Teoría e Historia Militares y Temas de Interés Permanente en los Conflictos y Crisis Modernos. Military Theory and History and Topics of Permanent Interest in the Modern Conflicts and Crisis.
Categoría: The Mistakes in the Work of the Commanda
This is obviously not a Treatise on the determining Parameters of Military Efficiency. Nor is it a Study on the Principles or Operating Systems of War. On which you have at your disposal enough articles on this Web Page, which you consult now.
It is a matter of making a brief explanation of the characteristics of these determining Parameters. That they should always work in Harmony and Cohesion.
So that, with this description in hand, you can easily define and know the Failures and Errors made by the Units in their most dangerous Job: War.
Doctrine and Regulations.
These determining Parametersmust define and transmit the What and the How of the units and means in the war against the various possible enemies.
In other words, it supposes having good Principles of its Art-Science of War and Operating Systems suitable for modern, hybrid and cybernetic warfare.
And, they must do it in a broad, clear, creative, stimulating, flexible, participatant and decisive way.
The Determining Parameters and their full means of expression.
Those Determining Parameters are conceived and materialized by the Human Element of Weapons and War. Without it, they would only be more or less numerous sheets of letters. Waiting to obtain its meaning, always eminently practical, its full expression and its transcendent utility. They get it with their employment by the military.
Logistic chain.
Organizes and distributes the means to units. It could also participate more or less in its acquisition in the market. Generally includes health services.
It must be close, and it using various means: long-distance and delivery transport, warehouses or centers (hubs) or kitchens at various levels of action and with control and computer means. It must act informed, farsighted, proactive, organized and sufficient.
The Action Trilogy.
Units of the arms and services.
That they can integrate tactical and operational groups of Combined Arms with common tasks and missions. That they will be at one with each other, trained, also jointly, that they provide mutual support and a synergy of effects and that they have mutual respect.
Commands. officers.
They must be willing, empathetic, trained, motivated, decisive, respected, responsible and long-suffering.
Non-commissioned officer corps.
They must be close, trained, specific, capable, formed, loyal to the commands, soldiers and units and respected and highly regarded by the soldiers.
The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was victorious in the Civil War over the Russian White Armies. These were supported to a greater or lesser extent in it by the European Powers, the United States and Japan. Already then, the Soviet Politburo set its eyes on Europe, in order to spread the World Revolution. In this, the internationalist ideas of Leon Trotsky had a decisive role.
Leon Trotsky
To do this, General Mikhail Tukhachevsky would attack the recent Republic of Poland with his armed Eurasian Hordes. And he would win over the bourgeois Republic. Thanks to the fact that the Polish peasants would «fervently» join the socialist liberation offered by the Red Armies.
The imperialist attack on Poland.
The Reds reached the Warsaw Front, trying to overwhelm it from the nort.
General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, left, with other Senior Commanders of the Red Army
There, Marshal Josef Pilsudski, hero of the Liberation of Poland in World War I, toured his brigades and divisions. Raising and consolidating the combat morale of its forces and the identity of the Polish Nation, against communist Russian Imperialism.
And, he prepared with his General Staff and the commanders of his large units an in-depth mobile defense. Against the frontal and massive attacks of the enemy.
From Kyiv, about 500 km from the Front, Tukhachevsky encouraged his own, treating their hordes as despots, aided by their political commissars. And he directed his military operations on the maps of the situation of the war in his Command Post. That it was updated by unverified information from his large units at the Front.
The Operational Caedes.
Tukhachevsky had also tightened his Logistic Lines to the maximum. He was engulfed, touching in his imagination the triumph at hand.
Although they ate from looting the ground they walked on. From their distant rear they needed weapons, ammunition, equipment, clothes, shoes, medicines, troops replacement, pack mules and the essential Russian «cars of the country».
And, as a Miracle emerged from the concentration of the attacker’s Errors and the defender’s Effective Parameters, the attacker found himself without friendly ground under his feet. Without the essential operational rear area. To rest, maneuver, fight and consolidate after specific fights. And, he had to back off miserably.
The Soviets in arms, not effective military, retreated to the borders of the USSR.
