The Taliban’ Military Operations in Afghanistan II.


or The Expert Taliban Military Field Manual

The suicidal Taliban.

The suicidal fighter is a common weapon of the Taliban. The suicidal militant is for the Taliban a cheap, abundant, effective and highly asymmetric weapon. If the explosive charge, its characteristics and the vector are the suitable ones: the sophisticated enemy sensors and the protective jackets use as little against her. Nor the armored vehicles and the buildings serve to be protected from her. The trigger carrying agent can be man or woman and adult or child. It can cooperate in his suicide attack a bushes, a goods selling street place, a donkey, a bicycle or an engine vehicle. A suicidal fighter of one alone use is not a select shooter: it is not necessary to form him militarily (basic, technical and tactical knowledge). Complementary to the explosive belt or jacket, his other fearsome weapons are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.

The suicidal soldier must go unnoticed in the place chosen for the attack: by his age, genre, aspect, movements and attitude. To be able to approach his target and make exploit the load, producing the major possible number of enemies dead and mutilated. The added human and physical hurts that are caused around the explosion point are only «collateral damages”. To calm the repugnances in producing them, an Al-Qaeda «ideologist», Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a «religious» theory about the not looked for hurts. According to her, it is allowed to the Yihad’s militants to kill Muslims, when it is inevitable. Even, when it is useful to the cause. So, the suicidal soldiers express their desire that the not looked for dead, should be considered also by Allah as martyrs of His «Holy War».

The suicidal Taliban is an essentially inhuman weapon. We do not know any case in which it has used in only destroying a military physical target: a bridge, a store. Sometimes the suicide is used as part of a command, for blow opening the entry to a complex or for promoting with his immolation the surprise of the enemy and attracting his attention. Here the suicide’s «merit», who already must has certain instruction, is that of the whole assailant group in his action.

The motivations of these «sworn-in» are simple. Not to be able to chronically cover his basic natural needs of: sustenance, family, security, refuge and cover, and the reasonable progress expectations is a spur for his enrollment. The economic prizes that the Taliban give to the «martyrs» families are covering this line. The religious motivation is the powerful way of conviction. The suicides of the Yihad are methodically and intensely catechized. And live in an involving «environment» where they get clarify his doubts and that breathe them to prematurely reach the Paradise. The universal character of the Umma or Muslims’ community, facilitates the flow and the insertion of suicidal soldiers from other countries. In the last years, the followers of the Sunna are those who are using the suicide in his «Holy War». They are used by al-Qaeda, the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the members of Hamas.

The Military Contradictions in Afghanistan.

The foreign military men are tied by their own contradictions. On one hand, for socially correct or electoral reasons, is avoided to define this conflict, not already as a war, but as what it is: an “irregular Islamic popular liberation war”. That is directed against «a corrupt, impious and unpopular government, puppet of the exterior Allied powers». This way, the Allied armies establish strict “clashing procedures”, which they say that are to protect the Afghan people. But in all when they meet threatened or want to undertake some advances in the Taliban “loose controlled territory”, they only firstly and principally trust in their devastating and/or indiscriminate heavy fire capacity.

The Americans and their allies do not have a permanent and indefinite commitment, the hallmark of the good ally, with the Afghan political regime. That is an incoherent puzzle of tribal and personal interests. Agglutinated by the social and political power that today they hold, use and distribute. Neither is possible to «impregnate» in its entirety and per se, an inorganic western democracy in a Moslem’s country with an ancient, enduring and little evolved social structure. Without liberal principles and forms in her idiosyncrasy, the Afghan leaders and sheiks will use the new political power mechanisms to increase their influence and benefit, in a supposedly modern and free, but inarticulate society. An Islamic democracy, in use and customs guided by the Islam and the Sunna, is not equal to a liberal democracy.

Also exists a complete lack of nearness and commitment with the Afghan people. That perceives the «unfaithful armed foreigners» in his territory, as something temporary, relative, foreign and superposed to his interests and the personal, familiar, tribal, cultural and religious needs, in this order. Only some British managed to be accepted, respected and estimated, in a personal title, by the pashtunes and baluchis. It was the epoch of the British Empire of India and the famous Northwest Border (the Durand Line and the Tribal zones) with Afghanistan. It was a historical distant stage, with events that were going up with a minor pace that nowadays. Where the overseas «service shifts» (» military tours of duty”) lasted several years.

At beginning the summer of 2010, a powerful offensive of the ISAF took place in the province of Kandahar, at east of Helmand, to defeat and remove the Afghan Taliban of their habitual and original social support base. There were used ground and air multinational forces, as in Marjah’s battle in February, and selective commands assaults type «bites and flees». Nevertheless, the offensive was paralyzed without achieving her goals and it is not known of her resumption. Marjah was an important culture and processed center of the opium in Helmand’s province. After the battle and occupation, there was try to establish a local government, dependent on Kabul, which sank immediately and came to nothing. Soon there started appearing in other nearby populations the «green buds» of the Taliban. Who advanced without been disturbed after the military ebb tide.

The operational strategy of the ISAF is unsuccessful. The results of his military actions or are lean or lack continuity and go away vanishing. As would say an illuminated defeated politician: «they only belong to the wind». And precisely, because the Afghan «authorities» would have to consolidate, develop and keep those successes. Here it is easier to militarily win than occupy. And to temporarily occupy is easier that to convince and appease. And to assure and develop a civil native zone got from the Taliban.