The Western Defense and the Great Strategy of his Nations II.


This way, for us, to cut away in our National Defense is to damage, hurt or mutilate, according to the cases, the solidity, conviction, credibility and continuity of the internal and external projection of the Spain “seal». It is not a question of having up to an elite unit of «infantry on donkeys» (as «mountain dragoons»). To be able to clean an affront in Bolivia or in the Central African Republic. As the one that had needed Great Britain, when she wanted to avenge in the 19th century an offense from the Bolivians. That showed off her Ambassador mounted in a donkey. And found that neither the Royal Navy, nor her embarked infantry could coming up to lands so deep inland. But it is a theme that our Smart Defense, praised already by the NATO, supports and balanced and adequately distributes her budgets and means. In order that she can face the three mentioned kinds of wars, in the framework of the European and Western Joint Defense.

The modern units must be adapted for every type of fight and, at the same time, be bivalent or polyvalent. For example, the small elite units are suitable for their employment in the three types of wars. Their tasks are to attack diverse enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, using assaults with limited aims in his tactical or operative depth. Realizing always a study, the exposition and very rigorous tests of their insertion and extraction, which are their tactical weaknesses. The artillery units and the nuclear tactical missiles units are useful in the first phases of a nuclear conflict. And when the conventional war enters a serious conflict, which cannot get lost. Using them as part of a flexible response operational strategy and by successive steps. The modern anti ballistic missiles of the system AEGIS and the Patriots can serve to collaborate destroying the enemy missiles of any origin and in the three types of conflicts. Let’s remember that Saddam Hussein provoked repeatedly the Israelis in the War of the Gulf of 1991 (a regular war), using his different types of SCUD (ballistic antiquated missiles of calculable paths) with conventional heads. And that Hamas, in the totally asymmetric conflict at ends of 2012, was throwing with great profusion and diffusion theirs over Israel’s south and center. Managing to reach without any precision Tel Aviv’s beaches and the suburbs of Jerusalem, using the missiles facilitated by Iran. That is to say, almost all the types of existing units are necessary, incorporating them In a balanced and sufficient combination, to attend to the challenges of the different armed conflicts.

The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (not driven planes of exploration and of bombardment) also has content and usefulness here. But always operating as part of the «combined weapon sets». The planes without crew can substitute profitably one «reconnaissance long range patrol» (exploration patrol in the operational enemy zone). To confirm with the sights the presence of an eminent enemy chief, hidden between the walls and courts of his shelter residence, placed in a cultural and ethnically related to him country. An exploration patrol would assume undue risks in the deep interior of an hostile territory. And even they might precisely and cleanly execute him with the AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles. If it was not because the most probably of doing it (that belongs to God!), which is looked for by the «overkilling», «over liquidating» the enemy. In spite of the «dead and injured men and collateral property damages», that grow this way lateral and exponently. And the almost neurotic «body count» or checking the corpse or the remains, to properly value the mission. Both are «appearances» (or spiderwebs, as is preferred) taken root in the mind and know how of the commands and military doctrines of the USA.

For example, when they tried, with only a pure attrition action, to operationally destroy the long distance and distribution transports and the logistic support structures (stores and distribution centers towards the different enemy supply areas of its tour, sections with hard surfaces roads, vehicles repair centers, etc.) of the Route Ho Chi Minh. Using the «saturation bombardments» of the B-52 (a strategic bomber in constant tactical missions!) and the most precise attacks of their ground support bombers. These were principally the AC-130, with diverse variants, and the light bomber B-576, a highly improved device, designed from the British Canberra of the 50s of the 20th century. The Route allowed enough abaster to the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese forces in the «demilitarized zone», between both Vietnamese republics, and at the south of that. And it was thinking up from North Vietnam across this of Laos. The support bombers were attacking in the night the trucks’ rest parks and the trucks marching groups. And, following came the “body count”, using airplanes with cameras. Looking to measure and quantify the success of the missions of the Command Hunt (or Command for the Route). The problem was that, the following day, the whole attacked section of the route was turning out to be unpolluted, without debris, not even any residue. The junior Americans officials explained ironically it, speaking about the effective action of a «Great Laotian Truck Eater Monster». That was taking charge at dawn, stubbornly cleaning the route for the North Vietnamese. For 1972, the total of enemy vehicles destroyed in the Uncle Ho’s Route, according to the most rigorous body count, was overcoming in more than 50% the calculated by the Military Intelligence in the total North Vietnamese park.

And this has continued happening in the «stage» of the War called of the Information. Whose paradigm or principal metaphor, is the computer and its derivatives. It was supposed that, after the «dispersion» created by the introduction of the internal combustion engine in the operations, it should turn to give a major sensation of control and security in the area of their direction and control. And allow to automate many of the of the military operations’ phases. But, during the so called Kosovo’s War, the Serbian were high capable of teasing the ultramodern sensors of the NATO’s airplanes. Using for it cheap artifices of elementary technology: as were the diverse camouflages, the decoys or false targets and the fleeting emission of their machines. When the «fog» in the air operations vanished, their inefficiency, after 78 days of bombardments, was evident. And in this period, the NATO was encouraged by a false sensation of success. «Newsweek» published an article in the year 2000, where appeared an investigation realized by USA Air Force years ago, to «measure» the results of those air raids. So, they detected the rests of 14 tanks (of the 120 initially «targets reached»), of 18 armored infantry transport vehicles (for 220 «targets reached» declared) and of 20 towed or self-propelled artillery pieces, while they confirmed in its moment up to 450 «struck» pieces. More things of the electronics, optics and the great distance to the enemy…


The Western Defense and the Great Strategy of his Nations

Since more than two decades, the USA has been systematically reducing his Defense budgets. Free of the threat of a global confrontation with the USSR and his allies of the Warsaw Pact, the USA has dedicated growing quantities of the contributors money to increase their squalid «social public expenditures». But, the USA is something more than a «continent in their self», only subject to the mercantile globalization. They are the principal pillar of the West Defense. And they are one of his two poles or vital, active, ideological and complementary nodes. And the other are Western and Oriental Europe, joined now with their anxieties of freedom and by a several social and economic systems, that are imperfect, but assumed and in development.

Development of the situation of weakness.

During the application of the Marshall Plan (known there as the European Recovery Program, name toked from the general of five stars George Marshall, chief of the High Staff of the US Army during the World War II and Secretary of State in 1947) for the reconstruction and development of Western Europa, this was nourished with the American assistances and investments. And before his voracious Red enemy «ad portam», that might cross theoretically the German plains in a few hours and reach Hamburg and the Benelux, the western Europeans did not have to realize relevant expenses for their Defense. Europe was entrusting it to the weapon systems and the soldiers of the USA. Which were covering and threatening the whole low abdomen of the Red Czars Empire. Forming so placed a protective insulating cordon, from the North Atlantic up to the Pacific Ocean and creating strategic alliances from the NATO to the SEATO (or South East Asia Treaty Organization). If we want to estimate how much money and effort the Europeans saved themselves, been able to do without these inevitable expenses of pure survival, we can see an example. The overwhelming weight of the military expenses that supported the USSR in his last ten years, was the necessary reason, though not sufficient, of their social economic asphyxiation. That took them to the inevitable precipice in 1989. A second range Soviet leader accepted later that, «we even did not have anything to eat».

