Real Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare

Introduction.

Ernesto Guevara and de la Serna, who signed as «Che» the Banco Nacional of Cuba money bills, was an educated, young, disciplined and methodical man. He was capable of analyzing the «military» path of the Cuban revolution from 1956 to 1958. And he extracted a few characteristics of how it developed this way and why it triumphed. His mistake was to extrapolate them to all the geographical places in his «Guerrilla warfare». As if those qualities were trustworthy, confirmed and, especially, immutable ideological and military principles.

The operative characteristics of the Cuban political guerrilla process, surprisingly rapid, and easy and slightly bloody, were very particular. Because that one was helped and stimulated by a very combative urban insurrection. That supported the weight of the merciless repression of the Batista’s bailiffs. Guevara, guerrilla in the Sierra and foreigner, took those characteristics as the axioms of action for an uprising people. Without giving neither value or usefulness to the civilian fighting, civic or armed. So important always in the Cuban nationalist political process. Following this way, the ideas of other «orthodox» violent revolutionaries of the epoch, but from other parts of the world, like Mao, Giap or Ho Chi Minh.

The Che’s guerrilla experience in Bolivia. The author applied his social military asymmetric theories, far from favorable Cuba.

It is not advisable to try to create a guerrilla focus, applying Guevara’s ideas. In Social Sciences the efficiency is a measure of the kindness of the applied methods and principles. To save the effort and the life, it is necessary to remember how this «strategist and tactician» of the «rural guerrilla warfare, in an underdeveloped Spanish-American country», gentleman ended.

The reading of his «Diary of Bolivia» allows us to learn from a strange, painful, and progressively insurmountable and asphyxiating, reality. Otto von Bismarck, the German Iron Chancellor (chief of the Government) was saying that the intelligent man was also learning with other people’s experience. We know the guerrilla path of the Che in Bolivia. The «scientific» guerrilla method he discovered, took all them to the disaster in Bolivia. The Bolivian Communist party (Mario Monje was his General Secretary) gave him the back. Because the opportunism is a common communist quality. The general Fulgencio Batista and Zaldívar was the candidate for President of the Republic of Cuba with the Popular Socialist party (since 1944, the new name of the Cuban Communist party) in 1940. The Party, in any country and circumstance, always theoretically justifies his acts, saying that the objective conditions for the masses action exist or do not exist. His «scientific» political method, based upon the dialectic materialism, would be very badly tested in the Grecian postwar revolutionary experience, as we will see downwards.

And the armed group with the Che turned finally into a group of «errant rebels». According to Mao Zedong, it is the worst thing that can happen to the irregular armed revolutionaries. That need to be established in a more or less isolated and protected zone with certain safety. And that cannot be indefinitely changing refuge, becoming fruitlessly and rapidly exhausted. They need the «bases» to be able to extend from them their doctrine among the popular masses, always with a certain degree of military constraint. Though only it would be for their armed active presence. And to be able to obtain from them the logistic support, refuge, information, personal help and indispensable recruits.

This way, the guerrilla sedentary and semi fixed bases turn, in turn, into one of the scanty military «hard» goals that the rebels offer to the military forces that fight them. The destruction of the guerrilla bases of the Communist party in the north of Greece by the Greek and British armies in 1949, supposed the end of a long (from 1946), hard and difficult insurrection armed in Greece. Placed around the cities of Vitsi and Grammos, in the border zone with Albania and Yugoslavia triangle, where the guerrillas were getting the supplies and recruits, the bases turned simultaneously in vital and very vulnerable for the guerrillas. The Greeks communists were getting support and energy from the anti nazi war popular crescent force.

The opportunity, extension and qualify of his irregular military rebel doctrine.

At the beginning of January, 1959, in a rapid consideration and synthesis of the guerrilla Cuban process, newly finished, Fidel Castro, got enthusiastic with his social military operational «discovery», was defining categorical: «Without training, without war tactics, we manage to conquer that Army …» «No professional Army (in America) would have forces to offset the activities of revolutionary guerrillas». «In any other (geographical) stage, with the same political conditions that ours, the popular guerrillas are invincible». See Carlos Franqui. Diario de la Revolución Cubana. Ediciones R. Torres. Barcelona, 1976. Pages, 703 and 704. Simultaneously published in France (he lived in Paris) and Italy.

With all this statement, he was who first established the social ideological operational theoretic basis of the Spanish-American guerrilla warfare. Afterwards Guevara developed, with scientific aspirations, its military guerrillas lived ideology. It was wrote in his «Guerrilla Warfare» book. He centered it on two postulates. That he was claiming the Cuban guerrilla warfare had absolutely (undoubtedly and without deviation) demonstrated in practice. «The popular forces can win a war against the Army» Indeed, this has happened in other occasions in History. «Not always it is necessary to wait that all the conditions for the revolution are present. (He was thinking in Mao’s theory of protracted warfare). The rebel revolutionary focus can create and develop them». His tragic end would give the «relative, local character, questionable, personal and conditioned» measure of his principal military «discovery».

Guevara dedicated great part of the forty thousand words of «The Guerrilla Warfare», to the study of the men who were forming the guerrillas and to giving advises on the life in the mount. But the work is slightly extensive in the study of the guerrilla tactics and strategies. As for value the opportunity and quality of his technical «offers» in his work: We only have to look at any photo, even of 2 or 3 decades ago, of armed irregular military rebels in some uneasy country in the World. They all generally have an assault rifle and an antitank rocket launcher. That usually are an AK-47 and a RPG-2 or RPG-7, all of Soviet design. Guevara speaks about a «grenade-launcher» designed by the Cuban guerrillas. Its propellant is a hunting cartridge, without pellets, adjusted to a wood rod. In its free end is adjusted a proper tin, full with gunpowder and grapeshot, and provided with a time fuse. It is fired off with a cut away shotgun, adequately inclined. Their guerrillas long arms were Springfield 1903 cal. .3006, with some American M-1 and Dominican San Cristóbal cal. 30 short carbines, some Thompson 1928 model cal. 45 machineguns and a few semiautomatic Garands cal. 3006. A superficial examination of the American FM Improvised Ammunition Devices, will give you better and abundant ideas to use in an undeveloped, hostile and without logistics support rebel asymmetrical environment.

The facts from which Guevara extracted his conclusions: The development of the insurrection against the usurpation of the political power by Batiste, after his coup d’état of March 10, 1952.

In the violent fighting against Batista, there were two radically different manifestations in their conception, techniques, tactics and strategies: the rural guerrilla and the urban commands for «action and sabotage», both of the Movimiento «26 de Julio». There in the Sierra, Fidel, with a militarily insignificant guerrilla rebel group, turned into the permanent and admired symbol of the resistance against Batista. Being kept in his little accessible «summons base», with an unique magnetism, he was orientating the Cuban public opinion towards his political option and, in these moments, amorphous ideologically.

The small urban groups presented against the regime a discontinuous, appropriate and dangerous battle, using 3 different tactics: attempts, sabotages and bombs and claiming petards. The price paid for these operations was high. Fighting in inferiority of forces, inside populations totally dominated by the men of Batista, whom did not lose their crushing control until January 1, 1959. And if the Police were not always capable of doing an effective preventive task, she followed the strategy of not leaving without response any suffered reverse. And we know that she was not going with considerations at the moment of select and apply the repression. Let’s indicate an example of each one.

On Monday, the 23rd of December, 1957 was «executed» by a «26 de Julio» command the colonel Fermín Cowley, chief of Holguín’s military district, in a hardware store of the city, at the north of Oriente. He was direct responsible of the massacre of the «Corinthia» invaders and a bloody repression against urban members of the Movement. Carried out in the previous Christmas, immediately after the pro-Castro invasion from Mexico in the «Gramma» little motorship.

On Tuesday, the 28th of May of this year took place the destruction of an important electric power conduction knot, in Suárez street at Havana downtown. The used technique was very known from then: rent of a building low floor, excavation of a tunnel up to the goal and placement and detonation of the explosives. As result of the sabotage, extensive zones of the capital were without light up to 3 days.

Every night, at 9 p.m., in La Cabaña fortress over Havana bay, a cannon-shot was going off, to indicate the Havana inhabitants an exact hour to facilitate the adjustment of their clocks. It was a useful custom preserved from the colonial epoch. Along 1957 and 1958, it was frequent to hear 5, 10 «cannon-shots of the nine», in the period that goes from five of nine to five after nine. When we all were more or less attending for the hourly sign. In general, it was tried that these «petards» were not causing body injuries.

The great revolutionary attempt of the urban and democratic «26 de Julio»: the general strike of April, 1958.

The general strike coordinators were Faustino Perez, national delegate of the Movement «26 de Julio» and Manuel Ray, chief of the Civic Resistance. Its organization was in charge of the strike committees, hierarchically integrated from the local level. They were constituted by members of 2 mentioned organizations, with a workers representative, member of the pro-Castro Frente Obrero Nacional (FON). The accomplishment of the strike was in charge of the «action and sabotage» commands of «26 de Julio». The instructions to the population, transmitted in proclamations, leaflets and radio emission, were demanding an active, even violent participation, of the people in the strike.