And, the revolutionary dream of crossing the Polish plains and invading Germany. And free Europe from the capitalist or imperialist system, this as the culmination of capitalist development. It dissipated like the smoke of the tobacco that the Soviet troops smoked.
Current situation.
This idiosyncrasy of the Slavic military of the West of the Urals continues to influence the operations, needs and mental characteristics of the military of the Russian Federation.
The discipline of the troops in the barracks is deplorable. Free time, laziness, inane or risqué talks abounds.
Heavy equipment maintenance is poor. Some writer calculated that, from his military experience, half the tanks in battle would soon stop working and would be short of fuel and spare parts.
The Russian army lacks in its essential structure the framework of a corps of non-commissioned officers specifically formed for the immediate direction of the troops and the satisfaction of their needs. That they know them as well as their mothers. And with extensive military knowing and training, empathy and leadership skills. Respected by the soldiers and which recognize that without them and without obeying them, their chances of survival on the battlefield are much less.
Consequences for immediate operations.
This may be an insurmountable obstacle to Putin‘s plans, which Gerasimov is trying to fulfill.
And it could not be surpassed by the mere concentration of the mediocrity of equipment and men in the Fronts.
The opportunity arises from the play of dialectical actions between the opposing units. Opportunity is the tactical, even operational, weakness that arises in an enemy sector or is about to do so. We can act on it and even precipitate it with our combined weapons system in an «action interface» especially favorable to us. In opportunity always underlies an enemy error. If this was insurmountable for him, it would be due to the unforeseen, surprising circumstances that concurred. Opportunities are a useful and advantageous feature provided by the dialectic of actions in the chaos of war.
The intermediate objectives foreseen in the plans are not opportunities. They are forecasts derived from the planning and the well-founded resolution of the command. When contacts with the enemy begin, its achievement begins to be tested, as Moltke said, in the dialectics play.
Functioning.
Of this play in a chaotic environment, independently of the greater or smaller deviations from plans, will arise the opportunities and the dangers. The dangers would be the enemy opportunities on us. Both are unexpected, but accessible and exploitable during a certain time. The reason of the unpredictably of the opportunities in the time is in the number almost infinite of variables and individual and collective actions that concur to define a “situation” and the successive cycles of action in which it develops.
The opportunity arises when the enemy fails to use his forces and means of support. It can originate in differences in the qualities of enemy forces and in the transitability of a given terrain, that debilitates a defense or the momentum of an attack. It also appears in the negligence of the enemy in presenting an exposed flank, that is, an interface of action real or potential favorable with us, not properly taken care of by him to face our available combined arms system. The opportunity is an emptiness in combat capacity that arises in a cycle of action for a unit, or a sector, that is unprotected and neglected for long enough allowing it to be detected and exploited by the enemy.
It is necessary to take advantage of opportunities quickly. The dynamics of interaction ina chaotic environment makes opportunities unattainable after a short time. The succession of cycles of action continually modify circumstances.
Developing.
To detect opportunities at any level of military activity, intelligence is necessary (elaborated the exploration and reconnaissance and converted into useful, continuous, sufficient knowledge) and the sufficient presence of the corresponding command. To take advantage of them, simple and vertical communication is necessary, supported by implicit communication between subordinate leaders and mobility, flexibility and combat capacity available in the units and commands involved. If the opportunity is transcendental, the tactical or operational center of gravity of the military means is transferred to it by the command. If it is important, their use must contribute concentrically to its creation and development.
The same characteristics just mentioned, but focused on ourselves, are the ones that, in turn, will protect us from enemy dangers or opportunities. This will prevent its appearance, compensate for the danger or mitigate its presence and reduce our time of vulnerability. If despite foresight and care, surprising or unexpected circumstances concur in its appearance, even due to a mistake on our part, the means to be used are the last two actions mentioned for its detection and use.
What is that sufficient presence of the commander? The one that allows him to take advantage of the opportunities that arise at his level of activity. All of this is directly related to the two different command styles or forms for carrying out the tasks of the different levels of command.
Tactical command must be exercised bySensing the “action interface” with the enemy, exchanging actions with him on the ground. The limit of tactical command is clearly in the brigade. And, in large operations or in the attack or in the armored forces, it probably reaches in greater or lesser degree to the division, whose commander must drive forward the march or the attack behind the first important marching force of the bulk of the unit.
