratégica defensiva de los rusos. Que explicita su deseo debilitante, miedoso de preservar su frontera oeste con Ucrania de cualquier cercanía enemiga. Que facilite un ataque de objetivo limitado de Ucrania en el interior de Rusia.
Es evidente que en terreno preparado para la defensa rígida, las puntas de avance mecanizadas ucranianas no deberían atacar.
Ya a mediados de 1943 en el llamado saliente de Kursk, las fuerzas de Model, atacando desde el norte, y de von Manstein, desde el sur, no llegaron a juntarse, ni a cortar mínimamente dicho saliente. Que estaba defendido completamente por “regiones fortificadas” dispuestas en la profundidad en el saliente.
La lucha en las trincheras de la defensa es una forma de lucha abandonada hace unos 105 años. Cuando la artillería se convirtió en la reina de la batalla y las trincheras protectoras de los soldados perdieron su capacidad de ocultar y cubrir del fuego a aquellos. Los fuegos artilleros podían ser suficientemente precisos como para llegar a acertar rápidamente en los recorridos de las trincheras. Era necesario privar al enemigo de vistas y aumentar la defensa directa de armas y hombres avanzados.
Esto se consiguió desplegando la defensa en avanzadas de combate, fortificadas o no, y destacamentos avanzados en defensa móvil. Y dispersando y fortificando las siguientes posiciones o reductos en profundidad. Y acercando las reservas tácticas al inicio de la zona de artillería. Y disponiendo piezas de ella al inicio de ésta, especialmente de contrabatería, de la defensa pesada antitanque y de hostigamiento/neutralización del avance enemigo al ataque.
Teatro de operaciones y posibles ataques y movimientos.
La gran cuenca del Donbass, de terreno favorable al empleo de medios mecanizados atacando, es el área geográfica en la que en esta guerra han tenido lugar los principales combates. Existe una llanura costera señalada por las ciudades de Mariupol, a poco más de 50 km. desde la frontera rusa, Berdjansk y Melitopol, que conforman la línea de abastecimientos principal de Crimea desde Rusia, muy importante para los rusos.
El interior convexo del Donbass al este soporta el actual frente de guerra ruso ucraniano.
En la parte exterior están los rusos y desde ella se preparan y lanzan ataques con objetivo limitado contra posiciones menos preparadas ucranianas. En un intercambio puramente táctico de los esfuerzos, sin la búsqueda de un objetivo operativo. Como sería invertir el frente enemigo en un sector, desbordarlo o romperlo para una explotación mínima. Y, la defensa rusa se apoya en fortificaciones muy preparadas, que parecen excluir de entrada cualquier plan de ataque o contraataque medianamente exitoso. Que supere el forcejeo táctico habitual con ganancias de espacio despreciables. Que, algunas veces son recuperadas por un contrachoque táctico ucraniano.
El mejor contraataque ucraniano partiría del norte de Zaporiya e iría dirigido a la costa del mar de Azov, al sector entre Berdjansk y Melitopol. Es conveniente dirigir el esfuerzo hacia un par de objetivos diferentes. Que obligará a los rusos a dispersar más su rechazo. Y que son igual de importantes para los ucranianos, porque de lo que se trata es de cortar operativamente la línea rusa de abastecimientos. Y establecer en ella, no necesariamente encima, una fuerte posición de defensa ucraniana.
Llamamos “sistema” a un conjunto armónico (con correspondencia entre ellos) y sinérgico (que actúan conjuntamente) de elementos diferentes, pero relacionados en su naturaleza, que producen o generan una función compleja y esencial de la actividad militar más amplia. Su definición aspira a que los distintos sistemas comprendan de forma global a las variables o elementos de su naturaleza que intervienen en las operaciones. Ello permitiría focalizar en ellos más fácil y precisamente nuestra atención, para conseguir el control y la dirección de todo el complejo fenómeno de la guerra.
Las “capacidades de combate” son el conjunto de los medios militares (armas y apoyos) que posee un “sistema militar cerrado” (en una operación, una campaña) o una sociedad o estado para su defensa.
Desarrollo.
Su expresión más cabal son los conjuntos de armas combinadas o interarmas, incluso en el nivel de las pequeñas unidades. Que permiten multiplicar y flexibilizar las posibilidades de lucha en los campos y las interfases de acción con el enemigo. Buscando acelerar el ritmo (tempo) o la velocidad de los ciclos elementales de los períodos de acción contra él. De hecho, la inclusión de las armas pesadas de infantería como elementos orgánicos de apoyo en las pequeñas unidades, ya configura cualitativamente un sistema de armas combinadas.
Las capacidades de combate son las que nos permiten obtener la decisión y, por tanto, la eficacia operativa en los combates decididos, buscados y trascendentes y en los que nos impone el enemigo. Y son las que dan credibilidad a las capacidades de movimiento del conjunto en las maniobras, a través de la amenaza real que generan sobre el enemigo. El simple movimiento es una floritura vacía o un suspiro impotente, sin su unión complementaria con la capacidad de hacer daño al enemigo y la voluntad de hacerlo.
La capacidad de combate y la capacidad de movimiento operativo forman un “par de opuestos” complementarios y sinérgicos dentro de los distintos sistemas operativos de combate. Ninguno de los dos trasciende sin el otro. Es más, uno de los dos solo se frustra y se malogra sin el otro. Ambos sistemas procuran y dinamizan las acciones tácticas y ejecutan y fertilizan las maniobras operativas.
Estudios Cuantitativos.
Si queremos acudir a una cuantificación de las capacidades de combate, dando valores, que serán siempre relativos, a las distintas unidades y armas, podemos acudir singularmente a la obra de Trevor N. Dupuy (1). En ella cuantifica las unidades en función de sus tipos. Y, añadiéndoles un factor en función del ejército que consideremos y en cuál guerra o campaña actúa, obtiene unos valores de potencia militar relativa para cada caso.
Estas “potencias” son una cuantificación relativa (recordemos el factor multiplicador, que introduce la eficacia de cada ejército frente a un enemigo concreto en una situación dada) de las capacidades de combate de los ejércitos terrestres en las distintas épocas o teatros de operaciones.
Simpkin realiza un desarrollo similar, más cualitativo, en función de los equipos de las unidades (sólo vale para los ejércitos mecanizados), siendo los extremos de la clasificación, una unidad de infantería y una unidad de tanques de igual nivel (2).
En ese carácter suyo y de la aplicación, el uso y las posibilidades de las capacidades de combate se trata extensa y diversamente por toda esta obra
1) Trevor N. Dupuy. La Comprensión de la Guerra. Estudio y Teoría del Combate. Madrid, 1990. Págs. 123 a 172.
2) Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift. Londres, 1994. Págs. 79 a 85.
We call a “system” to a harmonic (with correspondence between them) and synergistic (acting together) set of different elements, but related in nature. That produce or generate a complex and essential function of the broader military activity. Its definition aims for systems to globally understand the variables or elements of their nature that intervene in operations. This would allow us to more easily and precisely focus our attention on them, in order to achieve control and direction of the entire complex phenomenon of war.
“Combat capacities” are the set of military means (men, installations, weapons and all supports) that a “closed military system” (in the case of an operation or campaign) or a society or state possess for its defense.
Development.
Its more complete expression is found in combined or inter arms groups which, even at the small units level, multiply and adapt the possibilities of military struggle in the interfaces of action with the enemy. Combined arms groups seek to accelerate the pace (tempo) or the speed of the elementary “cycles of action” against him. In fact, the incorporation of infantry heavy weapons as organic support elements in small units, forms, qualitatively, an inter arms system.
Combat capacities are that allow a force to achieve a favorable decision and, therefore, operational efficiency in the determined, sought after and transcendent combats, with the enemy. They also give credibility to group movement capacities in maneuvers through the real threat that they pose for the enemy. Simple movement is an empty decoration or an impotent sigh, if it is not paired with the capacity to damage the enemy and the will to do so.
Combat capacity and the capacity of operational movement form complementary and synergic «opposing but not antagonist couples» within the operational systems. Neither of them transcends without the other. Moreover, one of the two is only frustrated and fails without the other. Both systems procure and invigorate tactical actions and execute and fertilize operational maneuvers.
Quantitative studies.
Trevor N. Dupuy has tried to work out a way of quantifying combat capacities (which will always vary according to different units and weapons and countries). (1) Dupuy’s work quantifies units depending on their type and adds a factor depending on which army, war and campaign are under consideration, to obtain values of relative military power for each case.
These «powers» are a relative quantification (remember that there is a multiplier factor, which introduces the efficiency of army in the face of a concrete enemy in a given situation) of the combat capacities of land armies in different epochs or theatres of operations.
Simpkin proposes a similar, more qualitative formula that factors in the equipment of units (this formula is only suitable for mechanized armies). Being the extremes of the classification, an infantry unit and a tank unit of equal level. (2)
The applications, and possibilities of combat capacities are extensively discusses throughout our works.
(1) Trevor N. Dupuy. The Comprehension of the War. Study and Theory of the Combat. Madrid, 1990. Pages 123 to 172.
(2) Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift. London, 1994. Pages 79 to 85.
This is obviously not a Treatise on the determining Parameters of Military Efficiency. Nor is it a Study on the Principles or Operating Systems of War. On which you have at your disposal enough articles on this Web Page, which you consult now.
It is a matter of making a brief explanation of the characteristics of these determining Parameters. That they should always work in Harmony and Cohesion.
So that, with this description in hand, you can easily define and know the Failures and Errors made by the Units in their most dangerous Job: War.
Doctrine and Regulations.
These determining Parametersmust define and transmit the What and the How of the units and means in the war against the various possible enemies.
In other words, it supposes having good Principles of its Art-Science of War and Operating Systems suitable for modern, hybrid and cybernetic warfare.
And, they must do it in a broad, clear, creative, stimulating, flexible, participatant and decisive way.
The Determining Parameters and their full means of expression.
Those Determining Parameters are conceived and materialized by the Human Element of Weapons and War. Without it, they would only be more or less numerous sheets of letters. Waiting to obtain its meaning, always eminently practical, its full expression and its transcendent utility. They get it with their employment by the military.
Logistic chain.
Organizes and distributes the means to units. It could also participate more or less in its acquisition in the market. Generally includes health services.
It must be close, and it using various means: long-distance and delivery transport, warehouses or centers (hubs) or kitchens at various levels of action and with control and computer means. It must act informed, farsighted, proactive, organized and sufficient.
The Action Trilogy.
Units of the arms and services.
That they can integrate tactical and operational groups of Combined Arms with common tasks and missions. That they will be at one with each other, trained, also jointly, that they provide mutual support and a synergy of effects and that they have mutual respect.
Commands. officers.
They must be willing, empathetic, trained, motivated, decisive, respected, responsible and long-suffering.
Non-commissioned officer corps.
They must be close, trained, specific, capable, formed, loyal to the commands, soldiers and units and respected and highly regarded by the soldiers.
The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was victorious in the Civil War over the Russian White Armies. These were supported to a greater or lesser extent in it by the European Powers, the United States and Japan. Already then, the Soviet Politburo set its eyes on Europe, in order to spread the World Revolution. In this, the internationalist ideas of Leon Trotsky had a decisive role.
Leon Trotsky
To do this, General Mikhail Tukhachevsky would attack the recent Republic of Poland with his armed Eurasian Hordes. And he would win over the bourgeois Republic. Thanks to the fact that the Polish peasants would «fervently» join the socialist liberation offered by the Red Armies.
The imperialist attack on Poland.
The Reds reached the Warsaw Front, trying to overwhelm it from the nort.
General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, left, with other Senior Commanders of the Red Army
There, Marshal Josef Pilsudski, hero of the Liberation of Poland in World War I, toured his brigades and divisions. Raising and consolidating the combat morale of its forces and the identity of the Polish Nation, against communist Russian Imperialism.
And, he prepared with his General Staff and the commanders of his large units an in-depth mobile defense. Against the frontal and massive attacks of the enemy.
From Kyiv, about 500 km from the Front, Tukhachevsky encouraged his own, treating their hordes as despots, aided by their political commissars. And he directed his military operations on the maps of the situation of the war in his Command Post. That it was updated by unverified information from his large units at the Front.
The Operational Caedes.
Tukhachevsky had also tightened his Logistic Lines to the maximum. He was engulfed, touching in his imagination the triumph at hand.
Although they ate from looting the ground they walked on. From their distant rear they needed weapons, ammunition, equipment, clothes, shoes, medicines, troops replacement, pack mules and the essential Russian «cars of the country».
And, as a Miracle emerged from the concentration of the attacker’s Errors and the defender’s Effective Parameters, the attacker found himself without friendly ground under his feet. Without the essential operational rear area. To rest, maneuver, fight and consolidate after specific fights. And, he had to back off miserably.
The Soviets in arms, not effective military, retreated to the borders of the USSR.
