This is obviously not a Treatise on the determining Parameters of Military Efficiency. Nor is it a Study on the Principles or Operating Systems of War. On which you have at your disposal enough articles on this Web Page, which you consult now.
It is a matter of making a brief explanation of the characteristics of these determining Parameters. That they should always work in Harmony and Cohesion.
So that, with this description in hand, you can easily define and know the Failures and Errors made by the Units in their most dangerous Job: War.
Doctrine and Regulations.
These determining Parametersmust define and transmit the What and the How of the units and means in the war against the various possible enemies.
In other words, it supposes having good Principles of its Art-Science of War and Operating Systems suitable for modern, hybrid and cybernetic warfare.
And, they must do it in a broad, clear, creative, stimulating, flexible, participatant and decisive way.
The Determining Parameters and their full means of expression.
Those Determining Parameters are conceived and materialized by the Human Element of Weapons and War. Without it, they would only be more or less numerous sheets of letters. Waiting to obtain its meaning, always eminently practical, its full expression and its transcendent utility. They get it with their employment by the military.
Organizes and distributes the means to units. It could also participate more or less in its acquisition in the market. Generally includes health services.
It must be close, and it using various means: long-distance and delivery transport, warehouses or centers (hubs) or kitchens at various levels of action and with control and computer means. It must act informed, farsighted, proactive, organized and sufficient.
The Action Trilogy.
Units of the arms and services.
That they can integrate tactical and operational groups of Combined Arms with common tasks and missions. That they will be at one with each other, trained, also jointly, that they provide mutual support and a synergy of effects and that they have mutual respect.
They must be willing, empathetic, trained, motivated, decisive, respected, responsible and long-suffering.
Non-commissioned officer corps.
They must be close, trained, specific, capable, formed, loyal to the commands, soldiers and units and respected and highly regarded by the soldiers.
A minor issue arises, but of great importance due to the disagreements it creates in Moscow and with the troops in the campaign. It is the growing presence of the Wagner Group as a Russian fire extinguisher in the war in Ukraine.
It includes convicted criminals, Syrian and Libyan mercenaries «among other elements of bad living» and Russian volunteers. In general, they enjoy disparate salaries, depending on their experience, origin and life path; a convict is basically paid with his freedom, more or less garnished with a clean record.
Their boss is Prigozhin, a Russian plutocrat and Putin henchman. This man is in conflict with part of the Kremlin and with senior military leaders over the permanence of his «private mercenary armed group» in the Russian ranks in the campaign.
The implicit tolerance of the Russian military commands in Ukraine with the men of the Wagner Group generates enormous discomfort among the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers stationed there. And it greatly lowers their combat morale and their «esprit de corps«.
If Gerasimov comes with full powers as commander of the campaign and considers the previous arguments, in relation to the motivation and combative disposition of his Russian regular forces, he has to recompose the situation of the forces, in relation to the presence of the Wagner Group in the Russian ranks.
Unity of Action and Concentration of Efforts in the Campaign.
Another of the capital problems that Gerasimov will have to solve is the strategic and operational Integration of all the active Fronts of the Russian forces in presence.
To establish a strategic «Superior Effort Unit» that is coordinated, proportional and synergistic. To optimize in «effective times«, according to the «superior universal saving means» principle and the «military principle of the Objective», the distribution and coordinated use over time of the human and material capacities assigned to the different Fronts.
Thus, the Russians have several Fronts with different importance and presenting different opportunities.
The Kiev Northern Front is inactive. Lukashenko is Putin‘s due ally and with his bravado and maneuvers he causes uncertainty in Kiev. It offers an opportunity to drain mobile Ukrainian troops, to fix and protect the Front from possible Russian rapid raids.
Here the presence in Belarus of a mechanized Russian “task force” would suffice. Counting on tanks and infantry combat and transport vehicles, with support from artillery, engineers, defense against aircraft and ground support aviation and its escort. And integrating a couple of divisions. That moved around the south of Belarus, prowling.
The Crimean Front is active towards Kherson, Mariupol and Zaporiya and creates uncertainty towards Odessa. It allows the defense of the 4 territories annexed by Putin.
The Donbass Front, in southeastern Ukraine, is active in the oblasts or provinces of Lugansk, to the north, along the border with Russia, and Donetz, to the south. The Northeast Front, towards Kharkov is in hibernation. Both hold promise in theory in this new phase of the war.
The joint and coordinated action from both Russian Fronts, of «breaking shock forces» of the Ukrainian Tactical defense. Followed, after the irruption, by «armored mobile groups» with air support, advancing in the Ukrainian operational rear towards a town or small area. Forming a wide and double enveloping movement around the enemy. It can create a “pocket” of it or, at least, a serious threat of cutting off communications for the most active Ukrainian forces, and therefore equipped with heavy equipment, deployed in the east of the country. Russia has more than enough regular mobile forces for this.
The Ukrainian Counterattack.
The Ukrainians can counterattack by employing armored forces with sufficient punch, such as the more modern Main Battle Tanks. The “heavy” tanks that Zelensky claims from the US and Europe now. The Challengers (with their Chobham armor); Leopards 2 A5, of German engineering; Leclercs, the first type built of this new generation of tanks and the Americans Abrams.
Advancing rapidly from the depth of the Ukrainian deployment, on one flank of the Russian advancing points. Let’s remember that this territory is favorable ground for armored vehicles.