Strategically everything was outlined as an attempt of the «26 de Julio», to get the people to an urban, fulminating and decisive action, against the government. It was the last opportunity of the liberal and democratic line of the Movement, in wide majority in its ranks. Opposite to the radical and squalid line that was agglutinating in Sierra Maestra and Sierra de Baracoa. Because what was questioned in the later analysis of the facts by the National collegiate Direction of «26 de Julio», was the validity of an ideology (the liberal democratic one) for the failure of a badly applied tactic (to confront too directly the tyrant).

The principal Workers’ Federation of Cuba (CTC) abstained from helping the strikers and the Popular Socialist party was specifically excluded. The FON, the other labor force, without too many capacity of dialog with the employers and without sufficient penetration among the workers, failed in the organization of the strike. The order for the general strike was begun to transmit to the people by the radio at 11 a.m. of Wednesday, 9th of April, 1958, surprising all in their works and occupations. It failed the correct mobilization of the people, in altars of the security of the complex operation. Nevertheless, in March, the «26 de Julio» emitted a Manifest calling to the strike and existed a «rising» of sabotages in the cities, that were encouraging its members for its «summit final operation». For example, in the night from March 15 to March 16 only in Havana exploded nothing less than hundred bombs and petards.

In March, Batista appointed the effective and bloodthirsty army brigadier Pilar García as chief of the National Police. The government was kept calmed. For a time he did not realize roundups of hostile elements. But soon he began to act. There was done an extensive and intense use of false strike callings, in the days he had up to its beginning. Managing to poison the communication between the urban rebels and the people, and that this was beginning to suspect in the genuineness of the pro-Castro summons. Police agents, equipped with the red and blacks bracelets of «26 de Julio», were used extensively in actions of popular confusion and of attack and smashing the commands of action and sabotage.

The result of the efforts to initiate and extend the general strike, made concrete in a number of unconnected, isolated and costly actions and successes. That did not manage to involve the popular masses in the violent facts. In the Great Havana, most of the trade business, the public transport and the industries, did not follow the strike. In Santiago de Cuba, in Santa Clara happened similarly. In Holguín, the commands burned out the thermal plant. In Havana was confirmed the assault to several radio stations, a gunfire in the suburbs, the assault to an armory and the destruction of an electrical transformer, which left a part of the capital without electric light. The number of dead men happened in these urban encounters exceeded the hundred, which in great majority were rebels.

On Saturday, the 3rd of May, 1958, the National Direction of «26 de Julio» celebrated a tense meeting of almost 6 hours, close to Altos de La Plata. There was realized a hard self-criticism process, which take to a radical change of the operational postulates. There were purged Faustino Perez, the chief of the urban castristas commands and the principal leader of the FON, as maximums responsible of the disaster. The dismissed passed to occupy important places in the guerrilla organization. The urban commands remained restricted to a tactical support mission of the operations of the guerrilla columns. The control of the Movement went on totally to hands of the guerrillas, being modified the structure and the composition of the National Direction. This remained presided by a Secretariat with 6 members, presided by Fidel Castro.

The two prominent campaigns in the Cuban guerrilla insurrection: the army’s offensive in the spring summer of 1958 and the final «26 de Julio» counter-offensive, progressively and rapidly occupying the whole Island.

In March, 1957 the pro-Castro guerrilla in Sierra Maestra was approximately formed by 80 men, rest of the invaders of the «Granma», urban members of «26 de Julio» and local peasants. In April, 1958 existed approximately 300 guerrillas. In Sierra Maestra were approximately 180 rebels, distributed in two columns. And in the Sierras del Cristal, Baracoa and Nipe, adjacent with that one, were other 120 «bearded».

In May, 1958 general Eulogio Cantillo Porras was appointed as chief of operations in Sierra Maestra. He took charge to direct the unique important offensive for the destruction of the principal focus of the guerrilla. He got around 6 thousand soldiers joined in 14 infantry battalions, 1 light tanks company (14 Tm. with a 37 mm cannon), 2 75 mm. cannons batteries and 5 infantry independent companies, supported by two fighters and bomberfighters squadrons and several navy vessels. The military aviation, dependent on the army, was called Fuerza Aérea del Ejército (FAE). Between 3 and 4 thousand additional men, of the Rural Guard and the army, simultaneously realized protection of properties and infrastructures and public order missions in the Oriente province. The operations plan was more proper of the regular orthodox war. It was foreseeing to attack simultaneously, with two columns of reinforced infantry, from the north and the west, the «zone under rebel influence» of the Sierra, of around 2 thousand Km2, placed at the west of Santiago de Cuba’s basin. Formed the rebel’s rejection front, another infantry column would progress from the south over its rear, looking for breaking up the enemy resistance. And working together, pushing and squashing it up to its last positions. There would be kept a fixed siege of the operations zone, occupying the mountains spurs, to avoid guerrilla support movements and escapes of beating guerrillas.

Castro, who knew the loss of enthusiasm of the enemy troops, after the first skirmishes, followed a protracted resistance operational strategy. The enemy columns met a defense in depth, in a favorable ground for it. Destined to scourge them to the maximum and removing away from them the victory. And eluding the guerrillas an irreversible tie down in the fights and skirmishes. From the ends of April, the rebels devoted themselves to organize the Sierra’s entrances and its internal routes and to store in their zone all the equipment, weapon and supplies that they could, among these approximately 10 thousand bovine beasts. Around La Plata, Seat of the Comandancia, was established a quadrilateral rhomboid of approximately 100 Km2, framed by the Turquino peak, its mountain chain, Altos de La Plata and Agua Alrevés, as final rebel redoubt, where the commands and the reserves placed.

On May, 25, the troops initiated their advance over the rebel security vanguards, formed usually by short range shotgunners, «escopeteros», in the first Sierra entrances. The military men managed to approach with some of their advance spears, employing reinforced battalions, deployed in companies, to La Plata, but already without really combat force or operational capacity. The military advances were realized without the coordination that was demanded in their plans, attacking always in isolated advance sectors. This allowed the rebels, moving in interior lines of known and wild territory, to successively center in the enemy repulse. Only a maximum of 800 to 1000 soldiers attacked each time, of the whole of those who were operating. This way, the battalions were beaten by parts, even surrounded sometimes for a time, and repelled one after other. The second line units that occupied the zones invaded in May and June, were expelled from the Sierra, by the second ten of August, 1958. Approximately 36 combats, secondary actions and skirmishes took place in the campaign. The rebels suffered in whole approximately 35 dead and 45 injured men and captured more than 450 soldiers. No «bearded» rebel fell down prisoner.

Finished this campaign, Castro extended on August 18 an «order of march» to the commander Camilo Cienfuegos. In it, he was ordered to drive his rebel column «Antonio Maceo» n º 2, with approximately 120 men, up to the province of Pinar del Rio, in the western end of Cuba, at distance of approximately 1000 km. To establish there a guerrilla base, after crossing freely the island. On August 21 another order of the Comandancia arranged that the commander Ernesto Guevara, at the head of his rebel column nº 8 «Ciro Redondo, approximately 150 men strong, was moving to the province of Las Villas, in the center of Cuba, at approximately 500 km. His mission was to paralyze the passing movements of the military governmental forces through this province. The operational rebel strategy was offensive, supposing: an immediate harassment on the Santiago de Cuba basin, by the remaining rebel columns, directly directed by the Comandancia. And the invasion of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas, distant in the distance and in the guerrilla operational capacity. Which were the other two Cuban provinces that were possessing mountainous chains for possible guerrilla refuge.

At the beginning of September, the castristas guerrillas were reaching the thousand men. In the Oriente’s Sierras were operating approximately 700 men and the invading columns had approximately 300 men. At the end of 1958, more than 15 guerrilla columns, almost all of recent creation, had between 3 and 4 thousand men, operating many as auxiliary and of garrison forces. The rebel operations essentially consisted in a successively pushing aside, disarming and detaining, their always very superior enemies in number and equipment. But, without morale, courage, stamina and commitment with their professional duty. The offensive speed of advance over Havana, was dictating by the guerrilla columns’ scanty capacity of advance and maneuver. Each with power similar to a company of irregular infantry, partially motorized.

The Cuban dead soldiers during almost two years of guerrilla campaign were approximately 170-180 men. During this period the rebels approximately lost 125-130 men. In the revolt final period, the Cuban armed forces were increased up to 45 thousand men. The mortality of the Cuban population, according to the census of 1953, was 6 deaths each year for every 1000 inhabitants. According to all that, we can affirm that the Batista’s military men profession during war time was certain safe.

Cuba, simply, was changing from bad personal tyrant to worse institutional tyrant. In his speech of May 1, 1960, during the official acts on the occasion of the Labor Day, Fidel attacked publicly and for the first time, the electoral democratic system, as official channel of the sovereign expression of the people will. There he was shouted repeatedly by the ad hoc concentrated masses with shouts of: «Elections, what for?». With it was enthroned semiofficially and permanently in Cuba the system of «hand lifted at all sight and, poor who dissents!». That is proper of the democratic Marxists Leninist assemblies. And everything what from it was stemming for the government and the personal and collective rights of the Cuban people.

