Categoría: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMANDS

Iran attacked by air.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

Persia is one of the three great Indo-European civilizations, along with Greece and Rome. If the Greeks had their Iliad and the Romans their Aeneid, the Persians had their Book of Kings. Persia is as Western as Ireland. And Ireland means the same as Iran, «land of the Aryans.»

Although Persia converted to Islam after the Battle of Nehawend in 642 a.C., its Islam is Shi’ism and has strong influences from Zoroastrianism. This is one of the oldest monotheistic religions. It was founded by the prophet Zoroaster in Persia around the 7th to 6th centuries b.C. Zoroastrianism has a dualistic view of good and evil. Angra Mainyu is the evil spirit, the principle of evil and destruction. It is the opposite of Ahura Mazda, the good and creator god. A practical summary could be the motto «think good, speak good, do good.»

The Shiite ayatollahs have much in common with the ancient «magi.» The name «magi,» as both category and occupation, is derived from the name given to the sages (of which there were several) who came from Persia in search of the newborn King of the Jews.

For all these reasons, we can say that Iranian Shiism is a national religion.

The last Iranian dynasty, the Pahlavi, focused on expanding and deepening the work «The Book of Kings,» with its 60,000 verses. This was a way to weaken radical Islam through the «ethnic cultural roots» of a 2,600-year-old empire.

The radical Shiite Ruhollah Khomeini had to go into exile in France because of his strict doctrine. He was only able to return to Iran after the 1979 Revolution, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

All of this enshrines, consolidates, and extends the identity and characteristics of the Iranian people.

CYRUS II THE GREAT, FOUNDER OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

As a symbol of the enduring and strenghting nature of the Iranian Ethos, we have the elite military unit of the Immortals, founded by Cyrus II the Great. Initially an infantry unit, it later became a cavalry unit under the Sasanian Empire. It comprised 10,000 handpicked soldiers. When a member fell, he was replaced after the battle. They formed the Persian king’s personal guard and were also used as shock troops in battles. In this way, they transmitted through time the idea of ​​continuity and strength of this special corps and, with it, of the entire army of the Empire and the Persian nation.

NADIR SHAH

This national identity has been reinforced by its resistance to invasions and oppression throughout the centuries. Iranians have fought in numerous battles and wars to protect their national territory and their sovereignty within it. From Alexander the Great‘s conquest to the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, and including the era of Nadur Shah, who led the resistance against the Afghans (also known as Pashtuns or Patans) in the 18th century, the defense of the nation is seen as a sacred duty by many Iranians. This is reflected in modern public events such as the Day of Sacred Defense.
Resistance, or the modern concept of resilience (a term borrowed from English), and sacrifice in defense of the nation and its characteristics (territory, religion, language) are recurring themes in Iranian culture.

Heavy aerial or artillery fire.
Artillery and ground-attack aircraft (and, more recently, unmanned aerial vehicles) have these tasks to fulfill in their operations:

Blinding. This means preventing or hindering enemy observation. It ranges from the occasional use of smoke or fog to attacking enemy observation positions, sensors, radars, or satellites.
Disrupt. This aims to interrupt or hinder enemy military operations. Counter-battery fire and interdiction attacks in the enemy’s tactical and operational zones are two examples.
Neutralize. This aims to temporarily render an enemy position or unit ineffective. It is the upper and general limit of destruction that should be applied, according to the main principle of saving resources.
Modern tactics and operations, applied by the Russians in support of their «uncomfortable ally» Syria and the al-Assad family, have openly begun to demolish enemy defensive positions, even in urban or industrial areas, before the supported infantry assault to capture them.
An uncomfortable ally is one that causes more setbacks and unpleasantness than results and victories. Italy was such an ally in World War II. The Russians had their only naval base-port in the Mediterranean at Port Taurus in Latakia, Syria.

DESTRUCTION BY HEAVY FIRE IN A SECTOR OF GAZA

Destroy. The goal is to eliminate or permanently disable an enemy capability or position. There are obvious cases where this task is applicable, for example, destroying a bridge or a bunker, an ammunition depot, or a military vehicle distribution park. It is the most costly means in relation to providing operational effectiveness.

The choice of task also depends on the military objective. For example, is it a fortified position or are they forces on the move? And, of course, on the available resources. These are usually always insufficient, and the commander must take this into account when allocating resources and reserves to his forces.

The Unconditional surrender.

This is a diplomatic-military procedure that did not normally exist before World War II.

Simply put forward conditions that were draconian enough to reduce the surrendering nation to near destruction.

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, FRENCH PRIME MINISTER.

This is what French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, nicknamed «The Tiger,» dictated to Germany on November 11, 1918, in a railway carriage at the Compiègne Forest, where the German surrender agreement was signed. He was not in the coach.

Germany lost the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine; the Ruhr industrial basin, the symbol and heart of its heavy industry; its Army was limited to 100,000 men, with a ban on tanks; it was required to pay enormous reparations for the costs of the war, etc.

A separate chapter concerns Germany‘s irreversible loss of its African colonies:

East Africa (present-day Namibia); Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania, along with the island of Zanzibar); Togo; Rwanda; Cameroon.

CHILDREN FLYING A KITE MADE FROM HIGH-VALUE GERMAN BANKNOTES

The hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic was one of the most infamous in history. In 1923, it reached almost 30,000%. Prices doubled every three and a half days. This immense inflation greatly alleviated the real burden of the war debt, which they paid with «paper money,» quite literally.

Tanks were replaced by large wheeled fake models for studies and training (war games).

The 100,000 military personnel assigned to the war, became the officers and non-commissioned officers of the future German Army, which was also provided with a revolutionary doctrine.

The socio-cultural and military mechanisms of the Iranian regime in its development and maintenance.

The arrival of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini in Iran from his exile in France in 1979 marked the beginning of a shift in direction and the ideologization of the Iranian Civic Revolution.

The Shiite clergy of Qom soon realized that the Revolution was a «source of law» (with great potential) and that it needed to secure its position against an almost intact Iranian Armed Forces, inherited from the Pahlavi Empire.

SADDAM HUSSEIN AL-TIKRITI

In 1980, Iran was attacked by Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, and the army performed poorly.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established by order of Khomeini on April 22, 1979. It was a Parallel Army, ideologically and religiously unwaveringly loyal to the ayatollahs and Iranian Shiism. Some parallels could be drawn with Hitler’s SS. The ayatollahs sought and implemented an effective army, loyal to them and their principles.

GENERAL QASSEM SOLEIMANI, ONE OF THE MOST FAMOUS COMMANDERS OF THE AL-QUDS BRIGADES (REVOLUTIONARY GUARD)

The Revolutionary Guard is responsible for Iran‘s internal and border security, law enforcement, and Missile Forces. Its operations are geared toward asymmetric warfare, controlling smuggling, and the Strait of Hormuz.

Today, so many years later, the Iranian Armed Forces are sufficiently loyal and effective in the regular defense of Iran.

(To be continued)

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL SURPRISES.

Prolegomenon.

Military surprise is more a part of the art of war and its creation, than of military science, the doctrine, its regulations and the principles or «good-doing» rules of war. Of course, its scope and instruments are taken from military science. Military science has its logic and practice oriented towards applied theory.

Military doctrine forms the framework, the structure, the heart of all development and the wisdom that military science has been developing so far. The military doctrine of each state incorporates the idiosyncracy, history and civilization of the corresponding nation. The permanent virtues and the more temporary values of the former are also reflected in its military doctrine. All this channels it in one direction and one sense.

War art has in its conception and execution the characteristics of: variability; the unusual and singular conception; the different, unexpected and novel application and the relative ingenuity (naturalness and freshness) and freedom in its facts.

If we are guided mainly by military science, which also knows the enemy, the results of the war dialectic will be obtained by maintaining a superiority in men and means, marches and maneuvers. And the cost will be the attrition of means and human wear in a greater proportion and always undue, than with the use of surprise.

Thus, a defence deployed in depth and with sufficient reserves, probably deprives us of many opportunities for effective surprise. But, almost always, acting in the microfield, as using a tactical zoom, we can apply the tactical or operational surprise, unusual and unexpected.

Development.

The surprise becomes specify and materializes in an unexpected action on the enemy by fire and/or shock. That, taking advantage of the enemy’s habitual lack of combat availability, makes him the victim of an attack that he is not in a position to successfully reject.

Obviously, the units in charge of surprise must avoid enemy’s reconnaissance, advanced combat units and security. In charge of giving the units that detached them, enough time to get the combative disposition that allows the rejection of their attacker.

But, the mental surprise must not only be unexpected for the enemy. But, in order to be able to take full advantage of its potential and effects, it must also be unusual, special, infrequent. With an unquestionable tendency to be «unusual», as never seen. This unusual character, never occurred, extraordinarily reinforces the quality of unexpected and sudden use of surprise.

We don’t always have the unusual at hand. And surprise often favors, by employing the law of action, the most mobile and even only the active rival.

Then, the use and manipulation of the “appearances”, the appreciated characteristics of the events and their circumstance, will allow us to establish and develop a new tactical or operational situation. Which will be surprising and unusual for the enemy. And it will give us an unexpected victory, at the beginning of the faced dialectic situation.

A Tactical example with operational trascendence.

Here is an example of an extraordinary force acting as a normal force and, in so doing, completely deceiving the enemy by manipulating appearances of the events.

In January 1943, with the Soviet advance threatening Rostov, the 4th Panzer Army of colonel general Hoth moved back from its positions on the banks of the Sal and established a defensive line south of the river Manich. Passing through that area were the supply and retreat routes of the 1st Panzer Army. Routes that had been kept open, if a disaster like that of Stalingrad was to be avoid. In Stalingrad, the Sixth German Army, the Army unit more powerful of the Wehrmatch, was caught. The 4th Panzer Army was assigned to protect this bottle neck in the communications of the Armies Groups Don.

