THE DRONES AND THE ENEMY OPERATIONAL ZONE. SECOND PART.

(continuaton)

The range of the most specific tactical actions extends from 12-15 km to 40-50 km deep into the enemy position.

We have already seen that the operational zone was very vulnerable to deep exploitation by enemy mobile groups. However, the support mass, made up of structures based on stability and management and with units with qualitatively lower combat readiness, due to their unnecessary nature, is even more vulnerable. It is another matter whether, with modern armies, based on the countless manufactured products necessary for their operations, the exploitation of an enemy’s deep rear is operationally easy or even feasible.

Theory of using drones in reconnaissance and combats.

The countries of Eastern or Central Europe, as some of them say, as if they could modify geography, have land and sea borders with Russia, and these are their lengths:

Country Land border Percentage Sea border

Finland 1,271.8 km 21.7% 54 km

Belarus 1,239 km 21%

Ukraine 2,093.6 km 35.7% 567 km

Norway 195.8 km 23.3 km

Latvia 270.5 km

Lithuania 266 km 22.4 km

Estonia 324.8 km 142 km

Poland 204.1 km 32.2 km

Total……………. 5,865.6 km 840.9 km

European countries are overwhelmed by the lack of means, tactics, techniques, and doctrine to stop attacks and incursions of varying depth by the “unmanned aerial vehicles” (drones). The decided solution is to equip the entire eastern European border with a «physical network of reconnaissance and attack drones from short to long range.» However, this is structurally unsafe, imperfect, and insufficient.

INCORPORATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO OPERATIONAL DRONES

Following the recent Russian drone incursions into Poland and Romania, the Defense ministers of the so-called «frontline» countries decided on Friday, September 26, to begin as soon as possible the joint construction of an «anti-drone defense system» covering their entire extensive border with the threatening enemy. The intensification of incidents and grievances involving this innovative weaponry by Putin’s Russia has directly contributed to this decision.

For its part, Ukraine, through its Defense Minister Skmyhal, has pledged to assist its European allies in developing technology and tactics in this field of weapons. European Union Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius believes that the Ukrainian army has the most experience in the development and use of various types of drones.

RUSSIAN LONG RANGE ATTACK DRONE

The defense ministers decided that they should move «from discussions to concrete actions.» The first objective would be to create a national and interoperable drone detection system, building on the aforementioned experience of Ukraine. According to Kubilius, this is currently the biggest shortcoming. Heads of State will be informed at the European Council Meeting at the end of this October, so they can provide political support for developing this objective. It was suggested that its implementation could take a year.

EU DEFENSE COMMISSIONER, ANDRIUS KUBILIUS

By concentrating the enemy sufficient drones in depth and in a narrow sector of the European drone front, it can be penetrated and overrun from the flank, from the rear, and from deep penetration into the rear, our operational zone. Depending on the drones’ range, payload capacity, and weapon types.

The concept of modern warfare is almost equivalent to hybrid warfare. This would be, according to the US term, fifth-generation warfare. We now approach it with digital and computer methods, using the discrimination and precision of algorithms and electromagnetic radiation and pulse technology—V-generation warfare, hybrid or multifaceted warfare.

The Laser Defense System against drones employs three phases of action: Detection, Location, and Destruction. First, the drone is detected and classified according to its size, speed, and flight path. Once classified, the target is locked onto using tracking mechanisms to maintain precise aiming on the drone. This phase is crucial to ensure that the laser beam remains focused on the target throughout the entire engagement process.

And this model of dialectical confrontation, with an essential component of physical force, requires a holistic, harmonious integration of the available multidisciplinary means with the different objectives, whether simultaneous or successive, that we wish to achieve.

Before now, the endless plains of Poland and Germany could allow Soviet mechanized units, stronger in infantry, to adequately combat in the vast urbanized and industrial areas of the invaded countries. After attack and penetration by shock armies and mobile exploitation groups, they could rapidly advance across them, covering their flanks from any Allied counterattack and reaching the North Sea.

MARSHAL MICHAIL TUJACHEVSKI’S AND DEEP PENETRATION DOCTRINE.

In doing so, they broke the cohesion of Allied defensive positions, dispersed heavy defensive fire and its coherence, and disrupted the comprehensive Allied defense direction in Central and Western Europe.

Today, and not so long ago, tactical weapons are «drone swarms,» ​​organized into various types, missions, and aircraft and its own deploy, and operational weapons are «large swarms,» ​​organized into appropriately varied «groups» in its own deploy. Fighters can operate as some of the aerial vehicles deployed to protect the aforementioned tactical and operational weapons.

The need to defend many things (borders, command and communications centers, troop concentrations, weapons and tracked and wheeled vehicle depots, spare parts, ground movements) will literally leave reconnaissance and attack resources at a complete loss. Until the last moment, until the Slavic enemy reveals its objectives through its mobilization and march/attack deployment, the allied «defense swarms» (reconnaissance, drone attacks, and ground forces) will not be able to adequately engage the allied points under attack.

THE END.

Russia and its Super Hypersonic Ballistic Missiles

Introduction.

Russia, the predatory Empire, which sells raw materials, oil, natural gas, electricity, rare minerals, and buys and copies technologies of all kinds and more sophisticated goods and maintains an incomplete Armed Forces. In 2024, they totaled some 900 thousand active troops.

The structure of these has an immediate officialdom, Junior Officials and Officers, in charge of carrying out the orders of the battalion commander. The orders of the battalion commanders are received from their brigade commanders (general brigadier), where the operational action of the forces is specified: making the tactical actions of the subordinate forces have a transcendence, an already operational importance, in the «higher plans».

