Operational Strategy – Página 3

THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA V.

The Military Operations of the Islamic State of Syria and Levant.

The Islamic State has the strategic advantage of his territorial unity, which allows him to support the fights following his interior communication lines. His enemies are dispersed by his borders and operate in multitude of sectors or strips. This advantage can be used to fix and keep his enemies, dispersed and operationally unconnected for the different countries and zones. This way, IS preventing them any concentration to attack him.

So, in his Mosul’s operational center, with approximately 2 million habitants, the major city under his power, he keep the Erbil’s peshmergas fixed, the capital of the Iraqi autonomous Khurdistan. These are not capable of throwing an individual offensive, to go snatching cities and zones from the ISIL and are kept at the defensive. They are Sunnis Kurds, that do not want to coordinate with the army of Iraq and the sectarian Shiites militias.

In Anbar, the ISSIL occupied al-Ramadi, its capital, where the Iraqi army went out, here also, at the disbandment, in an unforeseen and accelerated retrograde march. And he threatens the western flank of Baghdad, which says to be training and concentrating forces to recover her, departing from the new base in Taqaddum, at 25 km from al-Ramadi, where are a new reinforce of 450 new American soldiers, and that acts as a bolt, a ground obstruction, against the projection of the ISIL over Baghdad.

IS’S FIGHTERS SUPOSSED KILLED BY KURDS

The Islamic State has now three great operational areas:

The first great zone includes all the south of the Caliphate, from Aleppo’s south-east up to al-Ramadi, following the course of the high Euphrates. In her, the ISSIL is spreading and being consolidated, occupying Palmyra city, finishing the expelling of the National Syrian Army of Dar-ez-Zour’s province (his last troops in her are surrounded at the west of the capital) and the Iraqi soldiers and the Shiites militias from Anbar’s province. At the west of Palmyra are Tiyas and the military airports of the Shayrat, occupied by the NSA, which are vulnerable targets for the ISSIL, capable of attacking them from two marching directions. With it, a western defensive flank directed to Damascus might be established.

In the north of Iraq, the ISSIL keeps his positions in Nínive’s province and part of Saladin’s province, so being consolidated also in the high Tigris.

In Syria, at Aleppo’s north and north-east, along around 400 Kms. of the border with Turkey, up to Hasaka’s frontier province, the ISISL keeps a strategic game based on small offensives and tactical retreats, in a zone of great operational instability. Trying to debilitate the Front al-Nusrah (near the frontier Azaz), the Syrian peshmergas (in Kobani) and other groups opponents and to keep open the narrow frontier sectors, Ras al-Ayn, between others, where he realizes his exchanges of crude oil and derivatives, seized goods, armaments and new supporters. Also he wants to stop the offensive of the opposition in Aleppo, since the ISSIL does not have now free means to exploit any destabilization in Aleppo, that would be produced this way. But in Hasaka he wants to be consolidated, to increase his geographical continuity, to protect his frontier passages with Iraq and Turkey, here is Tel Abyad, and to increase his strategic rear, reinforcing this way the Palmyra’s projection over Damascus.

THEY ALSO USE THE USEFUL FOOLS…AN AUSTRIAN.

Turkey, which wants to keep in his south border a difficult military politic balance of power, suspects so much of the (Syrian) Kurds of the YPG and of the ISSIL, both approaching in force to his territory. And Erdogan is considering to establish a safety zone of 10 Km. in depth in Syrian territory from the common border, occupying her with around 12 thousand Turkish soldiers. From her, the Turks might also partially control other more 25 or 30 Km. in depth, using his heavy artillery. It is a thorny and controversial topic, of international indefinite transcendence, so the command of the FF.AA. has asked Erdogan for a formal wrote order, that the President still has not granted.

The air bombardments of the Coalition of the 60 nations, assigned to the Operation «Inherent Resolve», erode and cause casualties to the Islamic State during almost one year. But they do not stop his military principal operations of fixation of his enemies and of increasing the territory of the Islamic State. At less that the western countries, including the USA, the NATO and the European Union, in any degree and practical necessary national combination, are ready and resolve to put on the Syrian and/or Iraqi territories a “sufficient investment of their own soldiers”, in the form of combined ground forces, distributed in the combinations adapted for the tasks that they will assume, the ISSIL will not be beaten by his enemies of these Arabic infected countries. And it seems that the ISSIL will possible be defend indefinitely from his frontier enemies. In the air raids in Syria take part Arabia, the USA, Bahrain, Canada, the Arab United Emirates and Jordan. In Iraq, asking for the authorities permission attack Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the USA and Great Britain.

THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAK AND SIRIA, II PART.

(CONTINUATION)

Contradictions of the ISSIL.

Since they do not have sufficient rooting between the Iraqi or Syrian population, to leave their temporal positions does not suppose abandoning the habitants to the armed enemy. The habitants of the occupied areas are not gained for the Jihad or holy war. These settlers are frightened, threatened and, at least, neutralized, in order that they give cover, subsistence and support to the jihadists bands and neither hinder, nor importune them in their activities. Only those that they cooperated with the » Enemies of the jihad » can be in danger before them. When they occupy a population, especially in the periphery of the Islamic State, the jihadists always prepare the evacuation routes towards the suburbs, and of retreat, from these to the established nearby meeting points. To escape from them to the reception or of occupation regional positions.

When they are liberated of the jihadists, many habitants, specially in the hamlets, try to flee temporarily and to shelter in the nearby major populations. The reason is that the imperious, inconsiderate and hammering despotism of the jihadists, is joined by the heavy fires of their enemies, used during the capture of the population. Both the military men and the rebels major groups (fundamentally the peshmergas) prefer avoiding their losses and hurrying up the evacuation of the jihadists, using the aviation and artillery, if they have it. Even, the free flight rockets with hollow load like the RPG-7V (an artillery of the poor), thrown in double or triple volleys, cause a devastating effect in the masonry or adobe buildings. This already would serve to make to withdraw towards downtown, the jihadists security forces from their anticipated positions, placed in the limits of the population or in adjacent points. And already finally, the Syrian army usually moves back soon, to realize other attack missions. So, the constant, fluid and up to reversible character of the military operations. Then, the jihadists can return and purify responsibilities. Because of all this, many civilians think: «once, but not more».

The decision, aggressiveness and the scorn to the death of the jihadists has given them military advantages over the lay rebel opponents. And his activity and significance is increasing in the military Syrian opposition panorama. In several Syrian provinces, as Raqqa or Deir al Zor, they have displaced the Free Army of Syria and have «settled» as the only operational rebel force. In December, 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria assaulted the headquarters of the Supreme Military Council of the lay moderate political opposition, in the frontier Turkish city of Bab al-Hawa and plundered the arsenals and depots. And the combats between rebels have been constant in the mountainous Kurdish regions during 2.014. All this took the USA and Great Britain to progressively suspending all kinds of military support to the Syrian rebels. For fear that parts of the proportionate means and supplies and reinforcements for the FAS, like the sunni commands trained in Jordan, lead to the elevation of the Western enemies.

TAKING A CONFORTABLE WALK, BUT, WHERE ARE THEIR ENEMIES?

Al-Baghdadi immediately established the Sharia, as civil and penal law of the caliphate. So, all the women, even the shops manikins, were forced to cover their faces, for not appeal the men with sinful suggestions. His Islamic courts apply the death sentence to different practices considered criminal, as the Muslim women’s rape, the homosexuality, adultery and blasphemy and some cases of thefts. The unfaithful or heretics people (Christians, yazidis, shiites, mandeos, etc.) that do not turn to the sunni Islam (initially they thought to make pay the Christians some exaction for the ISSIL), are violently chased. This way, successively, their houses are marked, their goods, seized, their wives, raped and their children, murdered. The pursued suffer summary executions and are taken as hostages, to collect rescues. There have been denounced of persons’ decapitations that deny to the conversion, including women and children, and the exhibition of their corpses in the public squares. This unleashed a religious genocide specially in the Iraqi areas of the rotter caliphate, which has provoked a massive flight of persons of the minorities towards the neighboring countries, Turkey, Jordan and The Lebanon, generating a refugees’ serious problem in them.

In his zeal for obtaining the adhesion of new followers, the ISSIL looks at West. His preferential aims are the deceived young persons, mentally unmotivated and ideologically, not educated in the virtues of the European civilization. And spoiled and overfed in our mercantile and materialists countries, who have turned all the desires into needs to be satisfied by the markets. This way, the IISIL spread at the end of May of 2.014 the first edition of a weekly magazine in English, the «Islamic State Report» and a video in German, but subtitled in English. In this one, a western jihadist, praises Baghdadi, the leader of the ISSIL, announces as «good news … the return of the Sharia and the Islamic State» and openly asks their sympathizers to come, «and join the ranges» of the ISSIL. The Islamic State Report tries to give an idea of the increasing degree of institutionalization that is acquiring the Islamic State in his bases. The publication gathers an interview with the person in charge of the formation of the new clergymen of this territory, the sheikh Abu Hawraa al-Jazaairi. That indicates that they already have educated dozens of them in a new educational center and that they have prohibited the presence in the mosques of those that they do not study in it.

The «Islamic State Report» published months ago an ironic and sensationalist article: “ Patrolling with the Protection of the Consumer Office». And Abu Salih al-Ansari, in charge of the specialized unit in verifying that food is not sell in poor condition, or that do not adjust to the islamist directives of the ISSIL, warns that a telephone has been enabled to attend the public complaints… Constantly they give images in the social networks of the daily life in the caliphate and spread videos with hostages executions, as response to what they consider the aggressions of the Crusaders. Also, the IS calls his sympathizers in the world to perpetrate individual and isolated actions in the enemy rear. Immediately after the air offensive of the Coalition, they called to commit outrages against the citizens’ life of the countries that form part of her. It is calculated that in March of 2.015 already there are in Twitter more than 40 thousand operational accounts of jihadists, with propaganda and proselytizing eagerness.

The Assault to a Universal Civilization.

Already in the summer of 2.014, after Mosul seizure, the IS began to destroy the heretics temples of the Islam. And presented a video, announcer of the barbarism who would strike on all the territories that rules the Caliphate, titled: «The destruction of the unfaithful sanctuaries and statues in Nineveh (province)». Where without mercy appeared the blowing-up of the shiites and sufis mosques of the city. In all that, al-Baghdadi‘s jihadists emulate with more efficiency, insanity, extension and giving themselves up the blind mullah Omar‘s Taliban. That in 2.001 destroyed with dynamite, because their direct heavy fire was not effective for their technical dimness, both Buda’s giant statues, of 37 and 55 ms. height, in Bamiyan’s mountain, Afghanistan, which were Cultural Heritage of the Humanity.

THE BARBARIAN FLAG…

Following his wild run towards the human sewer, the al-Baghdadi’s bearded at the end of February tackled against the images, statues, bas-reliefs, busts and coins with effigies of the old Mesopotamic cultures. Mosul’s Archaeological Museum was going several years in restoration, to overcome the hurts suffered after the first War of the Gulf (with the repression of the Kurdish revolt) and the insurrection against the American occupation. In it were hoarded great collections of historical art, proceeding from 1.800 archaeological deposits that surround the city, where were standing out the remains obtained in the Assyrian cities of Nimrod and Nineveh. There were statues of the Assyrians kings, a collection of winged lions or bulls, bas-reliefs and friezes showing activities of the daily life, as hunting, and a great statue of Lammasu, his protective god, with body of lion or bull, wings of eagle and human head. In London already has been detected the arrival of a hundred of small pieces, ceramic, coins and crystals, plundered in Syria by the jihadists. Always will exist collectors capable of buying the stolen material, justifying themselves in that «if I do not buy it, another one will do».

But, all these objects were gathered, preserved and hoarded from the beginnings of the written History by the successive habitants of the «Great Mesopotamia» and the «Great Syria». That were turned to the Islam when the Muslims conquer the Sasanian Empire around the 644. Between these settlers are included the primitive Muslims, the pious ancestors of the Islam, the examples to be followed by the Islam of pro, rooted traditions and orthodoxy. That are the models who presume imitate and continue the salafists jihadists of all the epochs. And that form the «group of the ancestors», formed by the Prophet, his companions and the first 4 sunnis caliphs, known as the Rashidun or «straightly guided by Allah». How do they dare to try to destroy what They preserved? Armed with hammers and working maces and radial saws and dressed like messes, working with zeal, we all have seen the videos distributed by them, announcing their deeds and to frighten the foreign people, in the television newscasts.

The most affected places, placed in Mosul’s surroundings, were the ruins of the Assyrian city of Dur Sharrukin, Nineveh, Nimrod and Hatra, the capital of the Phartian kingdom between 247 and 226 B.C. This one was declared Heritage of the Humanity and is included from 2.010 in the list of cultural sites on the verge of extinction by the Fund of the World Heritage, due to the plunders and the lack of protection by the Iraqi government. Impotent, the Iraq government asked the Security Council of the UNO on Friday, the 6th of March, help to preserve all this historical heritage of the humanity, attacked with impunity by the IS. It is of worth indicate that Nimrod is half of way between Mosul, left also to driven to despair by the Kurdish Iraqi peshmergas, when the IS attacked her at the beginning of last June and Erbil, the capital of these. And never the “Kurdish warriors” tried to counter-attack the lightly escorted squads of wreckers of the IS. One sees also that the general James Terry and his American expedition for the formation of the new Iraq army, who came in November of 2.01, go with some delay in their missions. Oh, how easy the al-Baghdadi mujahidins are motivated, trained and fight!! Also, the Mosul’s Christian legacy was a goal, months ago, for Allah’s brainless. That attacked the Chaldean and Syrian orthodox cathedrals of Mosul, two fundamental symbols of the Assyrian Christian inheritance. And the ISSIL immediately replaced the crosses in the exterior of the temples by his black flags with the Shahada.

In parallel and without continuity solution, the hallucinated jihadists attacked also during February of 2.015 the Mosul’s libraries, the third city of Iraq (the second is Basra, with almost 4 million habitants) and the most important in the hands of the IS. For them, for books already have the Noble Koran. And other texts are creations of the human mind, alien to Allah. First, was plundered Mosul’s Central Library, where they extracted from the shelves between 2 thousand and 8 thousand books (according to the different reliable sources that inform us) and took them in a dozen of vehicles and opened light trucks. In the principal racks only Islamic texts stayed. After the theft, the jihadists demolished with explosives part of the principal building of this knowing temple, to condemn it for his activity and rendering useless it for this infidel use. Then, they assaulted the library of Mosul’s University, where burned hundreds of profane books (science, philosophy, literature), in front of his pupils summoned for that witches’ sabbath. Also were object of pillage other known libraries of the city, like that of the Latin Church or that of the Monastery of the Dominicans Friars, whose books also were withdrawn without been destroyed, in vehicles. The university texts were of common use and were handled, but other stolen writings are of major value and are destined for the marketing with international venal buyers. A person in charge of libraries in Mosul calculated that the losses and the thefts concerned more than 112 thousand books and manuscripts preserved in them.

Everybody wants to be in the «Islamic State».

Though without having the operational unity of the irregular forces of the ISSIL in the territories of Syria and Iraq, in other countries of the Muslim wasp’s nest of Southwest Asia and the Maghrib, spontaneous and emotional regional adhesions have arisen for the first sunni Caliphate of the third millennium. Lacking of military operational action unity, it is a question of some «ideological emotional bonds», arisen from the zeal to belong to something more than to a terrorist diffuse and profuse Network, with distant commands and without the feet in the Arabic immediate and desert land, as it is with al-Qaeda.

In Libya, almost irreversibly crushed between the hundreds of local, regional and semi nomadic tribes, spread for his 1.760 thousand Km2. of surface, exist 2 great enemy groups who were disputing the favor of the tribes and that were operationally stagnant. In Tobruk, in the Cirenaica, resides the Libyan government recognized by the community international and supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And in Tripoli, which occupied her in August of 2.014, the «rebel» government of the Libyan Dawn coalition, with high islamist presence, which denies again and again to have links with al-Qaeda, and that are supported by Qatar and Turkey. And this is the original humus, the favorable environment, the fertilized ground where once and again we see that appears and prospers the poisonous, stinking and purulent virus of the salafists jihadists: the social chaos and fracture.

This way, on Wednesday, the 18th of February, the IS local groups occupied the important city of Sirte, placed in the gulf of her name, between Tripoli and Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica. Sirte is also Muammar al-Gaddafi’s natal city, whose death 4 years ago initiated the decomposition and the total clash in the country. To celebrate it, the jihadists, which are not bombed here by the Obama’s Coalition of the 60, realized an impressive parade of victory and force. Hundreds of jihadists and sympathizers realized a power exhibition in the streets of the city, where paraded the «battalions» of their irregular infantry and dozens of light armored gunned transport vehicles (type, light opened van) with mujahidins, that were accompanied and greeted with cheers and acclamations by the habitants during their tour for the city. The government in Tobruk did not react to these facts and the «rebel» limited himself to make advance towards Sirte, without other intentions, the Misrata’s «brigade», placed at Sirte’s northwest. This way, the Islamic State in Libyan version has managed to hoist his black flag in Sirte, in Derna, a fishermen town with 50 thousand habitants of the Cyrenaica, where his tribal militias already swore loyalty to al-Baghdadi, and in other minor enclaves of this country, where it began to appear in force.

In Nigeria, the Boko Haram’s fighting chiefs are usually the familiar or tribal chiefs, their local leaders. They attack forming a «swarm» of small units that act simultaneously or successively, coordinated by a «combat chief». This primitive, tribal, «free» character, does that among the regional chiefs exist rivalries, which prevent a vertical integration of the terrorists. His tactics and methods are: all kinds of ambushes; the harassment at certain distance of marching units and garrisons; the liquidation of sentries and small patrols; the harassment to the supply and communication lines of the military and the local self-defense forces; the sudden attacks against small garrisons; the capture of hostages of all classes with varied aims: to execute them, to sell them, to incorporate them into his ranges, to obtain the price of rescue; the execution or mutilation of the enemies or elements that hinder them: journalists, collaborators of foreign organizations, local authorities, religious. They take advantage to the maximum of his knowledge of the ground, of his high mobility, of the people support and of his natural fighting capacit. These bands always plan their retreat from the action zones, because, though they are fanatical and does not matter too much for them to die, it is not in their goals to be immolated deliberately for the Cause.

THE NIGERIA’S CRAZY MAHDI.

Shekau, called the black Ben Laden, is a controversial type at the eyes of the westerns, included his own name, Abu Baker Shekau, because their followers called him Darul Tawhid. He was born approximately 40 years ago in the wide zone between the south of Niger and the North-East of Nigeria. His formation is not known, but he knows the Koran and speaks the tribal languages of the zone (kanuri, fula, hausa and Arab) where the terrorist band operates. He fluently uses the means of the propaganda and the fear. He repeats Ben Laden’s theatrical bits (to raise the finger as a sign of threat towards the cameras, to his lookers) and mounts an equal staging (black flags, Kalashnikovs and Korans) in his appearances to the enemy means. One of a major declarations he did, was in a video taken after killing 180 persons in 2012: «I enjoy killing anyone that God orders me to kill, the same I enjoy killing hens and sheep». It is said that he is solitary, introspective and cruel. And is distrustful up to with his own men. He lives protected by a close loyal group, in the style of Ben Laden, and remains away from the majority of the group. Always, in these more or less chased principal commands, is inevitably developed the paranoia, which ends up by altering their cognitive and emotional functions. One of four wives of Mohamed Yusuf, executed in a police station in 2.009, which was his predecessor and the founder of Boko Haram, has returned to marry Shekau, according to the Nigerian intelligence. Nobody knows who finances him. Not only he is a mystery for West, but for many of his sectarian companions. He was given for dead in 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2.014, but the information was incorrect. He has a bullet wound, already recovered, in the leg. Now, he only goes out to outside the cloudy days, to prevent to be located by the drones or the spy satellites. The USA offers $7 million for the relevant information that leads to capture him.

