Mes: julio 2009

El Atentado a las Fuerzas Españolas en Afganistán.

Las noticias que nos dieron.

Tras el atentado a las fuerzas españolas del 9 de noviembre de 2008, se destituyó a Rafael Casinello, como responsable de la División de Contraterrorismo del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia. La razón aducida fue que el flujo de inteligencia facilitada por su negociado era insuficiente y dependía a su vez excesivamente de la inteligencia facilitada por los estadounidenses. La inteligencia parte de la información más o menos bruta y recibida de diversas fuentes o detecciones, que es transformada por estos servicios en elaborada y, además, proyectada hacia deducciones y posibilidades para las agencias y los cuerpos a los que sirven esos servicios. Se dijo que ambos hechos, ataque y deficiencia, no estaban relacionados.

¿Qué podemos deducir nosotros, sin mayores revelaciones oficiales?

El 9 de noviembre tuvo lugar un ataque rebelde yihadista (reivindicada por los talibán) a una agrupación de marcha del ejército afgano, que era escoltada y protegida por blindados ligeros españoles. Dado que los rebeldes afganos son fuerzas de infantería ligera irregular, la protección ofrecida por las tropas españolas era suficiente para el rechazo defensivo en campo abierto.

Hemos visto fotos del lugar del ataque enemigo. Muestran una geografía muy común en Afganistán. Se trata de zonas áridas, abiertas, desprovistas de cubiertas, con largas vistas en todas direcciones. Aunque las tropas españolas sólo tuviesen un protocolo defensivo, es posible cumplirlo eficazmente y rechazar los ataques directos rebeldes.

Un vehículo que se acerca a una columna militar es siempre detectado. Como se trata de un portador de explosivos, su excesivo peso se delata por su pesado andar y la deficiente maniobrabilidad. También el alocado iluminado que lo conduce nos ofrece pistas. En Afganistán los vehículos van muy ocupados. Y este vehículo sólo lleva a su conductor. El cual va vestido de blanco, como un mártir de la Yihad. Como pasaporte para el Jardín de las Huríes se llevará consigo al mayor número posible de enemigos, muertos y mutilados. Lo que no le han dicho probablemente sus jefes locales es que la permanencia en el Jardín no es ETERNA, sino larga e indefinida. Allah, inmarcesible e inaccesible, considera que no es asunto de los pobres hombres conocer éste, su designio sobre los elegidos. Y, también, que hay otras Suras (capítulos) y Aleyas (versículos) del Noble Corán que condenan la muerte de otros musulmanes, la destrucción innecesaria de bienes, etc.

Ante las maniobras sospechosas del vehículo, que busca el rápido alcance a la agrupación de marcha, se le pueden dar por megafonía las voces de alto a suficiente distancia. Si no se dispone de megáfonos, las señas y las mantas de colores valen para los acercamientos a las medias distancias. Allá, en Afganistán, no son tontos. Y todos saben perfectamente que no deben acercarse a las columnas militares, y mucho menos de manera rápida, agresiva o ambigua. Seguidamente se puede abrir fuego de ametralladora por delante o al lado del vehículo. Los disparos por encima tienen una posibilidad de no ser advertidos. Por último, es posible alcanzar el motor o sus ruedas con precisión, antes de que se acerque a la distancia eficaz de empleo de la carga explosiva. De momento, «no hemos hecho nada que no tendríamos que hacer, ni hemos dejado de hacer nada que tuviéramos que hacer», parafraseando a Fernández de la Vega con los piratas somalíes.

¿Qué pudo pasar con nuestros hombres?

Creemos que unos pocos días antes del ataque, regresó una fuerza española, tras cumplir su tiempo de servicio. Se dijo también que algunos de los muertos acababan de llegar a destino. Los rebeldes exploran por observación. Tienen todo el tiempo del mundo para ello y su magra capacidad de combate les impide la exploración en fuerza. Junto a nuestros cuarteles, en las alturas cercanas a los caminos, siempre hay hombres observando. También tienen paciencia, cosa de la que no andan sobrados nuestros hombres. Seguramente habían detectado el cambio de fuerzas en nuestras posiciones. Y saben que cualquier relevo es un momento de debilidad para cualquier fuerza, para cualquier posición defensiva, en cualquier forma de lucha regular o irregular, de maniobra o de atrición.

Y actuaron militarmente como podían y saben hacerlo. Es absurdo pensar que vendrían los talibán con banderas verdes y negras desplegadas, tocando tambores y flautas y cantando sus himnos, a pecho descubierto contra nuestras armas automáticas ligeras y pesadas. Eso lo hicieron el Mahdí (que significa el guiado por Dios) y sus seguidores (los ansares o devotos), que vestían sus chilabas blancas, con parches de colores cosidos para significar su pobreza y humildad, en el último tercio del siglo XIX en Sudan. Por cierto, las damas de Omdurman, la capital del Mahdi, cerca de Jartum, obviaron esta «exigencia» religiosa de su mando religioso, cosiendo en las chilabas de sus maridos piezas de telas ricas, para señalar su categoría social y económica. Y así le fue a sus sucesores y a su Califato. Por «importar» formas de lucha perjudiciales, asimétricas y foráneas para ellos. ¿Cómo atacábamos nosotros a las fuerzas francesas en la Guerra de la Independencia? Es guerra y combate, no sólo construcción, educación, sanidad y buenismo.

Para más información sobre la lucha contrainsurgente en estas latitudes, se puede seguir nuestro artículos «Operaciones en Afganistán y Pakistán».

 

 

The Ardennes Battle.

Introduction.

The Intervention of Patton’s 3rd. Army in the Counterattack against the German Penetration in the Ardennes in the Winter of 1944. An Example of the Operational Employment of the Tempo, or Measure of the Proper and Effective Rapidity with which the Operations are Executed.

It is an example where appear highlighted certain qualities of a great mobile force. Which allow she to successfully overcome the high operational requirements that are asked to her. We will concentrate principally on the mental processes, on the organizational characteristics of the Great Unit, together with its long service, which made it possible to rapidly and forceful react to a very difficult exigency.

The beginning of the Allied problems in the West Front.

On December 16, 1944, Patton was keeping his 10 ª Armored Division in the village of Thonville, ready to follow the attack on Saarlautern, a population over the Sarre. Then, when everything was ready, Eisenhower ordered Patton the suspension of the offensive of 3rd. American Army in the territory of the Sarre, foreseen for the 19th. The events in the front of the VIII American Army Corps in the Ardennes, had suddenly caught, not only Eisenhower, but also Bradley, Commander in Chief of 12 º American Armies Group, where the mentioned Corp was fitted. And Montgomery, Commander in Chief of the British forces, which were operating in the north end of the European Operations Theatre.