For this, Ukraine will need to have several battalions of such tanks. Distributed by their most important concentrations, each with about 50 tanks. Distributing or employing it by isolated companies is to waste its special and unique off-road forward speed, shock and firepower, protected by effective armor. Which is completely decisive in modern combat.
In all this theoretical filigree of maneuvers and combats, the most capable, equipped, motivated and prepared will win.
The denatured current Russian air front.
The goal of the current Russian air front is the weakening of Ukrainian morale. Through the successive attack on civilian facilities (energy, water and communications) and urban centers of some importance in Ukraine.
It should be noted that this rather criminal objective does not target the enemy military forces, but their unarmed rearguard populations. For more INRI, it began to be used shamelessly when Putin and his Kremlin bosses and henchmen realized that his “special military action” in Ukraine was a “bluff”. And that the Ukraine was a tough nut to crack for the Russian forces employed in it.
Almost 2,500 years ago, Master Sun (Sun Tzu), in the Warring States Era, already warned that «when the general is already appointed by the sovereign, he should not interfere in his affairs» and «when the courtiers and ministers interfere in his command, they bring misfortune to the Kingdom”.
In addition, this objective has already been used in other cases and with zero effectiveness, by the way.
Japan was mercilessly bombarded by the US, when it had already managed to occupy the Japanese islands (e.g., Okinawa) close enough to insular Japan. The Japanese were already preparing their civilian population for a Numantine resistance to the invader. Creating an immense natural fortress on its islands, where each one was a fortified redoubt of it.
They were the two atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which represented an «ascent to the upper limits» in the fight against civilian rearguards. Because they were much more than a very large cannon shot. The ones that forced Japan to surrender unconditionally to the Americans. Because they threatened (although they didn’t have any more artifacts at the time), to destroy the essence and Japanese national identity.
In general, the use of the «indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian rearguards», what it achieves is to galvanize them around their government and their armed forces. Because they perceive from the enemy a demonic, fierce hatred towards them, which would seek the destruction of their identity, culture and idiosyncrasy.
Modernly, such bombing type was used by the US in North Vietnam. They left South Vietnam in 1973 and in 1975 the communist forces occupied it, almost without resistance.
Russia’s Air Support to its Ground Forces.
The Russian air front in Ukraine must be directed against enemy troop concentrations (reserves, attack preparations, marching forces), their ground communications and logistics network, command posts and communications centers, attack points of their forces, artillery and rocket and drones launch positions.
Russian Generals missing from their Battle Forward Post in Ukraine
There are hundreds of videos of Ukrainians neutralizing Russian air, naval and ground vehicles. That more than fighting at close distances, it seems that they pose as if they were shooting ducks at a town fair.
videos are mostly produced by almost unknown film companies.
And sometimes even a supposed Russian general falls almost in the battle’s first rows.
general never accompanies or stands in combat with a platoon
lieutenant or company captain or a battalion commander or lieutenant
His tasks are not to hit shots. Nor haranguing the men around him. Or drive them into combat by his example. That is done by the officers in charge of the units and the non-commissioned officers in immediate command of the soldiers. Who know their soldiers like nobody else. Or will it not be so here?
The task of the general officer is to conceive and conceptualize the combat and the maneuvers of his tactical units, fulfilling the Tasks and Missions of the Army in campaign.
And, facilitate the means in: combined arms units; anti-tank, artillery and air support for them and the logistics for it: from health to supplies of all kinds, from fuel to ammunition, through maintenance teams and removal of damaged vehicles and kitchens and food distribution to the collection points of the units.
harangues and drives the commanders and chiefs of units dependent on
him. And, to all the soldiers on rare occasions.
fulfill Those, fulfilling the universal principle of the
economy of human and material means. That is, following the
best and most optimized use of it.
And, as I have said before, the death of a general is a national disaster. And, the death of a 4-star general, commander-in-chief of an army of many tens of thousands of soldiers, is a national catastrophe.
because they are very important military assets.
Now, closing the “historical and definer cicle”, the wars of V generation are called hybrid or multi functional wars, which, really, always have existed. With the major or minor participation of each one of the available “means of intervention» (Foreign Relations, regular and irregular Armed Forces, Economy, Cybernetics, etc) in the social group, to obtain the searched «functions of intervention» on the enemy. Forming a “means” mix, adapted to all situations and confrontation theaters.
for nominating nowadays with an exotic and new word, preferably
foreign, one makes
this way a «mean
or a function of intervention»
fresh and promising. The problem is that the ignorance of the
history, still the recent one, impoverishes the new concepts, ideas
and situations of conflict.
Without winning in application,
efficiency and cognitive capacity
with it. With
this, only it
falls or repeats
the previous history, returning
to learn it. And that, as
in a spiral screw,
only changes the phenomenon temporal
«plane of execution«.
Where are kept safe
and now partly secret, the different «essential
parameters» of the phenomena
of the conflicts and fights.
Almost all the «means of intervention» of the State, used to obtain his national aims, already were present in the panoply of means at his disposition, a long before this new name of the Hybrid War. The «functions of intervention» were developed by «means» adapted to the real possibilities of his epoch. And they were obtaining the looked aims, though they were very specific. There we have the actions of the SAS (Special Air Service) as «special forces of punctual intervention with limited objectives” in the enemy rearguard. Fighting against this one and to support and help the local «forces of resistance to the occupant». In the USA we have to the SEALs, the Rangers, the Delta force and the Special Forces, among others. In Germany is the GSG 9 group. In Australia and New Zealand they have the same name that the British corps.
strategic and tactical needs of the war and the functions of the
«means of intervention» are slightly
variable. And his variability is a function
of the improvements in general training, scope, speed,
capacity of shock and fire on the enemy, communications between
«means», protection of these, etc. That offer the
successive technologies applicable to the «means».