In a qualitative jump in his terrorist activities, Boko Haram kidnapped in the middle of April 2.014 270 Nigerian girls in a Chibok’s school, at the northeast of Nigeria, which whereabouts are still unknown. These fanatic rebels are called themselves «the disciples of the Prophet for the spread of the Islam and the Jihad», that express «Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad”. «Boko Haram is a serious threat for Africa and for Europe. His will is to destabilize the north of Nigeria, the neighboring countries and the whole region», declared François Hollande in the high-level meeting celebrated in Paris on Saturday, the 17th of May of 2.014, on occasion of the terrorist escalation. «Boko Haram already is not a local group, but he is clearly operating as an arm of al-Qaeda in the center of Africa. Without the help of all the countries of the African west, we will never be able to win him», declared, in turn, the Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan. The Nigerian government possesses 20 thousand soldiers, planes and intelligence units deployed in the North-East of the country, where Boko Haram is more active. But, «these troops are not prepared to face an armed group with these characteristics», Indicated the British secretary of Foreign Affairs, William Hague. Nigeria and his neighbors Cameroun, Chad and Niger realize «coordinated patrols» to look for missing persons and hostages and to control the traffic of weapon, in the frame of the Commission of the Lake Chad’s Basin.

Three devices exploded in Maiduguri, at the North-East of Nigeria, on Saturday, the 7th of March of 2.015. It was the worst assault to the city realized by militants of Boko Haram, which try to occupy the population from ends of January. It is confirmed that approximately 58 dead and 139 injured have taken place in the explosions that shocked the city. So cruel like al-Baghdadi, but more histrionic and higher stoned than him, Abu Baker Shekau has seized this opportunity and the consequent merits, for declared himself a subject of the Islamic State on Sunday, the 8th of March. “Baya” to the caliph of the Muslims, proclaimed Shekau in an Arab recording. The “baya” is the loyalty oath and submission to a religious politic Islamic authority. And several islamic, but minor groups, of the whole world have given already his oath of loyalty to the caliph of the IS.

WHITHOUT COMMENTS FROM ISLAM’S PIOUS ULEMAS AND MUFTIS…

INSANITY ATTACK TO A KNOWING TEMPLE, UNIVERSITY OF GARISSA, KENYA TO KILL CHRISTIANS…

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAK AND SIRIA I.

The appearance of the Islamic State has supposed a qualitative change in the goals, the possibilities, the reputation and in the general and operational strategy of the salafist jihadists of the entire world. Till then, the ideological headquarters of the terrorist group al-Qaeda were establishing and ordering to his own groups or regional supporters, some punctual aims of assault and destruction of persons, goods and places. And its accomplishment, isolated and unconnected between them, operationally, temporally and locally, were marking the terrorists limits of the action and the propaganda, that the organization was looking for. They were acting, really, as a network.

But his «nodes» (the radiant local centers) were weak, without operational transcendence and were remaining too distant between them. These were joined by «ropes», representing his potentials of communication, combined actions and mutual support, which were frayed, almost free. The design, the functionality and the absent and remote direction of this Network were not serving for anything more… In his history, the followers of Ben Laden never managed to control a sufficient extension of key territory. «Al-Qaeda is only a movement, we are already a State«, declared a proud salafist mujaidin of the ISSL. The reality is that the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant spreads diffuse and intermittently for a territory of the size of Spain, which goes from Aleppo up to Diyala’s Iraqi province, at the east of the country, with the Euphrates as vertebral column of his urban enclaves.

A LUXURY WATCH WASN’T USED BY THE PIOUS ANCESTORS OF THE ISLAM TO CONQUER HALF WORLD…

The Drawn Sword of the Islam.

His name is Ibrahim Anwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri. But the guy is in the line of the Popes and some political and military sheiks of the Islam, of the changing name on having ascended or been raised to the seat. And this way, he has named Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. That means, the Father of Baker, from Baghdad. It is a vague name, following the narrow structure used in the epoch of the Arabic tribes, inflamed of overwhelming zeal for the Islam. For it, he only might be recognize at home, at the eating times, if he did not have the well-deserved reputation of «Butcher of the Islam». He was born in a village near to Samarra city, a provincial capital at north of Baghdad, in 1.971. The first witnesses indicate that he was a pacific, introverted and reserved man, who liked to read, to visit the mosque and to play football a place near home.

He had beard, was using with a white cap and dressed the dishdasha, the Iraqi masculine tunic. With 18 years he did the military service in the army of Saddam Hussein. Really, the EISL has altered the behaviors of the youth, presenting him much more pious and occupied for the Koran studies, that really he was. It seems that he took Islamic studies in Baghdad’s University. There are not many locate eyewitnesses of his life and his own family have fled from the city, pulled down of been related with this element. After the American invasion of 2.003 and the beginning of the sunni insurrection against the collaborating chiies and the tribal militias of the clergyman al-Sadr, al-Baghdadi took part in the rebel groups in what was called the «sectarian war (2.004-2.007)».

During a pursuit against Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, the chief of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Baghdadi was arrested. The Americans classified it as a «civil intern», that is, linked with the rebels, but not participant in their operations. And interned him in Camp Bucca, at the south of Iraq, a vague time between 1 and 2 years, as the whole mystery or trick that deliberately wraps this subject. This prison was more comfortable and, especially, more tolerant than the shameful Abu Ghraib, near Baghdad. Where the Americans were retaining, near his operational center of the capital, those who more worry them with theirs facts or relations with the rebels. Observed impassively by his lenient jailers, the interns of Camp Bucca realized contacts between them, were sharing Information, read the Koran, interpreting it in their radical and slanted way, and received yihadists harangues. And towards ends of 2.005 he was liberated.

Ibrahim Anwad began to form part of al-Qaeda in Iraq, where he pointed out in a short time for his organizational capacities. But, at June 7 of 2.006 al-Zarkawi died in a joint air raid of the USA and Iraq aviation, near Bakuba, approximately 65 Kms. at the north of Baghdad, where also died 7 assistants of the terrorist chief. In a few months, Ibahim Anwad took control of the organization in Iraq. By 2.007, Abu Baker, integrating also other yihadists bands in al-Qaeda, assumed the conductive command of the new Islamic State of Iraq, in whose name was stamping his style, capacity and intention. They were difficult, diminished and secret times for the group. The Americans were in Iraq; their anti terrorist strategy of dispersion and isolation of the rebels active bands, rested on the each disputed area in the self-defense tribal forces, the so called Sahwa or «sunni reappear» (sunni dawn), was working from 2.007, under general David Petraeus’ guidance; and the sunnis had left their politics of not take part in the Iraqi public life, dominated and without legal opposition till then by the chií majority.

Implacably chased by his threatened enemies from home and overseas, Abu Baker slips often in the immense desert zone of Syria (his oriental desert) and Iraq (Anbar’s frontier and desert province), stopping in the surroundings of the controlled cities by the ISSIL. The terrorists use small dispersed and camouflaged or masked groups of vehicles, which travel intermingling with the habitual traffic of the zone. That goes sticking to the course of the Euphrates, through the adjacent roads and ways in the desert. There have been realized several attempts of physical elimination of the caliph, using the air not crewed vehicles or by means of specific incursions at charge of a reinforced platoon of elites troops, with his missions of assault, support and isolation. The actions were approved after be detecting his probable presence, thanks to tale-bearings or intelligence operations. But, till now, only they have led to causing falls in his escort officials or his close co religionists, without reaching the slippery leader.

At the short distances, the Caliph, proudly, reserved and mercilessly, appears, according to witnesses information, despot and yet overwhelming, in the treatment with third parties foreign to his intimate circles. Unlike the previous chief of «al-Qaeda in Iraq», Abu Baker takes very much care of his personal image and does not allow his capture by the means. His more extensive and trustworthy images date back to his proclamation in Mosul of the islamist Caliphate. Nevertheless, Ibrahim Anwad al-Badri’s first police photos show him with discontinuous and careless beard and something chubby for a man in the forties years of his life.

The Structure of the Caliphate.

The Administration created by al-Baghdadi is worthy of better destinations. And is a proof of his organizational capacities of political religious leader of the Islam. The executive dome of al-Imarah is formed by the Caliph, his two delegates for Iraq and Syria and the cabinet or council, integrated by 7 advisers. Al-Imarah means Muslim emirate. There exists a legislative organ for military and religious matters named the Council of the Shura, which depends on the al-Imarah governance, that is to say, of his three principal commands and the cabinet. Every national delegate possesses 12 regional governors, each attributed to important or key populations or to certain zones of each country. Also, every delegate has 8 secretaries or offices, dedicated specifically to the tasks or departments more important.

This way, they are: Assistance of the fighters, for the support of the foreign mujaidins. Finance, which controls the sale of oil and derivatives, hostages and confiscated objects and buys weapons and supply. Intelligence, which gathers information, elaborates intelligence and distributes it to the different interested parties. Legality, which entrusts of the legal matters, of the judgments and of the mujaidins and sympathizers’ recruitment. Leadership, which writes the laws and procedures and establishes the political strategy. Means, which regulates them and realizes all kinds of propaganda. Military, on whom depends the coordination of the defense and armed extension of the caliphate. Security, which carries out the internal vigilance and executes the death sentences, operating as a kind of politician delegation or religious police.

And, how many guerrillas possesses the ISSIL? The CIA valued few months ago it was possessing something more that 30 thousand mujaidins, of which 20% would be foreign. It is the source most serious and qualified to realize such difficult estimation. Some of them have been pulverized by the aviation of the Obama’s Coalition; some, of the foreign, hallucinated and stultified adventurers, have returned to their countries to do there the Jihad; and some thousands will have increased his ranges from the summer to now. In the worst of the possibilities for the freedom and the persons, the forces of the IS would not overcome the 45 thousand useful armed. And of them approximately 10 thousand are foreign, catechized in his places of origin and mesmerized by the facts and propaganda of the IS.

Jihadists in Syria.

The deep crisis of the Syrian civil society and the mismanagement produced by a civil war «in crescendo», that already extends for 4 years, causing 200 thousand dead men, have allowed to the jihadists groups of the Near East to settle in Syria. His refuge zones and his areas of influence are not individually big, nor continue. They are rather dispersed and nearby between them. And none of them would resist a military serious harassment. The occupied zones form like amorphous and fluent «spots» in evolution, from which they withdraw if the military enemy pressure is strong and continued. To install in alternative positions the nearest possible, that allow them to keep a minimal operational connection with other regional positions.

In Syria have proliferated the «supporters sets» or bands of al-Qaeda. The reasons of why they have not been articulated an only terrorist Syrian group are different. One is the distance and the lack of control and ascendancy of al-Qaeda’s «head office». This is the cross of his operational decentralization, for which the Network usually presumes and threatens to reach his enemies for half the planet. The communist parties, verified specialists in the capture of the power, always exhibited an ideological, operational and military monolithic unit, proper of warriors filled with enthusiasm monks, in their so called of «national liberation» fights for three continents. Another reason is that these «separated brothers» hate between them. The egalitarianism derived from the brotherhood in the salafist sunni doctrines, soon originates between the «equal ones», a purulent and contagious infection of envy, ill-will and rancor. And vice versa, the existence of a capable, just hierarchy, respected and accepted in an organization, favors the emulation and the ascent of many of the most capable. A reason that weighs is also the ambition, the audacity, the overflowing aggressiveness and the lack of scruples of his military chiefs and locals sheiks. Their first bitter enemy is neither the Army, nor the SFA or the Kurds, Alauits, Christians or Druzes’ self-defense militias, according to the regions. Their more hated and dreaded enemies are the commands of other jihadists groups in Syria. Because they are the most related, their rivals for the command, that they who compete with them for the direction of the jihadism in Syria.

About the strategies of the 2 jihadists groups of Syria, the “Front al-Nusrah for the Liberation of the Peoples of the East” seeks to establish only a «Islamic radical emirate» in Syria. And the ISSIL, born in the guerrilla warfares in Irak after 2.003, wants to create a salafist Caliphate more extensive and permanent. And to install it, for the moment, in Syria and Iraq. Though already it has done punishment assaults to the Lebanese Shiites, in response to Hezbolá’s support to al-Assad. The first follows and goes in parallel with the strategy of al-Qaeda of favoring the creation and functioning of national or regional «representative cores». That from his physical distance and with the structural laxity of the Network, could be controlled by her, about orders, strategies and operations and the use of «al-Qaeda’s brand». But, the ISSIL looks for a functional independence and, probably also ideological, with «head office core» of the Network. Since the Islamic State would act as an “operational command» in a supranational zone. Which might include the whole southwest of Asia. This way, an administrator and absentee high headquarters, is of no use and irrelevant for the ISSIL.

Ayman al-Zawahiri confirmed in 2.013 the link of the Front al-Nusrah of Abu Mohammed al-Golani with al-Qaeda and denied any relation with the ISSIL. And he had to intervene in several occasions to deprive al-Baghdadi of authority. “The ISSIL must be abolished, whereas the Islamic State of Iraq must continue working», he declared categorical al-Zawahiri in November, 2013. «Al-Baghdadi committed a mistake on having established the ISSIL without asking us for permission», and, continued, the Syrian al-Golani also «has been wrong on having announced his rejection of the ISSIL, without our permission». Al-Zawahiri ordered then that the Islamic State of Iraq should circumscribe his operations to that country, whereas the Front al-Nusrah is «an independent branch of al-Qaeda that reports before the general command (a kind of regional delegate)». In addition, he recriminated both «brothers groups» for their acts of violence against other Muslims. In response, and in spite that the original group «al-Qaeda in Iraq» of Musab al-Zarkawi sworn loyalty to al-Zawahiri, al-Baghdadi declared in rebelliousness towards him. Producing an important crisis of leadership in the Network, which they tried to repair moving away from al-Baghdadi. This debilitated the fight against al-Assad, as the jihadists groups were spreading in Syria and her army was centering towards the great populations. And during the clashes between the rebels of first of 2.014, al-Golani offered his mediation to the groups, which it did not come to fruition, looking to give priority to plant face against to al-Assad. In this epoch the break between the 2 great jihadists groups complete, after a series of approximation talks between delegates of both branches, celebrated in the Syrian Kurdistan. In one of them Abu Baker appeared, forming part of the negotiating group, but without revealing his identity to his speakers of the Front al-Nusrah.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

AN UNSUCCESSFUL AND DEGRADED CALIPHATE II.

(CONTINUATION)

The Islamic State of Syria, Iraq and Levante (southwest of Asia)

In general, the jihadists groups have failed in actively and firmly joining in a social wide group, which gives coverage and permanent impulse to their «imperialistic social religious movement». Their «catechizing of the violence» allows them to be prepared mental for the glorious and in peace death, and, even for the suicide, in the accomplishment of their punctual tactical actions. But this rage and insanity sermon is not a weapon for the conversion of social groups. And there is a fundamental reason for it,: their «creed» lacks possibilities of acceptance, victory and permanency, out of the vicissitudes of a war. The jihadists groups act with an unnecessary and indiscriminate brutality, which discredits them before the Islam, the Koran and the Sunna or Islamic tradition gathered in the hadises or writed «comments and facts» of Mohamed. This lack of religious legitimacy provokes the absolute absence of venerable, respected and pious ulemas and mufties at their side. Their supposed «Islam ideology» is based on a few favorable verses of the Koran (this has approximately 6200), on some formely historical facts, when the minor Jihad (or violent one) was applicable and useful for the Umma, and not on the totality of the message of the Islam.

The Operational Complications of the Jihadists.

Al-Qaeda acted in Syria in 2011 and 2012 using the Front al-Nusrah for the Liberation of the Peoples of East. This name was and is of inversely proportional length to his real operational capacity. Al-Nusrah was responsible of the great isolated and indiscriminate attacks with bombs in Damascus and other cities. They were seeking to introduce a factor of instability and social fracture in the real parameters of this war. That did not manage to produce for the discontinuity of the attacks and for be knowing the authorship of these insanity assaults against Muslims. In the revolt against the occupation of 2003 in Iraq, al-Qaeda had lines of supplies and recruitment from Syria, which nowadays are used in the other way. From Turkey they were also receiving «internationalists muhaydinnes». And in 2012, part of the liberated in several assaults to Iraqi prisons, joined the Front al-Nusrah, which was fortifying in number and operational capacity.

The differences between the ISSIL and the Front al-Nusrah are born in a personal clash: the ill-will between Abu Abdulah al-Bagdadi, chief of the Islamic State of Iraq (today, the ISSIL), and Abu Mohamed al-Golani, founder of the Front al-Nusrah. Initially, the Iraqis helped the Syrians to establish their own affiliated organization of “the Network”. But, in the spring of 2013 al-Bagdadi announced the creation of the Islamic State of Syria, Iraq and the Levant. And tried to fuse his organization with her of to the-Golani. Certainly, the Front al-Nusrah rejected directly his absorption. The Iraqi al-Baghdadi considers himself to be a direct disciple of Osama Ben Laden. And already in 2010, took the command of the AQI, which inherited from the unsuccessful Musab al-Zarkawi, changing then its name to «Islamic State of Iraq».

The ISSIL is very unpopular in Syria, for his extremism and for having a qualified majority of Iraqis and jihadists from Europe and other parts of the world in his rows. After Yarabulus’s recent occupation, in the north of Syria, they beheaded a dozen of men, and fixed his heads in stakes. And the habitants who could, frightened emigrated to Karkamis, a Turkish locality. The rejection to the ISSIL is such that the Syrian National Coalition, the principal political opponent platform, assures that the organization is supported by the Syrian regime, which theoretically is enemy of all of them. This way, In a communique of January, 2014 it affirmed: «The Coalition believes that the ISSIL is closely linked with the terrorist regime, and serves directly or indirectly, to the interests of the president al-Assad and his lobby. The Syrians’ murder at hands of this group does not leave doubts on the intentions in his creation, his aims and the agendas to which he serves, confirmed by the nature of his terrorist hostile actions to the Syrian Revolution».

On other hand, the Islamic Front is an alliance created in 2013 by seven islamist «radical and moderate» groups, all opposite to the Network. His spokespersons say that they approximately count with 45 thousand fighters. But, we do not believe that reach 10 thousand militias of «light irregular infantry». If the Front is n force in a key point as the frontier position Bab al-Hawa with Turkey, at the level of Hatay’s province, the ISSIL has kept for four months Azaz, the ville of access to Alepo from the Turkish border in Kilis. In the north of Syria operate all the groups, controlling unconnected chunks of ground. The ISSIL killed Abu Rayan, a negotiator of «Ahrar Sham», a group of the Islamic Front, at the end of December. To the murder joined the assault of the ISSIL at the beginning of year to Kafranbel, in the power of the ELS. The clashes between the Islamic Front and the Islamic State of Syria, Iraq and Levant spread to Alepo’s neighborhoods and to the localities Tel Rifat and Maskanah. On Friday, the 3rd of February, an offensive of «Suqur Sham», another group of the Front, prevented the ISIS from send reinforcements near Azaz. Complicating everything, the so called «Army of the Syrians Muyahidins» has just been formed, where gather the adversaries of the ISIL and also joined by the Front al-Nusrah. We verify that the islamist terrorists are generally ideologically, institutionally and strategically divided. Though the rivals bands could offer occasionally support, refuge, information or supplies between them. The reasons are that the chiefs of principal bands always want to be «emirs (princes) and interpreters (doctors) of the Islam.» Their urgencies and organizational and tactical preferences have very mundane and degenerate foundations. «By their actions and fruits you will know them».

A confused, diffuse and schizophrenic strategy…

Keeping a similar strategy in Syria and Iraq by the ISSIL for the creation of his radical salifist independent caliphate has several important mistakes. One is to simultaneously fight in two countries with different strategic approaching. Other is to divide their meagres trained operational forces in two fronts. In Syria, the valid strategic for the heterogeneous, multiple and divided opposition to al-Assad, is to support, at least, the unit in the military strategy. This way, all the military efforts could converge in different, simultaneous or successive, objectives, that decides a military high command, respected by all the present and active groups in Syria. Already we have seen how al-Assad amounts means and efforts to his cause (militias trained of Hezbola, armament, equipments and ammunitions reinstatement, political diplomatic support from China, Iran and Russia). This is allowing him to beat in diverse combats the opposition groups and to expel them from positions that were occupying, some during certain time. Not observance of this strategy, of pure survival, would lead the opposition to his progressive destruction by the SNA.

