Categoría: The Friction in the Military Operations

THE DRONES AND THE ENEMY OPERATIONAL ZONE.

The operational zone. Its functions and vulnerabilities.

The operative zone is the geographical space where develops the process of turning the mass of support of the strategic rear (forces, supports, logistics, communications, headquarters) into «units of action» qualified and specialized for its employment in «interfaces of action» with the enemy. These constitute the active points of what can call front, increasingly mobile and discontinuous, due to the dispersion of the forces, its tactical speed and its fire power.

The above mentioned units of action join combined arms groups, which low tactical level is in the habit of being the reinforced battalion or company, that have subsets or elementary units, in the mobile combat.

The critical elements of this zone, which is the physical support of that activity, are the communications of all kinds, the spaces of maneuvers (zones of deployment, of equip, of wait, of advance, provided with covers or desenfilades), the engineers units and of operational reconnaissance, the logistic means (stores, distributions means and zones) and the centers of production of the intelligence and the transmission of the reconnaissances.

The operational zone must have the sufficient geographical depth to be able to contain, supply, deploy, direct and command the sufficient number of units, following the necessary advance or assault spears close to the front, to repeat the efforts in «interfaces of action» and to achieve the tactical aim that in these appears and decides.

In practice a spatial symmetry is in the habit of existing, as general Richard Simpkin indicated, in the operational zones of both contenders, along the supposed constant line of the front. A difference very marked in the depth of a zone, can indicate the tactical weakness of a rival, either by minor resources or by a slower enrollment for the combat of its strategic reserves or military means in general (great strategy or total strategy level).

The reasons for including the engineers troops among the critical elements of the operational zone, reside in its specific fighting functions: they act against the enemy center of gravity; they are very scanty forces for all the tasks that they can fulfill; its action has a great multiplier effect on the enemy effort; they provide other forces engineers’ material for its particular use; they are responsible for the interceptions and reinforced cuts on the area and the most effective obstructions: antitank stable positions, minefields and more elaborated fortifications. With it they affect gravely the effective effort of our capacity of movement as operational system.

The functional mentioned elements of the operational zone are highly vulnerable. In effect, they lack enough nearby capacity of defense (including the infantry antitank, though they are of support), that is usually is limited to the security elements detached by the units and the centers and that, though it is circular, they are of punctual type in its positioning. If there takes place the destruction or the breaking up of these functional critical elements, which act as a connected and interdependent net of an alone seam. Generating the affected elements “commotion waves” for all it and this will affect exponentially the functionality of the operational rear, making it finally collapse.

Deprived the enemy action units in its active points of the front, of its operational zone, which qualifies, supports and stimulates them, the survival of the whole front sector affected is impossible after a time, for exhaustion or consumption. Likewise, the moral effects of the ungrateful surprise and the loss of the expectations precipitate the collapse of its front more rapidly yet. Its forces will tend to move back towards its deep rear, to protect the functional elements that allow them to operate tactically.

And, what about of the capacity of combat of deployed units in the operational zone, being prepared to operate in this front sector or in contiguous one? Can they defend the functional elements of its operational zone? Can they counterattack the enemy penetration?

We must remember that any military group, from a tank crew up to an army, passes most of its time, neither deployed nor prepared to fight. Its time passes doing labors and operations that allow it to go to fight in the chosen moment.

Whether training, embarking, moving, equipping, supplying, reorganizing, waiting, or resting, no unit is fully combat-ready. It is precisely in the operational zone where units prepare to conduct their operations against the enemy. Even if this is a tactical march, «pushing» a flexible and discontinuous front with weak combat readiness on the part of the enemy.

For the defense of the operational zone, we can only rely on the ready operational reserves and the deeper tactical reserves, both located in that sector or in adjacent ones.

The support mass is the set of military assets that converge in the theater or campaign. Its means of action is stability and is governed by the «management» of senior commanders. This is based on defined processes and standards, which are stable over long periods of time, which give it the necessary predictability of the desired effects of its action. They maintain and demonstrate the cohesion and the functionality of these military structures and hyperstructures.

At the army group level, the support mass extends from the forward limit of the defensive position to 300-500 km in own depth and with a width of approximately 300 km.

Towards the 75-100 km zone, the support mass hyperstructure disaggregates into the most active structures and microstructures, which constitute the operational and tactical units. These will operate in the “fields of action” and at the “interfaces of action” with the enemy, up to approximately 150-250 km in depth. To this end, they will follow operational-tactical combat and maneuver procedures, guided by the criteria of decentralization, exploitation of opportunities, surprise, counterattacks, enemy gaps, etc., and governed by the superior intent and its center of gravity, all of which are specific to the structures and microstructures active with the enemy.

(to be continued).

Action Interfaces as Zones of Tactical Development against the Enemy. Second Part.

A “weapons system” seeks to attack the enemy preferably in a certain way, taking advantage of its lethal or neutralizing potential. Against it, an enemy will always find an increasingly effective defense: armor, fire, obstacles, mobility; dispersion, concealment with or without cover, etc.

Combined weapons systems seek to produce a synergy, a multiplication of the individual capabilities of the weapons, a compensation for weaknesses or drawbacks and a weakening of enemy capabilities, together with a greater exposure or accentuation of its tactical vulnerabilities.

This synergy should produce effects on enemy combat capabilities and on its speed of action or capacity for movement: It must neutralize enemy defense. It must create in the enemy a vulnerable overexposure, when receiving the effective, complementary and coordinated action of the inter-arms systems. It must produce an operational indecision in the enemy, which harms its speed and capacity to react.

The inter-arms system is a technological and tactical way of increasing the favorable active interfaces on the enemy. It is an element of the operational strategy, carried out on the interesting points of the enemy deployment, to create a tactical vulnerability and to be able to produce the decision or the exploitation with the minimum wear of the available combat capacity of its own.

In the supplementary systems, the enemy defends itself in the same way from all the attacking elementary systems. A kind of saturation or maximum effect of the form of attack undertaken is sought. An example is the indirect fire of artillery and mortars.