One of the «means of intervention» of a world or regional power to obtain his «national and strategic aims» are the «Foreign Relations«. That has a concept qualitatively more extensive than the Diplomacy. This refers to the State or government affairs, that treat two or more nations (alliances). And the diplomatic «function» is to negotiate by the political way what communicates to him his State, department or secretary. Asking and receiving successive instructions, if it was necessary, to support and continue the negotiation. And being kept or not in his execution and protocol relations, within the qualities of discretion, prudence and tact that characterize his trade.
The Foreign Relations also include other relations and more heterodox actions. That is necessary to look for, to keep and to support in the exterior to obtain our National aims. This way, a function of the foreign relations is to appear for it, new opportunities and more secondary ways or routes and «means of intervention«. The Foreign Relations collaborate directly, since always it has been done, using the means and the in force national strategy, with the Intelligence, the Economy and the national Armed Forces. That is to say, acting together in a «mix» of functions and means of intervention, the war always has been Hybrid from the Prehistory. Creating new opportunities and ways, to apply and use the whole creative and potential capacity of the State, to achieve his strategic and operational aims.
A succinct example between thousands of situations. The «Central Strategic Command of Combined War» can request to Foreign Relations the search of dissident or domestic enemy in a potential enemy country. Located one o more of these, there are valued his capacities, circumstances, implantation and operational possibilities. This way, FF. RR. would present a report to the Central Command in the shape of a «founded resolution”, involving in it. That is, valuing schematically the existing cases and being decided for one or two, depending on his qualities and our general or punctual convenience.
These dissidents or enemies will be politicians or also armed rebels. In the first case, our nation might grant to them asylum, scholarships, economic support and advice to his groups. In the second one, in a phase of major confrontation, we could also send supply and armaments, advisers and trainers and «special operations» or units of «foreign volunteers», to support and/or reinforce them in his insurgents activities.
At the beginning of the 16th century the «reformists and heretical» ideas of the priest Martin Luther propagated in the center and north of Europe, with the help of the press. The origin of the word propaganda arises during the Counter Reformation. It is a reference to the spread of the catholic faith. With the Jesuits in the forefront of this task of catechizing. Facing to the deviations from the preexisting orthodoxy, taught by the Lutherans, Huguenots, Calvinists, Erasmists, etc.
always handles basic,
essential information, that are easy
and simple by
definition. This is due to the fact that his «aim» (the
is always large
and numerous: the
a certain country or region, or a religious, economic, racial or
socially different extensive group.
They are those that it is necessary to inform, convince and,
the cases, to protect.
«mean of intervention» against
the enemies or to change or to influence wills, which was not known,
for unthinkable, until a few years ago, is the Cybernetic War.
The cybernetic attacks can go to the software or the hardware of the personal IT, managerial or institutional systems. The software is the «logical support» of an IT system, which makes possible the accomplishment of the different tasks. This «logical support» includes the operating system and the applications or IT programs that those realize. The hardware is the machinery or the set of physical components of the computer. This way, summarizing, the software generates instructions that are executed by the hardware or physical support of the system.
In general, the attacks are realized to the software of a system, looking for a «weakness» of this one. And using the malicious codes, the back entrances, etc. A penetration or attack to the software is prevented in general with an antivirus adapted to the received virus. To attack the hardware is necessary to act on the «physical component» of the computer. And his detection, with the nowadays existing miniaturization, turns out to be very improbable and long in the time, until the devastation is detected. The best way of acceding to the hardware is realizing the intrusion in the factories of components and of assemblies. But these are protected by control measures of components and external equipment, based on the nationality and the producer of them. Unless the attacker and the manufacturer undesirably match…
The Economy is an important and classic “mean of intervention» of the State and of the Nation. It means and involves in the effort of war the capacity of obtaining and producing all kinds of goods and services, intermediates and finals, that the technologies and processes in effect in each stage are capable of get and obtain.
The Economy is tied directly with the applied, specific education, of the skilled workforce, who is needed and could be achieved in a nation. The own aptitude to obtain goods or services (even with tourism, raw materials, trade) appetizing to other nations or social groups, will serve for the direct exchange or for barter of the goods and services in which a society is showing a deficit. As an example, energy or specifically qualified workforce.
Also, in cases of need and usefulness, a nation can decide to assign more productive resources to the production of a certain good. But, all more it is required specialization in the production, the performances, both neat and economic (as cost of them) will be minor. By virtue of the laws of the diminishing performance and of the increasing costs that suffer these «specialized reconverted productive processes«.
It is very easy to use the cement in producing military goods of static defense (bunkers, defensive armed lines) and not to raise buildings with it; it is relatively easy to convert the industrial vehicles factories of into armored vehicles plants. And it is very difficult to obtain great performances from a dairy changed in an arms plant.
All of these «means of intervention» require been necessarily and sufficiently harmonized and coordinated by a «centre of gravity» of the Central Strategic Command in each theatre of operations. That, in a centripetal and convergent effort, simultaneously or successively, it would direct and apply the specific means at its disposal.
The center of gravity is not an own physical unit, nor is its mission, neither a point in space or one with a predominant physical characteristic or an enemy unit.