And, the revolutionary dream of crossing the Polish plains and invading Germany. And free Europe from the capitalist or imperialist system, this as the culmination of capitalist development. It dissipated like the smoke of the tobacco that the Soviet troops smoked.
Current situation.
This idiosyncrasy of the Slavic military of the West of the Urals continues to influence the operations, needs and mental characteristics of the military of the Russian Federation.
The discipline of the troops in the barracks is deplorable. Free time, laziness, inane or risqué talks abounds.
Heavy equipment maintenance is poor. Some writer calculated that, from his military experience, half the tanks in battle would soon stop working and would be short of fuel and spare parts.
The Russian army lacks in its essential structure the framework of a corps of non-commissioned officers specifically formed for the immediate direction of the troops and the satisfaction of their needs. That they know them as well as their mothers. And with extensive military knowing and training, empathy and leadership skills. Respected by the soldiers and which recognize that without them and without obeying them, their chances of survival on the battlefield are much less.
Consequences for immediate operations.
This may be an insurmountable obstacle to Putin‘s plans, which Gerasimov is trying to fulfill.
And it could not be surpassed by the mere concentration of the mediocrity of equipment and men in the Fronts.
El Ejército Rojo de Obreros y Campesinos resultó victorioso en la Guerra Civil sobre los Ejércitos Blancos Rusos. Estos fueron soportados en mayor o menor medida en ella por las Potencias europeas, los Estados Unidos y el Japón. Ya entonces, el Politburó Soviético puso sus ojos en Europa, con el fin de extender la Revolución Mundial. En esto, las ideas internacionalistas de León Trostky tuvieron un protagonismo decisivo.
Leon Trotsky
Para ello, el general Mikhail Tujachevsky atacaría a la reciente República de Polonia con sus Hordas armadas euroasiáticas. Y ganaría a la República burguesa. Gracias a que los campesinos polacos se sumarían “fervorosos” a la liberación socialista que le brindaban los Ejércitos Rojos.
El ataque imperialista contra Polonia.
Los Rojos llegaron hasta el Frente de Varsovia, intentando desbordarla por el norte.
El General Mikhail Tujachevsky, a la izda., con otros Altos Jefes del Ejército Rojo
Allí, el mariscal Josef Pilsudski, héroe de la Liberación de Polonia en la I Guerra Mundial, recorría sus brigadas y divisiones. Elevando y consolidando Ia moral de combate de sus fuerzas y la identidad de la Nación polaca, frente al Imperialismo ruso comunista.
Y, preparaba con su Estado Mayor y los comandantes de sus grandes unidades una Defensa móvil en profundidad. Contra los ataques frontales y masivos del enemigo.
Desde Kiev, a cerca de 500 km del Frente, Tujachevsky alentaba a las suyas, con el trato de los déspotas a sus hordas, ayudado por los comisarios políticos de ellas. Y dirigía sus operaciones militares sobre los mapas de la situación de la guerra en su Puesto de Mando. Que era actualizada por las informaciones no contrastadas de sus grandes unidades en el Frente.
El Caedes Operacional.
Tujachevski había tensado también sus Líneas Logísticas al máximo. Estaba engolfado, rozando en su imaginación el triunfo a mano.
Aunque comían del pillaje al terreno que pisaban. Necesitaban también, desde su retaguardia lejana, armas, municiones, medicinas, reposición de unidades, ropas, calzados, mulas de carga y los “carros del país” rusos.
Y, como Milagro surgido de la concentración de Errores del atacante y de Parámetros Eficaces del defensor, el atacante se encontró sin suelo amigo. Sin la imprescindible zona de retaguardia operativa. Para descansar, maniobrar, combatir y consolidarse tras las luchas puntuales. Y, tuvo que retroceder miserablemente.
Los soviéticos en armas, que no militares eficaces, retrocedieron hasta las fronteras de la URSS.
Y, el sueño revolucionario de cruzar las llanuras polacas e invadir Alemania. Y liberar a Europa del sistema capitalista o imperialista, éste como culminación del desarrollo capitalista. Se disipó como el humo del tabaco que fumaban las tropas soviéticas.
Situación actual.
Esta idiosincrasia de los militares eslavos del Oeste de los Urales continúa influyendo en las operaciones, necesidades y características anímicas de los militares de la Federación de Rusia.
La disciplina de las tropas en los cuarteles es deplorable. Abundan los tiempos libres, la holgazanería, las charlas inanes o subidas de tono.
El mantenimiento de los equipos pesados es malo. Algún escritor calculó que, por su experiencia militar, la mitad de los tanques en batalla dejarían de funcionar pronto y que les faltarían combustibles y repuestos.
El ejército ruso carece en su estructura esencial de la armazón un cuerpo de suboficiales formados Específicamente para la dirección inmediata de las tropas y la satisfacción de sus necesidades. Que los conozcan tanto como sus madres. Y con una amplia formación militar, empatía y capacidad de mando. Que los soldados, así, los respeten. Y reconozcan que sin ellos y sin obedecerlos, sus posibilidades de supervivencia en el campo de batalla son mucho menores.
Consecuencias para las operaciones inmediatas.
Esto puede ser un obstáculo insalvable para los planes de Putin, que Gerasimov intenta cumplir.
Y que no se supera por la mera Concentración de la Mediocridad de equipos y hombres en los Frentes.
Surge, un tema menor, pero de gran importancia por las desavenencias que crea en Moscú y con las tropas en campaña. Es la presencia creciente del Grupo Wagner como apagafuegos ruso en la guerra de Ucrania.
WAGNER RECLUTA CONVICTOS RUSOS.
En el mismo se encuadran criminales convictos, mercenarios sirios y libios “entre otros elementos de mal vivir” y voluntarios rusos. En general, gozan de sueldos dispares, dependiendo de su experiencia, origen y trayectoria vital; a un convicto se le paga fundamentalmente con la libertad, más o menos adornada con limpieza de antecedentes.
Su jefe es Prigozhin, un plutócrata ruso y paniaguado de Putin. Este hombre está enfrentado con parte de los del Kremlin y con altos jefes militares por la permanencia de su “grupo armado mercenario particular” en las filas rusas en campaña.
La tolerancia implícita de los jefes militares rusos en Ucrania con los hombres del Grupo Wagner, genera un enorme malestar entre los oficiales, suboficiales y soldados allí destacados. Y rebaja enormemente su moral de combate y su “esprit de corps”.
Si Gerasimov viene con poderes plenos de jefe de la campaña y considera los anteriores argumentos, en relación a la motivación y la disposición combativa de sus fuerzas regulares rusas, tiene que recomponer la situación de las fuerzas, en relación con la presencia del Grupo Wagner en las filas rusas.