In Iraq, the strategy of the Sunnis does not try to gain a civil war at the democratic imperfect regime al-Maliki, of Shiite majority. Neither she claims, nor might, expel them from the country by depletion, on having emphasized their disability to finish with the armed rebels and forcing them to assume it. This was the case of many “wars of national liberation” in the colonial countries in the middle of the 20th century. To many of the guerrilla popular movements it was enough to them to resist for some years the floods and onslaughts of the foreign military forces. And, this way, resisting, they tired the metropolis peoples from support a distant, poor assumed and harmful war and enervated their armed forces. Which were often lack of understanding and up to underestimated in their own homes. The Sunnis fight to regionally guarantee the power of their tribes, based on their accepted chiefs, on their «assemblies of equals» of those standing up in them and in the Pashtunwalli or code of honor for their behavior and their individual and collective rights and duties. The Sunnis fight to get rights and concessions from the Shiite majority, which they too obstinately deny to them within the rules of the imperfect inorganic democracy existing in Iraq.

For it, their combats are very measured. And his aims go on through few and successive steps. So, the Sunnis leave certain freedom of action to the Islamic State, provided that they respect their hegemony and do not try to establish strategic guerrilla bases in the tribal zones. Then, in concrete cases, they facilitate temporary refuge, supply and concealment to their «action groups» in their operations. As was the case of the previous concentration of the companies and battalions of the Islamic State for the harassment and the temporal occupation of al-Ramadi and Faluya. The Islamic State has little probabilities of establishing itself and managing to control a more or less great zone in Iraq. Because, both the army and the Sunnis militias would reject his attempts of creating stable bases. Necessary to realize consistent and connected operations, looking for some military and/or social definite and transcendent aim.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN

If Plutarch was living today, surely he would write one of his «Parallel Lives» (one of two collections of his works), dedicated to trying and comparing the not crewed planes («death from above») and the suicidal yihadists («Allahu Akbar»). In effect, both are annoying and asymmetrical weapon, directed against the personnel and the mental and volitional factors of the enemy. That are not tactically decisive. And whose military effects are limited, but accumulative.

The Not Crewed Planes of exploration (reconnaissance) and ground recognition and of bombardment.

They are technologically advanced weapons, which began to develop several decades ago, destined to eliminate a minimum of «designated enemies», so much real as «ideological or potential «. And to minimizing the own losses. Which does irrelevant his economic cost for their rich owners. They have a highest effective range and are of the category of «intelligent». Though are not yet authorized to decide the moment to throw their missiles, once acquired the target. Their operational strategic use might be named the «War of the Drones».

The specific tasks that were distinguishing the CIA and the Pentagon, were intermingling during the first decade of the 21st century. This was owed to the operational and strategic failure of the USA in the long asymmetric wars of IV th generation (be read of guerrilla warfares and, be added or not, as be the hostiles, of national liberation) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Actions that they carried out after their short «armed conflicts» after 11/09/2001 against the masses armies (of second generation) of their tyrannical regimes. And using in them their trained and very technologically equipped forces (of III rd generation). Closed in false the Iraqi front and initiated the retreat in Afghanistan, the White House is endowing the CIA of more military means to give hunt to the salafists terrorists. So she has increased his drones or planes without crew fleet. And is considering to authorize an increase of the Pentagon’s spies’ network, to exercise a bigger control on the refuges of al-Qaeda in the Arabic peninsula and in the east and north of Africa.

These changes in the strategic and operational aims of the CIA and the Pentagon and the suitable endowment of means, culminated during the Barack Obama’s first mandate. The CIA has taken more active part in the eradication of the international jihadism, and has expanded notably his program of assaults with missiles thrown by drones. In the summer of 2011, Obama nominated the former director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, chief of the Pentagon. And the commander of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and chief of the Central military Command, David Petraeus, was nominated director of the CIA. Petraeus, before resigning 9/11/2012, for that of the erotic (his biographer) of the Power, asked Obama for a reinforcement of the drones fleet of the Agency. To be able to effect assaults beyond the habitual aims in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. The Agency and the Pentagon have their looks put in Mali and Libya, in view of the increase of the activity in the zone of the franchise «al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, the Ansar Dine group and the Anzawad’s Islamic Republic, seated at the north of Timbuktu. The tuaregs have changed his former employer Gaddafi for the salafists terrorists. To whom Gadafi accused of being his armed opposition. And that are destroying the universal heritage of Timbuktu, under the pretext that its monumental representations rival with Allah. Sources of the North American intelligence say that the drones fleet of the CIA does not excel 35 at the end of 2012 and Petraeus requested ten more.

The CIA has a list of «threats» to the USA, of which he has authorization to kill. In September, 2011 he got a famous success on having killed in Yemen the imam Anuar al-Aulaki, an American well-known personage of al-Qaeda. The Pentagon also has his «ist of authorized targets». That are checked every week by approximately 100 security analysts of the Administration. Their function is to recommend to the president the changes of names in the list. The procedure is semi officially called the «Tuesday of the terror» in the White House. The CIA and Joint Command of Special Operations of the Pentagon cooperate in many of these attacks. Their targets are supposed leaders and even simple militants of al-Qaeda and associate groups of jihadists. And the tactic is to exterminate them before they act. This is one more step in the foundations of the military doctrine of the USA. Determined for decades by the contradictory parameter of «not suffering losses in any war or conflict «.

The Obama’s «war of the drones» has much of «preventive» character”-– before that crime has been committed–and the executions are summary, without judicial sentence. And ,for this reason, it supposes attributing the right to realize extra judicial executions in any part of the world. So, Obama’s right hand in this theme, John Brennan, a veteran of the CIA, is called the «Czar of the Assassins». The program «Death of the Sky» (Death from Above) is legitimized only » by the person of the president «. The executions are legal, because the president decides and arranges them. Obama has obtained with the drones a weapon to appear «hard and effective» in the fight against al-Qaeda, without turning out to be unpopular with the voters. But, according to Christopher Griffin, in an article published by «Rolling Stone», «Obama’s secret war supposes the major air offensive not driven by human beings, never realized in the military history». And paraphrasing Churchill, he adds «never so few had killed so many people by remote control».

The Administration does not admit explicitly the existence of the program of drones, for safety motives. Though the White House declares in her calculated filtrations, that the not searched victims are almost non-existent. Not all the analysts accept this “surgical precision” without authentic information, attributed to these assaults from well away the horizon. An important problem is that the drones terrify entire areas, with some of them flying a lot of time over the settlements. On the other hand, as is the case of Pakistan, the «basic information» for the creation of intelligence for the mission, is facilitated by the local paid people. That also offers false information. More important and controversial is the question of the euphemistically so called «collateral falls», as if they had less importance on having been caused by the imprecisions and the operational mistakes. Some assaults with drones have caused tens of civilians deaths, including women and children, as is the case of Saleh Mohammed al-Anbouri in Yemen in December, 2009. And only in Pakistan, according to The Guardian, the drones would have killed around 3000 persons, of which a third were clearly civil, between 2008 and 2011.

The assaults against the human aims are realized by missiles thrown from drones. Since 2002, the USA has realized almost 450 missions of this kind in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. President Obama authorizes the assaults in Somalia and Yemen. But he is consulted only about a third of the missions in Pakistan. Where the «operational at charge» decide on the basis of “general received orders”. The Pentagon also uses the drones in his operations of exploration and of assault in Afghanistan. The CIA has his principal role in Pakistan. Where exists internally an ambiguity calculated of the FFAA, the intelligence services (the ISI is the most important, with much) and the Government in the relations and preferences towards: his foreign ally, the USA, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban and the pashtunes tribes of the frontier zones, near the former Durand line, and the southern baluchis (the Baluchistan). A strategic national aim for Pakistan is to support an important, preferably decisive influence, in the internal Afghan matters. And a strategic military aim at the east of the country is to have monitored, controlled and neutralized his own Taliban and other hostile minor groups, at the east of Peshawar’s meridian, and without they act at the east of the Indus river.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not accepted tacitly by both Parties, that «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military means) were carried on and were necessary, to keep away from the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the “foreign fundamentalist terrorism” of any origin, religion or ideology. This justified the post war occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with an exploded fiscal and exterior deficits and with a democrat Administration, is necessary for the USA to save more in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, the USA qualitatively lowers the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only not national violent enemy. This terrorist salafist internationalist «network», without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for the American forces and means of «rapid punctual incursion».

This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile area, attacks with limited aim by elite small units and small expeditionary forces and units of Marines amphibious assault, transported in «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and equipment for several years in a theater of operations, are rejected indefinitely by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense». This way, the Pentagon has to operationally center on the counter terrorist tactics and technologies. And he seeks to reinforce his own espionage branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The reason is simple and clear: as the CIA has been effective giving hunt to terrorists abroad, the Pentagon wants to be more like it, and less as an army at use, to adapt to the new aims and national strategies. In November, 2012, Panetta asked Obama to allows him to recruit 1600 new spies. It would double the size of the DIA. At the end of this month, the secretary of Defense declared that: «The campaign against al-Qaeda will take place out of “declared combat zones”. And using tactics that leave little track, with precision operations».

The principal not crewed planes are the Predator and the Reaper. And cost more than $13 millions of dollars per unit. The Pentagon possesses approximately 19000 for the tasks of espionage and combat. The CIA has his own fleet, with reserved information. The General Atomics makes the drones. Their weapon more devastating are the missiles AGM-114 Hellfire II, the Lockheed Martin. In October, 2012, the USA entrusted 24000 missiles for his use and that of allied authorized countries. There exist the variants of antitank hollow load (HEAT), antipersonnel (with diverse types of explosion and fragmentation, reinforced or not) and with self guided (fire and forget). Each one weighs 47 Kg., with 20 % of useful load (warhead), it is guided by laser with diverse technologies and has a range of 8 Km. The effect of a volley of several of them on a block of houses of adobe or masonry is devastating. But it guarantees the elimination of the human selected target.

The equipment of the base is very simple and highly elaborated: the remote control of the drones, several screens and a pedal, in front to the ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit their views to the pilots in land. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the controller of the camera, which form one «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during the whole day, checking his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, his family has gone shopping. In fact, all the «teams» talk about an «established intimacy» with the Afghan families, observed during up to weeks. Thing that, for example, the foreign soldiers of the ISAF on the area would not know. Neither it seems, according to the medical statistical studies realized, that the pilots and observers were affected by the enemies dead in an important way. Also they reject that their work is like a video game. Though some of them argue that they do not know any video game that is required to observe the aim for hours.

The US Air Force of the Pentagon possesses more than 1300 drones pilots, being employed at 13 bases in the USA. And he would need at once approximately 300 more, at least. The majority of the military missions are in Afghanistan. The Pentagon calculates that for 2015, the Air Force will have to count with 2000. Already he trains more pilots for drones that for the conventional flights: 350 in 2011. And from 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters or bombers, learning to direct a drone. The chief of the Air Force HHQQ, general Norton A. Schwartz, recognized that the pilots of drones might overcome the classic ones in the next years. The halo and the combat pilot’s profession change for that of “armchair screen viewer civil servant”. And air bases in the USA increasingly stop dealing with traditional flights «to «direct» drones.

In November, 2011, after an assault with drones in the border with Afghanistan, where died at least 24 Pakistanis soldiers of a control fort, Pakistan blocked the way of the logistic convoys of the NATO following the routes of Khyber and Shaman to Afghanistan, from Peshawar. They are two crucial routes in order that the soldiers of the ISAF, that have used them during the last 10 years of asymmetric combats, receive fuels, equipments, provisions and military material. The Pakistani Defense minister, Ahmad Mukhtar, indicated at the end of 2011, that they might reopen them to the ISAF, if they pay for it. And, according to sources of the Pentagon, Pakistan forced them to dismantle also a platform of drones installed in a base in the southwest of the country, principally manned by the CIA. Washington lost temporarily one of his more powerful weapon: the permission to throw missiles from the not driven planes against the insurgents in the provinces of the northwest of Pakistan, tactics that generalized there from 2008. In turn, Panetta, also indicated then that the USA is «coming to the limit of his patience» with Pakistan,»for his disability to act against the armed groups in the tribal zones». At the beginning of 2013 the drones pulverized the so called mullah Nazir in the province Pakistani of Southern Waziristan (in the tribal zones). The volley of rockets thrown to reach him, also killed two of his more nearby collaborators, Rafey Khan and Atta Ullah, who were accompanying him in the vehicle. Already the USA had previously realized several assaults to finish with his life. This guy belonged to the «neutral» Taliban in Pakistan. And, at least, it was giving cover, helps and logistic support to the members of al-Qaeda and to the Afghan Taliban, who operated at the other side of the border. And probably he was a collaborator of Pakistani «authorities» during some long periods. It is confirmed by the fact that in November, 2012 Nazir was object of an unsuccessful suicide attack at Wana’s market, the provincial capital.

In a declassified report of the Central Command of the Pentagon, published in December, 2011, is assured that «the catalyst of the assault was the opening fire by the PAKMIL (the Pakistani Army)”. But are added that «the cooperation and collaboration in the border were disabled by a mutual distrust climate»; that the orders given by the NATO «were lacking clarity and precision», and that the goal of the mission was «inadequate». The final result was that the Marines’ James Mattis, in charge of the Central Command, ordered a series of changes in the protocols for the frontier operations. And, would not it be that for routine and lack of commitment with the missions, those which existed were not fulfilled well? Finally, bureaucracy will kill the initiative and the inventiveness. And it will turn out that, as with the black greyhound of the Han Chinese, when, being tied, he was asked to catch unattainable hares…

The mutual distrust exists in all the cooperation areas between the USA and Pakistan. Since both countries were sealing an alliance after 11-S, to fight al-Qaeda, the Congress of the USA has sent $ 20000 millions as «economic aid» to Islamabad. The real and practical results of this «alliance» are lean and scanty and the loyalty of Pakistan to the interests of the USA, for which this collaboration is paid, is questionable. Because Pakistan keeps his firm loyalty to the aims of his great or national strategy. Several members of the USA Congress asked for a change of approach in his relations in this geostrategic region. The representative to the Chamber, Duncan Hunter, declared that «Afghanistan needs economic and political stability, to guarantee that the victory of the USA is lasting. And the relation between the USA and Afghanistan must be also a point of interest, not only for the future of Afghanistan, but for the whole region». And Frank Wolf indicated: «It is clear that to manage to triumph in Afghanistan, we must solve first a series of problems in Pakistan. To obtain a military victory in Afghanistan is a thing, but our general success depends on more factors».

The authorities of Pakistan and Yemen, allied of the United States against al-Qaeda, have protested several times, so much for the violation of theirs sovereignties with war actions, as for the death of people who did not have any relation with the conflict. And they warn that this war carried out secretly, destabilizes them and gives arguments to the jihadists.

(to be continued)

THE SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FROM 1920 TO 1990.

(continuation)

THE TANKS ARMIES AS SUMMIT WEAPON OF THE ART SCIENCE OF THE SOVIET WARFARE.

Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

The structure and combat capacities of the tanks armies.

They were formidable war machines. Each one was integrated by 2 tanks corps and a mechanized corp, with all the auxiliary services and necessary supports. Having a very variable personnel, between 40 and 65 thousand men, according to the availabilities of means and workforce and the needs of the different operational plans of the Stavka.

The first unit that was according to this concept was activated in June, 1943. Previously also existed “great mobile units” like so called. But they really were conglomerates of tanks brigades reinforcing infantry divisions, generally «of the Guard». The most famous was probably the «Group Popov», commanded by the general of this surname. At the beginning of 1943 was employed against the operational rear of the Don armies group of Marshall Erich von Manstein, that operated in all the south of the USSR. It was thrown by the Southwest Front of general Vatutin in the direction Pavlograd-Zaporozhe, towards the mouth of the river Dnepr in the Black Sea. Seeking to isolate and surround all the German forces at the east of the river, in a large-scale reproduction of Stalingrado’s Soviet ring, which had just fallen down in the Red Army‘s hands. The principal counterattack thrown by Manstein against the group Popov, was in charge of 48th panzer army corp and a SS panzer corp. Both forming the 4th panzer army under the command of the colonel general Hermann Hoth, which destroyed it. Erasing it from the Soviet Battle Order, until it was reformed and re-equipped and re-trained its units.

By 1944 existed up to 26 tanks corps and 11 mechanized corps in the Soviet army, but until January was not activated the 6º tanks army. Sometimes a tanks army had 2 mechanized corps, but this was very rare, because these were the most necessary great and scanty units of the operational Soviet strategy. On the other hand, for fighting in the areas of bad or difficult “transitability” (with more conceptual wealth that only «bad ongoing»), forests, mountains and snow covered or swampy zones, the Soviets were using a combination of a mechanized corp with other of cavalry. Of these mobile horse-mechanized armies never were more than 2 or 3 in the Soviet Battle Order. These and the tanks armies could be equivalent in power, punch and operational movement capacity to the German panzer army corps. But these were always more numerous, for example, even in the year 1944 the Germans were counting with between 10 and 18 panzer corps, it is true that with very different capacity, according with the available means.

The Soviet tanks corps was equivalent to the panzer division. It was formed by 3 battalions of main battle tanks and 3 infantry battalions, supposedly mechanized or motorized. It was completed by some artillery and heavy tanks or assault cannons and other auxiliary units. It theoretically had 240 tanks and assault cannons, while the panzer division had up to 150 vehicles of these types. Nevertheless, this one was better balanced as combined arms great unit. Possessing 12% more men (up to approximately 13.300) and 20% more infantry, better mechanized (approximately 4.500 men).

The mechanized corps was the major unit «type western division» formed by the Soviets. In relation to the panzer divisions, it was possessing 26% more of men, 17% more of infantry and 152% more of tanks and assault cannons, which were partly replacing certain deficiency in artillery, which was always towed, not self-propelled. It was much more than a panzer grenadiers division and was equivalent to the major panzer divisions. But his lack of motorized transport, 19% less, was making it less consisting in his operations that the German last mentioned.

For its part, the Soviet shock armies were great units formed by infantry divisions, generally of the Guard, reinforced by some artillery divisions and several tanks brigades of (that were equivalent to the mentioned «battalion» and had approximately 65 tanks) and engineers brigades, according to the plans of the Stavka. They were destined to assault the most strengthened and defended extensive positions in the German front. And to guarantee the irruption, without taking care so much their losses.

Their operational movement capacity was very deficient.

A great handicap of the Soviet tanks armies was the absence in them of the infantry combat vehicles or of transport (carriers), lightly armored and generally roof opened in this epoch, for the supposedly mechanized infantry. Destined to accompany the tanks, across all the grounds. Forming part of the mechanized or tanks brigades, which were the tactical subunits of those.

During their advance, the infantries in occasions had for their transport North American Studebaker, very resistant trucks. And other times they had to travel very much. Though the most frequent was that the infantry battalions mounted, as unexpected riders, on the tanks of the tanks battalion of their brigade. In any case, as the missions were many and divergent, in the operational surroundings of their aim, the infantries were dismounting and covering afoot the last tens of km up to his arrangement zones. These flying columns operating in depth in the German rear that was crumbling, were systematically attacked by the German aviation, which caused large devastations in they, at least in material. In addition, when they were going towards specially sensitive aims for the Germans, in which these were concentrating their tactical aviation, the mobile groups were forced not to circulate by day.

Why could this happen with so important units Soviet units? Because the Soviet fighters, which bases and airports were staying deeply behind his lines, did not have sufficient action range to watch and protect permanently all their journeys. And neither they were always carrying in their “marching groups”, organic anti-aircraft defense means. That would complicate more their weak and meager logistics. This was stopping them in that advance without consideration to the losses, which the middle and low chiefs were using

excessively. To fulfill the severe requirements that their Superiors were marking and the political deputies were monitoring about their fulfillment. It was frequent that in the attached epigraphs of the commanders orders, specially «of combat «, was including the paragraph «I will submit to a martial court the official who does not use to the maximum his means».

(to be continued)

The Taliban’ Military Operations in Afghanistan II.

(CONTINUATION)

or The Expert Taliban Military Field Manual

The suicidal Taliban.

The suicidal fighter is a common weapon of the Taliban. The suicidal militant is for the Taliban a cheap, abundant, effective and highly asymmetric weapon. If the explosive charge, its characteristics and the vector are the suitable ones: the sophisticated enemy sensors and the protective jackets use as little against her. Nor the armored vehicles and the buildings serve to be protected from her. The trigger carrying agent can be man or woman and adult or child. It can cooperate in his suicide attack a bushes, a goods selling street place, a donkey, a bicycle or an engine vehicle. A suicidal fighter of one alone use is not a select shooter: it is not necessary to form him militarily (basic, technical and tactical knowledge). Complementary to the explosive belt or jacket, his other fearsome weapons are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.