But Europe also was contributing an ideological counterpoint, a psychological balance and a socio cultural magma to this transversal «mutual exchange» in the West. That were giving to the USA, continuity, sense and belonging to a tradition and to an active, enterprising, expansive, Christian and millenarian idiosyncrasy. That were taken root in the Greeks, the Romans, the Christian Revelation and the identities and baggages of the peoples westernized successively. This helps to constantly create and adapt the collective identity of the USA and his raison d’être as «primus inter pares» of this actual civilization. And this «double osmosis» of thoughts, experiences and identities, creates the modern western society, as we know her. That, with all his failures, mistakes and faults, continues being the «social identity and entity» more anticipated social, political and economically. And the one that more individual and collective rights recognizes to her citizens and inhabitants.

Now the purple and the control in West weighs to the USA. And, in the retreating phase of one of their vital cycles, they have partly forgotten their belonging to the Western Civilization » dependent of the international commerce». But this multi polar world is not safer than that of the two antagonistic irreconcilable, liberal and communist, social blocks, which disappeared almost 15 years ago. Let’s see several examples of prominent «nodes» in the actual «multi polar network» of nations and their associations and alliances. An expansionist China governed by the Communist Party, who looks for regional alliances, for the moment only with commercial interests towards the scanty and strategic materials, with the emergent countries of all the continents. And that tries to create her «sphere of influence and co prosperity» of great metropolis in the western Pacific Ocean. A full of contradictions Russia, a great power that always has reacted and has grown bolder with the dangers and vital difficulties, with an increasing importance and ambition. The South American and African continents, in that almost only the lack of leaders and effective elites, which are the principal antidote against the corruption and the lack of stable investments, hinder and stop an exuberant and endured economic and social expansion during decades. A Middle East and a north of Africa in full social boiling, that are guided by an expansive, global and exclusive religion in her more vindicator interpretations. More than for a few democratic «green buds», which do not have any tradition in their social idiosyncrasies.

A stationary and bureaucratized Europe, very advanced technologically and developed. But that is ideologically lethargic and without «reasonable illusions». That motivate and stimulate it to the social phase of motivation and expansion of a new cycle. And without having attacked to his time, still, the most difficult integration of his supranational institutions. To that there are opposed passively all the national and European bureaucracies, for his own inert existential weight, and in reason to the structural present and future complications and to the zones of power in game. That motivate and stimulate it to the phase of socials motivation and expansion in a new vital cycle. And without having undertook in time, still, the most difficult integration of her supranational institutions. To which are passively opposed all the national and European bureaucracies, by their own inert existential weight. And in reason to the structural present and future complications and to the zones of power in game. Because only when the belonging to a social superior entity produces social, political and economic tangible benefits, will be when the peoples, regions and many of their leaders appreciate, be interested and prefer the Joined Europe, to a commercialized and amorphous union of European nations.

Correction of the course of the Western Defense towards an expansion phase .

The USA and the countries of the old Europe must remember that the expansion and yet the maintenance of the civilizations begin with the arrival of the colonists, merchants and adventurers. That assume the first risks in interacting with local natives and create the first bonds between strangers. In order that all they start feeling interestedly complementary between them. And without nobody perceives between them a potential threat. That the falling back civilizations or yet «stable and crystallized», create an existential emptiness. That attracts and favors the penetration, deployment and new developments in the neighboring civilizations.

And that no healthy civilization cannot be supported without a sufficient Armed Forces. That must assume and face the different and yet contradictory challenges of the three classes of conflicts or modern wars: the regular, the nuclear and the irregular. In the European intervention in Libya, authorized only for the air protection of the civilians, was observed that the Europeans lack, for example, of airplanes of supply of fuel in flight. And these had to be facilitated by the USA, to carry out our air interdiction missions and of bombing the reinforced positions and the tanks of Libyan government. And the ground attacking French aviation to support the operations of the French and of Mali troops has also needed the airplanes of supply in flight of the USA. To be able to increase her attack to land capacities, in firepower, effective range and time of service and optimize his offensive flights. And to displace from Azawad’s Islamic Republic, in the north of Mali and with a surface of 600 thousand Km2. (The major European country, France, only has 550 thousand Km2.), all the radical islamist groups (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib, Ansar al-Dine and others), that established themselves in Mali at the beginning of 2012, when Gaddafi was eliminated. The significant European lacks are not corrected in reasonable time due to the national diminishing budgets, which we have to apply in an economic long stagnation phase. But, also, due to the own absence of an European sufficient, integrated and flexible Defense Politic.

Nevertheless, in May, 2012 a summit conference of NATO took place in Chicago, to define his joint strategy for Afghanistan and to deep into the «Smart Defense». And, on the occasion of its preparations, at the end of April, 2012, the General Secretary of the NATO, the Danish Anders Fogh Basmussen declared that: «I do not believe that Europe is being militarily threatened just now, during this crisis». Is it necessary to see the wolf’s ears to buy and to provide the shepherds with dogs and cudgels? How much time is necessary in creating new units in combat capacity and in designing, making and deploying new weapon systems?





Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

His tactical and operative employ in the marches and combats.

Once inserted the tanks army inside the enemy operational zone, his employ was generally much separating of the Soviet theory of the mechanized modern war of «maneuvers». The mechanized or tanks brigades were often used in untidy or even rash form. They were separated and simultaneously looked for many aims, using the maximum possible operating speed: To displace towards the west, pushing them, the major possible number of enemy units or other times, to cut off them. To liberate many populations, villas and places. And to attack in a too much broad sector, all the enemy units that were occupying defensive positions in it.

The logistics left a lot to be desired even for these elite units, as they were moving away from his lines and were consuming his initial resources. The units and small units were lacking equipments, armament, supplies, ammunitions and food. And the scanty and late restoration of the long-suffering falls, dead, injured and sick men, had very soon and almost permanently the units below his maximum authorized endowment. This tightened to the maximum the resources and men was leading to the units to a chronic lack of sufficient combat and operational movement capacities, in the spears of advance detached by the battalions, in the way of companies and even platoons. And without these combined joint capacities it is not possible to exercise a real, solvent and devastating “influence” on the enemy. That would move towards the units and their commands in the shape of “waves of commotion”, through the enemy rear. Except that, during a time, the enemy believes it or is in worse operational conditions that the attacker.

Frequently the offensive operations were realized without operational exploration, not even of combat, lacking the small attacking unit of information or intelligence about the enemy, his means and supports and his positions, and let’s not say on his intention. The formation of assault, even in these elite infantry units was usually the more or less thin line of advance (in «guerrilla»), formed transversely in the direction indicated by the chief of company command to the platoons chiefs, without any intentional deployment in depth and with scanty support of organic heavy machine guns or mortars. It is worth indicate that in last 2 complete years of war (spring, 1943 to spring, 1945) it was very normal, according to the above mentioned thing, that the endowment of a company was from 20 or 30 to 50 men, as the maximum.