In the complementary systems, one of the systems attacks the enemy and when the latter reacts defensively, seeking to dislocate the attacker, it becomes especially vulnerable to the action of the other or several of the other weapon systems used. The enemy thus suffers an extension of his vulnerability, over a longer time or space of action, achieving the three desired effects.

A complementary system is that formed by the obstacle and the fire. To overcome the obstacle, the enemy must concentrate and/or stop his advance and this reduces his impetus or quantity of movement and makes him especially vulnerable to repulse fire, which must not destroy the obstacle. Another complementary system is the fire and tactical maneuver developed by the small units or advance spears of an attack.

Another complementary combined arms system would be the convergent maneuver, taking advantage of positions and terrain and the available combat capacity, echelon it laterally to create more favorable interfaces. Faced with each convergent attack sector, the enemy has to react in a different way. With this, he creates vulnerabilities not well estimated by the enemy, in favor of the rest of the sectors that intervene. On the other hand, the combat capacity deployed towards a rejection will not always be in the best orientation to employ it in another more or less expected direction. If this is combined with neutralizing support fire, the entire enemy system is severely disrupted and dispersed, in its defense plan, in its fire plan and in its conduct.

The inter-arms system seeks to paralyze the enemy’s action or severely disrupt it, by affecting the quality of the combat capacity, generating in it a contradictory and more ineffective mode of action. It also acts in the same way in the successive cycles of action, divided into observation, situation, decision and action. And it does so through the direct deprivation suffered by the enemy of acting coherently and consistently in them, due to the incapacitation of its available combat capacity.

The analysis of the search for the decision in World War I will give us a practical example of the application of the search for the appropriate action interfaces, using inter-arms systems that are different in their composition, although with identical effects and results. Since the tactical solutions achieved on both sides lacked the complement of the sufficient operational movement capacity (the other of the operating systems with which it forms a complementary interactive pair), the operational strategic solution could not be achieved.

The origin of the German assault forces (Stormtroopers) , at the end of 1916, was in the awareness of the need and the possibility of fragmenting the pseudo-compact enemy front, into smaller sectors of advance, practically into advance spears, in which to act through an inter-arms or combined arms system. Favorable action interfaces would thus be created, in which to be able to act with freedom of action, at the level of reinforced assault platoons, which would advance by covered jumps to the enemy positions, behind a relatively short barrage of fire.

Supports in tactical subordination would include Russians shortened 76.2 mm guns, who were very well suited for heavy direct fire support and who lacked the backlash of other cut-off pieces, heavy grenade launchers, light mortars, machine guns and flamethrower squads and engineer platoons (pioneers). These last three supports would be those that would accompany the infantry to the direct assault of the trenches or enemy defense strong points. These were thus isolated from the support of their artillery or other nearby positions, which were neutralized by the German heavy artillery or by other assault sections.

On the other hand, on the Allied side, it was the English who used the first tanks (tanks was their code name in their development), heavy and clumsy, at the level this time of the great front of wide sectors, to provide continuous direct fire support to their infantry and enable them to successfully fight deep into the German tactical zone and even break through it. They were also used to clear trenches along their lines, protected by their armor and using mainly their machine guns.

However, neither side had a single “medium” that could maintain, depending on the use and circumstances, an adequate tactical speed and operational speed without interruption between them. In short, it could successively achieve tactical and operational objectives. The logistic support system was also not developed enough to be able to quickly send a significant flow of supplies and people along narrow, unconsolidated lines of advance.

In effect, there was a tactical speed (very few km per hour) that could be maintained both by infantry (of course, also German) and by tanks designed to support it, and a higher operational speed, maintained by the railway and trucks and other vehicles in the deep operational zone of each belligerent side.

This meant that, once a local tactical breakthrough was achieved, exploitation within the enemy operational zone could not be achieved. Faced with this, any of the contenders would bring their operational or strategic reserves closer in time and convert them into units deployed with full combat readiness. Thus, they created a new tactical zone very close to the breakthrough, blocking it.

To achieve the operational decision, a “means” was needed that was capable of acting with a certain autonomy at both levels of war activity: the tactical or immediate and the operational or deep and transcendent.

In modern warfare, with a considerable deployment of close and long-range, direct and indirect firepower, despite the progressive emptiness of the immediate battlefield (almost thirteen times greater in this world war than a century earlier, in Napoleon’s campaigns), this «means» could only be a well-armed vehicle, sufficiently protected and powered by an internal combustion engine.

But acting according to the tactics of relatively narrow sectors and combined arms systems, developed by the Germans for their assault forces and subsequently used by all their infantry in the general campaign of the spring of 1918, from March 21 to July 18, the date on which the Allies began their general offensive. And counting on reasonable logistics, which would compensate for wear and tear, maintenance and the capacity for operational movement.

In 1917 and 1918, neither of the two sides, neither the Cordial Entente or the Allies nor the European Central Empires, possessed either the two concepts or the specific elements of their application. In fact, a polished and developed synthesis (integrating the nascent war aviation into the German infantry inter-arms system) of the ideas and means of both would be necessary.

However, the Western Allies had the classic means in relative abundance. And they used them according to the knowledge of the time to achieve a strategic decision in the Western European theater. Generalissimo Foch used a strategy of hammering, of stubborn reiteration of efforts. Seeking that the «tactical reaction» provoked in the Germans would affect the strategic capacity of systematic renewal of their defensive front. And, in the end, this German strategic combat capacity collapsed.

And thus the Allies achieved the strategic decision of the war.

THE END

Weapons and their Defenses in the History. First Part.

Introduction.

Throughout history, supposed war rivals have perfected their weapons, Techniques, and Tactics to defeat an enemy who violently opposes the achievement of their objectives.

In the Beginning,

The strongman appeared with a large stick or club, coming after his neighboring rival. At one point, the latter, who was practically a weakling, hid in a bush by the side of the road. When the strongman passed by, confident and well-equipped, he waited for him to leave his back free and attacked him on an unprotected «essential vulnerability.» The «big man» fell lifeless to the ground. History doesn’t say what happened to the two characters in the fable.