 

 

The Hamas’ defense in the Gaza strip

It is not easy to manage and defend the repulsing urban zones. Its employment demands high requirements to the Hamas combatants:
An enough motivation, which encourages them to follow the armed way and risking their lives for its cause. That appeases and rationalizes them the inevitable fear for the fighting in the nearby distances with a superior enemy, until the seniority offers to them new impulses. A good training in the infantry fighting, which gives them trade and confidence. A successful cooperation between the small units that garrison the zones, that guarantees them a cohesion without fissures in their tenuous and lean deployment and that allows and facilitates the command conduction and the accomplishment of his plans. To get iron nerves tempered by everything previous, that accustom them to fight in solitary or in small groups, refusing to flee in face of the implacable threat of the heavy Israelis military fire.

To all this «professional» tension that these irregular fighters support, there joins the tension created by a civil fierce fight. That they keep, for their will, intermingled with their unarmed families and homes, which turn out to be equally threatened and attacked. For all this, among the two tens of thousands of existing Hamas militias, not more than 20 % of them can in these moments use this kind of defensive fight.

These urban irregular enemies protect themselves extending their defensive positions beyond what would be necessary in a conventional defense. Covering this way a major occupied surface. In the defense zone they establish several reinforced delaying points. These protect the most critical positions of the zone, incorporate in the defense the buildings with steel structure , specially resistant, and form fire bags to ambush the Tsahal soldiers that gets through. But there are very few resistant buildings in the crushed and mistreated Hamastan. The resistance nests have in the Gaza zone more importance, provided that the occupation of the zone of defense is more tenuous, they cannot strengthen the positions too much for not stand out them to the Tsahal, the sights are more short and exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delaying points and they fall back to them, if are invaded or destroyed. Numerous alternative or exchange positions exist, more of the habitual in this kind of fight. This allows to deceive the Tsahal about the forward limit of the defense position, its real extension, the limits of the sectors that form it, the intentions of the rebel command of the zone about its defense and to disperse the heavy fire of the attacker. In the edges of the urban zones they never establish these fixed positions. Those are occupied by combat advanced parties which mission is to receive the possible explorers or civil observers, to avoid surprises and to deceive about the real tracing of the defensive zone. The occupants of combat advanced positions, distributed in pairs of sentries and some very small mobile patrol, fall back in their moment towards the more interiors delaying points.

These Hamas urban «fortresses» are diffuse, secret and imperceptible to the strangers. Only in a few hours their previous works are reinforced and occupied. It is necessary to enter in the houses to detect perforated walls and to find alleys under a furniture or a carpet. Its communication routes need more working time to get done, but also are less evident. Their firing positions are not complex. They need a few interlaced firing sectors, an immediate protection against the Israelis irruption in mass or with commands, a few covers against the heavy normal fire and a sufficient concealment that keeps them away from the sights of the enemy probable successive positions and his approximation avenues. The obstacles and the mines, even false in certain percentage and always distantly to not betray them, will serve to break in parts the enemy assault and to offer to them more static targets, for example for the mortars, which will have registered its fires. The destruction that generates the ample heavy fire support without aiming to a precise target, reinforces the rebel combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the accesses of the military, except when they are reached by a ordnance direct impact. To operate this defensive net structure the Hamas militias have prepared numerous and narrow tunnels, dragging trenches and gaps in garden walls and interior walls of the buildings. In such a way that, away from the enemy sights, allow them to occupy the combat and observation positions at wish, to defend them more or less time or not, to move among them and to reinforce the most threatened or pressed positions.

Generally the Hamas irregulars would try to shoot from the front, with isolated or couples snipers preferably armed with the SVD sniper rifle, at individual and small groups of Tsahal infantry soldiers. And to attack from the flank or the rear at the enemy units that penetrate in their defensive zone, which already are disintegrated in squads or platoons with one or two armored vehicles in close fire support. Those prepared communications aforementioned allow them to appear, always in small number, behind or at the flanks of the Israelis units, while these stop, regroup, ask or receive instructions, or decide where to advance, and to erode them, causing some casualties. For example, from a basement or a floor, through an irregular hollow in a yard or garden wall, under a parked or destroyed vehicle in the street, where emerges a narrow tunnel with a covered and disguised mouth. From these positions the armed rebels fire some RPG-7V rockets or several short blasts, always aiming, of the Soviet RPK light machine gun or the obsolete RPD, but which always appear with irregular rebels. The interior houses courts serve them to place the mortars, which constitute their the only «heavy fire» fighting source, protected by a near infantry position. They fired them with the maximum angles on the abundant, large and always excessive Israelis concentrations. The usual mortar is the 82 mm. Russian modern M-1937 model. Here that the attacker presents three times more men (in fighting means the proportion must be 20 to 1) neither favors nor facilitates their labor. But this offers the persecuted Hamas defenders more targets against use their exiguous fire power. Especially because, in a given moment, is small the attackers’ proportion that are putting in real distress the defenders. Similar positions, protected by the houses and the interior courts environment and surrounded by innocent and unarmed inhabitants, are those that they use to stubbornly launch their free flight rockets, the Kassam and the Iranians, more modern and with more operational range which receive dismantled, on the Israeli nearby populations at the north of the Gaza strip.

The crucial moment for the defense comes when the Hamas zone commander decides to evacuate it, after having stopped and delayed the enemy assaults for some time. Trying to cause him losses as high as possible, but without been exposed excessively to a fighting in the close distances, or to be outflanked or to lose his freedom of action. This is inexorably tied to the transfer of space to the Israelis enemies. For it, the Hamas militias avoid and get through in opportune moment (using the night or a stop in the enemy attacks), the direct assault of their enemy, not his extensive or vague bombardment, without precision. The militias have enough exit tunnels directed to not very nearby buildings (often official and even respectable (mosques), offices, companies and some houses) or dry riverbeds (wades) and not evident bushes in the open land. From there they could disperse through the outside in very small groups towards friends reception positions, in the first moments. The protection of the evacuation is therefore vital and both entrances or exits from these tunnels are always covered by resistance nests, which take to end their rigid defense.

Some tactical and operative conclusions for this defense fighting.

The ground defense of Gaza is very difficult to maintain through the time. The strip lacks geographical space to be able to establish a flexible defense deployed in depth. This is necessary to give power, solidity, continuity and support to the rejection fight.

On the other hand, the external supply of weapon, ammunitions and military equipment to Hamas is strangled by Israel. That has bombarded accurately the zone of communication tunnels around Rafah, at the south of the strip, which were concealing crossing the border with Egypt. To guarantee its complete sealing, the Tsahal has established, at least, two «military locks» managed by mechanized infantry and tanks, near Netzarim and Tel Katifa and transversely to the land strip. Which practically prevent the transit (traffic is merchandising) of military equipment proceeding from Egypt.

Hamas’ «military» structure socially agrees with the local Palestinian clans. Its tactical top unit is a reinforced «battalion» of about half a thousand men, for giving it a practical «name». In its elite units, Hamas tries that the formation, training and equipment of the infantry militias are homogeneous. The mutual support of the sectors of the defense during an Israeli assault, is this way difficult and precarious. It is more difficult yet to realize counterattacks, not sectorial countershocks, over the ground Israeli penetrations against the Gaza strip.

Those will attack following 2 or 3 different and convergent directions. Seeking to disperse the Palestinian rejection fire, to disturb the command conduction of the defense and to break the coherence and consistency of all the position. With the first assaults, as unexpected as possible, on the edge of the populations, to obtain a few advanced depart positions and to be already on their interior. To continue then their difficult systematic work of advance and sweep. There are two Israeli indispensable infantry mechanized brigades in this operation: the Givati and the Golani. The first counts with small units trained for the assault with limited objectives in urban zones. The Golani is famous for her fight against the Syrian tanks in the war of the Yom Kipur of 1973, blocking their pass across the Golan Heights, to the plains of Galilee, and forming part of a tactical task force of combined arms of the Tsahal. The Golani has 4 or 5 battalions well trained in the urban war, using training camps very similar to the Palestinian populations.

Hamas, in its desperate fighting, is going to look for the serious enemy erosion (Israel is very sensitive to the men’s loss) in the numerous isolated microcombats that will happen during the irruption and the Israeli advance in the populations. But without being able to give a tactical transcendence, far from it operational, to its present military struggle.

The best thing that Hamas can do now is to leave this Numantian combat, without military hope. Looking for protect and keep its militias and people and to be prepared for another better occasion. Where, its blood’s effort in Allah’s path, this is the sense of the military «yihad», would be more useful and productive tactical and operatively

The Biological Warfare

ITS REAL POSSIBILITIES AS TERRORISTS’ USABLE WEAPON AND IN THE MODERN WARFARE. ITS INSTRUMENTS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

The biological warfare is the military use, as war weapon, of the living pathogenic, animal or plant organisms, and of the natural poisonous products, called toxins. Since the germs and the bacteria are used in it, it is also called germ warfare, though this term only incorporates a part of the biological agents capable of being used aggressively against the men.