How did work the Allied Intelligence?

Being prepared for his offensive in the Sarre, colonel Koch and his G-2 section of the 3rd. Army, had not limited themselves to the study of the enemy situation in his own front. From October, they were worrying with the increasingly numerous and clear evidences that the Germans were accumulating reserves in the front of 1st. American Army. Among them, they identified Panzer divisions, Mechanized Infantry divisions and Parachutists’ divisions. All were elite units and not simple rearguard or garrison current divisions.

The mystery was, why? It was a question of counter-attacking in Aachen’s area, where 1st. Army of the Lieutenant General T. G. Courtney Hodges was attacking? Were they destined for a attrition attack against the North flank of 3rd. Army, when this was penetrating beyond the Sarre? If they were not going to be used against any of these American advance axes on the German Reich, where was supposed that they would be? Which was the explanation of the high enemy railway transit (traffic is merchandising) on both sides of the Rhine?

At the north of 3rd. Army, in the Ardennes, the VIII Corps of general Middleton was keeping a front of 120 Km., between Monschau and Echternach. The general Middleton was possessing almost five Infantry divisions, two of which had not entered in combat yet and other two that had been severely punished in the recent combats of 1st. Army in the Hürtgen’s forest.

The more the colonel Oscar W. Koch was thinking about it, less he liked the situation that was presenting, opposite to the north flank of his Army. Called the «spark» of the 3rd. Army, Patton always had in the «war room» of Koch, which were the different probabilities of the estimations of a situation. And in the pure field of the intelligence, the general was relying on one of the most penetrating and brilliant brains of the sections G-2 or S-2 of the H. Q. and Staffs of the US Army.

In a meeting of commands and the H. Q. of 3rd. Army, on December 9, Koch presented the situation. In the front of the VIII Corps were 2,5 times the number of enemy divisions that were facing against all the 3rd. Army of Patton and 3,5 times the number of those who were facing against the 7 º American Army of the general Patch, in the south flank of 3rd. Army. Also, the enemy was relying on a rested and re-equipped Air Force, capable of putting in the air a thousand airplanes during a limited period of time. The area in front of the VIII Corps, continued Koch, was not unfavorable for the development of offensive enemy operations: none of the water streams that were crossing it, constituted important obstacles to the ground transit, the area was offering abundant covers to the sight and the Americans were not supporting in it defensive organized positions.

In general in Europe, with all the types of existing amphibious means, the principal obstacle to the modern military transit of motorized units will be offered by the banks of the water streams. It is necessary to consider the slope of both shores. And the characteristics of resistance, adherence, consistency, etc. of their ground and their immediate approximation areas. It is supposed that the enemy, prepared for the operational rejection, controls or has destroyed the bridges that cross them, for being evident bottlenecks of the ground terrestrial transit network.

The colonel Koch summarized saying that the enemy had a wide numerical advantage in the sector of the Ardennes, which had slowly and constantly achieved. And that, in his opinion, a secondary attack against the area in question might be «a shot in the threatening arm to the Germans». This was a possibility that had to be born in mind.

Patton prepares his alternative operational plans.

The briefing caused a deep impression in the meeting assistants. Among whom were Brigadier Hobart R. Gay, H. Q. chief of 3rd. Army, the commanders of the 3rd. Army Corps and some division generals. In the discussion that followed, was decided that nothing had to do that could disturb the preparation of the great attack of 3rd. Army over the Sarre on the 19th. But they must initiate immediately the planning to face the situation that would develop, if the enemy carry out an attack against the front of the VIII American Corp. In addition, the mentioned plans not only had to consider the protection of the exposed north flank of the 3rd. Army. But also the accomplishment of a 3rd Army’s counterattack in the north direction.

Patton finished the conference with these words: «We will be in conditions to face anything that happens». Patton, as Bradley, believed in assuming calculated risks. But Patton, unlike Bradley, who was who had the reputation of sensible, prudent and meticulous, was covering his bets. So, it was unjust, superficial and uncertain, to declare or think, being based in his opera star’s behavior, that Patton was in general acting by premonitions, hunches, conjectures or by impulses of the moment.

Well, but, what’s up?, Was only Patton who had a competent reconnoissance and intelligence services in all the US Army of the European theatre?

Let’s see the most significant and involved cases in the West front: The colonel Benjamin «Monk» Dickson, 1st. American Army’s G-2, presented in November a memorandum to Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, Commander in Chief of this Army, in which he was valuing the situation at the front with Germany. And was estimating that was impossible for the Germans to launch any operational attack. Nevertheless, in December, colonel Dickson detected an unusual high moral in the German prisoners of war captured by his 1st. Army. And the appearance of slogans as «for Christmas, Aachen (where the Americans were attacking) will be of the Fuhrer». The colonel thought that his previous valuation had to be checked and on the 10th emitted his «intelligence estimation» n º 37. In which he was affirming that in the next 15 days anything could happen in the mentioned front. But this forecast did not have practical consequences. Hodges asked Eisenhower for reinforce his Army with the sending of other 2 divisions and this request was not attended.

On the other hand, brigadier Edward Sibert, G-2 of 12 º American Armies Group of general Bradley, thought that colonel Dickson was missed and that no division must be sent in support of 1st. Army. In addition, simultaneously, Brigadier E. T. Williams, G-2 of the British Armies Group of Marshal Montgomery, affirmed that the Germans were unable to launch an attack in these moments. After the offensive of the Ardennes, Williams asked clearly for excuses, recognizing «the wrong that I was». Nevertheless, general Sibert kept silent and did not comment anything on his great judgment mistake. That moved to definitively increase the lack of Allied preparation for the repulsion of the enemy.

The Fuehrer’s ambitious plans, to be developed in the incoming campaing.

Adolf Hitler was then physically, emotionally and mentally very diminished. His nerves were broken, since the unsuccessful conspiracy to murder him in July of that year. By means of a bomb that exploited in his meetings room, full of high commands, and that he worked out miraculously alive. His physical and mental situation and the very unfavorable course of the war for Germany, were making him specially inclined to be a prey of false illusions. That always are more or less real and founded, because the expression of an alienation always takes forms and contents from the real environment and culture. Probably perceiving a spiritual link between Prussian King Frederick the Great (who always was fighting in global disadvantage and taking advantage of the central position of Prussia in his wars), and he, Hitler commented to his generals, that he also was going to take the offensive and to reach memorable successes. In spite of the fact that his military fortune was in the lowest level of the whole war.