When the number of members of the two factions increased enormously, they instinctively sought to group together, so they could attack and defend themselves much better.

At first, there was a relatively large group, and soon the focus was on organizing and utilizing the group. And the phalanx was born, a wall of twelve or sixteen ranks of men armed with long spears or pikes, extending several ranks ahead, well-trained in their combined handling at close range. They were protected by a large shield and pieces of metal or heavy leather on the chest, head (helmet), arms, and legs.

In ancient Greece, the Spartans refined the tactical instrument of the phalanx to the fullest.

No one was as trained and protected as they were. And their society accepted and honored their militari ethos, embodied in the phalanx. Spartan mothers would tell their sons, phalangist hoplites, to «return with the shield or on the shield.» There was no quartermaster or medical care, properly speaking. And mothers instilled in their sons the warrior social mentality of their society.

THE IMPRESSIVE PHALANX

But, behold, the right wing of the phalanx was less protected than the left. This was due to the way the men naturally protected their left flanks with their shields.

And at Leuctra, around 344 BC, Sparta, with a majority of its forces (10,000 men), set out to crush Thebes (6,000 men). Unaware that its phalanx model had changed,

Epaminondas and his pair, Pelopidas, had introduced the «oblique order» into their Theban phalanx. On their left wing, they deployed a greater number of forces, and the best of them. Among them, a phalanx formed by homosexual couples, which they called the «Sacred Band.»

They also refused to employ their center and right wings, as is typical of the oblique order. Perhaps the heightened sensitivity of homosexuals, which is said to be present in the Theban homosexual leaders, may have influenced their sharpness and refinement.

On the Spartan right wing was the commander of all their forces. This was thus the «core of their resistance.» And this was battered and beaten by the Theban forces on their left wing. And then appeared the «Caedes,» the slaughter and the finish of the vanquished.

From afar, the Spartans on their center and left were also affected by the defeat and the damage to the hoplites on their right wing. And they began to retreat, without having been defeated by weapons.

A year after Leuctra, Epaminondas was touring the Peloponnese peninsula, commanding forces of the newly formed Arcadian League. And he appeared in front of the city of Sparta, within whose sight, it was said, enemy forces had never appeared.

Phalanxes were too large to be able to move freely and quickly against the enemy. They acted as a «dam» of Force against Force, where surprise, skill, and flexibility could not exist. Another characteristic of their technical rigidity is that they had to fight on flat terrain, at least without undulations or obstacles such as rocky outcrops or patches of trees and bushes, which broke their structural continuity.

Rome meets the Greek phalanxes.

The Romans had a military structure based on the legion, as a large operational unit, of about 5,000 men. The legions were made up of maniples or, much later, cohorts, small tactical units capable of moving and maneuvering on the battlefield, gaining the flexibility, skill, and surprise that phalanxes lacked. And their centurions, one to the right and one to the left of the first row of the maniple, and their officers were capable of leading them individually.

At the Battle of Pydna, in June 168 BC, a battle took place between the Romans led by Aemilius Paullus and the Macedonian Perseus. The Macedonian phalanx vigorously attacked the Roman formation of two legions and forced it back toward the fortified Roman camp. However, the terrain was uneven and somewhat rocky, and as it advanced, the phalanx lost its solidity and integrity.

A MOMENT AND A PLACE OF THE BATTLE OF PIDNA.

Seeing this, Paulus gave orders to the maniples (centurions) to act independently on the enemy phalanx. The centurions then took command. The maniples advanced and began to take advantage of the smallest gap in the enemy’s pseudo-compact formation to introduce their men there.

They began wreaking havoc with their gladius (somewhat short Roman swords, prepared for close combat) on the defenseless flanks of the Macedonian hoplites, armed with long pikes.

Soon, Aemilius Paullus launched the Second Legion against the center of the enemy line. It shuddered and finally gave way. The Greek spearmen were now nothing more than a hindrance, both in fighting and defending. The Roman legionaries vigorously launched themselves into the attack. And then came the Caedes, the massacre, the collapse of the formation into a shapeless mass, terrified and fleeing individually.

When the sun set, Paulus halted exploiting his success. The death toll showed one hundred Romans and twenty thousand Macedonians had finally fallen.

The Mongols threaten Central and Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongols, nomadic tribes from the interior of Asia, who dominated mounted combat and had a very elaborate and simple military organization, appeared for the first time on the borders of eastern Europe.

Their logistics were simple and involved supplying on the ground they trod, following the broad pastures as they advanced, each rider carrying several mounts with him.

The Mongols started from their strategic zone, defined by the «advance and location» of their nomadic settlements, their yurts or nomadic houses, pulled by oxen, never observed or suspected by their enemies, and reached the tactical zone with them. Their operations did not require the physical and mental support of the operational zone, the transition for the forces and their support between the strategic and tactical zones.

A RECREATION OF SUBUDAI BAHADUR, THE GREATEST MONGOLIAN STRATEGIST.

In front of the discontinuous front of their enemy positions (cities), there is a wide, unprotected, and empty area, uncontrolled by anyone, which the Mongols make the most of for their operational approach. Their enemies, the feudal heavy cavalry forces and their infantry spearmen and archers, maintain nothing resembling advanced detachments, which make mobility reconnaissance and repel the Mongol advance parties of reconnaissance and combat.

The Mongols’ concern toward the enemy was generally strategic, considering their «exposed flanks» at the level of the «occupied» countries. This concern stemmed from their always small numbers for the objectives entrusted or sought.

And from the real tactical no invincibility of their forces, if they encountered an organized, skilled, and, above all, calm enemy.

In 1221, after conquering the Muslim Empire of Samarkand, located between the Syr Darya and Amur Darya rivers, Genghis Khan systematically plundered Afghanistan. His son Tilui slaughtered most of the inhabitants of northern Persia. With no possible live enemies on their strategic flank, they protected the southern flank of the Mongol Empire.

(To be continued)

ACTION INTERFACES as Zones of TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT against the Enemy. Part One.

Introduction.