La Unidad de Acción y la Concentración de los Esfuerzos en la Campaña.
Otro de los problemas capitales que tendrá que resolver Gerasimov es la Integración estratégica y operativa de todos los Frentes activos de las fuerzas rusas en presencia.
Para establecer una “Unidad Superior del Esfuerzo”, estratégica, que sea coordinada, proporcional y sinérgica. Para optimizar en “tiempos eficaces”, según el principio “universal superior del ahorro de medios” y el “principio militar del Objetivo”, la distribución y el empleo coordinado en el tiempo de las capacidades humanas y materiales adjudicadas a los distintos Frentes.
Así, los rusos tienen diversos Frentes con diferentes importancias y presentando distintas oportunidades.
El Frente norte de Kiev está inactivo. Lukashenko es aliado debido de Putin y con sus balandronadas y maniobras provoca incertidumbres en Kiev. Brinda una oportunidad de drenar efectivos ucranianos móviles, para fijar y proteger el Frente de incursiones rápidas rusas posibles.
Aquí bastaría la presencia en Bielorrusia de una “fuerza de tareas” (tasks force) mecanizada de Rusia. Contando con tanques y vehículos de combate y transporte de infantería, con apoyo de artillería, ingenieros, defensa contra aeronaves (DCA) y aviación de apoyo a tierra y su escolta. E integrando un par de divisiones. Que se moviera por el sur de Bielorrusia merodeando.
El Frente de Crimea está activo hacia Jerson, Mariupol y Zaporiya y crea incertidumbre hacia Odesa. Permite la defensa de los 4 territorios anexionados por Putin,
El Frente del Donbass, al sureste de Ucrania, está activo en los oblast o provincias de Lugansk, al norte, junto a la frontera con Rusia, y Donetz, al sur. El Frente del Noreste, hacia Jarkov o Kharkov está en hibernación. Ambos son promisorios en teoría en esta nueva fase de la guerra.
La acción conjunta y coordinada desde ambos Frentes rusos, de “fuerzas de choque de ruptura” de la defensa Táctica ucraniana. Seguidas, tras la irrupción, por “grupos móviles blindados” con apoyo aéreo, avanzando en la retaguardia operativa ucraniana hacia una población o pequeña zona. Formando un amplio y doble movimiento envolvente en torno al enemigo. Puede crear un embolsamiento de éste o, al menos, una grave amenaza de corte de comunicaciones para las fuerzas ucranianas más activas y, por tanto, equipadas con equipos pesados, desplegadas en el este del país. Rusia cuenta con más que suficientes fuerzas móviles regulares para ello.
El Contraataque Ucraniano.
Los ucranianos pueden contraatacar empleando fuerzas blindadas con suficiente punch, como los Main Battle Tanks más modernos. Los tanques “pesados” que Zelensky reclama a los EEUU y a Europa ahora. Los Challengers (con su blindaje Chobham); Leopards 2 A5, de ingeniería alemana; Leclercs, el primer tipo construido de esta nueva generación de tanques y Abrams, los estadounidenses.
Avanzando rápidamente desde la profundidad del despliegue ucraniano, sobre un flanco de las puntas de avance rusas. Recordemos que ese territorio es terreno favorable para los blindados.
Para ello Ucrania necesitará contar con varios batallones de dichos tanques. Distribuidos por sus concentraciones más importantes, cada uno con unos 50 tanques. El distribuirlo o emplearlo por compañías aisladas es desperdiciar su especial y única velocidad de avance todoterreno y potencias de choque y de fuego, protegidas por un blindaje eficaz. Que es completamente decisoria en el combate moderno.
En toda esta filigrana teórica de maniobras y combates, ganará el más capaz, equipado, motivado y preparado.
El desnaturalizado frente aéreo ruso actual.
El objetivo del frente aéreo ruso actual es el debilitamiento de la moral ucraniana. Mediante el ataque sucesivo a las instalaciones civiles (energías, agua y comunicaciones) y a los núcleos urbanos de cierta importancia ucranianos.
Es de señalar que este objetivo bastante criminal no tiene como blancos a las fuerzas militares enemigas, sino a sus poblaciones inermes de la retaguardia. Para más INRI, comenzó a ser usado descaradamente cuando Putin y sus altos capitostes y paniaguados del Kremlin se dieron cuenta de que su “actuación militar especial” en Ucrania era un “bluff”. Y que Ucrania era un hueso duro de roer para las fuerzas rusas empleadas en ella.
MAESTRO SUN
Hace casi 2500 años, el Maestro Sun (Sun Tzu), en la Época de los Reinos Combatientes, ya avisó que “cuando el general ya es nombrado por el soberano, éste no se debe meter en sus asuntos” y “cuando los cortesanos y ministros interfieren en su mando, traen la desgracia al Reino”.
Además, este objetivo ya ha sido utilizado en otros casos y con nula eficacia, por cierto.
El Japón fue bombardeado inmisericordiemente por los EEUU, cuando ya había conseguido ocupar las islas japonesas (p.e., Okinawa) suficientemente cerca del Japón insular. Los japoneses ya preparaban a su población civil para una resistencia numantina al invasor. Creando una inmensa fortaleza natural en sus islas, donde cada una era un reducto fortificado de ella.
Fueron las dos bombas atómicas de Hiroshima y Nagasaki, que supusieron un “ascenso a los límites superiores”, en la lucha contra las retaguardias civiles. Porque eran mucho más que un cañonazo muy grande. Las que obligaron al Japón a rendirse incondicionalmente a los estadounidenses. Porque amenazaron (aunque no tuvieran más artefactos en ese momento), con destruir la esencia e identidad nacional japonesa.
En general, el uso del “bombardeo indiscriminado de las retaguardias civiles”, lo que consigue es galvanizar a éstas en torno a su gobierno y a sus fuerzas armadas. Porque perciben del enemigo un odio demoníaco, feroz hacia ellas, que buscaría la destrucción de su identidad, cultura e idiosincrasia.
Modernamente empleó ese tipo bombardeo los EEUU en Vietnam de Norte. Ellos abandonaron en 1973 el Vietnam del Sur y en 1975 lo ocuparon, casi sin resistencias, las fuerzas comunistas.
El Apoyo Aéreo de Rusia a sus Fuerzas Terrestres.
El frente aéreo ruso en Ucrania debe ser dirigido contra las concentraciones de tropas enemigas (reservas, preparaciones para el ataque, fuerzas en marcha), sus comunicaciones terrestres y la red logística, los puestos de mando y centros de comunicaciones, las puntas de ataque de sus fuerzas, las posiciones de artillería y de lanzamiento de cohetes y drones.
