Categoría: Modern Warfare

News on Modern Conflicts. Novedades en Conflictos Modernos.

Utilizamos esta Sección de Novedades para dar a conocer en avance los próximos artículos que irán apareciendo en las distintas «categorías» de temas de esta página, dedicada a los conflictos y crisis modernos.

Terrorismo, Guerrillas y Violencia

El Terrorismo es una compleja operación Política y Violenta de amplia Variedad de acciones. Sus acciones violentas deben ser deliberadas, Continuas o Sistemáticas y buscando Influenciar a una amplia audiencia (mucho mayor que los afectados Directamente por dichas acciones violentas) y generando miedo, hasta miedo insuperable, en dicha “población blanco u objetivo”. Para que realicen y tomen las actitudes y acciones que los terroristas buscan.

Así, una acción aislada o sin interés político no es terrorismo. Será vandalismo,odio vesánico, brote psicótico… pero no es, ni será técnica o jurídicamente terrorismo.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Inteligencia militar y nacional, fallos y resultados.

Los servicios de inteligencia de los grandes países suelen acertar muchas veces en sus opiniones y pronósticos.

Los trabajos concretos de inteligencia a los que se dedican unos pocos agentes modernos, suelen terminar con un éxito parcial o total.

Los trabajos complejos con ramificaciones y desarrollos, que esconden un futuro estimable, pero, no seguro, fallan estrepitosamente. Por esta particularidad compleja y futurible. Y, porque la capacidad de observar y medir un parámetro del alma humana es algo inaprensible, dudoso e incómodo. Seguidamente veremos varios casos concretos.

Las razones para que se produzca la divergencia de aciertos entre los casos singulares y la proyección al futuro (solución prevista) de los asuntos complejos, trascendentes al tiempo, están en parte en la dificultad de su concepción, el riesgo que se corre en aventurar y en la exposición no contrastada a los mandos. Evidentemente, existe aquí una dialéctica entre el ocultamiento realizado y el proceso cognitivo e intuitivo de su imaginación, desarrollo y proyección (solución estimada).

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

HAMAS ATACA A ISRAEL EN 2023.

Los distintos atacantes llevaron a cabo un “ataque de enjambre” sobre posiciones en el centro y sur de Israel. Varios, de los principios o normas de las fuerzas militares en un ataque convencional fueron desatendidos. Por ejemplo, la unidad del objetivo y la unidad del mando de las fuerzas y el mantenimiento de una estructura, de un despliegue para todas las fuerzas atacantes. Aquí, cada pequeña “unidad de acción” islamista tenía su propio jefe y su particular objetivo. Y, es el conjunto de acciones del “enjambre atacante” el que define la estrategia y el complejo objetivo real de Hamas.

LA GUERRA DE MANIOBRAS. EL CONCEPTO DE LA BATALLA AÉREO TERRESTRE MODERNA. UNA INTERPRETACIÓN DEL MARISCAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.
 Un ejemplo poco conocido de la trascendencia omnipresente de la logística y de su línea de comunicación (más o menos ramificada) en las operaciones y muy importante por sus resultados finales, es la operación denominada DONBASS (la gran zona operativa) por los soviéticos, desarrollada entre el 29 de enero y mediados de marzo de 1943, al sudoeste del río Donetz. Ella forma parte de lo que los alemanes llamaron la batalla del DONETZ: el último éxito estratégico de Von Manstein, que fue malogrado por Hitler en Kursk.
 
 
THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.
A little known example illustrates the omnipresent transcendence of logistics and the line of communication (more or less branched out) in operations and their final results. Between January 29 and mid-March 1943, the Soviets developed an operation called Donbass at the southwest of the Donetz. This operation forms part of what the Germans called the battle of the Donetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.

 

Valery Gerasimov, comandante militar ruso en Ucrania.

Con todas las derrotas acumuladas padecidas por el Ejército de la Federación rusa en su “operación militar especial” en Ucrania desde el 24 de febrero de 2022 hasta ahora, Vladimiro Putin no descansa, se irrita y no tiene paz.

Su último “as en la manga” es el general de ejército Valery Gerasimov, nacido en la ciudad rusa de Kazan, hace 67 años y jefe del Estado Mayor General desde 2012.

Una edad casi ideal para el trabajo que se le viene encima. Definido por organización, cambios estructurales, disciplina, flujo suficiente de medios y mano dura.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine.

With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.

LA PSICOLOGÍA DE LOS TERRORISTAS ISLAMISTAS

La civilización y sus estructuras vital y social en sus interacciones con los individuos y su psicología.

El fallo de los yihadistas en integrarse en un «grupo con creencias y virtudes (los valores permanentes) compartidos». Que le den identidad, sentido y pertenencia a sus vidas.

¿Por qué se comportan así? ¿Cómo tratar a los recuperables? ¿Cómo combatir a los vitandos o recalcitrantes?

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIST TERRORISTS

The civilization and his vital and social structures , in his interactions with the individuals and their psychology.

The failure of the jihadists in joining a «group with shared beliefs and virtues» (the permanent values). That give to their lives identity, sense and belonging.

Why do they behave this way? How to treat the recoverable ones? How to attack the hatefuls or recalcitrant terroris

THE PERSECUTIONS TO THE MODERN CHRISTIANS.