The action interface is a spatial concept that defines the zone and space where we develop violent action against the enemy and his means, following tactical criteria adapted to the nature of our objectives. The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system.

In a penetrating attack, for example, the surface of the interfaces is quantitatively limited and these are selected in the enemy’s depth, according to their critical points and those that hinder the advance of our forces, for example, observatories and anti-tank firing points. In defense, we quantitatively increase the potential interfaces in our depth and in a somewhat laminar way.

The interface is what makes tactical action and the destruction of the enemy possible, applying a pure, chosen, selective and favorable attrition. The absence of interfaces, on the contrary, gives a certain security to any force. With the presence of the enemy, even close by, being a threat.

The interface is not only linear or frontal and with the depth of the range of heavy infantry weapons and tanks. But is extended superficially and spatially by the action of indirect artillery, surface destruction means (reactive artillery) and combat and bombing aircraft. The smaller the interface in an area of ​​operations, the more the operational maneuver criterion will work and in a larger interface. We will seek from advantageous positions and with effective and synergistic means (combined or inter-arms) to annihilate (incapacitate) the enemy.

The speed of exchange (actions and effects) in the interface is qualitatively variable and is conditioned by the transitability of the terrain and by the nature of our intention. In the attack we seek the fluidity of tactical actions. In defense, we wish to add a thickening to them, which will help us break the enemy in front of the front limit of the defense position and in the various ambushes and prepared fire pockets, both main and alternative as well as supplementary, preferably before their irruption.

In the interfaces there are certain critical points, where our tactical interaction with the enemy will be especially effective. These are their tactical vulnerabilities, their gaps in protection or combat capacity or their neglected means of defense, even if they are only so for a time. Combat reconnaissance is essential to detect them and it is the tactical leader’s mission to decide which one or ones to act on, seeking in the tactical decision, the operational significance of the higher command.

Combat capacity is applied on an interface with a variable depth depending on the weapons. Combat capacity has a maximum, useful, relatively stable value for the different weapons or weapon systems, which we can measure in men per meter of action interface.

For the shock, for example, it is not possible to use more than one man per 1.5 ms. of contact interface. For rifle fire, considering a platoon of 50 men useful for about 300 ms of interface, its value drops from 0.6 to 0.15 men per m. of front. Artillery would produce a blinding, disruptive, neutralizing or destructive effect, added to the action in the interface, but complementary to it and never a substitute. Machine gun fire would not substantially lower the proportion, since its fire “equivalent” to that of a certain number of infantry, depending on the terrain and its ability to acquire targets, in rapid fire of 15 rounds per minute and marksman.

Development.

However, from the wars of antiquity to the wars of the 1980s, dispersion has increased from a proportional value of 1 to 5,000 on the battlefield or tactical field. For modern static organized defense, it is equivalent to a battalion of 750 men in 3 km2. Mobile or nuclear defense can triple that surface. This dispersion has emptied the battlefield, now covered by direct fire and indirect fire support, and has allowed the operational terrain of large units to be greatly deepened, up to 50 to 75 km.

An obstruction, a gorge, a river in which the interface was reduced or altered, would limit the real possibilities of the attacker and greatly empower the defender. Thus, the defensive battle of King Leonidas in the Thermopylae gorge would be an example of containment of overwhelmingly superior forces, due to the absolute limitation of the interface of action between the Persian and Spartan armies and not being able to apply it to the critical Greek centers, for example, an exposed flank, until a shepherd served as a guide to a Persian contingent to reach it.

All this operational complication simultaneously makes most of the forces employed in an action unproductive or inactive at a given time.

Given that there is this practical limitation to the use of our available combat capacity, due to the disproportion between tactical space and combat interface, the issue of achieving the maximum application of our force arises.

To achieve this we must:

Increase as much as possible our favorable interfaces with the enemy, especially on the weak and critical points of his deployment; adequately rotate the units in tactical contact; maintain an adequate space for maneuver in our tactical rear, which allows us to push forward the necessary spears of attack or maintain the different possible defensive interfaces in the face of enemy irruption or penetration.

And employ each weapon in the most favorable possible interface of action:

Thus, the weight of the effort will be borne by the infantry in prepared attacks against an enemy ready to repel (for example, an anti-tank front), at long advance distances and in terrain with limited visual control, such as forests, built-up areas and broken terrain, with the tanks supporting them with fire and advancing by covered jumps. The tanks can go ahead in encounter attacks, in slightly undulating terrain and if the enemy has a poorer combat readiness, but taking care that the infantry closes the distance quickly. For short distances, we use the joint attack in the same sector; both weapons can advance from different positions in a convergent attack in encounter combats and in enveloping combats, the synchronization of both being fundamental. Inside the enemy position, the tanks attack the firing positions with their fire and the infantry clears the positions from their flanks.

It is also possible to structurally increase our favorable action interfaces with the enemy.

This is achieved in the attack by breaking through and penetrating favorable sectors and always by encirclement, reversal of fronts and encirclement and by coordinated frontal and overflow pursuit. The attacker’s successive echelons can, in turn, create a favorable action interface against an enemy that is not sufficiently defended, for example, artillery positions or communication centers or logistics parks, and also by a flank attack from our depth with mechanized or armored units, on an enemy counterattack against our penetration.

In the defense, the opposite will occur. The breach of the defense zone, even if it is mobile, will be avoided by increasing the possible unfavorable interfaces for the enemy along its «range».

This is achieved by the echelon in depth of active defensive means and by their preferential placement on the counter-slopes, in covered, hidden, preferably flanking, alternative and supplementary positions and received by a local infantry defense and seeking good and intersecting firing sectors. Also by the increase in interceptions (reinforced cuts, quickly placed minefields, natural obstacles more or less perpendicular to their sectors of advance) defended by fire, which channel the attack towards zones of convergent fire or which delay and erode it. And, finally, by the timely use of local counter-shocks and counter-attacks by mobile or, at least, rapid, tactical or operational reserves. These constitute the extraordinary and unexpected force that acts on enemy vulnerability, which is then in disorganization, dispersion and neutral morale before the consolidation of its gains from the attack.