A minor issue arises, but of great importance due to the disagreements it creates in Moscow and with the troops in the campaign. It is the growing presence of the Wagner Group as a Russian fire extinguisher in the war in Ukraine.
WAGNER RECRUITS RUSSIAN CONVICTS.
It includes convicted criminals, Syrian and Libyan mercenaries «among other elements of bad living» and Russian volunteers. In general, they enjoy disparate salaries, depending on their experience, origin and life path; a convict is basically paid with his freedom, more or less garnished with a clean record.
Their boss is Prigozhin, a Russian plutocrat and Putin henchman. This man is in conflict with part of the Kremlin and with senior military leaders over the permanence of his «private mercenary armed group» in the Russian ranks in the campaign.
The implicit tolerance of the Russian military commands in Ukraine with the men of the Wagner Group generates enormous discomfort among the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers stationed there. And it greatly lowers their combat morale and their «esprit de corps«.
If Gerasimov comes with full powers as commander of the campaign and considers the previous arguments, in relation to the motivation and combative disposition of his Russian regular forces, he has to recompose the situation of the forces, in relation to the presence of the Wagner Group in the Russian ranks.
Unity of Action and Concentration of Efforts in the Campaign.
Another of the capital problems that Gerasimov will have to solve is the strategic and operational Integration of all the active Fronts of the Russian forces in presence.
To establish a strategic «Superior Effort Unit» that is coordinated, proportional and synergistic. To optimize in «effective times«, according to the «superior universal saving means» principle and the «military principle of the Objective», the distribution and coordinated use over time of the human and material capacities assigned to the different Fronts.
Thus, the Russians have several Fronts with different importance and presenting different opportunities.
The Kiev Northern Front is inactive. Lukashenko is Putin‘s due ally and with his bravado and maneuvers he causes uncertainty in Kiev. It offers an opportunity to drain mobile Ukrainian troops, to fix and protect the Front from possible Russian rapid raids.
Here the presence in Belarus of a mechanized Russian “task force” would suffice. Counting on tanks and infantry combat and transport vehicles, with support from artillery, engineers, defense against aircraft and ground support aviation and its escort. And integrating a couple of divisions. That moved around the south of Belarus, prowling.
The Crimean Front is active towards Kherson, Mariupol and Zaporiya and creates uncertainty towards Odessa. It allows the defense of the 4 territories annexed by Putin.
The Donbass Front, in southeastern Ukraine, is active in the oblasts or provinces of Lugansk, to the north, along the border with Russia, and Donetz, to the south. The Northeast Front, towards Kharkov is in hibernation. Both hold promise in theory in this new phase of the war.
The joint and coordinated action from both Russian Fronts, of «breaking shock forces» of the Ukrainian Tactical defense. Followed, after the irruption, by «armored mobile groups» with air support, advancing in the Ukrainian operational rear towards a town or small area. Forming a wide and double enveloping movement around the enemy. It can create a “pocket” of it or, at least, a serious threat of cutting off communications for the most active Ukrainian forces, and therefore equipped with heavy equipment, deployed in the east of the country. Russia has more than enough regular mobile forces for this.
The Ukrainian Counterattack.
The Ukrainians can counterattack by employing armored forces with sufficient punch, such as the more modern Main Battle Tanks. The “heavy” tanks that Zelensky claims from the US and Europe now. The Challengers (with their Chobham armor); Leopards 2 A5, of German engineering; Leclercs, the first type built of this new generation of tanks and the Americans Abrams.
Advancing rapidly from the depth of the Ukrainian deployment, on one flank of the Russian advancing points. Let’s remember that this territory is favorable ground for armored vehicles.
For this, Ukraine will need to have several battalions of such tanks. Distributed by their most important concentrations, each with about 50 tanks. Distributing or employing it by isolated companies is to waste its special and unique off-road forward speed, shock and firepower, protected by effective armor. Which is completely decisive in modern combat.
In all this theoretical filigree of maneuvers and combats, the most capable, equipped, motivated and prepared will win.
The denatured current Russian air front.
The goal of the current Russian air front is the weakening of Ukrainian morale. Through the successive attack on civilian facilities (energy, water and communications) and urban centers of some importance in Ukraine.
It should be noted that this rather criminal objective does not target the enemy military forces, but their unarmed rearguard populations. For more INRI, it began to be used shamelessly when Putin and his Kremlin bosses and henchmen realized that his “special military action” in Ukraine was a “bluff”. And that the Ukraine was a tough nut to crack for the Russian forces employed in it.
MASTER SUN.
Almost 2,500 years ago, Master Sun (Sun Tzu), in the Warring States Era, already warned that «when the general is already appointed by the sovereign, he should not interfere in his affairs» and «when the courtiers and ministers interfere in his command, they bring misfortune to the Kingdom”.
In addition, this objective has already been used in other cases and with zero effectiveness, by the way.
Japan was mercilessly bombarded by the US, when it had already managed to occupy the Japanese islands (e.g., Okinawa) close enough to insular Japan. The Japanese were already preparing their civilian population for a Numantine resistance to the invader. Creating an immense natural fortress on its islands, where each one was a fortified redoubt of it.
They were the two atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which represented an «ascent to the upper limits» in the fight against civilian rearguards. Because they were much more than a very large cannon shot. The ones that forced Japan to surrender unconditionally to the Americans. Because they threatened (although they didn’t have any more artifacts at the time), to destroy the essence and Japanese national identity.
In general, the use of the «indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian rearguards», what it achieves is to galvanize them around their government and their armed forces. Because they perceive from the enemy a demonic, fierce hatred towards them, which would seek the destruction of their identity, culture and idiosyncrasy.
Modernly, such bombing type was used by the US in North Vietnam. They left South Vietnam in 1973 and in 1975 the communist forces occupied it, almost without resistance.
Russia’s Air Support to its Ground Forces.
The Russian air front in Ukraine must be directed against enemy troop concentrations (reserves, attack preparations, marching forces), their ground communications and logistics network, command posts and communications centers, attack points of their forces, artillery and rocket and drones launch positions.
With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.
The latest «ace up his sleeve» is Army General Valery Gerasimov, born in the Russian city of Kazan, 67 years ago and Chief of the General Staff since 2012.
An almost ideal age for the work that is coming up. Defined by organization, structural changes, discipline, sufficient flow of means and a strong hand.