General Erich von Manstein, before his capture of the Crimean fortress

Soon the Soviets reached the confluence of the Manich and Don rivers, took control of the small city of Manutchskaya that was only 30 kilometers from the mouth of the Don on the south bank, and sent advanced detachments in this direction. On January 23, the 11th panzer division and 16th infantry division counterattacked the Soviet advance spears and pushed them back to Manutchskaya.

Then, it was vital to restore the south front of the Don and Manich and to expel the Soviets from the city. Which was one of their bridgeheads (which, usually with much skill, could be rapidly reinforces once constituted).

GENERAL HERMANN BALCK, ONE OF GERMANY’S FINEST TACTICIAN.

The Germans made a direct assault from the southwest on the 24th, seeking to surprise the Soviets with the operation continuity. Instead, they found that the Soviets had created an antitank front in this entry to the city. Using tanks with their hulls partly buried and distributed between the buildings, along the streets, and in other difficult to see locations.

The 11th panzer division, a crack division with a magnificent tactician as chief, quickly stopped the assault when it detected the importance of defenses.

On the 25th, the general Hermann Balck initiated an assault on the northeast sector of the city, which the Soviets identified as a main assault, similar to the previous one and following the orthodox criterion of «not insist on unsuccessful or frontal assaults» (not profitable). For it, they moved rapidly theirs antitank means (tanks are the most mobile) to the new threatened sector.

To make credible this assault (manipulation of the appearances), at the beginning the whole divisional artillery was used in its support. It was also the more dangerous direction of assault for the Soviets. Since that part of the city was nearest to the principal bridge over the Manich and its occupation would isolate the Soviet bridgehead on the south bank. These factors constituted the «primary evidences«.

The assault on the north-east sector was probably already considered by the Soviet defense as a German alternative assault and, because of this, they reacted rapidly to what happened.

Infantry half-track vehicles and reconnaissance light tanks executed the principal «virtual» assault, simulating the march of mechanized vehicles, concealed by smoke curtains. And seeking more to hide them from the enemy than to protect their advance. This gave a «secondary evidence» to the credibility of the «appearances«.

When the Soviet’s determination in the new defense was estimated, which confirmed the alteration of its original deployment and the attraction made by the normal «apparent» attack. The bulk of the divisional artillery threw a powerful fire blow on a sector of the southwest zone of the town. A single battery continued to support the ongoing false principal assault.

Most of the tanks of 15th panzer regiment immediately attacked the forward limit of the defense, entering the town and advancing on its interior. To attack from the rear the new defensive Soviet deployment, especially its tanks. The mechanized German infantry then closed in behind them.

The Soviet resistance crumbled. Its infantry ran to the bridge over the Manich river. But was chased by the 61th motorists battalion.

German casualties in liquidating Manutchskaya’s stronghold were, according to its own sources, one man dead and fourteen injured men. The Soviets had between 500 and 600 casualties and 20 destroyed tanks.

Action Interfaces as Zones of Tactical Development against the Enemy. Second Part.

A “weapons system” seeks to attack the enemy preferably in a certain way, taking advantage of its lethal or neutralizing potential. Against it, an enemy will always find an increasingly effective defense: armor, fire, obstacles, mobility; dispersion, concealment with or without cover, etc.

Combined weapons systems seek to produce a synergy, a multiplication of the individual capabilities of the weapons, a compensation for weaknesses or drawbacks and a weakening of enemy capabilities, together with a greater exposure or accentuation of its tactical vulnerabilities.

This synergy should produce effects on enemy combat capabilities and on its speed of action or capacity for movement: It must neutralize enemy defense. It must create in the enemy a vulnerable overexposure, when receiving the effective, complementary and coordinated action of the inter-arms systems. It must produce an operational indecision in the enemy, which harms its speed and capacity to react.

The inter-arms system is a technological and tactical way of increasing the favorable active interfaces on the enemy. It is an element of the operational strategy, carried out on the interesting points of the enemy deployment, to create a tactical vulnerability and to be able to produce the decision or the exploitation with the minimum wear of the available combat capacity of its own.

In the supplementary systems, the enemy defends itself in the same way from all the attacking elementary systems. A kind of saturation or maximum effect of the form of attack undertaken is sought. An example is the indirect fire of artillery and mortars.

In the complementary systems, one of the systems attacks the enemy and when the latter reacts defensively, seeking to dislocate the attacker, it becomes especially vulnerable to the action of the other or several of the other weapon systems used. The enemy thus suffers an extension of his vulnerability, over a longer time or space of action, achieving the three desired effects.

A complementary system is that formed by the obstacle and the fire. To overcome the obstacle, the enemy must concentrate and/or stop his advance and this reduces his impetus or quantity of movement and makes him especially vulnerable to repulse fire, which must not destroy the obstacle. Another complementary system is the fire and tactical maneuver developed by the small units or advance spears of an attack.

Another complementary combined arms system would be the convergent maneuver, taking advantage of positions and terrain and the available combat capacity, echelon it laterally to create more favorable interfaces. Faced with each convergent attack sector, the enemy has to react in a different way. With this, he creates vulnerabilities not well estimated by the enemy, in favor of the rest of the sectors that intervene. On the other hand, the combat capacity deployed towards a rejection will not always be in the best orientation to employ it in another more or less expected direction. If this is combined with neutralizing support fire, the entire enemy system is severely disrupted and dispersed, in its defense plan, in its fire plan and in its conduct.

The inter-arms system seeks to paralyze the enemy’s action or severely disrupt it, by affecting the quality of the combat capacity, generating in it a contradictory and more ineffective mode of action. It also acts in the same way in the successive cycles of action, divided into observation, situation, decision and action. And it does so through the direct deprivation suffered by the enemy of acting coherently and consistently in them, due to the incapacitation of its available combat capacity.

The analysis of the search for the decision in World War I will give us a practical example of the application of the search for the appropriate action interfaces, using inter-arms systems that are different in their composition, although with identical effects and results. Since the tactical solutions achieved on both sides lacked the complement of the sufficient operational movement capacity (the other of the operating systems with which it forms a complementary interactive pair), the operational strategic solution could not be achieved.

The origin of the German assault forces (Stormtroopers) , at the end of 1916, was in the awareness of the need and the possibility of fragmenting the pseudo-compact enemy front, into smaller sectors of advance, practically into advance spears, in which to act through an inter-arms or combined arms system. Favorable action interfaces would thus be created, in which to be able to act with freedom of action, at the level of reinforced assault platoons, which would advance by covered jumps to the enemy positions, behind a relatively short barrage of fire.

Supports in tactical subordination would include Russians shortened 76.2 mm guns, who were very well suited for heavy direct fire support and who lacked the backlash of other cut-off pieces, heavy grenade launchers, light mortars, machine guns and flamethrower squads and engineer platoons (pioneers). These last three supports would be those that would accompany the infantry to the direct assault of the trenches or enemy defense strong points. These were thus isolated from the support of their artillery or other nearby positions, which were neutralized by the German heavy artillery or by other assault sections.

On the other hand, on the Allied side, it was the English who used the first tanks (tanks was their code name in their development), heavy and clumsy, at the level this time of the great front of wide sectors, to provide continuous direct fire support to their infantry and enable them to successfully fight deep into the German tactical zone and even break through it. They were also used to clear trenches along their lines, protected by their armor and using mainly their machine guns.

However, neither side had a single “medium” that could maintain, depending on the use and circumstances, an adequate tactical speed and operational speed without interruption between them. In short, it could successively achieve tactical and operational objectives. The logistic support system was also not developed enough to be able to quickly send a significant flow of supplies and people along narrow, unconsolidated lines of advance.

In effect, there was a tactical speed (very few km per hour) that could be maintained both by infantry (of course, also German) and by tanks designed to support it, and a higher operational speed, maintained by the railway and trucks and other vehicles in the deep operational zone of each belligerent side.

This meant that, once a local tactical breakthrough was achieved, exploitation within the enemy operational zone could not be achieved. Faced with this, any of the contenders would bring their operational or strategic reserves closer in time and convert them into units deployed with full combat readiness. Thus, they created a new tactical zone very close to the breakthrough, blocking it.

To achieve the operational decision, a “means” was needed that was capable of acting with a certain autonomy at both levels of war activity: the tactical or immediate and the operational or deep and transcendent.

In modern warfare, with a considerable deployment of close and long-range, direct and indirect firepower, despite the progressive emptiness of the immediate battlefield (almost thirteen times greater in this world war than a century earlier, in Napoleon’s campaigns), this «means» could only be a well-armed vehicle, sufficiently protected and powered by an internal combustion engine.

But acting according to the tactics of relatively narrow sectors and combined arms systems, developed by the Germans for their assault forces and subsequently used by all their infantry in the general campaign of the spring of 1918, from March 21 to July 18, the date on which the Allies began their general offensive. And counting on reasonable logistics, which would compensate for wear and tear, maintenance and the capacity for operational movement.

In 1917 and 1918, neither of the two sides, neither the Cordial Entente or the Allies nor the European Central Empires, possessed either the two concepts or the specific elements of their application. In fact, a polished and developed synthesis (integrating the nascent war aviation into the German infantry inter-arms system) of the ideas and means of both would be necessary.

However, the Western Allies had the classic means in relative abundance. And they used them according to the knowledge of the time to achieve a strategic decision in the Western European theater. Generalissimo Foch used a strategy of hammering, of stubborn reiteration of efforts. Seeking that the «tactical reaction» provoked in the Germans would affect the strategic capacity of systematic renewal of their defensive front. And, in the end, this German strategic combat capacity collapsed.

And thus the Allies achieved the strategic decision of the war.

THE END

Weapons and Their Defense in the History. Third Part.

However, the Mongols flung upon it, Almost completely surrounding the camp and showering it with bombs and incendiary arrows, which burned the wagon trains and tents and frightened the beasts. They sowed chaos among their enemies and already shattered the Hungarians’ self-confidence.