The command of the army corps is clearly an corps’ operational management and must have a broader perspective of the whole. As well as a greater distance from direct contact with the enemy, which overcomes the interface of action and its immediate rear. This gives the command breadth, vision, serenity and security.
In the immense chaos that is created in a combat, the foresight of the command can impose and outline its evolution in a direction and sense.
Like the effective command, is capable of «searching» and «feeling» the enemy’s signs of weakness and discouragement. And then he prepares the forces that he will use in the persecution and the support that he will give them. Putting them under the command of an energetic, spirited, leading and lucid commander.
The command must prepare «rapidly available forces» in the units under its command. For example, a mixed company in the battalion; a combined arms battalion in the brigade. In such a way that the appearance of the opportunity, close and surprising, allows him to take advantage of it. Since the surprise will help the opportunity to be seized at first by a relatively small force of their own. And that may soon be reinforced by the bulk.
Example of the effective, non-physical presence of a High Command.
Erich von Manstein directed the counterattack operation of the German Armies Group Don, mainly against the Soviet Southwestern Front of General Vatutin, from his headquarters in Zaporiya. By mid-March1943, the Germans had eliminated six tank corps in the order of battle of Vatutin, recovered Kharkov and settled a resistant defense front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported in the Mius and the Donetz. They also had enough mobile reserves in the south of Russia to reject possible soviet operational ruptures in the zone. And, after the setback of Stalingrad, they had recovered the strategic initiative, at least in the southern theater of operations.
HITLER, WORRIED, VISIT MARSHAL VON MANSTEIN AT ZAPORIYA, UKRAINE.
An attack against the Kursk salient, completed its formation by von Manstein‘s advance on Belgorod, which would have begun in April, then had a chance of success due to the lack of Soviet preparation.
This same offensive, which began in July 1943, determined that no more mistakes by the German High Command (Hitler) were of any importance: then, the subjet of total strategy or state strategy was no longer who would win the war, but how long it would take to do so.
A Failure in the effective presence of command.
Let’s see an example of an inadequate presence of the commander, in relation to the echelon that he is supposed to command. It starred Rommel in North Africa in November 1941.
Rommel’s advanced command post in the desert.
Mistakenly believing that the British armor was dispersed after some fighting, Rommel ordered to concentrate his Panzers on the Libyan-Egyptian border. Directly dedicated to it, acting as a regimental commander, he was involved in the repulse of a British attack. He was even isolated with his command vehicle, due to a mechanical problem, for half a day at the front.
This temporarily deprived him of control of operations in Tobruk. This was Rommel’s main operational objective, while resisting the German siege was the main objective of the English. Due to this unjustified distraction, Rommel had to abandon the attempt to take that fortified port, located in his operational rear, which he could have consolidated for his defense of his won territory.
In less than a month, the advances of the English tanks and infantry forced him into a long retreat towards Tunisia. He had to give up almost all the ground he had gained since March, when he arrived in Africa, until he recovered and was able to fight back, as British pressure lightened.
Russian Generals missing from their Battle Forward Post in Ukraine
Introduction.
There are hundreds of videos of Ukrainians neutralizing Russian air, naval and ground vehicles. That more than fighting at close distances, it seems that they pose as if they were shooting ducks at a town fair.
These
videos are mostly produced by almost unknown film companies.
And sometimes even a supposed Russian general falls almost in the battle’s first rows.
Developing.
A
general never accompanies or stands in combat with a platoon
lieutenant or company captain or a battalion commander or lieutenant
colonel.
His tasks are not to hit shots. Nor haranguing the men around him. Or drive them into combat by his example. That is done by the officers in charge of the units and the non-commissioned officers in immediate command of the soldiers. Who know their soldiers like nobody else. Or will it not be so here?
The task of the general officer is to conceive and conceptualize the combat and the maneuvers of his tactical units, fulfilling the Tasks and Missions of the Army in campaign.
And, facilitate the means in: combined arms units; anti-tank, artillery and air support for them and the logistics for it: from health to supplies of all kinds, from fuel to ammunition, through maintenance teams and removal of damaged vehicles and kitchens and food distribution to the collection points of the units.