The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system. Each of them individually presents “action characteristics” and more convenient transitability, which give them a preferable target profile and tactical deployment qualities, from whose combination in the system arises the synergy of the whole.

(To be continued)

The Command, the Friction and the Mistakes. 2nd Part.

(CONTINUATION)

The Friction.

Between plans for attaining objectives, and their actual accomplishment, is the arena of execution, which is affected by errors, poor interpretation and omission.

In effect, with voluntary action (different from chaos) exist the likelihood of avoidable and inevitable errors, the fundamental actions and actions of secondary importance, foreseeable facts and hypotheses and not to mention unexpected or imponderable actions that carry with them opportunities for both contenders.

Friction works to remove plans from their complete execution and objectives, no matter how correctly and well-conceived they may be or how well-equipped the force with means, assistance and distribution. Friction derives from the natural, hyperfunctional complexity of military phenomena and can be expressed as the «inevitable” additional price that we must be paid to achieve certain objectives in an operation. When the «price» is higher – when there is a «supertax» – the problem is conceptually and qualitatively different: the «failure», the “mistake” appears in plans, their execution, the means used to pursue them, etc.

The Mistakes or Failures.

Failures or errors result from attitudes, procedures and basic ways of acting that are erroneous, inconvenient, weak, imperfect or mistaken. The existential imprint is what ensures their survival. Failures can occur at strategic, operational or tactical levels of military; they can cause “wears” more effectively than friction and can cause the annihilation of both rival forces and the complete failure of their objectives. Linking failures with friction, and not considering their unique effects, is always a mistake.

The main causes of errors and failures are:

1) Poor planning or conceptualization of objectives, as well as the operations and means to use to achieve them.

2) Poor knowledge of the enemy; his plans, intentions and the various means on which he uses.

3) Lack of consideration of the “transitability” (more than ongoing) of the operational grounds during times and levels of actions.

4) Poor implementation plans at any level.

5) Poor conditions for logistics and communications at any level, as a function of the implementing operations and their decreasing yields.

6) Implementing superfluous or mistaken operations.

The greatest failures must to be avoided or eliminated at all costs before or during the course of the plan, since, by their nature, they put at risk the achievement of objectives at all levels.

The greater failures are more probable in the tactical than in the strategic level but, on the other hand, they are of lesser importance to global plans. One example is fighting a battle without adequate intelligence. It is also «easier» to know if a strategic error is likely to occur (it is another thing if the error could be avoided), as fewer «elements» are a factor, although their importance is greater in action. For example, French military doctrine was mistaken when, in May 1940 they confronted Germany and lost the campaign, the French and their allies having enjoyed their greater (at least land-based) military means over the Germans.

This means that, at the tactical level, failures or errors must wait for, they are generally of less relative importance on a global level, and where and how they will occur is not known in advance. However, at the strategic level failures or errors are more decisive. Yet it is easier (at least for an alert minority at low levels of Command) to know what types of failures may occur, where they will occur and by whom will they be caused.

The Compensations and Corrections of the failures and mistakes.

To stop failures or errors before they occur is, at least theoretically, possible if a method and doctrine – that is, a basically correct style of behavior and command – is followed at all the military functional levels. This, combined with a sound strategy, can prevent failures or errors. Indeed it is this that all good commanders in chief must attentively and jealously execute, but doing so is very difficult, given that it requires concurrence, cooperation and obedience by so many levels, units and individuals in the military.

It is therefore necessary to also prepare for the probability of serious failures and errors by having means and procedures for neutralizing and compensating for them. These means and procedures should center on what steps would effectively compensate for serious failures and errors.

Those made at the tactical and operational levels are economically compensated by actions taken in the operational and strategic echelons, which are qualitatively superior. Among others the most important ways of compensating for errors are: Enveloping and turning fronts operations in the same or contiguous sectors of advance. Opening other fronts, consistent with the overall strategic-operational direction. Using convergent sectors of advance for the same objective. Redoubling efforts by deploying echelons in depth. Pursuing alternative objectives within a larger line of attack, with the primary objective being enemy rather than geography. Using greater reserves, which must be continuously refreshed and reformed at all levels, etc.

More serious errors at strategic level are much more difficult to compensate for, given the importance of this level for operations and combat. Also, it is not wise to assume that militarymeans, for their specialized and scanty natures, will necessarily be too much at this level.

For these reasons, the best way to counter serious failures is to prevent them when at all possible. The carelessness is equivalent here to look for the defeat and to give the enemy the decision in the conflict. But, is it easy to modify, before a defeat, military doctrine? Is it possible before to replace a military cupola? Is it possible to establish a promotion mechanism, that reasonably preserves the integrity of the combined-arms groups, that also takes advantage of the tactical benefits of implicit communications between units that stems from common experience? Is it possible, after a victory, to revise the military doctrine that lay behind that success?

We will consider now errors that do not stem from attitudes or behavior negligent or foolish, to be in the same category as friction, that is, “minor«. How can friction and minor failures be compensated for?

This can occur by using greater “means” (forces, ability, plans and operations ramification, etc.) than the theoretically necessary, given the calculated “correlation of forces” needed for a particular tactical effort. This can mean: reiterating the effort; building up reserves or using of units of greater quality and training; using diverse sectors or axes of advance, seeking for alternative and/or simultaneous objectives within the overall direction of advance, etc.

Failuresorerrors can be attenuated and diminished, but only exceptionally are they nullified.

Actually both phenomena of disorder are superimposed, stemming as they do from plans that are more or less deficient and the natural friction that arises from executing plans that are really exceptionally complicated. Both generate “practical frustration” in their implementation, that should be taken into account.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine. 2nd. Part.

(continuation)

The mercenary and rapacious Wagner Group.

A minor issue arises, but of great importance due to the disagreements it creates in Moscow and with the troops in the campaign. It is the growing presence of the Wagner Group as a Russian fire extinguisher in the war in Ukraine.

WAGNER RECRUITS RUSSIAN CONVICTS.