Almost as USSR Marshal Georgi Zhukov had it. When he went to important battle places to preside, on behalf of STAVKA, the General Staff of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, the main offensives of his Front Groups against the Germans, A Front was the Western equivalent of Army Group, although the Red Armies were smaller in men and means than the Western ones.
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION GEORGI ZHUKOV, WITH ALL HIS AWARDS.
When Putin appears with his senior military commanders in the photos, his Defense Minister Shoigu is to his right and Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff of all the Armed Forces, is to his left.
As Assistants at his Main Command Post, probably in Crimea, Gerasimov will have the Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation, to which the vast majority of the troops present in that theater of operations belong, and the current deputy chief of his General Staff (his G-1, in our nomenclature).
At first there was talk that the appointment of Gerasimov was a maneuver by the top Russian military commanders. To see how an intellectual general, a modern hybrid warfare theorist, performed in the field. But, it is not true that he has no combat experience. He has enough of her.
Gerasimov already participated in his day in the two «anti-banditry wars» or counterinsurgency (Russian name) in Chechnya. That was fighting hard for his independence from Russia, as the heir of the USSR, the former imperialist oppressor. In the second, in 1999, he was the deputy head of the Russian armed forces in the campaign. He is accused of war crimes against Chechen populations for his direct action.
He also acted, already as Chief of the General Staff of the Russian forces, during Russia’s campaign in direct support for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, since 2015, making frequent trips to the Syrian theater of operations.
Based on his direct experiences and his ability to analyze and synthesize the issues of his profession, Valery Gerasimov developed his Theory of Military Doctrine, currently in force in Russia. It’s his Hybrid War Theory.
Although it is nothing more than a Compilation of diplomatic, heterodox foreign, economic and military action policies and their trends. In short, what Gerasimov advocates is to use against the enemy all the means of a modern State in a great centripetous and synergistic action: diplomats, heterodox exteriors (various support for internal enemy dissidents, including armed forces, boycotts, promotion of popular discontent), economic, military
Thus, Putin decided with his military leadership to replace the «butcher of Syria» Colonel General Surovikin, as military chief of the Ukrainian campaign, appointed just a few months ago. He was the fourth replacement for the Russian campaign manager in Ukraine.
The general of ideas and methods with a strong and intransigent hand and centralized orders, which were given from top to bottom, by a general with more flexible and fresh training and ideas.
Based on his direct experiences and his capacity for analysis and synthesis of the issues of his profession, Valery Gerasimov developed his Theory of Military Doctrine, currently in force in Russia. It’s his Hybrid War Theory.
Although it is nothing more than a Compilation of diplomatic, heterodox foreign issues, economic and military action policies and their trends. In short, what Gerasimov advocates is to use against the enemy all the means of a modern State in a great centripetous and synergistic action: diplomats, heterodox exteriors (various support for internal enemy dissidents, including armed forces, boycotts, promotion of popular discontent), economic, military
Thus, Putin decided with his military leadership to replace the «butcher of Syria» Colonel General Surovikin, as military commander of the Ukrainian campaign, appointed just a few months ago. It was the fourth replacement of the Russian campaign commander in Ukraine.
The general of ideas and methods with a strong and intransigent hand and centralized orders, which were given from top to bottom, by a general with more flexible and fresh training and ideas.
That adapted the stagnant and heavy working of the Russian Army to a war of IV (guerrillas) and V (hybrid) generations.
Fighting against a very well equipped enemy (with better equipment and materials than theirs, for a conventional war, in general), committed and determined in their fight, with highly trained officers and cadres, tremendously motivated.
And, educated, trained and mentalized for a modern war, both of «operational movement and combat» and of «guerrillas and counterguerrillas».
Some Problems for Gerasimov.
Many are the problems accumulated by the Army of the Russian Federation and not all of them are solvable in the short term. Probably because they are already structural.
Continuous, effective and sufficient military logistics.
One of the star, creaking, problems of the Russian military is to establish a modern and effective comprehensive military logistics. Even defining it is quite simple for a professional.
INDOCTRINATION IN A SOVIET STATE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE.
But, in the USSR and now in the Russian Federation, they have not been able to or did not know how to do it well.
In the USSR it was a classic that the potatoes collected in a kolkhoz or sovkhoz rotted in the field. Meanwhile, a few tens of km away, the urban people suffered from hunger or a nearby alcohol manufacturing industry did not receive the potatoes to produce it, from the starch of them.
Probably, the seminal error comes from the Marxist-Leninist economic doctrines, far from reality even in theory. In this case, the economy.
Where logistics is not considered, nor is «added value» attributed to it in the economy. Therefore, in the Budgets and the theoretical Soviet Five-Year Plans it was not taken into account.
The “total value” of a good comes from the “labor of the workers” and, later, of the peasants as well. And, amen.
As all the value of the good is attributed to the producers, the difference between the sale price and the production cost of the workers, the famous surplus value, is accused of being Appropriated (Stealed) by the bloody capitalists.
Capitalist production is not simply the production of commodities; it is essentially the production of surplus value.
This is one more theoretical fallacy of communism, with disastrous economic and military consequences for the country.
Although communism has already disappeared from Russia as a theoretical ruling force, many of its styles, ideas and methods, applied for 70 years, have penetrated and endured in the idiosyncrasies of society and its culture.
Con todas las derrotas acumuladas padecidas por el Ejército de la Federación rusa en su “operación militar especial” en Ucrania desde el 24 de febrero de 2022 hasta ahora, Vladimiro Putin no descansa, se irrita y no tiene paz.
Su último “as en la manga” es el general de ejércitoValery Gerasimov, nacido en la ciudad rusa de Kazan, hace 67 años y jefe del Estado Mayor General desde 2012.
Una edad casi ideal para el trabajo que se le viene encima. Definido por organización, cambios estructurales, disciplina, flujo suficiente de medios y mano dura.
Casi como lo tuvo el mariscal de la URSSGeorgi Zhukov, Cuando acudía a los lugares de batalla importantes para presidir, en nombre de la STAVKA, el Estado Mayor General del Ejército Rojo de Obreros y Campesinos, las principales ofensivas de sus Grupos de Frentes contra los alemanes, Un Frente era el equivalente occidental al Grupo de Ejércitos, aunque los ejércitos rojos eran más pequeños en hombres y medios que los occidentales.
MARISCAL DE LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA GEORGI ZHUKOV, CON TODAS SUS CONDECORACIONES.
Cuando en las fotos aparece Putin con sus jefes militares superiores, su ministro de Defensa Shoigu está a su derecha y Gerasimov, el jefe del Estado Mayor de todas las Fuerzas Armadas, está a su izquierda.