He
harangues and drives the commanders and chiefs of units dependent on
him. And, to all the soldiers on rare occasions.
To
fulfill Those, fulfilling the universal principle of the
economy of human and material means. That is, following the
best and most optimized use of it.
And, as I have said before, the death of a general is a national disaster. And, the death of a 4-star general, commander-in-chief of an army of many tens of thousands of soldiers, is a national catastrophe.
Simply
because they are very important military assets.
When
the Russians have attacked the vast area of the Donbass,
as the Center of Gravity of their military efforts in
eastern Ukraine, they have done so by employing other,
more primitive tactics, if possible.
Russian
attempts to employ their modern combined weapons units,
the Mobile Battalion Groups, a kind of demi
mobile brigades or light brigades, against the
ecumens of Kyiv, in western
Ukraine, or Kharkov, in eastern Ukraine,
were met with unexpected defeats. Thanks to the effective rejection
tactics of the Ukrainian units, employing a mobile defense with
cession of space and a favorable terrain for defense, almost
always.
After
the capture of Mariupol,
with its port to the Sea
of Azov
and its gigantic steel industry
Azovstal,
the time came to attend and occupy the Donbass’
basin,
with
the oblast (province) of Lugansk,
to the north, next to the Russian border and the oblast of Donetz,
to the south, towards the peninsula of
Crimea,
occupied already in 2014.
In
this new performance of the Russian Army, «support»
heavy fire is no longer such. It has, as an Army
Branch,
an
Own
Use,
«per
se«.
That it is surgical and almost total destruction of Ukrainian
positions. This guarantees greater survival to their soldiers in the
assault on those positions. Operation, on the other hand, that will
rarely be important already.
These are not brilliant tactics, nor exemplary ones they use.
GENERAL ULYSSES GRANT
They
are similar to the Attrition and Wear
tactics employed by Grant at the end of the
American Civil War. He systematically chased Lee and
attacked him, not caring too much about the cost. But, he wore him
down inexorably. And it led him to his surrender at Appomattox
in April 1865.
As
he won and as in the war is debatable almost everything, Grant
was commended for his perseverance, definition and
concentration on a decisive goal and other things…
Or, those used by Foch, Generalissimo of the Allies in the Western European theater in 1918. Who hammered uninterruptedly the German positions in some sectors. Until breaking them, bursting behind their lines and trying a shallow exploitation. That always broke the opportune German operational counterattack. And, that only changed his effort to other sectors, when the German resistance was strong or hardened in them.
GENERALISSIMO FOCH, ALLIED SUPREME COMAND IN 1918
But
this unfailingly exhausted the means available to an
adversary inferior to the Allies. And, it led Germany
to a humiliating surrender before them. And to the dismemberment of
the Second Reich and the establishment of the Weimar
Republic. That did not direct positively the desires and
wishes of the German people.
They
are the tactics of the great mace or hammer
on the anvil. In contrast with indirect actions and maneuvers of
other generals and theaters of operations and epochs. They have the
elegance, cleanliness, speed and efficiency of Foil fencing.
These
Russian tactics are more costly, long and bloody. And,
they are applicable when:
One’s
means are far superior to those of the enemy.
The
Russian’
Command
and Control
structure does not respond effectively to the needs of modern
warfare. Regarding the complementary
use of maneuver
and combat,
according to the
needs of the command and the taking advantage of the opportunities
that arise.
Politicians
Only ask the military for victory.
Own
commands are mediocre and subject to a «zero
fault»
control by their superiors. Above all, such commands
lack imagination and freedom of action.
We
will see bad, costly and painful results.
Campaign’s General Development.
Tactical mobile battalions attack in a sector of between one and three km, according to the intensity of the effort that the brigade leaders want to apply in the area. The mobile battalion, which is the effective autonomous tactical unit of the Russian Army, possesses its own organic artillery. But, for certain missions seeking the wear and tear of the enemy, the division can assign them even one more artillery group in direct support, coming from the reserve of it.