There is taking place in the last months a real «planetary conjunction». It is about the «temporal coincidence» of a bloody and fierce pursuit of the Christians, whose «green outbreaks» are in the Arabic Islamic countries. That is coincidental with the solvent, quiet and cunning action of the European «trendies», against the virtues of the European societies. Both actions are surely a «cosmic part» of the so called «Mysterium iniquitatis» or agree to the Darkness.

Modern Allied Urban Warfare against the Insurgency.

Introduction.

The American and European troops are prepared to fight against a regular military enemy provided with a masses army. Or even more modern, of the IIIrd generation, with more elaborated technologically means and better trained men, to support the lonelinesses and tensions of the awaited current battlefields. Definitively, his «way», his action space, is the direct and opened clash in presence of a great profusion of probable enemy targets. His instrument is the attrition, the destruction of the aims that the enemy presents and could be detected and acquired in all the depth of his march or assault deployment. The last two enemy echelons, nowadays increasingly remote or deep, are reached by the longe range support aviation or with the ballistic or autonomous missiles of medium range.

Resultado de imagen de Russian Ordnance fire in Middle East

Which is here the role of the man? To detect and confirm the enemy targets, to try to fix them, if it is about a patrol or a small combat unit and to call his «ordnance» in order that it devastates them. Only his elite units, always scanty and, therefore, exceptional and precious, are formed in the nearby infantry fight using only his organic means.

In Iraq and in Syria the islamist bases are always in the cities and populations more favorable for the activity of his different bands. And they are surrounded or permeated by military local and foreign forces. Already initiated the war, the North American intelligence intercepted a memorandum of 17 pages written by Abu Musad al-Zarqawi, former chief of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, to Osama bin Laden. In it he was expressing his worry for his survival: «In Iraq there are not mountains where we could shelter, nor forests in whose thickness we could hide. There are spies eyes everywhere. Our backs are exposed and our movements are realized in view of all». And this geographical military space is similar in Syria.

The Action of the military Forces against the current Insurgency.

In the books on the guerrilla warfare, it is discused of the tactics of the siege to the military fixed or semipermanent positions. The guerrillas, deprived in the first phases of an ideological armed revolution (communists, of fight against the foreign occupant) of enough military capacity, have their guidelines to attack the mentioned military positions.

Resultado de imagen de Russian Ordnance fire in Middle East RUSSIAN REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN SYRIA

In the zones not dominated by the guerrillas, but bordering the areas under his control, it is where develops the fight of those for removing the military enemy. Seeking to also control these areas and to realize in them his ideological indoctrination of the populations. The guerrilla bases only can grow in space or increase his number, when the military enemy moves back. Or when his positions (advanced positions, barracks) are submitted to a more or less nearby and ferreous siege. That must be continuous in his effects: that is to say, controlling the approximation and exit routes of those. To threaten, harass, check and to attack in its moment the surrounded forces. And the reinforcement and supply columns of that come to help. Using limited attacks, ambushes and traps and registered fire bags.

In the regions infected by the guerrillas, not necessarily occupied by them, the military positions are protective, extensive and few fortress. His garrison is high. The military set evokes there a blind, awkward and low mobile bunker. The military men realize from them special forces operations of reconaissance and against guerrilla positions and of march to the combat on targets of zone, at charge of strong columns. To occupy and then defend them, according to the capacities of the military forces. In this, the commitment and moral of them is decisive.

Resultado de imagen de Bombing in Middle East GOVERNMENT CARPET BOMBING IN SYRIA.

In the irregular war against the bands of the Islamic State, the armed forces and his auxiliary ones use in his operational strategy, some of Mao Ze Dong’s 10 military principles to direct the tactics of the Chinese guerrillas and semi regulars. Those were enunciated by Mao on December 25, 1947 in his speech before the Central Committee of the PCC. Let’s see, in not necessarily original order: 1) To attack first the isolated and spread enemies and later the stronger enemy forces. 2) To take first the small villages and, finally, the big populations. 3) Not to fight combats, if you are little prepared for, nor present combats in which the victory is not sure. 4) To concentrate always for each combat forces absolutely superior to those of the enemy. 5) To destroy the enemy while it moves and is more vulnerable. 6) To use the intervals between campaigns to rest and to regroup and to train the troops…but not allow that the enemy have a pause, not even a breather. 7) Take first the populations low defended. And, when the conditions are favorable to us, those with medium defenses. And wait to increase our advantages, to assault the better defended cities.

This operational strategy outlined by Mao, using simple, didactic and efective procedure, is of a low military level. As corresponds to an insurrection that had to grow, to develop and to spread. And that was employing rural uncultured forces and was arming itself principally with the enemy captured weapon. Mao said that he «had a call option in the weapon of the British arsenals».

Resultado de imagen de ejercito iraquí chií IRAQI TANK WITH SHIA BANNER…

But this same orthodox operational strategy of the weak rebel against the strong military, is that are going to use the Allied forces, agglutinate and supported by the USA and Russia (in Syria), to attack an islamist insurgency, entrenched in his urban bases. And keeping the massive, repeated and overwhelming employment of the modern air and ground heavy fire on the rebels. So much in the battles and combats that appear, as for the wear and interdiction of the islamist positions, his facilities and movements.

Seeking as strategic aims to defeat the rebels and to occupy his bases or positions. That would be finally select for a policeman’s labor. Bases that are the only hard, definite and static aims, which the guerrillas have. With a qualitative difference with the diffuse, evasive, fleeting and slippery aims that the guerrillas offer in movement. Bases that are directly attacked, using the military forces (to those that is supposed better trained and equipped and, at least, equally motivated, that the rebels) and his enormous power of direct and indirect fire.