It includes convicted criminals, Syrian and Libyan mercenaries «among other elements of bad living» and Russian volunteers. In general, they enjoy disparate salaries, depending on their experience, origin and life path; a convict is basically paid with his freedom, more or less garnished with a clean record.

Their boss is Prigozhin, a Russian plutocrat and Putin henchman. This man is in conflict with part of the Kremlin and with senior military leaders over the permanence of his «private mercenary armed group» in the Russian ranks in the campaign.

The implicit tolerance of the Russian military commands in Ukraine with the men of the Wagner Group generates enormous discomfort among the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers stationed there. And it greatly lowers their combat morale and their «esprit de corps«.

If Gerasimov comes with full powers as commander of the campaign and considers the previous arguments, in relation to the motivation and combative disposition of his Russian regular forces, he has to recompose the situation of the forces, in relation to the presence of the Wagner Group in the Russian ranks.

Unity of Action and Concentration of Efforts in the Campaign.

Another of the capital problems that Gerasimov will have to solve is the strategic and operational Integration of all the active Fronts of the Russian forces in presence.

To establish a strategic «Superior Effort Unit» that is coordinated, proportional and synergistic. To optimize in «effective times«, according to the «superior universal saving means» principle and the «military principle of the Objective», the distribution and coordinated use over time of the human and material capacities assigned to the different Fronts.

Thus, the Russians have several Fronts with different importance and presenting different opportunities.

The Kiev Northern Front is inactive. Lukashenko is Putin‘s due ally and with his bravado and maneuvers he causes uncertainty in Kiev. It offers an opportunity to drain mobile Ukrainian troops, to fix and protect the Front from possible Russian rapid raids.

Here the presence in Belarus of a mechanized Russian “task force” would suffice. Counting on tanks and infantry combat and transport vehicles, with support from artillery, engineers, defense against aircraft and ground support aviation and its escort. And integrating a couple of divisions. That moved around the south of Belarus, prowling.

The Crimean Front is active towards Kherson, Mariupol and Zaporiya and creates uncertainty towards Odessa. It allows the defense of the 4 territories annexed by Putin.

The Donbass Front, in southeastern Ukraine, is active in the oblasts or provinces of Lugansk, to the north, along the border with Russia, and Donetz, to the south. The Northeast Front, towards Kharkov is in hibernation. Both hold promise in theory in this new phase of the war.

The joint and coordinated action from both Russian Fronts, of «breaking shock forces» of the Ukrainian Tactical defense. Followed, after the irruption, by «armored mobile groups» with air support, advancing in the Ukrainian operational rear towards a town or small area. Forming a wide and double enveloping movement around the enemy. It can create a “pocket” of it or, at least, a serious threat of cutting off communications for the most active Ukrainian forces, and therefore equipped with heavy equipment, deployed in the east of the country. Russia has more than enough regular mobile forces for this.

The Ukrainian Counterattack.

The Ukrainians can counterattack by employing armored forces with sufficient punch, such as the more modern Main Battle Tanks. The “heavy” tanks that Zelensky claims from the US and Europe now. The Challengers (with their Chobham armor); Leopards 2 A5, of German engineering; Leclercs, the first type built of this new generation of tanks and the Americans Abrams.

Advancing rapidly from the depth of the Ukrainian deployment, on one flank of the Russian advancing points. Let’s remember that this territory is favorable ground for armored vehicles.

For this, Ukraine will need to have several battalions of such tanks. Distributed by their most important concentrations, each with about 50 tanks. Distributing or employing it by isolated companies is to waste its special and unique off-road forward speed, shock and firepower, protected by effective armor. Which is completely decisive in modern combat.

In all this theoretical filigree of maneuvers and combats, the most capable, equipped, motivated and prepared will win.

The denatured current Russian air front.

The goal of the current Russian air front is the weakening of Ukrainian morale. Through the successive attack on civilian facilities (energy, water and communications) and urban centers of some importance in Ukraine.

It should be noted that this rather criminal objective does not target the enemy military forces, but their unarmed rearguard populations. For more INRI, it began to be used shamelessly when Putin and his Kremlin bosses and henchmen realized that his “special military action” in Ukraine was a “bluff”. And that the Ukraine was a tough nut to crack for the Russian forces employed in it.

MASTER SUN.

Almost 2,500 years ago, Master Sun (Sun Tzu), in the Warring States Era, already warned that «when the general is already appointed by the sovereign, he should not interfere in his affairs» and «when the courtiers and ministers interfere in his command, they bring misfortune to the Kingdom”.

In addition, this objective has already been used in other cases and with zero effectiveness, by the way.

Japan was mercilessly bombarded by the US, when it had already managed to occupy the Japanese islands (e.g., Okinawa) close enough to insular Japan. The Japanese were already preparing their civilian population for a Numantine resistance to the invader. Creating an immense natural fortress on its islands, where each one was a fortified redoubt of it.

They were the two atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which represented an «ascent to the upper limits» in the fight against civilian rearguards. Because they were much more than a very large cannon shot. The ones that forced Japan to surrender unconditionally to the Americans. Because they threatened (although they didn’t have any more artifacts at the time), to destroy the essence and Japanese national identity.

In general, the use of the «indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian rearguards», what it achieves is to galvanize them around their government and their armed forces. Because they perceive from the enemy a demonic, fierce hatred towards them, which would seek the destruction of their identity, culture and idiosyncrasy.

Modernly, such bombing type was used by the US in North Vietnam. They left South Vietnam in 1973 and in 1975 the communist forces occupied it, almost without resistance.

Russia’s Air Support to its Ground Forces.

The Russian air front in Ukraine must be directed against enemy troop concentrations (reserves, attack preparations, marching forces), their ground communications and logistics network, command posts and communications centers, attack points of their forces, artillery and rocket and drones launch positions.

FINAL.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine.

Introduction.

With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.

The latest «ace up his sleeve» is Army General Valery Gerasimov, born in the Russian city of Kazan, 67 years ago and Chief of the General Staff since 2012.

An almost ideal age for the work that is coming up. Defined by organization, structural changes, discipline, sufficient flow of means and a strong hand.