The center of gravity is a coordinated flow of ideas of variable application, that generate original actions for fulfilling the mission and objectives. Originality, flexibility, variability, consistency, difficulty to predict by the enemy and effectiveness are essential to its establishment. Actually, the center of gravity is the instrument of direction, distribution and concentration, impulse and work. That the command has to focus on and unify, with the goal of accomplishing objectives and missions, and employing the efforts of his subordinate units and supports.
The chief is centered in his objectives and missions by means of the created center of gravity and follows a methodology for applying the operational systems.
As far as concentration goes, the so called “principal effort” expresses an effect of penetration in a given direction and a sense of being able to arrive at the rupture and exploit it. The combined-arms and aerial efforts of the units are concentrated on this.
The center of gravity has a more spatial and temporal sense, looking for an “operational convergence” of “related efforts” towards an objective. Those are not necessarily contiguous, simultaneous or sequential, but are synergic and result in outcomes based on consideration of the optimal form (means economic) of action of each weapon and service.
The center of gravity is more global or holistic; the main effort is more adding and cumulative. The main effort is exemplified by the hammering strategy of French Marshal Foch on the European western front beginning in the summer of 1918. This strategy was used to overcome the Germans purely by eroding their battle capacity in the theater of operations. And only shifting its direction when German resistance was excessive.
The effects of the main effort are more direct, predictable and evident. Those of the center of gravity are more subtle and unexpected, at least in the first phases of a military action.
The main effort is an instrument of the tactical level and is not necessarily generalized to the other levels. The center of gravity can be used in all dialectical activity where several means (either in number or in nature, near or distant) can be used. Within each level of military activity, beginning with the superior one, the center of gravity brings together and harmonizes all activities to obtain the most important effect or objective of that level.
At the strategic level, these would be the critical vulnerabilities of the enemy within the theater of operations. The nature of these would be informed by an important political component. At operational level the center of gravity would be created over the critical vulnerabilities of the campaign. At tactical level it would be the objective that would make operational transcendental the battle. If this was correctly addressed, as necessary for the operational direction, the objective would be that which would be decisive in the battle and get the exploitation of victory.
The center of gravity supposes a centripetal action of all the lines of performance, of the ramified activity of all the units and the services, not necessarily coincident, but convergent in their efficiency and result.
Following the communications ramified lines, we take advantage of the departure situation of each force and the transitability of the land, looking for the optimal use of the combined-arms set, reserves and logistics. By means of the different lines of attack or action we induce uncertainty in the enemy, we disperse his defensive capacity and disturb his plans for, and execution of, defense.
The ramified lines, in a final centripetal action, are peculiar to the center of gravity. The accumulation of forces in a sector, reiterating (inserted or successive units) or strengthening (adding tanks, narrowing the sector or providing greater fire support) the effort, is peculiar to the concept of the main effort.
An example of the use of the center of gravity following those ramified lines at the strategic level, is found in Napoleon’s operations to secure the surrender of Ulm held by the Austrian army of General Mack and Archduke Ferdinand.
In an ample advance of its independent army corps, the Great Armée (about 210,000 men) crossed the center of Germany, from the Rhein to the Danube. With this it operationally interposed between the Austrians (about 40,000 men) and the allied Russian forces that went to help them. The French initiated the crossing of the Danube on October 7, 1805 and, during the following week, Napoleon converge most of his army corps in an enormous spiral on Ulm. While a sufficient force watched the arrival from the east of Russian General Kutuzov.
General Mack made, in vain, several attempts at rupturing through Napoleon’s forces, applying his greatest efforts in Haslach and Elchingen. Both Austrian commanders quarreled among themselves and Archduke Ferdinand, with his 6,000 riders, separated from the main force and tried to escape to the northeast.
On the other hand, General Mack and the rest of his men (about 27,000, after the mentioned battles) met Napoleon’s overwhelming numbers at the doors to the city of Ulm since October, 14 and laid down their weapons at the feet of the Michelsberg mount. The capitulation was signed by General Mack on the 20th. The forces of Archduke Fernando were surrounded and won by the cavalry corps of Murat near Trochtelfingen. Another 12,000 Austrians surrendered in Neustadt. The campaign, without properly battles, cost Austria more than 50,000 men of her initial forces of about 70,000 troops.
The center of gravity directs, canalizes, gathers and orients the creation and the direction of the strike of different units and supports in each case. Its shift by the command allows the continuous adaptation to circumstances and the maintenance of focus on intermediate aims.
The center of gravity has as effective factors the speed of operations and logistics. The first allows optimal actuation of the combat capacity of forces and the second diminishes or compensates for the inevitable wearing down of the mobility capacity of troops and posible combat capacity during operations.
Its negative factors are poor transitability, including caused by obstacles, cuts and minefields, and battles command did not wish to engage in. The first “wears away” the operational mobility of the troops and the second “exhausts” their potential combat capacity.
Without those capacities, the fluidity, synergy and the ramified activity of thecenter of gravity tends to revert in a main effort in an operational direction that is quickly known by the enemy. So, the “stunning waves” that are generated on the enemy, cross-sectional to our advance in his operational zone, diminish with it in intensity and frequency, perhaps in the end, even disappear.
The direct elements of performance in the center of gravity are the combined-arms sets, the own and superior level of reserves (even including those in the mass of support or operational rearguard) and logistics. Once the center of gravity is conceived, it is applied and developed by means of the operational systems.
and the Future.
