THE INFANTRY FIGHTING: EAST VS WEST.

The last tens of meters up to reaching a determined enemy or gullible in his positions, form the fighting zone of the infantry. And she has yet major validity and importance in the actual wars. With the approximation to the combat from the brigade, the last global direct human possible vision of the units and resources, and the division, the western doctrines tend to be fixed in the dominant characteristics of the area and of his transitability or ground ongoing throughout the day and of the years seasons and according to the climate, to realize his plans.

But they neglect the use of the microarea at the levels of squads, teams, companions pairs and weapon servants. In the microarea, by means of the cover, the patience, the secrecy and the concealment, those «combats groups» might use against the enemy, his capacities of resistance (to the surprise), of mobility or concealed tactical «activity» (in the defense), of initiative and of freedom of action. Operating over him in minuscule «action interphases» (or microsectors). This is specially actual and necessary in the fight against regular and irregular «nobody» enemy, which lack the modern military technological advances and the economic resources to provide them. And that search for need and/or idiosyncrasy, to compensate his asymmetries with the domain of this infantry fight, seeking to see this way the white of the eyes of the enemy.

The military American Doctrine for the modern Wars.

The news that are received since years from the war operations zones in the countries in conflict, proceeding from the journalists inserted in the fighting forces, of the correspondents detached in the different populations of those (Kabul, Baghdad, Saigon, Hue) and those that the armies in presence issue, are revealing a series of characteristics that are common to the forces of the different western modern armies. They all are following the trend initiated by the Americans of having the enemy less nearby, more seen and observed and more beaten by the heavy air and artillery fire. It is not looked with this, in increasing effects order, to blind it, to disturb it, or to neutralize it, but to destroy it. That is the costliest and improbabliest of his effects and that demands an increased and deficient expense of the resources. And the worse thing is that does not always exist his direct connection with the offensive maneuvers of the ground forces. That often do not come to beating the broken enemy after the fires blows. The ground deployments are «secondary» and, therefore, also are his movements, dispersions and concentrations. The heavy fire has turned into a «economic and industrial» substitute (it changes military effort into dollars) of the maneuvers and the assaults of the ground forces. And the reason of all that is known by the poor and asymmetric enemies of West: the horror to the risk in combat and to assuming falls.

Resultado de imagen de deep battle american doctrine MONGOLS SOUGHT FOR THE ENEMY DISRUPTION, ATTACKING ITS VULNERABILITIES, PENETRATING ITS EMPTY REARWARDS, MOVING FASTER AND CREATING APPEARANCES FOR THE ENEMY.

The massive employment of the heavy fire is the principal «argument» of the Pentagon. His doctrine (Field Manual of the US Army 100-5, Operations) does not emphasize the initiative and rests in enemy reacts to the «real or potential action» from protected positions in the whole operations zone. The USA has created a ground forces with few capacity and skill in his small units for the combat in the infantry fighting zone, where more risk take the men. The trend of the doctrine looks for a formation (knowledge, education and command) and an intelligence (as elaborated, sufficient and constant information) excellent and abundant for the chiefs and officials. They are the managers of conceptualize the combat and the persons in charge of the fulfillment of the mission of his units and small units. It is supposed that the soldiers will do well and will work well, being able to use his sophisticated equipments and those of his companions of unit and fulfilling the orders of his subofficials and officials. These are supposed elaborated at the sufficient level, to give them perspective and cohesion with the intention of the high controls.

Resultado de imagen de deep battle american doctrine GOOD AGAINST A II GENERATION ARMY AND MORE CENTRALIZED THAT OURS: THAT OF SADAM HUSSEIN.

One of the operation principles that gathers strength in this renewed doctrine is that of the simultaneity. This establishes to beat at the same time, with heavy fire of artillery and aviation, the first and second enemy attack echelons and even his reserve, using against her the aviation and the tactical rocketry. The infantry and tanks forces are designed to attack or to counter-attack this now beaten enemy in all his depth and to assure the battle decision. Here does not exist the detection and the assault to the enemy weak points. Nor the «general saving» (an essential, universal and original principle of the war, according to Fuller) of means and of human lives. Nor the skilful, risky and fruitful maneuvers of functional and/or positional dislocation of the enemy. In opened area, the infantry cannot attack without indirect and/or direct heavy fire support and without concealment (night, fogs, smokes, draggings). But this complementary support has been hypertrophying, up to turning into a «weapon» for itself (as decades ago it was tried to do with the tanks) in the mix of the military resources and in one supposedly «maneuvers warfare». About which speak, but not well applied, the updates of the FM 100-5 from 1985. The such promising, already omnipresent and wished “not driven planes” of exploration and/or bombardment or «drones» are not more than the global projection in scope, safety of employment for the user and game of possibilities of the heavy fire, about which we speak. The marshall von Hindenburg designed the adage: «A battle without Schwerpunkt (the place where or the unit that applies our “principal effort”) is like a man without character». The North American army acts generally evoking a heavy, forceful mace, hammering and excessive. The Afrika Korps, by the contrary, reminded us an elegant, agile, unforseeable, (almost) sufficient and effective foil.

The Employment of a IIIrd Generation Army in the “military asymmetric” Enviroment.

The wars of fourth generation are the counterinsurgency wars or guerrilla wars or irregular wars or armed revolts or national liberation wars or organized banditry, which always have existed, coexisting with the conventional variants where only regular forces combat. They are those that the USA has lost or not won lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (Marines’ peace disembarkation, then demolished in his barrack), Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» of the tribal masters of the war and the militias of the Islamic Courts, now of al-Shabab), Iraq and Afghanistan. They are very unequal wars against an enemy of lower technological military level man relative to the own regular forces, taken root almost always in the own or occupied civil population, militarily low intense and extensive or long in the space and the time. With awkward frequency, when the human (own or local agents) or technological Americans «sensors» detect some probable rebel activity of the yellow ones, muhaydins or hostile foreigners, they first devastate the building, the «block», the zone. What for them is really a surface target. And then they are going to wipe off and to do the corpses inventory, the «body count». Sometimes between the rubbles they can meet the corpses of a yellow, blackish or innocent and numerous Muslim family. It abuses of the attrition, when the enemy fuses with the civilians. It is careless the active, unexpected patrolling work, who needs proportionally less material and human means. But that bases In the military trade, the physical and moral courage, the freedom of action and the creativity in the low and intermediate commands and in the men.

Imagen relacionada OBAMA FIRED CENTCOM GENERAL MATTIS WITHOUT A PHONE CALL.

The western soldiers have exchanged or forgotten the «principles» or rules of the good to do in the war, for the simultaneity and the depth of the distant fire, covering the whole enemy highly probable zone. With it there is neither means economy, nor principal effort, nor the necessary discrimination between soldiers and the potentially enemy civilians. The armies look eagerly for the safety and the confidence in his decisions and missions. Precisely when the environment in which they are and act in the last 5-years periods, the guerrilla or asymmetric wars, is variable, fleeting, without definite limits, confused and hard to grasp. The uncertainty, the chaos, the mistakes, the friction and the failures, the scanty means and the partially fulfilled plans, the weariness and the fear are the «omnipresent demons», that characterize and concern this neutral «magma» of the war. And it is neutral because it leaves being drive and guide largely by the human superior «plans and actions». That are stimulated by the «correct sense» of the commands, the determination, the will, the physical and moral courage, the motivations (ideological, religious, ethnic, social…), the suitable training, the sufficient equipment, the commitment with the tasks and missions and the respectable and respected commands.

Resultado de imagen de obama got away from iraq and afghanistan SOME DEADLY RECORDS.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not tacitly accepted by both American parties, that the «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military equipment) were supported and necessary, to remove of the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the fundamentalist foreign terrorism of any origin, religion or ideology. It justified the ill-fated post war bad oriented occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with a fiscal and exterior deficits ran away and with a Democrat Administration, it is necessary for the USA to save in military resources. To dedicate them «to construct a nation here, at home», as defined Obama. This way, the USA lowered qualitatively the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only one violent not national enemy. This internationalist salafist terrorist «network», with delirious and impossible ideas, without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for his forces and means of «rapid punctual incursions». This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile areas, operations of assaults by elite units and small expeditionary forces and of Marines amphibious assault. These transported by «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and specific equipment for several years in an operations theatre, they are indefinitely rejected by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense».

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Modern Allied Urban Warfare against the Insurgency.

Introduction.

The American and European troops are prepared to fight against a regular military enemy provided with a masses army. Or even more modern, of the IIIrd generation, with more elaborated technologically means and better trained men, to support the lonelinesses and tensions of the awaited current battlefields. Definitively, his «way», his action space, is the direct and opened clash in presence of a great profusion of probable enemy targets. His instrument is the attrition, the destruction of the aims that the enemy presents and could be detected and acquired in all the depth of his march or assault deployment. The last two enemy echelons, nowadays increasingly remote or deep, are reached by the longe range support aviation or with the ballistic or autonomous missiles of medium range.

Resultado de imagen de Russian Ordnance fire in Middle East

Which is here the role of the man? To detect and confirm the enemy targets, to try to fix them, if it is about a patrol or a small combat unit and to call his «ordnance» in order that it devastates them. Only his elite units, always scanty and, therefore, exceptional and precious, are formed in the nearby infantry fight using only his organic means.

In Iraq and in Syria the islamist bases are always in the cities and populations more favorable for the activity of his different bands. And they are surrounded or permeated by military local and foreign forces. Already initiated the war, the North American intelligence intercepted a memorandum of 17 pages written by Abu Musad al-Zarqawi, former chief of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, to Osama bin Laden. In it he was expressing his worry for his survival: «In Iraq there are not mountains where we could shelter, nor forests in whose thickness we could hide. There are spies eyes everywhere. Our backs are exposed and our movements are realized in view of all». And this geographical military space is similar in Syria.

The Action of the military Forces against the current Insurgency.

In the books on the guerrilla warfare, it is discused of the tactics of the siege to the military fixed or semipermanent positions. The guerrillas, deprived in the first phases of an ideological armed revolution (communists, of fight against the foreign occupant) of enough military capacity, have their guidelines to attack the mentioned military positions.

Resultado de imagen de Russian Ordnance fire in Middle East RUSSIAN REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN SYRIA

In the zones not dominated by the guerrillas, but bordering the areas under his control, it is where develops the fight of those for removing the military enemy. Seeking to also control these areas and to realize in them his ideological indoctrination of the populations. The guerrilla bases only can grow in space or increase his number, when the military enemy moves back. Or when his positions (advanced positions, barracks) are submitted to a more or less nearby and ferreous siege. That must be continuous in his effects: that is to say, controlling the approximation and exit routes of those. To threaten, harass, check and to attack in its moment the surrounded forces. And the reinforcement and supply columns of that come to help. Using limited attacks, ambushes and traps and registered fire bags.

In the regions infected by the guerrillas, not necessarily occupied by them, the military positions are protective, extensive and few fortress. His garrison is high. The military set evokes there a blind, awkward and low mobile bunker. The military men realize from them special forces operations of reconaissance and against guerrilla positions and of march to the combat on targets of zone, at charge of strong columns. To occupy and then defend them, according to the capacities of the military forces. In this, the commitment and moral of them is decisive.

Resultado de imagen de Bombing in Middle East GOVERNMENT CARPET BOMBING IN SYRIA.

In the irregular war against the bands of the Islamic State, the armed forces and his auxiliary ones use in his operational strategy, some of Mao Ze Dong’s 10 military principles to direct the tactics of the Chinese guerrillas and semi regulars. Those were enunciated by Mao on December 25, 1947 in his speech before the Central Committee of the PCC. Let’s see, in not necessarily original order: 1) To attack first the isolated and spread enemies and later the stronger enemy forces. 2) To take first the small villages and, finally, the big populations. 3) Not to fight combats, if you are little prepared for, nor present combats in which the victory is not sure. 4) To concentrate always for each combat forces absolutely superior to those of the enemy. 5) To destroy the enemy while it moves and is more vulnerable. 6) To use the intervals between campaigns to rest and to regroup and to train the troops…but not allow that the enemy have a pause, not even a breather. 7) Take first the populations low defended. And, when the conditions are favorable to us, those with medium defenses. And wait to increase our advantages, to assault the better defended cities.

This operational strategy outlined by Mao, using simple, didactic and efective procedure, is of a low military level. As corresponds to an insurrection that had to grow, to develop and to spread. And that was employing rural uncultured forces and was arming itself principally with the enemy captured weapon. Mao said that he «had a call option in the weapon of the British arsenals».

Resultado de imagen de ejercito iraquí chií IRAQI TANK WITH SHIA BANNER…

But this same orthodox operational strategy of the weak rebel against the strong military, is that are going to use the Allied forces, agglutinate and supported by the USA and Russia (in Syria), to attack an islamist insurgency, entrenched in his urban bases. And keeping the massive, repeated and overwhelming employment of the modern air and ground heavy fire on the rebels. So much in the battles and combats that appear, as for the wear and interdiction of the islamist positions, his facilities and movements.

Seeking as strategic aims to defeat the rebels and to occupy his bases or positions. That would be finally select for a policeman’s labor. Bases that are the only hard, definite and static aims, which the guerrillas have. With a qualitative difference with the diffuse, evasive, fleeting and slippery aims that the guerrillas offer in movement. Bases that are directly attacked, using the military forces (to those that is supposed better trained and equipped and, at least, equally motivated, that the rebels) and his enormous power of direct and indirect fire.

Resultado de imagen de german anti partisan operations RUSSIAN PARTISANS.

The military and social problem that exists here is that the Allied rebel Arabic groups, the Kurdish peshmergas and the Iraqi military men and his loyal militias, lack the military virtues of the National complete armies. And they have acquired not military habits on the preservation of his men in combat. Avoiding them at any price the mutilation and the death. In It have influenced decisively the religious and social origins of the different «allied» soldiers groups and his interests and divergent aims, at times even antagonistic, within these two civil wars. Social elements and parameters contaminated, spurious and, even strange, before the concept of the Umma or community of faithfuls of the same god, Allah.

Resultado de imagen de shia tanks against isis IRAQI SHIA MECHANIZED ARTILLERY AGAINST ISIS

They follow for it this operational strategy of going very little by little, first occupying the weakest islamist positions that surround and defend the biggest. Devastating with the heavy fire from the distance the islamist disclosed positions, which are intermingled with with the houses and refuges of the civilians. Because the war they do, so much the Americans as the Russians and all his allies, in the urban fighting areas that are the islamist occupied populations of Iraq and Syria. And the prolongation of the war, the major time that they will use to obtain his military aims, preserving his men in the combat, the civilians will pay it. With his blood, with the destruction of his material means and buildings and with his massive displacements, seeking to save already only the life and without knowing who will receive and help them.

Let’s see a historical example of the action of counterinsurgents forces, in high unfavorable conditions for them. The German forces antipartisans in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In his manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that “the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be answered».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, for the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His antipartisans troops were consisting always of variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German troops of security and policemen; security troops of his Allies in the front of the East, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of Allied «Russian» forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes, insafe. The hard core of the units were the Germans. The posts did not have homogeneous troops. In them, the men’s qualities were intermingled, in order that mop or novice was encouraging by the presence of the strong, and in him was removed the thoughts of weakness or desertion.

Resultado de imagen de german anti partisan operations LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES GIVING SUPPORT TO AN ANTIPARTISAN OPERATION IN RUSSIA.

Before the inability to provide troops and security to his rearguard in the whole territory conquered to the USSR, at the west of an imaginary laid out between Leningrad and Stalingrado, the Germans had to select very well the points of garrison. These rarely had more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the post could be defended for a time. While, others, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor the vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of antipartisans forces, there were formed reconnaissance and combat patrols. Something like reconnaissance in force patrols, to locate and harass the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, against a guerrilla threat or the location of an important bands concentration, even there were temporarily brought troops from the forward line (of the operational zone), for the assault and destruction of that one, generally looking for his siege and annihilation.

