TRANSITABILITY OR GROUND ONGOING – Conflictos Modernos

Iran attacked by air.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

Persia is one of the three great Indo-European civilizations, along with Greece and Rome. If the Greeks had their Iliad and the Romans their Aeneid, the Persians had their Book of Kings. Persia is as Western as Ireland. And Ireland means the same as Iran, «land of the Aryans.»

Although Persia converted to Islam after the Battle of Nehawend in 642 a.C., its Islam is Shi’ism and has strong influences from Zoroastrianism. This is one of the oldest monotheistic religions. It was founded by the prophet Zoroaster in Persia around the 7th to 6th centuries b.C. Zoroastrianism has a dualistic view of good and evil. Angra Mainyu is the evil spirit, the principle of evil and destruction. It is the opposite of Ahura Mazda, the good and creator god. A practical summary could be the motto «think good, speak good, do good.»

The Shiite ayatollahs have much in common with the ancient «magi.» The name «magi,» as both category and occupation, is derived from the name given to the sages (of which there were several) who came from Persia in search of the newborn King of the Jews.

For all these reasons, we can say that Iranian Shiism is a national religion.

The last Iranian dynasty, the Pahlavi, focused on expanding and deepening the work «The Book of Kings,» with its 60,000 verses. This was a way to weaken radical Islam through the «ethnic cultural roots» of a 2,600-year-old empire.

The radical Shiite Ruhollah Khomeini had to go into exile in France because of his strict doctrine. He was only able to return to Iran after the 1979 Revolution, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

All of this enshrines, consolidates, and extends the identity and characteristics of the Iranian people.

***CYRUS II THE GREAT, FOUNDER OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.***

As a symbol of the enduring and strenghting nature of the Iranian Ethos, we have the elite military unit of the Immortals, founded by Cyrus II the Great. Initially an infantry unit, it later became a cavalry unit under the Sasanian Empire. It comprised 10,000 handpicked soldiers. When a member fell, he was replaced after the battle. They formed the Persian king’s personal guard and were also used as shock troops in battles. In this way, they transmitted through time the idea of continuity and strength of this special corps and, with it, of the entire army of the Empire and the Persian nation.

This national identity has been reinforced by its resistance to invasions and oppression throughout the centuries. Iranians have fought in numerous battles and wars to protect their national territory and their sovereignty within it. From Alexander the Great‘s conquest to the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, and including the era of Nadur Shah, who led the resistance against the Afghans (also known as Pashtuns or Patans) in the 18th century, the defense of the nation is seen as a sacred duty by many Iranians. This is reflected in modern public events such as the Day of Sacred Defense.
Resistance, or the modern concept of resilience (a term borrowed from English), and sacrifice in defense of the nation and its characteristics (territory, religion, language) are recurring themes in Iranian culture.

Heavy aerial or artillery fire.
Artillery and ground-attack aircraft (and, more recently, unmanned aerial vehicles) have these tasks to fulfill in their operations:

Blinding. This means preventing or hindering enemy observation. It ranges from the occasional use of smoke or fog to attacking enemy observation positions, sensors, radars, or satellites.
Disrupt. This aims to interrupt or hinder enemy military operations. Counter-battery fire and interdiction attacks in the enemy’s tactical and operational zones are two examples.
Neutralize. This aims to temporarily render an enemy position or unit ineffective. It is the upper and general limit of destruction that should be applied, according to the main principle of saving resources.
Modern tactics and operations, applied by the Russians in support of their «uncomfortable ally» Syria and the al-Assad family, have openly begun to demolish enemy defensive positions, even in urban or industrial areas, before the supported infantry assault to capture them.
An uncomfortable ally is one that causes more setbacks and unpleasantness than results and victories. Italy was such an ally in World War II. The Russians had their only naval base-port in the Mediterranean at Port Taurus in Latakia, Syria.

***DESTRUCTION BY HEAVY FIRE IN A SECTOR OF GAZA***

Destroy. The goal is to eliminate or permanently disable an enemy capability or position. There are obvious cases where this task is applicable, for example, destroying a bridge or a bunker, an ammunition depot, or a military vehicle distribution park. It is the most costly means in relation to providing operational effectiveness.

The choice of task also depends on the military objective. For example, is it a fortified position or are they forces on the move? And, of course, on the available resources. These are usually always insufficient, and the commander must take this into account when allocating resources and reserves to his forces.

The Unconditional surrender.

This is a diplomatic-military procedure that did not normally exist before World War II.

Simply put forward conditions that were draconian enough to reduce the surrendering nation to near destruction.

***GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, FRENCH PRIME MINISTER.***

This is what French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, nicknamed «The Tiger,» dictated to Germany on November 11, 1918, in a railway carriage at the Compiègne Forest, where the German surrender agreement was signed. He was not in the coach.

Germany lost the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine; the Ruhr industrial basin, the symbol and heart of its heavy industry; its Army was limited to 100,000 men, with a ban on tanks; it was required to pay enormous reparations for the costs of the war, etc.

A separate chapter concerns Germany‘s irreversible loss of its African colonies:

East Africa (present-day Namibia); Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania, along with the island of Zanzibar); Togo; Rwanda; Cameroon.

***CHILDREN FLYING A KITE MADE FROM HIGH-VALUE GERMAN BANKNOTES***

The hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic was one of the most infamous in history. In 1923, it reached almost 30,000%. Prices doubled every three and a half days. This immense inflation greatly alleviated the real burden of the war debt, which they paid with «paper money,» quite literally.

Tanks were replaced by large wheeled fake models for studies and training (war games).

The 100,000 military personnel assigned to the war, became the officers and non-commissioned officers of the future German Army, which was also provided with a revolutionary doctrine.

The socio-cultural and military mechanisms of the Iranian regime in its development and maintenance.

The arrival of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini in Iran from his exile in France in 1979 marked the beginning of a shift in direction and the ideologization of the Iranian Civic Revolution.

The Shiite clergy of Qom soon realized that the Revolution was a «source of law» (with great potential) and that it needed to secure its position against an almost intact Iranian Armed Forces, inherited from the Pahlavi Empire.

In 1980, Iran was attacked by Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, and the army performed poorly.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established by order of Khomeini on April 22, 1979. It was a Parallel Army, ideologically and religiously unwaveringly loyal to the ayatollahs and Iranian Shiism. Some parallels could be drawn with Hitler’s SS. The ayatollahs sought and implemented an effective army, loyal to them and their principles.

***GENERAL QASSEM SOLEIMANI, ONE OF THE MOST FAMOUS COMMANDERS OF THE AL-QUDS BRIGADES (REVOLUTIONARY GUARD)***

The Revolutionary Guard is responsible for Iran‘s internal and border security, law enforcement, and Missile Forces. Its operations are geared toward asymmetric warfare, controlling smuggling, and the Strait of Hormuz.

Today, so many years later, the Iranian Armed Forces are sufficiently loyal and effective in the regular defense of Iran.

(To be continued)

THE DRONES AND THE ENEMY OPERATIONAL ZONE. SECOND PART.

(continuaton)

The range of the most specific tactical actions extends from 12-15 km to 40-50 km deep into the enemy position.

We have already seen that the operational zone was very vulnerable to deep exploitation by enemy mobile groups. However, the support mass, made up of structures based on stability and management and with units with qualitatively lower combat readiness, due to their unnecessary nature, is even more vulnerable. It is another matter whether, with modern armies, based on the countless manufactured products necessary for their operations, the exploitation of an enemy’s deep rear is operationally easy or even feasible.

Theory of using drones in reconnaissance and combats.

The countries of Eastern or Central Europe, as some of them say, as if they could modify geography, have land and sea borders with Russia, and these are their lengths:

Country Land border Percentage Sea border

Finland 1,271.8 km 21.7% 54 km

Belarus 1,239 km 21%

Ukraine 2,093.6 km 35.7% 567 km

Norway 195.8 km 23.3 km

Latvia 270.5 km

Lithuania 266 km 22.4 km

Estonia 324.8 km 142 km

Poland 204.1 km 32.2 km

Total……………. 5,865.6 km 840.9 km

European countries are overwhelmed by the lack of means, tactics, techniques, and doctrine to stop attacks and incursions of varying depth by the “unmanned aerial vehicles” (drones). The decided solution is to equip the entire eastern European border with a «physical network of reconnaissance and attack drones from short to long range.» However, this is structurally unsafe, imperfect, and insufficient.

**INCORPORATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO OPERATIONAL DRONES**

Following the recent Russian drone incursions into Poland and Romania, the Defense ministers of the so-called «frontline» countries decided on Friday, September 26, to begin as soon as possible the joint construction of an «anti-drone defense system» covering their entire extensive border with the threatening enemy. The intensification of incidents and grievances involving this innovative weaponry by Putin’s Russia has directly contributed to this decision.

For its part, Ukraine, through its Defense Minister Skmyhal, has pledged to assist its European allies in developing technology and tactics in this field of weapons. European Union Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius believes that the Ukrainian army has the most experience in the development and use of various types of drones.

The defense ministers decided that they should move «from discussions to concrete actions.» The first objective would be to create a national and interoperable drone detection system, building on the aforementioned experience of Ukraine. According to Kubilius, this is currently the biggest shortcoming. Heads of State will be informed at the European Council Meeting at the end of this October, so they can provide political support for developing this objective. It was suggested that its implementation could take a year.

***EU DEFENSE COMMISSIONER, ANDRIUS KUBILIUS***

By concentrating the enemy sufficient drones in depth and in a narrow sector of the European drone front, it can be penetrated and overrun from the flank, from the rear, and from deep penetration into the rear, our operational zone. Depending on the drones’ range, payload capacity, and weapon types.

The concept of modern warfare is almost equivalent to hybrid warfare. This would be, according to the US term, fifth-generation warfare. We now approach it with digital and computer methods, using the discrimination and precision of algorithms and electromagnetic radiation and pulse technology—V-generation warfare, hybrid or multifaceted warfare.

The Laser Defense System against drones employs three phases of action: Detection, Location, and Destruction. First, the drone is detected and classified according to its size, speed, and flight path. Once classified, the target is locked onto using tracking mechanisms to maintain precise aiming on the drone. This phase is crucial to ensure that the laser beam remains focused on the target throughout the entire engagement process.

And this model of dialectical confrontation, with an essential component of physical force, requires a holistic, harmonious integration of the available multidisciplinary means with the different objectives, whether simultaneous or successive, that we wish to achieve.

Before now, the endless plains of Poland and Germany could allow Soviet mechanized units, stronger in infantry, to adequately combat in the vast urbanized and industrial areas of the invaded countries. After attack and penetration by shock armies and mobile exploitation groups, they could rapidly advance across them, covering their flanks from any Allied counterattack and reaching the North Sea.

***MARSHAL MICHAIL TUJACHEVSKI’S AND DEEP PENETRATION DOCTRINE.***

In doing so, they broke the cohesion of Allied defensive positions, dispersed heavy defensive fire and its coherence, and disrupted the comprehensive Allied defense direction in Central and Western Europe.

Today, and not so long ago, tactical weapons are «drone swarms,» organized into various types, missions, and aircraft and its own deploy, and operational weapons are «large swarms,» organized into appropriately varied «groups» in its own deploy. Fighters can operate as some of the aerial vehicles deployed to protect the aforementioned tactical and operational weapons.

The need to defend many things (borders, command and communications centers, troop concentrations, weapons and tracked and wheeled vehicle depots, spare parts, ground movements) will literally leave reconnaissance and attack resources at a complete loss. Until the last moment, until the Slavic enemy reveals its objectives through its mobilization and march/attack deployment, the allied «defense swarms» (reconnaissance, drone attacks, and ground forces) will not be able to adequately engage the allied points under attack.

THE END.

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL SURPRISES.

Prolegomenon.

Military surprise is more a part of the art of war and its creation, than of military science, the doctrine, its regulations and the principles or «good-doing» rules of war. Of course, its scope and instruments are taken from military science. Military science has its logic and practice oriented towards applied theory.