When the aim was important or extensive, 2 companies were deployed by wings, serving the rough direction given as limit between their advance strips, to prevent them from intermingling the platoons. It was then very possible to count with artillery support from the brigade. For example, a battery of reactive artillery of 132 mm., the Katiuskhas, with 4 rockets launchers with 16 tubes each one on Zil 6X6 trucks, that were shooting more or less simultaneously, turning the surface target into a destruction zone. Or, in case of see or be waited enemy tanks, they were receiving the support of a 2 or 3 tanks T-34-85 platoon. Or, later, type JS-2 with the 122 mm. cannon, with a much slower shooting speed. Since, for industrial difficulties, it had the projection load separated from the perforation or explosive round. Already in 1944, with the foreign territory occupied by Germany very restricted, it was frequent to see the Tigers or Panthers or the assault or antitank cannons, supporting German small and fixed defense positions.

The German fortification works, in the great majority of his fixed rejection positions, were scanty and of circumstances, except in the big occupied populations. They consisted in more or less long trenches, infantry foxholes and shooting positions of the heavy weapons, and vertical cuts and reinforcements of the natural obstacles. Generally, they had too much reinforced and hided points, which could be used then as alternative positions, and they were lacking men to manned these. The usual ignorance of their enemy, was often leading that the attacking Soviet line, without noticing, was left to approach up to the last tens of ms. of the supposed defensive occupied positions. Then, it was counter-attacked from flank or reverse by one or two of German infantry platoons, commanded by an energetic official, that had slipped out of the defensive perimeter and were remaining hidden. The security lack to the flanks and of proper depth deployment of the attacking forces, as well as battalion reserves, provoked that the attacking unit was destroyed and repelled, with more or less falls. The Germans did not usually pursue. And sometimes, taking advantage of his enemy reverse, they get from their positions at full light and without major measures. And to retreat. And even, without being received, to move to another defense support point more in their rear.

Neither the Soviet tanks units were enduring too much better. They were using in their marches or even in the assaults, too much known and stereotyped deployments, and without taken care habitually of the exposed flanks. This could be taken advantage by some German veteran tanks unit. The count Hyazinth Strachwitz von Gross-Zauche and Camminetz is almost not known in West. For the simple reason he fought during almost 4 years of war in the East front. He managed to be rewarded with the Gentleman’s Cross of the Iron Cross (that was hung of the neck). And that he was successively adorning it with the Oak Leaves and the Diamond swords for her. He was one of the best commanders of a panzer regiment. And his successes might assume at equal parts, to a good tactical sense and a particular knowledge of the Russian idiosyncrasy. He gave his better tactical blow being already major general and commander of the panzers of the North armies group, in the autumn of 1944. His front sector was in calmness, being reorganized the Soviets, and Hyazinth Strachwitz sensed beforehand where they would attack on having renewed the offensive. With only 4 tanks he deeply penetrated behind the enemy lines and established an ambush over the supposed approximation zone of to the front. In its moment appeared at full speed a small Soviet tanks unit, completely ignorant of the presence of the German tanks, that was destroyed. More tank units were approaching and followed the same luck. Incredibly, the Soviet commanders allowed that the massacre should continue, without establishing the combat exploration or the march security or, at least, verify the origin of the enemy so precise fire. After about an hour of the first shot of German cannon, in the ambush zone (killing zone) were lying the smoking and deformed remains of 105 Soviet tanks. Almost equal of inexplicable was that the count returned behind his lines with his 4 intact tanks.

The Soviet great combats in the German rear.

When the Soviets were waiting the presence of the panzer corps or divisions, that were the only enemy great units that could attack their mobile corps with profit, the tanks army was advancing in the German operational zone with more prudence. His marching groups were forming a deployment that was guaranteeing tactical cohesion, protection against surprises and combat capacity.

The fuels supply was the first Achilles’ heel of the Soviet great mobile units. Though the infantry divisions of the Fronts were always continuing after their mobile corps, to support them, consolidate the enemies’ clear regions and garrison the populations, their pedestrian speed was insufficient to reach them rapidly. This way, sometimes a mechanized or tanks corps could remain aground and isolated. And on him were falling rapidly all the mobile reserves that the Germans could have to hand in the zone and which employment was not unprotecting other sector. On having known their near forced detention, the mobile corps were immediately going on to the defensive action and were establishing their campaign fortifications. The mechanized corps resisted well, in spite of the falls. But the tanks corps, smaller and less complete, were swept off easier by the panzer and their mechanized infantry. These cases happened even in 1944.

In these cases, always came a moment in which it was supposed that the Soviets had fought well and that already they could not win, nor get out of the combat and move back. Then, the crews and the soldiers of these elite units were dispersing in small groups, leaving behind their valuable heavy equipments and were trying to infiltrate up to their lines. And this was very difficult to get. But this was a war for the survival and mercilessly. And already Stalin had indicated the luck of the Soviet prisoners of war, if they were managing to survive the captivity in the deep rears of the Reich, his allies and the occupy countries. And that had surrendered too soon to the Germans, specially at the beginning of the war. Charging the enormous military national effort in their following comrades and the people. «Nothing will be forgotten, nobody will be forgotten”.

When the situation was difficult, the Soviets were not hesitating to spend an Army of tanks to stop the enemy by pure attrition.

In the tanks battle of for Prokhorsvka’s villa on July 12, 1943, as part of so called Kursk’s battle, faced the 5º tanks army of the Guard of the general Romistrov against 2º panzer army corps of the SS, commanded by general Hausser. The Soviets were counting with approximately 900 tanks and assault cannons, but were not joining any of the modern SU-152 assault cannons, the so called «beasts killer» (Tigers, Panthers) and the majority (around 500) of their tanks were T-34 76,2 mm, which could not distantly perforate the Tigers’ frontal shielding. The Germans had around 600 tanks (of them, approximately 100 were Tigers) and assault cannons. But none of these were of the Ferdinand or Elephant model. These only were used in the north attack on Kursk’s salient.

The Germans advanced towards the village with the Tigers forming the top of a great blunt wedge, with the Panzer IV and III covering the flanks and the assault cannons in its interior. The Soviets went to get them. The shock of the armored masses of both armies transformed in a fierce and chaotic whirlwind. The speed and the great maneuverability of the T-34 allowed them to very rapidly advance to reach the nearby fighting distances. Which would allow them to attack the Tigers with fruit and preferably at the flank. These would lose this way their advantage of being able to do effective fire at long distances and keeping the invulnerability of his frontal shield. The combat developed in multitude of small actions between 2 or 3 tanks.