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational aim of his antipartisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies were kept reasonably opened from Germany, Poland and Romania up to the rears of the German forces and his allies in the East. And the flow of men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods that received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Millions Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and towards there there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch, in his continuous rotations.

The Ambushes against military Patrols and Units.

Introduction.

One of the principal tasks of the military men of the International Forces in Support of the Security, deployed in the Southwest of Asia, in the countries menaced by the islamist terrorism, is the motorized patrolling by the dusty ways that interlace the zone of influence of their barracks. These areas almost lacks Tarmac roads. When there exist they are not a great thing. The caps of asphalt have between one and two fingers of thickness; and the heats soften them and pot-holes and bubbles are easily formed. Usually, this is not an aggressive patrol. It is an exhibition, routine and of visual and logistic link patrolling, between their principal and secondary positions and with the nearby population centers.

When the military men think that there can be problems, they receive the support of the air observation. They are reconnaissance not manned planes (the UAV, in his initials in English), whose use spreads in these asymmetric conflicts. They can detect (in ideal conditions) at 5 thousand meters if a person is armed. The Americans use the Predator model (which is armed also) and the the Searcher (without attack capacity), being able both to operate up to 350 km from his base.

Resultado de imagen de Guerrillas sunníes JAISHALADL SUNNIS IRAQIS GUERRILLA POSING…

In some cases the rebels and bandits have dared to attack some of the military marching columns. Fighting from fixed and spread, hasty fortified positions, forming a fringe like a half moon or crescent, which was embracing the march way. Their problem was that the rebel weapon were of tense fire and so their fighting positions were in the forward slope. So, the armed light armoured vehicles with foreign infantry, could combat profitably with the guerrillas in their reinforced fox holes, small trenches and folds of the ground. In effect, their targets acquisition and machine-guns fire control systems, were allowing them the selection and the precision of their fires against the punctual targets of the irregular rebels. And were forcing them to move back and to hiding in the near hamlets.

There are more others cases in which the rebels use the explosive handcrafted artifices (in English, «improvised explosive devices») in the ways crossed by the military men in patrol. They usually place them setting off from the villages, as their improvised forward base, and taking advantage of the concealment and the protection of the nights. There is a high afraid to these artifices, already famous from the postwar period of Iraq. Because they are unexpected, unpredictable and hard to detect. Also, are enervating (the mental perspective of a possible, though improbable explosion, burdens much more than the real probability of the hurts in the attack) and they put the men in the passive defense and in the wait, knowing that active measurements to avoid them are not taken.

Resultado de imagen de improvised explosive devices

The explosive hollow charges that form the majority of these artifices, attack the “low guts” of the military foreign vehicles, their most vulnerable and less protected part. Down there, they cannot carry the reactive charges of repulsion or a multiple layers “shield” with ceramics, like the hulls of the main battle tanks. It is calculated that the Afghan Taliban and the members of the ISIL rebels can place and activate during a year, more 10 thousands of these handcrafted mines. Some correspondents call the artifices, the most effective weapon of the insurgency. Though they are, in their operational set, like an immense minefield; but that are not simultaneously placed and super widespread, improbable and without being covered by the enemy fire.

The Technologies and Tactics to eliminate the Danger of the Ambushes and Explosive Traps in the Tracks.

There are several, the passive or reactives and the actives, assuming that the initiative and the aggressiveness, against worse prepared and trained rebels, is with the military men. They all are «defensive». Since the Department of the War passed to be named long ago of the Defense, everything is “defense”.

Between the passive ones can be to increase the visual recognition of the tracks, observing protuberances and changes of color that should not correspond, in the soils of those. The «travel times» of the columns would diminish a lot. It is necessary to cross those more slow, looking at the soil and looking over the horizon, searching also for careless observers, not very distant. They do not use too much cable activators. These are expensive and weigh, and the rebels are in isolated zones and their logistics is weak and complicated.

The devices are activated generally by the pressure of the vehicle or by a transmitter of a given frequency and range; it can serve an opening doors device. With their frequency inhibitors, the military men try to offset the radio waves of the probable frequencies in the zone. Being the most expensive and complicated transmitters, that with more range, power and frequencies range of use. It is the game of the cat and the mouse. The problem arises when the guerrillas of an area receive a transmitter activator that uses an unforeseen frequency.

Also the columns might be harassed by registered mortar fire during the stops that they were doing to confirm or to eliminate some possible artifice, as some of them might be simulated.

Resultado de imagenGENERAL VALERIANO WEYLER.

Another way would be to move out of the tracks, cross-country running. For the wheel vehicles, this not always is possible. And, in addition, their wear of the pieces and the consumption of fuel increase very much, as also the march schedules. At the same time, it diminishes the comfort and increases the weariness of the travelers in missions of long range and routine patrolling.

That it is not said that it is impossible or very difficult to do. Since this was what the general Valeriano Weyler did, to frighten the Cuban mambises of the surroundings of the ways and tropical paths. On February 10, 1896, the general was taking charge of the government of Cuba and of the headquarters of the Spanish army deployed in her. The president of the Cabinet, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, restorer of the Bourbon monarchy, was supporting the politics of keeping the colonial domination in Cuba, up to «sacrificing the last man and the last peseta». And named Weyler for the mentioned positions, in substitution of the general Arsenio Martínez Campos, the peacemaker of the war from 1968 to 1978. Which this time failed in bringing positions over with the armed rebels.

Imagen relacionada GENERAL ARSELIO MARTÍNEZ CAMPOS.

The Cuban guerrillas, in this new war, were taking advantage of the concealment of the “manigua” (tropical jungle) and his nearness to the ways, to harass with rifle fire the Spanish columns and to cause them some falls, without getting involved in a fight. Weyler prompt designed the tactic of rejection the enemy. A reconnaissance with combat capacity was going suitably forward to the Spanish columns in march. It was moving by the jungles (autochthonous bushes) that were surrounding the routes of march, without moving away too much from the paths. The “mambises” or Cuban armed rebels, forming variable and scanty harassment forces, were this way raised from their ambushing positions and drove away from the principal Spanish forces.

Particularities of the mountainous zones and their inhabitants.

The mountainous areas of the geopolitical region of the Southwest of Asia are specially dangerous for the foreign military units of any size in maneuver. The spurs of the heights are frequently crossed by wadis or seasonally dry riverbeds of brooks and springs. In them it can conceal a group of men. That will not become visible until his opportunity of harassment by the fire arises, from rapidly reinforced and camouflaged positions, of the military units. Or have an encounter skirmish with some military group that comes out to the hollow without precautions.

Also it is easy to approach some rocky outcrop, adorned or not by a small thorny bushes, without detecting any enemies patiently crouched down behind it. That will attack the carelessness soldiers, using their knives or cutlasses. Even, when the men return to the principal way, after establishing and keeping a defense position to secure the march of the principal column, giving them the back.

The tribes who live there have as characteristics in their identity and customs, the belligerence and the intertribal brawls. The most important and widespread are the etnia pashtun and the baluchis.

The surprise, which is an effective multiplier of the «specific combat capacity» of a given unit, is constantly and systematicly employ by the irregular fighters. This way, it happens that, «in this wide, ocher and arid valley, they have never attacked us», because the mountains that frame it are at 300 or 400 m. in the horizon. Well, today they are going to attack you with short bursts (2 to 6 shots) of machine gun with bipod, when you advance gullible and spread in that dull and known valley. Without bothering for establishing the march security with pickets, which protect the principal column. And offering multiple small targets to the tenacious, thoughened and poisonous enemy.

Military Tactics in the counterinsurgency fighting.

Finally, some specific tactics and techniques exist for the fight against irregular rebels, that can be used here. It looks to keep the initiative, the creativity and the law of the action in our side. It is a question of the independent employment of light infantry small units (at first, type plattoon or section) in reconnaissance and attacks tasks of the enemy bands.

For the defense of the own communications, they can be used aggressively against the bands that scourge or that hinder them (the artifices are like more spread and selective mines). For example, they can advance and conceal in a sector where the terrorists or local bandits bands are active. In the night, when those are usually placing in the tracks their explosive artifices, they will attack thoughtlessness them (with the maxim surprise and for the major effect). This demands of all the men of the patrols and units: formation, motivation, commitment with the mission, specific training, initiative, creativity, self-sufficiency, sobriety, patience, serenity, alert of the senses, silence and quietude.

An advantage that will multiply the combat capacity of the military patrols, resides in that these bands usually neglect their security in what they think that it is their rear. As soon as a combat has taken place with the rebels, the patrol must be extracted or return to his barracks. To rest, report or brief, return to train, to be equipped and to move to another sector, when it be appropriated, in another mission.

Epilogue.

Any ambush that turns out to be effective involves a failure, a deficiency, a carelessness in the security of the attacked. The routine of the actions; the softness of the men; the sufficiency and conceitedness of the direct and top commands; the scanty formation of the soldiers; the insufficient motivation of all the military men and his lack of commitment with the tasks or missions. They constitute serious departure faults to the creation and the maintenance of an effective march security. In the reconnaissance and of combat patrols and in the movements of the units and small units.

And, though the security does not appear frequently in the «lists» of the principles of the war, specially in the most short, the security has come to remain. And the failure to keep this principle will concern in major or minor degree and extension the efficiency of other «companions or partners principles». Since the whole of the principles forms a holistic, synergic, concurrent and convergent group, on the military actions. Defining all simultaneously the «what to do» in the war or in the armed conflict.

THE MILITARY SURPRISE AS ART AND HETERODOXY

Almost all the technologies, tactics and operations directed to obtaining the tactical or operational surprise over the enemy, can be benevolent considered at the edge of the regulations and existing procedure. That are practised in the different countries and groups of them or supranational alliances.

Between other reasons, to fight only according to the «book» is usually too much acquaintance and predictable. In addition, many of the general «knowledge» gathered in them are shared by different blocs and nations, even antagonistic. And it is necessary, to respect the regulations and ordinances and to look for the aim indicated by the command, as the goal to obtaining.

But the creative and decisive action must follow the one that we call the «way of the surprise«. As guide, compass, of our decisions and actions. Looking for that fleeting and juicy opportunity that arises in the development of the mutual actions between the armed rivals; those careless or vulnerable enemy weaknesses, in conditions that we can create sometimes, equally more unforeseen and unusual. To obtain our goals with more forcefulness, efficiency, elegance and rapidity. Achieving it with fewer loss of time, of men and of means. Let’s remember the basic and universal principle of the economy of the means.

Sure that following always the «book» they will be able to approach and to take to good term the common operations. But, apart from the fact that the enemy has an essentially equal doctrine and regulations, a way of fighting will be first known and then learned or dominated and, probably, up to overcome finally by the enemy. The triumphant Germans in the first period 1939-1941, with the extension of the war, allowed the knowledge and the learning of his war of combined weapon by his enemies. That finally overcame them in technologies, tactics and operations and drove them to their thunderous defeat in 1945.

And this «guide» is of special need and affection in the bureaucratized and crystallized armies. Where the unforseeable, not guilty failures, are not only a contingency to be overcame by the set. But they can be also an administrative or political weapon against the persons in charge. And where the follow-up of the «book» and the superiors orders to the letter, armour and protect the low commands of the responsibility of their acts and results.

Martin Van Creveld said that was the anteroom, before the final unworkability and prostration, of «the military organizations that were not getting up-to-date and renewing». Martin Van Creveld was expelled as lecturer, many years ago, from Israel’s Military High College.

Then, the results will be obtained increasingly at the cost of the wear and the men means and materials losses. Tending to triumph then the rival that more demographic and economic capacity has.

There arises then a corollary of this way of thinking the military thing. The zeal to avoid human falls, extended to all the modern armies or of IIIrd generation, will lead to the preventive, protective and therapeutic employment of the own heavy fire. Looking that the own forces do not have to fight at close ranges. This is called military modern technology and is highly regarded by the national armament industries. This is not more than the perversion and trick of the heavy fire. Whose functions or tasks, in increasing order of action and efficiency, are: to blind, to disturb, to neutralize or cover and to destroy the enemy in the different fighting forms and situations.

And the action over the aim will tend to the physical destruction, as guarantee of the security of the men. In the actual civil wars in Iraq and Syria, we have the examples in the exagerate and methodical bombardments on the enemies. Armed and civilians; real and suspects.

The Military surprise, looking for the enemy dislocation and shock

During his operations, the enemy deployment is conforming in the direction and with the intention that he has decided and determined, for his military echeloned means and for his logistic routes. This way, he is showing his «cards» to his rival, depending on his action tempo and he is commiting, according to those.

Our surprise can create «per se» a new «exposed flank«, another more or less critical «vulnerability» in the enemy. That he was not considering yet, that he was not waiting, nor was prepared to defend her by some of the fighting forms. That are the attack and the defense, in their varieties and combinations.

Our surprise «penetrates» in the enemy deployment, seeking to shock and dislocate functionally or positionally it. And, at least, to cause him losses, to occupy profitable positions for our operational development, to diminish his tempo or operational pace and to confuse, delay and disturb him in his plans and deployments. Using for it, by our part, the minimal means expense and seeking to achieve the maximum possible effect on the enemy. With which we optimize the effort of our actions, following the general principle of the economy of the available means.

When the enemy reacts, to offset and overcome the effect of our surprising action, he is adapting necessarily to our intention. And, if that one is serious, he moves away more or less from his interests and plans. With his reacting movements for the rejection and the attack to our forces, the enemy is disregarding his intention and his mission. In relation to these, the enemy is removed from them and also unbalanced. This way, a right conceived, planned and realized surprise can «prepare» the enemy for us. So, he face in disadvantage, with fewer available resources and a worse deployment, our offensive principal action. That would be already more direct, massive and orthodox.

In such a way that exist a whole range of possible effects to obtaining over the enemy with our surprising actions. That will change also according to the means destined to obtain our surprise, the conception, the preparation and the accomplishment of it and the available time, considering also the set of our operations.

WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE.

Introduction.

The appearance of the IT treatment of the information supposed a revolution in the capture, production and transmission of the existing or caught information. Whose possibilities and transcendency are still far from know, even in his scope and his limits. The information generated in a battlefield or an operations theatre of is enormous, ephemeral in diverse times, almost immeasurably and fluid. The latter quality is fundamental for the production of the intelligence. That is the information caught by the units and sensors of all kinds and that is digested or prepared by the specific organs (G2, S2 and agencies of intelligence), to create a sufficient, effective, opportune and constant intelligence. That is used by the «advanced users» or commands in the different levels of military action (tactical, operative and strategic).

Since it could not be otherwise, in view of the brief exposed scheme, the IT industry soon found an enormous area of activity and possibilities in the military field. And the high military commands, often in «ad hoc» prepared meetings and coctails, received from the manager directors and chairmen of the branch corporations, animated, brief and exciting presentations of the enormous performances that might give to their units of all the branches, the designed, elaborated and installed softwares and hardwares by these vanguard technical companies. The battlefield or the operations zone (the area, the enemy and I), known, conveyed and controlled in real time by my men!!!

The Support of the military Information Systems.

It is not the case that these new technologies allow to elaborate a complex and integrated weapon system. This already existed before the information age and the electronic existing advances allowed his creation. For example, the AEGIS defense system for ships against aircraft, warships, missiles and submarines was designed, created and installed for the first time in 1973. It is equiped by destroyers and even frigates (in a simpler model) of the USA and his allied nations. And this way they are called the «shields or defenders of the Fleet». In effect, every «naval group» centred and escorting an aircraft carrier and every «naval combined force of strategic projection», rely on several ships provided with the AEGIS system. This consists of a powerful radar of several megawatts of power, capable of catching and continuing up around 200 potential targets, placed at distances of up to 350 km to the installed system.