Military doctrine forms the framework, the structure, the heart of all development and the wisdom that military science has been developing so far. The military doctrine of each state incorporates the idiosyncracy, history and civilization of the corresponding nation. The permanent virtues and the more temporary values of the former are also reflected in its military doctrine. All this channels it in one direction and one sense.

War art has in its conception and execution the characteristics of: variability; the unusual and singular conception; the different, unexpected and novel application and the relative ingenuity (naturalness and freshness) and freedom in its facts.

If we are guided mainly by military science, which also knows the enemy, the results of the war dialectic will be obtained by maintaining a superiority in men and means, marches and maneuvers. And the cost will be the attrition of means and human wear in a greater proportion and always undue, than with the use of surprise.

Thus, a defence deployed in depth and with sufficient reserves, probably deprives us of many opportunities for effective surprise. But, almost always, acting in the microfield, as using a tactical zoom, we can apply the tactical or operational surprise, unusual and unexpected.

Development.

The surprise becomes specify and materializes in an unexpected action on the enemy by fire and/or shock. That, taking advantage of the enemy’s habitual lack of combat availability, makes him the victim of an attack that he is not in a position to successfully reject.

Obviously, the units in charge of surprise must avoid enemy’s reconnaissance, advanced combat units and security. In charge of giving the units that detached them, enough time to get the combative disposition that allows the rejection of their attacker.

But, the mental surprise must not only be unexpected for the enemy. But, in order to be able to take full advantage of its potential and effects, it must also be unusual, special, infrequent. With an unquestionable tendency to be «unusual», as never seen. This unusual character, never occurred, extraordinarily reinforces the quality of unexpected and sudden use of surprise.

We don’t always have the unusual at hand. And surprise often favors, by employing the law of action, the most mobile and even only the active rival.

Then, the use and manipulation of the “appearances”, the appreciated characteristics of the events and their circumstance, will allow us to establish and develop a new tactical or operational situation. Which will be surprising and unusual for the enemy. And it will give us an unexpected victory, at the beginning of the faced dialectic situation.

A Tactical example with operational trascendence.

Here is an example of an extraordinary force acting as a normal force and, in so doing, completely deceiving the enemy by manipulating appearances of the events.

In January 1943, with the Soviet advance threatening Rostov, the 4^th Panzer Army of colonel general Hoth moved back from its positions on the banks of the Sal and established a defensive line south of the river Manich. Passing through that area were the supply and retreat routes of the 1^st Panzer Army. Routes that had been kept open, if a disaster like that of Stalingrad was to be avoid. In Stalingrad, the Sixth German Army, the Army unit more powerful of the Wehrmatch, was caught. The 4^th Panzer Army was assigned to protect this bottle neck in the communications of the Armies Groups Don.

**General Erich von Manstein, before his capture of the Crimean fortress**

Soon the Soviets reached the confluence of the Manich and Don rivers, took control of the small city of Manutchskaya that was only 30 kilometers from the mouth of the Don on the south bank, and sent advanced detachments in this direction. On January 23, the 11^th panzer division and 16^th infantry division counterattacked the Soviet advance spears and pushed them back to Manutchskaya.

Then, it was vital to restore the south front of the Don and Manich and to expel the Soviets from the city. Which was one of their bridgeheads (which, usually with much skill, could be rapidly reinforces once constituted).

**GENERAL HERMANN BALCK, ONE OF GERMANY’S FINEST TACTI*CIAN***.

The Germans made a direct assault from the southwest on the 24^th, seeking to surprise the Soviets with the operation continuity. Instead, they found that the Soviets had created an antitank front in this entry to the city. Using tanks with their hulls partly buried and distributed between the buildings, along the streets, and in other difficult to see locations.

The 11^th panzer division, a crack division with a magnificent tactician as chief, quickly stopped the assault when it detected the importance of defenses.

On the 25th, the general Hermann Balck initiated an assault on the northeast sector of the city, which the Soviets identified as a main assault, similar to the previous one and following the orthodox criterion of «not insist on unsuccessful or frontal assaults» (not profitable). For it, they moved rapidly theirs antitank means (tanks are the most mobile) to the new threatened sector.

To make credible this assault (manipulation of the appearances), at the beginning the whole divisional artillery was used in its support. It was also the more dangerous direction of assault for the Soviets. Since that part of the city was nearest to the principal bridge over the Manich and its occupation would isolate the Soviet bridgehead on the south bank. These factors constituted the «primary evidences«.

The assault on the north-east sector was probably already considered by the Soviet defense as a German alternative assault and, because of this, they reacted rapidly to what happened.

Infantry half-track vehicles and reconnaissance light tanks executed the principal «virtual» assault, simulating the march of mechanized vehicles, concealed by smoke curtains. And seeking more to hide them from the enemy than to protect their advance. This gave a «secondary evidence» to the credibility of the «appearances«.

When the Soviet’s determination in the new defense was estimated, which confirmed the alteration of its original deployment and the attraction made by the normal «apparent» attack. The bulk of the divisional artillery threw a powerful fire blow on a sector of the southwest zone of the town. A single battery continued to support the ongoing false principal assault.

Most of the tanks of 15^th panzer regiment immediately attacked the forward limit of the defense, entering the town and advancing on its interior. To attack from the rear the new defensive Soviet deployment, especially its tanks. The mechanized German infantry then closed in behind them.

The Soviet resistance crumbled. Its infantry ran to the bridge over the Manich river. But was chased by the 61th motorists battalion.

German casualties in liquidating Manutchskaya’s stronghold were, according to its own sources, one man dead and fourteen injured men. The Soviets had between 500 and 600 casualties and 20 destroyed tanks.

THE DRONES AND THE ENEMY OPERATIONAL ZONE.

The operational zone. Its functions and vulnerabilities.

The operative zone is the geographical space where develops the process of turning the mass of support of the strategic rear (forces, supports, logistics, communications, headquarters) into «units of action» qualified and specialized for its employment in «interfaces of action» with the enemy. These constitute the active points of what can call front, increasingly mobile and discontinuous, due to the dispersion of the forces, its tactical speed and its fire power.

The above mentioned units of action join combined arms groups, which low tactical level is in the habit of being the reinforced battalion or company, that have subsets or elementary units, in the mobile combat.

The critical elements of this zone, which is the physical support of that activity, are the communications of all kinds, the spaces of maneuvers (zones of deployment, of equip, of wait, of advance, provided with covers or desenfilades), the engineers units and of operational reconnaissance, the logistic means (stores, distributions means and zones) and the centers of production of the intelligence and the transmission of the reconnaissances.

The operational zone must have the sufficient geographical depth to be able to contain, supply, deploy, direct and command the sufficient number of units, following the necessary advance or assault spears close to the front, to repeat the efforts in «interfaces of action» and to achieve the tactical aim that in these appears and decides.

In practice a spatial symmetry is in the habit of existing, as general Richard Simpkin indicated, in the operational zones of both contenders, along the supposed constant line of the front. A difference very marked in the depth of a zone, can indicate the tactical weakness of a rival, either by minor resources or by a slower enrollment for the combat of its strategic reserves or military means in general (great strategy or total strategy level).

The reasons for including the engineers troops among the critical elements of the operational zone, reside in its specific fighting functions: they act against the enemy center of gravity; they are very scanty forces for all the tasks that they can fulfill; its action has a great multiplier effect on the enemy effort; they provide other forces engineers’ material for its particular use; they are responsible for the interceptions and reinforced cuts on the area and the most effective obstructions: antitank stable positions, minefields and more elaborated fortifications. With it they affect gravely the effective effort of our capacity of movement as operational system.

The functional mentioned elements of the operational zone are highly vulnerable. In effect, they lack enough nearby capacity of defense (including the infantry antitank, though they are of support), that is usually is limited to the security elements detached by the units and the centers and that, though it is circular, they are of punctual type in its positioning. If there takes place the destruction or the breaking up of these functional critical elements, which act as a connected and interdependent net of an alone seam. Generating the affected elements “commotion waves” for all it and this will affect exponentially the functionality of the operational rear, making it finally collapse.

Deprived the enemy action units in its active points of the front, of its operational zone, which qualifies, supports and stimulates them, the survival of the whole front sector affected is impossible after a time, for exhaustion or consumption. Likewise, the moral effects of the ungrateful surprise and the loss of the expectations precipitate the collapse of its front more rapidly yet. Its forces will tend to move back towards its deep rear, to protect the functional elements that allow them to operate tactically.

And, what about of the capacity of combat of deployed units in the operational zone, being prepared to operate in this front sector or in contiguous one? Can they defend the functional elements of its operational zone? Can they counterattack the enemy penetration?

We must remember that any military group, from a tank crew up to an army, passes most of its time, neither deployed nor prepared to fight. Its time passes doing labors and operations that allow it to go to fight in the chosen moment.

Whether training, embarking, moving, equipping, supplying, reorganizing, waiting, or resting, no unit is fully combat-ready. It is precisely in the operational zone where units prepare to conduct their operations against the enemy. Even if this is a tactical march, «pushing» a flexible and discontinuous front with weak combat readiness on the part of the enemy.

For the defense of the operational zone, we can only rely on the ready operational reserves and the deeper tactical reserves, both located in that sector or in adjacent ones.

The support mass is the set of military assets that converge in the theater or campaign. Its means of action is stability and is governed by the «management» of senior commanders. This is based on defined processes and standards, which are stable over long periods of time, which give it the necessary predictability of the desired effects of its action. They maintain and demonstrate the cohesion and the functionality of these military structures and hyperstructures.

At the army group level, the support mass extends from the forward limit of the defensive position to 300-500 km in own depth and with a width of approximately 300 km.

Towards the 75-100 km zone, the support mass hyperstructure disaggregates into the most active structures and microstructures, which constitute the operational and tactical units. These will operate in the “fields of action” and at the “interfaces of action” with the enemy, up to approximately 150-250 km in depth. To this end, they will follow operational-tactical combat and maneuver procedures, guided by the criteria of decentralization, exploitation of opportunities, surprise, counterattacks, enemy gaps, etc., and governed by the superior intent and its center of gravity, all of which are specific to the structures and microstructures active with the enemy.

(to be continued).

THE WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN. An apocalyptic war? Second Part.

(Continuation)

The Shiites had neither the means nor the organization to dominate in the territories where they abounded. Thus, Shiism, almost always a demographic minority, assumes a fatalistic, passive attitude, even causing physical suffering because of it.

The Shiites are waiting for the return of the missing Imam (caliph). Imam is the name given to the political-religious leaders in Shiism.

The Shiite Doctrine, application and reality.

The Shiite Historiography, Mythology or Sacred History can be summarized as follows:

The missing caliph Imam of the Shiites will come as “Al-Mahdi” (the Guided by Allah) at a given moment in history, to make the orthodox Umma (Muslim Community) (the Shiites) triumph in the world for a long period.

It is said that up to a millennium on Earth, before being taken individually to one of the heavens of Islam. There are seven heavens, in the last of which is Abraham, father of the Semites, who is visited daily by about 50 thousand angels of Allah.

Unlike the Sunnis, the Shiites soon established a Muslim clergy. In charge of guiding the people and maintaining the “ideological orthodoxy” of the Ummah.

There is no theology in Islam. Because Allah is unfading, incomprehensible, unreachable for men. And, that of father, father, nothing. Islam is unconditional submission to Allah. They only reach Insha’Allah, “may God will it.”

The core of the Shiite ideology is in Qom, Iran. Which is, saving all the inevitable differences, like a “Vatican.” Here there are Grand Ayatollahs, Ayatollahs and Khilafatlahs, decreasing in hierarchical order. And, there is no systematic correspondence between the degrees of study in Islamic sciences and the ranking of the different titles in Governance.

During the long civil war in Syria, the Israelites bombed Hezbollah units on more than one and two occasions, who were fighting there for Bashar al-Assad, the Alawite doctor president. They did not carry out precision attacks, to volatilize a specific target.

After the latter type of attack used against Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, the main leader of Hezbollah for many years, the Most Supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, threatened a total war against Israel, calling for the union of Islam for this. And, he had an AK rifle at his side.