In May, 1940 the Panzer Divisions had used with great success the forest areas of the Ardennes to initiate the Battle of France, in spite of their recognized difficulties of transitability or ground ongoing. Hitler was hoping that they could make the same thing now, at the end of 1944, facilitating to his mechanized units a comfortable and surprising sector of irruption and a clean breakthrough in the great Allied front of the West, to then cross the Mosa and to continue up to Antwerp. This was the principal Allied port, near to Germany, for unloading and reception of men, equipment, supplies and replacements, for the Allies. Who were preparing themselves for bursting in a wide strategic front in the Reich. With this strategic operation, Hitler was trying to isolate also in a great bulge towards the north and between the sector of advance of his Armies and the sea, the 1st. Canadian Army, the 2 º British Army and the 1 º and 9 º American Armies.

If the theory does not adjust to the practice, worse for the theory …

If the ring was closed and was kept adequately firm, the Allies would face the dilemma of a second Dunkerke or the piecemeal destruction of their isolated and without supply Armies in a great strategy bulge. These surprising and adverse circumstances would create the conditions in order that the Western Allies were recognizing the difficult and costly thing, that was going to be to obtain the victory in the German Front. With it, they might more easily accept a partial armistice with Germany. Which would dismantle the international coalition against her. Then she would remain free to face the Soviets in the East. That already were dangerously approaching to the borders of the Reich in overwhelming force. And this would give the necessary time to the German investigators and engineers, to develop and implement new and sophisticated weapons systems, for offsetting and overcoming the almost inexhaustible pushing flood of men and means of the USSR.

Since a long time ago, the German principal chiefs and commanders had realized the difficult, useless and even dangerous thing that was to discuss with the Fuehrer, facing directly his ideas. So, it was very difficult that they were deciding in these moments, to seriously advise him against a very matured by him plans. On the other hand, the objective strategic and operational conditions of 1940 were not those of 1944. The Germans had taught with their successive and repeated during more than 4 years successes, the secrets of the modern mechanized war to their enemies. And both the Soviets and the Americans had adapted and improved them, in the operational and tactical levels of their own military activity. The Staffs calculations done for the operational needs of the mechanized forces and the reserves of existing fuels, indicated that only there would be available 75% of the necessary fuel for all the foreseen offensive operations. This was trying to be corrected by the optimistic prediction that many of the reserves deposits of the Americans, would be captured during the rapid German advances through the operational enemy rear.

During the crossing of the Ardennes in 1940, the German advance axis in southwest direction was favored by the orientation that were following in this area, the scanty paths that were crossing it. The axis of advance proposed at ends of 1944 was going in the northwest direction, with little available tracks. And let’s not forget the enormous weight increase achieved in these 4 years by the medium and heavy tanks. In addition, in relation to the cross-country advance, this direction was going in opposition to the disposition and the outcrops of the fields of the zone.

The decided sector for the great attack had a width of approximately 140 km, and was going from Monschau, in the north, to Echternach, in the south. At the right of the German deployment was 6 º Panzer Army of the SS, commanded by the SS General Sepp Dietrich. In the center, would advance the 5 º Panzer Army of von Mantteufel and at the south, the 7 º German Army, entrusted to protect the whole south flank of the German penetration. These large units were fitted in the B German Armies Group of Marshal Walter Model, who was depending on Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, named very recently as German Commander in Chief of the West Front.

The reaction of the Allied High Commands before the confirmation of the very bad military news.

In the first hours of December 16, when the first reports were received about what was going to be the most important battle for the Americans in the European theatre, Hodges ordered the movement of the 9th Armored Division, which was taking part in the attack against Roer’s dams, to support the VIII Army Corp. This division, together with Patton’s 10th Armored Division, would later take part in the defense of Bastogne’s siege.

With the first news of the attack, only Eisenhower, among all High Commanders, perceived that it was something of importance. Contrary to Hitler’s suppositions, the Allied High Command answered in a coordinated form, moving immediately the armored reserves of both adjacent armies. The 7th Armored from the north (destined to defend St. Vith) and the 10th Armored of Patton from the south, in Middleton’s support. This rapid response turned out to be one of the keys of the campaign of the Ardennes. Finally on the 17th, Eisenhower dispatched his last reserves, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions from Reims to Bastogne.

On the evening of December 19, a high-level meeting was summoned in Verdun to make decisions that would affect the campaign. Present was General Devers, Commander of the 6th American Armies Group, deployed south of Bradley’s. The «general situation» and «enemy situation» Staff maps showed that von Mantteufel had obtained a clean breakthrough. And that his forces were passing rapidly through the gap between Bastogne and St. Vith.

Eisenhower succeeded in his initial commentaries: «The current situation has to be seen as an opportunity for us and not as a disaster. I only want to see smiling faces at this conference». Patton proposed that «We have the temple to allow these damned bastards should advance toward Paris. Then we will isolate and chew them». His response coincided with his 3rd Army’s flexible and powerful capacity of operational movement. But the High Commanders, Eisenhower and Bradley, preferred a cautious approximation. Their plan was based on firmly holding all the edges of the penetration. Then, this would be restrained by the blockade of the highway knots, so vital for the Germans, at St. Vith and Bastogne, where the forces of the 5th Panzer Amy of von Mantteufel were advancing. Behind, at the rear, a defensive line would be reinforced and incorporating the Moos in the general rejection plan. Then, a massive counterattack would be launched over the Germans by Patton’s forces.

Eisenhower asked Patton, «when can you attack?». Patton was prepared, as we saw. After the meeting on the 9th, he had several contingency plans. Therefore, he answered with serenity and sureness: «On December 22, I can attack with 3 divisions». Patton was referring to the 4th Armored Division and the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions, integrated in his III Corps, which would advance following the Arlon-Bastogne axis. For Eisenhower the response was an improper to a cardinal question. He did not know that Patton had studied closely the possibilities and, over all, was prepared to lead them to the end. Eisenhower’s impression rose from the fact that he was a general of the old school and was now dedicated to the high strategic and political matters of the European theatre. Therefore, he did not believe that anyone was capable of making a 90 º turn in the axis of advance of a modern army and to carry out a march in winter, in opposition to the direction lay of its principal communications lines.

Patton gets his orders and acts with a model rapidity and capacity, fruits of the collective previous work and the experience of his 3rd. Army.

After telling Patton off, Eisenhower authorized a 1-2 day delay for the attack. After the meeting Patton called his headquarters to report which offensive option the 3rd Army was going to follow.

The south flank of the 5th Panzer Army was defended by the 7th Infantry Army of General Brandenberger. For his mission he counted with 3 Infantry Divisions and one of parachutists. But Patton’s counterattack came long before the German planners had calculated. Nonetheless, the difficulty of the ground area and the tenacious German resistance by select and committed with their mission troops, restrained the advance in force of the 3rd Army over the 5th Panzer Army and its supply lines.