The caught information goes to a computer center that reports to a decision center. Which arranges the launches of missiles depending on the mission of the group or naval force and the estimated danger generated for him by the target. The system is installed in front of the armoured control center of the ship. That gives the final permission for the launch of the missiles. These are arranged in rows of vertical silos (habitually, are four with 4 missiles each one) placed in the front cover, in the part that was occupying the conventional artillery. The silos are re-fed from the interior of the ship with other missiles after the launches. The missiles are propeled by solid fuel, which allows that they should be smaller than the land launched. And the adjustment of the system is studied for the destruction of the enemy ballistic missiles.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age

The activities that the military men realize in action in front the enemy are numerous, varied and some of them are complex. And all of them demand a sufficient attention from the controls and men. Let us see some of the most significant. Regarding the movement in the ground: to advance, to stop and to move back; so much running as walking, crawling or incorporated, and doing it by jumps or in zig zag. Regarding placing and valueing the environment, hostile or not: to observe, to detect, to process, to decide, to transmit or not the results and to act. Regarding the form of fight (rejection or attack): to hide, to cover and to be protected, to change position, to define well evasive detected targets, to receive the orders of the immediate chief, to attack them with deliberate, rapid, etc. fire, (if it is a question of an infantry). Regarding the communication with his “group” (team, weapon, squad, section): to receive orders and information, to send information and orders, to spread information. And they carry out all this under the uncertainty, the lack of comfort, the tension, the loneliness, even of his companion or buddy, and the fear … The constant and repeated sometimes audio-visual information, that is communicated by the modern digital systems can relieve this physical and psychic load of the soldiers? So to achieve it, would really be of great help for them.

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age ARE THEY LOOKING, DECIDING OR FIGHTING?

Resultado de imagen de warfare in information age IS IT USEFUL HERE?

To all that, it could join a flood of information, insignificant in this moment for his mission or his immediate action. This can generate an increase of the needs of the attention capacities of the military men. Through the more important senses, the sight and the ear. And to originate a diversion of his effective available attention (if there is), towards external not fundamental or neutral stimuli of the images and the conversations. The system is going to transmit them a clearer and detailed information of the targets, even defining some more ephemeral or veiled. But it will not give them information about the intentions and the mental conditions of the different located enemies and their group. Though the system is served with probabilities, previous experiences, alogarithms and reliable estimations…

A practical Application.

In the new model of fighting, the attacking force would be kept simultaneously dispersed, communicated and informed in real time and looking for and attacking the enemy. It would be the supposed advantages of the swarm and his concentric and simultaneous assault, which would count now with the knowledge of the ground and the enemy, thanks to the multiple sensors and systems and the real, caught and transmitted information (not intelligence) to the units of the force.

Are similar in capacity all the units of the force? Then we are demanding from them that each one acts as a «polyvalent» fraction of the unit, without specializing them. With what they will probably have some specific, quantitatively insufficient capacities. Are specialized the units of the force? Then they will have to rely on the simultaneous concurrence, in the defense and the attack, of several units. That should complement between all the necessary functions of this tasks «group». And if the enemy electromagnetic countermeasures work against the wireless communications and is established a communications «silence»? And if we now do not have the telephony circular network of the unit and do not possess double couriers for the transmission of “parts and orders” to the chief and from the chief?

And if the enemy deploys in the same way as us? So we would come to a general clash of weak individual forces against enemies weak forces individual. As the great units spread out for his fighting form. Clash that would be solved by multiple partial and isolate combats, using the attrition. They would be like the singular combats of champions and leaders, which happened in other times. And would gain those who were finally keeping a major number of valid units. It would be a clash won by pure material wear of means: men, military means and expensive and sophisticated IT material, almost without transcendent application.

THE NO “COMBAT AVAILABILITY” OF THE FORCES IN THE DEFENSE.

 

A variant exists of deficient or useless «combat availability» of a military force. And it happens when exists the «entrusted«, the «satisfaction» of the commands in the real state of alert of that one. Without assuming or to appreciate the failures in it.

The Development.

We know that the high limit of a characteristic or property is very difficult or impossible to reach. Some of them are the «total destruction» of the enemy and the absolute «public security» in a population or in a society. If you monitor the great public sites, airports, parks, they would attack a church or a mosque…There are always plenty of potential objectives and not enough security forces… But what is exigible and necessary is that the commands optimize the use of the received military resources, which always are insufficient, in the tasks at their charge. With it they will have made all the humanly possible for fulfilling them. Since the optimization of those is equivalent to his «good employment » and to everything what this involve.

The variant of the deficient «combative availability» that we treat, arises in the defense. And it has several possible origins and reasons. This way, we have the deficient organization and deployment of the security zone. That will allow in major or less measured its secret, patient and multiple penetration by enemy groups. That will not have to possess necessarily sappers’ training. Also the dominant positions near the more or less permanent and important position of the forces, must be garrisoned by advanced detachments of, at least, a squad.

The approximation routes to the forces, from certain distance, must be registered by the mortars, the artillery and/or the aircrafts of support. In some sections ambushes can be established and, in others, obstacles and barriers covered by the own fires. Other sectors can be provided with cameras and sensors. The thermal and acoustic airborne sensors can track and detect small enemy units in the different phases of their approximation march to the combat. The intelligence should facilitate trustworthy reports, with sufficient information and updated with the enemy intentions and plans in our zone and their development.

Resultado de imagen de soldados indisciplinados THEY ALSO COULD BE IRREGULARS.

In the irregular war, the enemy is in the habit of reconnoitre, at least initially and also in fluid conditions of fight, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these «reconnaissance positions», which will never be fixed, but alternative and ephemeral. The own patient observation is the way. And bearing in mind that, if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes must be substituted the observer, Because he looks, but already he does not see. If additional means exist for it and as complement, it is necessary to use the patrolling against the armed or not native marauders, in the way of reconnaissances and attacks with limited aims.


Let’s remember that the correct security must prevent that our forces could be beaten by the fire of the enemy infantry weapons. Also, detecting the enemy, tactical surprises from him are avoided to those. And that the presence and/or the action of our forces in this zone, including the advanced detachments, have as a specific task, to win the sufficient time, in order that the forces that have advanced and deployed them, could reach the right «combat readiness» to reject the enemy. And for all this, the security is a irrenounceable part of our total “combat readiness”.

But, also the most experienced veteran or professional units can be «surprised» by the appearance in force of the unexpected enemy, in an assault against them. And it happens when they are entrusted or satisfy with a deficient security. That is another face, less evident and defined as such, of her not or insufficient own “combat availability«.

An Example from the Western Front in the Second World War.

On June 10 of 1,944, soon after the midnight, 2 º battalion of 29 ª division of infantry of U.S.A. was prepared to pass the night. The men had traveled approximately 25 Kms. during the last 20 hours. The executive official of the battalion, commander Maurice Clift, chose a zone formed by two meadows surrounded by hedgerows, in order that the troops were happening the night in the open. The men entered them and were left to fall down against the terraces of the hedges. So tired they were that nobody bothered to come untied the rucksacks and the personal equipment. The majority of they remained slept at once. Some few paid attention to the noise of a few engines coming closer, but they thought they were American vehicles.

They were actually German tanks and trucks belonging to 352 ª infantry division. Not known by none of two rivals, the Germans had been withdrawing and following the same route that the American battalion followed in its advance. When they stopped, the German explorers detected the North American movements in the meadows of encamped. The Germans advanced secretly and surrounded the meadows.

Suddenly, the Germans threw flares. Under the sinister light, almost as brilliant as the midday light, its assault cannons opened fire on the hedges against the Americans. Along one of the hedges, a platoon got up and was cut down by the German machine guns. Many Americans, scared and disoriented, were running across, looking for the meadows exit; the German infantries were knocking down them with its repetition fire. The shells of the German mortars were exploiting for all the zone of the meadows. The Americans were responding with a vague, jerky rifles fire, directed to the opposite hedges. Which could reach both the Germans and their own men in their strolling.

Resultado de imagen de soldados indisciplinados  WASTER SOLDIERS.

«It was terrible”, a survivor was indicating general Cota. «We had crawled more than 90 ms. out of the field, when we listened from behind, a shouting of our men. I thought that the Germans were launching a bayonet charge against them».

The commander of 2º battalion, lieutenant colonel William Warfield (ironically, camp of war), had his command post in a farm close to the highway. Warfield tried to establish a defense, but it was in vain. The officials who threw out the house towards the field, were brought down rapidly. A German shouted in English towards the command group: «Give up, give up!». «Of giving up, certainly not!», roared Warfield. He tried to lead a small group towards the meadows where his men were, but turned out to be dead immediately.

The battle extended about 20 minutes. The battalion had 150 casualties, including 50 dead, slightly more than one third of its effective. Little before dawn, a gravely injured young lieutenant who was reporting to his division commander, general Charles Gerhardt, was falling down suddenly on knees and was striking the soil with his fists. While was sobbing and was sorry that all his men were died and that he had left them to fall down.

The general Gerhardt got angry. «Without safety, shouted exalted. «Simply the battalion came to the field and threw to fall asleep».

An example of the modern counterinsurgency warfare.

The Bristish Complex Bastion in the province of Helmand.

Helmand is one of 32 provinces of Afghanistan. It spreads over 58.583 km ² at the southwest of the country and has a population around the million and half of inhabitants, of the pashtun and baluchi ethnias. The capital is Laskar Gah. In his Washer’s district, at the northwest of the capital, the Camp Bastion is installed. It is the principal military British base in Afghanistan. It can house between 20 and 30 thousand persons in all its facilities, British and American principally, depending on the Branch to which they belong and their missions, equipments and supplies. It occupies a total extension of 52 Km2, approximately 10 km per 5 km. It was designed to be the center of the logistic operations of the ISAF in Helmand. In addition, it is the major military British camp constructed outside their country after the II World War. Built by the British Engineers since the beginning of 2006, the Complex is placed in a desert zone and away from the populations and is provided with long clear sights in all directions.

The Camp is divided structurally in different «sections». Bastion 1 and 2 were first erected. Bastion 2 also contains the Camp Barber (USA) and the Camp Viking (Danish). Bastion 0 was added about 2010 and it houses the facilities of the external contractors. The Bastion 3 is used for the specific training of counterinsurgency. The Complex also includes Camp Leatherneck (of the USMC) and Camp Shorabak, of the National Afghan Army. Camp Bastion’s airport, which possesses two landing strips, attends more than 600 aircraft flights every day, in operations of combat, logistic and medicals. In the attached heliport are deployed the Westland WAH-6 Apache of multiple attack and the Boeing CH-47 Chinook of mixed transport. In these moments the Complex can handle and attend almost all the military and civil aircraft in use. The Complex also houses a great military campaign hospital. And large areas of this great base are protected by a nine meters high concrete wall, which spreads over a perimeter of more of 40km, inserted with special vigilance towers, with soldiers and high technology instruments.

Resultado de imagen de soldados indisciplinados SOLDIERS DRINKING IN THE JAIL.

The British base has been attacked in diverse occasions during his years of existence. The most “media” occasion has been this that we treat. In the assault were dead two Marines (of the attached Camp Leatherneck). And other nine persons, eight military men and a civil contractor, were hurt. Six McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II airplanes of the Marines Corps were destroyed and other two were very damaged. As for the logistic facilities, were destroyed three stations of fuels supply and damaged six aviation hangars not structurally reinforced.

The atack tactic of the Taliban.

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended or without spirit enemy position is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL hollow charge grenade-launchers. They only fire on verified targets or from above and from below them. When they try to keep the surprise, the initiative and the confusion, to lengthen the military reaction time and to obtain a very local and temporary superiority, they act without their meager heavy fire support.

E incluso avanzan arrastrándose lenta y pacientemente. Por ejemplo, para romper un perímetro defensivo y dirigirse y atacar los hangares y aparcamientos evidentes de grandes aeronaves.

A characteristic of the Taliban is that they do not get involved in the defense of their positions. Once obtained the harassment of the enemy and extended the hurt, the mutilation and the stupor on the military men, they will move back. They are not so silly to wait intrepid for the heavy, precise and devastate military fire. Nor to presume of courage, in front of enemies with weapons of superior range and characteristics and capable of turning a surface target into a destruction zone. Also, there are the time and its corollary, the opportunity. The Taliban handle very well the tactical and operational times. They are masters of the patience, the waiting, the repetition of simple and easy trainings. For the important attacks they manage to use scale models of the goal. And, to penetrate in a base and attack the heavy and evident war aircrafts, only need to represent part of the perimeter, the directional location of the target and its identification, as well as the rejection fighting positions of the irruption sector.

Its execution.

Enough hours before 12 pm of Thursday, the 13th of September of 2012, the Taliban forces began to approach from several directions to the air zone of the Complex. To keep a low tactical trace, they followed dragging techniques in their advance to and through the security zone of the area. And up to there got, without being detected, 45 to 50 insurgents that, in three convergent spears of advance attacked by midnight, supported by their squad organic weapons. Not to being detected up to the beginning of the assault, also helped them the scanty combative availability of the men. And the tedious and unproductive routine of the guards and patrols, which creates the passive defense of a great protective barrack. Around 15 Taliban from two of the groups, managed to get through Camp Bastion’s perimeter and to effectively attack the air zone. Finally the attacking group was wiped out (dead and injured men and prisoners).

It was a «significant» assault, the British Defense Department declared, as the insurgents should never have come so far away. It was, admitted the ISAF, a «good coordinated» attack. Organized in three assault groups, the Taliban managed to get through the defense perimeter of the base. «They were well equipped and trained, dressing USA Army uniforms and armed with automatic rifles, grenade-launchers and explosive jackets», continued the ISAF in his communique. This mission assured that during the assault, the international troops killed 14 insurgents and hurt other one, who is arrested.

The British correspondents in Afghanistan assured that Camp Bastion has an excellent visibility from all parts and is extremely strengthened. The defense correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, who has been for more than twelve times in Camp Bastion, wrote on Sunday, the 14th: «In spite of being in the center of the most dangerous province of Afghanistan, I always felt completely sure, undoubtedly, from an assault of the Taliban. And honestly I believed that there were more possibilities of dying knocked down by a military vehicle that murdered by insurgents». The Coalition’s forces, make clear the correspondents, ask themselves how the Taliban were capable of giving this surprise attack to a strengthened and isolated complex barrack. And a spokesman, Adam Wojack, said that the Friday assault «was a sign for the Coalition that it is necessary to give much attention to the popular, local and international state of mind about Afghanistan».

On Monday, the 10th of September Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman insurgent, declared to Reuters that the Taliban were trying to use all their resources to kill the prince Henry (also called «Harry the Nude», his name of war), third in the succession line to the British throne. After the facts, another Taliban spokesman underlined that they attacked in «revenge» for the American amateur movie which offends Mohammed. And that they choose to commit an attack against Camp Bastion, because the prince Harry was there, acting as co-pilot gunner in the Joint Air Group.

 

And other one of an unsuccessful army …

On Sunday, the 18th of December, 2016, the franchise of the Islamic State in the Republic of Yemen realized an assault against the barracks of the so called National Security in al-Saulaba. That is placed 20 km at north of the coastal city of Aden, at the south of the country and that is now his nominal capital. One first showy characteristic of these suicidal assaults of the EI is that from August of this year, three assaults have been realized against the same barracks. Whose commands obstinatly mantain an ineffective and deficient «combative readiness» of the forces of the garrison, to keep their security.

In the last assault, the most lethal, died 50 soldiers of the Army of Yemen, loyalist to the president Abdo Rabu Mansur Hade. Hundreds of soldiers were still in the exterior of the barracks, waiting to receive the permission to enter and to receive their pays. One thousand soldiers had acceded already in the military facilities. But the access was limited to avoid agglomerations in the courts and facilities. Then, sunni terrorist slipped between the soldiers who were waiting out. And detonated his explosives jacket. Possibly liberating the so called “detonator of the dead man”.