The result of the battle was undecided. The Germans lost approximately 300 vehicles, including numerous Tigers, and the Soviets suffered the fall of approximately 450 vehicles. Though initially the Soviets moved back, remaining the Germans in control of the area, the Soviets recovered it little later. With what the Germans could not recover all their damaged or broken down tanks, which were total falls in their units.

The modern evolution lines of the Soviet operational strategy until 1989.

After the irruption of the Fronts or Soviet groups of armies in Eastern Europe and all the broad of the front of the East, the Soviet theoretics and the high commanders realized the need to change the structure of their tanks armies and corps. In effect, the urban, industrial and semi urban areas of the European East were demanding a major employment of the infantry support for the fight in them. They were new types of areas, full of obstacles to the advance and innumerable covers and/or «concealing relative heights», highly suitable to the active defense in depth. Here, the mechanized infantry (it was begun to call also motorized, though it was using the «combat» armored vehicles) was the principal weapon of the fighting. Also in the predictable future, a possible tactical nuclear war or not towards the Western Europe, would even accentuate this need of the motorized infantry.

It is not until 1965, 12 years after Stalin’s death, in which are started recognizing the contributions and the works of the mentioned theoretical purged military men. Assuming already to each person theirs ones and not as part of an ambiguous and impersonal Soviet military collective popular thinking school.

In turn the tanks armies and theirs corps and divisions units were adapting and changing. This way were created the so called «operational maneuver groups» (O.M.G.), destined to the exploitation in the lands of West Germany and Benelux in the decided operational directions. They could be formed by one or two tanks armies, reinforced in infantry and artillery. But their battle orders changed with the time and with the appearance of the atomic tactical weapon (missile, air and artillery). This brought the dispersion of the deployment after the irruption in several tanks and mechanized corps. That would advance very unfolded by all the attainable ground routes of the enemy area, to avoid to turn into an eligible target for the atomic fire. Also for they would have to approach with rapidity and unfolded to the “forward limit of the enemy positions”. The speed of march and the precision and range of the heavy direct fire would compensate their dispersion and the loss of shock. So achieving an effect of «crumbling of the enemy rear» thanks to the higher number of insertions and exploitations in the Western Front and its depth rear.




Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

The structure and combat capacities of the tanks armies.

They were formidable war machines. Each one was integrated by 2 tanks corps and a mechanized corp, with all the auxiliary services and necessary supports. Having a very variable personnel, between 40 and 65 thousand men, according to the availabilities of means and workforce and the needs of the different operational plans of the Stavka.

The first unit that was according to this concept was activated in June, 1943. Previously also existed “great mobile units” like so called. But they really were conglomerates of tanks brigades reinforcing infantry divisions, generally «of the Guard». The most famous was probably the «Group Popov», commanded by the general of this surname. At the beginning of 1943 was employed against the operational rear of the Don armies group of Marshall Erich von Manstein, that operated in all the south of the USSR. It was thrown by the Southwest Front of general Vatutin in the direction Pavlograd-Zaporozhe, towards the mouth of the river Dnepr in the Black Sea. Seeking to isolate and surround all the German forces at the east of the river, in a large-scale reproduction of Stalingrado’s Soviet ring, which had just fallen down in the Red Army‘s hands. The principal counterattack thrown by Manstein against the group Popov, was in charge of 48th panzer army corp and a SS panzer corp. Both forming the 4th panzer army under the command of the colonel general Hermann Hoth, which destroyed it. Erasing it from the Soviet Battle Order, until it was reformed and re-equipped and re-trained its units.

By 1944 existed up to 26 tanks corps and 11 mechanized corps in the Soviet army, but until January was not activated the 6º tanks army. Sometimes a tanks army had 2 mechanized corps, but this was very rare, because these were the most necessary great and scanty units of the operational Soviet strategy. On the other hand, for fighting in the areas of bad or difficult “transitability” (with more conceptual wealth that only «bad ongoing»), forests, mountains and snow covered or swampy zones, the Soviets were using a combination of a mechanized corp with other of cavalry. Of these mobile horse-mechanized armies never were more than 2 or 3 in the Soviet Battle Order. These and the tanks armies could be equivalent in power, punch and operational movement capacity to the German panzer army corps. But these were always more numerous, for example, even in the year 1944 the Germans were counting with between 10 and 18 panzer corps, it is true that with very different capacity, according with the available means.

The Soviet tanks corps was equivalent to the panzer division. It was formed by 3 battalions of main battle tanks and 3 infantry battalions, supposedly mechanized or motorized. It was completed by some artillery and heavy tanks or assault cannons and other auxiliary units. It theoretically had 240 tanks and assault cannons, while the panzer division had up to 150 vehicles of these types. Nevertheless, this one was better balanced as combined arms great unit. Possessing 12% more men (up to approximately 13.300) and 20% more infantry, better mechanized (approximately 4.500 men).

The mechanized corps was the major unit «type western division» formed by the Soviets. In relation to the panzer divisions, it was possessing 26% more of men, 17% more of infantry and 152% more of tanks and assault cannons, which were partly replacing certain deficiency in artillery, which was always towed, not self-propelled. It was much more than a panzer grenadiers division and was equivalent to the major panzer divisions. But his lack of motorized transport, 19% less, was making it less consisting in his operations that the German last mentioned.

For its part, the Soviet shock armies were great units formed by infantry divisions, generally of the Guard, reinforced by some artillery divisions and several tanks brigades of (that were equivalent to the mentioned «battalion» and had approximately 65 tanks) and engineers brigades, according to the plans of the Stavka. They were destined to assault the most strengthened and defended extensive positions in the German front. And to guarantee the irruption, without taking care so much their losses.

Their operational movement capacity was very deficient.

A great handicap of the Soviet tanks armies was the absence in them of the infantry combat vehicles or of transport (carriers), lightly armored and generally roof opened in this epoch, for the supposedly mechanized infantry. Destined to accompany the tanks, across all the grounds. Forming part of the mechanized or tanks brigades, which were the tactical subunits of those.

During their advance, the infantries in occasions had for their transport North American Studebaker, very resistant trucks. And other times they had to travel very much. Though the most frequent was that the infantry battalions mounted, as unexpected riders, on the tanks of the tanks battalion of their brigade. In any case, as the missions were many and divergent, in the operational surroundings of their aim, the infantries were dismounting and covering afoot the last tens of km up to his arrangement zones. These flying columns operating in depth in the German rear that was crumbling, were systematically attacked by the German aviation, which caused large devastations in they, at least in material. In addition, when they were going towards specially sensitive aims for the Germans, in which these were concentrating their tactical aviation, the mobile groups were forced not to circulate by day.

Why could this happen with so important units Soviet units? Because the Soviet fighters, which bases and airports were staying deeply behind his lines, did not have sufficient action range to watch and protect permanently all their journeys. And neither they were always carrying in their “marching groups”, organic anti-aircraft defense means. That would complicate more their weak and meager logistics. This was stopping them in that advance without consideration to the losses, which the middle and low chiefs were using

excessively. To fulfill the severe requirements that their Superiors were marking and the political deputies were monitoring about their fulfillment. It was frequent that in the attached epigraphs of the commanders orders, specially «of combat «, was including the paragraph «I will submit to a martial court the official who does not use to the maximum his means».