Resultado de imagen de german anti partisan operations RUSSIAN PARTISANS.

The military and social problem that exists here is that the Allied rebel Arabic groups, the Kurdish peshmergas and the Iraqi military men and his loyal militias, lack the military virtues of the National complete armies. And they have acquired not military habits on the preservation of his men in combat. Avoiding them at any price the mutilation and the death. In It have influenced decisively the religious and social origins of the different «allied» soldiers groups and his interests and divergent aims, at times even antagonistic, within these two civil wars. Social elements and parameters contaminated, spurious and, even strange, before the concept of the Umma or community of faithfuls of the same god, Allah.

Resultado de imagen de shia tanks against isis IRAQI SHIA MECHANIZED ARTILLERY AGAINST ISIS

They follow for it this operational strategy of going very little by little, first occupying the weakest islamist positions that surround and defend the biggest. Devastating with the heavy fire from the distance the islamist disclosed positions, which are intermingled with with the houses and refuges of the civilians. Because the war they do, so much the Americans as the Russians and all his allies, in the urban fighting areas that are the islamist occupied populations of Iraq and Syria. And the prolongation of the war, the major time that they will use to obtain his military aims, preserving his men in the combat, the civilians will pay it. With his blood, with the destruction of his material means and buildings and with his massive displacements, seeking to save already only the life and without knowing who will receive and help them.

Let’s see a historical example of the action of counterinsurgents forces, in high unfavorable conditions for them. The German forces antipartisans in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In his manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that “the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be answered».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, for the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His antipartisans troops were consisting always of variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German troops of security and policemen; security troops of his Allies in the front of the East, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of Allied «Russian» forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes, insafe. The hard core of the units were the Germans. The posts did not have homogeneous troops. In them, the men’s qualities were intermingled, in order that mop or novice was encouraging by the presence of the strong, and in him was removed the thoughts of weakness or desertion.

Resultado de imagen de german anti partisan operations LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES GIVING SUPPORT TO AN ANTIPARTISAN OPERATION IN RUSSIA.

Before the inability to provide troops and security to his rearguard in the whole territory conquered to the USSR, at the west of an imaginary laid out between Leningrad and Stalingrado, the Germans had to select very well the points of garrison. These rarely had more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the post could be defended for a time. While, others, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor the vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of antipartisans forces, there were formed reconnaissance and combat patrols. Something like reconnaissance in force patrols, to locate and harass the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, against a guerrilla threat or the location of an important bands concentration, even there were temporarily brought troops from the forward line (of the operational zone), for the assault and destruction of that one, generally looking for his siege and annihilation.

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational aim of his antipartisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies were kept reasonably opened from Germany, Poland and Romania up to the rears of the German forces and his allies in the East. And the flow of men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods that received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Millions Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and towards there there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch, in his continuous rotations.

THE MILITARY SURPRISE AS ART AND HETERODOXY

Almost all the technologies, tactics and operations directed to obtaining the tactical or operational surprise over the enemy, can be benevolent considered at the edge of the regulations and existing procedure. That are practised in the different countries and groups of them or supranational alliances.

Between other reasons, to fight only according to the «book» is usually too much acquaintance and predictable. In addition, many of the general «knowledge» gathered in them are shared by different blocs and nations, even antagonistic. And it is necessary, to respect the regulations and ordinances and to look for the aim indicated by the command, as the goal to obtaining.

But the creative and decisive action must follow the one that we call the «way of the surprise«. As guide, compass, of our decisions and actions. Looking for that fleeting and juicy opportunity that arises in the development of the mutual actions between the armed rivals; those careless or vulnerable enemy weaknesses, in conditions that we can create sometimes, equally more unforeseen and unusual. To obtain our goals with more forcefulness, efficiency, elegance and rapidity. Achieving it with fewer loss of time, of men and of means. Let’s remember the basic and universal principle of the economy of the means.

Sure that following always the «book» they will be able to approach and to take to good term the common operations. But, apart from the fact that the enemy has an essentially equal doctrine and regulations, a way of fighting will be first known and then learned or dominated and, probably, up to overcome finally by the enemy. The triumphant Germans in the first period 1939-1941, with the extension of the war, allowed the knowledge and the learning of his war of combined weapon by his enemies. That finally overcame them in technologies, tactics and operations and drove them to their thunderous defeat in 1945.

And this «guide» is of special need and affection in the bureaucratized and crystallized armies. Where the unforseeable, not guilty failures, are not only a contingency to be overcame by the set. But they can be also an administrative or political weapon against the persons in charge. And where the follow-up of the «book» and the superiors orders to the letter, armour and protect the low commands of the responsibility of their acts and results.

Martin Van Creveld said that was the anteroom, before the final unworkability and prostration, of «the military organizations that were not getting up-to-date and renewing». Martin Van Creveld was expelled as lecturer, many years ago, from Israel’s Military High College.

Then, the results will be obtained increasingly at the cost of the wear and the men means and materials losses. Tending to triumph then the rival that more demographic and economic capacity has.

There arises then a corollary of this way of thinking the military thing. The zeal to avoid human falls, extended to all the modern armies or of IIIrd generation, will lead to the preventive, protective and therapeutic employment of the own heavy fire. Looking that the own forces do not have to fight at close ranges. This is called military modern technology and is highly regarded by the national armament industries. This is not more than the perversion and trick of the heavy fire. Whose functions or tasks, in increasing order of action and efficiency, are: to blind, to disturb, to neutralize or cover and to destroy the enemy in the different fighting forms and situations.