But, as stated before, Shiism will never win a total war. Its importance and capacity in the Muslim world prevents it. And, for this to happen, the missing caliph, as al-Mahdi, must come and lead him to inevitable triumph on Earth for a Millennium. First Essential Contradiction.

Another essential contradiction is that Allah gave the Muslims, as weapons to fight against the idolaters and the Jews, the spear, the mace, the sword and the bow and arrows. So that they could conquer their lands of Dar-al-Islam. Where Islam governs and practices its religion in complete freedom and dominion.

And, with them, they conquered in one century from Persia (Sassanid Empire) to Spain, almost all the lands of the Sunni Caliphate. In successive, triumphant and astonishing campaigns.

Incorporating the conquered regions into the caliphate, without persecuting the inhabitants. The administrative link with new power was the payment of a variable tax for practicing another religion. This linked the inhabitants with the Muslim garrison of the area and with the cadi, caid or governor. In some cases, the Sakat or Muslim canonical alms was higher than the tax on the infidels.

On November 1, 630, the Prophet triumphantly entered Mecca, suppressing the idolatry that reigned before Islam (defended by the ruling caste) and the Kaaba, the sacred stone, was transformed into a center of Muslim piety. It will be the point where the Muslim faithful will direct their five daily prayers of Salat. The most devout travel with their prayer mat and some tablets, where they calculate the coordinates of the point where they are, to orient themselves well in the direction of Mecca. Before, the Muslims were oriented towards Jerusalem, but the hostile behavior of the Jews made Muhammad change the geographical direction of the Salat.

In 632, Muhammad died in Medina, the city of the Prophet. In 711, they invaded the Iberian Peninsula, most of which was already conquered in 726. In 732, the Muslim were defeat at Poitiers by the forces of Charles Martell who thwarted the attempt to expand in the West.

And, now in 2023 and 2024, the the Shiites and their irregular allies are constantly using ballistic and free-flying rockets against the Jews. And they are not winning.

And now we are entering the realm of the “possible imaginative.”

Among the clergy of Qom, may arise the temptation, among the youngest, most prepared and ambitious, to force al-Mahdi to come. And to enter into the invincible spiral of victory. They would be toying with the idea that by militarily raiding Tel Aviv they would put themselves at the head of Islam.

Islam was great and powerful, according to them, when it carried out the Minor Jihad: spreading Islam by arms. Also, the Sunni Turks think that the Sublime Porte was only strong and prosperous during the long periods when it was fighting with the Europeans for control of the Mediterranean and Central Eastern Europe.

The Khomeini revolution had already given the Shiites a boost and an influence, then unthinkable, among the nostalgic, young and/or bellicose Muslims.

There is a hypnotic (mesmeric) attraction for the Iranian leaders, in the hidden, unspoken, and unrevealed part of politics and religion, that “That” would be the wake-up call to the hidden al-Mahdi, so that he would reappear and lead his Shiite faithful in the triumph of Islam at the Culmination of History.

The End.

Weapons and their Defenses in the History. First Part.

Introduction.

Throughout history, supposed war rivals have perfected their weapons, Techniques, and Tactics to defeat an enemy who violently opposes the achievement of their objectives.

In the Beginning,

The strongman appeared with a large stick or club, coming after his neighboring rival. At one point, the latter, who was practically a weakling, hid in a bush by the side of the road. When the strongman passed by, confident and well-equipped, he waited for him to leave his back free and attacked him on an unprotected «essential vulnerability.» The «big man» fell lifeless to the ground. History doesn’t say what happened to the two characters in the fable.

When the number of members of the two factions increased enormously, they instinctively sought to group together, so they could attack and defend themselves much better.

At first, there was a relatively large group, and soon the focus was on organizing and utilizing the group. And the phalanx was born, a wall of twelve or sixteen ranks of men armed with long spears or pikes, extending several ranks ahead, well-trained in their combined handling at close range. They were protected by a large shield and pieces of metal or heavy leather on the chest, head (helmet), arms, and legs.

In ancient Greece, the Spartans refined the tactical instrument of the phalanx to the fullest.

No one was as trained and protected as they were. And their society accepted and honored their militari ethos, embodied in the phalanx. Spartan mothers would tell their sons, phalangist hoplites, to «return with the shield or on the shield.» There was no quartermaster or medical care, properly speaking. And mothers instilled in their sons the warrior social mentality of their society.

But, behold, the right wing of the phalanx was less protected than the left. This was due to the way the men naturally protected their left flanks with their shields.

And at Leuctra, around 344 BC, Sparta, with a majority of its forces (10,000 men), set out to crush Thebes (6,000 men). Unaware that its phalanx model had changed,

Epaminondas and his pair, Pelopidas, had introduced the «oblique order» into their Theban phalanx. On their left wing, they deployed a greater number of forces, and the best of them. Among them, a phalanx formed by homosexual couples, which they called the «Sacred Band.»

They also refused to employ their center and right wings, as is typical of the oblique order. Perhaps the heightened sensitivity of homosexuals, which is said to be present in the Theban homosexual leaders, may have influenced their sharpness and refinement.

On the Spartan right wing was the commander of all their forces. This was thus the «core of their resistance.» And this was battered and beaten by the Theban forces on their left wing. And then appeared the «Caedes,» the slaughter and the finish of the vanquished.

From afar, the Spartans on their center and left were also affected by the defeat and the damage to the hoplites on their right wing. And they began to retreat, without having been defeated by weapons.

A year after Leuctra, Epaminondas was touring the Peloponnese peninsula, commanding forces of the newly formed Arcadian League. And he appeared in front of the city of Sparta, within whose sight, it was said, enemy forces had never appeared.

Phalanxes were too large to be able to move freely and quickly against the enemy. They acted as a «dam» of Force against Force, where surprise, skill, and flexibility could not exist. Another characteristic of their technical rigidity is that they had to fight on flat terrain, at least without undulations or obstacles such as rocky outcrops or patches of trees and bushes, which broke their structural continuity.

Rome meets the Greek phalanxes.

The Romans had a military structure based on the legion, as a large operational unit, of about 5,000 men. The legions were made up of maniples or, much later, cohorts, small tactical units capable of moving and maneuvering on the battlefield, gaining the flexibility, skill, and surprise that phalanxes lacked. And their centurions, one to the right and one to the left of the first row of the maniple, and their officers were capable of leading them individually.

At the Battle of Pydna, in June 168 BC, a battle took place between the Romans led by Aemilius Paullus and the Macedonian Perseus. The Macedonian phalanx vigorously attacked the Roman formation of two legions and forced it back toward the fortified Roman camp. However, the terrain was uneven and somewhat rocky, and as it advanced, the phalanx lost its solidity and integrity.

***A MOMENT AND A PLACE OF THE BATTLE OF PIDNA.***

Seeing this, Paulus gave orders to the maniples (centurions) to act independently on the enemy phalanx. The centurions then took command. The maniples advanced and began to take advantage of the smallest gap in the enemy’s pseudo-compact formation to introduce their men there.

They began wreaking havoc with their gladius (somewhat short Roman swords, prepared for close combat) on the defenseless flanks of the Macedonian hoplites, armed with long pikes.

Soon, Aemilius Paullus launched the Second Legion against the center of the enemy line. It shuddered and finally gave way. The Greek spearmen were now nothing more than a hindrance, both in fighting and defending. The Roman legionaries vigorously launched themselves into the attack. And then came the Caedes, the massacre, the collapse of the formation into a shapeless mass, terrified and fleeing individually.

When the sun set, Paulus halted exploiting his success. The death toll showed one hundred Romans and twenty thousand Macedonians had finally fallen.

The Mongols threaten Central and Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongols, nomadic tribes from the interior of Asia, who dominated mounted combat and had a very elaborate and simple military organization, appeared for the first time on the borders of eastern Europe.

Their logistics were simple and involved supplying on the ground they trod, following the broad pastures as they advanced, each rider carrying several mounts with him.

The Mongols started from their strategic zone, defined by the «advance and location» of their nomadic settlements, their yurts or nomadic houses, pulled by oxen, never observed or suspected by their enemies, and reached the tactical zone with them. Their operations did not require the physical and mental support of the operational zone, the transition for the forces and their support between the strategic and tactical zones.

***A RECREATION OF SUBUDAI BAHADUR, THE GREATEST MONGOLIAN STRATEGIST.***

In front of the discontinuous front of their enemy positions (cities), there is a wide, unprotected, and empty area, uncontrolled by anyone, which the Mongols make the most of for their operational approach. Their enemies, the feudal heavy cavalry forces and their infantry spearmen and archers, maintain nothing resembling advanced detachments, which make mobility reconnaissance and repel the Mongol advance parties of reconnaissance and combat.

The Mongols’ concern toward the enemy was generally strategic, considering their «exposed flanks» at the level of the «occupied» countries. This concern stemmed from their always small numbers for the objectives entrusted or sought.

And from the real tactical no invincibility of their forces, if they encountered an organized, skilled, and, above all, calm enemy.

In 1221, after conquering the Muslim Empire of Samarkand, located between the Syr Darya and Amur Darya rivers, Genghis Khan systematically plundered Afghanistan. His son Tilui slaughtered most of the inhabitants of northern Persia. With no possible live enemies on their strategic flank, they protected the southern flank of the Mongol Empire.

(To be continued)

Russia and its Super Hypersonic Ballistic Missiles

Introduction.

Russia, the predatory Empire, which sells raw materials, oil, natural gas, electricity, rare minerals, and buys and copies technologies of all kinds and more sophisticated goods and maintains an incomplete Armed Forces. In 2024, they totaled some 900 thousand active troops.

The structure of these has an immediate officialdom, Junior Officials and Officers, in charge of carrying out the orders of the battalion commander. The orders of the battalion commanders are received from their brigade commanders (general brigadier), where the operational action of the forces is specified: making the tactical actions of the subordinate forces have a transcendence, an already operational importance, in the «higher plans».

The non-commissioned officers, corporals and sergeants, rise from the troops, from among the most active, experts and, perhaps, loyal. There are no non-commissioned officer academies in Russia, which would prepare them for their duties in the ranks. And these “classes” (the non-commissioned officers) are the ones that accompany, inspire and directly command the soldiers in all kinds of military operations.

The troops see them “as one of their own, not necessarily always the best.” And they consider this promotion to be their merit, distinguishing them from the troops. The officers, in turn, maintain their training status, command and prerogatives.

It is difficult to find here the weft and the plot for the forces of an army to always function in harmony, efficiency, training and professionalism.

We exclude the Rocket and Space Forces, Special Forces, Engineers and part of the Artillery and Armored Forces. They are an elite that boasts of it. And, on which Russia and its ruling class depend for its survival.

Valery Gerasimov is the Chief of the General Staff. And, in view of the successes that Russian soldiers were achieving in their combats and other operations in Ukraine, Putin also appointed him Chief of the Special Military Operation Forces in Ukraine. And, practically, Valery disappeared from the sight of the public and journalists.

A Chief must have his Advanced Command Posts so close to the active enemy, that it facilitates the leadership of the Chief.

During the Polish-Soviet War, from February 1919 to March 1921, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Chief of the Red Army in the Field, had his command post in Kyiv, 500 km from the Front. And, Jozef Pilsidski, the Polish Supreme Commander, continually visited his divisions on the Warsaw front, half surrounded by the Reds. The Reds acted like an Asian horde, living off the territory they trampled, for their vital human needs. Suddenly, Pilsudski counterattacked and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army retreated to Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania.

There are four stages in the trajectory of offensive missiles in which an anti-missile system could act.

They could be destroyed in flight in the atmosphere (even over enemy territory), shortly after their launch. The smoke trail that the engine throws out and the burning flames that accompany it can be detected immediately by satellites and reconnaisance aircraft.

Some attacking missiles could be altered in their trajectory by the strong and punctual action of an electromagnetic field, which acts on their control and guidance device. And it can do so throughout the post-launch stage.

Once fragmented or not, active warheads with multiple ogives, when the targets are already close, can be acted upon, by following final ballistic trajectories. These are easily calculated by the defense against aircraft (DCA).