Hybrid War, a scolium?
but this concept for command can be useful for the wars of I, II, III
and IV generation (according to the US denomination, widely
«accepted»). But, now we approach the era of the war
of V generation: the
hybrid or miltifacetic or multifunctional war.
Employing, in addition, digital, computer methods, using the precision and discrimination that allow mathematical algorithms and the technology of radiations and electromagnetic pulses.
But it is just that this model of dialectical confrontation with its variable component of physical strength, needs a harmonious and holistic integration of the available multidisciplinary means. By focusing them on achieving different objectives simultaneously or successively, that we want to achieve. And preserving the universal principle of optimization and saving means.
Prince Wenhui’s butcher was carving up an ox, he seized the animal
with his hands, forced it to its knees and his knife, upon being sunk
into the animal, produced a pure musical sound.
Seeing his butcher working one day, Prince Wenhui said: –Ah!, Excellent! How have you reached such perfection with your art?
aside his knife, the butcher answered, «At first, when I, your
servant, began butchering oxen, I only saw the ox before me; after
three years I still did not see the ox itself. Now I use my spirit to
truly know the ox, not my eyes to merely see it. Once the senses are
restrained, it is the spirit that acts.
the natural lines of the ox, I cut between the joints until I reach
the bones between the bones and the tendons. In this way, the knife
accommodates the natural lines of the ox and, in this way, encounters
not even the merest hindrance from the veins or tendons, much less
from the animal’s big bones!
good butcher changes knife once a year, since that it is used to cut
the meat; a common butcher changes it once a month, as he uses to cut
bones. Nineteen years has passed that I, your servant, have used the
same knife. With it I have butchered thousands of oxen, yet it
remains as sharp as if it had recently been forged at the millstone.
The joints of the ox have hollows and the blade of the knife is not
thick. Sinking the blade of the knife into the softness of the ox is
done comfortably and easily. Because of this, even after so many
years my knife appears as new as when it was just came off the
I sometimes run across a knot, I probe the difficulty and proceed
with the greatest care. I regard the ox intently, move slowly, handle
the knife very carefully and, there!, the ox is quartered and reduced
to flesh. At that time I stand up, knife in hand, and look around
feeling pleased. I clean the knife and put it away.
Prince Wenhui. Hearing your reasoning I have come to understand the
work necessary to nurture life.
it is true, Sir, remarked the butcher, this virtue is acquired
neither from erudition nor from books. It is the fruit of observation
and reflection and, because of that, it cannot be passed on if not
learned first-hand. (1)
The effect of a torrent of water in his way (2):
we observe a torrent descending on successive banks of land or dams
that lie in its way, we see that it first thrusts against the
obstacle, probing and testing all its surfaces.
Opportunely, once finding a small break or weakness, the water gathers and its first trickles begin to rush over the obstacle.
on all sides, the water rushes through the gap and, by eroding the
earth it comes into contact with, widens the gap. Whirling through
and around the edges of the gap, the water washes away soil and
expands the gap.
this happens, a current of water flows directly through the gap; on
each side of the current, whirlpools of water continue to circulate.
Having crossed the gap, the water gathers and expands, to become once
again a torrential onslaught. As it flows, the water increases
constantly its volume until the torrent has reached again its
original proportions, leaving in ruins all obstacles that it
The butcher, his knife and his art, non-reflective in action, represent the specific aim of the operative strategy in war: disorganize the enemy with the least possible cost to one’s own means (combat capacity, operational mobility and supplies).
The work of the butcher is to cut up beast; to convert it from a beinginto a set of pieces and wreckage that is ready to be prepared for consumption. To prepare the pieces of the ox for later consumption, further work of cutting, portioning and reducing is required by other butchers and cooks at the palace. This work is equivalent to battles of encirclement and annihilation, where the overwhelming superiority of a local operative strips its enemies of resources and strength.
metaphor of flowing water is akin to the flexibility
and adjustments necessary to tactical actions carried out by units
and small combined arms units against an enemy.
the breach in an obstacle encountered by water is neither enlarged,
nor does it expand without erosion. Not even water, the
embodiment of docility and smoothness, vanquishes, per se, soil.
drop of water that flows through the breach, erodes soil through its
“minimal gravitational force”, especially during the turbulent
movement of the liquid, whose force is tangential to the
water in a torrent or river flows continuously, seemingly
inexhaustibly, due to the gravitational energy of the
Earth, which pulls it to the lowest level in a riverbed.
waters of the sea and of the rivers win over gravity and the forces
of Van der Waals, which join by covalent bonds
its molecules, thanks to thermal solar energy that
provides to them the «specific heat of evaporation«.
Water is condensed into drops by superficial tension,
giving them their size and shape. They are then gathered into clouds,
from which water falls as droplets again to the Earth, feeding the
«constant torrent «.
AndtheStrategy, the OperationalStrategyandthe Tactics,as Levelsofits Military Actuation.
The Levels of Military Actuation.
The first level of activity in the defense of a society is called national strategy or, also, in a some antiquated form, great strategy. In it are included the economic and diplomatic resources of the State. As part of the resources of a nation to get his great strategics aims in a war.
THE BARON OF MONTESQUIEU.
Military Strategy, or simply Strategy, in a great second level of activity, refers to the definition of the larger aims of a war, of an operations theater or of a campaign, including the distribution of the generally scanty military resources used to fulfill them.