The suicidal soldier must go unnoticed in the place chosen for the attack: by his age, genre, aspect, movements and attitude. To be able to approach his target and make exploit the load, producing the major possible number of enemies dead and mutilated. The added human and physical hurts that are caused around the explosion point are only «collateral damages”. To calm the repugnances in producing them, an Al-Qaeda «ideologist», Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a «religious» theory about the not looked for hurts. According to her, it is allowed to the Yihad’s militants to kill Muslims, when it is inevitable. Even, when it is useful to the cause. So, the suicidal soldiers express their desire that the not looked for dead, should be considered also by Allah as martyrs of His «Holy War».

The suicidal Taliban is an essentially inhuman weapon. We do not know any case in which it has used in only destroying a military physical target: a bridge, a store. Sometimes the suicide is used as part of a command, for blow opening the entry to a complex or for promoting with his immolation the surprise of the enemy and attracting his attention. Here the suicide’s «merit», who already must has certain instruction, is that of the whole assailant group in his action.

The motivations of these «sworn-in» are simple. Not to be able to chronically cover his basic natural needs of: sustenance, family, security, refuge and cover, and the reasonable progress expectations is a spur for his enrollment. The economic prizes that the Taliban give to the «martyrs» families are covering this line. The religious motivation is the powerful way of conviction. The suicides of the Yihad are methodically and intensely catechized. And live in an involving «environment» where they get clarify his doubts and that breathe them to prematurely reach the Paradise. The universal character of the Umma or Muslims’ community, facilitates the flow and the insertion of suicidal soldiers from other countries. In the last years, the followers of the Sunna are those who are using the suicide in his «Holy War». They are used by al-Qaeda, the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the members of Hamas.

The Military Contradictions in Afghanistan.

The foreign military men are tied by their own contradictions. On one hand, for socially correct or electoral reasons, is avoided to define this conflict, not already as a war, but as what it is: an “irregular Islamic popular liberation war”. That is directed against «a corrupt, impious and unpopular government, puppet of the exterior Allied powers». This way, the Allied armies establish strict “clashing procedures”, which they say that are to protect the Afghan people. But in all when they meet threatened or want to undertake some advances in the Taliban “loose controlled territory”, they only firstly and principally trust in their devastating and/or indiscriminate heavy fire capacity.

The Americans and their allies do not have a permanent and indefinite commitment, the hallmark of the good ally, with the Afghan political regime. That is an incoherent puzzle of tribal and personal interests. Agglutinated by the social and political power that today they hold, use and distribute. Neither is possible to «impregnate» in its entirety and per se, an inorganic western democracy in a Moslem’s country with an ancient, enduring and little evolved social structure. Without liberal principles and forms in her idiosyncrasy, the Afghan leaders and sheiks will use the new political power mechanisms to increase their influence and benefit, in a supposedly modern and free, but inarticulate society. An Islamic democracy, in use and customs guided by the Islam and the Sunna, is not equal to a liberal democracy.

Also exists a complete lack of nearness and commitment with the Afghan people. That perceives the «unfaithful armed foreigners» in his territory, as something temporary, relative, foreign and superposed to his interests and the personal, familiar, tribal, cultural and religious needs, in this order. Only some British managed to be accepted, respected and estimated, in a personal title, by the pashtunes and baluchis. It was the epoch of the British Empire of India and the famous Northwest Border (the Durand Line and the Tribal zones) with Afghanistan. It was a historical distant stage, with events that were going up with a minor pace that nowadays. Where the overseas «service shifts» (» military tours of duty”) lasted several years.

At beginning the summer of 2010, a powerful offensive of the ISAF took place in the province of Kandahar, at east of Helmand, to defeat and remove the Afghan Taliban of their habitual and original social support base. There were used ground and air multinational forces, as in Marjah’s battle in February, and selective commands assaults type «bites and flees». Nevertheless, the offensive was paralyzed without achieving her goals and it is not known of her resumption. Marjah was an important culture and processed center of the opium in Helmand’s province. After the battle and occupation, there was try to establish a local government, dependent on Kabul, which sank immediately and came to nothing. Soon there started appearing in other nearby populations the «green buds» of the Taliban. Who advanced without been disturbed after the military ebb tide.

The operational strategy of the ISAF is unsuccessful. The results of his military actions or are lean or lack continuity and go away vanishing. As would say an illuminated defeated politician: «they only belong to the wind». And precisely, because the Afghan «authorities» would have to consolidate, develop and keep those successes. Here it is easier to militarily win than occupy. And to temporarily occupy is easier that to convince and appease. And to assure and develop a civil native zone got from the Taliban.

The Taliban’ Military Operations in Afghanistan.

or The Expert Taliban Military Field Manual

In this epoch of scanty dissimulation, of powerful electronic sensors, even installed in the space, of spreads of the «intelligence», the enemy movements and hostile intentions are difficult to conceal to a military modern army. The means to achieve it are the dispersion, the geography (fogs, rainfalls, forests, orography, nights), the disguise (spoiling the reality) and the camouflage, concealing or adjusting reality. To avoid the detection and the heavy fire, to the enemy improved vision, is necessary to oppose the fleetingness, the smallness and imprecision of the images (few people, neutral clothes, conceal and dismantled weapons) and the insecurity in the apprehended «reality» (civil or armed and friends or enemies?). The enemy are difficult to be seen In the modern «empty» combat fields in combat availability at the nearby distances. Where the movements of the afoot infantry are not enfilade or by short and rapid jumps from concealment to concealment, preferably protected. And the «drones» or planes without crew of exploration and/or ground attack always will be able to lead to the murder of a few innocent smugglers or countrymen. By confusing them with enemy activists. Everything to do for losing the war to «gaining the hearts and minds of the enemy»!

The Taliban operational ways.

But, during a lot of time yet, the air and spatial means of the USA, as spy satellites, drones and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have great limitations in the detection and check of small ground, even regular, forces in the areas of difficult transitability and with concealment possibilities: as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized areas (industrial, warehousing and distribution, and housing). Those not only offer concealment, but also covered from enemy fire, up to the near combat distances. A slightly valued phenomenon here is the plethora of the «relative concealment heights», as determinant factor of the «transitability» («the good or bad ongoing» does not completely value and express it) of the units in this type of so abundant areas.

The operational key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands, at full or part time availability. They are in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and more or less temporarily occupying some of the numerous peasants settlements and hamlets. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform, hide and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operational development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present ISAF’s Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes; assaults to very small enemy isolated units, preferably natives, demoralized and/or tired; medium range fire harassment; kidnapping; short duration isolated incursions, helped or not by other nearby bands; and the mining of paths and ways (the fearful IED), usually travel by the enemy with their frequent, unimaginative and “showing” patrols. The sheiks or commands chiefs are ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns. In a minor and less extensive degree, operate the cells of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban «action units» type platoon must be unfolded in sections and even in «teams», for their large movements or with the possibility of the enemy presence. The extended march security helps to this secure deployment. The result is a network structure. Which nodes are the unfolded subunits and which “threads” indicate their horizontal and vertical relations, supports, communications and superposed protective shooting sectors. Even this network can be camouflaged, mixing or intermingling the “nodes” with pacific native groups. In this more yet empty battlefield, without permanent or consolidated lines, is necessary to accept the sporadic incursion in our own rear of military patrols of exploration and/or of combat. Their air abundant means facilitate them to realize surprising, rapid and powerful deep insertions, in charge of elite units. For it, in the haltings, rests and locations we have to keep the security, even in our rear and always deploying a tactical exploration.

This imposes a tremendous effort on the men and on the commands. Whose training, formation and discipline, motivation and religiousness and commitment with each mission must be complete. In this type of fighting, apart from the self-defence units, which dominate and monitor our own settlements and enclaves, the number of «select» soldiers, destined for the action units, it should be subordinated to their quality. These select fighters, as any other military mean of interest, always will skimp on. So, it is absurd to get involved in a clash, in which the Taliban’ combat capacity, is clearly lower than that of the enemy. Against the on board cannons and machine guns (both in ICV and airships), with their detection and fire control equipments, the ambushing Taliban, even protected in reinforced and/or covered positions, but in the forward slope to use their tense fire weapons, cannot support a duel.

The Taliban harassment operations on the military forces.

For the fire harassment to the patrols they don’t need to mobilize many fighters. The enemy will always call his tactical aviation or the helicopter gunships, which come fast, if he see a shooters spot or lunette in front of him. Even they sometimes overfly the marches of their columns and patrols, looking for opportunity targets. A small «selected» rebel unit can stop them. So forcing them to deploy, spend their ammunition as much as they follow their «engagement rules». And to regroup and, even, reequip, to continue their march. After the harassment the Taliban combatants, without being committed, will be scattered to gather on a main or alternative meeting point. And this can be repeated later by another «action unity». Fixed as they are to the tracks, the occasions for the Taliban will be numerous. And the results, enervating and frustrating, because they force the military men to the passiveness and to the moral wear.

Afghanistan almost lacks asphalt roads: there are only two. The most important gives itself a round turn all over the country, joining the principal populations, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, etc. So they called it Ring Road. Then there is the North-South Road, which follows this tour, at the east of the country. They are not great thing. The asphalt have between half and one inch of thickness; the heats soften it and potholes and bubbles are easily formed. But, under a protuberance can hide an explosive device. It is necessary to cross slow the roads and looking at the soil. The Taliban have not now the habit of recording on video the ambushes, to hang them on Internet. This does that the carelessness observers in horizon, highly vulnerable as acquaintances, are almost away from the limits of the landscape of the ambushes. And that do not use as alert sign of them. But, the explosive devices are constantly developing and perfecting. These give a certain anonymity, distance and impunity to his «placers». The devices detonated by cable cannot be neutralized by the inhibitors. They are not frequently using cables activators. These are expensive and weigh, and the rebels are in isolated zones and the logistics is weak, vulnerable and complicated. Some devices are activated by a frequency transmitter with a given range; even serves an electronic opening door device. With the frequency inhibitors, the soldiers try to offset the radio waves of the probable frequencies used in the zone. Being the most expensive and complicated transmitters, that with more range, power and frequencies range. It is the game of the cat and the mouse. The problem is that the guerrillas of an area receive a radio activator that uses an unforeseen frequency. The activated by pressure and wrapped in plastic, can be very effective if their hollow conical explosive charge covered with the fatal metal, is well enough. The multiple and complicated are increasingly used. For example, it is possible to place one of average credible load, which alerts the designated land observers in the vehicles. On having brought over or descend from these, some of them can be activated by cable. And even «throw» from the path flanks some hollow charge missile placed in fixed unexpected camouflaged launchers. If the soldiers dismount from the vehicles, also some mortar bombs can be thrown on the ambush area, having it registered from the deployment positions of the tubes.

The obligatory passing zones of the enemy (gorges, mountainous passes, ways bordered of rocky outcrops or with cut gutters and direct accesses to the hamlets) are adapted for their employment. It must be also used a certain number or percentage of trick «placements», keeping the scene and decoration, but without live charges or cable wastes, destined to harass, tease and tire the foreign enemy stroller. In the variety are the taste and the initiative. The effect on the enemy of the “explosive, real and fictitious, simple or multiple ambushes”, is not simply added. But is a potential function of those deployed.

A permanent harassment of the barracks is not normal, for unproductive and costly. Also, they are tremendously defended (sensors, pits, wire fences, patrols and fortifications) against the suicides bombs. But happens that the suicides, who are illuminated but not silly fanatics, usually attack “not sufficiently protected enemies groups”.

In order to remove the indirect fire origins, the military men can realize limited aim assaults, expelling the Taliban irregular mortars. With an active habitual patrolling, they can in these moments scare or beat and remove the hostile marauders. The Taliban usually explore, at least initially and also in fluid fighting conditions, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these reconnaissance positions. The patient observation is the way. Bearing in mind that if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes the observer must be replaced. Because he looks, but already not sees.

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended and/or without spirit position, preferable of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is this: at dawn they bomb with heavy fire from fixed missile launchers, then they approach to use mortars and finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance, shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL grenade-launchers. To avoid friendly fires, they would fire only to verified targets and from bottom to up or above to below.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY.

THE TANKS ARMIES AS THE SUMMIT WEAPON OF THE ART SCIENCE OF THE SOVIET WARFARE.

Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

From 1943, after the breakthrough of the German semi continuous fronts by the shock or infantry armies of the Soviet Fronts or «armies groups», these sent their more mobile great forces, the tank armies, to the interior of the enemy operational zone. To keep intact their combat and of operational movement capacities, it was tried that they were not taking part in the previous irruption, breakthrough and securing operations in the passing sector, at charge of the mentioned infantry or shock armies.

Prolegomena.

Everything approximately begins with Tujachevski’s «bad» experiences, as commander of the Western Front in the war of 1920 of the USSR against Poland. This way, inferred «the inability to destroy the enemy army in a wide modern front, with an alone blow, in a great battle. What was forcing to achieve this strategic goal by means of a series of battles». The guide of this battles succession would be the operational strategy. So giving coherence, strategic sense and joint in the time and space to the military efforts and decisions. Before the «costly» successes of industrialization of the Five-year Soviet Plans, until the 30s of the 20th century, the operational level remained limited to this successive series of battles. Because the Red forces were integrated essentially by infantry, artillery and cavalry. Weapons restrained, by their essential limitation in the advance speed, to always using this string of victorious battles towards his strategic goals in the military theaters.

Parallel, other Soviets theoretics were working on a new, «more «scientific» strategy, as would correspond with the country «new order», for the employment of the Red Army. So, V. K Triandafillov published in 1929 the book «The nature of the operations of the modern armies». And in the Field Manual (ustav) of the Red Army of 1929, coordinated by A. A. Svechin, many of his ideas were included. In February, 1933, the army issued his Provisional Instructions to organize the battle in depth, which were extended in March, 1935. And the Field Manual of 1936, prepared with Tujachevski’s supervision, which already had 44 years, and Yegorov, was establishing the basic principles for the deep battle and the variants of the operations in the enemy rear. Triandafillov died prematurely on July 12, 1931 in an aviation accident near Moscow. This saved probably him of suffered a few years later the politician paranoiac pursuit of Stalin. The Stalinist purge of the 37s and 38s materially liquidated a generation of high commanders and officials, that had devoted themselves to the study, definition and development of the military operational art. This way, Egorov, Kamenev, Svechin, Tujachevski, Uborovich and others less out-standing, were purged and executed. Their ideas and theories in development turned pale and were guarded, up to well entered the Great Patriotic War. The great units necessary for the employment of operational theory were dismembered in their basic components or units of every Arm, for their easier conduction and employment. And the frightened surviving commanders became much more conservative, stick on to the received orders as limpets, and unwilling to assume even the calculated risks. These insanities inconstancies and caprices of the envy and the poor self-esteem of a predator and distrustfully Red Fuehrer, incapable of the minor empathy, cost more than million casualties to the Red Army, in the first months of the war in the East.

Introduction.

The tanks armies, which only reached the number of sixIn the whole immense Soviet Order of Battle, were using principally in the most promising strategic or operational and even political directions, of the whole extensive war front in the European East. And according to the criteria of the Stavka or High Staff of the Soviet armed forces, under the direct control of the comrade Stalin. Therefore, many groups of Soviet armies or Fronts were not possessing them. They were the elite of the elite of the great Soviet units. And for their men’s endowment and equipments it was tried that were the best available ones and to full theoretical endowment, at least before their insertion in the enemy rear. This way, at the end of 1943, when the Soviet war machinery was acting in full sweeping offensive, only 320.000 men belonged to the mechanized or motorized forces, from the total of more than 4 million men of the Soviet Ground Forces. The need to provide them those, like the aviation, the navy and the artillery with the better educated and trained troops, was letting the infantry numerous forces (around 490 divisions, which were in stable number from 1943) with the most awkward men and the worse formed and equipped. Though the Red Army of the Workers and Peasants (RKKA, the Russian Рабоче-Крестьянская Красная Армия, Raboche-Krestianskaya Krasnaya Armia) was not called officially Soviet Army until 1946, for practical reasons we prefer calling him this way in this work.

The development of the mobile forces and their aims in the Soviet military doctrine.

When one speaks about the massive assaults, by successive big waves, of the Soviets, it is necessary to look for the tactical and human explanation of in the iteration of efforts that marks their doctrine. And in the military and yet imperfect school formation of their men, specially the infantries. Nevertheless, to the favorable and unfavorable characteristics of his national fighting for the survival, in the so called «Great Patriotic War», they could adapt all their social, economic and military efforts. Creating, for example, a number very limited of tanks and cannons of assault models, sobers, easy to handle, hard, rapid, with fuels more advantageous in their combustion Carnot’s cycle and with great fire power, already from the beginning. And that then made for many tens of thousands of units. Delivering a sub-machine gun to many infantries, forcing them this way to assault the enemy, to make him to feel the neutralization massive fire at their shooting effective distance (not more than 70 meters), to have some opportunity to live then. Towards the half of the war, the Soviets had working the incredible number of 310 officials’ schools, with more than 350.000 cadets, which formed during the war approximately 2.000.000 new officials. These were in charge, in their small units, together with the NCO, of giving a more or less military formation to the replacements that in them were received, proceeding from the successive levies of men and women of any age and condition.

The high Soviet commanders knew that, on an equal footing, their men were more worse soldiers than the Germans, especially in the offensive operations. Therefore, they had to win at least all the battles that were turning out to be transcendental in their effort of war. First to survive and, then, to conquer Germany and extend their recently established «political social order» in the Eastern Europe. The secret was residing in the exploitation of the enemy operational zone. That was badly defended by a first line without operational depth, chronically scanty of sufficient and effective antitank weapons, and, especially, chained to a rigid repulse, without transfer of space, by the myopic and distrustful top Nazi directives. And the designed weapon, from the doctrine of the deep penetration, developed by the ill-fared marshall Mikhail Tujachevski and others until 1936, and desperate taken again after the first great reverses in the war, was the top use of the select and scanty armies. That theoretically might reasonably penetrate several hundreds of km in the enemy rear.

In the rest of the large sectors of the front, the Soviets either were kept in the defense. And they were masters in the establishment and functioning of strengthened, almost impenetrable areas, zones and even «regions». Or their infantry divisions, with the support of their very scanty organic tanks or that assigned in tactical subordination and reinforced or not with some Katiuskas’s brigade and some heavy artillery regiment, to realize secondary assaults with limited aims. If the operation was more promising, the Stavka could assign to them some mechanized corps, the mobile more important great unit, always centralize controlled, or, at least, a tanks corps. Though during 1941 and 1942, 80 % of the heavy and campaign artillery was divisional, already at the beginning of 1944, 65 % was not divisional and was integrated to great independent units, the artillery divisions, formed by regiments. This organization was serving to concentrate it crushingly and very effectively in the most promising directions, decided by Stalin and his Stavka, and to facilitate and assure the break in.

The operational zone, its functions and weaknesses.

The operational zone, with a depth in this epoch from 18-20 km to 75-80 km from the front, is the geographical space where develops the process of turning the «mass of support» from the strategic rear (forces, supports, communications, logistic organization and HHQQ) into «units of action», specialized and qualified for their employment against the enemy, with the type of fight decided or imposed by him.

The critical elements of this zone, which is the physical support of that military activity, are: the communications of all kinds: the spaces of maneuvers and operations (zones of units unfolding, waiting, reorganization, re equipment, preparation, advance, provided with covers or non enfilade towards the enemy); the units of engineers and of operational reconnaissance (I include both them for their shortage, importance and universality of employment); the logistic means (centers of data processing and of operations control, warehouses and manipulation means, long distance and delivery transport and delivery areas); and the intelligence centers and those of the operational controls.