PARTIAL PHOTO OF A RUSSIAN MOBILEBATTALION IN PARADE
The advance by an attack strip is carried out by a mechanized or motorized infantry company and a tank company, with the corresponding services of the battalion. As fighting takes place on enemy urban terrain, villages and districts, command is exercised by the infantry chief. Which the tanks support from positions further back. Using their powerful cannons with direct fire and HE-type charges, against enemy infantry «support points» and «resistance nests» and anti-tank positions in the infantry zone. In the appearance of Ukrainian tanks and/or Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Russian tanks or a part of them, as decided by the tank command, would quickly switch to anti-tank ammunition and/or smoke charges, if appropriate.
RUSSIAN SATELLITE
There
is no operational
exploration
by parts of the Russian ground forces here. This function is
fulfilled by the many surveillance satellites deployed in space. And,
the «unmanned
aerial exploration vehicles»
or drones launched from the ground by the Army.
It is assumed that all this information collected by several different means and commands, is centralized in a common Intelligence Center.
RUSSIAN UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Responsible
for such reception and its analysis and projection for various times,
days, weeks, months. Creating
a reasonably reliable, up-to-date, continuous and timely
Intelligence.
That would facilitate to
the
ground commanders of brigades or mobile groups, in charge
of operations.
The
mobile battalions in contact only advance a small
combat
exploration
for
their different Weapons. To narrow down and outline the various
immediate targets that correspond to them.
If
the Artillery,
Rockets and Tactical Aviation
were used at
heart in
any of the battles of the Campaign, the Russian
ground
troops would have as mission in that battle the occupation
and consolidation of the objective
to «assault». In which there would no longer be enemy
soldiers, because they would probably have withdrawn in advance to
the attack of the Russian ground force.
Exposition of a complex real case, highly illustrative.
This is illustrated by mistakes that affected Germany’s plans and strategies during the war with the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945. During this war, Hitler and his commanders pursued a policy, strategies of state,total strategies and operational field strategies, many of which were plagued by poor decisions.
Still, knowing that erroneous, slanted or incomplete decisions had been made, in those circumstances, could anyone within the Wehrmatch have avoided the mistakes or serious mistakes of Germany’s actions?
In the campaign of 1941, Germany lacked a clearly defined objective and this divided its military effort. Germany’s principal attacks were dispersed between Leningrad, Kiev and Moscow, without existing a single objective of June 22, 1941. Both Leningrad and Kiev were given their own importance, rather than be treated as intermediate goals within a larger campaign. Moscow was not emphasized as a primary objective until October, when the possibility of a reasonable conquest had already disappeared.
Given the demographic and geographical characteristics of the USSR, it is absurd to pretend that the main objective was to annihilate the Red Army before the «Moscow meridian». Even if the top brass of the Wehrmatch wanted to recreate a large encirclement and annihilation operation in several successive battles.
General Heinz Guderian
The
diversion
towards
Kiev
of
the
Second
Panzer
Corp
of
Guderian
came
at
the
expense
of
the
effort
of
the
Center
Armies
Group advancing
towards
Moscow.
And
forced
its
tanks
to
detour
more
than
1,000
kilometers.
In practice, to
estimate the attrition of its operational
movement capacity,
these were equivalent to 2,000 km of
distance travelled.
But,
despite
the
many
prisoners
captured
in
Kiev,
these
were
not
sufficient
to
force
Stalin
to
surrender, because
this was disregarded at the time.
In September 1941, Leningrad could be taken by the Northern Armies Group. Hitler’s decision to surround the city was made in an effort to avoid the risk of troop losses that would come about by urban fighting, something which had indeed occurred in Kiev. But this decision tied the German Northern Armies to a secondary target. If the city had been taken rather than surrounded, the Northern Armies Group, despite their delay, could join the Center Armies Group to assault Moscow or to reinforce the march of the Southern Armies Group toward the Caucasus the following year, seeking for an economic fundamental target.
Now, occurs a huge mistake of Hitler. And it happens at the level of grand strategy, national strategy or total strategy.
In
1941, more than 50 million Slavs, living in Ukraine, White Russia or
Belarus and the Baltic countries, expected the Germans as liberators
of the unbearable yoke of the Stalinist communists. Between 1931 and
1937, “Little Father Stalin” had deliberately and calculated
massacred some 5 million Ukrainians, for the mere fact of being them.