Patton was advancing in a wide front, between Echternach and Materlange. In less than 48 hours of receiving Eisenhower’s orders, 2 American Divisions, the 4th Armored being one of them, advanced over Bastogne. After a week, the «supporting mass» of the Army, including approximately 250000 men and more than 90000 vehicles of all kinds (fitted in 17 divisions) had moved north between 80 to 115 kilometers, during a very bad winter weather.

The 3er. Army operational turn from its positions on the Saar towards the Ardennes, can not be compared for its difficult and size with any other Rommel’s maneuvers in the north of Africa or those of the Colonel General von Rundstedt’s «A» Armies Group, in France during the spring of 1940, also crossing the Ardennes. And the results were proportional to the showed efficiency.

On January 29, at the end of the battle/campaign of the Bulge-Ardennes 1944, Patton reported the following losses:

3rd American Army                       Germans

Personnel

Dead                        14879                                        96500

Wounded                 71009                                      269000

Prisoners                   —                                          163000

Lost                         14054                                          —

99942                                     528500

Equipment

Light tanks                  270                                           —

Medium tanks              771                                        1268

Panthers and Tigers    —                                            711

Guns                          144                                         2526

How and why all these worked?, to get their operational and tactical goals.

The operational efficiency of the movement of any operational group, can be quantify by his «movement quantity». This would be the product of his «combat capacity» (measure in human means, equipment and machines) by his «speed» in a given direction and sense. This product can also comparatively value, the equal or major efficiency of a relatively small and very rapid mechanized group (an armored or mechanized brigade) opposite to that of his «supporting» mass or main army body. Which has detached it and which moves much slower, deployed by the whole road network of the zone of march.

A «direction change of a force», or «military vector», of a mobile group in march or already deployed for a mission, slows down enormously his «operation speed», during a time that is an inverse function of the commands capacity and of her organization at all the levels.

These estimations can seem excessively theoretical or quantitative; proper of tests or war games for the H. Q. But it is important not to forget that the Soviet Doctrine, for deciding whether or when tackle their military offensive and defensive, both strategic and tactical actions, is based on calculations of the almost determinant principle of the «both forces correlation» (sootnoshenie sil) and how it evolves in the operational zone or theatre.

There exist several ways of optimizing the tempo in the different operations of a modern army:

«Combat capacity» attrition and «operational movement capacity» wear actions, due to unnecessary combat and unproductive movements, must be totally avoided. It is necessary to have a good logistics and a sufficient and protected line of supplies. Both, as dynamic and static supports of the recovery and the maintenance of the operational capacity of the units. It is necessary to consider always in our favor the area transitability or getting a useful (not necessary the geographic good one) ground ongoing.

The situation and its evolution must be analyzed from a perspective that is above our level of execution. This way the tactical unit will seek to tune how it looks operationally, by focusing on the desired result and exploiting opportunities with his parent unit. Contingency and alternative plans always must exist.

The command structure must be simple and their instructions, always as simple as possible and clear. The general intention and mission must be at the forefront at all times. The commander must decide and initially communicate his intentions, giving missions to his sub units. And to create and move the unit’s operation «gravity center», as a unifier and multiplier factor of the collective operational effort. Subordinates must act in decentralized ways and coordinating their actions to the maximum. It is here that implicit communication – the rapid, easy and often nonverbal communication that occurs between people who have worked and cooperated together for a certain time – becomes very important. Though this theoretically goes against the transfers, as a more rapid way of promotion.

To optimize the operations, the actions of the commander and the H. Q., all unit internal communications, the general experience and training, the advanced, sufficient and continuos control by the commander and by way of the staff, the exploiting opportunities and the use and renewal of suitable reserves are highly important and essential. That is to say, the structure and her functionality must be qualified to act effectively at increasing speeds in the fighting and maneuvering operations.

Libros Recomendables sobre la Guerra de Guerrillas.

En este blog presento desde hace tiempo, una lista de «libros recomendables sobre teoría militar», que es muy visitada. He de reconocer, como deficiencia, que en ella no he incluido ningún libro sobre la guerra de guerrillas. La importancia actual, histórica y social del fenómeno guerra irregular es incuestionable. Y, hoy en día, a casi todos los «guerrilleros» en activo les llaman fácilmente «terroristas». Desvirtuando con ello el enfoque objetivo y teórico que debe presidir cualquier acercamiento serio para la liquidación y erradicación popular del «brote» rebelde armado. Quiero ahora subsanar el error y extender mi comentario sobre el tema.    

Introducción.

La guerra de guerrillas es tan antigua como la humanidad. Probablemente surgió simultánea y sucesivamente en numerosos asentamientos humanos primitivos dispersos. En los que alguien, no necesariamente un alfeñique ni un cobarde, decidió no arriesgarse a sufrir heridas y mutilaciones, tan frecuentes y compartidas, en los llamados «combates singulares». Y atacó a su enemigo, esperándole emboscado y mediante un garrotazo inesperado.

Estas acciones inteligentes, apartadas de la pura fuerza bruta, fueron también las primeras aplicaciones balbuceantes de la llamada «guerra de maniobras». En la que intentamos sorprender y superar al enemigo desde una «posición o actitud» de ventaja. Para, finalmente, logrando la decisión, rematarlo o, al menos, rendirlo a nuestra voluntad. Esta última parte inevitable es la que a veces descuida demasiado la «teoría» de la «guerra de maniobras». Sin aceptar clara y plenamente que ambas expresiones son «formas» opuestas y complementarias, pero no antagónicas, como las dos riendas de un coche de caballlos, de la mejor llamada «guerra moderna».

Durante la II guerra mundial y en la etapa siguiente, llamada de «descolonización de los pueblos», la guerra de guerrillas tuvo un florecimiento espectacular, por todos los continentes y en casi todos los tipos de regímenes políticos. Porque las democracias vencedoras en aquélla también se vieron involucradas en ella, en su protectorados y colonias ultramarinos. La guerra de guerrillas se convirtió en la forma de lucha de los más débiles militarmente hablando. Y resultó eficaz muchas veces. Esto consagró su «aureola» de lucha por la libertad, de romanticismo de barra y butacón y de espejo de un cierto inconformismo generacional. Hoy en día, a la guerra de guerrillas de toda la vida, algunos teóricos de allende los mares le llaman pomposa y pedantemente «guerra asimétrica». Son los mismos expertos que también le llaman «guerra de cuarta generación». O sea, que es lo más «in» y nuevo. Como si ellos hubieran descubierto el fenómeno de la «guerra político militar irregular». Y vuelven a poner en el lado de los malos, sin excepciones, como hicieron los regímenes colonialistas en los años 40, 50 y 60 del pasado siglo, a quienes las emprenden.