The security is one of so called “principles of the war». That define «what to do» to obtain militarily our aims. And though it does not appear in all the existing lists of principles, specially in the shorter ones, the security is here to remain. And of its not observance, the efficiency and the power of other accepted principles will get reduced or disabled in their application. Since the principles constitute a global, harmonic and synergic set of the procedures of the to do well, for a military operational system.

EPILOG.

The combination of the usual defense and the mobile proactive defense exercises a synergic and convergent effect, of perfection and securement of the security zone. To detect and reject the tactical surprises of the enemy and to alert the own forces of his appearance from behind horizon. And to blur him the tracing of our defense zone. Thanks to the combat and observation advanced positions and the actions from them and of the patrols and advanced detachments. That would allow the enemy to glimpse and estimate where there would be the «defense positions» in the rejection zone and where the heavy fires of the defense would preferably go, in front of the forward limit of the mentioned zone.

The Defense of the Societies against the armed Attackers

Almost by definition, the military and police available means in an internal war against the armed attackers are very scanty. And, even, they can be scandalously insufficient. And this does not depend so much of the security forces, not of the established authorities, but it is a direct function of the inherent strategy to a correct terrorist process. The number of possible, potential aims, which offers an organized modern society, more or less developed, to the solvent operational strategy of an armed insurgency is almost countless and inexhaustible.

The targets of the sociopaths sworn-in in the rearguard civil areas.

Attacks to civil and religious authorities and to isolated members or little groups of the armed forces and policemen. Acciones coactivas y punitivas contra los colaboradores y espías de aquéllas. Coercive and punitive actions against the collaborators and spies of those.

Imagen relacionada URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN KIEV.

Destruction and sabotage of the plants and energetic networks: thermal plants, dams, combined cycle plants, wind fields, refineries, fuels deposits, crude oil, petroleum products and gas pipelines, electric transformers and high tension lines and their centers of control and distribution.

Assaults to the lines of communications: television and mobile telephony repeaters, broadcasting stations, radio antennas, telegraphic wires, bridges, tunnels and viaducts, halts and railway stations, railroad tracks and catenary parts, trains and buses, great tonnage trucks and distribution transport vehicles, temporary obstacles in the roads and railway tracks, covered or not by rebels indirect or direct fire.

Destruction or incapacitation of directly economic means of all sizes and importance: mines, plantations, industries, shops, hotels and resorts, groups of tourists. In these cases the insurgency must value the direct loss of working places and the probable alienation of part of the popular sympathy towards it. The effect is similar if there gets depressed the economic activity, but the employment is not destroyed directly.

Direct assaults against the population for, demonstrating the vulnerability and the defenselessness of all, to spread the irrational fear in the social attacked target, affecting his political and religious decisions. Generally, they will use explosives and the fire of automatic weapon, in infinites «mixes» or combinations in the practice, attacking places of great human concentrations. Where the aims are the human spread set and where it is not necessary to lose action time selecting them.

Resultado de imagen de Vigilancia policial militar POLICE PROTECTION OF THE DUOMO PIACE, MILAN. ¿WHICH IS THEIR «TARGET»?

Assaults against churches, mosques and synagogues in celebrations periods. Attacks to the peregrinations of the enemy religions and to their rest centers in them and of worship. Assaults in the parks, avenues, great streets and concentrations during the leisure, the holidays and social celebrations of all kinds. Assaults to the malls, markets and commercial department stores; the theatres, cinemas and auditoriums; the bus and railroad stations, the civil airports and the means of transport; the principal school centers and the offices of the public administrations.

This way, the terrorist attackers exert with his possible and remote presence, which must be always active, an effect of generalized grieveness in the modern societies. Whose members devote themselves to the production and purchase and sale of goods and services. And do not understand well what threatens and happens to them. An invasive action happens in the societies, working as an invisible and subtle gas, that has corrosive and pernicious properties. That penetrates and reaches everything. Demolishing slowly the defensive foundations of a civilized society, not trained for her defense.

The vigilant action of the policemen and military men.

The security agents, who guard here numerous «critical points», «sensitive areas», «strategic zones» before the observation of the present or pedrestrian public, exercise a deterrent, passive function and action. They try to avoid directly that the sociopaths attackers operate in them. And their active task is to look at short and medium ranges, the particularities, behaviours and characteristics that certain persons exhibit. That determine them as «suspects» and whose identification is immediately communicated to the companions in the area. And that allow them to center in them and in the follow-up of their immediate activities.

Resultado de imagen de turkish people TURKISH WOMEN. ¿EUROPEAN OR ARABS?

But, the «appearances» can remove of the objective reality. The Arabic features of a person, for example, will attract nowadays the interest of the security agents. Though the Arabs do not get a third of the Muslims of the world. And though the frantic rash of al-Shabab and Boko Haram are blacks. This way, the Turks, almost 85 million Muslims of sunni faith, that of the armed assassins, are more caucasian, as the Europeans. And they would easily passed as them. The Turks always insist before the foreigners, in emphasizing that they are not Arabic: of skin soft ocher/sallow colour  and thick lipers.

The alienated Attackers.

To overcome the men natural repugnances to commit an outrage against others people, it is necessary to temporarily appease and neutralize the normal human instincts. Let’s see some motivations used for it.

A «negative» motivation is the chronic loss of the basic natural needs: sustenance, family, safety, refuge and cover, expectations and reasonable progress. It is an effective spur to induce the employment of the liberating violence to a part of the society, specially the idealistic young men. The «positive» motivation would be the economic prizes that different radical Islamic organizations give to the families of the martyrs. And these are the fallen in combat against the ufaithfuls.

Resultado de imagen de madrasasEDUCATION OR BRAINWASHING PLACES?

Following the way towards the human psychology and soul, the religious motivation is another powerful mean of conviction and rooting. The followers of the Jihad are methodically and intensely catechized. The Koranic verses related with the Jihad, are known by heart by them. The other fighters «example» surrounds them in their daily life. In the way of photos, manuscripts, testimonial videos and destiny companions. Their preachers, we refuse to call them imames, clarify their doubts and encourage them to prematurely reach the Paradise. That is destined specially to the martyrs of the Jihad. That are those who die in the way of Allah.

A «ideologist» of al-Qaeda, Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a theory of «religious» base on the «not looked hurts», related to persons. According to her, it is allowed to their militants to kill Muslims when this is inevitable. And sometimes, more than that, when it is also useful. This way, in a message where they assumed the authorship of an assault of August, 2009 in Baghdad, al-Qaeda wished a rapid recovery of the wounded sunnis and expressed her hope that the dead men should be accept by Allah also as “martyrs”.

Locating, hunting and neutralizing them…

There are practical problems in the location and neutralization of the Moslems living in our countries during their violent radicalization process. We can identify potentials jihadists with certain sureness and after a specialized and methodical work. But we cannot detain them, while do not commit an offence during their activities: to try to arm and to train them; to conspire with others in his actions; to create bands structures to commit offences; to spread the exaltation and the use of the violence as ideological weapon; the militants’ recruitment for their ideological and armed radicalization; to gather funds for the organizations with intention of committing offences; to collaborate in the movements of politicallly active and possible militants in their trips towards the interior (countries of the Southwest of Asia, the Magreb and the Sahel) or exterior (enemy western countries: the «crusaders») Jihad.

Resultado de imagen de yasser arafat SEE HIS LOOK. HE WANTS TO KISS YOU…

As for the intelligence labors, great difficulty exists in the penetration of the islamist networks by own agents or collaborators. In general, the mujahidins, the sympathizers and collaborators: usually speak Arabic; do not belong to European or Spanish Americans races; the Moslem civilians do not collaborate in the tasks of espionage and reconnaissance against the armed islamist organizations.

On the other hand, the glamorous exhibition of pairs or groups of armed military men by the streets of the cities is operationally useless. Since they do not have a definite hunting target. His mission is the ostentatious and indefinite patrolling. Seeking to calm the pedestrians parishioners with their menacing own presence.

Resultado de imagen de Abu Yahya al-Libi Abu Yahya al-Libi, DEATH BY A DRONE ATTACK.

What do we still have? The information turned into intelligence. That must be contrasted, taken part to all the authorized agencies and user groups (including foreigns), constantly updated and necessary and sufficient. Excluding the undue plethora of excessive, routine information, not elaborated as intelligence. That is a way of poisoning and boring the own commands at all levels.

When the individual has done the psychological and volitional step (the «decision»): already has broken the sufficient bonds with his vital environment; including the family. And his mind is absorbed and directed to his new “situation” and to the offered and assumed identity. This way, he is almost irrecoverable for himself, for his family, for the society.

If the individual is one more of the «disoriented», emotionally confused and not integrated people. That are mental besieged by the resentments produced by the long-suffering, or believed as such, «offenses»: it is possible to recover him, is relatively simple to do it and is enormously laborious to obtain it.

The enormous necessary work, prolonged in the time, does that it could not rehabilitate all. It is necessary to fight against the inequalities that have mentioned. To look for temporary works is more rapid. To give them an education and a labor formation is slower. But it is indispensable in the medium and long term. To separate them of the «rotten suburbs» and of the pernicious influence of environment, friends and relatives, is very complicated and long. Because the «chunks» extracted from these, have created the poor and only identity that they have. That takes them to the personal and social failure and to the frustration.

THE IDEOLOGIC AND STRATEGIC PREFERENCES OF THE JIHADISTS. 3rd PART.

(CONTINUATION)

And this is the gravity center of the fight against the solitary wolves. To preventive and isolately hunt them is very difficult, because they scarcely do not leave tracks. It is necessary to fight against the necessary instigators of their ideas (persons, companions, mass media of all kinds, trips to their foreign centers). For it, is necessary to adapt the legislations, as it has been done against the family mistreaters or the financial refined crimes, supported by the immediate communication and on line. Without harming with it the due detection and following-up by teachers, disciples, communications of all kinds and their holes.

And of this, as almost all, we have exceeded experience. In July, 1884, the liberal government of Sagasta, implanted the first Spanish law against the attacks with explosives, generally carried out by the anarchists. In her, his instigators were rightly punished; not only the material authors of the outrages, but also its inducers.

The ideologic Adaptation of the Jihad to the present times.

The Islam has to assume that the Jihad was necessary for the establishment and the defense of the believers’ primitive community. The Prophet establishing the Islamic state from the violent destruction of the jahiliyya (the existing barbarism previous to the Islam Arabic). And even the Jihad could be useful for its rapid extension through the world, according with the existing condition of culture and development of the medieval civilizations. But its historical opportunity does not exist nowadays and then it must be replaced by «another type of EFFORT in Allah’s way», the Great personal Jihad. Which concept already exists in the Sunna and that might be recaptured and proclaimed by the ulemas and the pious muftis, which are the ideologists of the real and everlasting Islam. And, certainly, those enjoy the most ample political, social and economic independence: they are respected and/or fearsome by the governments in their respective countries, and usually are those who administer the Zakat or the canonical alms.

Resultado de imagen de imam al-Shafi Islam doctor AL-SHAFII, LEADER OF ONE OF THE ISLAM’S IDEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS.

Since the emergence of 4 principal ideologic Sunnis schools, the principle of the personal reflection effort, the ichtihad, got power in the Islam. The ichtihad is going to allow the development of the Arabic culture, so much for the civil aspects (sciences, trade, literature, art), as for the enrichment of its ideology. It is the base of Islamic lawyers as al-Shafii. The ichtihad is a source of brilliancy, creativity, enrichment, progress and peace in the way of the personal and collective effort towards God (this is the nucleus and the reason of the Islam), when already the Umma has spread and multiplied enormously through the world.

Resultado de imagen de the great Jihad THE «GREAT OR INNER MOSLEM JIHAD»…

But, circa the XIth century (V century from the hégira or march to Medina), the doctors of the Law close the door to the ichtihad. The methodological Islamic approach alters: from then, it is imitating, repeating and abusing of the compendiums.

The Needs of Renovation, Commitment and Action in the Islam.

In the face of his own terrorism (war actions against general, innocent and indiscriminate targets), the Islamic world is paralyzed and do not knows what to say or do. The spokesmen and intellectual affirm that the Islam is peace and tolerance. But this is not totally true. As we know by the facts and the omissions in its disapproval and ostracism. The majority of the Muslims take away from the attacks for opportunism, to protect the Islam, worried by the increasing rejection that it suffers in Western countries. But, when do the ulemas or the muftís intervene in the polemic? Almost never…

Resultado de imagen de al-azhar university AL-AZHAR UNIVERSITY, CAIRO.

Never was carried out inside the Islam a deep reflection on the political and religious opportunity of the violence. Does someone know Islamic active pacifists? It is not the case that the intellectual laymen Moslem react. These are not operative in the way that we know in the West, since for a good Muslim the politics, the society and the religion form the only, exclusive and inseparable Trinity established by Allah. Besides, the social and political failure of the intellectual laymen Arabs remains tied with that of the nationalistic, leftist and Europeanized elite, that stimulated the independence of the different Arabic nations after the World War II. And that created lay, «socialist» regimes rested on the clientism and the internal repression and separated by his ideology and interests from his respective Moslem societies.

Resultado de imagen de al-azhar university AL-AZHAR’S RECTOR WITH TAWADROS II, THE 112th COPTIC PATRIARCH…

Some actions by the spiritual chiefs of the Islam are attainable and they would be estimated by all. The ulemas might declare that the interests of the Islam and of the Umma have Spain and the rest of Europa as good friends, as part of Dar el-Ahd. That are the countries where the Umma does not dominate politically, but that is in peace with his inhabitants and can realize his actions and rites. The ulemas might use the institution of the takfir against the most recalcitrant, dangerous and criminal terrorists. Those who act turned aside perversely (maliciously or after being reproached by those without results) In name of the Islam. And they have not done it historically for the paralysing fear to falling down in a destructive and solvent spiral of mutual and multiple reproaches within the Umma. Let’s remember that the monolithic religious unit does not exist in the Islam. In which the people, in addition, has free access to his «submission to Allah», with only reciting the Profession of Faith. That would be equivalent, in certain form and measure, to the Christian baptism.

THE END.

THE IDEOLOGIC AND STRATEGIC PREFERENCES OF THE JIHADISTS. 2ND. PART.

(continuation)

4) The Islamic terrorists are in many places deeply divided ideologically, institutionally and strategically. Though the rivals bands could occasionally offer between them support, refuge, information or supplies. The real reasons are that the chiefs of principal bands want to be always «emirs or sheikhs and interpreters of the Islam” in his place, his region, his province… The Gaza strip is dominated for years by Hamas, a radical fundamentalist Palestinian sunni group, in direct and violent rivalry with the Palestinian government of al-Fatah in the West Bank of the Jordan. In Gaza, two branches of al-Qaeda organizations, Ansar al-Sunna and Ansar al-Islam, both derisory groups, also violently face Hamas for increasing their influence on the inhabitants. The Pakistani Taliban, principally the group Tehkrit e-Taliban Pakistan and the independenct Cachemirs, realize from time to time attempts against the shii minority of the country. In Iraq, the ISIS uses to attack the shiis that come in peregrination from the country and Iran to the annual acts of this religion in his sacred places of Samarra, Nayaf and Kherbala. And the discrepancies and, still, the offenses between both branches of the Islam, have made come again the violent conflicts in Iraq. Where, already in 1919, Arnold Wilson, the civil British administrator in Baghdad, was declaring that «the union of the mentioned ex-Turkish provinces (Baghdad, Basora and Mosul) to form a nation, was a recipe for the disaster. Because it was implying that it would bind three ethnic-religious very different groups to work together, being known well that they mutually hate”.

Resultado de imagen de arnold wilson SIR ARNOLD WILSON.