And the action over the aim will tend to the physical destruction, as guarantee of the security of the men. In the actual civil wars in Iraq and Syria, we have the examples in the exagerate and methodical bombardments on the enemies. Armed and civilians; real and suspects.

The Military surprise, looking for the enemy dislocation and shock

During his operations, the enemy deployment is conforming in the direction and with the intention that he has decided and determined, for his military echeloned means and for his logistic routes. This way, he is showing his «cards» to his rival, depending on his action tempo and he is commiting, according to those.

Our surprise can create «per se» a new «exposed flank«, another more or less critical «vulnerability» in the enemy. That he was not considering yet, that he was not waiting, nor was prepared to defend her by some of the fighting forms. That are the attack and the defense, in their varieties and combinations.

Our surprise «penetrates» in the enemy deployment, seeking to shock and dislocate functionally or positionally it. And, at least, to cause him losses, to occupy profitable positions for our operational development, to diminish his tempo or operational pace and to confuse, delay and disturb him in his plans and deployments. Using for it, by our part, the minimal means expense and seeking to achieve the maximum possible effect on the enemy. With which we optimize the effort of our actions, following the general principle of the economy of the available means.

When the enemy reacts, to offset and overcome the effect of our surprising action, he is adapting necessarily to our intention. And, if that one is serious, he moves away more or less from his interests and plans. With his reacting movements for the rejection and the attack to our forces, the enemy is disregarding his intention and his mission. In relation to these, the enemy is removed from them and also unbalanced. This way, a right conceived, planned and realized surprise can «prepare» the enemy for us. So, he face in disadvantage, with fewer available resources and a worse deployment, our offensive principal action. That would be already more direct, massive and orthodox.

In such a way that exist a whole range of possible effects to obtaining over the enemy with our surprising actions. That will change also according to the means destined to obtain our surprise, the conception, the preparation and the accomplishment of it and the available time, considering also the set of our operations.

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. (SECOND PART).

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

 

(CONTINUATION)

 

Results of the German counterattack and its trascendence.

Nevertheless, the booty gained was scanty. Von Manstein declared that there were approximately 23,000 dead Soviet soldiers and 9,000 captured Soviet soldiers. The materiel captured were approximately 615 tanks (probably largely recovered), 354 campaign guns, 69 anti-aircraft pieces and more than 600 machine guns and mortars. It was not possible to encircle the enemy and Soviet soldiers took advantage of this by leaving the heavy equipment and retreating. Von Manstein said that, because the extreme cold, his soldiers were bunched into small, tight groups, leaving wide spaces and lines in his rearguard, without effective cover. This partly happened because they were elite troops and because the war was without mercy.

COLONEL JOHN BOYD, AN AMERICAN TEORIST OF ITS MANEUVER THEORY.

At the beginning of March, 48th panzer Corps pressed toward the east of Kharkov and the SS panzer corps of General Halder was entrusted with recovering the long-suffering city for the Germans.

At the middle of the month, the Germans had a defensive resistant front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported on the Mius and the Donetz. They also possessed in the south of Russia sufficient mobile reserves to push back possible Soviet operational breaks in the zone.

As late as 1944, the Soviets had 26 tanks Corps and 11 mechanized Corps. Part of them joined together to form 6 tanks Armies. Each of which had two tanks corps and a mechanized corps (bigger and more balanced inn infantry and artillery). Some mechanized Corps joined a cavalry Corps, forming a great unit similar in capacity to the tanks Army but with fewer armored vehicles and more mobility in areas of difficult transitability (marshes, mountains, woods). These were used to exploit the break in the swampy areas of the south of the Soviet Union, as that of the Pripet river in the north of Ucrania. Although never coexisted more than two or three in the order of battle of the Soviet Army.

WILLIAM LIND, A CIVIL TEORIST.

The destruction of 6 tanks Corps of the Southwest Front (especially equipped with mobile forces) and dismantled them from their “support masses”, was an especially prominent, profitable and low cost operation for the Germans.

In addition, in its advance toward Kharkov between March 1st and 5th, the SS and 48º panzer Corps smashed from its flank and rearguard the Soviet 3rd tanks Army, led by general Pavel Semjonovic Ribalko. This Army was launched to relieve the forces of 6th infantry Army and had continued advancing toward Kharkov. This city that was by then, attracting all the attention and efforts from both sides.

As poor results and large losses mounted for the mobile Soviet forces, pessimism also grew in Stalin, who asked Sweden to mediate in seeking a solution to the war with Germany.

Nevertheless, the advance on Belgorod, outlining Kursk’s projection inside the territory occupied by Germany, sealed the aim for Germany’s strategic summer Campaign. After all these events had passed, the strategic initiative returned to the Germans at the level of the theatre of operations.

But, beginning on July 5, delayed in relation with the victories of Von Manstein, their action gave the Soviets time to extensively strengthen themselves, to establish “fortified regions” at the front level, and to assemble and organize a powerful counterattack force in the north and south of the projection. The allied landing in Sicily on the 10th of July, aborted the Wehrmacht’s already disastrous Operation Citadel. The Germans would never recover the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL DONN STARRY, HIGH COMMAND OF THE U.S. ARMY’S TRADOC.