Curiously (or not?), the Mongols still hadn’t completed or covered with any detachments the siege of the Hungarian wagon camp through the gorge leading into the heath. The Hungarian cavalry still with sufficient moral courage, formed a wedge to resist the charge; it was the last firm stand of the Hungarian army. However, most of them retreated through the «gap» in the siege, fleeing in small groups toward what they believed would be their salvation. And, truly falling into a deadly trap, which extended along the entire route of their flight to Pest.

The Mongol light cavalry, taking no risks, softened up the knight’s desperate wedge-shaped deployment from a distance with their bows and arrows, and then, seizing their opportunity, the heavy cavalry charged to crush them.

Numerous Mongol light detachments, in turn, set out in pursuit of the fugitives. One group pressed them directly from the rear, increasing their commotion, chaos, and fear. Meanwhile, other detachments carried out the «overwhelming pursuit,» catching up with them from the sides and spearing them or shooting arrows them from their mounts.

The remains of the Hungarians, their horses, equipment, and baggage were scattered along the road back to Pest for 50 kilometers. More than 70,000 Hungarian cavalry and auxiliaries perished on the battlefield, in the temporary encampment, and in the flight to the southwest.

After the Battle of the Sakh, Hungarian resistance collapsed.

The Mongols then attacked Pest and burned it. But they did not dare to cross to the west side of the Danube, exploiting their success, despite the moral and numerical superiority they enjoyed at the time. Batu and Subodai rested their army and consolidated their positions east of the great river. More than half a year passed, the main event being a half-hearted declaration of a crusade against them by the Pope, which achieved little in practice.

In December 1241, the Danube froze in this large region. The Mongols took advantage of the situation to sack Buda, reconnoissance in force in Austria, and sent a detachment south toward Zagreb in pursuit of King Béla. On the 25th, they assaulted Gran, the Hungarian capital and seat of its archbishopric, taking with them everything valuable and antique they could.

A portentous end for Europe.

Central andWestern Europe were ripe for a Mongol invasion. The Europeans lacked an army capable of confronting this threat, which was already breathing down their necks. The strategic plan Subodai explained to the Khan and his generals seemed to be faithfully carried out down to its final stages. But this was now merely an illusion, an impossibility. An «appearance,» as Sun Tzu would say.

OGEDEI GREAT KHAN

On December 11, 1241, they had received at Batu and Subodai‘s headquarters an escorted messenger from Karakorum, the Mongol capital. He brought news that Ogedai, the Great Khan, had died and that his widow was acting as regent until a new Mongol emperor was elected and ascended the throne. The Mongol princes present in the camps were eager to assert their rights to the succession and decided to return to their capital, taking the imperial tumans with them. Batu knew that without these elite troops, he could not hold Hungary, but he believed that with the Turkmen recruits, who were already experienced and had seen combat, he could retain most of his territories.

Thus, the Mongols evacuated Hungary, unhindered, harassed, or pursued by their enemies. Although they left behind the land that had been theirs devastated. This was a symbol of their idiosyncrasy and plundering nature, a land bandit and absolute predator. And they lacked the slightest capacity to create, maintain, develop, extend, and bequeath to their successors a civilization worthy of the name. And they could leave them only the accumulated results of their atrocities, bonds, tributes, plunder, and loot, and the military lessons to obtain them.

Sarai, capital of the subsidiary Empire of the Golden Horde.

Batu returned to his original base camp, in Sarai, near the Volga and barely 100 km north of Astrakhan. And there he established a subsidiary Mongol empire, which became known as the Golden Horde.

The Mongols would have no other opportunity to invade Europe. After this aberrant nightmare suffered by the Europeans, they invented all kinds of stories and myths, in which they recounted how they had defeated the «Tatar» invaders (as the Mongols were generally known in Europe) and forced them to return to their lands.

This unthinkable, sudden, and portentous result, occurring in the last possible moments… Was it a work of the Fate and Karma of Europe and its privileged Civilization? Or was it the result of Divine Intervention through the intercession of the Virgin Mary?

Of course, it was, humanly speaking, an excessive and incredible coincidence. But faith can never provide «evidence» either, because it would cease to be evidence and become verifiable reality. The effective Divine Intervention, in favor of Europe and its civilization, which without Christianity acting from its core would never resemble what it was and what it is, is likely, because It is never thunderous or overwhelming.

OGEDEI, LORD OF ASIA AND SUCCESOR OF GENGHIS KAN

God did not visit Elijah in a lightning storm or a hurricane, but in a gentle, soft breeze. And, for esotericists and syncretists, the explanation could be «a cosmic action of astral and Akashic forces, in favor of Light, Peace, and Human Civilization toward higher levels of Universal Consciousness.»

There is also a common «rational» explanation for what happened, but it cannot pinpoint the moment for this opportune withdrawal. The Mongols and associated Central Asian tribes were creating a Eurasian empire in the first half of the 13th century. But their material capabilities and ideological and religious resources were not adequate for such an important objective.

As we have seen, they had nothing satisfactory or lasting to offer the peoples of the occupied countries. The Mongols were kept in these foreign lands by the threat of known terror. As with other tyrants who sought to become «global,» their necessary collaborators were ethnically or ideologically similar. But the Mongol ethnic group and its ilk were demographically insignificant, for allowing them to monitor and defend themselves alone. All of this, in the decades since the invasion of Eastern Europe, had strained their military capabilities to the breaking point.

Thus, sooner rather than later, the Mongols would have had to undertake this general retrograde march to secure and consolidate their lands in Eastern Eurasia. They would have distanced themselves from contact with dynamic, ideological, and expansive civilizations, such as Europe, with which their relations of neighborliness and early exchanges of merchants, explorers, and adventurers would have been resolved through military confrontation.

(to be continued)

Weapons and Their Defense in the History. Second Part.

The Mongols Armies.

The Mongol Army’s cavalry was divided into light and heavy cavalry.

Their most distinctive weapon, used by all cavalry, was the S-shaped composite bow, which, properly drawn, could launch an arrow over 300 meters away. Its length made it useful for shooting from a mount.

The Mongols were herders, and their occupation gave them a lot of free time. This allowed them to amuse themselves by shooting the composite bow, thereby achieving great skill in its shooting and use and, very importantly, maintaining it over time.

Light cavalry was intended to harass the enemy in formation, send patrols ahead of their main body to gather intelligence, and pursue and finish off the defeated enemy as they fled.

Heavy cavalry struck the enemy in the clash; care was taken to ensure that the enemy was tired, dispersed, or in the minority.

The Mongols did not have a sufficient siege formation. They defeated the entrenched enemy with lures and tricks. And, by offering them a much-desired advantage, they trapped them.

Development.

In 1241, some 100,000 Mongols crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border to attack Hungary. A detachment of 20,000 men, two Mongol tumans or divisions, under the command of Princes Baidar and Kadan, will be tasked with ensuring that the Hungarians receive no reinforcements from Poland, Germany, or Bohemia.

To this end, they defeat the concentrations of forces from those countries at Chmielnik, about 18 km from Krakow. They lure the enemy into pursuit without prior combat, into an ambush, appearing to the enemy as a raiding party retreating to its base.

And, at Liegnitz, about 60 km west of Breslau, they employ a mangudai to deceive them. It consisted that a Mongol army «corps,» inferior to the enemy, seriously engaging in the fight with them. Its size was large enough to make the Mongol effort considered significant. This would mentally lure the enemy away from any other thoughts or possibilities. After a fierce battle, the sheer weight of the enemy forced the Mongol corps to retreat.

Batu crosses the Sakh with 40,000 men via the Stone Bridge

What had been a tactical retreat, never truly disorderly, was mistaken by its enemies as an exploitable defeat. Its complete and permanent ignorance of the Mongol enemy left it unaware of anything. And its desire for victory, heightened by the genuine effort exerted in the initial engagement, prevented it from seeing beyond its reach.

The relentless, full-throttle pursuit eventually dispersed the tight, solid formations of the European nobles. At one point during the pursuit, always far from the waiting enemy forces, the bulk of the Mongol heavy cavalry emerged, hidden, fresh, and launched into the clash. It ultimately broke up the disjointed cavalry groups into which the European pursuers had dispersed.

After a genuine hunt, the European forces remaining in the initial positions of the battle either dispersed as well or were in turn attacked by the entire Mongol force.

By then, in less than a month of operations, 20,000 Mongols (at the outset) had advanced some 650 km into enemy territory and won two decisive battles.

Poland was battered and shaken, and the Germans west of the Oder River were retreating and preparing to defend their kingdoms. The Bohemians, still intact, were some 400 km from the first Hungarian defensive positions on the Danube; therefore, their army was operationally ineffective in achieving the resolution against the Mongol attack on Hungary.

To ascertain the Germans’ «intent,» the Mongols staged a demonstration westward into Germany. King Wenceslas pursued them. At a certain point, the two tumans (-) split into small, elusive detachments. And, forming a cloud almost invisible to the enemy, they slipped past both sides of the Bohemian army and retreated eastward.

Recreation General Subodai Bahadur

In their retreat to join the main Mongol army (80,000 men), commanded by Subudai Bahadur, the Khan’s deputy, the Mongols crossed Moravia, ravaging its villages, warehouses, and fields. They thus created a vast desert wasteland, which would further protect Subudai‘s right flank by rendering those Moravian lands incapable of sustaining a passing army for any length of time.

The remnants of Princes Baidar and Kadan‘s forces managed to join Subudai‘s forces and continue to participate in his campaign.

General Subudai had devised and presented the invasion and attack plan to the Khan and his generals, and had been placed in command of the forces to carry it out.

Subudai concentrated his army in three marching groups. Each would enter Hungary by a different route, through the passes and valleys of the Carpathian Mountains. This deployment provided the Mongols with protection from enemy surprises and gave them an initial deployment, preparatory to the maneuvers of their three mobile corps. The Hungarians, for their part, did not dare attack any of them, for fear of the other corps advancing on their operational rear or capturing some of their cities.

