The Leadership in Action. – Conflictos Modernos

The New Times Coming for Defense.

Introduction.

It is said that military deterrence is a quality and that it cannot be measured. If I do not know the Effect of my investment in weapons, how do I know that I am protected? Will I not need more means of one kind or another?

Precisely, Science always tries to measure the variables in phenomena. And, it succeeds. The politician should read the “Scientific Forecast in Military Art”. Text by a Soviet military man, translated into Spanish.

And, now that we have to invest up to 5% of the GDP to defend ourselves from the “threats of the felonious East”. More.

Are most of the medal ribbons of the most lucid officer, the same..? That means that the event is repeated. And this can only be because they are given for pure seniority in service… Stagnation. But, they do not care to show them off, to those who have no idea of what they mean,. This is self-deception and the capital (not mortal) sin of vanity.

Martin van Creveld, a professor at the University of Jerusalem and author of several excellent books on military strategy and operations, said that “the country’s military institution had become an arthritic structure without creativity.”

And, without the qualities of initiative and flexibility, creativity becomes lame, if not paralyzed. And everything becomes stagnant.

Van Creveld was expelled from his post by the Israeli military caste.

Development.

The huge surprise of Saturday, October 7, 2014, given by the irregular militia of Hamas to the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) was a confirmed evidence.

You do not prepare such a complex and extensive operation, almost in full view of many people, as if it were a country party. And, just like that.

You always have to do a general rehearsal of the total operation. And, subject the means to tests of duration and demands, at least equal, as in action. For example, a drainage motor must be tested, using it for the same number of hours that will be needed in the action. A combined arms operation must always be carried out, since, except between units that have already acted together before, implicit communication will not exist, and “mutual collaborative actions” are difficult to improvise.

The training space must have the same characteristics and complications as the real one. And, it would be convenient for it to be located far from the mission operations area, so as to be free of giving indicative signals to the enemy’s observation and espionage. Men, means and supplies must be moved to the training areas and returned to their bases of departure for the actions.

Communication between units must be practiced without failure, especially those of different arms (infantry with tanks, tanks with artillery, ground support aviation with those that have to support), that must collaborate in tactical subordination during the development of the attack.

Each important function must have a “reserve executor”. For example, a glider cannot be unique, in case the winds carry it down far from the target of attack:

German airborne forces attack on Fort Eben Emael, Liege, Belgium, in May 1940. It controlled, by means of heavy fire from a fortress (as well as several bunkers and armored and consolidated redoubts), the paved approach route towards Brussels for the combined German forces.

The airborne forces in gliders landed on the roofs of Eben Emael, closed the Belgian exits to the roof and used hollow-charge bombs-grenades (an Originality not used before) to overcome the roofs of the various redoubts of the fortress. The roofs were designed to withstand the fire of German heavy artillery. But the hollow-charge bomb concentrates the force of its explosion in a jet of fire and molten metal, which penetrates concrete and armor and whatever else is thrown at it.

The fortress surrendered as soon as the redoubts began to be blown up and assaulted.

In spite of all the needs and the long preparation time for the attack, all the Israeli intelligence agencies were surprised by the unexpected and sudden attack by Hamas irregulars, trained for this war action.

And the Israeli people realized that the protection of their lives and property by their unbeatable Army was not effective. And they remained frozen and seriously distressed for a long time. This vivid emotional wound does not heal easily or quickly. Because the possibilities of it happening again exist. And they are not inevitable as a quality. The psychiatrist has no arguments… only tablets ones…

And why did Hamas surprise?

The strongest, most powerful proxy of Iran and coreligionist of the Shiites in South-West Asia was Hezbollah, the Party of Allah. This one was guarded, it was infiltrated like a Gruyere cheese by Israeli agents and there were middle and high-level personnel from suppliers bought by them and the Israelis knew all the traces left by suppliers, collaborators, goons and relatives.

Israel‘s foreign action and special espionage means silently «occupied» Hezbollah. And, they were prepared to make it implode or explode unexpectedly.

Hamas was the poor militia, squeezed into a very densely populated area. Capable of making a mobile or rigid Defense in Urban terrain against a trained, equipped, modern, motivated army. And, to endure the unbearable.

But, it was not supposed to carry out a more or less usual military attack, outside its external lines, keeping the objective won.