The operational zone must have the sufficient depth to be able to contain, deploy, drive, supply and direct the sufficient number of units close to the front, following the necessary spears of advance or attack. To repeat the efforts against the enemy and to obtain the tactical aim that raises or are decided. One differs very marked in the real depth (used) between the zones of the two antagonistic or enemy rivals, indicates a latent tactical weakness of one of them. Either for less military resources or for a slower advance or deployment for the combat of his strategic reservations, from his deep rear. This can be detected by the aviation of exploration. Deprived the active forces of a front of their operational zone, which makes able, supports and stimulates them, the survival of the whole front sector affected is impossible after a short time, for depletion or consumption. The moral effects of the loss of the positive expectations help to precipitate the collapse of this front. The forces will tend to move back or to be called towards the rear, to treat to protect the functional elements that allow them to operate tactically. In effect, for the defense of the operational zone, given the combative defenselessness of her “functional elements” and the scanty combat readiness and the lack of cohesion of the units that wait, reform and are re-equipped there, only we can possess in general the operational already prepared reserves, preferably mobile, and with the deepest and slower reserves of this sector or of the contiguous ones.

The presence in force of a tanks army, deployed in numerous more or less parallel routes of march, fulling all the available roads and paths, generates a great threatening «sector» and always unforeseen in the enemy rear. With an «operational efficiency» extended to his right, to his left side and towards the front. The «real threat» exercised by the mobile groups is a direct function of the distance to their possible aims, measure in «reaching times»; of their «operational movement capacity» to approach them and of their «combat capacity» to damage or occupy them. This creates an «influence», a gigantic «leverage» on the enemy affected zone, altering, dismantling, breaking it and, even, making it prematurely collapse, and without great attrition combats.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Latest British Misfortunes in Afghanistan II.

On how a passive defense is inoperative and shameful in the counter insurgency war!!

(continuation)

The Taliban assault at Friday, 14, September, 2012 against Camp Bastion.

The British base has been attacked in diverse occasions during his years of existence. The most “media” occasion has been this that we treat. In the assault were dead two Marines (of the attached Camp Leatherneck). And other nine persons – eight military men and a civil contractor – were hurt. 6 airplanes McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II of the Marines Corps were destroyed and other two were very damaged. As for the logistic facilities, were destroyed three stations of fuels supply and damaged 6 hangars of aviation not structurally reinforced.

The effective defense of the military barracks, redoubts and camps against the assault and the harassment of irregular armed rebels is founded on three operational qualities: the initiative, the mobility and the offensive action. These, in turn, are directly determined by the mentality and the combative disposition of the military men (which depend fundamentally on them) and by the military available means in the operations zone (that depend fundamentally on the politicians and the public managers). The gravity center of the active defense of the military fixed positions resides in the observation and the control of the approximation routes. That in rural zone can be a semi flooded rice field; in mountainous area, a heights line a little below the military crest; in urban zone, the streets orientated towards them, from certain distance, and in a road, a verge. All this compounded by the climate and the day hour. The observation and fighting military positions can consist from the couple of snipers up to a reinforced platoon, according to the characteristics of the area and the intentions and capacities of the enemy. Those are apart of the perimeter defense and of the patrols who cross it randomly, that constitute a part of the camp static defense. The enemy is in the habit of exploring, at least initially and also in fluid fighting conditions, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these reconnaissance positions. The patient observation is the way. Bearing in mind that if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes the observer must be replaced, because he looks, but already not sees. If additional means exist for it and as complement, it is necessary to use the energetic patrolling against the enemy, moving away the Complex much more, using armed reconnaissances and attacks with limited aims.

A passive defense, limited to rejecting the assaults, with the initiative and the election of the moments in hands of the enemy, is almost the most solvent of the combat morale that can experience a force, leaving apart a defeat. Ask about it to the Frenchmen who were defending multitude of redoubts and positions in Indochina before Dien Bien Fu in 1954 and to the nationalistic Chinese until 1949.

The operational offensive key is the energetic, constant, unpredictable patrolling, eager for the combat with the insurgents or of obtaining information. That constitute a more professional, more active and more lethal «swarm» than the insurgents bands. Integrated by units not usually bigger than a platoon. Whose weapons are the seal, the discretion, the mobility, with the night as collaborator and refuge. The initiative, demonstrated in the irregular war in multitude of small actions, is always habitual and consistently of the winning final side. It is not acceptable to allow that the enemy takes her, uses her or retains her. The initiative is joined to the creative imagination, framed and illuminated by the professional knowledge and the field experience . Together, reinforcing an enterprising character, they can be military decisive and efficient here

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended or without spirit position enemy is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault it is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL hollow charge grenade-launchers. They only fire on verified targets or from above and from below. When they try to keep the surprise, the initiative and the confusion, to lengthen the military reaction time and to obtain a very local and temporary superiority, they act without their meager heavy fire support. A typical characteristic of the Taliban is that they do not get involved in the defense of their positions. Once obtained the harassment of the enemy and extended the hurt, the mutilation and the stupor on the military men, they will move back. They are not so silly to wait intrepid for the heavy, precise and devastate military fire. Nor to presume of courage, in front of enemies with weapons of superior range and characteristics and capable of turning a surface target into a destruction zone. Also there are the time and its corollary, the opportunity. The Taliban handle very well the tactical and operational times. They are masters of the patience, the waiting, the repetition of trainings, simple and easy. For the important attacks they manage to use scale models of the goal. And, to penetrate in a base and attack the heavy and evident war aircrafts, only need to represent part of the perimeter, the directional location of the target and its identification, as well as the rejection fighting positions of the irruption point.

None of the laws of the war defined in the Geneva and The Hague conventions favor the Taliban fighting. The condition of right belligerent is granted by the fulfillment of them. For it, the bands should go uniformed, exhibiting the weapons, commanded by a chief and acting in name of a state that was retaining the sovereignty of, at least, a part of his territory. In the other cases, the national legislations are applied. They are specially hard in the cases of armed sedition. And qualifying of assassins, terrorists or bandits without entrails, to the rebels. Though, it is true that, in general, is suitable to smooth the “manual” treatment given to the partisans, to not irritate the positions and to no re-grow the excesses and the losses.

Enough hours before 12 pm of Thursday, the 13th of September, the Taliban forces began to approach from several directions to the air zone of the Complex. To keep a low tactical trace, they followed dragging techniques in their advance to the security zone of the area. And up to there got, without being detected, 45 to 50 insurgents that, in three convergent spears of advance attacked by midnight, supported by their squad organic weapons. Not to being detected up to the beginning of the assault, also helped them the scanty combative availability of the men. And the tedious and unproductive routine of the guards and patrols, which creates the passive defense of a great protective barrack. Approximately 15 Taliban from two of the groups, managed to get through Camp Bastion’s perimeter and to attack effectively the air zone. Finally the attacking group was wiped out (dead and injured men and prisoners).

It was a «significant» assault, the British Defense Department declared, as the insurgents should never have come so far away. It was, admitted the ISAF, a «good coordinated» attack. Organized in three assault groups, the Taliban managed to get through the defense perimeter of the base. «They were well equipped and trained, dressing USA Army uniforms and armed with automatic rifles, grenade-launcher and explosive jackets», continued the ISAF in his communique. This mission assured that during the assault, the international troops killed 14 insurgents and hurt other one, who is arrested.

The British correspondents in Afghanistan assured that Camp Bastion has an excellent visibility from all parts and is extremely strengthened. The defense correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, who has been for more than twelve times in Camp Bastion, wrote on Sunday, the 14th: «In spite of being in the center of the most dangerous province of Afghanistan, I always felt completely sure, undoubtedly, of an assault of the Taliban. And honestly I believed that there were more possibilities of dying knocked down by a military vehicle that murdered by insurgents». The forces of the coalition, make clear the correspondents, ask themselves how the Taliban were capable of giving this surprise attack a strengthened and isolated complex barrack. And a spokesperson, Adam Wojack, said that the Friday assault «was a sign for the coalition that it is necessary to give many attention to the popular, local and international state of mind about Afghanistan».

On Monday, the 10th of September Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman insurgent, declared to Reuters that the Taliban were trying to use all his resources to kill the prince Henry (also called «Harry the Nude»), third in the succession line to the British throne. After the facts, another Taliban spokesman underlined that they attacked in «revenge» for the American amateur movie which offends Mohammed. And that they choose to commit an attack against Camp Bastion, because the prince Harry was there, acting as co-pilot gunner in the Joint Air Group.

The Latest British Misfortunes in Afghanistan

On how a passive defense is inoperative and shameful in the counter insurgency war!!

Let’s see the «vital path» of the British in the current conflict. Of the “warlike fervor” of these «European technologically modern soldiers», give faith the operations carried out for years in Helmand province. After the war of 2001, which ended with the medieval theocratic radical intransigent regime of the Taliban, close to Lashkar Gal city, Helmand’s capital, up to 8 thousand British soldiers established themselves. That were successively relieved by their replacements in «tours of duty». This powerful contingent of professional experienced soldiers was unable in almost 7 years to fight, replacing the culture of opium in Helmand and appeasing the province, for the effective implantation in her of the Government of Kabul. To solve this operational Gordian knot of the ISAF, cutting it with a slit, it was decided…

The last great Offensive against the Taliban in Helmand: Marjah’s battle.

The “Operation Moshtarak” («Together», in dari, one of the afghan languages) began at Friday, February 12, 2010. For the operation approximately 15 thousand allied soldiers have met, from the ISAF and Afghanis. The USA contingent had around 4 thousand marines and 800 soldiers from the US Army. The Afghans were 2 thousand men and they accompanied the Americans in the attacks and occupations. The British were 4 thousand men and there were groups from Canada, Denmark and Estonia.

There were several operational aims in the “Operation Together”. The first was to aim a rapid and forceful blow to the Taliban, going forward to their usual spring operations. And showing them who have taken now the initiative. And as corollary, to try again to appeasing Helmand, for the effective and final implantation of the Government of Kabul in it. In the strategy of counterinsurgency is sought to clean the zone of the Taliban and to protect the inhabitants of their influence. It is supposed that the transcendence of the operations success will be indefinite. As the Government cannot request the loyalty of the people, if this is not defended effectively and permanently of the reprisals of the Taliban.

Also, it was the goal of eradicating the drug production in Marjah’s district. According with the UNO Agency for the Fighting against the Drug and the Organized Crime, 42% of the world opium is produced in Helmand’s province. And Marjah is one of the principal centers of the culture of the poppy and its chemical processing. The British were previously in charge of attacking its culture in the zone. But their efforts, up to the last summer, were insufficient and ineffective to achieve these two principal aims. In spite of the presence, at 40 Km from Marjah’s ville, of more than eight thousand British soldiers.

Another operational aim was giving field to the soldiers of the Afghan Army. Increasing their auto esteem and their military experience, trying his operational and organizational capacities and confirming his loyalties with the Government. Finally, it was wished that Marjah would be a «testing and checking center» for the different skills and techniques of pacification and civil development, of immediate and future application in the rest of the country. In a war against “national armed rebels”, these civil operations are the “other arm», complementary and necessary, of the successfully military actions over they.

The battle was carried out more in advancing and bombarding or shelling the suspicious positions. The allied troops were occupying and consolidating the successful advances. The external siege and the control of the possible escape routes of the guerrillas were in charge of the British and the auxiliary forces of Canada, Denmark and Estonia. That also defended the allied road links. The operation was completed in a month.

The Taliban, a light irregular infantry, without artillery or aviation, with a pedestrian and insufficient logistics, were beaten and removed from their combat positions in Marjah, dispersing finally, largely to the bordering provinces. And Marjah remained occupied by the Marines and the forces of the Afghan Army. A whole labor staid ahead now to earn the respect, the confidence and the loyalty of the villagers. And that they begin to accept the central Afghan government. Also it is necessary to offer them a future of peace, safety and prosperity. Replacing their current means of life, based on the opium poppy culture and the drug transport, by others that turn out to be reasonably profitable. And that do not move them simply to a subsistence agriculture without hope. Marines are excellent elite action forces. But in the vulgar and patient tasks of occupation and civilization of a more or less hostile and strange territory, they are mediocre, distant with people and no motivated.

In the province of Kandahar, the fief of the mulah Omar and the first national quarry of the Taliban, there were then almost 3000 Canadian troops, with the American and British forces. It was one of the first fighting «fronts» against the insurgency in the country, together with Helmand and the frontier Eastern provinces. As continuation of the cleaning in Marjah and at “load snort” of its military success, the allies decided to launch during the spring and the summer of 2010, the «Operation Kandahar», with almost the same operational aims that the first one. It was trying to make an intensive use of the operations of search and destruction of the enemy, to divide and disperse him. That would go at charge the elite units of of the armies, forming patrols of exploration, of combat and mixed, backed by Afghan soldiers and using the tactical aviation and artillery supports and the exploratory and precise fire capacities of the «drones». It was talked about the Battle of Kandahar. But, within a few weeks of initiated, his momentum was languishing. And losing initiative, creativity, will and applied force. And it was stopped speaking about her. In this epoch, the journalists detached in military units and populations in Afghanistan warned us that the «green outbreaks» of the insurgency were appearing, as vigorous and firm renews, within Marjah and Nad Ali…

In Afghanistan are present military forces from approximately 46 countries. Some of them are dedicated to support, garrison and rear tasks. As being a great coalition, without subordinating to it any of the interests that to each country dictate his needs and his political commitments, the coincidences between the allies are partial, have continuity solutions and are unstable through time. This intrinsic fragility of the coalition, is born in that almost all the allies do not practice State policies, but temporal or, worst enough, electoral. It is necessary to indicate that this owes largely to that there is not a clear perception of the Afghan problem. Not of his direct or indirect, immediate or distant nearness, to the national respective defense interests.

The great British military Complex Bastion in Helmand’s province.

Helmand is one of 32 provinces of Afghanistan. It spreads over 58.583 km ² at the southwest of the country and has a population around the million and half of inhabitants, of the pashtun and baluchi ethnias. The capital is Laskar Gah. In his Washer’s district, at the northwest of the capital, the Camp Bastion is installed. It is the principal military British base in Afghanistan. It can house between 20 and 30 thousand persons in all its facilities, British and American principally, depending on the Branch to which they belong and their missions, equipments and supplies. It occupies a total extension of 52 Km2, approximately 10 km per 5 km. It was designed to be the center of the logistic operations of the ISAF in Helmand. In addition, it is the major military British camp constructed outside their country after the II World War. Built by the British Engineers since the beginning of 2006, the Complex is placed in a desert zone and away from the populations and provided with long clear sights in all dirThe Latest British Misfortunes in Afghanistanections.

The Camp is divided structurally in different «sections». Bastion 1 and 2 are first erected. Bastion 2 contains also the Camp Barber (USA) and the Camp Viking (Danish). Bastion 0 was added about 2010 and it houses the facilities of the external contractors. The Bastion 3 is used for the specific training of counterinsurgency. The Complex also includes Camp Leatherneck (of the USMC) and Camp Shorabak, of the National Afghan Army. Camp Bastion’s airport, which possesses two landing strips, attends approximately 600 aircraft flights every day, in operations of combat, logistic and medicals. In the attached heliport are deployed the Westland WAH-6 Apache of multiple attack and the Boeing CH-47 Chinook of mixed transport. In these moments the Complex can handle and attend almost all the military and civil aircraft in use. The Complex also houses a great military campaign hospital. And large areas of this great base are protected by a nine meters high concrete wall, which spreads over a perimeter of more of 40km, inserted with special vigilance towers, with soldiers and high technology instruments.

(to be continued)

THE BEGINNING OF A CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA II.

(continuing)

About the «Muslim Brothers» (MB) as political modern «organization» there is profusion of available information, which is constantly updated. But the MB are different from a «political association», according with our Western use and understanding. Their function is eminently social in a wide and deep sense. Like is the Islam as religion. That is based on five props represented by a «opened hand». The jihad is added to those, as a collective blood effort in Al-lâh’s path, for the defense and extension of the lands of Dar-al-Islam. The Islam expresses by sacred actions (rites), necessary to be imbued and blooms in the personal and collective soul of the believers. And these «acts and ritual actions», from the Salat (his daily prayers, which re-join the whole present group), passing for the Roza or fasting in the Ramadan month and the Hajj or multitudinous peregrination to the Mecca, to the Zakat or charity (expressed as canonical alms for the Umma, administered by the ulemas, imams or sheiks). They are collective and highly composing the local or regional Muslim community. The MB are like a legal «confraternity», with the due distances, of the Islam. And with the Zakat they support services of social attention of all kinds (schools and madrasas, clinics, hospitals, help to persons and families). These forge the community in a «unit of general action» effective and resistant. That is of very difficult repetition or reply for the laymen, the atheists and other potential enemies.

On February 4, 1982, after a time of pacific active opposition, the Syrian MB Sunnis, tried an armed revolt in Hama’s city against Hafez al-Assad. His brother Rifaat al-Assad directed the military repression. Surrounded, isolated, without heavy armament, or supplies, the uprising MB were squashed by February 28. It is calculated in more than 20 thousand the rebels dead men during in the combats and in the later pursuit and mopping up. The consulted values range between 10 thousand and 40 thousand. Which indicates that they neither are checked, are not even trustworthy, coming from antagonists sources or fickle authors.

It was the epoch in which these mobs were not constituting a part of a social extensive, deep and determined action. But rather an activate «rebel military area». That was seeking to attract, after his first armed successes, wide sectors of the Sunnis Syrian population. Then, they were seditious without sufficient popular support. Not all the MB were even revolted. And that, therefore, could and must be submitted or swept by the established authorities, as irretrievable and odious rebels.

The dynastic government of the Assad and his political equipment have stopped forming a socialist and national regime a lot of time ago. As they neither represent or defend, nor integrate, the particular and collective interests of their nation. Now only support and protect the members of the social religious oligarchy. That monopolizes and distributes in different degrees the institutional, social and economic power of Syria. The Syrian regime is crystallized, without fluency, so much socially, as ideologically and administratively. And is turning into the shell of a «social political fruit», shriveled, sterile and empty.

A Panorama of national and military Strategy of the Civil War in Syria.

Strategically and in the medium term, the regime of the Assad and his institutional skeleton of the Baaz lay party and their supporters of the Republican Guard and the Air Force, the chiefs and many officials of the Army and the high ranking posts in the Administration, is finished.

Their outrages, the social fractures and the grinding time applied and caused to their heterogeneous people are too much. In order that the beginning revolutionary process (of abrupt change of regime and of political structures) has an acceptable and permanent “reverse” in Syria.

Operatively and in the medium term also, the SNA «monitored and encouraged» by the Republican Guard and the Military Security, has a wide operational movement capacity; a consistent logistic network of stores, warehouses, long distance transport and distribution transport and an IT system, that allows the control and direction of her; a sure flow of armament and equipments for replacement and a simply resounding combat capacity, against their armed semi regular and irregular enemies.

In this level of activity, it is of emphasizing the absence of the Syrian Air Force, in the combats, harassments and skirmishes that take place. It is an Army branch, technical, minority and loyal to the al-Assad, where came from daddy Hafez. That would act as air support, rebel movements interdiction and bombardment of their volatile and slightly definite “support rears” and bases of all kinds. She does not have counterinsurgency specific planes. That allow, flying at low speed, to fix the target and concentrate in it the fire, minimizing his action over not belligerent. As those of the Bronco and his derivatives family and even the old Mig-17.

Then, her employment in a revolt against poorly armed rebels and with diffuse and intermingled “fronts” with populations and neighborhoods of cities. It might give place, though more remotely that in the Lybian case, to the decision of a “military foreign intervention” of variable implications against the regime. The intervention, in this case, with the thorny and difficult political and geostrategic exposition that imply: the reluctance to her of China and Russia; the frontier nearness of The Lebanon and Iran;the natural and inconvenient allies of the regime alauí (chii) and the considerable major population of Syria, in comparison with Lybia. So, she Is stopped by the lack of direction, leadership and moral courage and of ideological and political definition of the so called Western «powers». The artillery, which is less visible and spectacular for the present and absent public, is freely used by the SNA, including the heavy organic tubes of the infantry. It is of emphasizing that in the Eastern Front war, the campaign, heavy and reactive artillery caused up to 45 % of the total losses of both rivals, against to 5 % attributed to the assault artillery and other 5 %, to the aviation. And 35 % of the losses assumed by the heavy organic weapons of both infantries. And this, taking apart that other tasks of the artillery also were to disorganize the enemy movements, to destroy equipments and fortifications and the harassment.