Como Adjuntos en su Puesto de Mando Principal, probablemente en Crimea, Gerasimov tendrá al Jefe de las Fuerzas de Tierra de la Federación Rusa, a las que pertenecen la inmensa mayoría de las tropas en presencia en ese teatro de operaciones, y al actual segundo jefe de su Estado Mayor General (su G-1, en nuestra nomenclatura).
En un principio se habló de que el nombramiento de Gerasimov era una maniobra de los altos jefes militares rusos. Para ver cómo se desempeñaba en campaña un general intelectual, un teórico de la guerra híbrida moderna. Pero, no es cierto que no tenga experiencia de combate. La tiene suficiente.
Gerasimov ya participó en su día en las dos “guerras antibandidaje” o contrainsurgencia (denominación rusa) de Chechenia. Que luchaba duramente por su independencia de Rusia, como heredera de la URSS, la antigua opresora imperialista. En la segunda, en 1999, fue el segundo jefe de las fuerzas armadas rusas en la campaña. Está acusado de crímenes de guerra contra poblaciones chechenas por su actuación directa.
También actuó, ya como jefe del Estado Mayor General de las fuerzas rusas, durante la campaña de Rusia de apoyo directo al régimen sirio de Bashar al-Assad, desde 2015. Haciendo frecuentes viajes al teatro de operaciones sirio.
A partir de sus experiencias directas y de su capacidad de análisis y síntesis de los temas de su profesión, Valery Gerasimov desarrolló su Teoría de Doctrina militar, vigente hoy en día en Rusia. Es su Teoría de la Guerra Híbrida.
Aunque no es más que una Recopilación de políticas diplomáticas, exteriores heterodoxas, económicas y de acciones militares y sus tendencias. En definitiva, lo que preconiza Gerasimov es utilizar contra el enemigo todos los medios de un Estado modernos en una gran acción dentrípeta y sinérgica: diplomáticos, exteriores heterodoxos (apoyo diverso a disidencias internas enemigas, incluso armada, boicots, fomento del descontento popular), económicos, militares.
Así las cosas, Putin decidió con su cúpula militar sustituir al “carnicero de Siria” coronel general Surovikin, como jefe militar de la campaña ucraniana, nombrado apenas hace unos meses. Era la cuarta sustitución del jefe de campaña ruso en Ucrania.
El general de ideas y métodos de mano dura e intransigente y órdenes centralizadas, que se daban de arriba a bajo, por un general de formación e ideas más flexibles y frescas.
Que adaptara el anquilosado y pesado funcionamiento del Ejército ruso a una guerra de IV (guerrillas) y V (híbrida) generaciones.
Luchando contra un enemigo muy bien equipado (con equipos y materiales mejores que los suyos, para una guerra convencional, en general), comprometido y decidido en su lucha, con oficiales y cuadros muy capacitados, tremendamente motivado.
Y, aleccionado, entrenado y mentalizado para una guerra moderna, tanto de “movimiento operativo y combate” como de “guerrillas y contraguerrillas”.
Algunos Problemas para Gerasimov.
Muchos son los problemas acumulados por el Ejército de la Federación Rusa y no todos son resolubles en el corto plazo. Probablemente por ser ya estructurales.
La Logística militar continua, eficaz y suficiente.
Uno de los problemas estrella, chirriante, de los militares rusos es establecer una logística militar integral moderna y efectiva. Incluso, definirla es bastante sencillo para un profesional.
ADOCTRINAMIENTO EN UNA COOPERATIVA AGRÍCOLA SOVIÉTICA.
Pero, en la URSS y ahora en la Federación Rusa, no han podido o sabido hacerlo bien.
En la URSS fue un clásico que las patatas recogidas en un koljoz o sovjoz se pudrieran en el campo. Mientras, a unas decenas de km el pueblo urbano padecía hambre o una industria de fabricación de alcohol cercana tampoco las recibía para producirlo, a partir del almidón de las patatas.
Probablemente, el error seminal venga de las doctrinas económicas marxistas leninistas, alejadas de la realidad hasta en la teoría. En este caso, la económica.
Donde la logística no se considera, ni se le atribuye “valor añadido” en la economía. Por lo tanto, en los presupuestos y los teóricos Planes Quinquenales soviéticos no se la tenía en cuenta.
El “valor total” de un bien viene del “trabajo de los obreros” y, luego también, de los campesinos. Y, amén.
Como todo el valor del bien se le atribuye a los productores, la diferencia entre el precio de venta y el coste de producción de los obreros, la famosa plusvalía, se acusa que se la Apropia (la Roban) los cochinos capitalistas.
Esto es una falacia teórica más del comunismo, con desastrosas consecuencias económicas y militares para el país.
Aunque el comunismo ya haya desaparecido de Rusia como fuerza gobernante teórica, muchos de sus estilos, ideas y métodos, aplicados durante 70 años, han calado y perdurado en la idiosincrasia de la sociedad y su cultura.
No es éste, evidentemente, un Tratado sobre los Parámetros determinantes de la Eficacia militar. Tampoco es un Estudio sobre los Principios o los Sistemas Operativos de la Guerra. Sobre los cuales tienen a su disposición suficientes artículos en esta Página Web, que consultan ahora.
Se trata de realizar una breve explicación de las características de esos Parámetros determinantes. Que deben funcionar siempre en Armonía y Cohesionados.
Para que, con esta descripción en la mano, puedan definir y conocer fácilmente los Fallos y Errores que cometen las Unidades en su Oficio más peligroso: la Guerra.
Doctrina y Reglamentos.
Los Parámetros determinantes deben definir y transmitir el Qué y el Cómo de las unidades y medios en la guerra contra los variados enemigos posibles.
O sea, supone tener unos buenos Principios de su Arte-Ciencia de la Guerra y unos Sistemas Operativos adecuados a la guerra moderna, híbrida y cibernética.
Y, deben hacerlo de una manera amplia, clara, creativa, estimulante, flexible, participativa y resolutiva.
Los Parámetros Determinantes y su medio de expresión cabal.
Esos Parámetros Determinantes se conciben y materializan por el Elemento Humano de las Armas y la Guerra. Sin éste, serían sólo unas hojas más o menos numerosas de grafías. A la espera de obtener su sentido, siempre eminentemente práctico, su expresión cabal y su utilidad trascendente. Que consiguen por su empleo por los militares.
Cadena Logística.
Organiza y distribuye los medios a las unidades. También podría participar en su adquisición externa en el mercado, en todo o en parte. Incluye generalmente los servicios sanitarios.