In the final phase of flight, both missiles and their active multiple warheads can be intercepted by friendly missiles and aircraft, during descent or approach to their target.

An interested perceptive reader can already glimpse the crux.

One of the most important effective factors of the defense system is the Time of Arrival at the Enemy Target.

Current combat systems work up to speeds of Match 3, perhaps 4, more than 3700 km/h.

The Oreshnik (Hazel) 9M729 attack missile, launched from the Kapustin Yar cosmodrome in the Astrakhan region, reached the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, on the Dnieper River.

The Russians (Putin) wanted to show clearly what they have.

We must keep in mind that propaganda tends to deceive the enemy as best as possible. One way is by magnifying real, possible and uncertain successes.

The Hazel weighs about 50 tons and its approximate theoretical speed is Match 11, more than 13,500 km/hour. It is not an intercontinental missile, because its characteristics make it difficult to make a parabolic journey as short as the one in fact (Kapustin Yar-Dnipro).

Short-range missiles, up to 500 km, are considered part of reactive or rocket artillery and their attack operations zones are in the enemy tactical zone and in its operational rear. Here the enemy units reform and recompose, rest, supply themselves, advance to occupy combat positions or retreat towards their operational rear in that sector of the front. And, here there are almost no Units in Combat Readiness, for the defense of those areas.

Apparently, the Hazel is capable of carrying 6 submissiles, each of which would carry up to 6 attack warheads, with or without nuclear charge. The Hazel would fly at an impossible speed for the defense against aircraft (DCA) to work with. Because, simply, the data from radars, detection aircraft, would arrive already outmatched, no aircraft or missile of its own could reach and destroy it. It would be like the fox seeing and reaching the Road Runner.

In the Beginning it was the long range. The great enemies were the United States versus China and Russia. Both groups of enemies being geographically far away. The Europeans were stammering in the military nuclear field.

But everything evolves. France, Great Britain and Germany, the latter with its American military bases, were and could be, at first, effective aviation bases with nuclear capabilities.

Russia realized this and began to prepare its medium-range nuclear warhead missiles, capable of destroying nuclear vectors in Western Europe and attacking factories and logistics hubs and cities on the subcontinent.

This was achieved by vectors with a range of 500 km to 5,500 km. A new field of military air operations was born, unthinkable a few decades ago.

It soon became necessary for everyone to control and regulate medium-range vectors. On December 8, 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, which stopped the proliferation of these weapons.

But on 02/01/2019, under Trump, the United States suspended the Treaty, accusing Russia of continuing to test-launch this type of medium-range missile. The next day, Russia also abandoned the Treaty.

And a new battlefield was left open, messy and unfinished.

The Soviet Union is “no longer that”. The Russian Federation is a corrupt and backward country, to which a market economy has been applied. Its military industry is quite suited to its interests.

The Hazel supposedly has a range of 6000 km, which puts it squarely in the category of an intermediate or medium-range missile. And its capabilities crown it as the “Queen of the Party”.

How much does it cost? How many Hazels can they manufacture in a given period of time? Will they dare to use it with atomic nuclear warheads? Do they all work equally well? Is there reproducibility in the manufacturing series? These are fission bombs with a capacity of “tens of thousands of kilotons” of destruction.

Quite sufficient, quite sufficient.

THE WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN. An apocalyptic war? First Part.

Introduction.

We have before us, face to face, the two most dangerous and extraordinary rivals that exist on Earth. They are the Jews or Israelites and the Shiite Islamists.

What gives them similarity? Both have a strong religiosity, resistant to anything, which is part of their identity and the essence of their life.

The Jews or Israelites.

The Jews are a small people, who have survived the vicissitudes of History in a truly unique and special way: persecutions, pogroms, genocides, collective exiles, attempts at religious assimilation, collective guilt received, deportations.

According to their ideology, they are the people Chosen by God to guard and carry through History the Plan of Yaweh for Humanity. They hold, treasure the promises of God to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses. This is where their merit, stamp and superiority are consecrated.

The Israelites have deviated from this many times, but Yahweh‘s anger has always been appeased. Among other things, because God needs them to complete his plan for men. Yahweh has been sending his warners, messengers or prophets to correct them, and he has punished them collectively with exiles, famines, nomadism, a sign that it was the people who had turned away from Him.

For the sons of Israel, God is not a Father. This is implausible. God is a “Great and Powerful Creator Lord”, with all the characteristics in superlative. He leads them along his paths, rewards and punishes them. He made them at his image and likeness; but that does not mean that God has eyes, ears, legs and hands. And, He is Loving with all his creatures.

Only Christians see and feel in God a Father, in Jesus a Brother Redeemer and in the Spirit, the Guide and Consoler of their earthly life, gently and serenely.

This belonging gives the Israelites a reassuring security. They are not proselytizers, they do not seek to spread their religion to others, even to their foreign cohabitants. The others do not belong to the people of God and have nothing to do with Salvation. This is the marrow, the central essence and the core of everything.

This gives the Israelites an unprecedented, solid and secure courage in the face of a terrifying Nuclear War. Which Israel, from the start, does not seek, nor desire. They advance in the battles, without worrying about the greater number of enemies, because Jahweh Fights at their Side.

If God wants it will happen and they will be taken by the angels to Jahweh, at the culmination of History.

The Shiite Muslims.

There is a great ideological and practical difference between Sunnism and Shiism.

The latter feels persecuted, because of the dynastic orthodoxies (it defends the rights of the Prophet’s family to lead Islam) and ideological orthodoxies (it admits fewer sources of revelation, limiting the Hadiths, the sayings and deeds of the Prophet, by their origin – who communicated them- and line of transmission), which the Shiites proclaim and defend.

A’isha, the third and most cultured of the Prophet’s wives, would have been a caliph if she were a man, and Ali, cousin, son-in-law, husband of Fatima, the favorite daughter of Mohammed, are the two main and reputable creators of Hadith for Sunnis and Shiites. They begin like this: I saw…; I heard…; I knew… and the successive transmitters are also added. This chain guarantees the traceability of the hadith.

Omar, the second caliph after Abu Bakr, worked to purify and organize the Hadiths and the texts of the Khoran.

The schism of Islam was consolidated on October 10, 680, when the troops of Yazid, the second Umayyad caliph, defeated and killed Hussein Ben Ali, grandson of Mohammed, in the battle of Kerbala, in Iraq. The total number of casualties on both sides in the decisive battle of Kerbala was seventy.

The supporters of Hussein “son of Ali” (that is, Ben Ali, pronounced in English as Bin Ali. And then we call him as we hear his name, Bin Ali), were called in Arabic shi’at Ali, in short, Shi’is.

Everyone knows, from the displays on the news, the rituals of self-flagellation that devout men practice on certain Iraqi Shiite holidays.

A powerful reason for this sense of sorrow and suffering may be the great demographic inferiority of the Shiites. 90% of Muslims are Sunnis, who occupy the Holy Places of Islam and are spread throughout the world. Of the remaining 10%, the vast majority is Shiite, more than 86%, and the rest corresponds to small fractions, such as the Alawites of Syria, the Turkish dervishes. All of the latter are “heresy within the heresy” for Sunni Muslims.

In effect, the Shiites are like an island (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, which are bordering and with a majority only in Iran and Iraq) surrounded on all sides by the ocean of the Sunnis.

(To be continued)

Yahya Sinwar: Is Him The Last Gazan Warlord?

Introduction.

The Israelis had the following strategic tasks for their invasion of the Palestinian Gaza Strip on Sunday, October 8, 2023:

Ensuring that Israel will not be attacked from the Gaza Strip again.

Organizing the political and administrative structure of the Strip and its peaceful and stable functioning.

Destroying (incapacitating) the capabilities of the Command and Structure and the militancy of Hamas.

That this terrorist organization, whose statutes state that the Palestinians occupy from the river (the Jordan) to the great sea (the Mediterranean) as their national land, will not again be a vital threat to Israel.

Development and means.

Israel has killed about 40 thousand Palestinians so far, according to Hamas sources, which are the least prestigious and least credible. And it has not yet achieved any of its important or secondary objectives. For example, eliminating the entire senior leadership of Hamas.

The tasks of artillery, as the heavy fire of an army, are, in ascending order of enemy annihilation: Blind, Disrupt, Neutralize and Destroy.

The last task is almost impossible to achieve. Because, the same debris produced by the first artillery fire or aircraft bombs, increases the chances of shelter and of creating ambushes and defensive positions by the attacked.

In the Plans for heavy fire support of ground units, normal and reactive artillery, heavy anti-tank defense, short and medium range rockets and ground support aircraft are included and intervened.

Normally it is impossible to kill or physically injure all the enemy. This may have been an impossible goal, sought by Israel in the first moments of the war. In the midst of the incapacitating intoxication of anger, pain, revenge and fear. When the Israelis found themselves in the middle of a strong and selective attack in their rather deep (operational) rear. That was not detected in any of its preparations and operational phases by the Mossad and other agencies, nor was it repelled, once it was launched, starting with the small garrisons of the IDF in the southeast and east of Israel, around the Strip.

If the objectives were more ambitious and provided with more resources, by the Hamas leadership (presidency and 3 vice-presidencies, with their advisors), and admitting the non-maintenance of the objectives occupied by Hamas, Israel would have been in serious military danger due to the damage to its rear military structures. The following could be attacked: military airports; land transport parks; obstructed roads and occupied or destroyed crossings; fuel depots; command and transmission centers; communication networks; arsenals…

The functions of the Hamas Structure.

The central structure of Hamas is made up of an external presidency (located outside the Palestinian territories) and three vice-presidencies. The Gaza one, under Yahya Sinwar‘s command, is the most influential in the organizational chart. Another is in the West Bank, operationally superimposed on the Palestine recognized by the UN, which is the Palestinian National Authority, based in Ramallah. The presidency and the other vice-presidency are abroad.

The president of Hamas was Ismael Haniyeh, who has just been sacrificed in an allegedly Israeli attack in Tehran. When Haniyeh was attending the takeover of the new Iranian president.

As a general rule, recently broken, Israel has the habit of not claiming responsibility for any attempt or attack on the enemy.

The importance that Sinwar has for Hamas in its organization and in decision-making, makes him surely the successor of the late president of Hamas. He will be in charge of making military and political decisions for Hamas. And in how to carry out the war and its objectives and in the difficult negotiations with Israel.

The liquidator missile entered precisely the room where Haniyeh was, protected by the Revolutionary Guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the Ideological Army of Iran. It is capable of protecting few within its borders. The precision in time and place of Haniyeh‘s Personal Data confirms that the Israelis have access to relevant information at the highest level in Iran.

And, it is in charge of developing the pro-Iranian revolutionary movements in the different countries of South-West Asia. Regardless of whether religiously they were of another belief or variety within Islam. Thus, they support Hamas, which is Sunni. In these activities, General Qassem Sulemaini, head of the al-Quds Brigades of the Revolutionary Guard, in charge of special actions outside Iran, where he entered at the age of 18, stood out with his own and shining light. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, referring to him: «He is a son to me, I am a father to him.»

One handicap Sinwar has is that his usual effective hiding place is the military tunnel networks that run through the Gaza Strip. They are a defining structure for rigid defense (without giving up space to the attacker, normally) and in depth against a modern and highly motivated mechanized army. But, this network does not facilitate external communications for executives and military personnel.

Another great difficulty for Sinwar to be the supreme leader of Hamas and to be able to negotiate with Israel and live, is that he was the Main Responsible and Theoretician (of what he wanted to be done; he always dresses in civilian clothes) of the treacherous, cruel and disproportionate military attack on the south and southeast of Israel on Saturday, October 7th.

From Gaza, the militiamen left, trained to the point of sufficiency, in models and assemblies, which matched and resembled the fighting terrains in Israel. Which they would find in their deliberate, calculated, known attack. Which they would launch with precision on the south and southeast of Israel.

And, the Hamas irregulars returned to Gaza victorious, after killing more than 1,200 Israelis, soldiers from small posts, civilians from villages and kibbutzim (group, in Hebrew), young people having fun at a popular concert and capturing and taking as hostages some 250 Israelis and foreigners of Jewish affiliation, men, women, children and the elderly. They had the characteristics indicated by the Hamas leadership in Gaza; if they are weak and die quickly, they lose them.