Tactics refers to the ideal execution of the combats with an enemy, who opposes with armaments, to the achievement of our strategic aims.
Between strategy and tactics exists an essentially practical space of prominent activity, called the operational level or operational strategy. Its mission is to optimize tactics and the means available in a campaign and in the theater of operations. As such, it defines and conceptualizes the battles, marches, etc., both the military operations and its correct succession, according to those decisive aims. It provides the tactics and the decision, a transcendence far beyond of the pursuit and the tactical exploitation of success. That is to say, operational strategy employs tactics as an essential instrument, combining them to achieve the ultimate objectives to which they are orientated and dedicated to achieving, forming then part of its strategic nature.
Thus, the operational strategy defines its own aims in the theater or in the campaign of action, which are the incapacity and disorganization of the enemy by exploiting his strategic and operational vulnerabilities. The first is orientated to reducing the enemy’s combat capacity, seeking to functionally or positionaly disable it, while protecting own’s combat capacity. The second is get by occupying or destroying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities in the operations zone.
OIL REFINERY: SYMBOL OF THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF A MODERN SOCIETY.
The critics vulnerabilities of the enemy are those whose occupation or destruction produces his serious disorganization and/or the loss of his will of defense. They are those elements, characteristics, possessions that give sense to the fight that he maintains. Its loss instills inevitably in the enemy a sensation of hopelessness and a sense of uselessness in continuing the fight at those moments, except for accumulating more losses.
The critics vulnerabilities are different in each one of the levels of military action, although the effects produced in the superior levels are transmitted to the inferior ones.
A strategic critical vulnerability, handled capably by the Spaniards in century XVI during the conquest of America, was the capture of the great chief or emperor of the indigenous confederations of the great invaded countries (Moctezuma in Mexico, Atahualpa in Peru). But, once turned hostage, the symbolic representation of a leader of this type plummeted, because the social vitality of the community which he directed, demands his renovation, as if he had died.
In II World War, the occupation of the capital and the fall of the government were strategic critics vulnerabilities, to which was acceded through an operational strategy of mobile warfare: spring campaign of 1,940 in the Western Front. The same tried Hitler in 1941 in relation with Moscow in the East front. Probably in that total war, almost of extermination, its fall had not the political importance that was attributed to it. But Moscow constituted a great hub, a railway communications center vital for all the U.R.S.S. at the west of the Urales and, in this sense, it had been a critical operational vulnerability.
To achieve these strategic intermediate aims, the operational level has some specific operational means that are the intelligence, the imbalance and the incapacity of the enemy, the time or speed of the operations and combats, the logistic organization and his physical support or line of supplies and the correct sense of the own command.
It uses these means to drive and to use ideally (and without squandering) the tactical-operational means at his disposition.
THE NATIONAL MORAL FLOURISHES IN ALL THE PLACES OF SOCIAL COEXISTENCE.
The ground transitability (in the whole geographical dimension of the nature of the areas, climate, station and hour of the day),
the combat capacity (military means made concrete in men, equipment, supports and combat vehicles) and the capacity of operational movement (transport of great and small tonnage, the supplies of all kinds and combustibles and the warehouses and accessible parks in the zone) owns available,
the freedom of action and the «favorable interfaces of action» with the enemy (that exist and that they can also be created always, by means of the extension or decrease of the «field of action» on that, as a tactical operational zoom, or by means of his change to another front sector or in the depth of the enemy zone). With these last 2 «systems» we can act always according to our criterion and interest and not simply react to the actions of the enemy.
This way, the mentioned «operational systems» realize the employment and the functioning of all the levels of the national defense. And they go from the conception and the great creation of aims, interests and available resources, received from the command and the nation, up to its practical final accomplishment. Involving in this also the necessary and the inevitable and imposed by the enemy, tactical employments of the military means, as stages for the ideal achievement of those commended aims.
AndtheStrategy, the OperationalStrategyandthe Tactics,as Levelsofits Military Actuation
The Ideology or Conceptand its Range.
The “will of defense” of a nation is its capacity to cause, create, develop and maintain defense forces. The strength of the defense forces, in turn, rely on the necessary support of the economy of the country and the diplomacy of the state. The will of defense is an expression of the will of being and the vital capacity, even biological, of a society. This concept overcomes and perfects the so called hybrid war or of V generation. That implies and supposes the employment of all his «orthodox and heterodox means of intervention» by the social belligerent group.
IMPRECISE ALLEGORY OF THE FIFTH GENERATION WAR.
As the term implies, will of defense is healthy, normal and sufficient when defense forces and the strength of the country’s economy and the quality of state leadership and diplomacy are proportional and adapted to the political objectives of society. These must also be adequate to the possible threats that the country may have to oppose, both within and out the country, within its geopolitical region or other sources of threat. This capacity and its performance in different situations stems from a correct “national moral”.
The will of defense is shaped normally in the Armed Forces, in its capacity of specific instruments of the defense function. The resources of the Armed Forces include the human resources, psychological and intellectual resources and material resources. The basis for the will of defense, the source from which these resources flow is the society itself.
At the level of human resources, troops must have suitable training, the combat readiness and a certain esprit de corps. Human resources are shaped by doctrine, military direction and military moral. So, they can carry out the military operations withstanding the effort and the wear of them, while maintaining their conviction in the missions to which they are assigned.