On April 3, Subudai formed his three mobile attack columns opposite Pest, on the east bank of the Danube. There stood King Béla of Hungary with his army of 100,000 men. Across the river, linked by bridges, lay Buda.

Having also deployed a tuman to Transylvania to ensure that the Christians did not receive reinforcements from Romania, the Mongols now numbered about 70,000 (plus) men. And the more time Subudai took in his calculations, decisions, and preparations, the more time other European rulers would have to make up their minds and come to support king Béla.

The Mongol general applied one of his combat stratagems on a strategic scale: his army retreated east. Using «reasoning,» the Hungarian commanders assumed that the Mongols did not dare to fight against their more powerful army. And, spurred on by their inaction in the face of the unhindered advance of the three Mongol columns, they demanded the King Bela to begin their pursuit. The Hungarians did not appreciate that Subudai was luring them away, from the protection of the Danube and the support of detachments and corps of the Hungarian army.

King Béla IV of Hungary.

King Béla, commanding the vast majority of his army, led the pursuit against the Mongols. The Mongol retreat was deliberately slow. It took them six days to reach the Sakho River, about 160 km northeast of Buda and Pest.

West of the river and on the plain opposite Mohi, the main town in the area, Prince Batu and Sabudai decided to confront their «pursuers.» On April 9, the Mongols crossed a wide gorge, advanced through a heath, crossed a Stone Bridge, and continued some 16 km to the thickets west of the Tokay hills and vineyards. There, they had numerous places to camouflage and hide.

Prince Batu, founder of the Golden Horde

The Hungarian army, pursuing them head-on, encamped in the heath, arranging their wagons in a circle, where they set up their tents, equipment, and horses. To the right of the temporary camp were the swamps along the banks of the Tisza River, to their front lay the Sakho Heath, and to their left were forests and small hills.

At dawn on Wednesday, April 10, 1241, Batu and around 40,000 men advanced toward the stone bridge from its eastern side. The Hungarians defended it vigorously, until they were forced to retreat due to the «fire bombs» launched by the Mongol catapults, as they were on a very narrow front.

We are now seeing, quite clearly, how the opposing rivals are assuming the roles of winner and loser. And that this situation continues until the very end. These are some of the «signs» that announce and precede the final results of the war dialectic.

The Mongols crossed to the western side of the Sakh, but for more than two hours, they were terribly pressed by the Hungarian charges, and only the fire of their archers allowed them to briefly reestablish their defensive line. Little by little, the Hungarian army deployed to eliminate the Mongol bridgehead over the Sakh.

Suddenly, General Subodai, who had also crossed to the western side via a makeshift bridge built downstream of the Sakh, while the Hungarians were distracted by the threat of the Mongol bridgehead, appeared with around 30,000 Mongols in the Hungarian rearguard.

Beaten and stunned, but with the courage and experience to avoid panic, the Hungarians retreated in good order to their nearby camp.

(To be Continued)

Weapons and their Defenses in the History. First Part.

Introduction.

Throughout history, supposed war rivals have perfected their weapons, Techniques, and Tactics to defeat an enemy who violently opposes the achievement of their objectives.

In the Beginning,

The strongman appeared with a large stick or club, coming after his neighboring rival. At one point, the latter, who was practically a weakling, hid in a bush by the side of the road. When the strongman passed by, confident and well-equipped, he waited for him to leave his back free and attacked him on an unprotected «essential vulnerability.» The «big man» fell lifeless to the ground. History doesn’t say what happened to the two characters in the fable.

When the number of members of the two factions increased enormously, they instinctively sought to group together, so they could attack and defend themselves much better.

At first, there was a relatively large group, and soon the focus was on organizing and utilizing the group. And the phalanx was born, a wall of twelve or sixteen ranks of men armed with long spears or pikes, extending several ranks ahead, well-trained in their combined handling at close range. They were protected by a large shield and pieces of metal or heavy leather on the chest, head (helmet), arms, and legs.

In ancient Greece, the Spartans refined the tactical instrument of the phalanx to the fullest.

No one was as trained and protected as they were. And their society accepted and honored their militari ethos, embodied in the phalanx. Spartan mothers would tell their sons, phalangist hoplites, to «return with the shield or on the shield.» There was no quartermaster or medical care, properly speaking. And mothers instilled in their sons the warrior social mentality of their society.

THE IMPRESSIVE PHALANX

But, behold, the right wing of the phalanx was less protected than the left. This was due to the way the men naturally protected their left flanks with their shields.

And at Leuctra, around 344 BC, Sparta, with a majority of its forces (10,000 men), set out to crush Thebes (6,000 men). Unaware that its phalanx model had changed,

Epaminondas and his pair, Pelopidas, had introduced the «oblique order» into their Theban phalanx. On their left wing, they deployed a greater number of forces, and the best of them. Among them, a phalanx formed by homosexual couples, which they called the «Sacred Band.»

They also refused to employ their center and right wings, as is typical of the oblique order. Perhaps the heightened sensitivity of homosexuals, which is said to be present in the Theban homosexual leaders, may have influenced their sharpness and refinement.

On the Spartan right wing was the commander of all their forces. This was thus the «core of their resistance.» And this was battered and beaten by the Theban forces on their left wing. And then appeared the «Caedes,» the slaughter and the finish of the vanquished.

From afar, the Spartans on their center and left were also affected by the defeat and the damage to the hoplites on their right wing. And they began to retreat, without having been defeated by weapons.

A year after Leuctra, Epaminondas was touring the Peloponnese peninsula, commanding forces of the newly formed Arcadian League. And he appeared in front of the city of Sparta, within whose sight, it was said, enemy forces had never appeared.

Phalanxes were too large to be able to move freely and quickly against the enemy. They acted as a «dam» of Force against Force, where surprise, skill, and flexibility could not exist. Another characteristic of their technical rigidity is that they had to fight on flat terrain, at least without undulations or obstacles such as rocky outcrops or patches of trees and bushes, which broke their structural continuity.

Rome meets the Greek phalanxes.

The Romans had a military structure based on the legion, as a large operational unit, of about 5,000 men. The legions were made up of maniples or, much later, cohorts, small tactical units capable of moving and maneuvering on the battlefield, gaining the flexibility, skill, and surprise that phalanxes lacked. And their centurions, one to the right and one to the left of the first row of the maniple, and their officers were capable of leading them individually.

At the Battle of Pydna, in June 168 BC, a battle took place between the Romans led by Aemilius Paullus and the Macedonian Perseus. The Macedonian phalanx vigorously attacked the Roman formation of two legions and forced it back toward the fortified Roman camp. However, the terrain was uneven and somewhat rocky, and as it advanced, the phalanx lost its solidity and integrity.

A MOMENT AND A PLACE OF THE BATTLE OF PIDNA.

Seeing this, Paulus gave orders to the maniples (centurions) to act independently on the enemy phalanx. The centurions then took command. The maniples advanced and began to take advantage of the smallest gap in the enemy’s pseudo-compact formation to introduce their men there.

They began wreaking havoc with their gladius (somewhat short Roman swords, prepared for close combat) on the defenseless flanks of the Macedonian hoplites, armed with long pikes.

Soon, Aemilius Paullus launched the Second Legion against the center of the enemy line. It shuddered and finally gave way. The Greek spearmen were now nothing more than a hindrance, both in fighting and defending. The Roman legionaries vigorously launched themselves into the attack. And then came the Caedes, the massacre, the collapse of the formation into a shapeless mass, terrified and fleeing individually.

When the sun set, Paulus halted exploiting his success. The death toll showed one hundred Romans and twenty thousand Macedonians had finally fallen.

The Mongols threaten Central and Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongols, nomadic tribes from the interior of Asia, who dominated mounted combat and had a very elaborate and simple military organization, appeared for the first time on the borders of eastern Europe.

Their logistics were simple and involved supplying on the ground they trod, following the broad pastures as they advanced, each rider carrying several mounts with him.

The Mongols started from their strategic zone, defined by the «advance and location» of their nomadic settlements, their yurts or nomadic houses, pulled by oxen, never observed or suspected by their enemies, and reached the tactical zone with them. Their operations did not require the physical and mental support of the operational zone, the transition for the forces and their support between the strategic and tactical zones.

A RECREATION OF SUBUDAI BAHADUR, THE GREATEST MONGOLIAN STRATEGIST.

In front of the discontinuous front of their enemy positions (cities), there is a wide, unprotected, and empty area, uncontrolled by anyone, which the Mongols make the most of for their operational approach. Their enemies, the feudal heavy cavalry forces and their infantry spearmen and archers, maintain nothing resembling advanced detachments, which make mobility reconnaissance and repel the Mongol advance parties of reconnaissance and combat.

The Mongols’ concern toward the enemy was generally strategic, considering their «exposed flanks» at the level of the «occupied» countries. This concern stemmed from their always small numbers for the objectives entrusted or sought.

And from the real tactical no invincibility of their forces, if they encountered an organized, skilled, and, above all, calm enemy.

In 1221, after conquering the Muslim Empire of Samarkand, located between the Syr Darya and Amur Darya rivers, Genghis Khan systematically plundered Afghanistan. His son Tilui slaughtered most of the inhabitants of northern Persia. With no possible live enemies on their strategic flank, they protected the southern flank of the Mongol Empire.

(To be continued)

The New Times Coming for Defense.

Introduction.

It is said that military deterrence is a quality and that it cannot be measured. If I do not know the Effect of my investment in weapons, how do I know that I am protected? Will I not need more means of one kind or another?

Precisely, Science always tries to measure the variables in phenomena. And, it succeeds. The politician should read the “Scientific Forecast in Military Art”. Text by a Soviet military man, translated into Spanish.

And, now that we have to invest up to 5% of the GDP to defend ourselves from the “threats of the felonious East”. More.