Almost as USSR Marshal Georgi Zhukov had it. When he went to important battle places to preside, on behalf of STAVKA, the General Staff of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, the main offensives of his Front Groups against the Germans, A Front was the Western equivalent of Army Group, although the Red Armies were smaller in men and means than the Western ones.

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION GEORGI ZHUKOV, WITH ALL HIS AWARDS.

When Putin appears with his senior military commanders in the photos, his Defense Minister Shoigu is to his right and Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff of all the Armed Forces, is to his left.

As Assistants at his Main Command Post, probably in Crimea, Gerasimov will have the Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation, to which the vast majority of the troops present in that theater of operations belong, and the current deputy chief of his General Staff (his G-1, in our nomenclature).

At first there was talk that the appointment of Gerasimov was a maneuver by the top Russian military commanders. To see how an intellectual general, a modern hybrid warfare theorist, performed in the field. But, it is not true that he has no combat experience. He has enough of her.

Gerasimov already participated in his day in the two «anti-banditry wars» or counterinsurgency (Russian name) in Chechnya. That was fighting hard for his independence from Russia, as the heir of the USSR, the former imperialist oppressor. In the second, in 1999, he was the deputy head of the Russian armed forces in the campaign. He is accused of war crimes against Chechen populations for his direct action.

He also acted, already as Chief of the General Staff of the Russian forces, during Russia’s campaign in direct support for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, since 2015, making frequent trips to the Syrian theater of operations.

Based on his direct experiences and his ability to analyze and synthesize the issues of his profession, Valery Gerasimov developed his Theory of Military Doctrine, currently in force in Russia. It’s his Hybrid War Theory.

Although it is nothing more than a Compilation of diplomatic, heterodox foreign, economic and military action policies and their trends. In short, what Gerasimov advocates is to use against the enemy all the means of a modern State in a great centripetous and synergistic action: diplomats, heterodox exteriors (various support for internal enemy dissidents, including armed forces, boycotts, promotion of popular discontent), economic, military

Thus, Putin decided with his military leadership to replace the «butcher of Syria» Colonel General Surovikin, as military chief of the Ukrainian campaign, appointed just a few months ago. He was the fourth replacement for the Russian campaign manager in Ukraine.

The general of ideas and methods with a strong and intransigent hand and centralized orders, which were given from top to bottom, by a general with more flexible and fresh training and ideas.

Based on his direct experiences and his capacity for analysis and synthesis of the issues of his profession, Valery Gerasimov developed his Theory of Military Doctrine, currently in force in Russia. It’s his Hybrid War Theory.

Although it is nothing more than a Compilation of diplomatic, heterodox foreign issues, economic and military action policies and their trends. In short, what Gerasimov advocates is to use against the enemy all the means of a modern State in a great centripetous and synergistic action: diplomats, heterodox exteriors (various support for internal enemy dissidents, including armed forces, boycotts, promotion of popular discontent), economic, military

Thus, Putin decided with his military leadership to replace the «butcher of Syria» Colonel General Surovikin, as military commander of the Ukrainian campaign, appointed just a few months ago. It was the fourth replacement of the Russian campaign commander in Ukraine.

The general of ideas and methods with a strong and intransigent hand and centralized orders, which were given from top to bottom, by a general with more flexible and fresh training and ideas.

That adapted the stagnant and heavy working of the Russian Army to a war of IV (guerrillas) and V (hybrid) generations.

Fighting against a very well equipped enemy (with better equipment and materials than theirs, for a conventional war, in general), committed and determined in their fight, with highly trained officers and cadres, tremendously motivated.

And, educated, trained and mentalized for a modern war, both of «operational movement and combat» and of «guerrillas and counterguerrillas».

Some Problems for Gerasimov.

Many are the problems accumulated by the Army of the Russian Federation and not all of them are solvable in the short term. Probably because they are already structural.

Continuous, effective and sufficient military logistics.

One of the star, creaking, problems of the Russian military is to establish a modern and effective comprehensive military logistics. Even defining it is quite simple for a professional.

INDOCTRINATION IN A SOVIET STATE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE.

But, in the USSR and now in the Russian Federation, they have not been able to or did not know how to do it well.

In the USSR it was a classic that the potatoes collected in a kolkhoz or sovkhoz rotted in the field. Meanwhile, a few tens of km away, the urban people suffered from hunger or a nearby alcohol manufacturing industry did not receive the potatoes to produce it, from the starch of them.

Probably, the seminal error comes from the Marxist-Leninist economic doctrines, far from reality even in theory. In this case, the economy.

Where logistics is not considered, nor is «added value» attributed to it in the economy. Therefore, in the Budgets and the theoretical Soviet Five-Year Plans it was not taken into account.

The “total value” of a good comes from the “labor of the workers” and, later, of the peasants as well. And, amen.

As all the value of the good is attributed to the producers, the difference between the sale price and the production cost of the workers, the famous surplus value, is accused of being Appropriated (Stealed) by the bloody capitalists.

Capitalist production is not simply the production of commodities; it is essentially the production of surplus value.

This is one more theoretical fallacy of communism, with disastrous economic and military consequences for the country.

Although communism has already disappeared from Russia as a theoretical ruling force, many of its styles, ideas and methods, applied for 70 years, have penetrated and endured in the idiosyncrasies of society and its culture.

(To be continued)

The Command, the Friction and the Mistakes

Exposition of a complex real case, highly illustrative.

This is illustrated by mistakes that affected Germany’s plans and strategies during the war with the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945. During this war, Hitler and his commanders pursued a policy, strategies of state,total strategies and operational field strategies, many of which were plagued by poor decisions.

Still, knowing that erroneous, slanted or incomplete decisions had been made, in those circumstances, could anyone within the Wehrmatch have avoided the mistakes or serious mistakes of Germany’s actions?

Conocer los primeros pasos políticos de Hitler nos ayuda a lidiar con los ultras de hoy

In the campaign of 1941, Germany lacked a clearly defined objective and this divided its military effort. Germany’s principal attacks were dispersed between Leningrad, Kiev and Moscow, without existing a single objective of June 22, 1941. Both Leningrad and Kiev were given their own importance, rather than be treated as intermediate goals within a larger campaign. Moscow was not emphasized as a primary objective until October, when the possibility of a reasonable conquest had already disappeared.