The military use of the pathogenic microbes.
The pathogenic organisms, which produce diseases in the man, can classify in 4 big categories or types: the fungi, the bacteria, the virus and the rickettsia, an intermediate entity between these 2 last ones, in its nature, size and characteristics.
The bacteria are unicellular organisms of spherical (they take the suffix coco in the name), cylindrical (the bacilli) or spiral (the espirilium) forms. They reproduce by transverse repeated division and, often, the partial microbes remain united forming a chain. Many of them can move by means of their whips or eyelashes (shorter). According to Lauria, the virus is a genetic element constituted by ribonucleic acid and desoxirribonucleic acid, suitably to move from cell to cell and capably of synthesizing with the available amino acids its particular proteins, which will form then the infective viral particles. It is not known neither its origin nor the date of its appearance, since the existence of fossils virus is ignored. Elford, in 1931, managed to measure its size, which varies between 10 and 300 microns. Also the virus classify in vegetables, animals and bacteriafhagous, every type with their specific characteristics. Their vital cycle has, among others, 5 important phases for us: fixation to the cellular surface, penetration inside the cell, multiplication of the virus at the cost of the components of that one, liberation of the new viral individuals and their dispersion in the environment.
The military employment of the pathogenic microbes is difficult, because they are living organisms. The military usual vectors, the conventional (explosive grenades) and the reactive artillery (rockets with ballistic path, without autonomous direction) and the air bombs, turn out to be too aggressive and destroy them before their dispersion in the target. To eliminate these serious limitations, bombs with ceramic cases have been developed, which has been tried satisfactorily with flies infected with the bacterium yessinia pestis, the causer of the bubonic pest. Also it has been tried its dispersion through the air, using dispensers means of several types. But its control and the estimation of the effect on the target are very difficult. During the 40s of last century, biological desiccated and freezing of the microbes technologies were improved. With them it was seeking to prolong their life and to increase their resistance, allowing them a major storage time, their dispersion using explosives and to achieve a longer exposure in the environmental conditions.
Their real employment by means of not military transmitters has been more common. In 1763, during the war in North America between Great Britain and France for the control of all the European colonies, the military British command decided to try to infect with smallpox the hostile Indians. With this motive 2 sheets and a handkerchief from the room of infected by smallpox in a British hospital, were delivered to 2 Indian chiefs. The disease spread soon among the tribes.
Soon after the suicidal air raids on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, in September, 2001, some packages and letters supposedly containing anthrax spores, active or in vitro, acquired or stolen in pharmacological investigation laboratories began to appear in the USA, in the post offices and the addresses. The collective paranoia of these tragic moments helped to increase the extension and the importance of these facts. And it constituted a multiplier of the propaganda perverse effect in any type of individual or collective terrorism aggression. Whose purpose is the terror extension, generally using violent indiscriminate actions and the threats of repeating them. That do that all the members of the attacked collectivity considering themselves to be possible or probable, according with the cases, goals of these future actions.
 

The toxins as a warfare weapon.
The toxins are poisons naturally produced by the plants or the animals, so much the big or visible as the microscopic ones or microbes.
The toxins have certain advantages for their employment as war weapon. They are natural, not more or less complicated, costly and unstable synthesis chemical products. This facilitates their production in pilot or manufacturer plant scale. Some of the biological toxins are among the most poisonous products that are known. Their effect is made without the presence of the producing agent. This one, as an alive organism, presents problems in its manipulation, as being more unstable or perishable than toxins. That is to say, they can be preserved and spread easier, by means of explosive special grenades or with aerosols or atomizers dispensers, boosted by inert or neutral gases.
The enterotoxin B of the golden estafilococo is the responsible of the majority of the food human poisonings. This bacterium can grow in multitude foods and on having done produces the toxin, which is consumed by the consumption. In general, the enterotoxin B is not lethal, but a dose of only 50 micrograms already causes vomits and diarrheas in the adults. The deliberate use of this toxin is possible. For example, during a siege by the irregular rebels, always relaxed and no hermetic, to military defensive positions, and trying to scourge and to debilitated the vital enemy resistance. The sharp sound effect produced by the operating toxin is called almost onomatopoeicly «the whistling sound».
A more terrible toxin, which it is possible also to find in the food, is the butolinic A toxin, produced by the clostridium butolinic bacteria. It is the most powerful known poison, a microgram kills an adult. The normal appearance of the bacterium associates with the badly preserved food, as the expired or badly sterilized during its manufacture tinned vegetables. It is a neuroagent that causes that the nervous system accumulates in excess during its functioning the acetilcolin, in a similar way that do the of nervous type agents used in the chemical warfare.
The castor toxin exists in the seeds and the leaves of the common castor plant. Its use by the secret service Bulgarian agents known as the umbrellas’ assassins, was confirmed in the 70s. In the free ends of those were concealed a mechanical launcher, which was projecting a pellet impregnated with the castor toxin and capably in the short distance of going in the naked meat. Two Bulgarian dissidents fled from the communist regime in their country, were positively identified of having being murdered this way in London.
 

Its appearance in the History. Modern situation.
From very ancient the pathogenic agents and the toxins have been used with military purposes. The poisoning of the enemy water fountains or to throw the infectious patients corpses over the enemy defensive walls, are military methods used by Alexander the Great or the Mongolian. It is only in the modern times when the use of biological agents in the war has acquired a stigma character. This way, no modern nation has admitted its employment in combat against her enemies.
We have an extreme example of how the use of biological agents by profane persons can go away of control, in the siege of the Genoese city of Kaffa, today called Feodosiya, placed in the Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea. During in it the biological harmful effects were reasonably circumscribed inside the walls of this city. In the middle of the XIVth century the Mongolian were besieging the city. The Mongolian were throwing over her walls, using catapults, the dead men’s bodies by the bubonic pest. It is thought that some Genoese ships that departed from the city towards their metropolis, could carry the plague’s bacillus, which was habitually lodging in the rates. Hereby the bubonic pest could reach Italy, and begin the massive and fulminating epidemic known in the History as the Black Death, which almost depopulated the European continent in that century.
From the 80s of last century, the genetic engineering and the biotecnology have turned into technically industrial instruments destined to improve the life conditions of the humanity. One of its possible applications is the development of vaccines against the pathogenic agents, both the natural and the reinforced by genetic actions on the first ones. This can allow the most developed countries to acquire a certain more or less widespread immunity, which is never absolute, against these biological attacks. Whereas their potential enemies, less technologically developed and with fewer economic resources, except the crude oil producers during the expansion phase of the sales cycle, would be defenseless against the biological military agents.
Its military use is punctual and restricted.
The effective, precise in the time and controlled use of biological agents in the modern combat is difficult and its results are also too vague. For the majority of the biological agents, its own nature does that its controlled launch on a target is difficult. Between the effective action on the enemy and the beginning and the development of the disease, it exists an unavoidable delay, due to the inevitable incubation periods, that goes from the hours to days; which is never acceptable in a mobile military operation. Always exist the natural and the acquired immunities (by vaccination or more or less controlled exposure), that prevent from specifying the real probable results, the number of enemy casualties derived from a biological attack. The theoretical estimated effects are diminished by certain climatic conditions, the rain, the fog, the solar luminosity and the extreme temperatures, or altered by the winds, which drag them of the surface target.
For all this, nowadays the military use of biological agents has a restricted employment in the special operations and the more or less concealed harassment of the enemy, technique where the time is not a rigid and critical parameter. This way, the goal of debilitating the enemy, more than eliminate him totally, does that the calculations of the conflicting forces correlation have to be neither so exact nor so punctual in time. The dissemination of the biological agents becomes directly, without the employment of the heavy ammunitions used as vectors. And the time between the exposure and the development of the disease, betrayed by its symptoms, constitutes then a planning factor within the attacking plan.
 