Are most of the medal ribbons of the most lucid officer, the same..? That means that the event is repeated. And this can only be because they are given for pure seniority in service… Stagnation. But, they do not care to show them off, to those who have no idea of ​​what they mean,. This is self-deception and the capital (not mortal) sin of vanity.

Martin van Creveld, a professor at the University of Jerusalem and author of several excellent books on military strategy and operations, said that “the country’s military institution had become an arthritic structure without creativity.”

And, without the qualities of initiative and flexibility, creativity becomes lame, if not paralyzed. And everything becomes stagnant.

Van Creveld was expelled from his post by the Israeli military caste.

Development.

The huge surprise of Saturday, October 7, 2014, given by the irregular militia of Hamas to the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) was a confirmed evidence.

You do not prepare such a complex and extensive operation, almost in full view of many people, as if it were a country party. And, just like that.

You always have to do a general rehearsal of the total operation. And, subject the means to tests of duration and demands, at least equal, as in action. For example, a drainage motor must be tested, using it for the same number of hours that will be needed in the action. A combined arms operation must always be carried out, since, except between units that have already acted together before, implicit communication will not exist, and “mutual collaborative actions” are difficult to improvise.

The training space must have the same characteristics and complications as the real one. And, it would be convenient for it to be located far from the mission operations area, so as to be free of giving indicative signals to the enemy’s observation and espionage. Men, means and supplies must be moved to the training areas and returned to their bases of departure for the actions.

Communication between units must be practiced without failure, especially those of different arms (infantry with tanks, tanks with artillery, ground support aviation with those that have to support), that must collaborate in tactical subordination during the development of the attack.

Each important function must have a “reserve executor”. For example, a glider cannot be unique, in case the winds carry it down far from the target of attack:

German airborne forces attack on Fort Eben Emael, Liege, Belgium, in May 1940. It controlled, by means of heavy fire from a fortress (as well as several bunkers and armored and consolidated redoubts), the paved approach route towards Brussels for the combined German forces.

The airborne forces in gliders landed on the roofs of Eben Emael, closed the Belgian exits to the roof and used hollow-charge bombs-grenades (an Originality not used before) to overcome the roofs of the various redoubts of the fortress. The roofs were designed to withstand the fire of German heavy artillery. But the hollow-charge bomb concentrates the force of its explosion in a jet of fire and molten metal, which penetrates concrete and armor and whatever else is thrown at it.

The fortress surrendered as soon as the redoubts began to be blown up and assaulted.

In spite of all the needs and the long preparation time for the attack, all the Israeli intelligence agencies were surprised by the unexpected and sudden attack by Hamas irregulars, trained for this war action.

And the Israeli people realized that the protection of their lives and property by their unbeatable Army was not effective. And they remained frozen and seriously distressed for a long time. This vivid emotional wound does not heal easily or quickly. Because the possibilities of it happening again exist. And they are not inevitable as a quality. The psychiatrist has no arguments… only tablets ones…

And why did Hamas surprise?

The strongest, most powerful proxy of Iran and coreligionist of the Shiites in South-West Asia was Hezbollah, the Party of Allah. This one was guarded, it was infiltrated like a Gruyere cheese by Israeli agents and there were middle and high-level personnel from suppliers bought by them and the Israelis knew all the traces left by suppliers, collaborators, goons and relatives.

Israel‘s foreign action and special espionage means silently «occupied» Hezbollah. And, they were prepared to make it implode or explode unexpectedly.

Hamas was the poor militia, squeezed into a very densely populated area. Capable of making a mobile or rigid Defense in Urban terrain against a trained, equipped, modern, motivated army. And, to endure the unbearable.

But, it was not supposed to carry out a more or less usual military attack, outside its external lines, keeping the objective won.

But, the Gaza attack did not intend to occupy, even for a couple of days, a tangible objective.

And, it was equipped with considerably fewer free-flying or guided rockets than Hezbollah was.

That is, it could pose a much less Orthodox threat to Israel than Hezbollah. It had tens of thousands of rockets of Iranian origin and acquisitions of very variable characteristics.

Hezbollah had a great political force in Lebanon and participated in its governance, and was a stronger and more motivated military force than the Lebanese national army.

There was plenty of information. Otherwise, it would have attracted attention and they would seek it out or implement it.

But, no one saw, detected, or heard of a Muslim militia capable of attacking Israel in the form of a “swarm” of “small units” (platoon or section type), operationally simultaneous. Trained as “reinforced mobile light infantry”.

It seems that the Ideologist and Military Leader of the successful and unstoppable Attack on Israel (for a short time) was the late Yahya Sinwar. He was a prisoner of war in Israel for a long time as a young man. And, he was released in one of those agreed prisoner exchanges.

Sinwar had time to think and mature the plan. And then, to prepare it and carry it out. And, he had his advisors, from the Revolutionary Guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

General Qassem Souleimani, the original head of its Foreign Branch, in charge of supporting all internal Islamic movements in the countries of Southwest Asia, sureness participated in the military training of Yahya Sinwar. Souleimani was killed by an American attack drone, after landing confidently and safely at the Baghdad airport. And he received a salvo of powerful Hellfire II HE (high explosive) rockets.

And, Sinwar was impervious to Jewish (intelligence) penetration, even in a very poor population environment, prone by character and necessity to bribery.

And, in the early hours of Saturday, October 7, 2024, Hamas launched its thundering Lightning.

The ideological adaptation of the minor Jihad to current times.

Introduction.

Islam has to assume that the Jihad, as a “bloody effort in the path of Allah” was necessary for the establishment and defense of the primitive community of believers.

Muhammad took refuge in a cave near Mecca to meditate and pray. Around 610, he began to receive motions, visits from angels sent by Allah (God, in Arabic). “Prophet, hear and write,” they ordered him. But, he was illiterate and had to dictate the verses to his collaborators. They were the Meccan verses of the Khoran, eminently religious. The first to believe his preaching were his wife, Abu Baker al-Sidrique, his father-in-law, Ali, his cousin, and then his son-in-law, his slave… About 40-45 followers formed the Muslim group that lived with him in Mecca.

Towards 615, a group of Arabs from Medina came to see him. The Jews had taken power in the Arab city and they wanted to reconquer it. But they had no guide, no motivating sense or ideology.

Muhammad understood this perfectly. “The Arabs of Medina were a force without ideology” and “he was an ideology without force”. So, “Let us use his force for our ideology”.

The authorities in Mecca were increasingly concerned about visits to the Prophet by foreign Arabs. And, from the beginning, the leaders of the Arab community in Mecca saw the behavior and religious rites of the Muslims as strange.

The situation had to lead to violence. And, they decided to kill the Prophet, at least.

Warned, Muhammad and Abu Baker fled the city. It was the Hegira or march of the Islamic Community from Mecca to Medina (the city of the Prophet) in 622. The small Muslim community followed the longest coastal route, as directed by Muhammad.

When Muhammad arrived in Medina, he pitched his tent on the outskirts. Soon the Arab chiefs came out to greet and receive him as their leader.

An embassy from Mecca went to the Medinan authorities to have Muhammad handed over to them. But, “they have reaped the green,” the chiefs warned the Meccan envoys.

The Jews saw the threat from Muhammad and attacked them. Muhammad defeated them and expelled them from Medina. Here the Prophet received the Medinan chapters or suras of the Koran, of an eminently political nature and of the governance of the peoples.

From Medina, the Muslim forces attacked and plundered several caravans of merchants, some from Mecca and others on behalf of the neighboring Jews.

The Muslims were growing in military capacity and good relations with the neighboring populations. Their tactics using very mobile light units and reiterative attacks, looking for enemy weaknesses or creating them, were effective and novel in combating their enemies.

However, on the other hand, Mecca and other towns in western Arabia were languishing and losing influence. It was the pendulum of History.

From Mecca they ended up sending a contact group to agree with Muhammad on peace and the acceptance of Islam as the religion of the Arabs. The leaders of Mecca accepted Muhammad‘s conditions.

On November 1, 630, Muhammad entered Mecca victoriously. He suppressed the Jahiliyya, the state of idolatry and chaos in Mecca, prior to Islam, and turned the Kaaba, one of the existing idolatrous points, into a center of Islamic piety. Until then, the Muslims practiced Salat, their daily canonical prayers, directing their position towards Jerusalem.

Disconnecting himself further from the Jews, Muhammad ordered a change of direction towards Mecca, specifically towards the Kaaba, and established only 5 prayers a day, according to the solar positions of activity of the Muslims.

Soon the new religion will spread throughout the Arabian peninsula, with Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634) using weapons against the last arabs idolatrous tribes. In 632, the Prophet died in Medina, his favorite city, he was barely 62 years old.

Developments.

Now comes what I call the First Transformation of Islam. Outwardly, its followers denote a continuous (in historical measures, not in chronography) conquering and expansionist activity. This will last until the year 750, at the end of the Umayyad dynasty. These successes are associated by the Muslims with the fact that Allah is with them. It is a growing Muslim century.

In a series of conquests, the Muslims destroy and take the Sassanian Empire, from Anatolia to Persia, through Asia. And, from Palestine, through Egypt, Libya, Ifrigia, the Rif and Hispania, throughout North Africa and the western European peninsula.

Their attempts to penetrate into Central Europe were cut off on October 10, 732, in the battle of Poitiers by Charles Martel, in command of the Frankish troops. Forcing the Islamic light cavalry to face solid defense forces, in a practical adaptation of the phalanxes, supported by archers from their rear. And, with their own heavy noble cavalry attacking the Muslim light cavalry by shock.

The five daily prayers of Salat, composed of standing and bowing, kneeling and lying down, with head turns and the repetition of verses from the Koran, exert an increase in religious piety, love of Allah and belonging to the prayer group among the faithful.

Here would end the historical emergence of the lesser Jihad. The historical opportunity for which does not exist today.