5) And the Delirium Tremens of their ideological action. Some of the craziest Islamic guerrillas were the Algerians in the 90s. Without not being at least studious of the Islam and with very earthly interests, they were excommunicated (of the Umma) some groups to others. The takfir or anathema stems from kfur or ungodliness. This directly relates to the religious and moral chaos or jahiliyya, previous to the Islam in Arabia. For it, is declared impious someone who is or tries to be a Muslim. And is exiled, at least morally, of the Umma.

Resultado de imagen de GIA Algerian terrorists THE 7 BENEDICTINE MONKS BEHEADED BY ALGERIAN ISLAMIST TERRORISTS.

6) They have a great operational decentralization. They obtain this partly by the universality of the Umma. That comes out and overcomes the idea of nation or race. And gives them the «assabiya» or personal identity and groupal belonging, by means of a totalizator religion. But that also prevents them from obtaining strategic consistent aims. Though his punctual actions are important, odious, painful, fearsome. And they are so by the brutality, the abandonment, the mutilation and the blood effusion that their victims suffer. That assume and are afraid for all the persons that feel threatened (the impact is subjective). And not by the scantiest probability that exists of suffering them. This is pure terrorism for its intentions, means and implications.

His irregular effective and transcendent action might begin with mobile actions of general harassment in the enemy rear, using the bands sufficiently establised in a territory. Seeking for the wear and demoralization of the enemy forces, his whole dispersion looking for protection and to paralyze them in the more or less static defense of the threatened territory.

7) The strategic communications of the bands are precarious or absent, insufficient, careless and vulnerable within the jihadists groups. And everything is due to his constitution in spread, confused and diffuse networks, that characterizes them. And it is not a question of the messages or alerts, that always can be sent and received, with only tactical transcendency. And it is not a consequence of the alternation of the deployments and concentrations in the military actions.

Those communications are: With the bases, for his rest, refuge, reorganization, indoctrination, information, logistic support and the indispensable protection against the sterile and exhausting «wandering». With the related or associate bands, for the general support, the information and his operational concentration for the different tasks. With the people, for his rest, temporary refuge, support and different means, information and the ideological religious action, to facilitate the later necessary territorial and human extension.

8) One of his strategic aims is to strike any government, of any origin and society, so as which the «possible aims» are attainable to them. Since the expansionist and aggressive Caliphate of dar el-Islam of the beginnings of the sunni Caliphate, does not exist today and they can not integrate in it for its “defense”.

9) They have a deep-rooted, sharpened and consistent zeal to do advertising of his successful actions. With that the West collaborates insensitively and liking of extending and defending the free information. Achieving with all this the magnificence and exaltation of a painful and unconnected results. That offer to them a social and religious protagonism very superior to the operational transcendency of them. This is not any more than the extension of the terror and his political and ideological consequences. By means of the «waves of commotion» that transmit without filter our modern communications to all the peoples, specially to us the Europeans.

Resultado de imagen de jihad propaganda THE JIHAD PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE…

10) But, all the positions and the psychological and ideological attitudes are also objectives to defend and to conquer by West, in this low intensity warfare for the expanse of a radical, out-of-date, exclusive and imposed dominion.

Than all this can be got is demonstrated by the actual precariousness and going back of the ISSI.

Resultado de imagen de ISIS IS MOVING BACK PENTAGON IS FORCING ISIS TO MOVE BACK IN SYRIA…

In Irak, its militar and social situation is of clear moving back up to Mosul. Wich is very difficult to liberate. Because it will be an urban fighting against a prepared, fortified and in deep defense manned by motivated and decided irregular fighters.

Resultado de imagen de ISIS IS MOVING BACK BOMBERS’ ATTACKS OVER ISIS POSITIONS.

Keeping a similar strategy in Syria and Iraq by the ISSI for the creation of his radical salifist independent caliphate has several important mistakes. One is to simultaneously fight in two countries with different strategic approaching. Other is to divide their meagres really trained operational forces in two fronts. In Syria, the valid strategic for the heterogeneous, multiple and divided opposition to al-Assad, is to support, at least, the unit in the military strategy. This way, all the military efforts could converge in different, simultaneous or successive, objectives, that decides a military high command, respected by all the present and active groups in Syria. Already we have seen how al-Assad amounts means and efforts to his cause. These are the trained “militias” of Hezbola; the Brigades al-Quds (Jerusalem) of the Republican Guard (Pasdaran) of Iran, under the command of the general Qassem Suleimani; the Russian Naval and Air Forces and her ground units of defense the installations; armament, equipments and ammunitions reinstatement; political diplomatic support from Iraq, Iran and Russia. This is allowing him to beat in diverse combats the opposition groups and to expel them from positions that were occupying, some during enough time. Not observance of this strategy, of pure survival, would lead the opposition to his progressive destruction by the SNA.

Resultado de imagen DIVISION GENERAL QASSEM SULEIMANI.

The «solitary wolves» and the freedom of unlimited expression in West.

The solitary wolves suicidal terrorists arise for the conjunction of several deficiencies, miseries and human ideologies. Almost all they are young persons full of idealism (sacrifice for his familiar and social group and searching of a promising future) and of vital interests, which are in full boiling of fulfillments. His social and cultural situation is usually deficient and vague. They suffer a real and/or praised by the imagination marginalization. Almost all of us, position to it, can use a heap of insufficiencies or personal and collective, psychological and material, not solve lacks. And, since the others do not solve us, to say that we are excluded from the society, is a cozy flight from the reality. And an intimate and real doubting of our own capacities (this, they will never accept it), to blame the others for our misfortunes.

In addition, the search for the lacks would always lead us to be bogged down in yearning and obtaining the omnipresent and inextinguishable «desires». And this «negative search» can prevent us from to do the utmost in going out forward, having attainable and progressive goals, to interiorly and externally develop as persons and to estimate the “neighbors” with loyalty and confidence. With what we will overcome those «lacks», with the orientation, the intention and the effort that we give to our ideas and accomplishments.

Resultado de imagen de solitary terrorists A KNOWN BRITISH INSTIGATOR OF THE LONE ATTACKS

In that germinal and manure land can easily sow the slanted ideas of a religious attainable, vindictive interpretation, that offers a purpose and a Mission in the life. And that rewards his «mujahidins» fallen in combat, specially the martyrs or witnesses, with a sensitive, clear, sure, showy (this quality of pure vanity is very attractive) and comfortable (it is not necessary to dedicate to it a life of effort, selflessness and renunciation) prize. The jihadists organizations usually facilitate substantial prizes to the families of his «martyrs». With what these also have insured the relative well-being of their most direct family in enough time. The result is that the «losers», «rooted out», «offended», «without empathy towards the neighbor», do not find it hard to take the decision to turn into a martyr of the Jihad. And the case is that the spreading, the explanation and the impregnation, which Lorenz would say, of those poisonous and addictive ideas, are realized with the major facility in our modern societies.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE IDEOLOGIC AND STRATEGIC PREFERENCES OF THE JIHADISTS.

The radical fundamentalist Islamic insurgents or jihadistas devoted themselves between the 60s and 80s to attack those that they were qualifying as corrupt and false or socialist or westernized and liberal «Moslem governments». Their fortune was small for all their commited effort. On one hand, the retreat of the Soviets of Afghanistan. But, possessing the logistic western support and the indispensable military action of pashtuns groups and other Afghans etnias, commanded by the regional «lords of the war». That is to say, the out-standing and charismatic maliks of the clans and regional tribes. Between them the most famous was Ahmad Sah Masud, the Lion of the valley of the Panjshir. And, for other one, they got the capture of the power in Sudan, inspired by al-Turabi, a «spider captain», having managed to get strong in its Army. This is still the only case in the sunni world. The propaganda was not appearing between his priorities and the informative fingerprint that they left in the western world was wretched. Few found out that they existed and of those are more less who remember their wanderings of then. From the 90, the jihadist aim turns against the unfaithful West. Considering the Great Satan personified in the United States of North America and his democratic western coreligionists, as the first agitators and corrupters of the Islamic peoples.

The Jihad allowed the rapid spread of the Islam.

The Jihad, expressed in the precise concept that we all understand, is not gathered in the Koran. Nevertheless, though there appear in the Koran approximately 8 «pacifists» verses, exist near 100 aleyas or verses which encourages the Muslims to the defense of the community or Umma, to the fight against the unfaithful people and to the armed spread of the Islam. Established the main lines, rapidly the political chiefs of the Umma, including the Prophet, threw hand of the instrument that so clearly was offering them and that they needed in a “struggle of life or death”.

At the beginning of the Islam, when was reigning the “jahiliyya” (definition of the barbarism previous to it) in the Arabs, the Jihad was indispensable and inevitable for the defense of the new religion. That was arising in the middle of a “stormy sea” of pagan and idolatrous and more or less nomadic tribes and clans, which were populating Arabia. It had not even begun the first expansion of the Islam to the whole Arabic world, and the Muslims groups could be easily eliminated by their enemies. And any radical change, even only new, finds always an initial rejection. Which originates in the conservative «ideological and tradition inertia», which always exists in the society where it appears.

Resultado de imagen de THE FOUR RASHIDUN THE 4 RIGHTLY GUIDED (BY ALLAH) CALIPHS (THE RASHIDUN)…

Three were the reasons that stimulated the Arabic tribes to starting a way of conquest of the wide and distant peoples and lands, strangers to the Arabic Peninsula. The first one was the religious reason. As in any religious primitive community, the Umma was the center of the Allah’s mandates and benedictions. And so, being lived collectivly and keenly, the fulfillment of a monotheistic and simple doctrine. This religion was demanding, in addition, an active and coercive, constant and expansive proselytism, directed to the unfaithful persons and the frontier hostiles. The obligation of the Jihad was similar to other “five basic rules or pillars of the Islam”. The Koran given to Mohammed in the birth of the Islam, has numerous verses or aleyas that demand the armed fight to the faithfuls ones.

Resultado de imagen de muslim conquest in the middle ages

In the side of the mundane interests, the extension of the Arabic conquests, in his uncontrollable advance during more than one century, brought the control over the goods and households of the new and numerous subjects and the political and military power on them. The Moslem domain was established by the presence of a governor with his military garrison, in every conquered important city or region. The relation of the new subjects with the Islamic regime was establishing and regulating by the payment to the governor of the periodic taxes. Owed to the imposed subjection and for practising, by the moment, a different religion. This flow of important and constant money began to come to the conquerors, who established diverse intelligent enough mechanisms for his distribution. The third reason, attainable to the nobles, chiefs and more out-standing Muslims, was the distribution of the quotas of power.That were generating the domain, the defense and the governance of the new territories of al-Islam. That are the lands of the domain of the Islam, the lands given by Allah to his faithfuls, the lands that they must keep or recover, if they are temporarily snatched. This way, the emirs, sheikhs and caids were proliferating, occupying and shaping the political Arabic structure of the islamized territories.

Resultado de imagen de muslim conquest in the middle ages VISIGOTHIC SPAIN WAS CONQUERED IN A FEW YEARS, BY FEW MEN AND WITHOUT MARTYRS… PROBABLY WITH THE HELP OF THE POWERFUL HISPANIC ARRIANS…

The Arabic original tribes of the Islam were receiving a part of the taxes and of the plunders of the conquest, though they were not taking part in any military expeditions. Another part was given to the participants in the Jihad against some bordering people or region with the caliphate. An important part belonged to the authorities of the Umma, centred on the caliphate of Damascus or of Baghdad, and regionally represented by his emirs or caides, to support the expenses of the governing and the maintenance of the theocratic State. From the later was stemming a part destined to pay, equip and forming up the new Jihads, towards the frontier territories of dar al-Islam, that were appearing. Finally, there was the Zakat or the canonical alms, given to the ulemas and muftis. That had as purpose to solve and compensate the Muslims for the punishment and the randoms of the life, with the contribution of their community. And that was distributed to the poor, the disabled and the patients, the orphans and the widows of the Umma. This was closing the process of distribution of the wealth and the power. That was mundanely welding and assuring the religious aspirations of the believers of the new faith.

Strategic contradictions of the jihadists in the irregular war.

The principal characteristics of the irregular war are his prolongation in time, consequence of his low military intensity, and that is civil and political. What imply a great social tear and inevitable acts of great cruelty. By the «ascent to the extremes» of the war, which Clausewitz was saying, without the safeguards of the laws and accepted customs, that get lost in this «born within itself chaos».

To reach the power or his strategic aims, the guerrilla has three aims in his total strategy: the military annihilation of the enemy, who can be simply appearing his disability to solve the problem of the bands in an acceptable time for the popular enemy rear; the destruction of the military and economic infrastructure that supports it and the capture of the people or of his religious, ethnic and/or social base to his ideas. In this dialectics of wills, ideologies and efforts the strategic aspects of the irregular bands of any ideology are three: the guerrilla bases, his forces correlation with the regular enemy and the communications in general.

The deficiencies and miseries of the jihadists, in relation with the strategy and the operative strategy are:

1) The jihadists have failed in actively and firmly joining to a social large group, which gives cover and permanent impulse to their «imperialistic social religious movement». The most mentally ill activists are slowly isolating themselves (at least, emotional and ideologically) of the society in which «they live». And they do it in altars of his violent methods, to which they sacrifice everything for obtaining the efficiency in the action. They continue to be prepared a process of segregation, purification (in his unexpected not orthodox rites fast, use water from sacred places and green, yellow or black banderoles with inscriptions of the aleyas that favor them), consecration and radicalization. This «catechizing of the violence» allows them to mentally come to the glorious and in peace death, and, even to the suicide, in the accomplishment of his punctual actions.

 2) The jihadists groups act with an unnecessary and indiscriminate brutality, which discredits them before his religion and unquestionably separates them of the pure Muslims and, still, of the normal ones. Let’s see some aleyas or verses from the Koran:

Sura (chapter), 4 aleya 33 «… Oh, believers … do not kill yourself (do not kill between you, is another description) …».

2, 10 » When it is said to them: do not commit disorders (voice that defined the crimes) in the Earth, they answer: Far from it, we introduce in it the good order (the Good)».

2, 11 «Alas!, they commit disorders, but they do not understand it».

28, 77 «As Allah makes the Good, also make you the good and do not foment the corruption (the Evil)» (murder of innocent and of peoples that receive you -the lands of dar-el-Ahd-, drunkenness, drugs, unnecessary damages of the things).

They despise and not comply with these moral aleyas, without Allah had changed them for they. Sura 2, aleya 100 «We do not abrogate any verse of this Book, nor we will make erase any one of your memory, without replacing it by other one equal or better».

3) The absolute absence of venerable and pious ulemas and muftis in their side.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

 

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIST TERRORISTS. 2nd. PART.

(CONTINUATION)

 

In France more than 4,5 million Muslims are settled, specially of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian origin. The European metropolis practised an «asymmetric multiculturalism», to first accept in his society and to next integrate, their emigrants. But, they cannot direct and regulate the social movements with the compass and the set square. The social emigrant groups were established in the periphery of the cities of reception. Where the habitability was cheaper. Neighborhoods, districts or distributions were formed, principally lived by clustered groups of these foreign cultures. That were serving for his support and protection and also for his isolation and compartment. The prime minister Valls declared that in France exist more of 450 of these not integrated and «isolated suburbs». Using a more wide and lax name, the country possesses around 750 Urban Sensitive Zones.

The personal evolution.

The first generation of emigrants and part of the second one was formed by docile, laborious and long-suffering individuals. That obtained the respect of his French neighbors (each time they were less) and a relative prosperity. They lukewarmly practised the Islam, overwhelmed as they were in the zeals of this world. And for his distance to Dar-al-Islam, the lands of political domain of his religion. They were wishing and tried for their descendants, a future without so many difficulties and penuries as they had his lives.