And, little by little, the political-military leadership of Hamas is cut down by the determination, the motivation and the intensity and permanence of the Israeli operations. Especially, the occupation and clearing of the territories and tunnels of Gaza.

The Tactical Maneuver in the Defense.

Introduction.

The spirit of mobile defense is ingrained in forward detachments. They fight the enemy using mobility, surprise, harassment, opportunity and local and punctual superiority, depending on the case. And, whose fight is always framed in the probable transfer of space to the enemy. Maneuver always presides over his tactical behavior.

This “active spirit” that animates and inspires the units that fight in front of the defense positions, must animate, or, at least, not be neglected or forgotten by the units that occupy them.

The defense must not only cling to its fortified or improved positions, to carry out the effective rejection of the enemy attack, through its precise, decisive and opportune fire.

Development of the Fight.

At least part of the defense forces, depending on the missions, the possible opportunities, the battlefields, their own capabilities and that of the enemy, must be trained and emotionally prepared to carry out tactical movements, to more effective and timely defense positions.

For example, carrying out from another support point, with part of its garrison, a local counter-shock against a partial penetration, not yet consolidated, achieved by part of the attacker. Enemy break-in that closely threatens another support point, preferably in the same defense sector.

If we make a delay defense, staffs from other delay points will make larger and more definitive tactical maneuvers. In the former, when a delay point is in danger of being surpassed or overwhelmed by an enemy attack, it must release and withdraw. Generally, by successive jumps, to the rear or to another delay point in the mobile defense by forward detachments. Where they should be received, to facilitate their new deployment in the location.

These delay points would be supported by a natural obstacle, a height, a river, etc. Delay points should never be deployed on the forward slope; seeking, for example, to open fire on the enemy at maximum distances. On the other hand, observatories and resistance nests should be placed on the forward slope or on the military ridge. The delay point will be deployed well down the back slope.

Use of tactical reserves.

Own reserves, concentrated at the end of the infantry zone or at the front of the artillery zone, as part of the defense, will also carry out marches and attacks, that is, maneuvers, in their tactical zone. That they will be, perhaps, more complicated in their deployments, unfolding and opportunities. To attack, from starting points in one’s own depth, the enemy forces that have broken through. Or, that are stopped in front of the defense zone.

The critical moment for the reserve counter-attack will be: when the enemy has passed the “culminating point” of his attack; is quite weak and is disorganized (loss of cohesion). The fire of the own artillery and of the nearby support points, those affected by the enemy attack, must also harass, neutralize the attacker.

These attacks by a combined arms reserve from depth, taking advantage of their mechanical mobility, and attacking on the enemy’s flanks and/or rearguard, are very effective for active tactical defense of friendly forces.

Heterodox applications of good working in Defense. And, if you want to be perfect…

Even, many times, with an unexpected Maneuver and, better yet, if it is also unusual, an enemy can be upset, confused and frightened. If he is governed by military more orthodox and serious canons and norms.

A premature withdrawal and, obviously, with cession of space, can mislead and disturb the enemy. Or, boost his self-esteem and greed and lure him into a dangerous chase.

A favorite Tactic of the Mongols, especially effective when their enemy was longing for the encounter or more confident of success, for reasons of sheer initial numerical superiority, was the «mangudai«. It consisted in the fact that an «army» corps of the Mongols, inferior to the enemy, seriously engaged in the fight. Its size was large enough for the Mongol effort to be considered significant.

With this, they were going to mentally attract the enemy and separate him from any other thought.

***BATTLE OF LIEGNITZ, SILESIA, POLAND***

After a hard battle, the sheer weight of the enemy forced the Mongol corps back. What was a tactical withdrawal, never disorderly, was taken by the enemy for an exploitable defeat, a rout.

His total and permanent ignorance of the Mongols did not make him suspect anything. And his desire for victory, increased by the real effort made in combat, did not let him see beyond.

The promising pursuit ended by scattering the close and solid formations of the enemy horsemen. At one point in the pursuit, always far from the rest of the waiting enemy forces, the bulk of the Mongol heavy cavalry emerged, hidden, fresh, and thrown into the shock. Which ended up breaking up the disjointed cavalry groups, into which the pursuers had scattered. After a real hunt, the enemy forces remaining in the initial positions in the battle either dispersed or were in turn attacked by the whole Mongol force.

We will now quote a special case of how the mental and moral dialectic of the two opposing commands, the given circumstances and the development of defense and attack, led to an incredible result of the faced battle.

Chu Ko Liang ordered Wei Yen and other generals to gather their forces and march east. He, waiting for news, stayed in Yanh Ping with 10 thousand men to defend the city.

His rival Ssu Ma I said to himself: «Chu Ko Liang is in the city, his forces are small, his position is weak, his generals and officers have lost courage.»

For his part, Chu Ko Liang was calm and confident. He ordered to remove the army banners and silence the drums. He forbade the soldiers to leave the city. And then, opening its four gates, he spread out his men in small groups through the streets of Yanh Ping.

20 "Chino Kongming Chu ko Tres Reinos Zhuge Liang Zhu ge Sabiduría Estatua|statue| - AliExpress — **Chu Ko Liang** ***idealized***

Informed Ssu Ma I of the existing situation, he feared a prepared ambush. The «appearances» had done damage to his courage, discernment and reason. And hastily he retreated with his larger army to the northern mountains.

Chu Ko Liang explained to his commanding general, «Ssu Ma I believed that I was laying a trap for him and fled to the foot of the mountain range.»

When Ssu Ma I learned later all that had happened, he was overwhelmed with disappointment and disgust.

An opera has even been written about this Chinese war episode.

Well, but what you are telling us seems to be something very special and very difficult to repeat. And, as if from other times of fear and superstition.

Now see you an almost similar case. Only more modern. And, where all the maneuvers and combats are in sight. But, its result is just as spectacular, unexpected and incredible. Than the previous one, taken as «unusual and difficult to repeat».

Battle of Cowpens — ***(Washington’s cavalry attacked on the other flank.)***

On January 17, 1781, the 45 year old American General Daniel Morgan engaged in a small battle in Cowpens the English regular forces of 27 year old Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. Both had similar contingents but 2/3 of Morgan’s around 1,000 men belonged to American territorial militias.

These troops were at risk of shock in face of the force of the regular troops, whose use of bayonets in close combat would terrify them. The militia men were better than normal shooters, being hunters, and had great personal initiative, but they lacked training in close fighting.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence. 2nd Part.

Books and experience are always neglected.

So, why did Hamas attack the villages, cooperatives and small military posts in central and southern Israel with an unleashed and ferocious venom and hatred in the early hours of Saturday, October 7, 2023 until the next day, when they withdrew or were evicted.

***YAHYA SINWAR, HAMAS’ HIGH POLITICAL COMMAND IN GAZA. HE IS MORE PROBABLY EXILED IN EGYPT.***

Because we don’t learn from books, because we are not born with experience and, what is worse, we have to earn it hard way. And, ultimately, because history repeats itself and you have to be very special to learn from the experience of others. Although, reasoning, we understand it well!!

But, there are those who believe that reasoning is the way or means to make a mistake with Conviction.

No guerrilla is harmless or irrelevant.

It is now worth dedicating a few paragraphs to a guerrilla “liberation conflict”, which could not win its war. But he managed to bring the conflict to a situation of impasse, stalemate, lack of commitment and loss of interest from his metropolis.

Where neither of the two combatants could militarily defeat the other. But, where the guerrillas could endure more time in arms than their metropolis. And time did not wear them down politically or socially. The British government was harassed by its people and by international public opinion to end the war. And, therefore, to give independence to its small colony in the eastern Mediterranean.

In 1925, Great Britain gave “colony” status to the small island of Cyprus, of Greek descent. Whose natives had “the illusion and identity purpose” of uniting socially and politically with Greece, in a political process called “Enosis”.

The Cypriots were good, rough and simple people, mostly peasants and without any military training. In 1955, Cyprus had about 550 thousand inhabitants and the island had only about 9,282 km2 of surface.

Its terrain did not offer special advantages in a guerrilla war. It has two mountainous areas, the Olympau and the Pentadaktilau, which are passable by paved roads everywhere by motor vehicles.

On the other hand, it does not have large and/or dense forests that host guerrilla bases that are welcoming, restorative, protective, and quiet. Where to indoctrinate the people and prepare for the combats and recover from them.

At the beginning of his war to liberate China, in the 1930s, Mao Ze Dong also declared that “a guerrilla focus needed to begin deep within a large country to prosper.” At the beginning of the communist rebellion, at the end of the 1920s, when he and the communists were even, the Kuomintang Chinese Army gave them a hard time and, in addition, Chiang Kai Shek was advised by German soldiers.

Finally, in October 1934, the communists left southern China and moved on a 12,500 km Great or Long March. and 370 days to Yenan, in the distant province of SiangXi, fighting along the way. Where 8,500 guerrillas and families arrived in October 1935, of the 150 thousand who left their crushed bases in southern China.

They were that disaster or annihilation.

Tactical Tables and Strategic Victory of Guerrillas.

From Nicosia, English troops can be transported by motor vehicle to any part of Cyprus within two hours. For the evacuation of the wounded or the transport of a patrol (a team or section), the English already had helicopters.

The limited size of the island allowed the English to thoroughly attack any part of it and at any time of the year.

In the early 1950s, Georgios Grivas, a retired colonel in the Greek Army, carried out a personal reconnaissance of Cyprus, to assess the possibilities of waging a guerrilla war against British domination of his homeland. In 1954, at the age of 56, he moved to the island, where he organized and led the E.O.K.A. ((Cypriot National Struggle Organization), using the code name “Dighemis”. The fighting began on April 1, 1955 and lasted 46 and a half months.

***PHOTO OF GEORGIOS GRIVAS, SIGNED WITH HIS CODE NAME***

The strategy, tactics and methods or techniques of guerrilla warfare were adapted to Cyprus. And that is the reason for the success achieved in that theater of operations.

There were two main offensive actions used by the guerrillas: sabotage of government facilities and means and surprise attacks, limited in their power and carried out by forces trained in maneuver, against the English troops. Both actions were limited at the beginning, due to a lack of trained personnel and a shortage of materials. Soon mines or, rather, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) began to be used quite a bit.

Excellent preparation and complete surprise of the enemy, together with the skillful leadership of the guerrillas, were the necessary characteristics for the success of the actions.

The British troops found themselves faced with irregular guerrilla fighting, without the slightest preparation for it. And they were not up to the task either tactically or organizationally. Thus, they needed a long period of preparation and training before they could attack the guerrillas. Which was equivalent to enduring some failures for a while.

For example, the British thought that the guerrillas were hiding in towns. Actually, they were hiding in the countryside, the mountains, literally “under the stones.”

British exploration did not know how to detect guerrilla hiding places. And, its discovery could mean falling into a trap: receiving fire from an unknown nearby position, suffering an explosion in the position supposedly occupied by guerrillas.

The British Army worked in platoons. It was the minimum tactical unit, because it could maneuver and operate on its own in the Micro terrain. And it was made up (this is just an example of a large one) of a light machine gun with its shooter and one or two loaders/defenders, a light anti-tank rocket launcher and a loader/defender, a leader and a second leader and two teams of two. men each. United and compacted like this, marching and attacking, they only made themselves more vulnerable to the enemy.

To raise and/or attack the guerrillas, teams or pairs of soldiers have to act, which may or may not be commanded by a corporal.

***ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III, FI**RST PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF CHIPRE***

The section (platoon, in English) or company is divided into a multitude of “small tactical units”, to extend over an area and cover it, through action on the micro-terrain. This is like a zoom and uses the “action unit” and attack distance as appropriate, depending on the enemy target.

By 1959, British forces had found themselves in a quagmire. It was very difficult for them to locate the guerrillas. And, they were not capable of attacking and defeating them either. But, the guerrillas were there, demanding the Independence of Cyprus and Enosis or incorporation into Greece. And, just their armed presence and their small successes represented a tremendous political and social setback for the British.