The proof is that the lesser Jihad is not named in the Koran, it does not exist directly in the commands of Allah. It is not necessary, nor transcendent. It is occasional and temporary in the plans of Allah.

And, it must be replaced by “another suitable type of effort in the path of Allah”.

This would be the effort of personal inner development (ascetic), seeking the purification and inner improvement of believers.

This concept exists in the Sunna, where it is called the Greater Jihad and could be promoted by the pious ulemas (ideologists) and muftis (jurists).

Since the emergence of the four main Sunni ideological schools, from the year 750 until after 1000, the principle of the effort of Personal Reflection, the ICHTIHAD, also gained strength in Islam.

These are 250 long years, because in History the facts are unraveled. Without rigid borders that cut their temporal and mental spaces. In which the Second Transformation of Islam will occur: the Ideological one. Where the body of doctrine will be elaborated for the practical application of Islam, in all areas of men’s lives.

The Ichtihad will allow the development of Arab culture, both in relation to civil aspects (science, commerce, art, literature), as well as the enrichment of its «ideology». And it is the basis of ideologues and jurists such as the Palestinian al-Chafii, in Cairo, founder of the most elaborate and brilliant Islamic school.

Ichtihad is a source of lucidity, creativity, enrichment, progress and peace, on the path of personal and collective effort towards Allah (who is really the religious core and reason of Islam), when the Umma (Arabic name of the Islamic community) has already spread and multiplied enormously throughout the world.

But, towards the 11th century (5th century of the Hegira), the ulemas and muftis close the door to ichtihad.

The methodological approach of Islamic progress is altered. And, from then on, it is imitated, repeated, creativity is slowed down, sypnosis are abused.

At the same time, the arts, sciences, civil and social studies of Muslims are languishing. The fear (always paralyzing) of fulfilling the demands (real or forced) of Islam arises. Perhaps the appearance of the fifth ideological school of Islam has an influence here. The last, the hardest and most intransigent, the violent one. Without it, Muslims would not have INSTITUTIONAL ideological support to evolve locally and temporarily to violence. The Salafi school, which wants to imitate the Salaf or the pious predecessors, because they were supported by Allah in their extraordinary successes, for their fidelity and piety.

(To be continuing)

ACTION INTERFACES as Zones of TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT against the Enemy. Part One.

Introduction.

The action interface is a spatial concept that defines the zone and space where we develop violent action against the enemy and his means, following tactical criteria adapted to the nature of our objectives. The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system.

In a penetrating attack, for example, the surface of the interfaces is quantitatively limited and these are selected in the enemy’s depth, according to their critical points and those that hinder the advance of our forces, for example, observatories and anti-tank firing points. In defense, we quantitatively increase the potential interfaces in our depth and in a somewhat laminar way.

The interface is what makes tactical action and the destruction of the enemy possible, applying a pure, chosen, selective and favorable attrition. The absence of interfaces, on the contrary, gives a certain security to any force. With the presence of the enemy, even close by, being a threat.

The interface is not only linear or frontal and with the depth of the range of heavy infantry weapons and tanks. But is extended superficially and spatially by the action of indirect artillery, surface destruction means (reactive artillery) and combat and bombing aircraft. The smaller the interface in an area of ​​operations, the more the operational maneuver criterion will work and in a larger interface. We will seek from advantageous positions and with effective and synergistic means (combined or inter-arms) to annihilate (incapacitate) the enemy.

The speed of exchange (actions and effects) in the interface is qualitatively variable and is conditioned by the transitability of the terrain and by the nature of our intention. In the attack we seek the fluidity of tactical actions. In defense, we wish to add a thickening to them, which will help us break the enemy in front of the front limit of the defense position and in the various ambushes and prepared fire pockets, both main and alternative as well as supplementary, preferably before their irruption.

In the interfaces there are certain critical points, where our tactical interaction with the enemy will be especially effective. These are their tactical vulnerabilities, their gaps in protection or combat capacity or their neglected means of defense, even if they are only so for a time. Combat reconnaissance is essential to detect them and it is the tactical leader’s mission to decide which one or ones to act on, seeking in the tactical decision, the operational significance of the higher command.

Combat capacity is applied on an interface with a variable depth depending on the weapons. Combat capacity has a maximum, useful, relatively stable value for the different weapons or weapon systems, which we can measure in men per meter of action interface.

For the shock, for example, it is not possible to use more than one man per 1.5 ms. of contact interface. For rifle fire, considering a platoon of 50 men useful for about 300 ms of interface, its value drops from 0.6 to 0.15 men per m. of front. Artillery would produce a blinding, disruptive, neutralizing or destructive effect, added to the action in the interface, but complementary to it and never a substitute. Machine gun fire would not substantially lower the proportion, since its fire “equivalent” to that of a certain number of infantry, depending on the terrain and its ability to acquire targets, in rapid fire of 15 rounds per minute and marksman.

Development.

However, from the wars of antiquity to the wars of the 1980s, dispersion has increased from a proportional value of 1 to 5,000 on the battlefield or tactical field. For modern static organized defense, it is equivalent to a battalion of 750 men in 3 km2. Mobile or nuclear defense can triple that surface. This dispersion has emptied the battlefield, now covered by direct fire and indirect fire support, and has allowed the operational terrain of large units to be greatly deepened, up to 50 to 75 km.

An obstruction, a gorge, a river in which the interface was reduced or altered, would limit the real possibilities of the attacker and greatly empower the defender. Thus, the defensive battle of King Leonidas in the Thermopylae gorge would be an example of containment of overwhelmingly superior forces, due to the absolute limitation of the interface of action between the Persian and Spartan armies and not being able to apply it to the critical Greek centers, for example, an exposed flank, until a shepherd served as a guide to a Persian contingent to reach it.

All this operational complication simultaneously makes most of the forces employed in an action unproductive or inactive at a given time.

Given that there is this practical limitation to the use of our available combat capacity, due to the disproportion between tactical space and combat interface, the issue of achieving the maximum application of our force arises.

To achieve this we must:

Increase as much as possible our favorable interfaces with the enemy, especially on the weak and critical points of his deployment; adequately rotate the units in tactical contact; maintain an adequate space for maneuver in our tactical rear, which allows us to push forward the necessary spears of attack or maintain the different possible defensive interfaces in the face of enemy irruption or penetration.

And employ each weapon in the most favorable possible interface of action:

Thus, the weight of the effort will be borne by the infantry in prepared attacks against an enemy ready to repel (for example, an anti-tank front), at long advance distances and in terrain with limited visual control, such as forests, built-up areas and broken terrain, with the tanks supporting them with fire and advancing by covered jumps. The tanks can go ahead in encounter attacks, in slightly undulating terrain and if the enemy has a poorer combat readiness, but taking care that the infantry closes the distance quickly. For short distances, we use the joint attack in the same sector; both weapons can advance from different positions in a convergent attack in encounter combats and in enveloping combats, the synchronization of both being fundamental. Inside the enemy position, the tanks attack the firing positions with their fire and the infantry clears the positions from their flanks.

It is also possible to structurally increase our favorable action interfaces with the enemy.

This is achieved in the attack by breaking through and penetrating favorable sectors and always by encirclement, reversal of fronts and encirclement and by coordinated frontal and overflow pursuit. The attacker’s successive echelons can, in turn, create a favorable action interface against an enemy that is not sufficiently defended, for example, artillery positions or communication centers or logistics parks, and also by a flank attack from our depth with mechanized or armored units, on an enemy counterattack against our penetration.

In the defense, the opposite will occur. The breach of the defense zone, even if it is mobile, will be avoided by increasing the possible unfavorable interfaces for the enemy along its «range».

This is achieved by the echelon in depth of active defensive means and by their preferential placement on the counter-slopes, in covered, hidden, preferably flanking, alternative and supplementary positions and received by a local infantry defense and seeking good and intersecting firing sectors. Also by the increase in interceptions (reinforced cuts, quickly placed minefields, natural obstacles more or less perpendicular to their sectors of advance) defended by fire, which channel the attack towards zones of convergent fire or which delay and erode it. And, finally, by the timely use of local counter-shocks and counter-attacks by mobile or, at least, rapid, tactical or operational reserves. These constitute the extraordinary and unexpected force that acts on enemy vulnerability, which is then in disorganization, dispersion and neutral morale before the consolidation of its gains from the attack.

The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system. Each of them individually presents “action characteristics” and more convenient transitability, which give them a preferable target profile and tactical deployment qualities, from whose combination in the system arises the synergy of the whole.

(To be continued)

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

Introduction and Development.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

Only analysts freed from Scholasticism and field manuals are capable of placing themselves in the free, impartial and lucid mental state or position. To capture anomalous, complex and difficult enemy situations. Since they are paid for results and speed, which are contradictory variables, the luxury of putting an analyst agent in a “quiet position” for an unpredictable, indefinite period of time is not usually acceptable.

The new techniques for detecting, observing and tracking targets should not be underestimated. Based on computers, electronic sensors, Artificial Intelligence. But, the presence of field agents should not be suppressed, but rather supported and increased. Cyber monitoring can specify for our spy the precise area of investigation and study.

BRIEFING OF A FIELD AGENT

The field agent is an infiltrator in a neutral or hostile environment. Able to approach and penetrate the government, business or social media of the rival. And capture relevant, important information in a consistent and sustained manner. The field agent gives a seal of verisimilitude or even reality to the information captured from the enemy.

It is not easy to recruit, train and insert your own field agent. Hence, in an era of haste, superficiality and intellectual complexity, technological means have been favored over field agents for espionage work.

Afghanistan 2021.

We all remember the moments of the change of government in Afghanistan in August 2021.

During almost 20 years of staying there, the United States had spent enormous sums of money on said stay, providing various support to the Afghan State and to choosing, training and equipping the Afghan National Army. The Americans even boasted in their public communications, especially from the Defense Department, that they were making progress in the anti-terrorist fight against the Taliban.