Tactically, the Syrian regime supported by the SNA is in conditions to defeat indefinite but not perpetually all his armed opponents. Any rebel armed force that faces him directly or that tries to defend her positions in a rigid defense without yielding space will be annihilated. The only opportunity that the armed opponents have is precisely not to be drawn by the Army to a lost combat in advance. His technologies and tactics must be the constant and far-sighted mobility; the dispersion and the infiltration, for the moment, in the urban fighting; the small, dispersed and more or less simultaneous or sequential actions in a sensible area; the echeloned escape; the fight with very limited goals and with advantageous temporary conditions; the systematic giving up of positions, forcing the enemy to deploy and prepare again. They can win for the rebel armed forces the necessary time to survive. And to manage to glimpse the victory, against the brutal national and international, political and social wear, which will suffer Bachar al-Assad’s regime, in exponential proportion to the repression time he exercises.

THE BEGINNING OF A CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA

The Syrian troops cause hundreds of dead and injured civilians in their attack to Homs’ city since Friday, 3rd of February. Justifying themselves with making “hot pursuit” of a group of supposed regular rebels in retreat. These actions in force spread already to other cities and small populations of the west of the country. This would be the summary of the news that are received from Syria during February. And with them an important qualitative change has taken place in this masked war. That is increasingly near to burst out and to develop and spread, with the typical characteristics of an armed sustained internal conflict.

Geographical Conditionings of the military Theater of Syria. His operational Characteristics in the Modern War.

Syria is fundamentally a flat country. The life and activity of his inhabitants is assembled and supported by 2 great rivers, the Orontes, which flows from north to south, and the high section of the Euphrates, which crosses his extensive and desert plains of the East, in south-east direction. A thin heights chain, the Ansariyya, which extends in its southern part in the Antilibano and Hermon mountain ranges, now close to Damascus, limits his narrow coastal plain, with Mediterranean crops. At the east of this heights succession, the Orontes, which feeds the irrigation of different crops from the Gab natural depression, allows different urban emplacements, principally Hama and Homs, from north to south. Around the Euphrates, the life sustains, thanks to the irrigations from the river and Tabqa’s dam, in the cities of Raqqa and Day the-Zawr and other minor populations.

As we have seen, the Syrian territory offers a favorable area for the operational movement and marches of the mechanized and motorized units and small units. That are capable of rapidly crossing large and surprising distances for their enemy. Using for it departure bases in their operational rear. This allows also that, any semipermanent concentration of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) could be easily reached, isolated and annihilated by the National Syrian Army (NSA) of Bashar al-Assad.

The Prolegomena of the Civil War in Syria.

Till now the combats between the rebels and the NSA were harassments, skirmishes, ambushes and small assaults to populations, which did not have the character of a «circle and siege», even partially and temporarily. All those had two key characteristics: they were very limited in time and did not have any operational projection. The falls of both «rivals», compared with those of any armed conflict that boasts, were ridiculous. On the other hand, many «minishocks» were not even detected by the normal observers or the international press.

The NSA has made one more step towards the crushing of the revolt, still in his tender buds. But already armed and spreading in «spots» over the whole west of the country. Using also in his «task», the artillery, the infantry heavy weapon and the heavy direct fire of the tanks. Heavy fire that, till now, seeks to sow the panic between the enemy soldiers and his civil supporters and the neighbors of the redoubts and strong temporary rebel points. Without that, with the direct and indirect support of their fires, take place military ground actions of operational transcendence. Only there happens the employment of «groups» of snipers by both parts. The select military men infiltrate and establish themselves, forming a short, discontinuous and broken front line, that covers a sector or strip of great frequency of movements in the population or city. And the rebels realize the neutralization action of the military snipers. And, while the panic produces the people’s move out, but rarely the flanks overflow, the soldiers advance, rolling in the created «emptiness». But without penetrating in it in force and decisively, to dismantle the rebel defense. Or to divide in sectors the enemy enclaves, as maneuver before their mop up by parts.

The self named Syrian Free Army in the Syrian Civil War.

It is a conglomerate of dispersed and unlike forces. That come from the intermittent desertion of small groups of members of the different forces of the NSA. There do not exist elements of the Air Force, which we know, between the rebels. The SFA is far from constituting an organic stable and consolidated structure. His order of battle is constituted, in his pinnacle, by the regional «brigades». These operate tactically in the “urban bed” of the Orontes. Looking only for limited goals of harassment or sudden attacks against the security forces and local important authorities. They do not have intention of defending the goals that are occupied. And they shelter at once, more or less deployed, in the nearby mountain chains. Or, forming small but integrated units, in some neighborhoods of the turbulent cities of Homs, Hama and other populations.

This rebel Syrian army, is better qualified and trained that the local «brigades» (hundreds of Lybian improvised «qatibas», in the style of «sans cullottes» or of the Iranian «basijs») of the questionable Libyan National Counsel of Transition. At least, his men possess a unit of doctrine, regulations and armaments. They have plenty of the varied personnel weapons, including the RPG family and her improved HEAT rockets of hollow lcharge and free flight and some heavy infantry armament (mortars and machine guns). His great weakness is his penury of armored vehicles, of artillery and of the antitank organic weapons of the companies and the specific battalions for antitank fighting. And the lack of a logistic stable network, sufficient and provided regularly.

Here also exists the social psychological phenomenon of raising in 2 or 3 degrees the category, the real size and the capacity of the real deployed and operative units. And that, for stale, does not cheat anybody.

Other active Protagonists of the Civil War in Syria.

The Syrian Army is the army of the nation. And it is formed proportionally as her, by a majority of sunnies recruits. That is which feeds, together with NCO s and junior officials of same origin, as an exuberant nursery, the ranks of the FSA. The Army is formed by approximately 200 thousand persons, most of recruit. The potential of the nation for a supported annual recruitment is around 220 thousand men. And it can reach even more than 320 thousand persons, with the first mobilization. Army is integrated by 3 army corps and varied and numerous independent units, with all the branches and available services. Within his upbringing is included a «political indoctrination». Not as severe, extensive and constant as that in the Communist armies, that look to imbue them with hatred towards the Zionist enemy and with loyalty to the Government and the Party.

The Army is «observed and controlled» by a younger brother of Bashar, Mahir, from his headquarters of the Republican Guard (the Haras al-Jumhuriyya). And by his brother-in-law Asef Shawkat, who directs the whole State Security, through his different institutional branches. In all the military «units» are «observers» of the Military Intelligence. Also there are several «Special Forces»units, formed exclusively by alauits volunteers, that nowadays received the joint name of «Force of Rapid Deployment», at the usage of other national armies. They are light infantry reinforced units, with the highest level in motivation, training and combat readiness.

If we want to speak about the combative efficiency of the Syrian Army, we have to depart from his specific “combat capacities». Definite and calculated by colonel Trevor Dupuy. And that refer to real values exhibited in conflicts. The last ones, calculated from the Yom Kippur’s War, were giving a value of 2,54 Syrian soldiers for one of the Tsahal. This was placing them over Jordanians and Egyptians, with values below 2. For more than 20 years, an improvement is perceived in the quality of the military personnel. And the junior officials receive now more tasks and are promoted also by his value, within the habitual parameters of the Arabic armies.

In this multicolored social military scene, are also present a few purely local autonomous militias, without operative connection between them. They do not exist in all the places and neighborhoods. There are out of the Baaz and his politician paramilitary militias that, for the moment, are inactive. Those try to keep a minimum of social internal order and the safety and the movement of the citizens and goods in the different enclaves, small populations and slums where they act. Their armament is merely the infantry personnel weapons and hunting firearms, in very varied number and composition depending on their location and contacts. Both the «task groups» of the SNA and the rebel bands keep, in this period of development of the fighting, a tolerant status quo with these civil militias. Which realize a suitable civil police labor for all.

In many alauits neighborhoods operates a paramilitary governmental militia (the «habiha»), formed by select militants of the Baaz. In different Sunnis neighborhoods act irregular armed rebels from the Muslim Brothers. It is very scanty the presence of radical religious Salafists and his furthermore exiguous local appendices. The past suicide attacks in Damascus were ascribed to them. This introduces a “social instability factor” in the “real parameters” of this war. That performs major effect and importance, that would correspond to it by the number and aggressiveness efficiency of these social religious radical Islamic. Finally, there also are «Sunnis irregular volunteers» from Iraq, without pays since the retreat of the USA. That would be crossing the Syrian border and her Eastern desert, to join the armed fight against the regime of the Baaz.

(to be continued)

THE NETWORKS WAR II.

(continuation)

The urban effective guerrilla war. Another principal domain for the swarming groups in the networks war theory.

It is not easy to use and defend the urban zones of repulse. Its employment demands high requirements to the rebel combatants:

An enough motivation, which encourages them to follow the arms way and risking their lives for their cause. And appeases and rationalizes them the inevitable fear of the fighting in the close distances with a superior enemy, until the seniority offers to them new impulses.

A good training in the infantry fighting, which gives them trade and confidence. A successful cooperation between the small units that garrison the zones, that guarantees them a cohesion without fissures in their tenuous and lean deployment. And that allows and facilitates the command conduction and the accomplishment of his plans. To get iron nerves tempered by everything previous, that accustom them to fight in solitary or in small groups, refusing to flee in face of the implacable threat of the military heavy fire. For all this, among the few tens of thousands of armed rebels existing, not more than 15% of them can in these moments use this kind of defensive fight. The military networks and the swarming of «small sections» have in these two operational characteristics, their major deficiencies.

These urban irregular enemies are protected extending their defensive positions beyond the necessary in a conventional defense, covering this way a major occupied surface. In the defense zone they establish delaying points, more or less reinforced. These protect the most critical positions of the zone, that incorporate in the defense the buildings with steel structure, specially resistant, and form fire bags to trap the enemy that gets through. The resistance nests have here more importance, provided that the occupation of the zone of defense is more tenuous, that they cannot strengthen the positions too much for covered reasons, the sights are more short and exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delaying points and to them they fall back if are invaded or destroyed. Numerous alternative or extras positions exist, more of the habitual in the urban fighting. This allows to deceive the military enemy about the forward limit of the defense position, its real extension, the limits of the sectors that form it, the intentions of the rebel command of the zone about its defense and to disperse the heavy fire of the attacker. In the edges of the urban zones they never establish these fixed positions. Those are occupied by combat advanced parties, which mission is to receive the possible explorers or civil observers, to avoid surprises and to deceive about the tracing of the defensive zone. The occupants of combat advanced positions, distributed in pairs of sentries and some very small mobile patrols, fall back in their moment towards the more interiors delaying points.

These «fortresses» are diffuse, secret and imperceptible to strangers. In a few hours the previous works are reinforced and occupied. Its communication routes need more working time to get done, but also are less evident. It is necessary to enter the houses to detect perforated walls and to find alleys under a furniture or a carpet. These positions are not complex. They need a few interlaced firing sectors, an immediate protection against the enemy irruption in mass or with elite commands, some covers against the heavy normal fire and a sufficient concealment that covers them from the sights of the enemy probable successive positions and his approximation avenues. The obstacles and the mines, even false in certain percentage and always distantly to not betray them, will serve to break the enemy assault and to offer to them more static targets, for example for the mortars, which will have registered its fires. The destruction that generates the wide heavy fire support without aiming a precise target, reinforces the rebel combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the accesses of the military, except when they are reached by a ordnance direct impact. To operate this defensive structure the rebels have prepared numerous and narrow tunnels, dragging trenches and gaps in garden walls and interior walls of the buildings. In such a way that, away from the enemy sights, allow them to occupy the combat and observation positions at wish, to defend them more or less time or not, to move among them and to reinforce the most threatened or pressed places.

Generally they try to shoot from the front, with isolated or couples snipers armed with the SVD or M-14 sniper rifles, at individual and small groups of enemies. And to attack from the flank or the rear at the enemy units that penetrate in their defensive zone, which already are disintegrated in squads or sections with one or two armored vehicles. Those prepared communications allow them to appear, always in small number, behind or at the flanks of the units, while these stop, regroup, ask or receive instructions, or decide where to advance, and to erode them, causing some casualties. For example, from a basement or a floor, through an irregular hollow in a yard or garden wall, under a parked or destroyed vehicle in the street, where it emerges a narrow tunnel with a covered and disguised exit. From these positions the armed rebels throw some RPG-7V rockets or several short blasts, always aiming, of the RPK light machine gun or the obsolete RPD. The interior houses courts serve them to place the mortars, which constitute their the only «heavy fire» source, protected by an infantry position. They fired them with the maximum angles on the abundant, large and always excessive military concentrations. The usual mortar is the 82 mm. Russian modern M-1937 model. Here that the attacker presents three times more men (in means the proportion must be 20 to 1) neither favors nor facilitates their labor. But this offers the persecuted defender more targets to be able to use his exiguous fire power. Especially because, in a given moment, is small the attackers’ proportion that are putting in real distress the defenders.

Also they possess an effective and increasing anti-aircraft defense of short range. From other courts and roofs, always protected by a nearby infantry resistance nest, several teams of light anti-aircraft rocket shoulder launchers carriers are arranged. Their location in the deployment is done depending on the most probable and most dangerous aircraft approximation directions for the defense. If they are sufficient and shoot skilful, they could use two nearby, but not contiguous launchers, whom form a team, and that shoot successively and rapidly (the SAM-18 flies at 2 Mach) against an aircraft or towards an enemy air formation in immediate approximation to its target. A typical rocket would be the SAM 7, called «grail» and «strela» (arrow) in not Cyrillic Russian. It had successive improvements and today is replaced in the military arsenals by the SAM 18 former mentioned, that has a useful attack height of 3,5 km (the double). And guides, a fuel rocket, an explosive head and a bait detector, all improved. The shoulder shooter limits himself to direct the launcher already loaded towards its target, wait until the missile confirms the target’s acquisition and then squeeze again the trigger. And to get hide.

The crucial moment for the defense comes when the zone commander decides to evacuate it, after having stopped and delayed the enemy for some time. Trying to cause him losses as high as possible, but without been exposed excessively to a fighting at the close distances, or to be outflanked or to lose his freedom of action. This is inexorably tied to the transfer of space to the military enemies. For it the rebels avoid in opportune moment the direct assault of their enemy, not his extensive or vague bombardment. The rebels must have sufficient exit tunnels directed to not very nearby buildings (often official and even respectable (mosques), offices, companies and some houses) or not evident dry riverbeds (wadis) and bushes in the open land. From there they could disperse through the ground in very small groups towards friends reception positions, in the first moments. The protection of the evacuation is therefore vital and both entrances or exits from these tunnels are always covered by resistance nests, which take to end their rigid defense.

All this cohesion, discipline, formation, training and firm and effective command of the irregular classic units, are distant of those of a military lax structure of networks or of the swarming of independent groups over an enemy or defending itself from him. Where are in this new theory, the center of gravity or the reiteration of efforts or the saving and optimization of the material and human means?

The effective operability of the units and small military units.

The war of networks tends to a too extensive subdivision of the military units. Turning out the «little group» or the net «knot», as tactical independent effective unit (TIEU). With them they would seek to extend the front (so the actions) on a more awkward or passive enemy, to disturb to his command and to alter his plan of fires.

But this is not practical in the operational level of the war.

The subunits tactically related need to have and keep a strip of advance or, at least, the little ones, a direction; a protected and concealed support fires (antitank and anti-aircraft defense and for neutralization and blinding of the enemy); the operational and permanent nearness of a logistic vehicles team, at least for health and to re-put ammunitions; a depth of the deployment, with a certain reserves; and his protection towards the exposed flanks and rear. All this supposes a minimal «tactical entity united and commanded», to keep both his security and resistance to the surprises, his combative efficiency, his deployment and his capacity of tactical movement.

And that they have to share with their companion units, a part of the fulfillment of the aim of their high command. And to have a combat mission directed on the enemy, as part of the gravit center of the efforts of the «major unit» of her. To avoid that these “group or nude” type units roam through the operational field, without a clear, effective and operatively transcendent intention.

All this reduces capacity and possibilities of employment to the networks and to the clusters of multiple «micro or small independent units», within the spectrum of the «situations of efficiency» that are raised and offered by the theory.

Here is an example of the correct employ of modern conventional military units. Against a reinforced infantry position that has advanced antitank weapons, a typical defensive zone, if it cannot be outflanked, an enemy dismounted infantry can break through or destroy it. It can be follow by tanks advancing by covered bounds to offer protection and direct fire support. The defender’s antitank will look for a relatively large and protected target, that it can hit from covered positions or, at least, from well-camouflaged positions, that are flanking the armored vehicles. And will fire by batteries with dispersed guns, so that the same enemy heavy fire can not incapacitate them. The infantry’s heavy weapons (machine guns in tripods) neutralize by «sweeping and searching» a more or less narrow frontal zone, that is occupied in depth by small, soft, dispersed targets such as an infantry platoon.

Attacking tanks can use H.E. and H.E.S.H. shells to overcome infantry strong positions and their infantry squads can attack with light machine guns the enemy antitank weapons, to prevent them from sighting or fix a target. All this destruction and neutralization, once irruption is achieved, proceeds in worm-like movements deep into the tactical zone of the assault sector of the interarms unit. Other parts of the enemy’s position that could collaborate in the rejection are blocked by smoke and/or neutralized by indirect fire.

At the same time, advanced observers from artillery and aviation corps will be defining new targets to its units, in addition to those found by assault units along the flanks and deep (through combat exploration) in the advance sector. The criterion of the gravity center of the fire of support at least will be neutralize all the targets that are opposed to the advance towards the enemy position, to the irruption and to the struggle inside the defense position of in the assigned sector. This will facilitate the direct fire and shock produced by the ground attackers, by means of concentrated and precise fire blows.

This optimizes effective action in a given environment at the level of the tactical groups of action or combined arms systems, whose complementariness has been described. In broken, undulating, wooded or urbanized (housings and factories) areas (not necessarily mountainous), the lack of sight control and the abundant “concealing relative heights” reduce the sector of “interfaces of action” with the enemy.

The suitably-sized “combined arms system” continues to be the element of effective action. The action is effected by companies or reinforced interarms platoons, with heavy fire support provided by battalions (medium and heavy mortars). Except in areas that are very flat and with few “sight obstructions”, ground “transitability” (more than simply “ground on going”), which physically limits the possible “interfaces of action” with the enemy, can prevent the fight using concentrated resources that are beyond those of a company. The battalion role will be to reinforce the efforts and distributing supports.

In these cases, existing communication ways, especially those more or less perpendicular to the front, are critical to land actions. Blockading these ways affects tempo (the total speed of the operation) enormously, by the difficulty presented by sloping or obstructed areas that surrounds them (forests, gullies, constructions, un-reinforced fords). The advance slows down or the forces have to be dispersed onto parallel available routes, forcing them to enter other difficult bordering areas.

Otherwise, contingency plans for units must provide for overcoming four types of unforeseen situations that can impede or endanger a mission. These include:

a) Possible direct action by the enemy in using or recovering initiative. This might take the form of an interdiction bombardment or counterattack. The solution is to tactically neutralize his action, without compromising the mission.

b) Possible encounter with the enemy. This could occur during combat exploration patrols or could be confronted by sentries, advanced security forces and advanced detachments and deep exploration patrols. It is necessary to submit or push back the enemy and to rapidly and temporarily change positions or direction, to not compromise the mission.

c) Possible unforeseen obstacles. These could be ditches, slopes of more difficult soil, blown-up bridges, floods, and storms that affect an area’s transitability. It is important to overcome these as rapidly as possible, while maintaining security and extending exploration.

d) Possible defensive/passive action of the enemy. These can take the form of an ambush, minefield, reinforced cut defended by fire, rejection fires of a defense position or antitank obstacles. These must be overcome as soon as possible, as in the case of natural obstacles, to avoid being moved by the enemy in a direction that is favorable to a counterattack or toward a zone covered by artillery or by convergent fires (bag fires zones).

In general terms, including in the commander’s plan, these must always be pursued:

1) To overcome or repel the enemy and/or unforeseen obstacles which hinder one’s forces and provide information to the enemy.

2) Avoid losing resources (or resources that are neutralized, detached or repulsed) that are important for fulfilling the mission. The surviving enemy can use compromising information, but he may receive it too late to be effective intelligence for him.

3) Resources necessary for the mission must be available for its execution. This multiplies efficiency, after commotion and the incident losses, to maintain a high momentum of execution: this being the product of combat capacity by the average speed of movement in a given period and in a certain direction.