Its difficult and improbable use by terrorists and madmen.
Attempts have been, as the already indicated about the anthrax spores and this that we report now. In 1980 the French police assaulted a home of the Red German Army Fraction in Paris, placed in n º 41 A, Chaillot street. Those which chiefs committed simultaneously suicide later in their isolation cells in Germany. There they found a simple but effective installation «washing-up basin» type for producing the butolinic A toxin.
A natural repugnance exists in the men to experiencing the diseases, specially the infectious, the disfigurement ones and the extreme debilitating. It is only enough to see the announcements about all kinds of health centers, which offer something like a youth elixir, similar to that Ponce of León looked for in The Florida in the 16th century. The age is inevitable and implacable, but it is sought to keep, almost by all the means, the use and enjoyment of the maturity, which deterioration is one of the most fearsome effects of the diseases. The infectious serious diseases are in the habit of passing with external catastrophic symptoms. The man s attacked from inside in his aspect, in his integrity and in his capacities, by a painful and even disgusting way, up to his infamous death. This is not the death more or less adorned by us, to make it glorious and less disgusting, which is waited for the soldiers in the battlefield.
The manipulation of the pathogenic microbes and their poisonous derivatives imply high pharmacological and chemical technology operations. Here any leak or impurity leads to the failure of the experiment or to an affection of the manipulators (the most nearby and exposed possible carriers). And already we know something of how these pathogenic dwarfs and their organic products operate over us.
The fundamentalist Islamic fanatics do not find in the Noble Koran nor in the Prophet’s sunna any inducement, stimulus or excuse for their employment in the war. The microbes and their humors are in the category of the pork, the dog, the aquatic animals without fins, of the banned by Allah, all of them impure and detestable for the faithful Muslim. When the Book descended from Allah, the “ansars” or Islam’s devout could acceptably died by the sword, the mace, the axe, the lance and the arrows, in defense of the Umma or universal Islamic community and to extend its domains, applying the Jihad or sanctified war in many aleyas or verses of the Koran.
One also speaks about the possible utilization of the most attainable and known for the biological warfare means by the madmen. But a mad is not an demented. The demented has degraded his cognitive and volitional powers, by the physical deterioration of his cerebral tissues, due to the age or certain diseases (ictus, cerebral arteriosclerosis). The mad, for his part, has a portion of his feelings, ideas and concepts affected, upset and missed. But the madman is capable of reasoning specially in the topics that I will call «objectives», which are outside of his deliriums and mental affections. The madman can believe that his more or less individual terrorist actions, will be important to subvert the political regime of a country. But the mad can know how to mix sugar and potassium chlorate (the pills to disinfect the throat) to make a domestic explosive. Though the ETA (BASQUE SECESIONIST REVOLUTIONARY GROUP) adds sulphur to it, here it is not needed and only reduces the weight efficiency, since the chlorine takes charge connecting with the potassium and forming potassium chloride. In any case, the sulphur can be obtained, as component of the gunpowder, if there exist sensitive products restrictions, treating with commercial chlorhidric acid the sodium bisulphide, a photographic developer. Or how to concentrate the cars batteries liquid, to obtain sulphuric acid, base to obtain nitric acid (for the cotton powder or without smoke powder) and nitrates (the oxygen supplier in the smoke gunpowders, base of the pyrotechnic. And the madman also has very much, a lot of fear, probably more because a hypochondriac specific component, about the degrading diseases, stigmatized by the social group.

Military Operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A Fourth Generation (asymmetrical, Guerrilla) War in Central Asia.

How do Western and Pakistani Armies develop their military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda?  What is the idiosyncrasy of the 40 million Pasthuns who live in the territories infected by them? How is the Pashtunwali or honor’s code of their tribes? How can be better attacked the presence, a perfect control does not exist, of the rebels and terrorists in the wide zone on both sides of the «Northwest border» Afghan Pakistani? The instruction, the omnipresent use of the heavy fire support and the mentality of the great modern armies, do they facilitate the efficient military operations against indomitable fanatic religious rebels in their own lands?

The social and military situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda form two vertically organized movements and from below to up. The ideological and geographical nearness allows them to collaborate tactically. That does that its cells do not know exactly which are the higher chiefs. They only know where they have to go to receive support or to send or to receive information or to communicate with another «peer» cell. The commands of these movements act by exception, not by presence or by deliberate action. This allows them to operate well, without the intervention of its high commands. The death of the mullah Omar and two or three chiefs in an American bombardment, would concern little its efficiency, its real military irregular levels of action. The «martyrdom» of the aforesaid or Bin Laden or his «managing director» al-Zawahiri would perform almost equal importance as their existence.
The operative key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs (sheiks), with their small guerrillas bands. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform them, hide them and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operative development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes, assaults to very small enemy isolated units, harassment by medium range fire, kidnapping, short duration isolated incursions and ways and paths mined. Ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns. In a minor and less extensive degree, operate the more independent cells of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Their usual procedure for assault a weak defended or without fighting spirit position is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault it is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL personal grenade-launchers.
Afghanistan almost lacks asphalt roads: there are only two. The most important gives itself a round turn all over the country, joining the principal populations, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, etc. So they called it Ring Road. Then there is the North-South Road, which follows this tour, at the east of the country. They are not great thing. The asphalt have between half and one inch of thickness; the heats soften it and pot-holes and bubbles are easily formed. But, under a protuberance can hide an explosive device. It is necessary to cross slow the roads, looking at the soil and looking over the horizon, searching for carelessness observers, not very distant. The Taliban have the habit of recording on video the ambushes, to hang them on Internet. They are not in the habit of using cables activators; these are expensive and weigh, and the rebels are in isolated zones and the logistics is weak and complicated. The devices are activated by the pressure of the vehicle or by an frequency  transmitter with a given range; even serves an electronic opening door device. With the frequency inhibitors, the soldiers try to offset the radio waves in the probable frequencies used in the zone. Being the most expensive and complicated transmitters, that with more range, power and frequencies range. It is the game of the cat and the mouse. The problem is that the guerrillas of an area receive a radio activator that uses an unforeseen frequency.
As for the usual attack by the light and medium weapons fire, the guerrillas do not approach too much. They are less trained and equipped than that the professional military men. They act roughly scourging. Their more frequent weapon, the AK in its variants 47 and M are not precise beyond 150-175 m., in linear shooting. The mortars fire turns out to be imprecise and can be eluded against a mounted patrol. Nevertheless, against the civilians and the vehicles and goods traffic these assault skills are sufficient and effective. The most  terrifying and effective weapon of the Taliban is the illuminated fanatic suicidal. That looks for, as passport to the Houris’ Garden (it is not an eternal prize!!), to carry with him the major number of dead and mutilated enemies. But the attacker could be a religious madman, but is not an idiot. The suicides do not attack the military prepared or fortified positions. Endowed in their defensive perimeter with complicated wire fences, pits, walls, spaces between obstacles, alarms. Because they know that the explosion will vanish in the air and that they will not let him to approach the sentries outposts, because already they are waiting for him. The principal weapon of the suicide is not his explosive belt or jacket. They are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.
The units of the Allied armies (in Afghanistan) or of the Pakistani army act employing battalions and regiments. With the battalion forces they try to sweep a zone in a direction, in whose opposite limit they have deployed a military «bolt». With a regiment they are in the habit of carrying out a search and annihilation operation in a given area. They are probably too much forces. The highland guerrillas have a natural weapon which lack the soldiers trained in «our way «: the patience and sobriety. In Vietnam they were lonely raised to the trees, and there were silently and stilly waiting, until the crossing of the soldiers who were sweeping the operational zone. Covering with mud the roof of an Afghan hut, it prevents the observation of its interior by the thermal vision airborne devices, crewed or not.
In 2002 the Pakistani began to send troops to the Waziristan and other Pashtuns zones, reaching progressively 80 thousand deployed men there. In their operations, destroyed Taliban training fields and captured many terrorist chiefs. But their regular war tactics and techniques, alienated them the favor or the neutrality, according to the cases, of the tribes, since there were taking place very easily civil innocent victims with them. Finally, in the autumn of 2005 the Government reached an agreement with the tribe chiefs or Maliks, moving back from the zone. It was a low intensity conflict: in the last 2 years 700 military men died. The problem was that it was clearly seen that the military men could not dominate the Pashtuns areas and clean them of terrorists. Since then, the reprisal raids are sporadic and punctual, over detected and given targets, which not always is obtained or destroyed.

The geographical space of the Pashtuns tribes (Afghans and Pakistani).

From Pakistan, looking from the Punjab (or «the land of the five rivers») towards Afghanistan, appears the great bed of the Indus river. This acts as geographical border with the Pashtuns lands, forming an enormous natural moat, which never stopped their raids. Then appears an irregular mixture of plains and mountainous spurs, in lands that turn out to be fertile when they can be watered, shaped by the first heights of the Suliman great mountainous chain. Beyond, the big mountains crown. Towards the north, forming perpetual snow zones, there are Alpine type pastures and heights forests, up to reaching the spurs of the massive chain Hindu Kush. Towards the south, spread the lowest Waziristan mountains, in which appear rocky outcrops at more than 3000  m. of altitude. Descending more toward south, are bush covered spurs and gullies, up to the desolation of Zheb and Mekran areas, already near the Indian Ocean, in the Baluchistan.
These intricate heights provide a wall that prevents massive invasions from one or another side of them, provided the passes are dominated. The most famous still nowadays is Khiber, since it opens the way between Kabul and Peshawar.
In the Baluchistan live the Baluchi, Braui and Pashtun (in the northern part) etnia tribes. In the South and North Waziristan’s regions the Pashtuns are more concentrated, forming a real Pakistani Pashtunistan. Within the great pashtun etnia, the Mahsuds (these specially inclined to break the agreements and treaties) are in the Waziristan central zone, the Wasirs and the Afridis live in the zone of Tirah and the Mohmands, at the north of Tirah. The zone of Chitral, at the north of the border, is formed by the Bajaur, Dhir and Swat districts. The Waziristans are the most problematic, independent and turbulent tribes. Their lands are poor and rough, in which scarcely they find an elementary sustenance. Formerly, up to the first third of last century, they were in the habit of descending occasionally in armed raids up to the Indus valley. To obtain value goods, mounts, jewels, foreign women, attacking and harvesting its inhabitants, which were Hindu of race and religion, and therefore, unbelievers. More to the south-east of the lands of these tribes, without coming yet to the Indus valley, are the lands also mountainous of the Khattaks, Bangashis and Yusufzais, all also Pashtuns. Tribes that produced first class Sepoys for the semi irregular British units operating in these zones.
The Afghan heights around the border with Pakistan are the other great slope west of the mentioned mountainous chains, crowned at the north of the country by the great Hindu Kush. The absence of European explorers in the Afghan side (Afghanistan was an independent country opposite to Russians and British), does that they are less studied and very little known by non specialist people.
In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are at the south and south-east, reaching 35% of the population and around 12,5 millions persons. Another important Afghan etnia are the Uzbecs (10%) and the Tajiks (25%), which live in the north of the country, bordering the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan independent republics. In the center live the Hazaras (20 % of the population), related with the Persian and in the south are the Baluchis (10 %), related, in turn, with the Pakistani Baluchistan tribes. The flow of Afghans, specially Pashtuns, towards Pakistan or coming back home, when the military conditions are smoothed, does that the figures, lacking for decades of an official census, are variable and vague.
In Pakistan are 4 great etnias: the Pashtuns, the Punjabis, the Sindhi and the Baluchis. Precisely, the country is nowadays divided in four big provinces: Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the Northwest Border, each one formed by numerous administrative districts. There exists an autonomous tribes zone, that goes between the last province and the border with Afghanistan and that is governed by the central federal authority. The tribal zone possesses 7 tribal agencies and 6 small districts. The individuals of Pashtun etnia are approximately 25 millions in the country.
After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the dispute arose with Afghanistan for the possession of the wide frontier tribal zones, which was looking for its exit to the sea. Both countries almost came to the armed conflict, until they signed in 1963 an agreement of borders determination. The borders existing during the British domain were ratified in it. And Afghanistan stayed as an interior country, without access to the sea routes.