Was it possible to avoid what happened to the Popov group and, thus, to the Soviet’s strategic plans for its 1942 winter campaign and to the Soviet’s strategic initiative, at least in the Southern theatre of the Soviet Union?

It was possible.

We have observed, in parallel and in a very second plane with some key facts, the getting absorbed (to get very much in …), the delight (to be delighted with …) and the fixation (to do without other rational arguments) of Stalin, in relation with the results that he promised himself with the impelled operations by the mobile corps of the Southwest Front of general Vatutin.

General Vatutin, one of the best field chiefs of the Soviet army, died before his time at hands of Ukrainian (anti-Soviet) guerrillas, only participated in this in a minor degree. Still, the delegate of the Stavka in charge of these crucial operations (Zhukov, Vasilevsky?) remembered him the transcendence that for the Supreme Commander and for the Soviet people they had.

A little time ago, Hitler also fixated on Stalingrad. This fixation led him to squander the capacity of his best Great Unit (the 6th infantry Army of general Paulus—yes, without the aristocratic Von) in a street struggle and a force-to-force confrontation. Their enemies were arranged on a static defense. A position that they were better able to defend and maintain than were the Germans, in the gigantic steel and cement fortress that was Stalingrad.Fight in which was not counting the German superb capacity of operational movement, which reduced the effort done to a confrontation between man vs. man and machine against machine. And, thus, causing a terrible attrition to the combat and movement capacities.

We can discuss about the strategic mistakes of high chiefs. As the line of communications (branched out) is so crucial, it is necessary to protect it adequately. But this fact is obscured and blurred by the desires of commanders.

What are the possibilities of defense for the advance sector that contains the communications line?

Independently of the advance deployment of mobile groups and their support mass (which must include the securities elements adapted for marches in enemy areas), «advanced detachments» must be brought forward.

These will be integrated by 15-30 % of the forces that bring them forward and will possess sufficient operational movement and combat capacities. The time it takes for the main group to join them is a function of the transitability of the terrain and of the capacities and intentions of the enemy in the operations zone. Its mission in defensive operations is to be used as “stable hinges” between the deployments of Great units, facilitating and protecting the movement of forces and supplies between them.

If the mass of support is too slow for the mobile group to continue advancing at a reasonable rate, it will end up lengthening dangerously the distance between the units and their support. This situation is very vulnerable to a mobile assault by the enemy from the depth of his zone and the sector of advance would be under threat of being cut, depending on the means and intentions of the enemy. This probability would require that a “mechanized group” be placed between the mass of support and the mobile group to reduce the distance between all three deployments and reducing reaction times to respond to a crisis. This would reasonably stabilize the sector of advance after the mobile group.

The mission of the mechanized group, which has less capacity for operational movement than the mobile group, will be to carried out the “sector mobile defense”. And will last until the forces of the mass of support arrive to relieve it. The anti-aircraft and antitank defense plan, the centralization of reserves and the defense of key points of the area, by means of “delay positions” and together with necessary heavy fire support, will be characteristic of the fight to stabilize the sector.

That is to say, it is necessary to sacrifice speed for safety to consolidate the stability of the sector of advance in enemy territory. A territory that does not need to be all occupied in force. Because would be defended by a mobile defense for a limited period of time. Taking disproportionate risks would be reckless and would put men, materiel and the operation in danger.

But, men (in this case, Hitler and Stalin are two examples) continue to make mistakes when faced with such circumstances…

THE END.

REASONS AGAINST A WAR WITH NORTH COREA.

Being afraid of an imperialistic aggression, the authorities of the Party of the Workers of North Korea (or Choson Rodongdang) and of his Armed Forces (or Inmun Gun), can perceive as the only escape from his chronic evils, to undertake a «revolutionary war of national unification«. What possibilities are of this happens? We examine afterwards the parameters of the «North Korean problem» and his “ways of develpoment» of his conflicts.

Introduction.

On June 25, 1950, Kim il Sung’s North Korean troops invaded South Korea, with Stalin’s approval, to realize by the force the reunification of the peninsula of Korea. That was divided in two countries with faced ideological regimes from the end of the World War II. The United States surprised in the first moment, came rapidly to help the South Koreans. The support of the People’s Republic of China, which sent trained forces in his recent civil war, and the military systems and equipments delivered by the USSR to the communists, allowed to reach a stalemate without victors by 1953. In July of this year, a truce was signed in Panmunjong, that not an end of the war. And the 38º north parallel was established as the border between both nations. A blood river of was spilt by all the actors only to keep the prewar situation.

Resultado de imagen de kim il sung KIM IL SUNG, THE FOUNDER OF THE DYNASTY.

To celebrate on Saturday, the 15th of April, the 105 º anniversary of the birth of il Sung, the «Father of the Mother land», Kim Jong-un prepared a great cake. That was luminous, shining, with his 105 «rockets candles» ignited. Jong-un does not want to be unworthy in anything to his dynasty and is playing like thunderer Jupiter, threatening with his atomic weapon and ballistic missiles of the first generation. With them he would have to face unfavorably and without possibilities of victory the modern combined weapon systems of the United States. It might damage very much South Korea. But it would not give him the victory and would affect all the Koreans.

The ideology and his Practice in North Korea.