(to be continued)



Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

From 1943, after the breakthrough of the German semi continuous fronts by the shock or infantry armies of the Soviet Fronts or «armies groups», these sent their more mobile great forces, the tank armies, to the interior of the enemy operational zone. To keep intact their combat and of operational movement capacities, it was tried that they were not taking part in the previous irruption, breakthrough and securing operations in the passing sector, at charge of the mentioned infantry or shock armies.


Everything approximately begins with Tujachevski’s «bad» experiences, as commander of the Western Front in the war of 1920 of the USSR against Poland. This way, inferred «the inability to destroy the enemy army in a wide modern front, with an alone blow, in a great battle. What was forcing to achieve this strategic goal by means of a series of battles». The guide of this battles succession would be the operational strategy. So giving coherence, strategic sense and joint in the time and space to the military efforts and decisions. Before the «costly» successes of industrialization of the Five-year Soviet Plans, until the 30s of the 20th century, the operational level remained limited to this successive series of battles. Because the Red forces were integrated essentially by infantry, artillery and cavalry. Weapons restrained, by their essential limitation in the advance speed, to always using this string of victorious battles towards his strategic goals in the military theaters.

Parallel, other Soviets theoretics were working on a new, «more «scientific» strategy, as would correspond with the country «new order», for the employment of the Red Army. So, V. K Triandafillov published in 1929 the book «The nature of the operations of the modern armies». And in the Field Manual (ustav) of the Red Army of 1929, coordinated by A. A. Svechin, many of his ideas were included. In February, 1933, the army issued his Provisional Instructions to organize the battle in depth, which were extended in March, 1935. And the Field Manual of 1936, prepared with Tujachevski’s supervision, which already had 44 years, and Yegorov, was establishing the basic principles for the deep battle and the variants of the operations in the enemy rear. Triandafillov died prematurely on July 12, 1931 in an aviation accident near Moscow. This saved probably him of suffered a few years later the politician paranoiac pursuit of Stalin. The Stalinist purge of the 37s and 38s materially liquidated a generation of high commanders and officials, that had devoted themselves to the study, definition and development of the military operational art. This way, Egorov, Kamenev, Svechin, Tujachevski, Uborovich and others less out-standing, were purged and executed. Their ideas and theories in development turned pale and were guarded, up to well entered the Great Patriotic War. The great units necessary for the employment of operational theory were dismembered in their basic components or units of every Arm, for their easier conduction and employment. And the frightened surviving commanders became much more conservative, stick on to the received orders as limpets, and unwilling to assume even the calculated risks. These insanities inconstancies and caprices of the envy and the poor self-esteem of a predator and distrustfully Red Fuehrer, incapable of the minor empathy, cost more than million casualties to the Red Army, in the first months of the war in the East.


The tanks armies, which only reached the number of sixIn the whole immense Soviet Order of Battle, were using principally in the most promising strategic or operational and even political directions, of the whole extensive war front in the European East. And according to the criteria of the Stavka or High Staff of the Soviet armed forces, under the direct control of the comrade Stalin. Therefore, many groups of Soviet armies or Fronts were not possessing them. They were the elite of the elite of the great Soviet units. And for their men’s endowment and equipments it was tried that were the best available ones and to full theoretical endowment, at least before their insertion in the enemy rear. This way, at the end of 1943, when the Soviet war machinery was acting in full sweeping offensive, only 320.000 men belonged to the mechanized or motorized forces, from the total of more than 4 million men of the Soviet Ground Forces. The need to provide them those, like the aviation, the navy and the artillery with the better educated and trained troops, was letting the infantry numerous forces (around 490 divisions, which were in stable number from 1943) with the most awkward men and the worse formed and equipped. Though the Red Army of the Workers and Peasants (RKKA, the Russian Рабоче-Крестьянская Красная Армия, Raboche-Krestianskaya Krasnaya Armia) was not called officially Soviet Army until 1946, for practical reasons we prefer calling him this way in this work.

The development of the mobile forces and their aims in the Soviet military doctrine.

When one speaks about the massive assaults, by successive big waves, of the Soviets, it is necessary to look for the tactical and human explanation of in the iteration of efforts that marks their doctrine. And in the military and yet imperfect school formation of their men, specially the infantries. Nevertheless, to the favorable and unfavorable characteristics of his national fighting for the survival, in the so called «Great Patriotic War», they could adapt all their social, economic and military efforts. Creating, for example, a number very limited of tanks and cannons of assault models, sobers, easy to handle, hard, rapid, with fuels more advantageous in their combustion Carnot’s cycle and with great fire power, already from the beginning. And that then made for many tens of thousands of units. Delivering a sub-machine gun to many infantries, forcing them this way to assault the enemy, to make him to feel the neutralization massive fire at their shooting effective distance (not more than 70 meters), to have some opportunity to live then. Towards the half of the war, the Soviets had working the incredible number of 310 officials’ schools, with more than 350.000 cadets, which formed during the war approximately 2.000.000 new officials. These were in charge, in their small units, together with the NCO, of giving a more or less military formation to the replacements that in them were received, proceeding from the successive levies of men and women of any age and condition.

The high Soviet commanders knew that, on an equal footing, their men were more worse soldiers than the Germans, especially in the offensive operations. Therefore, they had to win at least all the battles that were turning out to be transcendental in their effort of war. First to survive and, then, to conquer Germany and extend their recently established «political social order» in the Eastern Europe. The secret was residing in the exploitation of the enemy operational zone. That was badly defended by a first line without operational depth, chronically scanty of sufficient and effective antitank weapons, and, especially, chained to a rigid repulse, without transfer of space, by the myopic and distrustful top Nazi directives. And the designed weapon, from the doctrine of the deep penetration, developed by the ill-fared marshall Mikhail Tujachevski and others until 1936, and desperate taken again after the first great reverses in the war, was the top use of the select and scanty armies. That theoretically might reasonably penetrate several hundreds of km in the enemy rear.

In the rest of the large sectors of the front, the Soviets either were kept in the defense. And they were masters in the establishment and functioning of strengthened, almost impenetrable areas, zones and even «regions». Or their infantry divisions, with the support of their very scanty organic tanks or that assigned in tactical subordination and reinforced or not with some Katiuskas’s brigade and some heavy artillery regiment, to realize secondary assaults with limited aims. If the operation was more promising, the Stavka could assign to them some mechanized corps, the mobile more important great unit, always centralize controlled, or, at least, a tanks corps. Though during 1941 and 1942, 80 % of the heavy and campaign artillery was divisional, already at the beginning of 1944, 65 % was not divisional and was integrated to great independent units, the artillery divisions, formed by regiments. This organization was serving to concentrate it crushingly and very effectively in the most promising directions, decided by Stalin and his Stavka, and to facilitate and assure the break in.