But, the Gaza attack did not intend to occupy, even for a couple of days, a tangible objective.

And, it was equipped with considerably fewer free-flying or guided rockets than Hezbollah was.

That is, it could pose a much less Orthodox threat to Israel than Hezbollah. It had tens of thousands of rockets of Iranian origin and acquisitions of very variable characteristics.

Hezbollah had a great political force in Lebanon and participated in its governance, and was a stronger and more motivated military force than the Lebanese national army.

There was plenty of information. Otherwise, it would have attracted attention and they would seek it out or implement it.

But, no one saw, detected, or heard of a Muslim militia capable of attacking Israel in the form of a “swarm” of “small units” (platoon or section type), operationally simultaneous. Trained as “reinforced mobile light infantry”.

It seems that the Ideologist and Military Leader of the successful and unstoppable Attack on Israel (for a short time) was the late Yahya Sinwar. He was a prisoner of war in Israel for a long time as a young man. And, he was released in one of those agreed prisoner exchanges.

Sinwar had time to think and mature the plan. And then, to prepare it and carry it out. And, he had his advisors, from the Revolutionary Guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

General Qassem Souleimani, the original head of its Foreign Branch, in charge of supporting all internal Islamic movements in the countries of Southwest Asia, sureness participated in the military training of Yahya Sinwar. Souleimani was killed by an American attack drone, after landing confidently and safely at the Baghdad airport. And he received a salvo of powerful Hellfire II HE (high explosive) rockets.

And, Sinwar was impervious to Jewish (intelligence) penetration, even in a very poor population environment, prone by character and necessity to bribery.

And, in the early hours of Saturday, October 7, 2024, Hamas launched its thundering Lightning.

The ideological adaptation of the minor Jihad to current times.

Introduction.

Islam has to assume that the Jihad, as a “bloody effort in the path of Allah” was necessary for the establishment and defense of the primitive community of believers.

Muhammad took refuge in a cave near Mecca to meditate and pray. Around 610, he began to receive motions, visits from angels sent by Allah (God, in Arabic). “Prophet, hear and write,” they ordered him. But, he was illiterate and had to dictate the verses to his collaborators. They were the Meccan verses of the Khoran, eminently religious. The first to believe his preaching were his wife, Abu Baker al-Sidrique, his father-in-law, Ali, his cousin, and then his son-in-law, his slave… About 40-45 followers formed the Muslim group that lived with him in Mecca.

Towards 615, a group of Arabs from Medina came to see him. The Jews had taken power in the Arab city and they wanted to reconquer it. But they had no guide, no motivating sense or ideology.

Muhammad understood this perfectly. “The Arabs of Medina were a force without ideology” and “he was an ideology without force”. So, “Let us use his force for our ideology”.

The authorities in Mecca were increasingly concerned about visits to the Prophet by foreign Arabs. And, from the beginning, the leaders of the Arab community in Mecca saw the behavior and religious rites of the Muslims as strange.

The situation had to lead to violence. And, they decided to kill the Prophet, at least.

Warned, Muhammad and Abu Baker fled the city. It was the Hegira or march of the Islamic Community from Mecca to Medina (the city of the Prophet) in 622. The small Muslim community followed the longest coastal route, as directed by Muhammad.

When Muhammad arrived in Medina, he pitched his tent on the outskirts. Soon the Arab chiefs came out to greet and receive him as their leader.

An embassy from Mecca went to the Medinan authorities to have Muhammad handed over to them. But, “they have reaped the green,” the chiefs warned the Meccan envoys.

The Jews saw the threat from Muhammad and attacked them. Muhammad defeated them and expelled them from Medina. Here the Prophet received the Medinan chapters or suras of the Koran, of an eminently political nature and of the governance of the peoples.

From Medina, the Muslim forces attacked and plundered several caravans of merchants, some from Mecca and others on behalf of the neighboring Jews.

The Muslims were growing in military capacity and good relations with the neighboring populations. Their tactics using very mobile light units and reiterative attacks, looking for enemy weaknesses or creating them, were effective and novel in combating their enemies.

However, on the other hand, Mecca and other towns in western Arabia were languishing and losing influence. It was the pendulum of History.