And, never is any «fault» of the whole of a country, of an
ethnic group.
Ukraine
was the grain barn of the USSR and, during the Five-Year
Industrial Plan, Ukrainian agricultural resources were
diverted towards the objectives of that Plan. The peasants were not
assigned seeds and the remaining ones were kept to eat. The peasants
were required to deliver abusive quotas of milk, meat and crops.
Stalin approved genocide supposedly for the sake of his
ideology.
After
the victorious passage of the Wehrmatch, Himmler sent the SS. To take
care of the Slavs, the Untermensch, the undermen or human subbeens.
To obtain cheap, slave labor to the service of the Reich.
And, instead of accepting them and joining a large close and favorable rear, with all the millions of men available as allies. Capable of performing internal tasks of defense of the territory and of first protection of the immense line of communications from the Reich to the Eastern Front. And to integrate them to some extent into the «auxiliary forces» of the Wehrmatch, like the Romanians. And producing in Ukraine goods and services for the Germans. Hitler immediately alienated the will of the Ukrainians: employing the Vesanic occupiers of the SS, who killed them directly or banished them to Germany.
Soviet partisans.
And
the ex-Soviet rear was filled with anti-German partisans. That was
the only «strategic guerrilla» of World War
II. Since it was directly dependent on a constituted state and was an
operational auxiliary of the Red Army. Which gave it
certain characteristics of «belligerent of right«,
distancing them from the simple outlaws or bandits.
In the summer of 1943, when the Soviet guerrilla war reached its peak, some 250,000 partisans were fixing half a million German and allied troops (from Russians, Italians, Hungarians, rear police, to German garrison units). The Germans of the first line were only used in large operations of encirclement and annihilation of guerrillas. Even the small garrison forces, usually a section, with a core of Germans, maintained a proactive behavior: they had to send to patrol periodically to half a section or to join it with an external force, gathered for a more ambitious operation.
General Nikolai Vatutin
In
1942,
German
troops
were
within
100
kilometers
of
Moscow.
Nevertheless,
Hitler
changed
the
strategic
attack
of
the
campaign
to
the
south
and
its
more
economically
profitable
objectives;
a
change
that
his
generals
did
not
understand.
By
making
that
decision,
Germany
lost
forever
the
possibility
of
capturing
Moscow
or
Leningrad.
Later,
Hitler
made
the
delayed
decision
to
divide
the
South
Armies
Group,
with
one
part
proceeding
to
the
Caucasus
and
the
other
advancing
toward
Stalingrad.
The
result
was
that
neither
Armies
reached
their
objectives.
The acceptance of a battle of attrition and not of maneuvers (this was impossible) in Stalingrad, led the German Army to lose during it its greater and better operational movement capacity, against the Soviet Army of masses, almost inexhaustible. Later, by not allowing the rapid withdrawal of the German 6th Army from that city, when the Soviets established their operational encirclement or, better, before that, causing the German forces debilitating losses due to the lack of suitable and defended supply lines.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein
Hitler’s decision, in spite of all the criticism it provoked, to fight a late the battle with Soviet forces based in Kursk. Which could have been attacked in April, just a little after Erich von Manstein’s scythe blow against the flanks and rearward of the Soviet Voronezh Front or Armies Group of Voronezh of colonel general Vatutin and the Mobile Group of deep incursion of general Markian Popov, which marched towards the Dnieper’s mouth, centered the German armies again on a secondary target. Even worse was that Germany’s invaluable armored tanks that spear-headed the advance in Kursk (moving hard in rhombus – or armored shaped wedges or Panzerkiel) foundered, when they encountered Soviet antitank in deep deployments forming even “fortified regions”.
General Markian Popov
The result was similar for the Panzer Divisions, even reinforced by Tigers battalions and the new Ferdinand heavy assault guns, to what Germany infantry divisions faced in Stalingrad: pitting direct force against direct force and high troop looses for both side, were the parity in men and Germany’s superior preparation and tactical doctrine dissipated in the face of concentric high fires.
When a German was worth as a combatant what three or four Russians, according to the conscientious studies of the American colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, from the results of multiple battles of World War II.