The operational zone, its functions and weaknesses.

The operational zone, with a depth in this epoch from 18-20 km to 75-80 km from the front, is the geographical space where develops the process of turning the «mass of support» from the strategic rear (forces, supports, communications, logistic organization and HHQQ) into «units of action», specialized and qualified for their employment against the enemy, with the type of fight decided or imposed by him.

The critical elements of this zone, which is the physical support of that military activity, are: the communications of all kinds: the spaces of maneuvers and operations (zones of units unfolding, waiting, reorganization, re equipment, preparation, advance, provided with covers or non enfilade towards the enemy); the units of engineers and of operational reconnaissance (I include both them for their shortage, importance and universality of employment); the logistic means (centers of data processing and of operations control, warehouses and manipulation means, long distance and delivery transport and delivery areas); and the intelligence centers and those of the operational controls.

The operational zone must have the sufficient depth to be able to contain, deploy, drive, supply and direct the sufficient number of units close to the front, following the necessary spears of advance or attack. To repeat the efforts against the enemy and to obtain the tactical aim that raises or are decided. One differs very marked in the real depth (used) between the zones of the two antagonistic or enemy rivals, indicates a latent tactical weakness of one of them. Either for less military resources or for a slower advance or deployment for the combat of his strategic reservations, from his deep rear. This can be detected by the aviation of exploration. Deprived the active forces of a front of their operational zone, which makes able, supports and stimulates them, the survival of the whole front sector affected is impossible after a short time, for depletion or consumption. The moral effects of the loss of the positive expectations help to precipitate the collapse of this front. The forces will tend to move back or to be called towards the rear, to treat to protect the functional elements that allow them to operate tactically. In effect, for the defense of the operational zone, given the combative defenselessness of her “functional elements” and the scanty combat readiness and the lack of cohesion of the units that wait, reform and are re-equipped there, only we can possess in general the operational already prepared reserves, preferably mobile, and with the deepest and slower reserves of this sector or of the contiguous ones.

The presence in force of a tanks army, deployed in numerous more or less parallel routes of march, fulling all the available roads and paths, generates a great threatening «sector» and always unforeseen in the enemy rear. With an «operational efficiency» extended to his right, to his left side and towards the front. The «real threat» exercised by the mobile groups is a direct function of the distance to their possible aims, measure in «reaching times»; of their «operational movement capacity» to approach them and of their «combat capacity» to damage or occupy them. This creates an «influence», a gigantic «leverage» on the enemy affected zone, altering, dismantling, breaking it and, even, making it prematurely collapse, and without great attrition combats.




The Last Operational Projections opposite to the Most recent Threats.

The balance of the nuclear weapons between both great atomic hegemonic powers («guides and leaders» of their partners), is defined by the new START Treaty. This has been ratified on December 22, 2010 by the American Senate. And is hoped that the Russian Duma ratifies it, after her established by protocol study, in an only voting at the beginning of 2011. This new agreement replaces the START of 1991, which expired on Saturday, the 5th of December, 2009.

The START 2 supposes a qualitative and substantial limitation of the number of heads and nuclear strategic vectors of the USA and Russia. Far are the times in which the number of operational, stored and dismantled by pieces nuclear devices were reaching 50000 between both. By 2013, each country will deploy only 1550 strategic nuclear warheads and will have 800 carrying and multicarrying vectors for them: submarines, free flight rockets, ballistic rockets and planes. Also is established a new system of inspection of the arsenals and nuclear means.

Several are the deficiencies or topics not solved by the Treaty. One is the not limitation to developing the defense systems against the vectors. Also is kept the storage freedom of not operational warheads and of deployment of the atomic tactical weapons. Between both «models», each signatory power can have nowadays near 6000 warheads. The tactical nuclear weapon, destined to the battlefield, can be an intermediate step in a direct warlike confrontation between nuclear powers. Before using the nuclear strategic volleys against the operational or deep enemy rears. The USA claims that, at least, the last two topics been an object of a later treaty.

The rigorous limitations of the nuclear weapons do not eliminate them. No weapon has never been abolished, once acquired and extended the technology for his manufacture and use. It is necessary to learn to coexist indefinitely with them. An excessive control (very few explosive heads and vectors) does that they all are directed to attack the enemies population and industrial centers. This paradoxically goes in opposition with the pacifists aspirations. When the number of weapon systems overcomes a survival or practical threshold, it allows to follow an atomic flexible, variable and staggered strategy. In her, many of the vectors are pointed to destroy the enemy vectors in the diverse phases of his path to the goals: in and over the hostile territory or platform; in ballistic or autonomous flight towards the goal and over the own territory, both at high and very low level. This keeps limited the number of heads destined against populations and industries. Even it allows their tactical employment against profitable goals of military enemy concentrations, specially before reaching in force the forward limit of a principal defense position.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggressions are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, the Americans are called them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebellious and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

In these irregular wars many of the parameters of the previous wars are absent. There is no declaration of war by the Legislative Power of the strong or military contender. The victory is not obtained occupying the enemy territory. The military means lose a part of his leading role, in favor of the social, economic and political means, necessary to gain the will and the fervor of the societies at the stack. The treatment and the care given by the contenders to the civil population of the guerrilla infected territory is fundamental in the development and the result of the conflict. The duration of these wars is major than that of the conventional wars. The time, necessary in order that the rebels make and develop their total war effort, works, in general, in favor of the weak or irregular contender. The military means are not adapted, at first, to the type of fighting that is asked to them. Neither exist clear goals, nor territories at stake, nor front lines or enemies deployments, nor strengthened positions. If the guerrilla are it sufficient skillful and steady, to not directly and unnecessarily confront her chronic weakness to the enemy strength.

The Great Operational Lines of the Counter Guerrillas Forces.

Nowadays, in West, in Europe, the exterior leading role of the conventional armed forces seems to center in them, throughout the time and in varied theaters. The military western action opposite to their exterior irregular global threats demands an effective, light and mobile counterinsurgency forces, specialized in not orthodox tactics and technologies, as part of the conventional troops. That must always operate in conjunction with the national forces of the countries infected by irregular hostiles and supported with decision by the own economy and the diplomacy. This will strengthen their missions and compounded role, The counterguerrillas forces must not be enslaved to the strategies and tactics of the conflicts of the second and third generation or classic contemporary ones. Though these could arise punctually in the armed conflicts with the «urchin States» of each time (for example, Iran, North Korea or Venezuela).

Some of the operational characteristics of this different type of war, but not new, are:

To always avoid a protracted war. With her the enemy organizes, spreads and strengths, sometimes irreversibly. While the military men lose way, get angry and weaken. The war of Afghanistan is squarely in this long critical period.

To always attack the concentrations and the rebel bases. These are the hard and conventional goals that they offer to the military forces. To always defend and support the own communications and to attack those of the enemy. To take advantage for it of the light armored vehicles mobility and of the aircraft, which neutralize the information of the different enemy observers.