From Mecca they ended up sending a contact group to agree with Muhammad on peace and the acceptance of Islam as the religion of the Arabs. The leaders of Mecca accepted Muhammad‘s conditions.

On November 1, 630, Muhammad entered Mecca victoriously. He suppressed the Jahiliyya, the state of idolatry and chaos in Mecca, prior to Islam, and turned the Kaaba, one of the existing idolatrous points, into a center of Islamic piety. Until then, the Muslims practiced Salat, their daily canonical prayers, directing their position towards Jerusalem.

Disconnecting himself further from the Jews, Muhammad ordered a change of direction towards Mecca, specifically towards the Kaaba, and established only 5 prayers a day, according to the solar positions of activity of the Muslims.

Soon the new religion will spread throughout the Arabian peninsula, with Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634) using weapons against the last arabs idolatrous tribes. In 632, the Prophet died in Medina, his favorite city, he was barely 62 years old.

Developments.

Now comes what I call the First Transformation of Islam. Outwardly, its followers denote a continuous (in historical measures, not in chronography) conquering and expansionist activity. This will last until the year 750, at the end of the Umayyad dynasty. These successes are associated by the Muslims with the fact that Allah is with them. It is a growing Muslim century.

In a series of conquests, the Muslims destroy and take the Sassanian Empire, from Anatolia to Persia, through Asia. And, from Palestine, through Egypt, Libya, Ifrigia, the Rif and Hispania, throughout North Africa and the western European peninsula.

Their attempts to penetrate into Central Europe were cut off on October 10, 732, in the battle of Poitiers by Charles Martel, in command of the Frankish troops. Forcing the Islamic light cavalry to face solid defense forces, in a practical adaptation of the phalanxes, supported by archers from their rear. And, with their own heavy noble cavalry attacking the Muslim light cavalry by shock.

The five daily prayers of Salat, composed of standing and bowing, kneeling and lying down, with head turns and the repetition of verses from the Koran, exert an increase in religious piety, love of Allah and belonging to the prayer group among the faithful.

Here would end the historical emergence of the lesser Jihad. The historical opportunity for which does not exist today.

The proof is that the lesser Jihad is not named in the Koran, it does not exist directly in the commands of Allah. It is not necessary, nor transcendent. It is occasional and temporary in the plans of Allah.

And, it must be replaced by “another suitable type of effort in the path of Allah”.

This would be the effort of personal inner development (ascetic), seeking the purification and inner improvement of believers.

This concept exists in the Sunna, where it is called the Greater Jihad and could be promoted by the pious ulemas (ideologists) and muftis (jurists).

Since the emergence of the four main Sunni ideological schools, from the year 750 until after 1000, the principle of the effort of Personal Reflection, the ICHTIHAD, also gained strength in Islam.

These are 250 long years, because in History the facts are unraveled. Without rigid borders that cut their temporal and mental spaces. In which the Second Transformation of Islam will occur: the Ideological one. Where the body of doctrine will be elaborated for the practical application of Islam, in all areas of men’s lives.

The Ichtihad will allow the development of Arab culture, both in relation to civil aspects (science, commerce, art, literature), as well as the enrichment of its «ideology». And it is the basis of ideologues and jurists such as the Palestinian al-Chafii, in Cairo, founder of the most elaborate and brilliant Islamic school.

Ichtihad is a source of lucidity, creativity, enrichment, progress and peace, on the path of personal and collective effort towards Allah (who is really the religious core and reason of Islam), when the Umma (Arabic name of the Islamic community) has already spread and multiplied enormously throughout the world.

But, towards the 11th century (5th century of the Hegira), the ulemas and muftis close the door to ichtihad.

The methodological approach of Islamic progress is altered. And, from then on, it is imitated, repeated, creativity is slowed down, sypnosis are abused.

At the same time, the arts, sciences, civil and social studies of Muslims are languishing. The fear (always paralyzing) of fulfilling the demands (real or forced) of Islam arises. Perhaps the appearance of the fifth ideological school of Islam has an influence here. The last, the hardest and most intransigent, the violent one. Without it, Muslims would not have INSTITUTIONAL ideological support to evolve locally and temporarily to violence. The Salafi school, which wants to imitate the Salaf or the pious predecessors, because they were supported by Allah in their extraordinary successes, for their fidelity and piety.