To foresee the seemingly capricious and erratic behavior of the North Korean elites, it is necessary to know the ideological and psychological parameters of such catechized, closed and organized into a hierarchy society. And these parameters stem from the Marxist Leninist postulates. According to the interpretation and the applications realized during the Stalinist regime in the USSR. Finally, the most mellow communist ideology put in scene by the North Koreans, leads them to the use of expressions and linguistic turns, unusual and inexplicable, according to our forms of expression and formation of the thought.

Resultado de imagen de kim jong un

The North Korean direction aspires to the absolute unit of his strategies, his doctrine, his organization and his plans. In the North Korean terminology, the “Monolithism” represents a social politician structure as the granite, with absolute internal homogeneity and external unity of action. A «Structure» lacking fissures, across which the enemy could penetrate and damage it. There does not exist a significant or radical distinction between the peace and the war in the national North Korean strategy. Both are «phases» of the national politics, with different participations of the Inmun Gun. This is the Korean name in of the Armed Forces of North Korea. This way, the political, economic and military strategies are ways of the total North Korean strategy.

The leaders of North Korea consider, deriving it from the Soviet Stalinist strategy, that the North Korean strategy possesses an orientation and a style of exposition and formation for his plans and decisions. His foundation is the «supposedly sensible and scientific» calculation of the «correlation of forces» between the North Koreans and his enemies. This forces relation or ratio is a deliberate and calculated check of the potential relative capacities between both rivals, for the different conflict situations.

The North Koreans prefer obtaining his aims by pacific means. But the determinism of the dialectical materialism leads them to believe that the wars are inevitable, while the social classes, the existing oppressions between them and the imperialistic countries. Or, since in the last 65 years, they are surrounded with capitalist States, subject to the successive phases of growth and decadence in his economic cycles. The North Korean elites, with his special and distinctive psychology as mental vital substratum and with their ideology and the whole resounding paraphernalia where it expresses, do not wonder if they will have or not an external conflict. But, what kinds of conflict is it more profitable for us to destroy the enemy? And, in addition, who can triumph over whom in every case?

And they consider that, in agreement with the premises and the development of the dialectical materialism, that the successive clashes of the social antagonic oposites (those who are incompatible and/or not complementary). That are arising progressively and successively, as the historical materialism describes, finally will give them the reason. And they will obtain the victory over the stupid and decadent Yankee and Japanese imperialisms. To facilitate the things and as shallow and pale approximation, we can say that the historical materialism is as a Marxist description of the events or general History and that the dialectical one is as a scientific theory of the creation, development and solution of the social conflicts (that are all).

Resultado de imagen de kim jong un

We believe that the nuclear weapon is not more than a North Korean bet for covering all the «fissures», before a hypothetical imperialistic threat (of the hostile foreigners) against his regime.

Exposition and Development of the Situation.

Several are the reasons that dissuade the North Koreans from the preventive or initial use of a military assault.

The first in practice is the nearness of China, his principal support and mentor, that embraces the whole north border of the country. Though China does not be affected directly by the scanty atomic fires that cross the Korean peninsula, the radioactive clouds can reach his territory. And to damage his industrial factories and his external and internal sales, so much if pollutions take place, as if are rumors on them. Also China, as the only ground border, would receive a chaotic and important flow of Korean refugees.

China is today a state controled democracy of manufacturers and merchants. China has a modern dictatorial political system (of an only party); that is controlled and directed by an elite that supposes 10% of his population. China is one of the principal world economies: it has around 4$ trillions (million of millions) in American debt, with what he finances his principal world importer. The Chinese middle class is increasing, prosperous and forceful and is overwhelming affiliated to the Chinese Communist party. Very expressively, these elites of any economic system, also add up 135 million Chinese, around 10% of his population. There are not far ago the times of the cannibalism and of the successive famines and penuries in the lands of the Middle Kingdom. But, already many Chinese have known and enjoyed the innumerable goods that the modern capitalism and the industrial system produce. And, though their distribution between the population classes and the exports is yet very asymmetric and deficient, the Chinese do not want to risk getting lost them.

Resultado de imagen de nivel de vida China ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA.

And let’s remember that, in spite of the proliferation of the atomic and thermonuclear weapon during the 40 years of the cold war, no country of the so called Socialists or Popular democracies used them ever.

A psychological basic reason is that the Leninist Marxists look for the paradise in this Earth. That only will bring them a society without classes and without oppressive State, at the end of the times. After many, many, many generations of the «new man». Mao Ze Dong calculated that «there would be necessary more than ninety». «Long you entrust me it, Sancho». And if they lose this survival opportunity by a devastating war, they get totally bemused. And they are kidding themselves.

To any normal or delirious, even primitive religion, has never guessed to offer the paradise here. There are two cases in which the nuclear weapon can be used without ideological obstacles or preventions. The islamist jihadists offer the Paradise to the martyrs of the Yihad. With which they give the security to his believers in the future and solve their problems in this » tears valley». The Israelites consider themselves to be the people chosen by Jehova. And this has not changed opened and directly by Him. For them, the Christianity is a religious diversion, a blasphemous schism. They have the security of Jehova’s promises to Abraham, to Jacob and to Moses. In this exclusivity of the God’s favors, is based his void proselytizing interest. This way, it is not important for them to face a nuclear holocaust. If the existence of his nation, always threatened by his anxious and not democratic neighbors, meets irreversibly threatened. For example, losing a conventional war against the always surronding Muslims.