But the descendants received the worse of both separated civilizations, to form his «personal identity». On one hand, they received «from birth» the belonging to a minority culture and little known in the country, the Islam. So, his «exhibition» between his different neighbors, was not attractive, not honourable. Which was a source of personnel and colective frustration, sorrow and revenge (relative).

Of the hostess culture, essentially European and western, they received a lay culture, when it was not laicist. That minusvalued the religion and claimed for its private practise. When all the religions, and more the Islam, have a social principal component. Enclosed in the mosques, pantheons and sacristies, the religions suffocate and die. Neither they were educated in the virtues of the Western Civilization: Valuation of the different duties to carry out, as necessary, vital and social counterpart of the several rights to receiving. Appreciation of the sobriety, the effort, the saving, the commitment, the delay of the reward, the study or the formation, the possible frustration and the work, as necessary factors and parameters for the progressive and just attainment of the human personal and collective aims. Definitively, to form them in the affability, the social communication and the resilience, to be able to overcome the successive vicissitudes of the life.

And a great majority lacked solid, profitable and identity beliefs and virtues. That significantly were helping them, from his mixed origin, to create his necessary, personal, satisfactory and respected identity.

It might think that the insufficiency of this «social contribution» in the formation of the individual identity, does not justify the appearance of a asocial or sickly conduct in them. But we do not try to say it. We are exposing different facets of the phenomenon, bringing over the pieces to compose this psychological puzzle, trying to form a matrix with the different factors that meet. To express a «multicolored panorama», which allows us to gather in it the parameters of the situation. The failure of the social humus, of the original substratum of the individual will amplify his lacks and failures. And it will not contribute base and wealth for the creation of his resilience (development and overcoming of the adversities, going out experienced and strengthened) and of his reference parameters for his personal and social balance.

The disperse and partitioned French agencies of intelligence, in spite of the only antiterrorist command, calculate that in the country are around 8250 potentials mujahidins. That principally settle in the zone of Paris, the Provence, the Alps and the Côte d’Azur (centred on Marseilles and Nice). But, given the mass of existing believers, I calculate that his number would not go down the 20 to 25 thousand persons.

In a social group, the individuals capable of violently acting, without that a disturbing emotion affects them in his efficiency, are less than 4 %. And this does not want to say that all the so «endowed», should be going to exercise in his life the violence against his neighbor. In the Moslem French group would be more than 150 thousand persons, of whom 30-40 % would have the suitable age to realize this activity.

The politicallly active Islam, of salafist jihadist ideology, offers to these social «disoriented» an exit, a Moslem identity, the incorporation to a simple religion practised in community (the Umma). And gives them a mission and an intention: the Jihad. And makes them «oversized persons», but only before themselves, who believe it. In exchange for the suicide or the prison, it offers them the wished identity. That they never well developed. The identity that we could not help to give them, being members of our centenary nations.

The conversion in suicidal or not «attacker», demonstrates and confirms when the individual looks for his separation of the «unfaithful persons» and his ideology is focused in the radical branches of the Islam and in the Yihad. Some specialists astonish that the transubstantiation of the person in a madman carries out rapidly. Without need that his companions collaborate in the process, not that it is long in the time. Let’s remember the famous cases of «brain washing» against religious and politicians dissident, that needs some time. But, the mutation in «furious violent» of the 17-year-old Muslim Afghan refugee in Germany and received by Würzburg’s family, a small city of Bavaria, was cuasi instantaneous. The young person received the news of the violent death of a friend in Afghanistan. And it reacted arming itself with an axe and a knife and attacking the passengers of a regional train in the proximities of his city, on Monday, the 18th of last July. There ensued three serious and a slight injured men and the aggressor was brought down. What is true is that this young man already had forged his potential destination, for his mental lability, the lack of social virtues, included the distance from the “Islam of the People”, and his uprooting. And the death of the friend was only the «OK, forward». Because Nature does not do jumps in the emptiness.

The Degradation of the Violence in the Societies.

The vulgarization of the violence against the others is a recurrent phenomenon in the different civilizations and epochs. Not in vain the Roman adage says that «the man is a wolf for the man». Leaving apart the cases of social excluded and chased persons, the developed modern societies are disturbed by a widespread neurosis. That becomes established and produces in the personal neurosises. This affection does not turn us violent directly. But it makes us unstable and more inclined to yield before the external and internal tensions. The neurosis attacks ours resilience: for survive and keeping going.

And a way of escape before these «psychological traps» that we suffer, is the violence exercised against that we think culprits of our perceived “evils». That sometimes is the whole vicinity. And the range of possible forcing acts has an extensive gradation. But, these «chests of distress» suffered, are solved overcoming them, not keeping a malignant cycle of action and reaction.

The depraved and sinister character of the islamist terrorism.

This phenomenon has some specific results of death, desolation and helplessness. Totally different, in extent and power, with that an assassin in serie can produce. And that spread, from the terrorist «area of action», forming concentric commotion waves, over the whole attacked society. It is not a question only of the killer deliriums of some misdirected illuminated. It is not a thing of the failures of the multicultural society in joining a nation of races, which are united by the national virtues of the democracy and the freedom. They are not produced «per se» by the «exterior assaults» that the yihadistas promote and claim; when they realize that his social political structure is that of a persecuted, unsuccessful (and degraded) caliphate .

This is a concrete and clear manifestation of the «mysterium iniquitatis» in the History. That, as such, is not in the habit of appearing. Since his disgusting nature can, in these singular cases, be caught and understood by many persons. It is not the temptation of a «temporary illusory good» for the jihadists. It is the appearance, without veils, of the Evil in the World.

Some Solutions through the time.

The fight against the islamist terrorists has different fields of activity. Because his manifestation is multiple and synergic. And this way of integrated and effective, must be the varied answers.

The Destruction of the islamist Bases.

Their bases are the geographical locations indefinitely controlled by the salafists jihadists. They physically bond on the bases, to reform, to consolidate, to train and to increase their forces. From them, operating as his principally «departure base», they throw incursions and assaults with limited aim on his enemy. Seeking to scourge or to expel him from the immediate territory that occupies. The creation of these permanent jihadists cores depends on the measure in which the military enemy is defeated and expelled from them, with consistency and duration. From the bases are carried out the reception of sympathizers and militants of the revolutionary group. Which is scarcely effected between the settlers, but, in his most, they come already motivated and decided from outside. And this is so, though a part of their effort in the action and propaganda area is realized producing videoes, interviews, gazettes and papers for audio-visual wireless varied means: the edition, production and emission is located in the bases. In their bases, the social politics salafist action is so intense or more than the formation and the military training of «mujahidines of Allah «. She is necessary to establish and assure the motivation and the loyalty of the soldiers to the jihadist cause in the hostile environment that surrounds and harasses them

The bases are social military forms with «regular structure» of the jihadists. They present continuous and numerous aims to the action of the heavy fire means of his enemies, the aviation and the artillery. Some are «opportunity targets«, as all classes of movements of the terrorists and the discovery of new positions, and others are «hard targets«, known or reconnoitre: varied infrastructures, stores, refuges, meeting or of control and of communications centers, positions of combat, of supporting fire and of defense against aircraft, observatories, transport of goods, distilling of crude oil, etc.

And these jihadists bases are the only substantial, still and definite target that the terrorist bands offer. Where to make them feel all the superior and available power of the military fire. Where is possible to isolate them in sectors, to beat them by parts, without these could collaborate in the decided defense plan; nor to flee, if the siege of the settlement is firm. And where they might act, with another spirit and other motivations that do not offer the trainings, the peshmergas, shiies and sunnis militias and the national armies of Iraq, Lybia, Nigeria, Syria and Somalia.

The doctrinal failure of the jihadists terrorists.

The salafists jihadists groups have failed in active and firmly joining to a social large group, which gives coverage and permanent impulse to their «social religious imperialistic movement». Their «catechizing of the violence» allows them to be mental prepared for the glorious and in peace death, and, even for the suicide, in the accomplishment of their military actions. But this insane sermon is not a weapon for the conversion of social groups. And there is a fundamental reason for it: his radical «creed» lacks possibilities of acceptance, victory and permanency between the masses, out of the needs in the temporary vicissitudes of a war. The jihadists groups act with an unnecessary and indiscriminate brutality, which discredits them before the Islam, the Koran and the Sunna or Islamic tradition, gathered in the hadices or «comments and facts» Mohammed’s writings. This lack of religious legitimacy, provokes the absence of venerable, respected and pious ulemas and muftis in his side. Their supposed «Islamic original ideology» is based on a few favorable verses of the Koran (it has around 4.200) and on some historical favorable facts and not on the integrity and the intention of the message of the Islam. This social emotional separation from the local masses unfailingly does that the support of the neighbors to the terrorist groups is involuntary, not attractive, always interested and desmotivated.

The location of potentials jihadists in the lands of dar-el-Amn.

We can identify potentials jihadists with certain sureness and after a specialized and methodical work. But we cannot detain them, while do not commit an offence during their activities: to try to arm and to train them; to conspire with others in his actions; to create bands structures to commit offences; to spread the exaltation and the use of the violence as ideological weapon; militants’ recruitment for their ideological and armed radicalization; to gather funds for the organizations with intention of committing offences; to collaborate in the movements of politicallly active and possible militants in his trips towards the interior Yihad (countries of the Southwest of Asia, the Magreb and the Sahel) or exterior (enemy western countries: the «crusaders»).

As for the intelligence labors, great difficulty exists in the penetration of the islamist networks by own agents or collaborators. In general, the mujahidins, the sympathizers and collaborators: usually speak Arabic; do not belong to European or Spanish Americans races; the Moslem civilians do not collaborate in the tasks of espionage and reconnaissance against the armed islamist organizations.

On the other hand, the glamorous exhibition of pairs or groups of armed military men by the streets of the cities is operationally useless. Since they do not have a definite aim. His mission is the ostentatious and indefinite patrolling. Seeking to calm the pedestrians parishioners with their menacing presence.

What do we still have? The information turned into intelligence. That must be contrasted, taken part to all the authorized agencies and user groups (including foreigns), constantly updated and necessary and sufficient. Excluding the undue plethora of excessive, routine information, not elaborated as intelligence. That is a way of poisoning and boring the own commands at all levels.

The redemption of the jihadists and of the activists and frustrated individuals.

When the individual has done the psychological and volitional step (the «decision»): already has broken the sufficient bonds with his vital environment; including the family. And his mind is absorbed and directed to his new “situation” and to the offered and assumed identity. This way, it is almost irrecoverable for him, for his family, for the society.

If the individual is one more of the «disoriented», emotionally confused and not integrated. That are mental besieged by the resentments produced by the long-suffering or believed as such «offenses»: it is possible to recover him, is relatively simple to do it and is enormously laborious to obtain it.

The enormous necessary work, prolonged in the time, does that it could not rehabilitate all. It is necessary to fight against the inequalities that have mentioned. To look for temporary works is more rapid. To give them an education and a labor formation is slower. But it is indispensable in the medium and long term. To separate them of the «rotten suburbs» and of the pernicious influence of environment, friends and relatives, is very complicated and long. Because the «chunks» extracted from these, have created the poor and only identity that they have. That takes them to the personal and social failure and to the frustration.

The Community integrated by his upright members.

And now comes the result that they join the nation. Nowadays, ethnic group is not synonymous of nation. Many nations of the Earth are really «crucibles of races». They are the United States of North America, the Spanish-American nations, the great African nations… Where coexist in sufficient peace and harmony different races and cultures. That are shaped by not exclusive beliefs and by the virtues and national values.

A nation is a society of individuals, provided with social politic selfconsciosness. Collaborate to creating and support it the history, the tradition and the customs, and the language and the own moral sense. And secondly contribute to it the ethnias and the own territory, that not always exist, specially the first ones. This way, the territory of a country is not a nation. And it is not even the inarticulate population of a territory, under an only government.

When the nation is loved by his components and exists in them the desire to serve and to defend her in community, the concept of the motherland appears. That is the motherland that we love and defend. Both ideas are essentially interrelated. And, the absence of the patriotism or the shame for practise it, by members of a «social community«, leads to the defenselessness and the dismemberment of their nation, in major or minor degree, forming «groups of associate individuals».

This way, it is not surprising that are the Defense Forces of a nation, as institutions and in his members, which wave, teach and practise the patriotism as one of his essential virtues. The Defense Forces of a nation are the specialized set of the «natives or patriots» for the belligerent and complete Defense of his «country nation».

THE END.

THE WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. Second Part.

(CONTINUATION)

 

Operational Characteristics of the Attacks with Elite Ground Forces.

Units and small units that attack with limited aims (a deep incursion, the temporal capture of a critical position, an ambush) constitute a military closed «system». This condition imposes specific characteristics on the “interfaces of action” with the enemy, which are sometimes different to those of great units, especially in the theme of available means and the time of action.

Attacks with limited aims have been operationally used along large fronts. Where the enemy’s defense lacked depth and enough reserves and was looking to minimize own wear and make use of the multiplier effect of the set’s efforts. This occurred with notable success when the forces of the 9th German infantry Army of General Model sought to reform and consolidate its fronts in the Sychevka’s southwest zone between January and April of 1942.

The definitive characteristic of his use, adapted in these tasks, is that is used with criterion unity, by a kept and «concentric» in the result of his impulses “operational gravity center”. So that the limited efforts do not vanish in reconnaissance in force actions, in not suitable or out of opportunity sectors. It is to say, usiing unduly.

The field of action is the secret for applying freedom of action. By extending or decreasing the field of action, or by changing the field of action on the enemy, one can keep or recover the necessary freedom of action to act favorably and not simply reacting to the enemy.

«Field of action» is any «spatial-temporary-circumstantial» situation that allows for the suitable employment of an Army’s means and capacities in accordance or as part of that army’s intention. The field of action is formed by one or several «interfaces of action«, which are the very small sectors where direct contact occurs between the small units of action of each rival. Examples are when a deployed platoon attacks an enemy section, when a tank attacks infantry heavy weapons, when a section attacks by firing on an enemy’s strong position, when an engineering section opens a path in a minefield, etc.

The task is to find an optimal way in which, through successive «periods of action» applied in «fields or interfaces of action», one can gain the relative freedom of action to act and to carry out «quantum» or elementary units of the general intention. In addition, a general action can be divided into numerous partial actions to achieve in stages, momentary or minor «periods of action»; acting this way in the same «field», divided in minor interfaces of action.

Interaction in stages and situations suitable to advance one’s military means guided by the superior intention or orders is the general mechanism for applying, recovering and maintaining freedom of action in one’s favor.

A characteristic of the freedom of action is that is interactive with the enemy in the «interface of action» and is played out in fields of action that chosen by or imposed on an army. Passiveness means that freedom of action is not taken advantage of through lack of initiative. Thus, freedom of action can also have a result opposite to its intention and this can happen regardless of the type of fight engaged in, whether it is offensive or defensive.

The units had to gain combat superiority over the enemy, since obtaining a local and temporary supremacy would allow them to achieve their aims.

Essential to the mission’s conception are intelligence and simplicity. Essential to its preparation are security and training. The characteristics of the mission in action are surprise, tempo and the commitment of all the mission participants.

Simplicity allows the force to concentrate on a few related aims, using a limited number of men and means in the military closed system. If new tactics or different technologies are used, both the simplicity of the mission’s conception and the surprise of its execution will be enhanced.

On September 12, 1943, the captain of the S. S. Otto Skorzeny carried out the rescue of the Duce from his prison in the high mountain hotel Great Sasso located in the Apennines. Gliders were used to assault the position, fighting against the difficult cold draughts (these produced a delay in the arrival, as they landed at midday) and scarce sites for landing. That such a difficult assault would be attempted, higly surprised the on duty «carabinieri». The attackers took advantage of this by gaining access to the principal building while. At the same time, an acquaintance general of the «carabinieri» friendly landed with Skorzeny. Combat supremacy was rapidly achieved.