Terroristas y Beligerantes Legítimos en la Guerra de Guerrillas. 

Terrorista es el que emplea sistemática y deliberadamente la violencia física contra objetivos personales enemigos no militares o no combatientes. Buscando con ello extender el miedo, el desánimo, la parálisis o la ruina a toda una sociedad, una etnia, una demarcación social nacional. El terrorista hace de los civiles enemigos desarmados sus principales objetivos. Por el alto beneficio que consigue así para sus intereses, en daños, mutilaciones y muertes, y la mayor seguridad que conllevan para él estas acciones durante su ejecución. El terrorista suele ser un fanático religioso o ideológico. El torcimiento cognitivo que sufre, derivado de su perversión amoral, le hace percibir de una manera muy especial, subjetiva y viciada, los hechos y los elementos objetivos que definen y enmarcan los siempre complejos conflictos y realidades sociológicas de los países, religiones y razas.

Aparece inmediatamente en la rebelión político militar irregular, el problema de la legitimidad de la beligerancia armada. No todo el que empuña un arma, para defender unas ideas o proteger unos derechos o a unas personas, lo hace legal y legítimamente. Las Convenciones de Ginebra y de La Haya establecen unas normas jurídicas que enmarcan la legitimidad legal de la lucha armada.

Los combatientes irregulares deben ir uniformados, portando sus armas a la vista y dirigidos por sus jefes. ¿Es suficiente esto? Pues, no. Así lo hacen también algunos grupos de narcotraficantes armados. Es necesario también que la guerrilla, la guardia nacional, la Home Guard, las fuerzas de autodefensa del pueblo o del territorio, etc., lo hagan en nombre y autorizados por un estado constituído. Y que ocupe, al menos, una parte de su territorio nacional. Es tan restrictiva esta condición que, durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sólo los partisanos o guerrilleros soviéticos cumplieron este requisito.

Por otra parte, el que sean combatientes ilegales o no reconocidos legalmente, no los asimila directa y socialmente a bandidos o criminales. Así, muchas veces, en aras de la paz social y de no encarnizar la lucha armada, los gobiernos aceptan llevar a cabo su campaña contraguerrillera, sin exacerbar los métodos usados y los ánimos de los perseguidos. 

Mis libros recomendados.

El libro «Partisan Warfare» del académico Otto Heilbrunn trata extensamente el complejo fenómeno de la guerra de guerrillas, hasta alcanzar la profundidad de un tratado sobre el tema. Se basa en el modelo comunista y, más particularmente, en sus brotes asiáticos de mediados del pasado siglo: la China de Mao y la experiencia del Vietminh de Nguyen Giap contra franceses, estadounidenses y compatriotas.

Esto se completa ventajosamente con la obra en dos tomos «War in the Shadows» de Robert Asprey. Que trata por capítulos no muy largos la guerra de guerrillas a lo largo de sus numerosos y diferentes escenarios históricos. Y que le dedica una extensión bastante grande a las experiencias china y vietnamita. Quizás porque son más contemporáneas y hay sobre ellas más material.

Yo, en mi libro «On the Nature of War«, dedico un anexo suficiente a desarrollar los aspectos tácticos, operativos y estratégicos de la guerra de guerrillas. Y de la eficaz lucha contraguerrilllera. Basándome en los hechos descritos por éstos y otros autores.

Con ello tendremos una base teórica contundente de los mecanismos socio políticos y militares de la guerrilla y de la guerra en múltiples frentes contra esta clase de lucha irregular armada. Y una referencia suficiente, pero muy enriquecedora por sus pinceladas y circunstancias específicas, de la trayectoria del fenómeno que tratamos. Con su aparición intermitente y recurrente a lo largo de la Historia.

En otro nivel, resulta también muy interesante el libro «Guerra de Guerrillas» del general Georgios Grivas (alias, Dighemis, nombre de guerra). ¿Por qué? Por varias razones. La Organización Nacional de la Lucha Chipriota o Ethniki Organosis Kipriahou Agonos (más conocida entre nosotros como la E. O. K. A..), organizó y llevó a cabo durante cuarenta y seis meses y medio, una guerrilla independentista nacionalista. Que fue ajena a las numerosas experiencias comunistas «de liberación nacional» de la época. Éstas últimas muy pocas veces se presentaban ante sus pueblos, clara y abiertamente, como «marxistas leninistas». Lo hicieron en Grecia entre 1946 y 1949 y en Malasia entre 1947 y 1960. Y, en ambos casos, fueron derrotadas y liquidadas. Y, precisamente, por el Ejército británico.

La guerrilla chipriota fue una guerrilla circunscrita a un país pequeño, demasiado pequeño, de unos 9300 Km2. Una de las condiciones iniciales que Mao Zedong reclamaba para el inicio y posterior fortalecimiento de las guerrillas, era que el país tuviese profundidad, extensión. Que permitiese establecer a las guerrillas sus primeras bases de refugio, en zonas protegidas por su inaccesibilidad. Los chipriotas llevaron a cabo una difícil guerra de guerrillas, por lo escaso de la campiña, sus limitados recursos (unos 600 mil habitantes, y una parte era la comunidad turca), la fuerza del enemigo y la falta de buenos escondrijos, circunscritos principalmente al macizo volcánico de Troodos, al sur del país y de gran riqueza minera, coronado por el monte Olimpo de 1953 m. de altitud. El diario londinense «Daily Herald» llegó a publicar que un mariscal, tres generales y cuarenta mil soldados británicos no eran capaces de derrotar a la EOKA. Parece ser que el mariscal Montgomery declaró también que la EOKA era estratégicamente imbatible. Finalmente, los greco chipriotas no consiguieron la Enosis, o unión política con Grecia, pero sí la independencia de la isla.