(To be continuing)

ACTION INTERFACES as Zones of TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT against the Enemy. Part One.

Introduction.

The action interface is a spatial concept that defines the zone and space where we develop violent action against the enemy and his means, following tactical criteria adapted to the nature of our objectives. The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system.

In a penetrating attack, for example, the surface of the interfaces is quantitatively limited and these are selected in the enemy’s depth, according to their critical points and those that hinder the advance of our forces, for example, observatories and anti-tank firing points. In defense, we quantitatively increase the potential interfaces in our depth and in a somewhat laminar way.

The interface is what makes tactical action and the destruction of the enemy possible, applying a pure, chosen, selective and favorable attrition. The absence of interfaces, on the contrary, gives a certain security to any force. With the presence of the enemy, even close by, being a threat.

The interface is not only linear or frontal and with the depth of the range of heavy infantry weapons and tanks. But is extended superficially and spatially by the action of indirect artillery, surface destruction means (reactive artillery) and combat and bombing aircraft. The smaller the interface in an area of operations, the more the operational maneuver criterion will work and in a larger interface. We will seek from advantageous positions and with effective and synergistic means (combined or inter-arms) to annihilate (incapacitate) the enemy.

The speed of exchange (actions and effects) in the interface is qualitatively variable and is conditioned by the transitability of the terrain and by the nature of our intention. In the attack we seek the fluidity of tactical actions. In defense, we wish to add a thickening to them, which will help us break the enemy in front of the front limit of the defense position and in the various ambushes and prepared fire pockets, both main and alternative as well as supplementary, preferably before their irruption.

In the interfaces there are certain critical points, where our tactical interaction with the enemy will be especially effective. These are their tactical vulnerabilities, their gaps in protection or combat capacity or their neglected means of defense, even if they are only so for a time. Combat reconnaissance is essential to detect them and it is the tactical leader’s mission to decide which one or ones to act on, seeking in the tactical decision, the operational significance of the higher command.

Combat capacity is applied on an interface with a variable depth depending on the weapons. Combat capacity has a maximum, useful, relatively stable value for the different weapons or weapon systems, which we can measure in men per meter of action interface.

For the shock, for example, it is not possible to use more than one man per 1.5 ms. of contact interface. For rifle fire, considering a platoon of 50 men useful for about 300 ms of interface, its value drops from 0.6 to 0.15 men per m. of front. Artillery would produce a blinding, disruptive, neutralizing or destructive effect, added to the action in the interface, but complementary to it and never a substitute. Machine gun fire would not substantially lower the proportion, since its fire “equivalent” to that of a certain number of infantry, depending on the terrain and its ability to acquire targets, in rapid fire of 15 rounds per minute and marksman.

Development.

However, from the wars of antiquity to the wars of the 1980s, dispersion has increased from a proportional value of 1 to 5,000 on the battlefield or tactical field. For modern static organized defense, it is equivalent to a battalion of 750 men in 3 km2. Mobile or nuclear defense can triple that surface. This dispersion has emptied the battlefield, now covered by direct fire and indirect fire support, and has allowed the operational terrain of large units to be greatly deepened, up to 50 to 75 km.

An obstruction, a gorge, a river in which the interface was reduced or altered, would limit the real possibilities of the attacker and greatly empower the defender. Thus, the defensive battle of King Leonidas in the Thermopylae gorge would be an example of containment of overwhelmingly superior forces, due to the absolute limitation of the interface of action between the Persian and Spartan armies and not being able to apply it to the critical Greek centers, for example, an exposed flank, until a shepherd served as a guide to a Persian contingent to reach it.

All this operational complication simultaneously makes most of the forces employed in an action unproductive or inactive at a given time.

Given that there is this practical limitation to the use of our available combat capacity, due to the disproportion between tactical space and combat interface, the issue of achieving the maximum application of our force arises.

To achieve this we must:

Increase as much as possible our favorable interfaces with the enemy, especially on the weak and critical points of his deployment; adequately rotate the units in tactical contact; maintain an adequate space for maneuver in our tactical rear, which allows us to push forward the necessary spears of attack or maintain the different possible defensive interfaces in the face of enemy irruption or penetration.