MARINES GUARDING KABUL AIRPORT

This turned out to be like the “Potemkin villages.” That the Russian minister of that name prepared in the path that Tsarina Catherine the Great would follow on a trip. So that her trashy inhabitants would appear happy and shiny as her Imperial Majesty passed by.

As soon as the last American troops had to withdraw, the Afghan soldiers, who also turned out to be shoddy, began to surrender their weapons and escape the feared wrath of the Taliban. US forces were only able to secure a defensive perimeter of the Kabul airport. But, the “friendly Afghans” and their families had to get there to board a flight. Fleeing the tidal wave of the barbarity of the Taliban (scholars of the Koran).

As it had been negotiated with the Taliban to accept control of the airport by Western soldiers for a few days, this was not enough for many «collaborators» of the Westerners (translators, drivers, cleaners, etc.) and their families. Many had to make a painful journey to Pakistan to gain their freedom and their lives.

Vietnam War. American stage,

In the United States, during the Vietnam War, the “Igloo White” program was established, endowed with 1.7 billion US dollars, between 1966 and 1971, for the tasks of collecting information on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong supply routes in South Vietnam. The route started from North Vietnam, entering Laos, near the common border, and was the line of all kinds of supplies for the aforementioned forces, operating in South Vietnam. The route was strewn with devices that simulated a plant and were transmitters of information for US intelligence. They measured 1.2 ms. and their battery lasted 50 days. Many times an unmanned flying object, a drone, was used, which collected information from the ground and transmitted it via television to a distant plane.

A SECTION OF THE HO CHI MINH ROUTE

With the data collected from traffic on the roads, the Americans decided on interdiction bombing actions, carried out by their different aerial devices, including the invisible, inaudible and precise B-52 strategic bombers. In early 1971, data from aerial photos after the bombings, taken from planes flying after the attack formations, allowed analysts to assume that the “truck war” was causing a very severe strain on the industrial capacity of North Vietnamese suppliers (China and the USSR).

Historia Desterrada: La ruta Ho Chi Minh: Eje logístico clave en la Guerra de Vietnam

But, if it was true that so many trucks and equipment were destroyed, how was it possible that the communists maintained the initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks and other materials that literally plagued many of the roads and logistics parks on the Ho Chi Minh Route? Who bothered to remove them?

A more primitive stretch of the Ho Chi Minh Route

Another embarrassing issue was that the total number of vehicles counted by the US aviation as destroyed, exceeded several times the total number of cargo transport vehicles that North Vietnam had, according to Intelligency.

The answer to this essential mystery was soon given by the young American officers (juniors): they were eaten by a monster called the “Great Laotian Truck Eater”; a horrendous scavenger that rose towards dawn and devoured the vehicles destroyed by aviation during the night, after the required photographs for the “wreck count”, the count of debris achieved. Because Americans are very scrupulous with statistics and consider lying a «social sin» that is almost unforgivable for officials.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Spanish Fleet captures the British logistics Fleet in 1780.

Political Background.

Those were the times of the reign of the Bourbon King Carlos III, with Don José Moñino Redondo, Count of Floridablanca, Prime Minister of Spain since 1776, replacing the Marquis of Grimaldi.

Floridablanca, through the Count of Aranda, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, began systematic aid to the American war effort against Great Britain. The aid materialized first in money and supplies.

EL CONDE DE FLORIDABLANCA - RCMAGAZINE – Revista Cultural del Real Casino de Murcia
COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA

On April 28, 1779, Louis XVI of France ratified the renewal of the Family Pact between the two Bourbon kingdoms. And war was declared between them and Great Britain.

This is the century of the wars of kings. Since they are projected and carried out by sovereigns and their ministers. They sought to change the world map for dynastic interests and for the aggrandizement of their Powers. Without even taking into account the feelings of the people.

Background.

On July 9, 1780, a combined war fleet of 22 Spanish and 9 French ships had sailed from Spain, bound for the territorial waters of Great Britain. And in order to attack the enemies he could. An ambitious, broad and clear war mission.

Spain and France harassing the Royal Navy at home. To the Home Fleet, the enemy «home custody fleet».

Commanding our combined fleet was the general command of the Spanish Navy, Admiral Don Luis de Córdova y Córdova, 73 years old. At that age, Córdova was already back from Scholasticism, Thomistics, military or naval regulations, and the art of warfare of force against force.

LA GRANDE Y FELICÍSIMA CAPTURA REALIZADA POR DON LUIS DE CÓRDOVA Y CÓRDOVA | frquesada.com
LUIS DE CÓRDOVA Y CÓRDOVA.

Córdova‘s fleet was divided into a Spanish division and a French division of ships of the line. Supported by a flotilla of frigates, smaller in length and size than the other ships, but much faster at sea. Intended for exploration tasks (active, intuitive and daring) and security or screen tasks (discreet and hiding from enemy views) of the combined fleet.

The flagship of the Spanish Navy was then the imposing and majestic Santísima Trinidad, the most important sailing ship of the line ever built. She had 4 artillery decks and was launched in the shipyards of Havana, advanced in naval construction.

The Santísima Trinidad was also the flagship of Córdova‘s fleet, where he raised his personal flag. And, she will have a decisive role in the development of future war events

The allied ships were already in the English Channel, when they received the news from Floridablanca, informed by their spies in Great Britain, that two convoys with 52 cargo ships in total, had just set sail from the port of Portsmouth, in the south of England, to India and North America.

Pintura Militar y Naval: Navío Santísima Trinidad navegando en línea
THE SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD MAIN SHIP

This huge logistics fleet was in itself a necessary and sufficient objective for the tasks entrusted to the Admiral against Great Britain.

Córdova realized that his success lay in calculating with the greatest possible probability, that is, estimating correctly, the strip or sector of course followed by the logistics fleet. With this, he worked out for the combined fleet an interception course for the enemy ships, well to the east of the Azores. That would be confirmed later by his flotilla of frigates on a long-distance reconnaissance mission.

Unfortunately, most of the escort warships of the British logistics fleet returned to their bases, when it was already well under way in the open sea.

Developing.

Towards the first light of dawn on August 9, 1780, dispersed enemy freighters began to appear on the horizon of the combined fleet.

Córdova could attack them, cause them great damage, scatter the rest towards his port and capture a certain spoils. And, thus achieve a great victory.

But, he thought better of fooling them with an «appearance«. And, thus, defeat them one by one, capture them and make an immense booty, which he would take to Spain. And, at a minimum cost of life and damage to ships and their cargoes.

The Admiral ordered a large lantern to be lit and placed on the foremast of the Santísima Trinidad. This was the signal the enemy used to rally their ships around his Captain ship. Appearances, to work for, must be believable and the most expected and natural thing in the world. The enemy will fool himself…

And, the British ships headed towards the Spanish lantern that illuminated them on the horizon, as moths do towards the light…

It is worth remembering that our warships carried a variable crew, depending on their sizes and tasks, from the Spanish Marine Corps. In charge of fighting at sea and on land against enemies as infantrymen. And, that the groups leaders and captains of Córdova were fully trained to carry out the decided maneuvers.

Ahead of the Santísima Trinidad, the ships of the combined fleet fanned out to either side of the horizon, following a rough line. And each one was covered by its port or starboard guns. To receive the British as they deserved when the imaginary bag was closed more.

Some allied ships began their attack on the British freighters, seeing that they abandoned their course and wanted to flee.

Action of 9 August 1780 - Wikipedia
NAVAL BATTLE OF 9 AND 10 OF AUGUST OF 1780

From the Santísima Trinidad, they gave and transmitted the «combat order» to the allied groups ships, who transmitted them to the most distant ones. Thus, the rest of the allied ships closed on the scattered and sparse bundle of enemy cargo ships. Attacking them individually.

Let us remember that the cargo ships carried only a symbolic artillery for a minimum defense. Since its structure and displacement were intended to optimize its ability to carry loads for its destination. The artillery, its ammunition, gunpowder and the artillerymen greatly subtracted from its capacity, due to the effective specialization of the means. For its defense, they have the warships escorts.

The enemy, surprised and scattered, was overwhelmed and gave up quickly, once the allied ships were threatening them.

The three warships that were then escorting the British logistics fleet and a freighter escaped from the encirclement, heading for port. Some sources say that the three warships were seized by the allies. And they joined the Spanish Navy. And, they even give their new names as Spaniards.

It took a day to seize all the captured ships. The ring was not, nor could it be, as closed as on land. And, the warships would not surrender at first. Military marines and sailors are not intimidated by a threat and are trained to fight. Theirs is that they fled to the port, once they saw that they could do nothing to defend the freighters. Only to increase the irreparable losses of their nation.

Spanish Marines boarded enemy freighters to subdue and disarm British Trading Companies «soldiers» being flown to colonial duty stations to reinforce garrisons there. And to take the “prey”.

And they would remain in them to control that his sailors carried out the maneuvers to go to the destination ordered by the Admiral of the fleet.

The military operation was effective, clean, profitable and fast. Córdova and his combined attack fleet returned to the Homeland with a huge booty captured from the enemy.

The spoils of war seized by Córdova and his men amounted to:

1,800 “private soldiers” of the West India and East India Trading Companies.

Three thousand British sailors who manned the 51 captured ships.

About 140 million reales (old Spanish coin worth) as the value of the ships, merchandise of all kinds for sale, goods and supplies, weapons and ammunition of the ships and the men of the Companies.

The loss of the logistics convoy destined for the 13 North American colonies dealt a heavy blow to Britain’s war efforts there, against the Native Americans fighting for their Independence.

By August 20, Córdova, his ships, his men, and his enormous booty were reaching Cádiz. Being received in triumph by the local authorities and the people of Cádiz.

Some final considerations.

This Spanish naval feat has little resonance in the History books written since then. As an explanation, we could say that the «Efforts of arms» are always attributed «gunpowder and blood«. As notable, essential and instrumental Additions to them.