¿Por qué triunfaron los chipriotas? Porque el pueblo greco chipriota estaba unido cultural y firmemente (la Iglesia ortodoxa, dirigida por el arzobispo de Nicosia, Macarios, apoyaba totalmente el esfuerzo por la liberación y la Enosis) a sus escasos, eficaces, motivados y sufridos guerrilleros. Y ello, a pesar de que los turco chipriotas colaboraron con los británicos y que la EOKA tuvo que distraer en varios momentos a parte de sus menguos recursos para neutralizarlos. Los grupos guerrilleros elementales se formaban por 4 o 6 hombres; los que podían esconderse juntos, parcialmente dispersos, sin perder cohesión el grupo. Para las acciones mayores se reunían y coordinaban 2 o 3 grupos guerrilleros. Porque su organización guerrillera era suficiente, bien estructurada y muy flexible; no hacen falta demasiados hombres en armas. Porque sus mandos conocían sus debilidades, que eran muchas, y definieron un objetivo estratégico suficiente: Mantener una presión militar adecuada e indefinida, mediante acciones militares, sabotajes, propaganda y acciones populares, destinada a cansar y a desalentar a los ingleses. Grivas, en su «Plan General para la Acción Revolucionaria en Chipre» destacaba, «no hay que creer que nosotros, mediante esta forma y procedimientos pretendamos una derrota material y total de las fuerzas inglesas en Chipre. Perseguimos más bien su derrota moral, hostilizándolos e intranquilizándolos de tal manera que, al final, obtengamos el objetivo de la lucha. Ésa fue hasta el final nuestra meta estratégica. El éxito se lo debemos al hecho de habernos aferrado firmemente a ella».

Recommended Books on Guerrilla Warfare.

In this «blog» I present since a long time ago, a list of «recommended books on military theory «, that is very visited. I have to admit, as a deficiency, that in it I have not included any book on the guerrilla warfare. The actual, historical and social importance of the irregular war phenomenon is unquestionable. And, nowadays, almost all the «guerrillas» are easily called «terrorist». It was what the colonial powers were doing with the national movements of liberation in the 40s, 50s and 60s of last century. It was what Napoleon’s Frenchmen did in Spain since 1808. Spoiling with it the objective and theoretical approach that must preside any serious approximation for the liquidation and popular eradication of the rebellious armed «outbreak». I want to correct now the mistake and to specially extend my commentary on the topic.

Introduction.

The guerrilla warfare is so ancient as the humanity. Probably it arose simultaneously and successively in numerous human primitive dispersed settlements. In those somebody, not necessarily a coward or a weakling, decided not to risk being suffered wounds and mutilations, so frequent and shared, in the so called «singular fights». So he attacked his enemy, waiting for him ambushed and by means of an unexpected cudgel blow.

These intelligent actions were also the first stammering applications of the so called «maneuver warfare«. In which we try to surprise and to overcome the enemy from a «position» or «attitude» of advantage. For, finally and achieving the decision, to finish off him or, at least, to give him in to our will. This latter inevitable part is the one that sometimes neglects too much the «theory» of the «maneuvers warfare». Without accepting clearly and completely that both expressions are opposite and complementary, but not antagonistic, «forms», as both reins of a horse cart, of the better called «modern warfare«.

During the World War II and in the following stage called of «decolonization of the peoples», the guerrillas had a spectacular bloom, through all the continents and in almost all the types of political systems. It turned into the fighting way of the weakest militarily speaking. And it turned out to be often effective. This established its freedom fighting «halo», a bar and armchair romanticism and a mirror of a certain generational unconformity. Nowadays, at the ever present guerrilla war, some overseas theoretic call it pompously and pedantically «asymmetric warfare». They are the same experts who also call it the «fourth generation warfare«. As if they had discovered the phenomenon of the «social political irregular military warfare». And they return to put in the side of the villains, without any exception, as the colonialist nations did in the 40s, 50s and 60s of last century, to whom tackle it.

The Terrorists and Legitimate Belligerents in the Guerrilla Warfare.

Terrorist is who systematic and deliberately uses the physical violence against non military or non fighters enemy personal targets. Looking with it to extend the fear, the discouragement, the paralysis or the ruin to a whole society, an ethnic group, a social national demarcation. The terrorist makes of the enemy unarmed civilians his principal goals. For the high benefit that he obtains this way for his interests, in hurts, mutilations and deaths, and the high safety that these actions carry to him during their execution. The terrorist is usually a religious or ideological fanatic. The cognitive twisting that suffers, derived from his amoral perversion, makes him to perceive in a very special, subjective and faulty way, the facts and the objective elements that define and frame, the always complex conflicts and sociological realities of the countries, religions and races.

It appears immediately in the irregular political military revolt, the problem of the legitimacy of the armed belligerency. Not everyone that rise up in arms, to defend some ideas or to protect some rights or some people, makes it legal and legitimately. The Conventions of Geneva and of The Hague establish some juridical procedures that frame the legal legitimacy of the armed fighting.

The irregular forces must go uniformed, carrying their weapons at sight and commanded by their chiefs. Is this sufficient? Well, no. Some groups of armed drug-traffickers also go this way. It is necessary also that the guerrillas, the national guard, the Home Guard, the self-defense forces of the people or of the territory, etc. do it in name and authorized by a established state. That occupies with sovereignty, at least, a part of his national territory. This condition is so restrictive that, during the Second World War, only the partisans or Soviet guerrillas fulfilled this requirement.

On the other hand, the fact that they are illegal fighters or not legally recognized, does not directly and socially assimilate them to bandits or criminals. This way, often, in altars of the social peace and of not enraging the civil protracted armed fighting, the governments agree to carry out their counter guerrilla campaign, without exasperate the used military methods and the spirits of the persecuted ones.

The more recommended books.

The «Partisan Warfare» book of the academician Otto Heilbrunn treats extensively the complex phenomenon of the guerrilla war, up to reaching the depth of an Treaty on the topic. It is based on the Communist model and, more particularly, on its Asian outbreaks in the middle of the last century: Mao’s China and the experience of the Vietminh of Nguyen Giap against the Frenchmen, the Americans and his compatriots.

This is profitably completed with the two volumes’ work «War in the Shadows» by Robert Asprey. That treats through not very long chapters the guerrilla war along the numerous and different historical stages. And that dedicates a big enough extension to the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences. Probably because they are more contemporary and there exists on them more material.

I, in my military theory book «On the Nature of War», dedicate a sufficient annex to expound out the tactical, operative and strategic aspects of the guerrilla warfare. And those of the effective counterguerrilla multiple and diverse fighting. Basing on the facts described by these and other authors.

With all this, we will have a rich theoretical base of the social, political and military mechanisms of the guerrilla warfare. And of the war sustained in multiple fronts against this kind of irregular armed fight. And a sufficient, but very wealth-producing reference, by its brushstrokes and specific circumstances, of the path of the phenomenon that we treat. With its intermittent and recurrent appearance along the History.

In another level, it is also very interesting the book «Guerrilla Warfare» by the general Georgios Grivas (alias, Dighemis, name of war). Why? For several reasons. The National Organization of the Cypriot Fighting or Ethniki Organosis Kipriahou Agonos (more known between ourselves as E. O. K. A.), organized and carried out for forty six and a half months, an independent nationalist guerrilla campaign. That was alien to the numerous communist experiences «of national liberation» of the epoch. These last very rarely were appearing before their peoples, precisely and openly, as «Marxists Leninist». They did so in Greece between 1946 and 1949 and in Malaysia between 1947 and 1960. And, in both cases, they were defeated and liquidated. And, precisely, by the British Army.