And employ each weapon in the most favorable possible interface of action:

Thus, the weight of the effort will be borne by the infantry in prepared attacks against an enemy ready to repel (for example, an anti-tank front), at long advance distances and in terrain with limited visual control, such as forests, built-up areas and broken terrain, with the tanks supporting them with fire and advancing by covered jumps. The tanks can go ahead in encounter attacks, in slightly undulating terrain and if the enemy has a poorer combat readiness, but taking care that the infantry closes the distance quickly. For short distances, we use the joint attack in the same sector; both weapons can advance from different positions in a convergent attack in encounter combats and in enveloping combats, the synchronization of both being fundamental. Inside the enemy position, the tanks attack the firing positions with their fire and the infantry clears the positions from their flanks.

It is also possible to structurally increase our favorable action interfaces with the enemy.

This is achieved in the attack by breaking through and penetrating favorable sectors and always by encirclement, reversal of fronts and encirclement and by coordinated frontal and overflow pursuit. The attacker’s successive echelons can, in turn, create a favorable action interface against an enemy that is not sufficiently defended, for example, artillery positions or communication centers or logistics parks, and also by a flank attack from our depth with mechanized or armored units, on an enemy counterattack against our penetration.

In the defense, the opposite will occur. The breach of the defense zone, even if it is mobile, will be avoided by increasing the possible unfavorable interfaces for the enemy along its «range».

This is achieved by the echelon in depth of active defensive means and by their preferential placement on the counter-slopes, in covered, hidden, preferably flanking, alternative and supplementary positions and received by a local infantry defense and seeking good and intersecting firing sectors. Also by the increase in interceptions (reinforced cuts, quickly placed minefields, natural obstacles more or less perpendicular to their sectors of advance) defended by fire, which channel the attack towards zones of convergent fire or which delay and erode it. And, finally, by the timely use of local counter-shocks and counter-attacks by mobile or, at least, rapid, tactical or operational reserves. These constitute the extraordinary and unexpected force that acts on enemy vulnerability, which is then in disorganization, dispersion and neutral morale before the consolidation of its gains from the attack.

The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system. Each of them individually presents “action characteristics” and more convenient transitability, which give them a preferable target profile and tactical deployment qualities, from whose combination in the system arises the synergy of the whole.

(To be continued)

Yahya Sinwar: Is Him The Last Gazan Warlord?

Introduction.

The Israelis had the following strategic tasks for their invasion of the Palestinian Gaza Strip on Sunday, October 8, 2023:

Ensuring that Israel will not be attacked from the Gaza Strip again.

Organizing the political and administrative structure of the Strip and its peaceful and stable functioning.

Destroying (incapacitating) the capabilities of the Command and Structure and the militancy of Hamas.

That this terrorist organization, whose statutes state that the Palestinians occupy from the river (the Jordan) to the great sea (the Mediterranean) as their national land, will not again be a vital threat to Israel.

Development and means.

Israel has killed about 40 thousand Palestinians so far, according to Hamas sources, which are the least prestigious and least credible. And it has not yet achieved any of its important or secondary objectives. For example, eliminating the entire senior leadership of Hamas.

The tasks of artillery, as the heavy fire of an army, are, in ascending order of enemy annihilation: Blind, Disrupt, Neutralize and Destroy.

The last task is almost impossible to achieve. Because, the same debris produced by the first artillery fire or aircraft bombs, increases the chances of shelter and of creating ambushes and defensive positions by the attacked.

In the Plans for heavy fire support of ground units, normal and reactive artillery, heavy anti-tank defense, short and medium range rockets and ground support aircraft are included and intervened.

Normally it is impossible to kill or physically injure all the enemy. This may have been an impossible goal, sought by Israel in the first moments of the war. In the midst of the incapacitating intoxication of anger, pain, revenge and fear. When the Israelis found themselves in the middle of a strong and selective attack in their rather deep (operational) rear. That was not detected in any of its preparations and operational phases by the Mossad and other agencies, nor was it repelled, once it was launched, starting with the small garrisons of the IDF in the southeast and east of Israel, around the Strip.