Intelligence supposes complete, up-to-date and timely knowledge of the circumstances and characteristics of the mission. Here, with so limited employing means, intelligence is facilitated by different agencies and units that intervene with the mission, even those at the level of the state. Specially the CIA, the National Security Agency or NSA, the Central Security Service or CSS, that links with the NSA, and the FBI.

Security refers principally to the stages of planning, preparation, training and, if appropriate, stage of transport or insertion. It has active and passive aspects. Giving off misleading information and concealing the force’s real intentions up until the stage of action on the objective. Each person must only know what is necessary for his actuation.

Training must be generic for actions and tactics and specific for those actions required for the mission. Independently of this, training is necessary to achieve coordinated actions among units taking part simultaneously in some part of the mission. A general rehearsal of the mission is also necessary, including its planning duration and margins for mistakes. It is also good to include some variant that represents a mistake, an unforeseen event or a loss of combat or movement capacity. And that the men train in correcting them or, at least, in neutralizing them with his effort. For example, a part of the helicopters is knocked down or lands at major distance of the foreseen in the theoretical disembarkation zone.

The final «training area» must be similar in general characteristics to the «target area». And it must be placed at safe of detections and filtrations of information (security), which onlookers and interested persons can catch. The independent variable of «time» introduces sometimes unexpected and not always welcome effects. For example, a vehicle presents problems after a number of hours of hard use, that was not foreseen in tests of «at scale» time.

Surprise supposes attacking an enemy (even if arranged in prepared defense) at a point or flank that is neglected by him at the moment, giving the attacker a favorable «interface of action» on him. It must suppose a “tactical innovation”. Though it could also contain technical differential or new elements. Examples of such “innovations” in the past are hollow load bullets or charges and flame-throwers.

The surprise is the sufficient and necessary multiplier of the combat capacity of the «small incursion force». That will allow him to compensate the scanty military resources that it has on the area. To it joins his inconsiderate and carefully applied with rapidity employment. To provoke an overwhelming effect on the enemy, achieving the temporary local superiority. As being an «isolated military system», the incursion force of will receive neither reinforcements, nor supplies. For its part, the time is not neutral, here is an enemy: because there is not more operation time. From his depletion, the unit will confront the pursuit and his annihilation…

Speed consists in firmnessly acting, ahead of the enemy, in the successive elementary «cycles of action» that define a performance or process. It also presupposes acting with opportunities and with pace (adapted speed, relative to the enemy). Remember that an action cycle includes a phase of observation, a phase of determining the situation, the decision phase and the accomplishment phase. If one’s speed is greater than that of the enemy, his actions will be in response to situations that have already just passed.

Speed also implies rapidly reaching a situation of active supremacy in combat capacity. The enemy’s reaction speed is initially very slow as he is in a stupor, trying to verify what is happening. This means his phase of determining the situation will be lengthened. Deceptive action in these moments will lengthen the time that passes and fog the determination of the situation. Ways of doing this include utilizing some of the enemy’s uniforms, equipment or language by certain parts or subunits involved in the action. Once supremacy over the enemy is attained, it must always be kept. As scanty resources make its recovery very difficult. Once supremacy in combat capacity is reached, the probability of a mission’s success increases exponentially and the vulnerabilities of one’s forces are dramatically diminished.

The commitment of men and officers and their selection qualities, lend moral and physical courage to the actions they undertake. This is necessary to overcome uncertainty, stress, mistakes, diversions, enemy actions, and to take advantage of the always fleeting opportunities. Commitment supposes full knowledge of the mission and the full, voluntary and enthusiastic support of all participants.

Execution is carried out by establishing at the level of the regiment, battalion or company a center of gravity for the common effort, which harmonizes and consolidates the «missions» of its subunits.

THE END.

THE NATO’S RAPID REACTION FORCES.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established after the suicidal assaults of al-Qaeda in New York at 11 of September of 2001, that the «asymmetrical wars or of IVth generation» (irregulars and with low level of military means used) with the participation of the USA, would be supported overseas and without formal declaration of war. And that they were also necessary, to remove from the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the “foreign fundamentalist terrorism” of any origin, religion or ideology. It justified the ill-fated post war occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with a blowing up fiscal and exterior deficits and with a democratic renewed Administration, it is necessary for the USA to save in military resources.

The Strategic National Doctrine of the Americans democrats.

The new political philosophy is to dedicate now those recovered resources «to build a nation here, at home». This way, the USA lowered qualitatively the bar of the exterior terror, putting during the first mandate of president Obama, at al-Qaeda as almost the only one immediate “not national violent enemy”. This salafist internationalist terrorist «network», without own territory, with her operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in any normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable target for his «rapid punctual incursion» forces and means. This new “strategic national doctrine” justifies the increase of the use of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (not driven planes for exploration and recognition and of bombardment), spy satellites, own or local agents placed in the hostile territory, assaults by elite operational units and by small expeditionary forces and of Marine’s amphibious assault, these transported in «command and transport ships» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of dozens of thousands of military men and with his luggage and equipment for several years in an operations theater, are rejected indefinitely by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense».

This doctrine spreads and concerns, through the NATO, the strategic aims of his allies and the assigned and specific means to reach them. The training with IT programs is an example of the new practices in military training. Instead of moving soldiers by the Boot Camps or the vehicles in the maneuvers polygons of the mechanized or motorized units, the NATO is developing new “online artifices” to instruct their military personnel. And, though it could not be the norm of formation or training, the project is illustrative that the Alliance adapts to the new times of «financial global restrictions» for the Armies. In this scene of diminishing resources and threats still slightly valued or made concrete, the Defense Secretaries of the NATO, assembled at the end of February, 2013 in Brussels, decided to adopt some voluntary remedies. «It is a question of seeing if our nations resign their responsibilities because of the budgetary restrictions or if we demonstrate creativity and innovation and develop the necessary aptitudes to confront the threats in joint form», said Leon Panetta, American Secretary of Defense.

An Allied highly mobile «task force» for urgent missions.

The NATO will create shortly time a «sui generis» rapid reaction force (30 years ago were calling her of «rapid deployment»), that will form 13.000 cavalry and mechanized infantry soldiers, reinforced with artillery and engineers. It will be destined to be deployed in zones of conflict that are sensitive for their «global interests». Forget the Congo, Yemen, Somalia or Syria, which are not or are insufficiently interesting. This «great unit» will be formed by the Armies of the allied countries, who will incorporate into her their brigade or regiment type forces in a rotating form and for a minimal period of six months in duty tours. The experts of the Organization will design a “training plan” for them, which will last until 2020, until all the suitable units for these tasks have taken part in it.

«My call to the Allied Governments is that they stop the expenditure cuts (in Defense), that use better their resources (that already assigned) and, once the economy recovers, they begin to invest (in Defense) again. If the cuts continue, they will have a negative impact in our aptitude to provide defense and protection to our population», warned the secretary general of the NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at the beginning of the mentioned meeting. The most drastic reduction in topics of Defense corresponds to Greece, which in 2011 diminished a 25 % his military expense, after having reduced it in 20 % in 2010. So, in 2012 his Defense’s budget was only 60 % of that of 2009. There are other four minor countries, which also have done substantial cuts in military systems, men and re equipments for the Defense: Slovenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Below them, though also with reductions of two digits percent, is Spain, which military expense fell 11 % in 2011, after two years of very significant reductions. In general, almost all the countries save in their Armies, included the United States, which realizes the major military expense attributed in the world (4,8% of his GDP). The Chinese items, proceeding from a collectivized and directed centralized economy, are not homogeneous or comparable to ours, because many usable chapters by the Chinese Popular Liberation Army can be included in books as expenses or investments of other Chinese departments and services. But the total falls of the resources at the level of the Alliance get damped enough, thanks to exceptions as the German, who has increased the expenses in Defense in the years of this economic world crisis.

His uses, operational limitations and abuses.

The operative employment of the rapid reaction multinational forces will be as airborne or of disembarkation «detachments», supported by the tactical aviation and the national allied warships. Their action would be over «limited goals» and placed in not extensive areas and looking for an operative projection, not only tactical. Her employment would have to be in a relatively short time, due to the limitations in her combat and logistics capacities. A joint utilization of this “division (-) of combined arms” would allow to attack only one or two hostile brigades, which were isolated from their operational rears and / or deployed in areas of difficult access («bad ongoing» ground) by land. Reciprocally, his defense capacity and «resistance» are limited. Nothing of trying to appease (they also call it «to «stabilize») something similar to a «Gaza strip». That is the wasp’s nest of an network of irregular «units» of motivated and trained terrorists. Deployed in reinforced defense positions echeloned in depth. And using an unfavorable ground (a urbanized one) for the armored and / or motorized enemies means. That would be the principal resources and capacities of combat and of movement of this » special division light » (better to use the And using an unfavorable area for the armored means (not necessarily they have to be the heaviest cars of the Allies) and / or become mobile enemies. That would be the principal resources and combat and of movement capacities this light «special division» (is better to use the English meaning, in order that he does not resemble the light infantry).

The headquarters of these multinational forces, destined to act in «located conflicts», that concern the security or the interests of the Allies, will be probably in Belgium. Some great American units, which subunits might take part in his composition by turns, are the 24ª motorized division and the Marine¡s divisions. The small elite units of the Rangers, the SEAL or the battalions and the engineers’ companies, would remain detached in tactical subordination to the brigades or regiments of the Rapid Force, realizing their specific tasks in the missions and complementing those of them. The forces of rapid reaction will be able to protect an oil installation or a port and even to help to suppress riots. But they will not be able to face an insurrection or a generalized assault against a friend country. Their detachments will be always highly vulnerable to the encircle and the harassment. Their operational possibilities only might increase qualitatively if their missions are coordinated with those of a ground army which operates in the tactical or operational surroundings.

Politically, the offensive action of the rapid reaction division forces, on having lacked rooting in the peoples of his operations zones and of continuity his military intervention, will turn out to look more brutal and arbitrary. And it will be more alike a police action than a military orthodox operation. It is sure, in addition, that the neutral or hostile governments to the West in the geostrategic regions where she acts, will reject the right that the NATO has assumed, to act as gendarmes of his “partial interests” in a zones so distant from their national territories. This way, from a hypothetical military, problematic and excessively punctual and short action, the NATO appears directly as guardians of his own «new order», in an epoch of international soft and lightened action ways. Where to use the «big stick», as convincing argument for the decision and when the politics and the diplomacy have failed in obtaining a reasonable solution, it is very frowned upon by all the delicate stomaches.

THE WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS.

The global war against the organized terrorism, proclaimed by the president Bush after September 11, 2001, has gone flat. And with it, the military strategy of attacking the many-colored islamist jihadism, always threatening, in his nests and in his infected areas. Without existed for them neither bases, nor sure refuges in the world. Seeking to suffocate this certain, threatening, watched and already long-suffering danger. And to remove it from home, from the territory of the USA. Mr. Obama qualitatively and substantially cut down in 2011, the antiterrorist aims in the exterior American politics.

The new National Strategy of the USA.

For it, the Stategic Plan establishes aims more political than military in the Islamic Central Asia. «This one has been a difficult decade for our country. (Now) we can be glad to know that the pressure of the war is yielding». Is admitted that the Americans are not capable of «leave a perfect Afghanistan». Neither the western democracy is perfect. But it is comparatively the least unjust of the political known systems. And, due regulated by the play of the public powers and the honesty of his agents, it was the one that allowed the advent of the middle, numerous, polite, laborious and progressive classes. This way, they bet for the political negotiation with the moderate Taliban, to lower the activity of the armed groups. Bringing over the possibilities of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. But the major premise fails. The moderate Taliban do not exist. This name is disgusting to the logic. Since it is a contradiction in the used terms. Like the «negative growth», of which some politicians speak to us. The Taliban apply rigorously the sharia. That are the civil laws and penal social derivatives of the literal and rigid application of the Koran and Sunna or tradition, in the profane matters. And they impose it by the force. And with a foreign yielding enemy, without firm convictions, with internal contradictions; why the Taliban are going to negotiate, having the victory already smelling them as the aromatic flowers of Allah’s garden?

Obama proclaims, with fiscal and exterior deficits running away, the need to save in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, he qualitatively lowers the strip of the exterior terror. Putting the Base (al-Qaeda) and the IS as the violent not national enemies of the USA. The salafista internationalist terrorists with his known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, operational chiefs, is a more attainable and manageable aim for the schemes, the budgets and the aspirations of the «diminishing American defense». And it stays within range of the actions: of the CIA and of the Pentagon’s flaming spies; of the not crewed airplanes (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) of reconnaissance and atack; of the military punctual actions of the elite forces of the Pentagon; of the assaults of small expeditionary forces and/or of amphibious assault of the Marines, transported in «control and/or transport warships» with his naval escort; of the penetration of the terrorist groups or, at least, the approximation, the observation and the information, by local related elements, paid by the espionage of the USA. The deployments of tens of thousands of American soldiers and their complex equipment and specific supply for several years in a theatre of operations, are indefinitely rejected by the new «doctrine». The American people infected with the adherent and complex economic crisis, with the lack of political effective control, with the costs of the wars against the terror (it speaks about 1,6 $ trillions – not thousand millions – spent till now in Iraq and Afghanistan and around $60 million per month en the deployment of Libia, without taling part in offensive actions), is tired of the exterior actions and constantly reflects it in the surveys. As in the old times, in other national crises, a country that is almost a continent, partially withdraws towards himself.

The Need of a new formal and international “Legal Setting».

The laws give juridical character and institutionalizing for what the needs, the customs and, finally, the social norms have been looking and establishing in the evolution of the societies. There does not exist in the History an example similar to the operational, legal and institutional picture that that pose the USA and the islamist violent rebels in their antagonistic armed dialectic by the whole global world. Therefore, almost all the laws of the countries where develop episodes of this war, the international laws in use and the social existing norms, lack practical meaning and aptitude to establish an operational sufficient frame for this warlike conflict. Both great conflicting rivals use more or less freely the whole world bullring, included the space, as local «fields of action» to realize all kinds of operations against his enemy, his allies and his means and properties.

The real terms of application of this violent dialectics are changed, are new or different: total internationalization of the warlike scene. Will mention some of the significant or more known: the borders and the operations strips or sectors are diluted or are not significant in these. The operations precede and mark the combats or small battles. Violent, dispersed, slightly decisive, unexpected, discontinuous in the time actions; which obtain their transcendence by accumulation, not by successive or simultaneous concatenation. There take place large movements of units or small units in very short time. Great concentrated and rapid firepower capacity used by the rivals: the explosive vehicles manage to have the demolition capacity of a “smash block bomb”. The employment of these small units, which do not constitute a «useful target», protects them from the enemy heavy support fire. The digital capacities of the wireless communications and of the treatment and custody of the information are a new weapon in the fighting field for the sensitive information. This has taken the enemy to the employment of old means, which were put away: couriers, manuscript or typewritten reports, heads of local reports, which successively deliver the orders, etc. Qualitative increase of the importance of the dissimulation, concealment, disguise, mishap and enemy disinformation capacities.

This demands the creation of a new legal and normative frame, which gathers and regulates the new warlike conditions that are appearing, they are maturing and are developing since several decades. And everything, having a sufficient vision of future, in order that the evolution of the rivals and of the circumstances and the events do not invalidate the legal and moral means, at not much time of being defined and accepting by a majority of countries and persons. Because, the agents and the units and the reconnaissance means cross and will constantly cross the space and/or the territory of the rivals and of numerous foreign countries in their conflict. Because, the enraged contenders will continue skipping the borders, to realize their harassment punctual actions. They are of harassment because they suppose the destruction and/or the punctual abduction of persons and/or units. Without with them the operational capacity is significantly altered in the theatre or area.