The Cypriot guerrilla was a guerrilla limited to a small, too small country, with an extension of only 9300 Km2. One of the initial conditions that Mao Zedong was claiming for the beginning and later strengthening of the guerrillas, was that their country had depth, extension. That allowed the guerrillas to establish thier first refuge bases, in zones protected by its inaccessibility. The Cypriots carried out a difficult guerrilla war, for the scanty of the countryside, their limited resources (approximately 600 thousand inhabitants, and a part was the Turkish community), the force of the enemy and the lack of good hiding places, circumscribed principally to Troodos’s volcanic clump, at the south of the island and with great mining wealth, crowned by the mount Olympus of 1953 m. of altitude. The daily Londoner «Daily Herald» published that a marshall, three generals and forty thousand British soldiers were not capable of defeating the EOKA. It seems that the marshal Montgomery declared that «the EOKA was strategically unbeatable». Finally, the Greek Cypriots did not obtain the Enosis, or political union with Greece, but the independence of their island from Great Britain.

Why did Cypriots triumph? Because the Greek Cypriot people was firmily and culturaly tied and melted (in this help the undubitable support of the Ortodoxian Church, directed by Nicosia’s Archbishop Macarius, later the first President of the Pepublic of Cyprius) to his scanty, effective, motivated and long-suffering guerrillas. And so, in spite of the fact that the Turkish Cypriots collaborated with the British and that the EOKA had to distract in several moments part of her scanty resources to neutralize them. The guerrilla elementary action groups were formed by 4 to 6 men; those who could hide together and without cohesion loses in the group. For the major actions 2 or 3 guerrilla groups were meeting for and coordinating by a superior operational command. Because their guerrilla organization was sufficient, well constructed and very flexible. Because their commands knew their weaknesses, which were great, and so defined a strategic sufficient goal: To get and keep a military suitable and indefinite pressure, by means of military actions, sabotages, propaganda and popular actions, destined to tire and discourage the British and their Government. Grivas, in his «General Plan for the Revolutionary Action in Cyprus» was emphasizing, «it is not necessary to believe that we, by means of this way and procedures could get a material and total defeat of the English forces in Cyprus. We rather look for their moral defeat, harassing and upsetting them in such a way that, ultimately, we obtain the objective of the fighting. That was until the end our strategic goal. We owe the success to the fact of having stuck firmly to it».

Economía Fácil III.

Y Tercera Parte. 

(continuación)

Todo negocio debe contar con un período de iniciación, de arranque, cuya duración es variable en función del tipo de empresa, de su localización y de la situación económica. Y durante el cual se acumulan los gastos y las deudas, y los ingresos son relativamente escasos. He visto cerrar a algún comercio de barrio porque no pudo esperar a hacerse con una clientela y carecía de fondo financiero para mantenerse. En un comercio, la localización y la vía pública son fundamentales. A veces, incluso, las ventas son muy diferentes de una acera a otra en una calle comercial. Acabo de visitar una bisutería, que va a cerrar a los 5 meses de su apertura. Y situada en un callejón, a unos 50 ms. del centro de Madrid. Su público (el target) no pasaba por el callejón, lo orillaba a derecha e izquierda. Me dijeron que habían aprendido. 

También hay que considerar que hay sectores, mercados, rígidos y muy cerrados a la competencia de nuevos ofertantes. Por ejemplo, el transporte de larga y corta distancias cuenta con un enorme número de transportistas y agencias de transportes. Frente a una demanda concentrada en relativamente pocos grandes cargadores y cadenas de distribución o comerciales. Esto hace que los precios no se puedan formar libremente, que los transportistas sean, entre ellos, sus segundos peores enemigos y que los cargadores (o sus empleados!!!) abusen de su posición de dominio.

Sin embargo, un emprendedor inteligente y entusiasmado con su trabajo, logró superar con gran éxito, para ejemplo de todos, los contratiempos que le presentaron un sector tan duro y la burocracia administrativa. Juan Jesús Alegría, un empresario de Vitoria, con 47 años, quedó fuera del sector con la aprobación de la Ley de Ordenamiento del Transporte Terrestre. Juan Jesús no se arredró. Tras el lógico período de desorientación y dolor, sólo pensaba en cómo darle la vuelta a un negocio de familia, ya sin futuro. Por todas partes veía oportunidades y cambios, que él podía ofrecer a los potenciales y no atendidos usuarios de variantes elaboradas del transporte común. Pero no fue fácil la iniciación, el nuevo arranque del negocio. Su travesía por el desierto duró 3 años, en los que no vendió nada. En París tiene en marcha un autobús destinado a persuadir a los vecinos de que es bueno aprovechar bien el agua. Ganó el concurso frente a otras dos empresas francesas finalistas, ante un tribunal de adjudicación formado por doce mujeres. En Dubai diseñó un autobús para uso del sheik o jeque (el jefe), dotado de 12 plazas delanteras y una popa, donde se localizan los servicios particulares y lujosos para el mandatario y sus invitados. Tiene todo lo que puedan necesitar. Y envuelto en el lujo exquisito propio de un jeque petrolero. Cuando los dubatíes le sugerían 4 ideas, a Juan Jesús se le ocurrían otras 28 para el especial diseño.

Una falacia que debe tener siempre en cuenta el pequeño empresario es la llamada experiencia de la «mano de obra». Permítanme tratarla con un toque de ironía, suavizada por la broma. El humor es una de las «haches» que debe tener todo emprendedor individual. Las otras serían ser hábil (con cualidades para su función), hacendoso (trabajador y diligente en su oficio), humilde (conocedor de sus propias e inevitables limitaciones) y humano (justo con todos y compasivo con los desfavorecidos y los que reclaman su ayuda). La «mano de obra» suele blasonar de su experiencia laboral. Presentándola como un atributo. Que resulta mejorador y acrisolador de las propias cualidades, aprendidas e ignatas, a través del tiempo. Todo esto es cierto. El fallo está en el bagaje y la calidad de la experiencia esgrimida. La verdadera experiencia supone un aprender casi continuo con el estudio, en el oficio, en la vida. Así, realmente, la gran mayoría de los ofertantes de trabajo, lo que tienen son 2 o 3 o 5 años de experiencia, y 18, 22 o 27 años de repetición cómoda del oficio y de las relaciones adquiridas. En mi época, a esa experiencia mantenida en un oficio, se la premiaba y reconocía con los años de antigüedad. Ojo, con los experimentados.