If the objectives were more ambitious and provided with more resources, by the Hamas leadership (presidency and 3 vice-presidencies, with their advisors), and admitting the non-maintenance of the objectives occupied by Hamas, Israel would have been in serious military danger due to the damage to its rear military structures. The following could be attacked: military airports; land transport parks; obstructed roads and occupied or destroyed crossings; fuel depots; command and transmission centers; communication networks; arsenals…

The functions of the Hamas Structure.

The central structure of Hamas is made up of an external presidency (located outside the Palestinian territories) and three vice-presidencies. The Gaza one, under Yahya Sinwar‘s command, is the most influential in the organizational chart. Another is in the West Bank, operationally superimposed on the Palestine recognized by the UN, which is the Palestinian National Authority, based in Ramallah. The presidency and the other vice-presidency are abroad.

The president of Hamas was Ismael Haniyeh, who has just been sacrificed in an allegedly Israeli attack in Tehran. When Haniyeh was attending the takeover of the new Iranian president.

As a general rule, recently broken, Israel has the habit of not claiming responsibility for any attempt or attack on the enemy.

The importance that Sinwar has for Hamas in its organization and in decision-making, makes him surely the successor of the late president of Hamas. He will be in charge of making military and political decisions for Hamas. And in how to carry out the war and its objectives and in the difficult negotiations with Israel.

The liquidator missile entered precisely the room where Haniyeh was, protected by the Revolutionary Guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the Ideological Army of Iran. It is capable of protecting few within its borders. The precision in time and place of Haniyeh‘s Personal Data confirms that the Israelis have access to relevant information at the highest level in Iran.

And, it is in charge of developing the pro-Iranian revolutionary movements in the different countries of South-West Asia. Regardless of whether religiously they were of another belief or variety within Islam. Thus, they support Hamas, which is Sunni. In these activities, General Qassem Sulemaini, head of the al-Quds Brigades of the Revolutionary Guard, in charge of special actions outside Iran, where he entered at the age of 18, stood out with his own and shining light. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, referring to him: «He is a son to me, I am a father to him.»

One handicap Sinwar has is that his usual effective hiding place is the military tunnel networks that run through the Gaza Strip. They are a defining structure for rigid defense (without giving up space to the attacker, normally) and in depth against a modern and highly motivated mechanized army. But, this network does not facilitate external communications for executives and military personnel.

Another great difficulty for Sinwar to be the supreme leader of Hamas and to be able to negotiate with Israel and live, is that he was the Main Responsible and Theoretician (of what he wanted to be done; he always dresses in civilian clothes) of the treacherous, cruel and disproportionate military attack on the south and southeast of Israel on Saturday, October 7th.

From Gaza, the militiamen left, trained to the point of sufficiency, in models and assemblies, which matched and resembled the fighting terrains in Israel. Which they would find in their deliberate, calculated, known attack. Which they would launch with precision on the south and southeast of Israel.

And, the Hamas irregulars returned to Gaza victorious, after killing more than 1,200 Israelis, soldiers from small posts, civilians from villages and kibbutzim (group, in Hebrew), young people having fun at a popular concert and capturing and taking as hostages some 250 Israelis and foreigners of Jewish affiliation, men, women, children and the elderly. They had the characteristics indicated by the Hamas leadership in Gaza; if they are weak and die quickly, they lose them.

And, little by little, the political-military leadership of Hamas is cut down by the determination, the motivation and the intensity and permanence of the Israeli operations. Especially, the occupation and clearing of the territories and tunnels of Gaza.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence

Terrorists and guerrillas.

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Another thing is what the authorities decide. That they consider the armed irregular enemy little less than the Loose Demon. And they usually deprive him of almost all rights, even personal ones. And they legislate progressively harsher laws against them. Guerrillas or terrorists fighting against a constituted country are easier to outlaw.

The different International Conventions only consider irregulars who are deployed or supported by another national State as “legal belligerents.” And they have to be established in their own territory, even if it is minimal, have a clear and visible command, wear a uniform and some identifying insignia (a “patch”, a distinctive), with their weapons visible and act in accordance with accepted laws from the war.

These conditions were only met by Soviet partisans in the last World War.

And, of course, they are not fulfilled by the jihadists ganged up in Europe, the winnower and blind with anger marksmen and slashers from America, France or Norway, and those so-called, with little accuracy, lone wolves, since this animal is essentially gregarious and, more so for hunt.