Debe ser cercana, con medios diversos: los transportes de larga y de reparto, los almacenes o centros o nodos y cocinas en varios niveles de actuación y el control y los medios informáticos. Tiene que ser informada, previsora, proactiva, organizada y suficiente.
La Trilogía Ejecutora.
Unidades de las armas y servicios.
Que puedan integrar conjuntos tácticos y operativos de Armas Combinadas. Que estarán compenetrados, entrenados, también conjuntamente, que aporten un apoyo mutuo y una sinergia de efectos y que se tengan mutuo respeto.
Jefes. Oficiales.
Deben ser dispuestos, empáticos, formados, motivados, resolutivos, respetados, responsables y sufridos.
Cuerpo de Suboficiales.
Deben ser cercanos, entrenados, específicos de sus tareas, capaces, formados, leales a los jefes, a los soldados y a las unidades y respetados y altamente considerados por las tropas.
The conquest by the Mongols between 1219 and 1220 of the Islamic Empire of Kharizm (or Khuarezm), in Turkestan, will serve as a model to present its operational and tactical characteristics. The rapid defeat of the Muslims at the hands of Genghis Khan and his men is an example of the synergistic use of the operational movement capability and combat capability of a highly efficient military system.
Frictions between neighbors.
The Kharizm empire was very recent. While Genghis Khan conquered Central Asia, up to his borders, Shah Mohamed II extended his domain to the south and east. He had inherited the territory of modern Iran (Persia), but had also added Afghanistan, almost to the Indus River, and had reached the Sir Darya, occupying all of Transoxiana.
Large Equestrian Statue of Genghis Khan near Dadal, his birthplace, Mongolia
The entire confrontation between the two empires began when Inalchik, the governor of the city of Otrar, on the Sir Daria river, about 200 km from the Aral Sea, stopped a caravan of merchants sponsored by the Great Khan and executed their chiefs, accusing them of spies. And possibly he was right, but that was very undiplomatic and damaged a very sensitive issue in the usual customs between states and hierarchs. Genghis Khan sent an embassy to the Shah, made up of a Kharizmi and 2 Mongols, requesting a punishment for Inalchik. Muhammad executed the Kharizmi and returned the 2 Mongols to Genghis, their heads completely shaved, a serious personal insult to those warriors. War was already inevitable.
Force preparations.
Genghis Khan prepared his army for a march of more than 1,500 km, from his Tien San mountains to the borders of Transoxiana.
The Mongolian army at the time numbered just over 100,000 men. His basic tactical-operational unit was the tuman or division, with about 10,000 men, divided into 10 mingans or regiments. The great army was divided into three parts: the army on the left or the east, the one on the right or the west, and the one in the center. The first two had a highly variable number of men, depending on operational and tactical needs; for example, one could have double the number of men than another. The army in the center was much smaller, made up of elite units and the guards of the Khan and the various Mongol princes; in them their basic unit was the mingan. A Mongol army corps consisted of one or two tumans.
Dead of Mohamed II of Kharizm
Mohamed II assembled a large, well-armed and equipped army, totaling between 200 and 300,000 men (some authors speak of up to 400,000 men, clearly exaggerating), to defend his empire from the expected Mongol invasion from the east. Many of his men were also horsemen from the Turkestan steppes, who were equipped and fought in a similar way to the Mongols. The Shah was sure that his soldiers could stop and repel the invader.
To this end he deployed most of the troops along the Sir Darya, his great natural barrier to the east, and established a fortified line of communications from his army’s deployment to his capital at Samarkand. Lastly, to the north of the empire and protecting it, between the Aral Sea and the Sir Darya stretched the formidable natural obstacle of the Kizil Kum desert, in the Turanian depression, hard and dry where they exist.
Thus, reassured with a good plan, he defensively hoped that he could defeat the Mongols in a major battle, by sheer numerical strength of his army. But, it was von Moltke, the old man, head of the German HHQQ. in the late 19th century, who said that «plans used to last until first contact with the enemy.»
Development of operations.
During the spring and summer of 1219 a Mongol army corps under Jochi, the eldest of Genghis’s sons, ravaged the land west of the great Lake Balkhash, near Otrar, leaving a landscape so devastated that it it was incapable of supporting an army without its own supplies.
Jebe Noyan.
According to the campaign plan drawn up by the orlok or lieutenant of the Khan, Subidai Bahadur, a Mongol army corps headed in the early 1220s towards the valley of the Fergana River, south of the Sir Darya, on the exposed flank of the Turkmen deployment, to carry out a force reconnaissance. It was commanded by Jebe Noyan, one of the Khan’s best orloks.
Part of the Turkish forces, under the command of Mohamed and Prince Jalal-ad-Din, advanced slowly to the east, over the valley. When the vanguards met, Mohamed vastly outnumbered the Mongols and ordered to form up for combat. Caught in narrow terrain, which did not favor his cavalry force, Jebe decided to attack anyway. The Mongols charged the Turks ferociously, inflicting heavy casualties on them. They counterattacked, trying to involve them up and almost succeeded. But the Mongols managed to break contact and escaped to the east.
Most decisive operations for success.
In February 1220, the 3 Mongol armies, under the command of Genghis, Jochi and Ogedei and Chagatai, two of his other sons, crossed the area previously devastated by Jochi and unexpectedly converged on Otrar, on the left flank of the defensive line of Sir Daria. After the assault on the city, the Mongols captured the governor Inalchik and executed him very cruelly.
The two armies commanded by Jochi and the other 2 brothers then headed south, following the Sir Daria, and began to harass during their march the fortified positions of the Turks along their planned great defensive line. Simultaneously, the army corps of the orlok Jebe Noyan, turned north, took the city of Kokand, in the upper Sir Daria, and headed to meet the 2 Mongol armies.
All these offensive operations helped to fix Mohamed’s attention on his fortified defensive line of Sir Daria. In the south, he had won the battle and repelled the invader, and in the north, although the Mongols had taken Otrar, they had not penetrated Transoxiana. The Turkish army maintained its boast of invincibility. Mohamed brought all of his operational reserves closer to Sir Daria. However, although in both cases the Mongols had suffered heavy casualties, their ratio to them was of great concern to the Turks.
For its part, after the capture of Otrar, the army under the command of Genghis Khan, with Subidai as his chief of staff, and made up of 4 tumans, headed north. There he took the Turkmen city of Zarnuk, with the sole purpose of capturing a man who, according to his informants, knew of a practicable path through the Kizyl Kum, following a chain of oases.