El Estado como agente económico es regulador de actividades varias, modificador de las rentas disponibles, cobrador de impuestos y tasas y prestador de los servicios públicos.    

El Estado es la institución que se supone debe controlar y regir, en nombre de todos y por encima de personas y entidades privadas, en los temas y cosas comunes, generales y públicos. Una misión esencial de los poderes públicos es establecer un marco o método de actuación económica práctico, justo, legal y moderno. Y los medios para su observación y la corrección de inevitables desviaciones. Sea a través del Banco nacional, las comisiones nacionales de los mercados, etc. Y de manera continua, relativamente sencilla y ágil. Luego, tienen que dejar actuar a los agentes económicos. Que somos todos, actuando como consumidores, empresarios, prestatarios, empleados, instituciones, etc., en los distintos mercados «parciales»: de crédito, de transportes, de abastos, de valores, de trabajo, etc.

Una función, ya antigua, del Estado era actuar subsidiariamente (para reforzar o sustituir) y por excepción, como empresario. Actuaba en las áreas económicas deprimidas o importantes para el país. En aquéllas en que la iniciativa privada no lo hacía, generalmente por falta de rentabilidad o de recursos suficientes. En España esta actuación dio lugar a la creación del Instituto Nacional de Industria (el INI), verdadero holding estatal y el primer empresario de España, por su extensión y medios.

Tenemos en España unos tres millones de funcionarios, pagados con nuestros impuestos. Hace 35 años había del orden de 1 millón de empleados públicos. Y no tenían los avances actuales de la informática y de la domótica. Tenían que trabajar más a mano y dedicarle más tiempo a las labores burocráticas. Actualmente somos unos 10 millones más de habitantes y tenemos bastante más del doble de funcionarios. Desgraciadamente, además, el trabajo de los funcionarios, ejecutando «funciones» antiguas y nuevas mediante «documentos» externos e internos, soportados en ordenador, papel, fotos, etc., tiende a ocupar todo su tiempo «disponible». Y que no es necesariamente todo su horario «oficial».

Hay que mantener y costear a los ayuntamientos, a las comunidades autónomas y a la administración central, que forman el Estado. Los dineros para satisfacer sus múltiples necesidades, los recauda el Estado de los impuestos directos e indirectos, de sus rentas del Patrimonio nacional, de nuestras multas y recargos, de la colocación de la deuda pública a diferentes plazos (que ya pagaremos más tarde), del beneficio del Banco nacional y de las tasas por servicios. Esto, sin contar los ingresos de la Seguridad Social nacional. Cerca del 40% de nuestra vida (los pensionistas también pagan), la dedicamos a sostener un complejo Estado. Que no es precisamente un administrador sobrio, honesto, ejemplar, sensato, creativo y eficiente de la «cosa pública» y sus dineros. Aunque se llame a sí misma y con mayúscula, como dando ejemplo y diciendo, más allá de mí, nada, la Administración.

Con los impuestos directos, que son progresivos o crecientes en función del aumento de la base imponible, el Estado recauda más de los de rentas más altas o más pudientes. Con ello modifica su renta disponible, rebajándola progresivamente. Los organismos públicos nos cobran tasas, a precios fijados por ellos, por los permisos, actuaciones y servicios públicos que nos prestan. Los permisos de circulación de vehículos y de obras, los costes de los documentos de identidad o de conducción, las tasas de basuras y de vados en aceras, son algunos ejemplos. Sus precios suelen ser más alto de lo debido. Porque también constituyen un impuesto indirecto. Porque lo pagan inevitablemente todos los usuarios, ciudadanos y habitantes.

Periódicamente se pone de moda referirse a John Maynard Keynes, el economista de la Gran Depresión. Y es porque, en los ciclos económicos largos, a la fase próspera de los 7 años de vacas gordas, le sucede, desde los tiempos del Faraón, la fase deprimida de los 7 años de vacas flacas. Que, además, en los sueños del faraón del libro de José, se comían algunas de las vacas gordas, desandando parte del avance logrado. Keynes propuso, para reactivar la economía deprimida, aumentar el gasto de las instituciones públicas. Pero en el contexto en el que se encontraba la economía de su época, aún había muchas cosas útiles y oportunas por hacer. Se podían realizar numerosas obras públicas necesarias, nuevas, no repetidas: carreteras, autopistas, vías férreas, presas, puentes, aeropuertos, urbanización de zonas a desarrollar, etc. Esto es lo que están haciendo ahora en China, para mantener un ritmo «razonable» y suficiente (para crear empleo) del 6-8% de crecimiento anual, cuando sus mercados exteriores flaquean. Habiendo sido China, durante el último lustro, la fábrica polivalente del mundo. El estado totalitario chino está aplicando correctamente a Keynes, promoviendo un desarrollo sostenido, a través de la construcción de toda clase de infraestructuras y mercados internos, entre otras acciones y apoyos. Y sirviéndose de sus propios medios de pago (sus reservas de divisas y activos realizables son incontables) para financiarse sin inflación.

El problema surge cuando aplicamos a Keynes en un estado moderno desarrollado. La oportunidad y la conveniencia de las obras públicas en general que realiza el Estado u otros organismos públicos, porque no son incumbencia de nadie, pero benefician a todos son su novedad, singularidad y utilidad. Veamos un ejemplo de una actuación inversa y perversa. Es normal que en los distintos países, a lo largo de la historia, se vaya construyendo sobre los restos destruidos dejados por los antecesores. En Madrid, no. El firme profundo y de calidad del primer tramo de la calle Alcalá, se está levantando. Y está dejando al descubierto el adoquinado de hace más de 60 años, que lleva engarzadas las vías del tranvía, que circuló por aquí entre 1871 y 1972. La calle Fuencarral está prácticamente levantada entre gran Vía hasta casi llegar al Tribunal de Cuentas. Lo mismo ocurre con calles transversales como Pérez Galdós o San Onofre. Simultáneamente en la Puerta del Sol, bajo el anuncio del Tío Pepe, se rompen aceras y placas de granito de casi 2 m. de profundidad para acceder a las canalizaciones de las «utilities». ¿Son necesarias estas obras «sobre obras» para reordenar el tráfico de la zona? ¿Aportan novedad, diferencia y utilidad a los ciudadanos? ¿Qué ganamos con pagar temporalmente «peonadas» a un grupo de personas, si su calidad temporal y su competitividad siguen siendo bajas?

Ésta es una gestión demasiado frecuente de las instituciones públicas modernas: miopes, electoralistas, despilfarradoras, prepotentes (porque sí), poco útiles. Que deberíamos poder evitar.