Materials resources must support the military theory of the Armed Forces and have the necessary technological sophistication to serve the military’s objectives. They include the weapon systems and all the military hardware. All of these resources flow from a society that provides, maintains and nourishes them.
Which is operational about this natural phenomenon of the society’s capacity of defense?
In a modern society, the chain of transmission of the popular will to the Armed Forces, passes through a series of intermediate sociological gears of authorities and institutions. In them, crystallize and fulfill the popular will, albeit with all the shades, errors and deviations, derived from the degree of imperfection of society’s institutional system and of some authorities.
CHINESE INTERCONTINENTAL DF-41 MISSILES.
This implies that a direct military attack on the civil populace, does not debilitate the will of defense already shaped within its Armed Forces. So, military action is better focused on undermining the will of defense of the enemy armies, not on the society from which it springs.
To do this, the immediate goal would be the enemy’s Armed Forces, followed by the political system of the enemy’s country including its political objectives, plans, and alliances, as well as its military and auxiliary industries. Only finally would the focus of attack or pressure be on civilians of the enemy country.
The civil population, which is not intrinsically organized but is dominated by the ideological and institutional apparatus of the state, is capable of absorbing tremendous military blows. Examples of this are the bombing raids that Germany and North Vietnam endured for years. Ultimately, only the invasion of Germany forced its surrender. There is also the case of Iraq which was submitted to a kind of military siege in which its people were impoverished. Still, the Iraqi regime was even stronger than at the end of the allied invasion in the winter of l991, having suppressed internal opposition from Shiites and Kurds and having attracted the support or admiration of its resistance in the Arab world. Despite the first war against Iraq and the following siege, Iraqi’s did not rise against their political institutions and the content and expression of Iraq’s national will of defense was not altered. In the most radical case of a nuclear war, great civilian losses would occur initially, yet if the Armed Forces remained relatively intact due to defensive deployment and protection measures, it could prolong the defense of its country and even win.
This brings us to time as the environment in which the will of defense is expressed, and whose “effective factor” is “national moral”.
In effect, the will of defense is constructed in the time. And to destroy it requires actions within time. Those engaged in insurrection come to understand this point well. That a prolonged war directed at the source of the will of defense, the country’s people, will in effect attack the country’s national moral.
The National Moral, source of the Will of Defense.
The “national moral” is the collective conviction of how best to live by following historically-proven trends of peace, progress, own satisfaction, service and justice. This certainty is assumed by a society as its own vision, or conception of its destiny.
When individuals or groups do not subscribe this vision, or when they pervert it, the quality of national moral can deteriorates and often produces messianism. But, without illusion and enthusiasm, societies cannot achieve or create beneficial enterprises. Enthusiasmis a force of spirit, which conquers moral and ideological entropy (that is inevitably generated in societies), enlightened by a «reasonable illusion«.
THE DOCTRINE OF XI JINPING «illuminating» Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. IT WAS INCLUDED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. ONLY MAO AND DENG XIAOPING DESERVED SUCH AN HONOR.
When leaders also are in tune with the right social trend, and with the wishes of their people, a moral community is established between leaders and their people, that harmonizes and promotes national and social feelings. This process is the origin and creator of the national moral of societies and is at a different qualitative level than that of purely biased, ethnically-based or group-based interests.
There is an ideological creation from the people and to the people, which reason is that it most be in favor the people. Still, this process remains subject to deviations and historical aberrations.
The process of creating the national moral are positive when leaders act collectively with honesty and inspire their people to follow «correct ways» of living, within all the possible ways of living available to them. This implies and demands a certain ideological control on the part of the state’s leadership, which is one of its main functions. Abuses of this responsibility are best represented by Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda, Mr. Goebbels; the political deputies and the party structure for the proletarian dictatorship with Stalin, etc.
The natural organs for forming and transmitting the “national moral” are far removed from official propaganda offices. The reason is that the natural organs that generate national moral are found in the nuclei of society’s collective action and in its natural and institutional leaders. That is to say, the spaces in which national moral is created are homes, schools, churches, political parties, unions, working centers, and associations in general, etc.
After the battle of England, Churchill said that the future generations would say that «that one was our more glorious hour». This was possible thanks to an unbreakable social discipline, which was not ensuing from the study of manuals of civic education, but of the follow-up of a model spread by infinity of personal testimonies. The diffusion of the moral model of the citizen owed in a great extent to the educational labor of the Anglican Church.
The own Montesquieu admitted that the republican virtues only existed in the tales of the antiquity. This way, they were attractive to a leader minority, but his adoption by the citizens could not be done by legal or constitutional mandate. The moral theoretically proposed values, were seen as something artificial and remote. Without real connection with a practical and known moral code, highlighted with alive examples that could be follow.
THE TACTICAL FACTORS METT-TC OF THE RECEIVED MISSION FROM THE DIRECT COMMAND.
The Mission (M) determines the employ of the surprise, because it defines the «tactical environment«, over the merely spatial component, in which this one can apply and where it will be developed. The fulfillment of the received mission will determine decisively the possibilities of conception and application of the surprise. On having defined and express that one, the goal of the multiple and convergent actions of the efforts and means assigned by the superior command to a tactical chief. The detection by the exploration or the advanced “units of action” of a possible «interface of action»favorable over the enemy, does not authorize “per se” to a command to separate from the fulfillment of the mission of the top command.