Social anthropologic particularities of the Pashtuns tribes.

The internal relations of the groups, families and local families groups and clans, are characterized by incorporating into them certain rites, rules, attitudes and taboos. These gather, value and quantify their vital needs, their primary emotions and their beliefs. The Islam is rigorously followed in the wide zone we treat. They are all of the sunni branch, that accepts the Koran and the Prophet Sunna, his acts and remarks (hadices) due gathered by his disciples, as the orthodox sources of Allah’s revelation to the men. The differences reside in the rigor with which they examine and accept the sources of the Sunna. This assumption forms a part of the social inculturation, strengthening and cohesion of these groups.
These societies agree and are ruled by an authority, more or less respected and obeyed. The more be perfected and advance towards the exterior the society, the power of this authority will become strong and grow and will spread in influence areas. The smaller and isolated is the group, the authority power will be more moderating and integrating, acting as the first between the «equal ones». In these last cases, the meeting of the active members (men, hunters) of the clan in assemblies, “jurgas” (in its language), etc., has supreme and sanctioning value of the deviant or solvent conducts for the group. Evidently, in these local councils, the prestige and the power of each individual member counts, and in them some are more «equal» than others. These local chiefs or Maliks are like favored negotiators with the different governments, who enjoy a personal more than institutional authority, and whose agreements can be ignored by the adult males, if are not confirmed by the assemblies.
Their code of customs and honor is the Pashtunwali. It establishes to the individual certain rights and demands from him certain social duties towards the family, the clan and the tribe. The basic disputes on women, gold or valid money and lands are in the origin of the durable hatreds in these tribes. And that must be kept up to avenging the perceived affront. The own fragility and weakness of the society demands the appearance of the protective values. These might be the hospitality, the loyalty, the friendship, the scorn of the strange, the revenge of affronts and damages, the individual and collective honor. Each of them protects and enlarges in some measure or shade the small human group. As we will see the relations they are interpersonal, in the areas of the family, the clan and the region. They are projected by the opportunity, the nearness, the exchange of goods and the relation. And become strong with the loyalty, the respect of the accepted procedures and the treatment time. And depending on the accumulation of these elementary successive acts. A stranger can aspire this way to his integration, in a personal manner. And not for the quality or importance of his category or institutional position.
The hospitality takes implicit the reciprocity, when one travels, is alone and is not aggressive. This sometimes is perfected by the endowment of an escort to the traveler through insecure zones. The violation of this «escort» by an assault supposes a serious affront for the clan that provided it. The loyalty between the members of the group, sometimes very unstable, cohesion it. The honor inflates the self esteem and appearance before everybody. The revenge, in absence of a real justice, search to punish and then to repair the damages and affronts real or perceived. The scorn of strange not adorned with good qualities or menacing the group, seeks to prevent a priori their integration in it, as a passive defense form. The friendship embraces the ties with the equals and within the group. If someone joins these elementary groups, he is object of loyalty and friendship in a personal way. These values would increase by his performance, ways and personal behavior. It would be the case of a native forces chief, accepted by them for the pays, the honor and the status that they offer and project on the regional clans. The acceptance is not with the cargo, but with the person.
Another characteristic of the social organization of these frontier semi independent tribes is that they stimulate a relative endogamia. With it they seek to isolate, to protect, to support or to increase their idiosyncrasy, influence and patrimony. But, without been biological harmful its use. As it would be between the members of the same family or small or nearby clan. In effect, the marriages not only suppose and carry individuals exchanges between the families of the married. They also produce exchanges and flows of gifts, visits, relations and power plots. In a few little evolved societies, living in a difficult way and, sometimes surrounded temporarily by hostile, the matrimonial relations produce a «revenue», an increases of social positions, influences and goods, which are very estimated by the families.

How is it necessary to confront the approximation towards the frontier tribes and foment their pacification? So that they isolate and expel the violent radical elements. And assume a more lasting and strong ties with the central authorities of both implied countries.

The highland villages are numerous, small and spread for both sides of the common border. In them can be camouflaged a small group of «regulars» Taliban, waiting that the jerky military flood passes away. Apart, the Taliban enjoy a complicated system of natural caves, reinforced by communication tunnels, endowed with extended zones for waiting and the storage of all classes of goods. This system is used to facilitate the traffic between both countries, without having to use the frontier passages or the most habitual and known gorges, as «parts» of the complete journey. And as temporary refuge, when the Allies carry out reprisal or rebels searching operations, on Pashtun zones where they have been more active. Taliban are Pashtuns. Only are distinguished from the local tribes by their major religious proselytism and military activity. Some of the villagers whom the soldiers meet in their patrols and searches, could be «part-time» Taliban and sympathizers. Two or three men of a native group that pass along a rural way, can be a  Taliban team moving across.
Here it is possible to exploit an atavism that survives in all the collectivities. And that is shackled by the civic and moral education in the so called educated nations. And that is the egoism, as original fruit of the defense need and of the chronic shortage of original resources. That generates in the most primitive societies a distrust towards the non nearby neighbor, who is collectively estimated as a competitor and a probable enemy. The Taliban are foreign in Pakistan, and committed in a foreign war. Apart from their select and absorbent radical interpretation of the sunni Islam. Following the mentioned general guidelines it is easy and simple, though laborious and necessarily progressive, to achieve that the Pakistani Pashtuns close up their lands to the Taliban. Avoiding this way the spread of their doctrine and methods. And the extension of their operative refuges towards the west of the Indus, which always will prevent their possible eradication of Afghanistan.
The military operations in the modern wars (of third generation) demand to detect the most rapid and precisely a mechanized enemy, along all his deployment, up to his reserves. Then attacks him with ground and air heavy fire, including tactical rockets. But here the enemy is evasive, dispersed, worse armed, bad trained, unruly. He is native, is tough and scanty, hides easily, is a born predator, usually does not defend his positions. The operations of the military big units and units let escape the guerrilla teams, through infinity of tactical «interstices» or microvacuums of military «combat capacity». It is necessary to operate with nearness at his microtactical military level. To the diffuse, tenuous, but omnipresent «swarm» of the Taliban is necessary to interpose a civic military «swarm». Formed by voluntary elements, more qualified, professional and trained than the guerrillas.
It is necessary to create small «action units», for combined “social military” actions. That are capable of reaching the Taliban habitat and to expel them from it, progressively and firmly. Interposing between them and the tribes, his real guerrilla habitat. Units that, in its basic or standard model, would be formed by a squad of infantry light local loyal trained forces, a squad of professional foreign infantries and a group of civil technical personnel for tribe promotion and education with suitable material. Its logistics and support will be based on ground units and heliborne forces, centrally controlled from 2 or 3 near operative bases. And complemented by mobile columns in vehicles or of cavalry, forming a support patrols’ network in a region.
Once made firm these small flexible units, can arrive there major forces and brigades of work and education, to go garrison the zone and stimulating its social improvement. It is necessary to possess money to buy the will of collaborators and sympathizers. This can become facilitating work and social distinction to them. And to realize the necessary plans of development.
To eradicate the opium crops can be an independent strategic goal. And it is necessary to value very well its opportunity and possibility for every small zone. It is necessary to offer the natives an alternative of peace, progress and well-being, within their beliefs and ways, in order that they expel the Taliban.

THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ITS REAL POSSIBILITIES AS TERRORISTS’ USABLE WEAPON AND IN THE MODERN WARFARE. ITS INSTRUMENTS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

The biological warfare is the military use, as war weapon, of the living pathogenic, animal or plant organisms, and of the natural poisonous products, called toxins. Since the germs and the bacteria are used in it, it is also called germ warfare, though this term only incorporates a part of the biological agents capable of being used aggressively against the men.