The guerrillas were like an odorless, colorless and tasteless gas, which permeated everything and reached everywhere.

And, the central reason: the English were not capable of knowing and preparing an effective counteroffensive against the Cypriot forces.

And, the British press accredited and contrasted all this:

The Observer newspaper wrote that Cyprus‘ civil and military authorities had declared EOKA unbeatable. In turn, Marshal Bernard Montgomery said that the EOKA was strategically unbeatable. And the Daily Herald recognized that a field marshal, three generals and 40,000 British soldiers were not capable of defeating the EOKA.

The British agreed to grant independence to their colony and Grivas left for exile in Greece. This was one of the British conditions for the Agreement of Independence. He returned in 1964 and was appointed Chief of the Armed Forces of Cyprus.

THE END.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence

Terrorists and guerrillas.

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Another thing is what the authorities decide. That they consider the armed irregular enemy little less than the Loose Demon. And they usually deprive him of almost all rights, even personal ones. And they legislate progressively harsher laws against them. Guerrillas or terrorists fighting against a constituted country are easier to outlaw.

The different International Conventions only consider irregulars who are deployed or supported by another national State as “legal belligerents.” And they have to be established in their own territory, even if it is minimal, have a clear and visible command, wear a uniform and some identifying insignia (a “patch”, a distinctive), with their weapons visible and act in accordance with accepted laws from the war.

These conditions were only met by Soviet partisans in the last World War.

And, of course, they are not fulfilled by the jihadists ganged up in Europe, the winnower and blind with anger marksmen and slashers from America, France or Norway, and those so-called, with little accuracy, lone wolves, since this animal is essentially gregarious and, more so for hunt.

These would all be “armed soulless men.” And the soul is the Spirit of Man.

Pursuing them is just another Police activity, not war.

Tito‘s partisans, quite effective and intermittently deployed, did not comply with the conditions. And the national “resistance” of France, Italy, Poland was almost laughable. An enormous risk and immense pain to achieve Isolated damage to their Axis enemies.

A function that is ignored, like so many, is that one of the most important functions of the irregular rebels is to fix numerous enemy forces (for example, German, Italian, Allied) in their “territory of influence.” Which would otherwise be used by the military enemy in other more decisive and important strategic actions of the armed struggle.

Almost everything is unknown here too. One of the most extensive, prolonged and harsh cases of the terrorist struggle was the anti-partisan struggle of the Nazis in the USSR occupied by Germany.

Counterguerrillas.

The Germans had a wide network of forts, which formed a “network support base”, where the nodes were the forts and the ropes marked the rough directions of action for small local combats against the partisans.

There were also “mobile patrols”, strong in at least twenty-odd men, which continually pursued the localized partisan bands. If necessary, several of these were sometimes gathered in a region to carry out a larger attack.

The forces stationed in the forts were around a section (between 8 and 12 men). On nights without activity in their area, a part of the meager garrison was expected to go out to reconnaissance partisans or to integrate with other units to carry out an attack or pursuit proportional to their means.

The strongest units, used on the war fronts, were not normally used in the fight against partisan gangs. Except in cases of attacking or surrounding a large partisan unit with a certain probability of success.

Many times, operations to encircle and annihilate guerrillas turned out to be a fiasco. Due to the lack of secrecy and the abundance of temporary concealment in the siege that was established. And the partisans dispersed, hid or slipped away, crawling in pairs.

Results.

Were the results useful, necessary or dubious for the then called Red Army of Workers and Peasants, the activity of the partisans of the USSR?

The realities that the main and vital activity of the “line of logistical communications” from the Reich with its rear in the USSR was able to maintain throughout the war, the military, logistical and social activity (the comings and goings of the soldiers, sometimes due to illness or leave, and the units) of the Germans in their war effort. Supplies, weapons and troops passed through it for the advance and occupation of the USSR to the west of an imaginary line that ran from Leningrad to Stalingrad, passing through the west of Moscow.

If the Germans retreated relentlessly to the west, after losing the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, it was due to the very costly push of the Soviet Fronts or Army Groups, led by the STAVKA or General Staff. And “advised/commanded” by Georgi Zhukov or Alexander Vassilevski, as “Stavka Delegates to the Fronts” for the different major Soviet military operations.

Philosophy and mental basis.

Anyone who has come this far, may think of the horror of the fighting between partisans and German security forces on the Eastern Front. Because of the “rise to the maximum” in the harshness of military actions. And that the difference in races, religion or its absence, and divergent interests also spurred the belligerents.

Well, it depends on the temperament and character that each one had. And, in this case, common sense and a complementary nature led the Germans to begin to soften the “conditions of confrontation” at the individual level. It was about not getting hurt both. I mean, everyone.

The Germans learned from bitter experience that the firm and stubborn resistance of the partisans was due to their fear of suffering in captivity. And that this could easily be weakened by more humane treatment of the prisoner partisans.

Thus, the (German) Manual for the War against Gangs of 1944 included all these principles and ideas to be applied by the German security forces.

And, the partisans also began to behave like more civilized and less heartless combatants. This procedure or technique of respecting the integrity and rights of prisoners became an appreciated principle in the future guerrilla campaigns.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

Introduction and Development.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

Only analysts freed from Scholasticism and field manuals are capable of placing themselves in the free, impartial and lucid mental state or position. To capture anomalous, complex and difficult enemy situations. Since they are paid for results and speed, which are contradictory variables, the luxury of putting an analyst agent in a “quiet position” for an unpredictable, indefinite period of time is not usually acceptable.

The new techniques for detecting, observing and tracking targets should not be underestimated. Based on computers, electronic sensors, Artificial Intelligence. But, the presence of field agents should not be suppressed, but rather supported and increased. Cyber monitoring can specify for our spy the precise area of investigation and study.

The field agent is an infiltrator in a neutral or hostile environment. Able to approach and penetrate the government, business or social media of the rival. And capture relevant, important information in a consistent and sustained manner. The field agent gives a seal of verisimilitude or even reality to the information captured from the enemy.

It is not easy to recruit, train and insert your own field agent. Hence, in an era of haste, superficiality and intellectual complexity, technological means have been favored over field agents for espionage work.

Afghanistan 2021.

We all remember the moments of the change of government in Afghanistan in August 2021.

During almost 20 years of staying there, the United States had spent enormous sums of money on said stay, providing various support to the Afghan State and to choosing, training and equipping the Afghan National Army. The Americans even boasted in their public communications, especially from the Defense Department, that they were making progress in the anti-terrorist fight against the Taliban.

This turned out to be like the “Potemkin villages.” That the Russian minister of that name prepared in the path that Tsarina Catherine the Great would follow on a trip. So that her trashy inhabitants would appear happy and shiny as her Imperial Majesty passed by.

As soon as the last American troops had to withdraw, the Afghan soldiers, who also turned out to be shoddy, began to surrender their weapons and escape the feared wrath of the Taliban. US forces were only able to secure a defensive perimeter of the Kabul airport. But, the “friendly Afghans” and their families had to get there to board a flight. Fleeing the tidal wave of the barbarity of the Taliban (scholars of the Koran).

As it had been negotiated with the Taliban to accept control of the airport by Western soldiers for a few days, this was not enough for many «collaborators» of the Westerners (translators, drivers, cleaners, etc.) and their families. Many had to make a painful journey to Pakistan to gain their freedom and their lives.

Vietnam War. American stage,

In the United States, during the Vietnam War, the “Igloo White” program was established, endowed with 1.7 billion US dollars, between 1966 and 1971, for the tasks of collecting information on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong supply routes in South Vietnam. The route started from North Vietnam, entering Laos, near the common border, and was the line of all kinds of supplies for the aforementioned forces, operating in South Vietnam. The route was strewn with devices that simulated a plant and were transmitters of information for US intelligence. They measured 1.2 ms. and their battery lasted 50 days. Many times an unmanned flying object, a drone, was used, which collected information from the ground and transmitted it via television to a distant plane.

***A SECTION OF THE HO CHI MINH ROUTE***

With the data collected from traffic on the roads, the Americans decided on interdiction bombing actions, carried out by their different aerial devices, including the invisible, inaudible and precise B-52 strategic bombers. In early 1971, data from aerial photos after the bombings, taken from planes flying after the attack formations, allowed analysts to assume that the “truck war” was causing a very severe strain on the industrial capacity of North Vietnamese suppliers (China and the USSR).

Historia Desterrada: La ruta Ho Chi Minh: Eje logístico clave en la Guerra de Vietnam

But, if it was true that so many trucks and equipment were destroyed, how was it possible that the communists maintained the initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks and other materials that literally plagued many of the roads and logistics parks on the Ho Chi Minh Route? Who bothered to remove them?

***A more primitive stretch of the Ho Chi Minh Route***

Another embarrassing issue was that the total number of vehicles counted by the US aviation as destroyed, exceeded several times the total number of cargo transport vehicles that North Vietnam had, according to Intelligency.

The answer to this essential mystery was soon given by the young American officers (juniors): they were eaten by a monster called the “Great Laotian Truck Eater”; a horrendous scavenger that rose towards dawn and devoured the vehicles destroyed by aviation during the night, after the required photographs for the “wreck count”, the count of debris achieved. Because Americans are very scrupulous with statistics and consider lying a «social sin» that is almost unforgivable for officials.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Hamas attacks Israel in 2023.

General introduction.

Hamas commandos knew they would fight deep in Israeli territory. Very far from their supports, supplies and other Hamas units. Their targets were there: Israeli civilians and military personnel killed or taken hostage. And they knew that once 2 or 3 days had passed, the Israeli forces, superior in human and material resources, would attack, pursue, and ambush them. Their end, in general, was death. Since the Israelis would in this case still have a surplus of captured enemies. To interrogate and learn the parameters that Hamas used, to surpass them for a time: surprise them and establish combat superiority over their troops in many parts of Israel.

The various attackers carried out a “swarm attack” on positions in central and southern Israel. Several of the principles or norms of military forces in a conventional attack were disregarded. For example, the unity of the objective and the unity of command of the forces and the maintenance of a structure, of a deployment for all attacking forces. Here, each small Islamist “unit of action” had its own leader and its own objective. And, it is the set of actions of the “attacking swarm” that defines the strategy and complex real objective of Hamas.

***YAHYA SINVAR, PALESTINIAN MILITARY CHIEF OF THE GAZA STRIP.***

Here, Hamas forces attacked divided into a multitude of independent groups, small and sufficient, in charge of striking and/or destroying. Or occupy the Israeli military post, kibbutz or cooperative, and take Israeli or Western foreign hostages to send them to Gaza.

All of this reveals and shows us that the military effect sought by Hamas‘s multi-objective attack is an Internal Moral Shock, increased by the surprise factor of the action, already installed in the military establishment and in the populations of Israel. The aura of invincibility of the Israeli Armed Forces and the effectiveness attributed to Mossad and other affected security agencies, not so conspicuous, have been broken.

It is the set of «action units» of the militias, composed of variable weapons or branches of the FA: infantry, airborne, anti-tank, light armor, health, military police, which carries out, through these multiple and quasi-simultaneous actions on the Israeli Nation: The effect of shock, shattering, heartbreaking material and moral.

***SEMI IRREGULAR HAMAS TROOPS PARADING***

This multiple and general effect is inexorably transmitted to Israelis in arms through social mechanisms. The effects of damage to people and property not protected by the army, the invasion of cruel and vengeful Palestinian forces, which occupy and destroy different points in Israel, commotion and produce shock and disorientation of the troops.

Israel says it has mobilized almost 300,000 reservists to attack the Gaza Strip. They are not the best troops to maintain combat readiness and combat alert.

The geographical and military social scenario of the Islamist radicals.

The so-called Gaza Strip is a narrow, flat and small coastal corridor next to the Mediterranean Sea, located south of Israel. More than one and a half million people live crowded together in its approximately 363 km2 of surface. 99% of the inhabitants are Muslims and Christians number between 15 and 20 thousand souls. The strip reaches a demographic concentration of around 4,150 people per km2, which is one of the highest in the world. Its shape is that of an elongated rectangle, about 45 km long, measuring 12 km at its widest part. At the south is its border with Egypt of about 11 km, around the strategic city of Rafah.