The Use of Drones in the War against the Islamic Terrorists.

The drones are used in the irregular war in reconnaissance tasks and follow-up and in assault actions against small targets. The US Air Force of the Pentagon has more than 1300 pilots of drones, being employed at 13 air bases of the USA. And calculates that at end of 2015, will have around 2000 pilots of drones. Already she is training more pilots for remote-controlled planes that for the conventional flights: around 350 in 2011. From 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters, to pass to learn to direct a drone. The equipment in the air base for the guide and control of the drones is very simple and highly elaborated: the control or helm of the drones, several television screens, surrounded with numerous auxiliar visual indicators and controls and a pedal. Everything arranged in pairs in front to both ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit in live time their sights to his pilots. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the camera controller of the, which form a «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during long time, verifying his environment and his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, the possibility of not wished human hurts («collateral damages») was minimal. The plane is capable of, once caught and authorized by the pilots an aim to beating, initiating by itself the assault, but this function has never allowed it.

The reconnaissance of the enemy and his exact location, both units and commands and local chiefs, and the recognition of the operations area is an old dream of the commands of all the times, to free themselves of part of their dreads and uncertainties. Because the modern maneuvers, even at the close distances, are changeable and plastic for the rivals commands. If we add the possibility of a constant follow-up of that one, this is “honey on small leaves of cereal”. In these tasks, the capacities of the drones allow his deep insertion in the enemy territory, without any danger for the reconnaissance specialized own forces and a clear, fluid and effective transmission of the results that they catch. It might say that they are a weapon designed with fortune to fulfill the opportune missions, if his employment is reasonable, controlled and shown restraint.

Because, the use of «not crewed planes» in reconnaissance missions of the enemy, raises a problem of difficult solution for the Americans Intelligence agencies and the Pentagon. Is thought that only the CIA can be receiving daily near 2000 photographies and 2000 hours of recordings of video from his spìes «drones». And all this nonsense informative, this undue plethora of images, only can drive to the clogging of the transmission, processing and valuation channels of the information. And to the tedium and disorientation of the intermediate commands. All this, though are used powerful computers and «key images and signs» to discriminate them in the process of selection. This result only can drive to a few routine and shallow analyses in «importance content» and to a profusion of non asked reports.

That they would be late years in turning in real intelligence, because here it is necessary to think for it. That one is the confirmed and valued information for the different operational and strategic controls. That clear and sufficiently orientates them of a situation, of his probable evolutions and changes and of the own possibilities of action, in agreement with the military strategy and the operational one or the received mission. With the abuse, already it is not a question of «obtain relevant and sufficient information». But the information that is obtained is overflowing, relarge and indigestible. And it is an information that poisons and disorients all. The essential and decisive criterion, is that the efforts go to the sectors and the most sensitive and important aims of the complicated process of the massive espionage. Which allows to discriminate the gathered information with unit of criterion and respecting the Universal war principle of the saving of the means. And that, continuing proven and effective alogaritms, other aims and neutral topics are chosen and sift with a given periodicity.

The destructive capacity of the explosive charges that carry the not driven assault plane is limited in his number and in his total power. The essential characteristic of his use is that is destined to limited goals, well in his size (a small number of not very spread enemies) or in his protection (not fortified targets). Nevertheless, they are useful to beat combat armoured vehicles, included the main battle tanks, with his hollow load missiles, which attack them in their vulnerable parts or zones (tracks, roofs).

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE COMBAT OF THE SMALL MILITARY UNITS.

Introduction.

Each small military unit, each «action unit» is a sub unit that is capable of carrying out a function in the superior unit to which it belongs or gets support. From its tactical integration will arise bigger units of action, capable of actuating in larger » fields of action».

The units of action can be of command, combat (of fire, of shock and mixed), organizational (H. Q. sections), logistics, communications and of intelligence (exploration, intelligence and counterintelligence and propaganda and psychological war). The smallest of combat would be the squad with its fire support (light machine gun and servants) and its 2 or 3 teams, capable of maneuvering or defending a firing line.

It keeps them united and makes possible the fulfillment of its functions, its interest (esteem, self esteem and shared aim of the unit, opposite to the wear and the certain or apparent danger, but assumed as such), the full deployment (that provides an organizational structure and that feeds its functions, to guarantee the union and the action), the command (that offers guide, cohesion, example and correct command sense) and the situation (that is friendly, neutral or threatening, in increasing order of dilution of the union and loss of the efficiency). These originate in turn the deployments and the combats and the maneuvers, which are the «form» decided by the command to apply the capacity of combat and a “tempo”, pace or speed of action, thanks to the freedom of action that is possessed; those offer, together with the evolution of the situation, the opportunities and the dangers.

FIRE SUPPORT BASE WITH 105 MM. HOWTIZERS.

It appreciates a rich multiplicity of interactions between the subunits, on the basis of its functions and the dependence between them, in relation with its integration in the unit, the maintenance of its cohesion and the fulfillment of its superior function.

The deployments make possible the success or the failure; they also guarantees the order against the environment chaos or negative interactions, always unpredictable and unproductive; the situation gives intrinsically to the unit the courage or the cowardice; the command and the interest drive the positive or effective action of the unit, in order to its cohesion and its function or aim in the all set.

The Combined Arms Performance Process. The Control Means.

The units of action face the enemy using a combined arms system. They go to the enemy keeping a direction (maneuver and shock) and with a fire support. And though it could be a unit as small as the squad, with its shooters or fusiliers and of support teams, are specializing subunits in the combined arms concept. Sometimes the van men must do something strange to the Americans, but very effective advancing to the contact or passing the flank an enemy group or position, crawling.

REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

They try to reach the effective combat distance, creating a favorable interface, a shooting enfilade or a position for grazing fire or an effective assault distance, without losing its combat capacity. For example, by fixation by the enemy fire, by important losses or what affects its cohesion or the command, and by wear). And protected by the natural concealment or artificial one (fogs, covering fire). They work quietly and unseen in the micro ground without limitation of time up to the effective distance. They can use hand grenades to disguise their action on intermediate obstacles (sentries, etc.), that appears as mortar bombs.

The supposed continuous line of the front is crumbled. There arise a multitude of unexpected new internal fronts, possible favorable “interfaces of action” for us. It is not an infiltration, because the front is diffuse (approximately 0,15 man/m) and emptiness (some 4.000 m2/man). But of the active creation of «action fields» adapted in successive stages of action, for the employment of the unit in favorable interfaces over the enemy. The characteristics of performance are the coordination and/or the convergent effort of the different weapons in «fields of action» where they act. That are different and can be superpose, as they are shooters, light and middle mortars, machine guns, grenade-launchers, direct fire cannons, etc. From our appearance in effective force, where less they wish us and without having being detected, the erroneously expressive concept that «we» «infiltrate arises. But that is a mere spatial consequence of the real operational concept followed.

Technologically a division of significance exists between the support or the firing base and the attack or the offensive advance, linked by its cooperation. The support weapons are the protectors, those of greater effective range. The offensive weapons are those of smaller relative range in the set. Sequential and practically, thus, the cannon (direct or indirect heavy fire) protects the machine gun, the grenade launcher, the medium or light mortar. And these three protect and impel the shooters, when their action is or is already going to be evident.

Evolution of the Actions in his Sector. The Retroinformation of the Commands.

As consequence of the interfaces of action with the enemy, there arise in the tactical zone multiple actions of the action units. With them, the information feedback to the command, tends to enlarge to saturation, to bunch in all kinds of communications links and to affect the functional interrelationships of the unit. So, hindering its synergy, and demanding the reinforcement and/or the decision of the command, if he has not delegated sufficiently or is not monitoring the situation changes.

LAV’s ATTACKED WITHOUT INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT, THROUGH A VERY NARROW LANE, A BRIDGE…

This «undue plethora» is a structural generator of rubbing, a squandering of efforts and means. And it is the measurement of the trend to the loss of the cohesion, of the principal sense and the goal, which suffers a tactical combined arms unit.

The key to manage this «undue plethora», containing it reasonably, resides that everyone must observe, control and drive the necessary for the fulfillment of its mission, below its level in the hierarchy. For it the commander must share his intention and aims (mission type orders), establish a gravity center of his combined effort in every situation and guarantee the cooperation between and the support to his units. All this relying on the operations order and the updated intelligence received.

As parts of a complex system (hierarchy, specialization and aims and intentions), the units of action can be all autonomous (mission type orders, gravity center, different or shared operational sectors) and all specialized (engineers, antitank, anti-aircraft, exploration, chemistry, etc.) as is needed. To be able to fulfill, this way, with flexibility, rapidity and efficiency its functions in the interfaces of action with the enemy. It kept with all this, the structural hierarchy (integration in a major unit and its support) and functional (in the area of the intention and on support of this one).

The effective performance of the units of action resides in its aptitude to actuate flexible and semi independently from the section or platoon level in fulfilling the received mission. For it, they also will have to know and consider the capacities and needs of other weapon and supports. And acting the men looking for themselves and for other companions in the unit. Its officers and NCO must be capable of taking and drive decisions based on the mission and on the evolution of the situation.

Evidently, the desideratum is to work this way. And this one must be the trend to continue in the selection, formation, training and utilization of the men and the units. In the practice. the “degree of general efficiency” obtained, will be determined by the idiosyncrasy of a nation, the character more or less gregarious or independent of its peoples, its military doctrine and tradition, the defense budgets, the national moral, the national politics and the international situation, the integration of institutions and national organizations in the international sphere, etc.

An example attack of a combined arms unit.

Lets see an example. Against an infantry position more or less prepared, with advanced antitank means, a typical defensive zone, we can use in the breakthrough or in its destruction, if we can not pass outflanking it, the dismounted infantry followed in covered bounds by tanks for the protection and the direct fire support of it.

The antitank defender will look for a punctual, relatively big and protected target, from covered positions preferably or, at least, well camouflaged and flanking, and will act in batteries. With the pieces dispersed in order that the same enemy heavy fire can not incapacitate them. The infantry heavy weapons (machine guns in tripods) neutralize, «sweeping and searching», a more or less narrow zone of the front, occupied by a dispersed, small and smooth target, an infantry platoon.

The attacking tanks will beat with H.E. and H.E.S.H. shells those infantry strong positions. And the infantry squads will attack with its light machine guns the servants of the antitank pieces, hindering to acquire a punctual target. All this destruction and neutralization labor is spreading, once achieved the irruption, as a worm movements, in the depth of the tactical zone of the assault sector of the combined arms unit. Other parts of the enemy position that could collaborate in the defense rejection are blocked up by smoke and neutralized by indirect heavy fire.

GOING OUT TO CLOSE FIGHTING.

Besides, the artillery and aviation advanced observers will be defining to these support weapon the new targets that the own assault is discovering in the depth and in the flanks (combat exploration) in the advance sector. The criterion of the gravity center of the fire of support will be neutralize, at least, all the targets that are opposed to the advance towards the enemy position, to the irruption and to the struggle inside the position of defense in the assigned sector. Facilitating this way the direct fire and the shock of the land attackers. And that, by means of concentrated and punctual blows of its fire.

With it, the effective action in the given environment, «interfaces of action» essential characteristic, are optimized at the level of the tactical groups of action or combined arms systems, whose complementariness we have stood out.

In broken, very wavy, wooded or urbanized (housings and factories) grounds, not necessarily mountainous, that have scanty “sight control” and with abundant “relative concealing heights”, the “interfaces of action” reduce its sector.

The element of effective action continues being the combined arms system suitable sized. The action is effected by companies or reinforced interarms platoons, with the heavy fire support provided even by the battalion (medium and heavy mortars). Except in the most flat areas and of scanty obstructions to sight, the transitability, which limits physically the possible interfaces of action, prevents the fight using concentrated means beyond the company. The battalion role will be of reinforcing the efforts of their companies and canalizing the supports.

Always are critical in the land action the existing rivers, streams and channels, especially the more or less ones perpendicular to the front. The blockade of these waters flows affects enormously the tempo, the total speed of the operation, for the difficulty of the more or less sloping or obstructed area that surrounds them (forests, gullies, constructions, not reinforced fords). The advance slows down or the means have to be dispersed in the available parallel routes, forcing to enter other difficult bordering areas.

General Plans and Forecasts of the Command.

The contingencies plan of the units must include overcoming essentially four types of situations not foreseen, that intervene in the fulfillment of the mission and that can manage to compromise it.

These would be:

a) Possible direct action of the enemy, in use of the initiative or claiming recover it. It might be an interdiction bombardment, a counterattack. The solution is to tactically neutralize its action, without compromising the mission.

b) Possible encounter with the enemy. It would be a theme of patrols and sentries, advanced security forces and advanced detachments and reconnaissance patrols. It is necessary to submit or push back them and change positions rapidly and even direction temporarily, to not compromise the mission.

c) Possible unforeseen obstacle. They would be a ditch, a slope of more difficult soil, the blowing-up of a bridge, a flood, a storm, which affect the transitability of the area. It would be a matter of overcoming it as rapidly as possible, keeping the security and extending more yet the reconnaissance.

d) Possible action defensive/passive of the enemy. These are the cases of enter an ambush, a minefield, a reinforced cut covered by fire, the rejection fires of a defense position, an antitank obstacle. Is necessary to overcome it as soon as possible, as the natural obstacle case, avoiding besides to be canalized by the enemy in a direction he wished, favorable to a counterattack or at zone beaten by the artillery or by convergent fires.

In general lines, including in the commander plan, must always be foreseen:

1) To overcome or to repel the enemy and/or the obstacle, which hinder and which will present without being able to be foreseen, avoiding facilitate own information to the enemy.

2) Lost or detached means to overcome, to neutralize or to repulse are means deprived to the fulfillment of the mission. The surviving enemy can facilitate compromising information, which will be late a term in to be an effective intelligence.

3) It is necessary to continue the execution of the mission, with the necessary means to fulfill it. It is a multiplier factor of the efficiency, after the commotion and the incident losses, to keep a high execution «momentum»: the product of its “combat capacity” by its average movement speed in a period, at a given direction and sense.

The example of the preparation and the action of 3er. American Army of the general Patton, counter-attacking the German penetration in the Ardennes, is significant of these difficulties. Its «incident» was a sudden change of mission and of direction and sense of performance and the possibilities of their «execution momentum».

All this is not improvised. It results in the practice only as fruit of the frequent training and the organization work and the coordination of the H.Q. and all the commands and me. We shall remember the sayings, «it is actuated as it is trained» and «the man is an habit animal».

The Elite Military Units.

These units receive a more complete and effective training in the modern times. That is applicable to a personnel that clearly enjoys the exercise of his profession. And not only it enlists to fulfill a civic duty, to collaborate with the companions (up to the level of battalion), though the immediate ones are those of the piece or squad, and to come back home. In general, they act rapidly and hard, even inconsiderately, against his aim.

Resultado de imagen de ranger de texas A TIPICAL TEXAS RANGER OF THE XIX CENTURY.

It is a question of a military closed «system», that it is vulnerable to the encircle and the ambush and whose limited means are only the assigned for the mission. So, it is difficult to receive reinforcements, including when they operate in the surroundings of the own “supporting mass” or great units. The intelligence for the mission must be elaborated from confirmed, constant, sufficient and updated informations. Since she will protect them from the surprises and the setbacks in destination, which are the «critical difficulty» that they can find and the major danger for all men.

His combat experience has advised them to never surrender the weapons and to always continue the effort, the fight. What has saved them from more than one failure, since the enemy was surrendering before they: for not paying the high cost of conquering them. They largely accept the discipline as a necessary quality for the cohesion and efficiency of his unit. Here, more that in other branches, the commands have to be authentic leaders, directing with the example. And of proven formation, in order that his men admit that his «life insurance» in the missions is the fulfillment of the orders of his commands and with the flexibility degree that grants the order for the mission.