Resultado de imagen de Consejo Defensa Corea del Norte THEY FAIL TOO MUCH…

A total war with crossing of nuclear volleys with the enemy, would be hiper asymmetric against the elites of North Korea. That would lose everything what they possess and wish: the life, the exercise of the almost all-embracing power and a top living standard, in quality and variety, to that of their compatriots. Of future life, nothing. Therefore, it would go against the natural existing drives in all the men to tackle it in these lamentable conditions and with these apocalyptic perspectives. This one should be the principal reason to remove the adventurous deviationist, initiating this war, from the leaders of North Korea. So, largely, the Initiative, at his level and perspective, would continue in hands of the Maximum Leader of the Revolution of the United Workers and Peasants. The «Dearest Fatty» and his National Defense Council.

Orography of the conventional ground Conflict.

Korea is a mountainous peninsula. A central mountain chain crosses it from north to south, with its maximum heights overcoming 2000 ms. And forming, specially in the north, numerous and narrow valleys. These are orientated principally from north or northeast to southwest. The plains spread in the west of the peninsula, up to the coasts of the Yellow Sea. North Korea, therefore, does not present many favorable areas for the maneuvers of the mechanized forces. These can be easily canalized by broken areas and with short or half sight domain.

Resultado de imagen de Consejo Defensa Corea del Norte A FORMER NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL…

The natural obstacles can be reinforced by abatis, vertical cuts, numerous and small minefields, etc. They are natural areas for the employment of the antitank rejection, based on the hollow load missiles with varied effective shooting distances, got ready with a defense at charge of light infantry units. In support, a well protected and camouflaged artillery, with the enemy approximation avenues and the important or singular points of the area registered before. The flanks of the defense positions can rest on the compartments of the area that form the heights lines.

The Russia of Putin.

Russia reappears after the Dismemberment of the URRS.

The new Russia of Putin, after the difficult and undifferentiated parenthesis of Boris Yeltsin, is waking up from a traumatic transition to a formalist democracy. Not reflected yet in his structures of power and administration. After Yeltsin, the authorities had to be liberated of the «neocapitalist mafia oligarchy«. Which was looking for a political amorphous and of wide apex, specific «form», which was governing the country and was controlling the alternation of the parties, in more or less free elections. Into these ad hoc structures is transmuting the whole superviser and bureaucratic apparatus of the USSR, created throughout 70 years of ferreous dictatorship of the CP. For what it is not chance the professional origin and the mega presidentials manners of Vladimir Putin.

But that give to the new Russia an international creativity and an operational flexibility, that do not have his competitors more «calmed, formal and super regulated». He is what we would say of a good stylist boxer: «he has a great waist». Only to remember the «day of prayer and fasting for the peace in Syria», that proclaimed the Pope Francisco for September, 7, 2013. He accompanying for 4 hours the prayer in the Saint Peter Square that Saturday. Within a few hours, Putin proposed to the international Powers (including the inoperative UNO, which in the international conflicts only serves to give a hypocritical stamp of legality to the public things) the destruction «in situ» of the chemical arsenal of the Syrians of Bashar al-Assad and not his air bombardment. This took France and the USA with the changed foot. And to the Nobel prize of the Peace Mr. Obama, which had asked the support of the Congress for his Air Raid («necessary for the brutality of the Syrian Government with his population»), looking in anguish for supports between the legislators. Because he saw that they would rejecting up even his more moderate plans of intervention.

Resultado de imagen de putin helps al-Assad PUTIN HELPS AL-ASSAD’S REGIME…

The loss of his «controlled allies» of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, after the cold war, only left Russia to a geographically look for «new influences» towards the Asia Central, from Syria to the India and Vietnam. Turkey is a proverbial enemy of the Russians. Though now Erdogan, after knocking down a Russian ground attack plane on the northwest of Syria, has become a very friend of Putin. But this is relating to the moment, for not saying only anecdotal. China is a «partner, competitor and rival (not enemy)» of Russia, if serves this polyvalent definition, which does that none of the expressions are in fullness. In Afghanistan, the Russians could never have settled from the Modern Age. Also the Russians try to win and keep in his «political and commercial sphere» the new central Asiatic Islamic Turkman republics and the ex-Soviets Slavonic Republics. Till now, the Customs Union created by Russia includes only the White Russia and Kazajistan.

Resultado de imagen de putin xi jinpingCHINA IS A «PARTNER, COMPETITOR AND RIVAL» OF RUSSIA.

Following his direct, imperious and operating manners, in the middle of December, 2013, Putin threw a strong argument to Ukraine. In order that she was happening to form part of this Russian Turkoman «sphere of coprosperity»: he offered her to lower 33% the price of transfer of the Russian gas, of which Ukraine is recipient and reseller. And, to save Ukraine from the financial bankruptcy and did not have to be thrown for it in hands of the European Community Troika, he would give her up to $15 billion in soft credits. While, in Ukraine the newly arisen social politic problems have led to a strongest polarization of the country. Two almost antagonistic halves being formed: where the part at the west of Crimea, wants to move away from Moscow and the half at the east of this peninsula seeks to grow the bonds with Russia.

Ukraine is for history and for demography a part of the Europe limited at the East by the Urals. And Ukraine is for political opportunity and historical moment part of the democratic and liberal Center Western Europe. That forms together with the United States, which operates as the other fundamental «vibrant pole» placed at the West side of the Atlantic Ocean, the «Western Civilization». A great problem appears now, not only to Ukraine, but to his neighbors in its eastern and western frontiers. And it is to obtain that the today antagonists and irreconcilable forces, that face in Ukraine, crushing his motherland, turn into complementary and necessary forces between them. And it is a great joint, disinterested labor, with broad-mindedness and directed by statesmen. Which is necessary to develop to achieve it and to remove the scarecrows that glimpse in his political social horizons. If there not be obtaining this «merger of interests», which is the mission of the Politics, the alternative would be bad for all, natives and nearby and distant neighbors. And the wound only would be falsely closed up and for an unforseeable time.