The non-commissioned officers, corporals and sergeants, rise from the troops, from among the most active, experts and, perhaps, loyal. There are no non-commissioned officer academies in Russia, which would prepare them for their duties in the ranks. And these “classes” (the non-commissioned officers) are the ones that accompany, inspire and directly command the soldiers in all kinds of military operations.

The troops see them “as one of their own, not necessarily always the best.” And they consider this promotion to be their merit, distinguishing them from the troops. The officers, in turn, maintain their training status, command and prerogatives.

It is difficult to find here the weft and the plot for the forces of an army to always function in harmony, efficiency, training and professionalism.

We exclude the Rocket and Space Forces, Special Forces, Engineers and part of the Artillery and Armored Forces. They are an elite that boasts of it. And, on which Russia and its ruling class depend for its survival.

Valery Gerasimov is the Chief of the General Staff. And, in view of the successes that Russian soldiers were achieving in their combats and other operations in Ukraine, Putin also appointed him Chief of the Special Military Operation Forces in Ukraine. And, practically, Valery disappeared from the sight of the public and journalists.

A Chief must have his Advanced Command Posts so close to the active enemy, that it facilitates the leadership of the Chief.

During the Polish-Soviet War, from February 1919 to March 1921, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Chief of the Red Army in the Field, had his command post in Kyiv, 500 km from the Front. And, Jozef Pilsidski, the Polish Supreme Commander, continually visited his divisions on the Warsaw front, half surrounded by the Reds. The Reds acted like an Asian horde, living off the territory they trampled, for their vital human needs. Suddenly, Pilsudski counterattacked and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army retreated to Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania.

There are four stages in the trajectory of offensive missiles in which an anti-missile system could act.

They could be destroyed in flight in the atmosphere (even over enemy territory), shortly after their launch. The smoke trail that the engine throws out and the burning flames that accompany it can be detected immediately by satellites and reconnaisance aircraft.

Some attacking missiles could be altered in their trajectory by the strong and punctual action of an electromagnetic field, which acts on their control and guidance device. And it can do so throughout the post-launch stage.

Once fragmented or not, active warheads with multiple ogives, when the targets are already close, can be acted upon, by following final ballistic trajectories. These are easily calculated by the defense against aircraft (DCA).

In the final phase of flight, both missiles and their active multiple warheads can be intercepted by friendly missiles and aircraft, during descent or approach to their target.

An interested perceptive reader can already glimpse the crux.

One of the most important effective factors of the defense system is the Time of Arrival at the Enemy Target.

Current combat systems work up to speeds of Match 3, perhaps 4, more than 3700 km/h.

The Oreshnik (Hazel) 9M729 attack missile, launched from the Kapustin Yar cosmodrome in the Astrakhan region, reached the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, on the Dnieper River.

The Russians (Putin) wanted to show clearly what they have.

We must keep in mind that propaganda tends to deceive the enemy as best as possible. One way is by magnifying real, possible and uncertain successes.

The Hazel weighs about 50 tons and its approximate theoretical speed is Match 11, more than 13,500 km/hour. It is not an intercontinental missile, because its characteristics make it difficult to make a parabolic journey as short as the one in fact (Kapustin Yar-Dnipro).

Short-range missiles, up to 500 km, are considered part of reactive or rocket artillery and their attack operations zones are in the enemy tactical zone and in its operational rear. Here the enemy units reform and recompose, rest, supply themselves, advance to occupy combat positions or retreat towards their operational rear in that sector of the front. And, here there are almost no Units in Combat Readiness, for the defense of those areas.

Apparently, the Hazel is capable of carrying 6 submissiles, each of which would carry up to 6 attack warheads, with or without nuclear charge. The Hazel would fly at an impossible speed for the defense against aircraft (DCA) to work with. Because, simply, the data from radars, detection aircraft, would arrive already outmatched, no aircraft or missile of its own could reach and destroy it. It would be like the fox seeing and reaching the Road Runner.

In the Beginning it was the long range. The great enemies were the United States versus China and Russia. Both groups of enemies being geographically far away. The Europeans were stammering in the military nuclear field.

But everything evolves. France, Great Britain and Germany, the latter with its American military bases, were and could be, at first, effective aviation bases with nuclear capabilities.

Russia realized this and began to prepare its medium-range nuclear warhead missiles, capable of destroying nuclear vectors in Western Europe and attacking factories and logistics hubs and cities on the subcontinent.

This was achieved by vectors with a range of 500 km to 5,500 km. A new field of military air operations was born, unthinkable a few decades ago.

It soon became necessary for everyone to control and regulate medium-range vectors. On December 8, 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, which stopped the proliferation of these weapons.

But on 02/01/2019, under Trump, the United States suspended the Treaty, accusing Russia of continuing to test-launch this type of medium-range missile. The next day, Russia also abandoned the Treaty.

And a new battlefield was left open, messy and unfinished.

The Soviet Union is “no longer that”. The Russian Federation is a corrupt and backward country, to which a market economy has been applied. Its military industry is quite suited to its interests.

The Hazel supposedly has a range of 6000 km, which puts it squarely in the category of an intermediate or medium-range missile. And its capabilities crown it as the “Queen of the Party”.

How much does it cost? How many Hazels can they manufacture in a given period of time? Will they dare to use it with atomic nuclear warheads? Do they all work equally well? Is there reproducibility in the manufacturing series? These are fission bombs with a capacity of “tens of thousands of kilotons” of destruction.

Quite sufficient, quite sufficient.