The Enemy (E) is the essential and principal aim of a command. And the surprise is a multiplier essential factor of his potentials and means, to fulfill the received mission and to contribute to it. Surprise must then to look for: the spatial or functional dislocation of the enemy; or the economic wastage of his capacities; or a more rapid and effective fulfillment of the entrusted mission; or a positional advantage for the own deployment, for own immediate maneuvers; or the decisive assault or the counterattack to the critical or secondary vulnerabilities of the enemy, according to the plan of the top command.
The Terrain (T) and, for extension, the space is the essential support of the «tactical area» of the military action. This must use it always in its own profit, both in the assault and in the defense. In the rapid maneuvers, typical of the surprises, one will prefer using the favorable area for the employed weapon, in order that it favors the pace or tempo and the impulse or moment of them.
This way, the tanks (which fighting way is the attack) will use favorably in lightly wavy grounds and with great domain by the sights, without perpendicular cuts or water currents or rocky important outcrops. Nevertheless, the complete surprise can need the employment of tanks in difficult, not impossible ground, for them, so they are not waited by the enemy. Even, using in the spear of advance fewer armored units than the usual ones, which, with the surprise, would make feel with his presence equal fire power and shock.
The grounds provided with covers and/or concealments and the night and the atmospheric phenomena or meteors (rain, snow, hail), that reduce visibility and combative disposition in the defenders, favor the movement to the combat of the units and means of the surprise. Also, they allow their temporal concealment in the decided rest and departure zones. The inconvinient and/or disagreeable grounds facilitate the final approximation of the means of the surprise: gutters, edges of the streets close to the sidewalks, vertical walls that are practicable, cultivated fields, bushes, wetlands. In exchange for inconveniences and of time in the advance, we will win in the effective employ of the surprise.
In the defense, we will use the broken ground, with concealment relative heights (CRH) and covers for the small units (urban and industrial zones); partly resting on the rear slope and in natural obstacles (rivers, trees spots, etc.) that run parallel to the tracing of the defensive position; that impede or reveal the enemy movements, breaking his impulse, and facilitate the rejection from our own favorable positions. The counterattack from the depth of our tactical zone on the reverse or the flank of the enemy spears of advance, preferably after his determination, will be a very effective employ of the surprise. The fire traps (fire bags), the dispersed and small minefields, the fire blows from the defense points and resistance nests, retained up to the close distances with the enemy, are defensive surprises, but more waited by the enemy.
Being based on the ground characteristics and paying attention to the particularities of some part of the tactical area (enemy, mission, area, opportunity) the surprise will be planned and decided. And it will implement his assembly, deployment, support and unfolding, following a sufficient, protected and constant flow.
The Troops (T) necessary to execute and fulfill the conceived and decided surprise, must be adapted for the mission by his characteristics. The surprise is an offensive action over the enemy, developed unexpected, rapid and thougtlessly, in general. The equipment of the men and the air and artillery support must be the necessary and sufficient, in conformity with the determined plan. Besides his general training, the men must receive the specific training, depending on the characteristics of the mission and the actions to develop. The characteristics of obedience and initiative, patience, resistance and sobriety, physical qualities, enthusiasm and spirit of group, commitment with the mission, must be the best in the men. As they will be an important part of the actions. And they will act as chiefs and persons in charge of themselves and of his mission companions, in certain moments.
It is important a complete real time training of the mission. There are devices that fail at the X hours of use. The tension on the men and his sustained efforts affect their comfort and their efficiency and rapidity of action. With repercussions in his combative disposition, his alert and the precision of answers.
Often the heavy fire will be used to conceal the enemy from our surprise. The coordination of different weapon in the same mission or sector, is a critical point of it. For example, units of infantry, reinforced by some squads of engineers and supported by a few tanks sections, crossing a thick forest to surprisingly reach an enemy important position in the depth of his deployment. Acting in the same sector of advance or assault, the coordination between the small units must be tested and confirmed.
The Time (T) of the mission is a decisive factor of his success. On one hand, it must be the opportune one. For other part, the time must be enough and accelerated uniformly in the «successive cycles of action» of the development of the mission. In order that the concentration, the sequence or the simultaneity of employs and the forcefulness of our actions demolish the enemy human aim at which they are applied, once gotten the surprise.
It is necessary to consider always that all the actions need to happen an estimated planned time plus a complementary corrector time. This will depend on the degree of complexity of the mission: units, logistic support, demonstrative helping actions, crossing distances, passage difficulties, presence and intention of the enemy, simultaneity or sequence of employs, coordination. And it originates in the failures that arise in all the human activities and in the small and medium mistakes that are committed by the commands and men. Some call these the tactical friction of war. A serious mistake would suppose that the surprise was badly calculated or executed and it is an operational serious mistake.
The civilians (C) must not be damaged in a surprising mission. Even when the enemy mixes and protects in a civil area, it is possible to define and to make concrete a purely military aim. To isolate, attack and extirpate it with military accurate and mopping-up. Here is necessary the employ of the organic weapon of the ground attacking unit, which limit the not wished hurts and make concrete his effects in the selected targets.
The heavy indiscriminate air and artillery fire is a weapon of merciless and spread results for the employ in urban areas. His aim is not to blind, to disturb or to neutralize the enemy. The excessive and insistent heavy fire seek to destroy it. That is the more uncertain and less economic goal of all. Both the Soviets and the western allieds have used it with profusion in the civil wars of the Southwest of Asia. His use has as goal to destroy from far off and before to the assault, the enemy positions in the villages. Avoiding as much as possible that the own ground forces fight at close distances with the islamist rebels.