The example of the preparation and action of General Patton’s 3^rd American army in counterattacking the German penetration in the Ardennes illustrates the difficulties (its «incident» was a sudden change of mission, direction and execution) and the possibilities gave by the «momentum» of execution.

None of this is improvised. It is the result of practice and is the fruit of frequent training, the organization of work and the coordination of the H.Q. and all commands. These sayings remind us of this: «it is performed as it is trained» and «the man is an animal of habit».

In practice the degree of general military obtained efficiency, will be determined by the idiosyncrasy of the nation, the character more or less gregarious or independent of her peoples, both her military doctrine and tradition, the defense budgets, her » national moral», which feeds and holds her «will of defense», the political national and international situation, the integration of her institutions and national organisms in the regional or international area, etc.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

What are they? How many there are? How do they serve?

A historical analytical tour from the Fighting Kingdoms of the ancient China up to their modern expression for the irregular or asymmetric war

The so called «principles» of the war or advises for good acting in it, which also are permanent, so as are reinterpreted with good sense and flexibility, are the compendium of «what to do” on war. Nevertheless, not always were agree the authors or the doctrines to define or to enumerate them, the results being characterized by its extreme diversity before the same phenomenon.

Following their best theoretical experts and skilled users.

Following General André Beaufré, Clausewitz proposed three fundamental principles: the concentration of efforts, the action of the strong on the weak and the decision by the battle in the principal operational theater.

Nevertheless, the reading of his book «On the War» allows to extract at least other eight conclusions, milestones or advices in his great work. And they have the character of principles of the war. These would be: Simplicity in the plans and executions. Concentration on the enemy and relative economy of forces in other sectors, to help to get it. This way, the establishment of a principal effort and enough reserves to guarantee it through time. The surprise, as multiplier of the own military capacities. Superiority of the defense, which must be active, as a fighting form. Need of the offensive, to obtain positive and/or decisive results at the operational and strategic military levels.

Liddell Hart proposes six positive principles: Following a flexible and adaptable plan, to prosecute a constant goal, fitted to the available means, looked for by means of the line of action that offers the less resistance of the enemy and, therefore, the most unexpected for his deployment and following an operational direction that offers us alternatives and, therefore, that disconcerts and disperse the enemy forces. And two negatives: to not throw the forces in an unique blow or attempt, while the enemy is on guard or in conditions to elude or resist that blow and not to repeat in the same form or direction an assault, if it has previously failed. We can synthesize all this saying that: it is necessary to apply our concentration against the enemy weakness, once his forces are dispersed, and if before they were not, by our calculated enticing deployment dispersion .

Though Napoleon commented frequently and wrote very much on the principles of the war, he did not enumerate them anywhere. In presence of the marshal Saint Cyr he once commented: «If some day I have time, I will write a book describing so precise form the principles of the war, they will be understood by all the soldiers, being able to study the war as easily as any another science». The general John Frederick Charles Fuller, from the study of Napoleon’s campaigns, deduces undoubtedly that him used the following ones: Employment of the rapidity, faith in the resolution of the offensive, the surprise, the concentration in the decisive point (not necessarily the weakest in all his battles) and a carefully projected defensive system.

There have been really done diverse collections of the Napoleon’s maxims and military rules. Considered the best and first of all, the published in Paris in 1.827 and which was almost immediately translated to the rest of the principal European languages, certainly the Spanish. It is said that Stonewall Jackson was taking a copy of this opuscule in his rucksack. The colonel G. F. R. Henderson, biographer of Napoleon, considers that this summary «contains a complete enough account, in the Napoleon’s own words, of the great universal principles of the war». In this famous edition there appear 78 maxims, which were extended in other 37 rules in the later editions. But, the “Military Maxims» of Napoleon constitute rather a “tactical breviary” of approximately 35 pages, adapted to the technology of his time, similar to the expressly wrote and with bigger extension, already in the epoch of the mechanization of the war, by the Swiss colonel Frick.

For his part, Fuller analyzing Clausewitz and departing from his phrase, «the war only is a duel on a large scale», he is deducing up to seven general principles for the conduction of war, explained through a of box fight paraphrase. Those are: The conservation of the goal. The security. The mobility in the action. The utilization of the offensive. The surprise. The concentration of the forces. The economy of the forces. These Fuller’s principles were accepted and assumed by the North American military doctrine from 1.921, with the due updates in its exhibition and possibilities of application, and adding those of simplicity and unit of control.

The French traditional strategic school represented by the generalissimo Foch, victor of I World War, summarized the strategy in two principles: the economy of forces and the freedom of action. For its generality and abstraction they can be applied to all the tactics and strategies. General Beaufré summarizes them in to reach the decisive point thanks to the freedom of action, obtained by means of a good economy of forces.

The school of the North American great strategy or total strategy represented by the general Maxwell Taylor used, during its confrontation with the U. S. S. R. in the long cold war, two basic principles of performance: the adjustable dissuasion and the flexible response.

Stalin, the great victor of the II World War, whom was asking ironically, «how many divisions has the Pope? « (now we will see the reason), defined the five Soviet principles of the war, which he called «operational permanent factors»: The stability of the national civl rear, the fighting and political moral of the Army, the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the Army and the organizing skill of the cadres, officials and commanders.

These are in contrast with the so called “transitory factors”, of which only one has been specified, the surprise. Surely because it was the only one that Stalin mentioned as such, in the period following its lucky use at the strategic level by the Germans, on having invaded the U. S. S. R. The Soviet exhibition of the mentioned principles, necessarily does not mean that there do not exist other principles, that are so valuable as them in the military Soviet doctrine. But only that are not mentioned as such by her.

In «The Art of the War» of Sun Tzu there are also definite the roots of the principles of the war. They are not stated explicitly as in the West, but they appear expressed with that global sense of the Chinese philosophy. Which seeks to bear in mind everything at the same time, the particular thing and the general. More as an intimate perception and an experience, than as a «check list», a prescription handbook or a vademecum.

On the principle of the offensive SunTzu says:

«The invincibility resides in the defense, the opportunities of victory, in the attack». «When you have enough means, the suitable thing is the defense; when you have more than sufficient means, the assault.» «Those who are expert in the art of defending, hide themselves under the land of the nine folds; those who are expert in the art of attacking, advance as launching from the ninth sky. Thus, they are capable of be protected and insuring themselves the total victory at a time».

(to be continued)

A THEORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WARS II.

(continuación)

The Last Operational Projections opposite to the Most recent Threats.

The balance of the nuclear weapons between both great atomic hegemonic powers («guides and leaders» of their partners), is defined by the new START Treaty. This has been ratified on December 22, 2010 by the American Senate. And is hoped that the Russian Duma ratifies it, after her established by protocol study, in an only voting at the beginning of 2011. This new agreement replaces the START of 1991, which expired on Saturday, the 5th of December, 2009.

The START 2 supposes a qualitative and substantial limitation of the number of heads and nuclear strategic vectors of the USA and Russia. Far are the times in which the number of operational, stored and dismantled by pieces nuclear devices were reaching 50000 between both. By 2013, each country will deploy only 1550 strategic nuclear warheads and will have 800 carrying and multicarrying vectors for them: submarines, free flight rockets, ballistic rockets and planes. Also is established a new system of inspection of the arsenals and nuclear means.

Several are the deficiencies or topics not solved by the Treaty. One is the not limitation to developing the defense systems against the vectors. Also is kept the storage freedom of not operational warheads and of deployment of the atomic tactical weapons. Between both «models», each signatory power can have nowadays near 6000 warheads. The tactical nuclear weapon, destined to the battlefield, can be an intermediate step in a direct warlike confrontation between nuclear powers. Before using the nuclear strategic volleys against the operational or deep enemy rears. The USA claims that, at least, the last two topics been an object of a later treaty.

The rigorous limitations of the nuclear weapons do not eliminate them. No weapon has never been abolished, once acquired and extended the technology for his manufacture and use. It is necessary to learn to coexist indefinitely with them. An excessive control (very few explosive heads and vectors) does that they all are directed to attack the enemies population and industrial centers. This paradoxically goes in opposition with the pacifists aspirations. When the number of weapon systems overcomes a survival or practical threshold, it allows to follow an atomic flexible, variable and staggered strategy. In her, many of the vectors are pointed to destroy the enemy vectors in the diverse phases of his path to the goals: in and over the hostile territory or platform; in ballistic or autonomous flight towards the goal and over the own territory, both at high and very low level. This keeps limited the number of heads destined against populations and industries. Even it allows their tactical employment against profitable goals of military enemy concentrations, specially before reaching in force the forward limit of a principal defense position.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggressions are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, the Americans are called them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebellious and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

In these irregular wars many of the parameters of the previous wars are absent. There is no declaration of war by the Legislative Power of the strong or military contender. The victory is not obtained occupying the enemy territory. The military means lose a part of his leading role, in favor of the social, economic and political means, necessary to gain the will and the fervor of the societies at the stack. The treatment and the care given by the contenders to the civil population of the guerrilla infected territory is fundamental in the development and the result of the conflict. The duration of these wars is major than that of the conventional wars. The time, necessary in order that the rebels make and develop their total war effort, works, in general, in favor of the weak or irregular contender. The military means are not adapted, at first, to the type of fighting that is asked to them. Neither exist clear goals, nor territories at stake, nor front lines or enemies deployments, nor strengthened positions. If the guerrilla are it sufficient skillful and steady, to not directly and unnecessarily confront her chronic weakness to the enemy strength.

The Great Operational Lines of the Counter Guerrillas Forces.

Nowadays, in West, in Europe, the exterior leading role of the conventional armed forces seems to center in them, throughout the time and in varied theaters. The military western action opposite to their exterior irregular global threats demands an effective, light and mobile counterinsurgency forces, specialized in not orthodox tactics and technologies, as part of the conventional troops. That must always operate in conjunction with the national forces of the countries infected by irregular hostiles and supported with decision by the own economy and the diplomacy. This will strengthen their missions and compounded role, The counterguerrillas forces must not be enslaved to the strategies and tactics of the conflicts of the second and third generation or classic contemporary ones. Though these could arise punctually in the armed conflicts with the «urchin States» of each time (for example, Iran, North Korea or Venezuela).

Some of the operational characteristics of this different type of war, but not new, are:

To always avoid a protracted war. With her the enemy organizes, spreads and strengths, sometimes irreversibly. While the military men lose way, get angry and weaken. The war of Afghanistan is squarely in this long critical period.

To always attack the concentrations and the rebel bases. These are the hard and conventional goals that they offer to the military forces. To always defend and support the own communications and to attack those of the enemy. To take advantage for it of the light armored vehicles mobility and of the aircraft, which neutralize the information of the different enemy observers.

To keep the passive defenses of the war to the possible minimum. The big «protective» and costly barracks in relatively calm zones, only serve to socially and military isolate the regular forces, from the fluid and active environment of the irregular fight. If the military forces were initially not enough, is necessary to concentrate them temporarily in fewer zones and to promote between the population the self defense forces. To always use a constant, creative and energetic patrolling. So much for the exploration and the attack, as to hinder and isolate the guerrillas from the friends or neutral populations and to cut their communications. In both cases, is necessary to keep mobile, even airborne forces, to give them supports. To use the concentrations of regular military forces only to attack the guerrilla bases or to surround and chase his operational concentrations.

This will keep the initiative and the surprise, created by the regional network of small light “action units”, in hands of the military men. That by formation, training, means and vocation should clearly overcome the hostiles in the military operations. The principal goal is not to keep a “front line” or a «cultivated field» of barracks, redoubts and forts through a whole country or strategic region. But to active destroy the combat capacity and the operational movement capacity of the armed rebels.

And only the military «initial» and continued successes, will lay the foundations for a firm, irreversible and progressive pacification of the different regions of the country.

Let’s see now succinctly the possible distribution of the military bases depending on the enemy activity. In the enemy most favorable zones, the military positions must be solid and resistant, few and with a bigger garrison. In these areas must predominate the exploration of the bands and the major offensive operations against them, over their bases, concentrations, refuges and passages.

In the zones where the rebels try to settle, progress and manage to dominate the civilians, the military positions will be more numerous and with fewer troops. These are the more changing zones, of more irregular war, of combat meetings (the ambush is it) more frequent. Here is decided, first, the advance and the progress and, finally, the victory of one of both contenders. The enemy communications and the rebellious centers in these areas are the operative goals of the loyal forces, together with the defense of the populations. Resting, partly, on local self-defense forces, reinforced by highly mobile military patrols, even transported by helicopters. Assured the defense of an area in these zones, is possible to demand loyalty to the protected population. And to begin the labors of national economic support and civic rearmament.

In the most loyal or neutral and pacific areas is necessary to test the technologies and the methods of sincere and effective approximation to the population. The self-defense native forces, supported by military mobile patrols, in charge a manageable zone, must support here the weight of keeping their own security. In this zone can be located the helitransported and the mechanized sufficient reserves. To be sent to other 2 kinds of operational zones in support or assault operations. Also the brigades of economic support and of civic rearmament, can have here his stores and central big barracks.

When scanty military means are available and the enemy sustain an all-out war, is it possible to fight against armed and motivated rebels?

Let’s see a historical example of the action of military forces against insurgents, in unfavorable conditions for them. The German antipartisans forces in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In heir manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that » the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be replied».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, by the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His anti partisans troops were consisting of an always variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German security troops and policemen; security troops of his allies in the East Front, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of «Russian» allied forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes insecure. The hard core of the units were the Germans. In the positions usually were not homogeneous troops. In them the qualities were intermingled, in order that the more mope or novice was encouraging by the presence of the forte. And it remove from him the thoughts of weakness or desertion. Before the inability to garrison her rear in the whole territory conquered from the USSR, at west of an imaginary line between Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Germans had to select very well the points to garrison. These rarely were possessing more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the position could be defended for a time. While, the rest, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor their vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of anti partisans forces, they were formed exploration and combat patrols. Something like a reconnaissance in force forces, to locate and to scourge the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, before a guerrilla threat or the location of an important concentration, even were temporarily brought troops from the first line (of the operational zone) for the assault and destruction of those, generally looking for his encircle and annihilation. I

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational goal of his anti partisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies from Germany, Poland and Romania were kept reasonably opened up to the rears of the German forces and their allies in the East Front. And the men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods flows that they received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Million Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and to there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch.

THE CAPTURE OF BIN LADEN.

Introduction.

Bin Laden is the principal responsible for the attempts of September 11, 2001. And also probably those of March 11, 2004. But in a lax way, of ideological religious sponsorship. As he was in these dates, first sheltered in Afghanistan, and later hidden in its inaccessible and intricate Eastern mountains.

Al-Qaida is the principal reference franchisor of the radical Islamic, at level of the Umma, or Islamic universal community. And this is very important, because the Islam is a very socialized religion. Neither Hezbolla, nor Hamas, nor Iran, nor the Moslem Brothers, nor Tehkrit el Taliban have Bin Laden’s or al-Qaeda’s global ascendancy in the modern radical Islam.

His strategic principal aim is to implant a universal Caliphate. And neither of the Moslem actual states serve them. Because they are heretics, as the chií Iran. Because they are «corrupt», in spite of her religious radicalism, as Saudi Arabia, in hands of the thousand (or are they seven thousand?) «princes» of the family of Ibn Saud, the State founder at the beginning of last century. Or because they are «westernized», as almost all the remaining ones, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, etc.

It seems to be necessary, then, to capture Bin Laden or the high command of al-Qaida. Some looking for revenge for the received attacks, as Spain and Great Britain. Others, as the USA, to eradicate an islamist violent extremism. That extends his influence through the world and that from time to time commits an outrage against his country or against his allies.

Is it possible to do it? Which will be the difficulties? The direct actions against al-Qaeda, will turn out to be quite effective as are glimpsed?

The «last» Occurrence of the Military American Strategy in Afghanistan.

The general Stanley McChrystal closes the «Infernal Circle» of searching and apprehension of Osama Bin Laden. At the beginning of December, 2009, the general McChrystal, chief of the American Forces in the theater of Afghanistan, in one of his appearances in the Congress to explain and to defend the need of the intensification of the military operations in Afghanistan, has revealed his new find, after a «well-considered» reflexion. The general has conditioned directly the success of the fight against al-Qaeda to Bin Laden’s elimination. Is it certain this, operationally speaking?

Introduction. The Situation of the «Problem».

The Taliban and al-Qaeda form two vertically organized movements and from below to up, same in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That does that its cells do not know exactly which are the top chiefs. They only know where they have to go to receive support or to send or to receive information or to communicate with another «peer» cell. The ideological and geographical nearness allows them to collaborate tactically. The commands of these movements act by exception, not by presence or by deliberate action. This way, they give doctrinal orientations, establish essential lines of military and proselytizing action for the different territories and areas, they throw threats and warnings to the enemy governments and indicate punctual important (strategic) aims at the level of the set of the organization. This allows them to operate well, without the intervention of its high commands. The death of the mullah Omar or mullah Haqqani and two or three chiefs in an American bombardment, would concern little its efficiency, at its real military irregular levels of action. The «martyrdom» of the aforesaid or Bin Laden or his «managing director» al-Zawahiri would perform almost equal importance as their existence.

The operative key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets, at both side of the frontier. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform them, hide them and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operative development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes, assaults to very small enemy isolated units, harassment by medium range fire, kidnapping, short duration isolated incursions and ways and paths mining. Ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns. In a minor and less extensive degree, operate the cells of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The First great Attempt of Capturing Bin Laden and his direct close Friends.

In the autumn of 2001 took place the rapid crumbling of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, seated in a precarious and bad constructed state, which was giving cover and logistic support to the headquarters of al-Qaeda. This one, together with his «escort agents», a small group of active members and of training proselytes, gathered with time, forming an extensive and lax march deployment. And they slipped, following the narrow and steep routes that the zone was offering them, through the Afghan mountains up to Torah Bora. It began then, in December, 2001, the great operation of search and apprehension of the maximum leader of al-Qaeda. That was the direct and declared responsible person of the attempts of September 11 against the USA. Americans met for it near 100 groups specialized in «Long Range Independent Operations», in the zone in which it was supposed that Bin Laden was hiding. Why they did not catch or killed him? Possibly, if they were Israeli commands, they had achieved it.

In its day, according to the reports that are appearing to the public light, they said that it was for «lack of means». «We needed more soldiers there!, there declared recently the agent of the CIA Gary Bernstein. During his testimony, he assured that «we might have finished everything there». In 50 pages of a report published this year, are mentioned the testimonies of several military persons in charge. That saw how their High Commands were denying to them, for example, the thousand necessary men, according to them, to stop up the entrances and exits to Pakistan, or several bombardments.

Did they needed more than 100 elite commands for an operation of circle and annihilation of a band of irregular in fugue, terrified by the typical vague and nearby bombardments? Operation that would be limited to the zone where the enemy tracks and their electronic sensors, satellites, spies and intelligence agencies, were locating approximately the enemy. Surrounded the zone, by means of a double ring, not necessarily unbroken, but effective, the commands would penetrate centripetally in the suspicious area. Acting simultaneously, patiently, methodically and secretly, like a «swarm» of small units. Where the flank and the rear of every small unit would be defended by his initiative and offensive activity. And by the «influence» radiated by a nearby companion unit.

Also they imputed part of the responsibility in the escape to a “falcon” like Donald Rumsfeld. In those days, they say now, that Rumsfeld declared that if the USA was so hard in Afghanistan (for cleanly capturing the responsible person of that treacherous and civil tragedy?), it would wake up an anti-American feeling, bigger than that already existed. And because of it, he was supporter of a more «light» tactics, using controlled bombardments and with the collaboration with the Afghan Army.

The failure of an operation constituted a decisive strategic failure. In fact, for years there has not been trustworthy information of Osama’s whereabouts. As has just admitted the secretary of Defense Robert Gates, last December 7. And now, in 2009, al-Qaeda is renewed and spread. And Bin Laden, as the dead Che, inspires but does not command, a new generation of Islamic extremists, spread over numerous countries.

The Historical Precedents. The Geostrategic Present Stage.

Abdur Rahman, proclaimed Emir of Kabul in 1883, saw his sovereignty progressively reinforced on the totality of Afghanistan, immediately after the crushing by the British of the uprising, the same year, of Ayub Khan in Kandahar. In November, 1893, Abdur Rahman signed a “formal agreement” in Kabul with sir Mortimer Durand, secretary of Foreign Affairs of the British general governor in the India, Lord Lansdowne. That one fixed and established the political border between the India and Afghanistan. It was known since then as the line or the frontier tracing Durand.