These would all be “armed soulless men.” And the soul is the Spirit of Man.

Pursuing them is just another Police activity, not war.

Tito‘s partisans, quite effective and intermittently deployed, did not comply with the conditions. And the national “resistance” of France, Italy, Poland was almost laughable. An enormous risk and immense pain to achieve Isolated damage to their Axis enemies.

A function that is ignored, like so many, is that one of the most important functions of the irregular rebels is to fix numerous enemy forces (for example, German, Italian, Allied) in their “territory of influence.” Which would otherwise be used by the military enemy in other more decisive and important strategic actions of the armed struggle.

Almost everything is unknown here too. One of the most extensive, prolonged and harsh cases of the terrorist struggle was the anti-partisan struggle of the Nazis in the USSR occupied by Germany.

Counterguerrillas.

The Germans had a wide network of forts, which formed a “network support base”, where the nodes were the forts and the ropes marked the rough directions of action for small local combats against the partisans.

There were also “mobile patrols”, strong in at least twenty-odd men, which continually pursued the localized partisan bands. If necessary, several of these were sometimes gathered in a region to carry out a larger attack.

The forces stationed in the forts were around a section (between 8 and 12 men). On nights without activity in their area, a part of the meager garrison was expected to go out to reconnaissance partisans or to integrate with other units to carry out an attack or pursuit proportional to their means.

The strongest units, used on the war fronts, were not normally used in the fight against partisan gangs. Except in cases of attacking or surrounding a large partisan unit with a certain probability of success.

Many times, operations to encircle and annihilate guerrillas turned out to be a fiasco. Due to the lack of secrecy and the abundance of temporary concealment in the siege that was established. And the partisans dispersed, hid or slipped away, crawling in pairs.

Results.

Were the results useful, necessary or dubious for the then called Red Army of Workers and Peasants, the activity of the partisans of the USSR?

The realities that the main and vital activity of the “line of logistical communications” from the Reich with its rear in the USSR was able to maintain throughout the war, the military, logistical and social activity (the comings and goings of the soldiers, sometimes due to illness or leave, and the units) of the Germans in their war effort. Supplies, weapons and troops passed through it for the advance and occupation of the USSR to the west of an imaginary line that ran from Leningrad to Stalingrad, passing through the west of Moscow.

If the Germans retreated relentlessly to the west, after losing the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, it was due to the very costly push of the Soviet Fronts or Army Groups, led by the STAVKA or General Staff. And “advised/commanded” by Georgi Zhukov or Alexander Vassilevski, as “Stavka Delegates to the Fronts” for the different major Soviet military operations.

Philosophy and mental basis.

Anyone who has come this far, may think of the horror of the fighting between partisans and German security forces on the Eastern Front. Because of the “rise to the maximum” in the harshness of military actions. And that the difference in races, religion or its absence, and divergent interests also spurred the belligerents.

Well, it depends on the temperament and character that each one had. And, in this case, common sense and a complementary nature led the Germans to begin to soften the “conditions of confrontation” at the individual level. It was about not getting hurt both. I mean, everyone.

The Germans learned from bitter experience that the firm and stubborn resistance of the partisans was due to their fear of suffering in captivity. And that this could easily be weakened by more humane treatment of the prisoner partisans.

Thus, the (German) Manual for the War against Gangs of 1944 included all these principles and ideas to be applied by the German security forces.

And, the partisans also began to behave like more civilized and less heartless combatants. This procedure or technique of respecting the integrity and rights of prisoners became an appreciated principle in the future guerrilla campaigns.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Respect for the Social Signs and Symbols

Introduction and Origin.

All Social Groups, from the tribes, with their totems, plumage and crowns and pantheons, to the current complex National Societies, with their anthems, flags, buildings of the Public Powers, decorations and orders, have «External Signs of Identity and Sovereignty ”.

Who seek to specify and even define, for their own and strangers, the Identity, the Essence and some other social qualities, of that unique social group.

The external things, the fabric, the metals, the chords and texts of said «External Signs» are Transfigured into a «real expression» of said essence and identity. And this is what they mean and are worth to that social group that proudly hoists them.

There is a defined formula to incorporate some people into the category of citizen member of the social group in question. It emphasizes all the characteristics and conditions that any people must meet and respect when joining that group.