And, the Córdova combined fleet Action in the capture of the largest logistics fleet suffered by Great Britain in its history, was quiet (with little gunpowder) and unscathed (without much blood).

And therefore it is assumed to be with little military effort. In other words, without courage, brilliance, stripes, or warlike glory.

We don’t always have a Master Sun (Sun Tzu means that) on our way to understand us. And appreciating a complete victory taking advantage of the weaknesses and failures of the enemy.

The Ukrainian counterattack in the East of the country.

Introduction.

I think this should be an attack on the Azov Sea from Zaporiya (+-) area.

Cutting the Crimean supply line with Russia. And, towards Melitopol (+-).

The spears points of the attack can be somewhat bifurcated. So that the enemy does not know exactly what our immediate objective is. And it can concentrate from the Crimea too many forces to repel them.

The Russian supply line leaves the Crimea, crosses the coast of the Azov Sea and enters Russia towards Rostov on the Don. Any point is good to cut it, as long as the supply is suppressed.

The closer to Crimea it is cut off, the more “influence”, a material and moral effect, its presence will have on the Crimean Russians. The closer it is to the Russian border, the easier it will be for the Russians to deploy forces to push them back. And further away would be the Ukrainians from their supply bases and the reinforcement of men and units.

To attack where the front is now, in an easterly direction, towards the Russian border, is to reiterate the military effort on a Russian front prepared for defense. The Ukrainians would attack where they are most prepared and where their enemies are waiting for them. It would be a very mediocre and expensive strategy; force against force. And, the Russians have much more physical human and military resources than the Ukrainians.

The plan to attack towards the south of Ukraine imposes the law of action on them, it is daring, creative, novel and possible. And it would leave the Russians out of place in plans and positioning of their means for defense. That they would be on the great strip of the Azov Sea coast, Donetz and Lugansk oblasts and the Russian border.

It would be a strategy of strength against Russian weakness.

Structural development.

Pointing out different towns as “essential milestones” in the layout of the fronts, with a view to their operational exploitation, offers a string of names that are almost impossible to understand. Which are very difficult to locate on the maps available to us. A Bajmut, a Buça are locations that can be very painful and shocking. But, they shipwreck and get lost on our usual maps.

The fact is that Bakhmut is the Ukrainian name for the town called Artemivosk, in Russian. And, in Russian it appears on almost all maps. And, of course, most reporters and envoys to the theater of operations do not have time to correct these «bulk errors.»

All this “outer shell”, at the east of the Donbass, the Russian defensive structure prepared for the defense without giving up space, supposes the crystallization of a defensive strategic intention of the Russians. Which makes explicit his debilitating, fearful desire to preserve his western border with Ukraine from any enemy proximity. Which would facilitate a limited-target attack by Ukraine inside Russia.

It is evident that on terrain prepared for rigid defense, the Ukrainian mechanized forward spears should not attack.

Already in the middle of 1943, in the so-called Kursk salient, Model‘s forces, attacking from the north, and von Manstein‘s, from the south, did not come together, nor did they even minimally cut the salient. Which was defended entirely by «fortified regions» arranged in deep in the salient.

Fighting in the defense trenches is a form of fighting abandoned some 105 years ago. When the artillery became the queen of the battle and the protective trenches of the soldiers lost their ability to hide and cover them from fire. The artillery fires could be precise enough to hit the trenches quickly. It was necessary to deprive the enemy of views and increase the direct defense of advanced weapons and men.

This was achieved by deploying the defense in combat outposts, fortified or not, and advanced detachments in mobile fighting well in front of the position And by dispersing and fortifying the following positions or redoubts in depth. And bringing the tactical reserves closer to the start of the artillery zone. And having pieces of it at the beginning of it, especially as counter-battery and harassment/neutralization of the enemy advance.

Theater of operations and possible attacks and movements.

La gran cuenca del Donbass, de terreno favorable al empleo de medios mecanizados atacando, es el área geográfica en la que en esta guerra han tenido lugar los principales combates. Existe una llanura costera señalada por las ciudades de Mariupol, a poco más de 50 km. desde la frontera rusa, Berdjansk y Melitopol, que conforman la línea de abastecimientos principal de Crimea desde Rusia, muy importante para los rusos.

The great basin of the Donbass, with favorable ground to the use of attacking mechanized means, is the geographical area in which the main combats have taken place in this war. There is a coastal plain marked by the cities of Mariupol, just over 50 km away. from the Russian border, Berdjansk and Melitopol, which make up the main supply line of Crimea from Russia, very important for the Russians.

The convex interior of the Donbass to the east supports the current Russian-Ukrainian war front.

On the outside are the Russians and from there they prepare and launch limited-target attacks against less-prepared Ukrainian positions. In a purely tactical exchange of efforts, without looking for an operational goal. What would it be like to reverse the enemy front in a sector, overwhelm it or break it for minimal exploitation. And, the Russian defense relies on well-prepared fortifications, which seem to exclude from the outset any moderately successful plan of attack or counterattack. That overcomes the usual tactical struggle with negligible gains in space. That, sometimes they are recovered by a Ukrainian tactical counterattack carried on by a nearby Ukrainian small unit.

The Ukrainian mowing stroke.

The best Ukrainian counterattack would start from the north of Zaporiya and would be directed at the coast of the Azov Sea, in the sector between Berdjansk and Melitopol. It is convenient to direct the effort towards a couple of different objectives. That will force the Russians to further disperse their rejection. And that they are just as important for the Ukrainians, because what it is about is to operationally cut off the Russian supply line. And establish in it, not necessarily on top, a strong Ukrainian defense position.

The Combat Capacities of the Forces as an Operational System.

Introduction.

We call a “system” to a harmonic (with correspondence between them) and synergistic (acting together) set of different elements, but related in nature. That produce or generate a complex and essential function of the broader military activity. Its definition aims for systems to globally understand the variables or elements of their nature that intervene in operations. This would allow us to more easily and precisely focus our attention on them, in order to achieve control and direction of the entire complex phenomenon of war.

“Combat capacities” are the set of military means (men, installations, weapons and all supports) that a “closed military system” (in the case of an operation or campaign) or a society or state possess for its defense.

Development.

Its more complete expression is found in combined or inter arms groups which, even at the small units level, multiply and adapt the possibilities of military struggle in the interfaces of action with the enemy. Combined arms groups seek to accelerate the pace (tempo) or the speed of the elementary “cycles of action” against him. In fact, the incorporation of infantry heavy weapons as organic support elements in small units, forms, qualitatively, an inter arms system.

Combat capacities are that allow a force to achieve a favorable decision and, therefore, operational efficiency in the determined, sought after and transcendent combats, with the enemy. They also give credibility to group movement capacities in maneuvers through the real threat that they pose for the enemy. Simple movement is an empty decoration or an impotent sigh, if it is not paired with the capacity to damage the enemy and the will to do so.

Combat capacity and the capacity of operational movement form complementary and synergic «opposing but not antagonist couples» within the operational systems. Neither of them transcends without the other. Moreover, one of the two is only frustrated and fails without the other. Both systems procure and invigorate tactical actions and execute and fertilize operational maneuvers.

Quantitative studies.

Trevor N. Dupuy has tried to work out a way of quantifying combat capacities (which will always vary according to different units and weapons and countries). (1) Dupuy’s work quantifies units depending on their type and adds a factor depending on which army, war and campaign are under consideration, to obtain values of relative military power for each case.

These «powers» are a relative quantification (remember that there is a multiplier factor, which introduces the efficiency of army in the face of a concrete enemy in a given situation) of the combat capacities of land armies in different epochs or theatres of operations.

Simpkin proposes a similar, more qualitative formula that factors in the equipment of units (this formula is only suitable for mechanized armies). Being the extremes of the classification, an infantry unit and a tank unit of equal level. (2)

The applications, and possibilities of combat capacities are extensively discusses throughout our works.

(1) Trevor N. Dupuy. The Comprehension of the War. Study and Theory of the Combat. Madrid, 1990. Pages 123 to 172.

(2) Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift. London, 1994. Pages 79 to 85.

The determining Parameters of Effectiveness in modern Warfare.

Essential Introduction.

This is obviously not a Treatise on the determining Parameters of Military Efficiency. Nor is it a Study on the Principles or Operating Systems of War. On which you have at your disposal enough articles on this Web Page, which you consult now.

It is a matter of making a brief explanation of the characteristics of these determining Parameters. That they should always work in Harmony and Cohesion.

So that, with this description in hand, you can easily define and know the Failures and Errors made by the Units in their most dangerous Job: War.

Doctrine and Regulations.

These determining Parameters must define and transmit the What and the How of the units and means in the war against the various possible enemies.

In other words, it supposes having good Principles of its Art-Science of War and Operating Systems suitable for modern, hybrid and cybernetic warfare.

And, they must do it in a broad, clear, creative, stimulating, flexible, participatant and decisive way.

The Determining Parameters and their full means of expression.

Those Determining Parameters are conceived and materialized by the Human Element of Weapons and War. Without it, they would only be more or less numerous sheets of letters. Waiting to obtain its meaning, always eminently practical, its full expression and its transcendent utility. They get it with their employment by the military.

Logistic chain.

Organizes and distributes the means to units. It could also participate more or less in its acquisition in the market. Generally includes health services.

It must be close, and it using various means: long-distance and delivery transport, warehouses or centers (hubs) or kitchens at various levels of action and with control and computer means. It must act informed, farsighted, proactive, organized and sufficient.

The Action Trilogy.

Units of the arms and services.

That they can integrate tactical and operational groups of Combined Arms with common tasks and missions. That they will be at one with each other, trained, also jointly, that they provide mutual support and a synergy of effects and that they have mutual respect.

Commands. officers.

They must be willing, empathetic, trained, motivated, decisive, respected, responsible and long-suffering.

Non-commissioned officer corps.

They must be close, trained, specific, capable, formed, loyal to the commands, soldiers and units and respected and highly regarded by the soldiers.