To the east and north the Gaza border with Israel extends for about 51 km. The most important population of the strip is the one that gives it its name, Gaza, located in its northern third. The other prominent towns in the strip actually constitute “districts”, “peripheral neighborhoods” or “satellite towns” of the “ecumene” of Gaza. Among those not yet mentioned we will highlight Beit Hanoun (in the extreme north), Beit Layla, Sheikh Zaid, Dayral Balah (in the center), Jabalia and Kan Yunis (in the south, but not on the border with Egypt).

The unemployment rate of the population is between 35-40%. This makes it very dependent on external aid. And, furthermore, it excites their identity and social demands and defines as “solely” responsible for their evils the most visible, socially and culturally different, and close enemy, Israel. The search for a quick and utopian solution for this population necessarily requires a sufficient defeat of Israel, the oppressive and imperialist power. This makes its population very inclined to embrace “radical Islamist militants” doctrines and parties (the RIM). They allow them to glimpse and evaluate a solution, even in an indefinite and imprecise future. And at least they give them the hope they all need. Islamic Jihad and Hamas are the two main Islamist organizations with implant in Gaza.

Ideology of radical Islamist Palestinians.

Hamas, as a totalitarian socio-political-religious organization, exercises extensive power in all areas of civil coexistence of the inhabitants of Gaza. This power is also conditioned by the nature of the struggle in conditions of isolation, encirclement and hardship. This allows Hamas to invoke in its “general defense” the oppression to which the entire Palestinian population of Gaza is subjected, whether real, felt and/or magnified. Without, in practice, the tremendous suffering of the Palestinians being clearly distinguished from the victimhood wielded by Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. Between 100 and 200 thousand are the actual active militants of both radical organizations. In addition, there are their sympathizers and collaborators, with different degrees of involvement in the services and time dedicated to supporting Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

***ISRAELI SOLDIERS DISCOVER FIRST HAMAS TUNNEL SINCE 2014 WAR***

Hamas mesmerizes, tenses and grows due to the prospects of a more or less close confrontation with Israel. A people cannot be kept permanently in arms, much less in “combat readiness.” But, the reason for being of Hamas is to recover and imitate doctrinally, socially and militarily the epic and glorious times of the first century of Islam, which approximately coincides with our 7th century and the first part of the 8th. It was the era, after the death of Muhammad, extended in time beyond the first 4 caliphs, from Abu Baker to Ali, called by the Sunnis the Rashidun, the “rightly guided (by God)”.

Because its radical totalitarian ideologists have decided that, when Islam practiced armed Jihad and was rigorous in its faith and customs, Islam convinced, overwhelmed, spread prodigiously across three continents and was almost invincible… And they believe that by reproducing the “basic conditions” of that social context, of that booming civilization, today’s Muslims will once again be great, feared, respected and accepted. There is nothing more and nothing less.

We verify that every few years a “casus belli” occurs or is caused, worthy of its name and with its pernicious effects for the corresponding populations. Thus, there are not many possibilities of being able to truly dialogue with this, to reach common ground and reach peace agreements that are consistent and acceptable to all.

Operational considerations of the Defense of Gaza against Israel.

The land defense of Gaza is very difficult to sustain over time. The strip lacks geographical space to establish a flexible, mobile and echelon in depth defense. This is necessary to give power, solidity, continuity and support to the rejection struggle.

Furthermore, the external supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Hamas would be strangled by Israel. To ensure the sealing of Gaza, the Tsahal could establish “locks”, located transversely in the strip and occupied with reinforced mechanized infantry. They would prevent the transit of military equipment from Egypt. Iran‘s weapons and equipment have their hub or logistics center in Yemen. From here they are transported across the Red Sea to northern Sudan, from where they depart in caravans of trucks. They cross into Egypt halfway along its southern border and head to Rafah.

The Israelis sporadically carry out bombing raids on this “evil route”, concentrating on the intermediate depots along the route and on cargo vehicles. In October 2012, an unexpected explosion destroyed a weapons factory near Khartoum, the capital, and other times, truck convoys are destroyed. The naval persecution of this smuggling flow, through detection and exploration drone flights over the Red Sea, is carried out by the USA. And it is the scarce and reluctant collaboration of the three countries involved, Yemen, Sudan and Egypt, which does not allow the transit (traffic is merchandising) of heavy reactive artillery weapons to be made excessively burdensome for intermediaries and with little return for the end user.

(to be continued)

The Ukrainian counterattack in the East of the country.

Introduction.

I think this should be an attack on the Azov Sea from Zaporiya (+-) area.

Cutting the Crimean supply line with Russia. And, towards Melitopol (+-).

The spears points of the attack can be somewhat bifurcated. So that the enemy does not know exactly what our immediate objective is. And it can concentrate from the Crimea too many forces to repel them.

The Russian supply line leaves the Crimea, crosses the coast of the Azov Sea and enters Russia towards Rostov on the Don. Any point is good to cut it, as long as the supply is suppressed.

The closer to Crimea it is cut off, the more “influence”, a material and moral effect, its presence will have on the Crimean Russians. The closer it is to the Russian border, the easier it will be for the Russians to deploy forces to push them back. And further away would be the Ukrainians from their supply bases and the reinforcement of men and units.

To attack where the front is now, in an easterly direction, towards the Russian border, is to reiterate the military effort on a Russian front prepared for defense. The Ukrainians would attack where they are most prepared and where their enemies are waiting for them. It would be a very mediocre and expensive strategy; force against force. And, the Russians have much more physical human and military resources than the Ukrainians.

The plan to attack towards the south of Ukraine imposes the law of action on them, it is daring, creative, novel and possible. And it would leave the Russians out of place in plans and positioning of their means for defense. That they would be on the great strip of the Azov Sea coast, Donetz and Lugansk oblasts and the Russian border.

It would be a strategy of strength against Russian weakness.

Structural development.

Pointing out different towns as “essential milestones” in the layout of the fronts, with a view to their operational exploitation, offers a string of names that are almost impossible to understand. Which are very difficult to locate on the maps available to us. A Bajmut, a Buça are locations that can be very painful and shocking. But, they shipwreck and get lost on our usual maps.

The fact is that Bakhmut is the Ukrainian name for the town called Artemivosk, in Russian. And, in Russian it appears on almost all maps. And, of course, most reporters and envoys to the theater of operations do not have time to correct these «bulk errors.»

All this “outer shell”, at the east of the Donbass, the Russian defensive structure prepared for the defense without giving up space, supposes the crystallization of a defensive strategic intention of the Russians. Which makes explicit his debilitating, fearful desire to preserve his western border with Ukraine from any enemy proximity. Which would facilitate a limited-target attack by Ukraine inside Russia.

It is evident that on terrain prepared for rigid defense, the Ukrainian mechanized forward spears should not attack.

Already in the middle of 1943, in the so-called Kursk salient, Model‘s forces, attacking from the north, and von Manstein‘s, from the south, did not come together, nor did they even minimally cut the salient. Which was defended entirely by «fortified regions» arranged in deep in the salient.

Fighting in the defense trenches is a form of fighting abandoned some 105 years ago. When the artillery became the queen of the battle and the protective trenches of the soldiers lost their ability to hide and cover them from fire. The artillery fires could be precise enough to hit the trenches quickly. It was necessary to deprive the enemy of views and increase the direct defense of advanced weapons and men.

This was achieved by deploying the defense in combat outposts, fortified or not, and advanced detachments in mobile fighting well in front of the position And by dispersing and fortifying the following positions or redoubts in depth. And bringing the tactical reserves closer to the start of the artillery zone. And having pieces of it at the beginning of it, especially as counter-battery and harassment/neutralization of the enemy advance.

Theater of operations and possible attacks and movements.

La gran cuenca del Donbass, de terreno favorable al empleo de medios mecanizados atacando, es el área geográfica en la que en esta guerra han tenido lugar los principales combates. Existe una llanura costera señalada por las ciudades de Mariupol, a poco más de 50 km. desde la frontera rusa, Berdjansk y Melitopol, que conforman la línea de abastecimientos principal de Crimea desde Rusia, muy importante para los rusos.

The great basin of the Donbass, with favorable ground to the use of attacking mechanized means, is the geographical area in which the main combats have taken place in this war. There is a coastal plain marked by the cities of Mariupol, just over 50 km away. from the Russian border, Berdjansk and Melitopol, which make up the main supply line of Crimea from Russia, very important for the Russians.

The convex interior of the Donbass to the east supports the current Russian-Ukrainian war front.

On the outside are the Russians and from there they prepare and launch limited-target attacks against less-prepared Ukrainian positions. In a purely tactical exchange of efforts, without looking for an operational goal. What would it be like to reverse the enemy front in a sector, overwhelm it or break it for minimal exploitation. And, the Russian defense relies on well-prepared fortifications, which seem to exclude from the outset any moderately successful plan of attack or counterattack. That overcomes the usual tactical struggle with negligible gains in space. That, sometimes they are recovered by a Ukrainian tactical counterattack carried on by a nearby Ukrainian small unit.

The Ukrainian mowing stroke.

The best Ukrainian counterattack would start from the north of Zaporiya and would be directed at the coast of the Azov Sea, in the sector between Berdjansk and Melitopol. It is convenient to direct the effort towards a couple of different objectives. That will force the Russians to further disperse their rejection. And that they are just as important for the Ukrainians, because what it is about is to operationally cut off the Russian supply line. And establish in it, not necessarily on top, a strong Ukrainian defense position.

The Combat Capacities of the Forces as an Operational System.

Introduction.

We call a “system” to a harmonic (with correspondence between them) and synergistic (acting together) set of different elements, but related in nature. That produce or generate a complex and essential function of the broader military activity. Its definition aims for systems to globally understand the variables or elements of their nature that intervene in operations. This would allow us to more easily and precisely focus our attention on them, in order to achieve control and direction of the entire complex phenomenon of war.

“Combat capacities” are the set of military means (men, installations, weapons and all supports) that a “closed military system” (in the case of an operation or campaign) or a society or state possess for its defense.

Development.

Its more complete expression is found in combined or inter arms groups which, even at the small units level, multiply and adapt the possibilities of military struggle in the interfaces of action with the enemy. Combined arms groups seek to accelerate the pace (tempo) or the speed of the elementary “cycles of action” against him. In fact, the incorporation of infantry heavy weapons as organic support elements in small units, forms, qualitatively, an inter arms system.

Combat capacities are that allow a force to achieve a favorable decision and, therefore, operational efficiency in the determined, sought after and transcendent combats, with the enemy. They also give credibility to group movement capacities in maneuvers through the real threat that they pose for the enemy. Simple movement is an empty decoration or an impotent sigh, if it is not paired with the capacity to damage the enemy and the will to do so.

Combat capacity and the capacity of operational movement form complementary and synergic «opposing but not antagonist couples» within the operational systems. Neither of them transcends without the other. Moreover, one of the two is only frustrated and fails without the other. Both systems procure and invigorate tactical actions and execute and fertilize operational maneuvers.

Quantitative studies.

Trevor N. Dupuy has tried to work out a way of quantifying combat capacities (which will always vary according to different units and weapons and countries). (1) Dupuy’s work quantifies units depending on their type and adds a factor depending on which army, war and campaign are under consideration, to obtain values of relative military power for each case.

These «powers» are a relative quantification (remember that there is a multiplier factor, which introduces the efficiency of army in the face of a concrete enemy in a given situation) of the combat capacities of land armies in different epochs or theatres of operations.

Simpkin proposes a similar, more qualitative formula that factors in the equipment of units (this formula is only suitable for mechanized armies). Being the extremes of the classification, an infantry unit and a tank unit of equal level. (2)

The applications, and possibilities of combat capacities are extensively discusses throughout our works.

(1) Trevor N. Dupuy. The Comprehension of the War. Study and Theory of the Combat. Madrid, 1990. Pages 123 to 172.

(2) Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift. London, 1994. Pages 79 to 85.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine. 2nd. Part.