Given the demographic and geographical characteristics of the USSR, it is absurd to pretend that the main objective was to annihilate the Red Army before the «Moscow meridian». Even if the top brass of the Wehrmatch wanted to recreate a large encirclement and annihilation operation in several successive battles.

Heinz Guderian fue un criminal de guerra? - Quora
General Heinz Guderian

The diversion towards Kiev of the Second Panzer Corp of Guderian came at the expense of the effort of the Center Armies Group advancing towards Moscow. And forced its tanks to detour more than 1,000 kilometers. In practice, to estimate the attrition of its operational movement capacity, these were equivalent to 2,000 km of distance travelled. But, despite the many prisoners captured in Kiev, these were not sufficient to force Stalin to surrender, because this was disregarded at the time.

In September 1941, Leningrad could be taken by the Northern Armies Group. Hitler’s decision to surround the city was made in an effort to avoid the risk of troop losses that would come about by urban fighting, something which had indeed occurred in Kiev. But this decision tied the German Northern Armies to a secondary target. If the city had been taken rather than surrounded, the Northern Armies Group, despite their delay, could join the Center Armies Group to assault Moscow or to reinforce the march of the Southern Armies Group toward the Caucasus the following year, seeking for an economic fundamental target.

Now, occurs a huge mistake of Hitler. And it happens at the level of grand strategy, national strategy or total strategy.

El Antisemitismo de Stalin – El Financiero

In 1941, more than 50 million Slavs, living in Ukraine, White Russia or Belarus and the Baltic countries, expected the Germans as liberators of the unbearable yoke of the Stalinist communists. Between 1931 and 1937, “Little Father Stalin” had deliberately and calculated massacred some 5 million Ukrainians, for the mere fact of being them. And, never is any «fault» of the whole of a country, of an ethnic group.

Ukraine was the grain barn of the USSR and, during the Five-Year Industrial Plan, Ukrainian agricultural resources were diverted towards the objectives of that Plan. The peasants were not assigned seeds and the remaining ones were kept to eat. The peasants were required to deliver abusive quotas of milk, meat and crops. Stalin approved genocide supposedly for the sake of his ideology.

After the victorious passage of the Wehrmatch, Himmler sent the SS. To take care of the Slavs, the Untermensch, the undermen or human subbeens. To obtain cheap, slave labor to the service of the Reich.

And, instead of accepting them and joining a large close and favorable rear, with all the millions of men available as allies. Capable of performing internal tasks of defense of the territory and of first protection of the immense line of communications from the Reich to the Eastern Front. And to integrate them to some extent into the «auxiliary forces» of the Wehrmatch, like the Romanians. And producing in Ukraine goods and services for the Germans. Hitler immediately alienated the will of the Ukrainians: employing the Vesanic occupiers of the SS, who killed them directly or banished them to Germany.

La Guerra Partisana en la URSS - La Segunda Guerra Mundial
Soviet partisans.

And the ex-Soviet rear was filled with anti-German partisans. That was the only «strategic guerrilla» of World War II. Since it was directly dependent on a constituted state and was an operational auxiliary of the Red Army. Which gave it certain characteristics of «belligerent of right«, distancing them from the simple outlaws or bandits.

In the summer of 1943, when the Soviet guerrilla war reached its peak, some 250,000 partisans were fixing half a million German and allied troops (from Russians, Italians, Hungarians, rear police, to German garrison units). The Germans of the first line were only used in large operations of encirclement and annihilation of guerrillas. Even the small garrison forces, usually a section, with a core of Germans, maintained a proactive behavior: they had to send to patrol periodically to half a section or to join it with an external force, gathered for a more ambitious operation.

Nikolai Vatutin. Gran maestro delantero
General Nikolai Vatutin

In 1942, German troops were within 100 kilometers of Moscow. Nevertheless, Hitler changed the strategic attack of the campaign to the south and its more economically profitable objectives; a change that his generals did not understand. By making that decision, Germany lost forever the possibility of capturing Moscow or Leningrad. Later, Hitler made the delayed decision to divide the South Armies Group, with one part proceeding to the Caucasus and the other advancing toward Stalingrad. The result was that neither Armies reached their objectives.

The acceptance of a battle of attrition and not of maneuvers (this was impossible) in Stalingrad, led the German Army to lose during it its greater and better operational movement capacity, against the Soviet Army of masses, almost inexhaustible. Later, by not allowing the rapid withdrawal of the German 6th Army from that city, when the Soviets established their operational encirclement or, better, before that, causing the German forces debilitating losses due to the lack of suitable and defended supply lines.

Erich von Manstein: de estratega favorito de Adolf Hitler a ser su peor enemigo
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein

Hitler’s decision, in spite of all the criticism it provoked, to fight a late the battle with Soviet forces based in Kursk. Which could have been attacked in April, just a little after Erich von Manstein’s scythe blow against the flanks and rearward of the Soviet Voronezh Front or Armies Group of Voronezh of colonel general Vatutin and the Mobile Group of deep incursion of general Markian Popov, which marched towards the Dnieper’s mouth, centered the German armies again on a secondary target. Even worse was that Germany’s invaluable armored tanks that spear-headed the advance in Kursk (moving hard in rhombus – or armored shaped wedges or Panzerkiel) foundered, when they encountered Soviet antitank in deep deployments forming even “fortified regions”.

Markian Popov - Wikipedia
General Markian Popov

The result was similar for the Panzer Divisions, even reinforced by Tigers battalions and the new Ferdinand heavy assault guns, to what Germany infantry divisions faced in Stalingrad: pitting direct force against direct force and high troop looses for both side, were the parity in men and Germany’s superior preparation and tactical doctrine dissipated in the face of concentric high fires.

When a German was worth as a combatant what three or four Russians, according to the conscientious studies of the American colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, from the results of multiple battles of World War II.

(to be continued)