To keep the passive defenses of the war to the possible minimum. The big «protective» and costly barracks in relatively calm zones, only serve to socially and military isolate the regular forces, from the fluid and active environment of the irregular fight. If the military forces were initially not enough, is necessary to concentrate them temporarily in fewer zones and to promote between the population the self defense forces. To always use a constant, creative and energetic patrolling. So much for the exploration and the attack, as to hinder and isolate the guerrillas from the friends or neutral populations and to cut their communications. In both cases, is necessary to keep mobile, even airborne forces, to give them supports. To use the concentrations of regular military forces only to attack the guerrilla bases or to surround and chase his operational concentrations.

This will keep the initiative and the surprise, created by the regional network of small light “action units”, in hands of the military men. That by formation, training, means and vocation should clearly overcome the hostiles in the military operations. The principal goal is not to keep a “front line” or a «cultivated field» of barracks, redoubts and forts through a whole country or strategic region. But to active destroy the combat capacity and the operational movement capacity of the armed rebels.

And only the military «initial» and continued successes, will lay the foundations for a firm, irreversible and progressive pacification of the different regions of the country.

Let’s see now succinctly the possible distribution of the military bases depending on the enemy activity. In the enemy most favorable zones, the military positions must be solid and resistant, few and with a bigger garrison. In these areas must predominate the exploration of the bands and the major offensive operations against them, over their bases, concentrations, refuges and passages.

In the zones where the rebels try to settle, progress and manage to dominate the civilians, the military positions will be more numerous and with fewer troops. These are the more changing zones, of more irregular war, of combat meetings (the ambush is it) more frequent. Here is decided, first, the advance and the progress and, finally, the victory of one of both contenders. The enemy communications and the rebellious centers in these areas are the operative goals of the loyal forces, together with the defense of the populations. Resting, partly, on local self-defense forces, reinforced by highly mobile military patrols, even transported by helicopters. Assured the defense of an area in these zones, is possible to demand loyalty to the protected population. And to begin the labors of national economic support and civic rearmament.

In the most loyal or neutral and pacific areas is necessary to test the technologies and the methods of sincere and effective approximation to the population. The self-defense native forces, supported by military mobile patrols, in charge a manageable zone, must support here the weight of keeping their own security. In this zone can be located the helitransported and the mechanized sufficient reserves. To be sent to other 2 kinds of operational zones in support or assault operations. Also the brigades of economic support and of civic rearmament, can have here his stores and central big barracks.

When scanty military means are available and the enemy sustain an all-out war, is it possible to fight against armed and motivated rebels?

Let’s see a historical example of the action of military forces against insurgents, in unfavorable conditions for them. The German antipartisans forces in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In heir manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that » the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be replied».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, by the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His anti partisans troops were consisting of an always variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German security troops and policemen; security troops of his allies in the East Front, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of «Russian» allied forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes insecure. The hard core of the units were the Germans. In the positions usually were not homogeneous troops. In them the qualities were intermingled, in order that the more mope or novice was encouraging by the presence of the forte. And it remove from him the thoughts of weakness or desertion. Before the inability to garrison her rear in the whole territory conquered from the USSR, at west of an imaginary line between Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Germans had to select very well the points to garrison. These rarely were possessing more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the position could be defended for a time. While, the rest, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor their vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of anti partisans forces, they were formed exploration and combat patrols. Something like a reconnaissance in force forces, to locate and to scourge the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, before a guerrilla threat or the location of an important concentration, even were temporarily brought troops from the first line (of the operational zone) for the assault and destruction of those, generally looking for his encircle and annihilation. I

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational goal of his anti partisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies from Germany, Poland and Romania were kept reasonably opened up to the rears of the German forces and their allies in the East Front. And the men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods flows that they received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Million Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and to there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch.


The appearance of the atomic weapon at the end of the World War II supposed a milestone in the exposition, development and manifestation of the wars. The industrial modern powers, not necessarily advanced (neither China nor India were it), could develop, on having ended the World War and in a ripeness period of around 30 years, first the nuclear weapon of fission and then that of fusion. The military revolution that supposes the atomic weapon resides in the frightening concentration of fire, in time and place, of which it is capable. For example, an atomic bomb of 20 kilotons of TNT is equivalent to the simultaneous and concentrated destruction power in a few km2 of 4 million 75 mm. rounds for the Schneider rapid shooting cannon.

The Atomic Weapon as the Center of the Fires Plan.

All that overcomes qualitatively the mobile and fixed barrages and the punctual and concentrated blows of fires used by the heavy artillery. Nevertheless, that keep their usefulness in the forms of fight without atomic weapons and as tactical complement of these: inside positions, in the fighting near the outside limit of these and in urbanized zones, in the mobile war and in the guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfares. With it, also, the atomic tactical weapon is raised as the king of the fires. And to the plan atomic fires, if existed, must adapt the fires plan and the aviation support, both in the preparation and development of the battles.

In difference with other known or existing weapon, the atomic weapon does not have a proportionality or direct, sufficient and habitual correlation between the means used for it (its different vectors are a rocket, a plane, a heavy artillery round) and the destructive instantaneous effect that it develops. And let’s not believe that at the end of the World War II the fires plan of a battle was paltry or a snot of turkey. But with the atomic weapon it is necessary to mobilize neither big air fleets nor artillery divisions in support, to achieve a destructive given effect.

Let’s see a case of tactical employment of the overabundance of conventional fire means. Not looking for the neutralization of the objective, but his difficult destruction. In July, 1944 the Americans were trying the break of the German front at the west of Normandy. To operationally penetrate with the Third Army of Patton in the strategic rear of this great German rejection front. The Lehr Panzer Elite Division was spreading out in static campaign fortifications, including her scanty tanks as centers of support points of the defense, at the west of Saint Ló. She was occupying a sector of 6 km abreast and 4 km in deep. On July 24, 400 American bombardiers attacked the defense positions without causing serious hurts. The following day, approximately 1600 Flying Fortress attacked systematically them. The units that were supporting the German lines were eliminated almost at complete. The ways and roads of the zone remained impracticable. Towards the midday, the area was resembling a lunar landscape. The effect on toughen, formed and motivated men was indescribable, maddening some ones.

An effect of the atomic fires is the general decrease of the efficiency of the active and passive protections. The effect of the atomic air explosion is spherical. And on a ground surface is circular. This way, the forces must spread out in subunits, looking for the circumference that borders the area, and to realize the marches in smaller or deployed groups. Avoiding this way to offer useful goals to the atomic tactical enemy fires. The armored vehicles, for their speed, maneuverability, cross-country movement and crews protection, are useful in the atomic environment fighting. The burials, in the form of trenches or reinforced pits, and the concealments, the rear slope positions, the forests and the urban and industrial (urbanized) zones, continue having an important value in the tactical defense.

The Strategic Projection of the Nuclear Weapon.