The biological warfare is the military use, as war weapon, of the living pathogenic, animal or plant organisms, and of the natural poisonous products, called toxins. Since the germs and the bacteria are used in it, it is also called germ warfare, though this term only incorporates a part of the biological agents capable of being used aggressively against the men.

The biological warfare is the military use, as war weapon, of the living pathogenic, animal or plant organisms, and of the natural poisonous products, called toxins. Since the germs and the bacteria are used in it, it is also called germ warfare, though this term only incorporates a part of the biological agents capable of being used aggressively against the men.

The biological warfare is the military use, as war weapon, of the living pathogenic, animal or plant organisms, and of the natural poisonous products, called toxins. Since the germs and the bacteria are used in it, it is also called germ warfare, though this term only incorporates a part of the biological agents capable of being used aggressively against the men.

The military use of the pathogenic microbes.

The pathogenic organisms, which produce diseases in the man, can classify in 4 big categories or types: the fungi, the bacteria, the virus and the rickettsia, an intermediate entity between these 2 last ones, in its nature, size and characteristics.

The bacteria are unicellular organisms of spherical (they take the suffix coco in the name), cylindrical (the bacilli) or spiral (the espirilium) forms. They reproduce by transverse repeated division and, often, the partial microbes remain united forming a chain. Many of them can move by means of their whips or eyelashes (shorter). According to Lauria, the virus is a genetic element constituted by ribonucleic acid and deoxyribonucleic acid, suitably to move from cell to cell and capably of synthesizing with the available amino acids its particular proteins, which will form then the infective viral particles. It is not known neither its origin nor the date of its appearance, since the existence of fossils virus is ignored. Elford, in 1931, managed to measure its size, which varies between 10 and 300 microns. Also the virus classify in vegetables, animals and bacteriafhagous, every type with their specific characteristics. Their vital cycle has, among others, 5 important phases for us: fixation to the cellular surface, penetration inside the cell, multiplication of the virus at the cost of the components of that one, liberation of the new viral individuals and their dispersion in the environment.

The military employment of the pathogenic microbes is difficult, because they are living organisms. The military usual vectors, the conventional (explosive grenades) and the reactive artillery (rockets with ballistic path, without autonomous direction) and the air bombs, turn out to be too aggressive and destroy them before their dispersion in the target. To eliminate these serious limitations, bombs with ceramic cases have been developed, which has been tried satisfactorily with flies infected with the bacterium yessinia pestis, the cause of the bubonic pest. Also it has been tried its dispersion through the air, using dispensers means of several types. But its control and the estimation of the effect on the target are very difficult. During the 40s of last century, biological desiccated and freezing of the microbes technologies were improved. With them it was seeking to prolong their life and to increase their resistance, allowing them a major storage time, their dispersion using explosives and to achieve a longer exposure in the environmental conditions.

Their real employment by means of not military transmitters has been more common. In 1763, during the war in North America between Great Britain and France for the control of all the European colonies, the military British command decided to try to infect with smallpox the hostile Indians. With this motive 2 sheets and a handkerchief from the room of infected by smallpox in a British hospital, were delivered to 2 Indian chiefs. The disease spread soon among the tribes.

Soon after the suicidal air raids on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, in September, 2001, some packages and letters supposedly containing anthrax spores, active or in vitro, acquired or stolen in pharmacological investigation laboratories began to appear in the USA, in the post offices and the addresses. The collective paranoia of these tragic moments helped to increase the extension and the importance of these facts. And it constituted a multiplier of the propaganda perverse effect in any type of individual or collective terrorism aggression. Whose purpose is the terror extension, generally using violent indiscriminate actions and the threats of repeating them. That do that all the members of the attacked collectivity considering themselves to be possible or probable, according with the cases, goals of these future actions.

The toxins as a warfare weapon.

The toxins are poisons naturally produced by the plants or the animals, so much the big or visible as the microscopic ones or microbes.

The toxins have certain advantages for their employment as war weapon. They are natural, not more or less complicated, costly and unstable synthesis chemical products. This facilitates their production in pilot or manufacturer plant scale. Some of the biological toxins are among the most poisonous products that are known. Their effect is made without the presence of the producing agent. This one, as an alive organism, presents problems in its manipulation, as being more unstable or perishable than toxins. That is to say, they can be preserved and spread easier, by means of explosive special grenades or with aerosols or atomizers dispensers, boosted by inert or neutral gases.

The enterotoxin B of the golden estafilococo is the responsible of the majority of the food human poisonings. This bacterium can grow in multitude foods and on having done produces the toxin, which is consumed by the consumption. In general, the enterotoxin B is not lethal, but a dose of only 50 micrograms already causes vomits and diarrheas in the adults. The deliberate use of this toxin is possible. For example, during a siege by the irregular rebels, always relaxed and no hermetic, to military defensive positions, and trying to scourge and to debilitated the vital enemy resistance. The sharp sound effect produced by the operating toxin is called almost onomatopoeically «the whistling sound».

A more terrible toxin, which it is possible also to find in the food, is the butolinic A toxin, produced by the clostridium butolinic bacteria. It is the most powerful known poison, a microgram kills an adult. The normal appearance of the bacterium associates with the badly preserved food, as the expired or badly sterilized during its manufacture tinned vegetables. It is a neuroagent that causes that the nervous system accumulates in excess during its functioning the acetilcolin, in a similar way that do the of nervous type agents used in the chemical warfare.

The castor toxin exists in the seeds and the leaves of the common castor plant. Its use by the secret service Bulgarian agents known as the umbrellas’ assassins, was confirmed in the 70s. In the free ends of those were concealed a mechanical launcher, which was projecting a pellet impregnated with the castor toxin and capably in the short distance of going in the naked meat. Two Bulgarian dissidents fled from the communist regime in their country, were positively identified of having being murdered this way in London.

Its appearance in the History. Modern situation.

From very ancient the pathogenic agents and the toxins have been used with military purposes. The poisoning of the enemy water fountains or to throw the infectious patients corpses over the enemy defensive walls, are military methods used by Alexander the Great or the Mongolian. It is only in the modern times when the use of biological agents in the war has acquired a stigma character. This way, no modern nation has admitted its employment in combat against her enemies.

We have an extreme example of how the use of biological agents by profane persons can go away of control, in the siege of the Genoese city of Kaffa, today called Feodosiya, placed in the Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea. During in it the biological harmful effects were reasonably circumscribed inside the walls of this city. In the middle of the XIVth century the Mongolian were besieging the city. The Mongolian were throwing over her walls, using catapults, the dead men’s bodies by the bubonic pest. It is thought that some Genoese ships that departed from the city towards their metropolis, could carry the plague’s bacillus, which was habitually lodging in the rates. Hereby the bubonic pest could reach Italy, and begin the massive and fulminating epidemic known in the History as the Black Death, which almost depopulated the European continent in that century.

From the 80s of last century, the genetic engineering and the biotechnology have turned into technically industrial instruments destined to improve the life conditions of the humanity. One of its possible applications is the development of vaccines against the pathogenic agents, both the natural and the reinforced by genetic actions on the first ones. This can allow the most developed countries to acquire a certain more or less widespread immunity, which is never absolute, against these biological attacks. Whereas their potential enemies, less technologically developed and with fewer economic resources, except the crude oil producers during the expansion phase of the sales cycle, would be defenseless against the biological military agents.

Its military use is punctual and restricted.

The effective, precise in the time and controlled use of biological agents in the modern combat is difficult and its results are also too vague. For the majority of the biological agents, its own nature does that its controlled launch on a target is difficult. Between the effective action on the enemy and the beginning and the development of the disease, it exists an unavoidable delay, due to the inevitable incubation periods, that goes from the hours to days; which is never acceptable in a mobile military operation. Always exist the natural and the acquired immunities (by vaccination or more or less controlled exposure), that prevent from specifying the real probable results, the number of enemy casualties derived from a biological attack. The theoretical estimated effects are diminished by certain climatic conditions, the rain, the fog, the solar luminosity and the extreme temperatures, or altered by the winds, which drag them of the surface target.

For all this, nowadays the military use of biological agents has a restricted employment in the special operations and the more or less concealed harassment of the enemy, technique where the time is not a rigid and critical parameter. This way, the goal of debilitating the enemy, more than eliminate him totally, does that the calculations of the conflicting forces correlation have to be neither so exact nor so punctual in time. The dissemination of the biological agents becomes directly, without the employment of the heavy ammunitions used as vectors. And the time between the exposure and the development of the disease, betrayed by its symptoms, constitutes then a planning factor within the attacking plan.

Its difficult and improbable use by terrorists and madmen.

Attempts have been, as the already indicated about the anthrax spores and this that we report now. In 1980 the French police assaulted a home of the Red German Army Fraction in Paris, placed in n º 41 A, Chaillot street. Those which chiefs committed simultaneously suicide later in their isolation cells in Germany. There they found a simple but effective installation «washing-up basin» type for producing the butolinic A toxin.