(continuation)

The mercenary and rapacious Wagner Group.

A minor issue arises, but of great importance due to the disagreements it creates in Moscow and with the troops in the campaign. It is the growing presence of the Wagner Group as a Russian fire extinguisher in the war in Ukraine.

It includes convicted criminals, Syrian and Libyan mercenaries «among other elements of bad living» and Russian volunteers. In general, they enjoy disparate salaries, depending on their experience, origin and life path; a convict is basically paid with his freedom, more or less garnished with a clean record.

Their boss is Prigozhin, a Russian plutocrat and Putin henchman. This man is in conflict with part of the Kremlin and with senior military leaders over the permanence of his «private mercenary armed group» in the Russian ranks in the campaign.

The implicit tolerance of the Russian military commands in Ukraine with the men of the Wagner Group generates enormous discomfort among the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers stationed there. And it greatly lowers their combat morale and their «esprit de corps«.

If Gerasimov comes with full powers as commander of the campaign and considers the previous arguments, in relation to the motivation and combative disposition of his Russian regular forces, he has to recompose the situation of the forces, in relation to the presence of the Wagner Group in the Russian ranks.

Unity of Action and Concentration of Efforts in the Campaign.

Another of the capital problems that Gerasimov will have to solve is the strategic and operational Integration of all the active Fronts of the Russian forces in presence.

To establish a strategic «Superior Effort Unit» that is coordinated, proportional and synergistic. To optimize in «effective times«, according to the «superior universal saving means» principle and the «military principle of the Objective», the distribution and coordinated use over time of the human and material capacities assigned to the different Fronts.

Thus, the Russians have several Fronts with different importance and presenting different opportunities.

The Kiev Northern Front is inactive. Lukashenko is Putin‘s due ally and with his bravado and maneuvers he causes uncertainty in Kiev. It offers an opportunity to drain mobile Ukrainian troops, to fix and protect the Front from possible Russian rapid raids.

Here the presence in Belarus of a mechanized Russian “task force” would suffice. Counting on tanks and infantry combat and transport vehicles, with support from artillery, engineers, defense against aircraft and ground support aviation and its escort. And integrating a couple of divisions. That moved around the south of Belarus, prowling.

The Crimean Front is active towards Kherson, Mariupol and Zaporiya and creates uncertainty towards Odessa. It allows the defense of the 4 territories annexed by Putin.

The Donbass Front, in southeastern Ukraine, is active in the oblasts or provinces of Lugansk, to the north, along the border with Russia, and Donetz, to the south. The Northeast Front, towards Kharkov is in hibernation. Both hold promise in theory in this new phase of the war.

The joint and coordinated action from both Russian Fronts, of «breaking shock forces» of the Ukrainian Tactical defense. Followed, after the irruption, by «armored mobile groups» with air support, advancing in the Ukrainian operational rear towards a town or small area. Forming a wide and double enveloping movement around the enemy. It can create a “pocket” of it or, at least, a serious threat of cutting off communications for the most active Ukrainian forces, and therefore equipped with heavy equipment, deployed in the east of the country. Russia has more than enough regular mobile forces for this.

The Ukrainian Counterattack.

The Ukrainians can counterattack by employing armored forces with sufficient punch, such as the more modern Main Battle Tanks. The “heavy” tanks that Zelensky claims from the US and Europe now. The Challengers (with their Chobham armor); Leopards 2 A5, of German engineering; Leclercs, the first type built of this new generation of tanks and the Americans Abrams.

Advancing rapidly from the depth of the Ukrainian deployment, on one flank of the Russian advancing points. Let’s remember that this territory is favorable ground for armored vehicles.

For this, Ukraine will need to have several battalions of such tanks. Distributed by their most important concentrations, each with about 50 tanks. Distributing or employing it by isolated companies is to waste its special and unique off-road forward speed, shock and firepower, protected by effective armor. Which is completely decisive in modern combat.

In all this theoretical filigree of maneuvers and combats, the most capable, equipped, motivated and prepared will win.

The denatured current Russian air front.

The goal of the current Russian air front is the weakening of Ukrainian morale. Through the successive attack on civilian facilities (energy, water and communications) and urban centers of some importance in Ukraine.

It should be noted that this rather criminal objective does not target the enemy military forces, but their unarmed rearguard populations. For more INRI, it began to be used shamelessly when Putin and his Kremlin bosses and henchmen realized that his “special military action” in Ukraine was a “bluff”. And that the Ukraine was a tough nut to crack for the Russian forces employed in it.

Almost 2,500 years ago, Master Sun (Sun Tzu), in the Warring States Era, already warned that «when the general is already appointed by the sovereign, he should not interfere in his affairs» and «when the courtiers and ministers interfere in his command, they bring misfortune to the Kingdom”.

In addition, this objective has already been used in other cases and with zero effectiveness, by the way.

Japan was mercilessly bombarded by the US, when it had already managed to occupy the Japanese islands (e.g., Okinawa) close enough to insular Japan. The Japanese were already preparing their civilian population for a Numantine resistance to the invader. Creating an immense natural fortress on its islands, where each one was a fortified redoubt of it.

They were the two atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which represented an «ascent to the upper limits» in the fight against civilian rearguards. Because they were much more than a very large cannon shot. The ones that forced Japan to surrender unconditionally to the Americans. Because they threatened (although they didn’t have any more artifacts at the time), to destroy the essence and Japanese national identity.

In general, the use of the «indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian rearguards», what it achieves is to galvanize them around their government and their armed forces. Because they perceive from the enemy a demonic, fierce hatred towards them, which would seek the destruction of their identity, culture and idiosyncrasy.

Modernly, such bombing type was used by the US in North Vietnam. They left South Vietnam in 1973 and in 1975 the communist forces occupied it, almost without resistance.

Russia’s Air Support to its Ground Forces.

The Russian air front in Ukraine must be directed against enemy troop concentrations (reserves, attack preparations, marching forces), their ground communications and logistics network, command posts and communications centers, attack points of their forces, artillery and rocket and drones launch positions.

FINAL.

The Opportunity as Command’s Instrument for Victory

Introduction.

The opportunity arises from the play of dialectical actions between the opposing units. Opportunity is the tactical, even operational, weakness that arises in an enemy sector or is about to do so. We can act on it and even precipitate it with our combined weapons system in an «action interface» especially favorable to us. In opportunity always underlies an enemy error. If this was insurmountable for him, it would be due to the unforeseen, surprising circumstances that concurred. Opportunities are a useful and advantageous feature provided by the dialectic of actions in the chaos of war.

The intermediate objectives foreseen in the plans are not opportunities. They are forecasts derived from the planning and the well-founded resolution of the command. When contacts with the enemy begin, its achievement begins to be tested, as Moltke said, in the dialectics play.

Functioning.

Of this play in a chaotic environment, independently of the greater or smaller deviations from plans, will arise the opportunities and the dangers. The dangers would be the enemy opportunities on us. Both are unexpected, but accessible and exploitable during a certain time. The reason of the unpredictably of the opportunities in the time is in the number almost infinite of variables and individual and collective actions that concur to define a “situation” and the successive cycles of action in which it develops.

The opportunity arises when the enemy fails to use his forces and means of support. It can originate in differences in the qualities of enemy forces and in the transitability of a given terrain, that debilitates a defense or the momentum of an attack. It also appears in the negligence of the enemy in presenting an exposed flank, that is, an interface of action real or potential favorable with us, not properly taken care of by him to face our available combined arms system. The opportunity is an emptiness in combat capacity that arises in a cycle of action for a unit, or a sector, that is unprotected and neglected for long enough allowing it to be detected and exploited by the enemy.

It is necessary to take advantage of opportunities quickly. The dynamics of interaction in a chaotic environment makes opportunities unattainable after a short time. The succession of cycles of action continually modify circumstances.

Developing.

To detect opportunities at any level of military activity, intelligence is necessary (elaborated the exploration and reconnaissance and converted into useful, continuous, sufficient knowledge) and the sufficient presence of the corresponding command. To take advantage of them, simple and vertical communication is necessary, supported by implicit communication between subordinate leaders and mobility, flexibility and combat capacity available in the units and commands involved. If the opportunity is transcendental, the tactical or operational center of gravity of the military means is transferred to it by the command. If it is important, their use must contribute concentrically to its creation and development.

The same characteristics just mentioned, but focused on ourselves, are the ones that, in turn, will protect us from enemy dangers or opportunities. This will prevent its appearance, compensate for the danger or mitigate its presence and reduce our time of vulnerability. If despite foresight and care, surprising or unexpected circumstances concur in its appearance, even due to a mistake on our part, the means to be used are the last two actions mentioned for its detection and use.

What is that sufficient presence of the commander? The one that allows him to take advantage of the opportunities that arise at his level of activity. All of this is directly related to the two different command styles or forms for carrying out the tasks of the different levels of command.

Tactical command must be exercised bySensing the “action interface” with the enemy, exchanging actions with him on the ground. The limit of tactical command is clearly in the brigade. And, in large operations or in the attack or in the armored forces, it probably reaches in greater or lesser degree to the division, whose commander must drive forward the march or the attack behind the first important marching force of the bulk of the unit.

The command of the army corps is clearly an corps’ operational management and must have a broader perspective of the whole. As well as a greater distance from direct contact with the enemy, which overcomes the interface of action and its immediate rear. This gives the command breadth, vision, serenity and security.

In the immense chaos that is created in a combat, the foresight of the command can impose and outline its evolution in a direction and sense.

Like the effective command, is capable of «searching» and «feeling» the enemy’s signs of weakness and discouragement. And then he prepares the forces that he will use in the persecution and the support that he will give them. Putting them under the command of an energetic, spirited, leading and lucid commander.

The command must prepare «rapidly available forces» in the units under its command. For example, a mixed company in the battalion; a combined arms battalion in the brigade. In such a way that the appearance of the opportunity, close and surprising, allows him to take advantage of it. Since the surprise will help the opportunity to be seized at first by a relatively small force of their own. And that may soon be reinforced by the bulk.

Example of the effective, non-physical presence of a High Command.

Erich von Manstein directed the counterattack operation of the German Armies Group Don, mainly against the Soviet Southwestern Front of General Vatutin, from his headquarters in Zaporiya. By mid-March1943, the Germans had eliminated six tank corps in the order of battle of Vatutin, recovered Kharkov and settled a resistant defense front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported in the Mius and the Donetz. They also had enough mobile reserves in the south of Russia to reject possible soviet operational ruptures in the zone. And, after the setback of Stalingrad, they had recovered the strategic initiative, at least in the southern theater of operations.

***HITLER, WORRIED, VISIT MARSHAL VON MANSTEIN AT ZAPORIYA, UKRAINE.***

An attack against the Kursk salient, completed its formation by von Manstein‘s advance on Belgorod, which would have begun in April, then had a chance of success due to the lack of Soviet preparation.

This same offensive, which began in July 1943, determined that no more mistakes by the German High Command (Hitler) were of any importance: then, the subjet of total strategy or state strategy was no longer who would win the war, but how long it would take to do so.

A Failure in the effective presence of command.

Let’s see an example of an inadequate presence of the commander, in relation to the echelon that he is supposed to command. It starred Rommel in North Africa in November 1941.

***Rommel’s advanced command post in the desert.***

Mistakenly believing that the British armor was dispersed after some fighting, Rommel ordered to concentrate his Panzers on the Libyan-Egyptian border. Directly dedicated to it, acting as a regimental commander, he was involved in the repulse of a British attack. He was even isolated with his command vehicle, due to a mechanical problem, for half a day at the front.

This temporarily deprived him of control of operations in Tobruk. This was Rommel’s main operational objective, while resisting the German siege was the main objective of the English. Due to this unjustified distraction, Rommel had to abandon the attempt to take that fortified port, located in his operational rear, which he could have consolidated for his defense of his won territory.

In less than a month, the advances of the English tanks and infantry forced him into a long retreat towards Tunisia. He had to give up almost all the ground he had gained since March, when he arrived in Africa, until he recovered and was able to fight back, as British pressure lightened.