As an example,

«I swear allegiance to the Flag of (…) and to the Republic that it represents. Symbol of the Nation, one and indivisible. In the Respect for the Law and the Rights of all Citizens.»

An example of transgression of respect for them.

On Tuesday, February 21, 2023, the Spanish deputy from the secessionist Catalan party JuntsPerCat. An Excrescence of the dissolved party of the Benefactor of Catalonia and Father of the New Catalonia, Jorge Pujol. Miriam Nogueras has deliberately removed the National Ensign from a speaker’s lectern in the Press room of the Congress of Deputies.

Her felony action, impudent, without education, nor respect for the Nation that pays her salary is an Act of Treason of Lesa Homeland.

It, despite whoever her friends, accomplices, comrades and supporters of hers.

And, the President of Congress, Mrs. Batet, is a necessary cooperator in the offense to the Nation that pays them.

The decaffeinated sequel type Daladier and Chamberlain.

In another Social Group that Respects Itself more, the consequences for them would have been more proportional to the Offense.

The Combat Capacity of Russian Soldiers in Ukraine.

Background.

The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was victorious in the Civil War over the Russian White Armies. These were supported to a greater or lesser extent in it by the European Powers, the United States and Japan. Already then, the Soviet Politburo set its eyes on Europe, in order to spread the World Revolution. In this, the internationalist ideas of Leon Trotsky had a decisive role.

To do this, General Mikhail Tukhachevsky would attack the recent Republic of Poland with his armed Eurasian Hordes. And he would win over the bourgeois Republic. Thanks to the fact that the Polish peasants would «fervently» join the socialist liberation offered by the Red Armies.

The imperialist attack on Poland.

The Reds reached the Warsaw Front, trying to overwhelm it from the nort.

General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, left, with other Senior Commanders of the Red Army

There, Marshal Josef Pilsudski, hero of the Liberation of Poland in World War I, toured his brigades and divisions. Raising and consolidating the combat morale of its forces and the identity of the Polish Nation, against communist Russian Imperialism.

And, he prepared with his General Staff and the commanders of his large units an in-depth mobile defense. Against the frontal and massive attacks of the enemy.

From Kyiv, about 500 km from the Front, Tukhachevsky encouraged his own, treating their hordes as despots, aided by their political commissars. And he directed his military operations on the maps of the situation of the war in his Command Post. That it was updated by unverified information from his large units at the Front.

The Operational Caedes.

Tukhachevsky had also tightened his Logistic Lines to the maximum. He was engulfed, touching in his imagination the triumph at hand.

Although they ate from looting the ground they walked on. From their distant rear they needed weapons, ammunition, equipment, clothes, shoes, medicines, troops replacement, pack mules and the essential Russian «cars of the country».

And, as a Miracle emerged from the concentration of the attacker’s Errors and the defender’s Effective Parameters, the attacker found himself without friendly ground under his feet. Without the essential operational rear area. To rest, maneuver, fight and consolidate after specific fights. And, he had to back off miserably.

The Soviets in arms, not effective military, retreated to the borders of the USSR.

And, the revolutionary dream of crossing the Polish plains and invading Germany. And free Europe from the capitalist or imperialist system, this as the culmination of capitalist development. It dissipated like the smoke of the tobacco that the Soviet troops smoked.

Current situation.

This idiosyncrasy of the Slavic military of the West of the Urals continues to influence the operations, needs and mental characteristics of the military of the Russian Federation.

The discipline of the troops in the barracks is deplorable. Free time, laziness, inane or risqué talks abounds.

Heavy equipment maintenance is poor. Some writer calculated that, from his military experience, half the tanks in battle would soon stop working and would be short of fuel and spare parts.

The Russian army lacks in its essential structure the framework of a corps of non-commissioned officers specifically formed for the immediate direction of the troops and the satisfaction of their needs. That they know them as well as their mothers. And with extensive military knowing and training, empathy and leadership skills. Respected by the soldiers and which recognize that without them and without obeying them, their chances of survival on the battlefield are much less.

Consequences for immediate operations.

This may be an insurmountable obstacle to Putin‘s plans, which Gerasimov is trying to fulfill.

And it could not be surpassed by the mere concentration of the mediocrity of equipment and men in the Fronts.