A natural repugnance exists in the men to experiencing the diseases, specially the infectious, the disfigurement ones and the extreme debilitating. It is only enough to see the announcements about all kinds of health centers, which offer something like a youth elixir, similar to that Ponce of León looked for in The Florida in the 16th century. The age is inevitable and implacable, but it is sought to keep, almost by all the means, the use and enjoyment of the maturity, which deterioration is one of the most fearsome effects of the diseases. The infectious serious diseases are in the habit of passing with external catastrophic symptoms. The man s attacked from inside in his aspect, in his integrity and in his capacities, by a painful and even disgusting way, up to his infamous death. This is not the death more or less adorned by us, to make it glorious and less disgusting, which is waited for the soldiers in the battlefield.

The manipulation of the pathogenic microbes and their poisonous derivatives imply high pharmacological and chemical technology operations. Here any leak or impurity leads to the failure of the experiment or to an affection of the manipulators (the most nearby and exposed possible carriers). And already we know something of how these pathogenic dwarfs and their organic products operate over us.

The fundamentalist Islamic fanatics do not find in the Noble Koran nor in the Prophet’s sunna any inducement, stimulus or excuse for their employment in the war. The microbes and their humors are in the category of the pork, the dog, the aquatic animals without fins, of the banned by Allah, all of them impure and detestable for the faithful Muslim. When the Book descended from Allah, the «ansars» or Islam’s devout could acceptably died by the sword, the mace, the axe, the lance and the arrows, in defense of the Umma or universal Islamic community and to extend its domains, applying the Jihad or sanctified war in many aleyas or verses of the Koran.

One also speaks about the possible utilization of the most attainable and known for the biological warfare means by the madmen. But a mad is not an demented. The demented has degraded his cognitive and volitional powers, by the physical deterioration of his cerebral tissues, due to the age or certain diseases (ictus, cerebral arteriosclerosis). The mad, for his part, has a portion of his feelings, ideas and concepts affected, upset and missed. But the madman is capable of reasoning specially in the topics that I will call «objectives», which are outside of his deliriums and mental affections. The madman can believe that his more or less individual terrorist actions, will be important to subvert the political regime of a country. But the mad can know how to mix sugar and potassium chlorate (the pills to disinfect the throat) to make a domestic explosive. Though the ETA (Basque revolutionary terrorists) adds sulfur to it, here it is not needed and only reduces the weight efficiency, since the chlorine takes charge connecting with the potassium and forming potassium chloride. In any case, the sulfur can be obtained, as component of the gunpowder, if there exist sensitive products restrictions, treating with commercial chlorhidric acid the sodium bisulphide, a photographic developer. Or how to concentrate the cars batteries liquid, to obtain sulfuric acid, base to obtain nitric acid (for the cotton powder or without smoke powder) and nitrates (the oxygen supplier in the smoke gunpowder, base of the pyrotechnic. And the madman also has very much, a lot of fear, probably more because a hypochondriac specific component, about the degrading diseases, stigmatized by the social group.

Suggested reading for professional armed forces.

I offer a books´list on military theory, which reading will be very useful to you. And that I consider to be fundamental to know better the military topics and not simply to read a more or less repeated history.

I am including one of my book, fruit of my years of dedication to this topic, which content you can examine in www.amazon.com.

“Maneuver Warfare Handbook” by William Lind.

The classical on modern maneuver warfare. Used by the Marines Corps. It is based on the German experience in the World War II. That in turn is an extrapolation to the mechanized war, of the experiences developed by the Stormtroops (infantry assault forces) in the I World War.

“The Art of War” by Sun Tzu. Samuel Griffith’s translation is the best of all.

The permanent and global chinese military theory from a classical author. Its style and content characteristics support the idea of one unique author. With each useful reading, more shades and perspectives are caught. That come to fruition in major richness, agility and depth of thought.

Other «Chinese» books give you a number of strategies (the 33, the 36, the 100, etc.). Its utilization is based on its constant memorization or on iits permanent application. I consider them to be slight practical, for the profuse, diffuse and still confused character of many ancient authors of the Han etnia. What does happen if a different case arises? It seems as if they wanted to conceal their supposed wisdom from the not initiated ones.

“The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver” by David Glantz.

The Soviet military doctrine that won the War, fully explained. With them they won the II World War. And imposed their economic social system in half Europe, supposed «liberated» from the Germans.

“Forward into Battle” by Paddy Griffith.

Excelent book about last two centuries’ military tactics, extensively presented. It has detractors for its sometimes breaking vision.

«On War» by Clausewitz.

It is an extensive work, since it fits with the epoch, in which writing little was a sign of inconsistency, little importance and scanty reflection. The books or parts that compose it were finished in variable degree by the author, whose premature death did not allow its conclusion. We are interested in the first chapters on the theory and the philosophy of the war. Other books treat on the tactics of a period in which the enemy deployment was staying at the sights of the enemy command and his HHQQ and auxiliary, placed in a nearby height. He praises Liddell Hart’s opposite: a decisive battle using the maximum own concentration and power on the enemy army. In an age of masses armies, inaugurated by Napoleon, soon was clear that it was not possible to win a war between full armed nations, in an alone great battle. It was necessary a campaign with successive victorious operations, looking for the achievement of the military goals of the campaign (theatre of operations, Europe, Pacific Ocean, Africa) or the strategy. In addition, already there did not exist a genius advanced to his epoch as Napoleon.

“Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology”, compiled by Richard D. Hooker.

Short articles of some of the best modern military writers on that topic. It has works from Rommel, Leonhard, John Antal, etc.

“The Art of Maneuver” by Robert Leonhard.

One of the first full theory about maneuver warfare. And he stands out strongly, expanding the ideas torrent of this theory in development those moments.

“Race to the Swift” by Richard Simpkin.

On maneuver warfare. The best book of this British military thinker. Its reading is some difficult, for its language erudition.

“Manual de Táctica”, dos tomos, by Eike Middeldorf.

It is the most complete and current manual on modern tactics that I have found. It has chapters about land warfare using atomic tactical bombs and on the particular conditions of fight: by night, in forests, with extreme cold, etc.

“Strategy” by Basil Liddell Hart.

Best military theory by B. L. Hart. Easy to read.

“The Foundations of the Science of War” by John Frederick Charles Fuller.

The best book about military principles. Hard to read sometimes. Almost 65 years after its first edition, it was reprinted by the Marines Corps. I got a first edition copy from an American university library (Lancaster, Pa.). It had many critiques and later the author went back on the underlying ideas in the book. The critiques, in turn, had as bottom that he had an eccentric personality, in a group (the military men) tremendously conservative and established by protocol. He had mystical streakes (Hindu philosophy, yoga) and flirted with the Nazi, being got by Hitler.

“On the Nature of War” by Enrique Alonso.

The “how to do” in war. Recent, full and unusual military theory. It is based in 10 “operational systems”.

“Understanding War” by Trevor N. Dupuy.

It is a combat theory, based on History, military factors and its figures. I find that his «friction» concept development, took from Clausewitz, is deviant. And he exposes another concept different from Clausewitz.

Modern Asymmetrical Warfare.

Let’s see some examples of these irregular social-military conflicts :
Country and conflict nature.   Period.    Military and political result.

Greece, communist. 1946 to 1949. Suffocated.

Malaya, communist, tied to the Chinese etnia. 1947 to 1960. Suffocated.

French Indochina. 1946 to 1954. Creation of both republics of Vietnam.

The Philippines, communist. 1947 to 1952. Suffocated.

Kenya, nationalist. 1952 to 1959. Independence.

Algeria, nationalist. 1954 to 1962. Independence.

Cyprus, nationalist. 1955 to 1959. Independence.

South Vietnam. 1959 to 1975. Unification of the country under the aegis of North Vietnam. Dissolution of  the Vietcong, independence movement of the South.

Angola, nationalist. 1960 to 1975. Independence.

Afghanistan, nationalist. 1978 to 1989. Independence from the Soviet goverment sponsor.

The military counterinsurgents must avoid, therefore, the prolongation of the conflict, which is mining the conviction of their own forces and allowing that the enemy should spread, strengthen and prevail.

Sigue leyendo Modern Asymmetrical Warfare.

Asymmetrical Warfare

The pompously so called «fourth generation wars» are the counterinsurgency wars  or guerrilla warfares or irregular wars or armed civil revolts or wars of liberation or organized banditry, which have always existed, coexisting with the conventional variants of warfare.

They are those that the USA has lost or not winned lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (Marines pacifying disembarkation, then demolished in their barrack by Hezbollah members) and Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» of the war lords and the Islamic fundamental militias). They are unequal wars (they call them now «asymmetrical warfare») against an enemy of lower technological military level relative to the regular enemy forces, taken root always in the civil own or occupied population, slightly intense militarily and extensive in the space and the time.
With embarrassing frequency, when the North American human or technological «sensors» detect some probable Iraqi rebel activity or from the foreign muhaydines, first they devastate with ordnance the building, the block, the zone. Then they go to wipe out and to do the body count , because they are very scrupulous with their statistics. Sometimes among the rubbles they can find the corpses of an Arabic innocent and numerous family. There is an excessive use of the attrition, which is indiscriminate and perverse when the enemy fuses with the civil ones. There is a disregard of the active, unexpected patrolling, which needs proportionally less material and human means, but more trade knowledge, moral courage, performance freedom and creativity in the low and intermediate cadres and command and in the men.