The problem generated by this tracing was that the pashtunes, as definite and different race, remained divided geographically in 2 parts, placed in 2 territories of different sovereignties. The pashtunes lands of Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dhir, Khyber (with its gorge between Pesahwar and Kabul), Kuram and two Waziristans, stayed inside the British India. After the independence of the India, all these territories were incorporated to Pakistan. The Islamic state created at the time to satisfy and shelter the most part of the Indian Muslims. And that was including originally Bangladesh, at the far end of the Indian subcontinent, where the Bengali Muslims were living.

The pashtunes are nowadays 12-15 % of the Pakistani population. They are a poor minority, placed in zones with insufficient ground networks and of difficult development. But 25 % of the officers of the Pakistani army are pashtunes. As well as also about 40 % of officers of ISI (the Pakistani secret information service). The individuals of pashtún race are approximately 25 millions in the country.

In the northern part of Baluchistan live tribes of pashtún race. In the South and North Waziristan’s regions the Pashtuns are more concentrated, forming a real Pakistani Pashtunistan. Within the great pashtun race, the Mahsuds (these specially inclined to breaking the agreements and treaties) are in the Waziristan central zone, the Wasirs and the Afridis live in the zone of Tirah and the Mohmands, at the north of Tirah. The great zone of Chitral, at the north of the border, is formed by the Bajaur, Dhir and Swat districts. The Waziristans are the most problematic, independent and turbulent tribes.

In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are at the south and south-east, reaching 35% of the population and around 12,5 millions persons. Another important Afghan races are the Uzbecs (10%) and the Tajiks (25%), which live in the north of the country, bordering the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan independent republics. In the center live the Hazaras (20 % of the population), related with the Persian and in the south are the Baluchis (10 %), related, in turn, with the Pakistani Baluchistan tribes. The flow of Afghans, specially Pashtuns, towards Pakistan or coming back home, when the military conditions are smoothed, does that the figures, lacking for decades of an official census, are variable and vague.

After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the dispute arose with Afghanistan, which was looking for an exit to the sea, for the possession of the wide frontier tribal zones. Both countries almost came to the armed conflict, until they signed in 1963 an agreement of borders determination. The borders existing during the British domain were ratified in it. And Afghanistan stayed as an interior country, without access to the sea routes.

A pashtún independent and sovereign state does not exist. Their nation is divided between two Islamic states, not rivals and complementary. In none of them the pashtunes can impose their social and economic demands. Till now the Afghan Taliban revolt realizes her ambushes and assaults with limited aim mainly in the districts of pashtún majority. The tayicos and the hazaras form great part of the current security forces that get up slow, painfully and with reluctance in Afghanistan: approximately 90 thousand policemen and approximately 80 thousand native soldiers, with variable degrees of motivation, loyalty and training. In the pashtunes districts neither are enrollments to the national army nor to the Afghan police. Sometimes It looks like a pashtún war of liberation inside a country oppressive or neglected towards them.

These administrative colonialist policies were a frequent practice of all the imperial metropolis. To distribute the sovereignty of the territories, following geographical considerations. As a child would do it, drawing vaguely a map in his games. And leaving the different «regional races», separated and distributed between the forced resultant states. So creating permanent instability and, therefore, dependence and intervention need or foreign guardianship from the superpowers. There we have the cases of Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Ossetia, etc.

Barack Obama wants to reach 400 thousand operational and effective men in the Afghan security forces. To be able to leave them the defense of Afghanistan. Will he be able to motivate and to achieve that they enlist? Will they be loyal to a staggering and slightly representative democracy? Will they be effective in the hard fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurrections?

How is it Necessary to Attack in the Pashtunes mountainous tribal Zones?

We can say that, inside a partial area of these, the gravity center of the fight resides in the control of the passages and in the dominant heights of these. The military deployments must be long and narrow, as is required by orography. And in the marches, they must take advantage simultaneously of the whole net of paths, gorges and ways of a zone. This offers to them a certain previous deployment for the combat. It is not easy to rely on the support of air fire, for the requirements of maneuverability of the aircrafts. Punctual bombardments of saturation can be realized on an enemy reinforced position, which he has decided to defend. There must be avoided the heavy fires on the settlements, even suspicious, which do not answer to the unquestionable safety of the own expeditionary forces. The units to employ in the «interfaces of action» with the enemy in these hostile zones, are the small units of elite light infantry with high mountain training. No principal «mother» column, methodically advancing through these areas, can survive without deploying a combat advance guard, which should be occupying temporarily and successively the dominant points at the flanks of the advance path, and a rear guard that goes forward by successive observed bounds.

The advantage of the pashtunes over the regular forces, specially the foreigners, resides in the knowledge of their own area, on it they can move at great speed. They have a tactical elementary natural skill and a special trickery incorporated into their survival sense. They are capable of waiting patiently for a favorable opportunity for action, choosing generally when and where to do it. And they do not have shame in moving back when they can not realize their plans and can be threatened or cornered by the infidel modern enemy.

In addition, nowadays, the Taliban enjoy a complicated system of natural caves at several levels, in some frontier zones. That is reinforced by tunnels of communication, provided with zones extended for the waiting and the storage of goods of all classes. This system is used to facilitate the traffic between both countries, without having to use the frontier passages or the most habitual and known gorges, as «stages» of the complete journey. And as temporary refuge when the allies carry out operations at battalion or regiment levels, of search of rebels or of reprisal, on the pashtunes zones where they have been more active. The highland villages are numerous, small and spread for both zones in the Pakistani Afghan border. In them also a small group of Taliban can be camouflaged, waiting for the passing through of a military “flood”, as the mentioned ones.

The pashtunes have small military collective discipline and the enemy heavy fires air and ordnance affect their spirit and decision. Also, it affects them very much to see threatened or occupied their line of retreat and the light and medium enemy fires, when they receive them from heights superior to those that they occupy. The pashtunes can attack at night some aims that worth it, but they are not natural night fighters.

Prologue.

The global, polyvalent, integrator knowledge that needs the approximation to an armed religious politician revolt, is diverse and multiple. We recommend our readers, as complement, the reading of the different articles that, on the Taliban and al-Qaeda revolts we are publishing in the last months. With it, they will acquire a «prism» to observe, to discern and to predict the development of those «modern conflicts».

A Theory for the Modern Warfare

Her Historical Context

Her Theory and Evolution

Introduction.

The theory of the maneuver warfare tried to give a practical solution to the predisposition of the North American ground military forces of using exaggerated or inopportunely the heavy fire support. As their principal «argument» or action over the enemy, in the combats or in their preparation. Also she was seeking to consolidate the concept of operational strategy in the ground military operations. As new and precise level of action placed between the military strategy and the tactics.

The Principal Theoreticians and the Developed Situation.

Several are the theoreticians, both civilians and military, who helped to create a coherent, sufficient, practical and effective “doctrine body” for this new theory. We will point out the analyst and lecturer William S. Lind. Another fundamental personage was the colonel John Boyd, who was a former fighter pilot of the USAF. Also is important the contribution of the colonel professor of the Marines Corps Michael Wyly. Chronologically in a second row, stands out strongly, expanding the torrent of ideas of the theory in march, the colonel of the US Army Robert Leonhard.

The renowned Israeli military analyst Martin van Creveld was saying that «the Armies» were turning throughout the time in «paralyzed bureaucracies», losing in this process great part of their efficiency. They could continue killing, but they were doing it badly, slowly and expensively. Probably their excessive endogamy demands and forces them to allow that, from outside of the organization, renovating ideas are given them. At least, the North Americans did it and accepted them. And they tried to incorporate them into their doctrine, regulations and manuals. And, even they tried to put them into practice in their conventional following wars. They did not this way in their counterinsurgency wars, the lifelong guerrilla wars. To which now they call pompously “asymmetric wars” or wars of fourth generation.

In this introduction to a theory of the modern warfare we want to give a joint vision, holistic and applied of the developed ideas. And, sometimes, implemented, by those men,throughout a decade in last century: from first of the 80′ up to first of the 90′. Also we will permit to develop or to extend the concepts or the explanations. When the own development or account of the theory asks for it, for her better comprehension. And their authors and theoreticians have not been so explicit or prolific on having presented it.

The Fundamental Ideas of the Theory of the Modern Warfare.

The definition of tactics in this theory is important. Because from her firmly stems almost all her later development and applications. Tactic is the harmonic and sufficient combination of specific knowledge, experiences and military skills, to produce a surprising, sufficient, effective and powerful action on the enemy, in these given conditions of time, climate and opportunity. This «combination» must be tinged and modulated by the principal struggle and the “mission type” orders of the chief. And by the “resistances” and the “emptinesses” of the “combat capacity” that the enemy presents, in his tactical deployment and according to his intention.

«Combat capacity» are not only the present soldiers or military specialists. But also their equipment, their arms systems, the logistical support and their motivation, training, combat readiness and resting or existing combat deployment. She is the combined result of men, means, full situation and commands «cocktail». That usefully qualify the units for fullfilling their combat military operations.

In the battle, in the combat one seeks to introduce the enemy in successive cycles of «observation, situation, decision and action». That are more rapid than his capacities of action. In such a way, that the enemy successive «elementary» tactical actions, turn out to be progressive and fatally increasingly inadequate and ineffective, to offset, to overcome or to be opposed to ours. This must tend to destroy his unit structural operational cohesion and to foment and to extend the panic between his men, before the manifest military uselessness of the actions that he tackles.

The basic skills of how to shoot the weapons, the physical training or the reading of the maps and the ground orientation, etc. Or the advanced skills of how to realize the different operations of march, advances cross-country running, defense, the employment of a system of combined arms, some special type of assault, etc. Those will be given at their moment in the schools, the academies and the destinies.

You can see that we have not touched yet the «foundations» of the theory. The important thing in this theory is the acceptance and the assumption of her new approach, which highlights the qualities of initiative and creativity in the commands. To save physical military and economic means, the lives and the invaluable time, being thus much more effective.

The Functioning of the New Style of Action.

If we want to be more rapid and effective than the enemy, we have to have a sufficiently decentralized military organization, acting on him. Let’s remember the “cycle of action” with his four phases. If the observations of the subunits in contact with the enemy must be passed up, following a chain of control. With the definition of the situation made and the decision taken at a high command level. And then, the order for action transmitted downwards, across the mentioned command chain, and, then, executed the action. You can deduce that the cycle of action is going to be slow. And, even, it can turn out to be late and unproductive, in a tactical very fluid and changeable environment, far from the outdated combat linear fronts.

But we do not want that the military subunits in contact with the enemy at the tactical “interfaces of action” wander senseless thorough the combat field. Without our command superior sense or without efficiency. To guide them profitably in their activity, their orders would be “mission type”. In them the chief shares, entrusts, a part of his military intention to the subunit. And he gives her freedom of action (the how to do her job). In return for the fact that she realizes this part of his intention (the what to do). Also the command establishes a principal

centripetal combined effort on the enemy. And the subunit that acts in the principal effort receives the cooperation of the actions of her companions and the majority of the supports of the unit. That the unit command receives of his Superior in tactical or of war subordination.

But battle matters are fluid and highly unpredictable. Because we do not have all the factors, decisions, actions and circumstances that concur, perfectly known and controlled. The subunit acting in the unit principal effort can be going, without entering, to an enemy hasty prepared bag of fire or to an obstacle covered by the fire, not detected by the exploration, or to a defense position, reinforced with campaign fortifications. And a subunit companion could have flanked the not continue positions of the enemy. And being in conditions to accede easily to a park of trucks or to a position of mortars, deployed in the enemy tactical rearward. Then the chief would name to this another unit his principal effort and would stimulate his new promising action, giving her heavy fire supports and the cooperation of others. With this way of undertaking the actions, if a subunit remains isolated or get lost temporarily, she will know what to do during enough time. To be able to be surprising, unbalancing and going forward the enemy, the command must observe and feel the combat from enough ahead. But without taking part or been mentally trapped in it. And to be hearing (through his forward HHQQ) in the network of communications of the unit.

Except the known and evident cases, the indications about the battle ground should be that, explanatory indications of his intention, limits of the sectors of advance, points of control, and not direct units goals. It is better to order a subunit: » prevent that the enemy crosses the “Blue, 32 height, Red, beeches groups line». That to say her «you should occupy and defend the 63 height» (the dominant height over that line in her sector). This last does not guarantee that the enemy does not infiltrate, working at the micro ground area, taking his time. Or finds a no enfilade line of advance (a waviness of the ground of 2,5 or 3 m. can conceal main battle tank to the horizontal enemy sight), up to the other side of the front «line». The command has to split hairs, thinking, making concrete in words, briefing well, always observing and taking responsibility for everything. And his secondary commands have to be active and creative and taking responsibility of his actions.

The Consequences, Responsibilities and Results.

There start appearing some fundamental characteristics of the military organization, in order that this works well. A double and high responsibility of the commands and commands of the subunits. And an indispensable reciprocal confidence between them, created by the experience and the cooperation shared before. A major implication of the NCO in the bureaucratic and routine tasks of the administration of the unit and a better and intense dedication of the officials in conceptualizing the combat: looking in the decision or in the exploitation for his operational transcendence.

As inevitable consequence of this form of decentralized, fluid, surprising and rapid resilience action, mistakes will always arise in the realized actions. These will add to the inevitable «friction» generated by all the tactical and operational actions. And because the almost countless number of «individual and collective actions», that meet to shaping a warlike action and the inevitable absence of “total complete” information. It is necessary in general to agree and assume the mistakes as a minor, surmountable evil. And whose ballast is more than enough compensated by the goodness inherent to the followed operational method. But never accepted, not tolerated, as result of a previous incompetence, of the passiveness, of the negligence or of the lack of active commitment with the goal intention of the unit. You can enlarge these ideas in my book “On the Nature of War”, chapter 2, “Chaos and Error as Practical and Conceptual Spaces of War”.

Finally, there is a general approach towards the decisive and transcendent action in the operative level. Guided by the superior command intention, transmitted and entrusted to the chief of the unit. And for this to his subunits and supports units, with the cited direct and resilience methods.

Situations and Tactical Favorite Means of the Theory.

In the modern warfare is necessary a great activity of the combat reconnaissance, to generate the sufficient information to create the intelligence for the application of the appropriate skills and the definition of the general situation and the enemy situation, means and intentions (the first phase of the cited “cycle of action”). The deployment of the subunits in the “interfaces of tactical contact” might be in the shape of “snub reversed wedge”, when the enemy situation is not clarified at all. Or, at the other end, to take the approximate form of the “sharp long wedge”, when we are working in the micro emptinesses of the enemy deployment “combat capacity”. To cleanly burst in the rearward of the enemy defense zone (its first lower belly).

The means of the command emphasized in the maneuvers war are the reserve, the counterattack and the intelligent use of the supporting heavy fires. The reserve must always exist and, at least initially, must be in the hands of a capable, experienced and energetic subordinate. The reserve is the bet of the chief for his tactical transcendent victory. She must not be used to reinforce an effort or to compensate, without further ado, a mistake. For this various tasks, there are the bigger heavy fires, or the tanks and engineers, used in cooperation. Or the tightening of the units advance sectors or the units deployment in depth. Or to realize a secondary assault or a diversion. Therefore, the modern reserve is not a secondary subunit. Nor one that is reorganizing and having scanty means, poor in combat disposition and moral.

The counterattack offers initiative and tactical mobility to a more or less looked temporary or necessary defense. He must be opportune, powerful and launched when the enemy has passed the climax of his assault, has suffered losses and the situation can be recovered by us. The support heavy fires must seek to stimulate the maneuver of the unit. Their tasks must be blind, disturb or neutralize the enemy forces, more than destroy them. Because the last mentioned turns out to be costlier, very difficult to obtain and needs much more time to be gotten. And time is a precious tactical and operational independent and essential factor. Finally, the combined weapons or inter arms systems and the engineers or pioneers are used constantly in the war of maneuvers. And the last ones, in the principal effort, though also they supply his specialized means to all the subunits of their parent unit.

Something on the more Common, Dangerous and Frequent Guerrilla Warfare.

Nothing says specifically the new military theory about the guerrilla warfare. It is a shame. Because the Western countries face more frequently the danger or the challenge of a war of “fourth generation” or “asymmetrical”. That one of “third generation” or conventional modern mechanized war. And not by changing her name to the guerrilla war, the “prism and our knowledge”, with which we can «observe, analyze and define, decide the procedures and actions and put them into practice «, they change or improve.

We must indicate that this is an eminently mobile, subterranean and active war. With multiples objectives to reach. But highly different from those of the wars of the three first generations. Objectives subtle, but fruitful; more difficult to determine, but forceful in their results; more politicians and social that pure military and always compounded by these tree branches. But, as always, the goals must be confronted or defended or converted or taken. Like it is necessary to defend a strengthened position or to take a hill. But, the means and the ways are different and more various. Here the “meat mincer” of the modern supposed highly precise “heavy fire” of support, does not serve either.

The propaganda constitutes a strategic basic aim of all the taliban and al-Qaida rebels, with which the agencies and the western communications means collaborate filled with enthusiasm. Any successful and showy rebellious attack or ambush is immediately broadcast to the world. This always debilitates the will of permanency of the USA and his ISAF allies. His legions called by his families, want to return, to enjoy the varied and superfluous consumption goods and the exotic vacations. The Spartan mothers, something unthinkable nowadays, were saying to her children when they were going out in campaign, when the benign station came and they leave the winter barracks: «you shall return with the shield or on the shield». When they were fleeing, the big and heavy shield of the Greek hoplite, capable of resisting the tremendous blows of the Sarisas or long lances of 5 m., principal weapon of their phalanxes, was a hindrance and they were rejecting it.

The insurgents taliban and al-Qaida nets are secret or latent and operate aggressively only against the mobility of the army and the police, which they surprise, are a nuisance, cause damages, kill and mutilate. The attacks from several directions creates bags of fire and enfilade zones on the enemy. This produces besides a synergistic and enervating effect in the attacked forces. That is similar to the result of multi traumatize or to that of multiple nº 8 or 9 pellets in a minor hunting piece. They lack of enough punch to give decisive blows or to finish off an important enemy. They erode a military unit (not a small unit or isolated elements), but they do not annihilate it.

Against the prepared military positions established in depth they are not effective, though it exists afraid of the guerrillas and a lot of money is expended protecting them. Their bands lack important combat capacity and are also easily canalized towards approximation avenues with registered heavy fire and medium grazing fire. For the moment, they lack engineers’ training, which would allows them the punctual break of the static protector barriers. And of superior training, to use the crawling individual approximation, without time limitation, in their diverse missions out and inside the military and police camps and facilities. The big and large military forces bases only serves as refuge and rest for them. But removing them from their guerrillas civil and military goals. And isolating them from the Afghan people.

The logistics is a great disadvantage, especially the supply of equipment and no handmade goods. They possess many small active rears or bases, many full surrounded by their enemies, which activities can be detected always. The supply of the bands is provided by the support organization.

The patience must be a characteristic of all the implied in this irregular war. Also it is necessary for to be effective, to reach a minimum of trade and seniority. In the zones most favorable to the bands, it is very easy that the operations of search and siege are initially closed in emptiness. It is necessary to go gaining and selecting their zone population, as we have said before, in order that the military trade and the people loyalty combined should produce its military and social incomes. The successive victories of the Afghan National Army and Police will be gaining to them the favor of the people. Because all they want to be emotionally with the winning side. And because the interests of the Afghans are volatile, unlike and yet contradictory, based on the loyalty to the family, to the clan and to the tribe.

In this type of war the armed forces cannot defend from the enemy all its possible targets. Besides, never there would be enough remaining troops to keep the initiative and to carry out a multiple, flexible and mobile offensive action against the armed rebels. Here there are no linear fronts to establishing and cozy, protective and supplying operative rears. What exists are armed enemies groups, their logistic support and information groups and many groups of sympathizers with and surrounding them. That are integrated all according to the different personal courage of their different members. And all of them widespread and established through a big territory without limits or classic rears.

You can see more on military strategy, operational strategy, tactics and skills on guerrilla warfare, in its “Appendix” in my book “On the Nature of War”.