The fission weapon has a potential limited by the characteristics of her critical mass. This is the necessary mass of explosive in order that all the neutrons issued in the fission of the atoms of uranium 235 or plutonium 239, produce in turn an atomic fission and a tremendous emission of energy at an almost instantaneous speed. From a certain size, around a dozen of kilos, the own “exogenous and centrifugal” reaction drives the garbage of the reaction and the chunks of fuel still not fissioned, towards the atmosphere and the land, as part of the radioactive cloud. The fusion weapon, by her part, needs a tremendous activation energy at a temperature of million degrees. For it, she only was achieved to have when the fission weapon was at disposal. This is used as “percussion cap” for the fusion of the «explosive».

In this case, her «size» or explosive capacity only is limited by the general considerations of conception, design and assembly. It is a beyond, fundamentally technological step, which leads the atomic weapon to the areas of the national strategy and of the human morality. This way, weapons can be created with the destruction power of millions Tm. of TNT or Megatons. So, a real barbarity. To what there adds the general, extensive and indiscriminate character of the destruction on persons, equipments, goods and households in many Km around the explosion point. It is an abominable vileness, adapted for a unfavorable and implacable Final Judgment.

The Soviets, in their zeal for the more «visible big», to compensate their real lacks, managed to design the «Tsar» bomb in the 50s. It had a destructive capacity of 100 megatons. Finally, they made exploit a minor variation with almost 60 megatons of power, to avoid failures in the operation. Premier Khrushchev cynically complained that his scientists went away the hand and the device was working out slightly more powerful that the foreseen. The device detonated on October 30, 1961, in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, around 90000 Km2, in Europa’s extreme North-East, in the Arctic Ocean. Immediately after the event, ABC Daily published a front page, where they were turning out to be superposed on our Spain, the impacts of 5 of these insanity devices. We returned to the Middle Age, without capital means or productive infrastructures.

The Trends for the Wars of the XXth and XXIst centuries.

Till now, the wars were making between big and small «nations». They were the only capable of generating a «will of defense». This .made concrete in the Armed Forces and in the economy, the diplomacy and the people support of their societies. Looking for the defense of their strategic and national interests and their survival. A procedure or protocol existed for the war declaration and for the signature of the peace agreement. The one that was not respecting the honor procedure was considered to be infamous. And if he was turning out to be defeated, could wait for a severe punishment. President Roosevelt, on Monday, the 8th of December, 1941, at 12:30 pm. hour of Washington, in his speech before the American Congress assembled in Joint Session, and transmitted by radio to the nation, was declaring: «Yesterday was a day marked by the infamy…I request you declare the existence of a State of War between the United States of America and Germany, Italy, the Japanese Empire and all their Allies». And ultimately were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The contemporary wars lasted a few years. After which, exhausted the industrial capacity and the will of defense of the defeated nations, not necessarily invaded or occupied, these were accepting their defeat and the peace was signed. When the armistice or the peace conditions were too leonine and humiliating, they were originating new vital defense «impulses or take-offs» in the defeated people. Seeking to overcome and avenge the received damages and offenses. Those were the sure germ of a future war within a generation, measured in around 25 years. Just remember the treaty of Versailles or «Diktat» against Germany, signed on June 29, 1919, promoted by Georges Clemenceau, called the Tiger. Whose last payments referred to interests of the already liquidated principal debt, the reunified Germany has just done at the end of September, 2010, approximately 90 years after accepted.

The threat of the use of the atomic weapon in the war between the industrial powers, removed indefinitely the historical and recurrent danger of a war of interests of any class between them. The civil and military leaders of all of them, have exhibited throughout more than 65 years an exquisite tact, supported by the nationals diplomacy and economy, in the international relations and in the resolution of the raised conflicts. No «minor» relative question was deserving to assume the risk of an uncertain, costly nuclear warfare and without clear «victors». In any case, the big hegemonic powers or the principal ones in a strategic zone, were solving regionally his ideological and of interests fighting. And they were doing it by means of regionally limited sectoral wars. Where were fighting their partners and like-minded, local, not atomic and subsidiary nations, even out of their strategic natural zone. There we have the case of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, after the decolonization of the first one. Also the fight in the Horn of Africa between Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia, Cuba and Siad Barre’s Somalia. The latter’s overthrow, after his defeat in the war for getting the Ogaden Desert in 1991, precipitated Somalia in the chaos in which still is. And we have the Israel and the Arabic bordering countries case, which threaten her from time to time with her elimination and with throwing to the sea the surviving Jews.

The International Politics alters the initial Status Quo.

But the unstoppable proliferation of the atomic weapon between nations of cultures and idiosyncrasies very different from those of the big industrial original nations, can present a new, serious and complex problem. The nuclear threat is so radical and dangerous, that already now the «confidence» does not turn out to be sufficient in the rationality, the goodness and the good perform of all the world leaders, for its exposition and launch. The weapon systems to use will determine if the wars will be or not total. And it is necessary to apply real and practical limitations to those, which guarantee the rights of the Humanity in her survival and peace.

Let’s remember, in addition, that nobody grants the personal and collective human rights. It neither gains them nor obtains any group, supposedly anticipated and activist. They are inherent in the human nature and in all those who take part of her. What can do the political and religious collectivities is to recognize them or not and to defend them or not.

The mentioned systems include the defense systems against the military conventional vectors of the nuclear weapons: ballistic and selfguided rockets and aircraft and several types of ships. But a suicidal group can be also the vector of an atomic weapon of several hundreds of kilotons. That introduces it in an enemy urban center (city, barrack, industrial center). Any rascal power, even as part of a delirious strategy, can facilitate this type of devices to radical anti Western groups, which do not lack economic resources. This would connect intimately the types of contemporary wars.

Nowadays, the Islamic radicals are those who use with profusion and diffusion the suicides. Candidates to use this type of “arm of use and throw», do not lack to any group. And even a certain market exists between the radical Islamic groups, to punctually be facilitated «voluntaries». In the last years, the followers of the Sunna are who are using the suicide in the Islamic Yihad. It is used by al-Qaida, the Afghanistan’s Taliban of the mulhas Omar and Haqqani and the Tehkrit-e-Taliban Pakistan, the members of Hamas and the Pakistani separatists in the Indian Kashmir, accused of the assault to Bombay. The shiies of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran do not habitually use it. Though in the assault against the barracks of the western forces in Beirut in October, 1983, which was the presentation in society of Hezbollah, the drivers of the trucks, full of explosives, thrown against those, were suicidal. Also, the Iranians used their basijs militias in frontal massive assaults against the fixed reinforced positions, supported by mine fields, of the Iraqis, during the war from 1981 to 1989. The basijs were «popular militias» of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Without organization, method, discipline, resources or too much military instruction. But they were full of religious and patriotic anxieties. They were the last to come to the Khomeini revolution. And they had to demonstrate their fervor and militancy for her. In the Iranian cities they had turned into a rebellious problem for the clerical shii authorities. That canalized his redeeming impulse towards the lay enemy front. The militias were authentic, dispensable «cannon fodders».