Resultado de imagen de novarrusia soldiersUKRAINE’S INFANTRY FORCES.

For Russia, Ukraine is something more than a strategic ally. As would be the Japanese Empire, the Western Europe or the Great Britain for the USA. Ukraine is a part of the national Russian essence. In Ukraine was born many hundreds of years ago, the strong and promising germ of the Russian nation, the Rus. From the fall of the USSR in 1989, Russia did not face a major disruptor cataclysm, potentially rupturist, that the Orange Revolution of Julie Timoshenko in 2004. Russia must have digested and neutralized or assimilated it, slowly and pacifically. But, the Ukrainian natives and his Russian allies chose to contain and to extinguish it.

It was the easiest thing, but they left a powerful embers under the cap of ashes. And the latent problem has re-arisen now, virulent and almost out of control. The «irresistible offers» of the European Union to Ukraine neither make concrete, certainly, they nor materialize. Beyond the reports and briefings of the European bureaucracy of Brussels and other cities, paralyzed, without imagination, or moral courage, which is selfprotected and automanages. By February 19 or 20, 2014 was generalized the use of “free shooters” or snipers of the police and the special security forces against the most uncontrollable demonstrators or emphasized from the popular revolts, specially in Kiev.

Resultado de imagen de novarrusia soldiers EAST UKRAINE IS IN DANGER…

Since then, the armed opposition of the Novarussia (this way the prorussians separatists autoname their territory in the Donbass’ basin and adjacent zones), supported by the Russians with military equipments (intermingled with convoy of supposed humanitarian help for the civil population of the region) and «groups» of voluntary internationalists, even veteran prorussians Chechenian; and the central government of Kiev, with the president Petro Poroshenko at its head, have followed an operational politic strategy of the “give and take”, of the cachumbambé or balancing pole. Where everything is enough measured and reasonably controlled, to be advancing each part by few and measured steps. Without they irreversibly get run away the animal of the open warfare between nations and alliances. And this way we are and we will continue for long time…

After realizing the armed manly act in Ukraine, the popularity of Putin raised in Russia. And it is kept consistently since then over 80 %… This is not normal in the democracies, if do not exist exceptional situations. Which are those in Russia? Putin has turned into a political social vibrant hub for the Russian people. To which he has recovered the national honor and the category of world power. At less, that is what Russians feel and caught… And though it would not be such, according his demographic and macroeconomic dates, if he was lacking the nuclear arsenal inherited from the USSR. But the emotions and then the feelings are those that create and send out the psychic energy. And they are capable of overcoming the dismay and the vulgarity of a little hard and gray life. And the Russian people wishes and bets for it. And Putin is now his leader, commander, great chief and guardian.

The National Strategy of Putin.

But, not all are kindness and advantages in a super presidentialist regime. The concentrated and decisive power has to be administered in small doses, to not abuse, nor damage, nor to fall down in the temptation of looking for his indefinite continuity. The despotism (that arises from the rotten conviction of the controls from which «they» have «saved» «their» Motherland), the corruption and the clientelism spread over the circles of the power and his outskirts. And they become manifest and customary in the society.

The political and ideological opposition, with his critiques, parliamentary actions and street protests, can become almost unbearable for those who center in planning, deciding and executing in altars of the people, but not with the people. The jail and the confiscation of goods are reprisals of all the life. Which origin gets lost in the times night, in the prehistory, for the dissidents, uncontrollable and disobedient and for all the potential (imagined or not) and real enemies of the regime.

Another «appearance» of democracy that the Russian government exhibits: when the exercised power is almost all-embracing, it is not balanced or compensated by other public independent powers and is held during too much time, turns out to be almost inevitable the appearance of the self-complacency, the corruption, the indifference and the arrogance in many controls that were originally correct.

Russia, at least during a time, will try to recover his rights, traditions and influences. Or it will have to content with turning into a “nation State», without dependent, participative and profitable for all partners «coprosperity spheres”. That «regional or second-class power», as Obama named her at the beginnings of this crisis at the beginning of 2014.

Russia, once known himself as the Second Rome, follows a national, centrifugal, expansive strategy towards the exterior, from her «vibrant European space«. Leaving from that great «national center of the Slavonic etnia» and acting in “waves of communication, influence and domain”, in this order, Russia is straining in extending his presence and ascendancy all over the world, going towards all the possible countries.

Resultado de imagen de russia the second Rome A BUST OF THE PRESIDENT AS CAESAR, ROME EMPEROR OR CZAR, RECEIVES THE SALUTE…

One of the first national exterior aim of Putin is to promote the «multipolarity in the world structure» of the great powers and his allies. Looking that does not exist a world hegemonic power as the USA, which hinders him in the extension of his influence and power from his «core center». For it, Russia will create alliances and will establish agreements and treaties with third parties in detriment or in substitution of that hegemonic power. And he will be a «intransigent obstructionist actor» in all the actions that that one unilaterally promotes in the international forums (UNO, Atomic International Energy Agency). This way, the actions of the western nations in the Syrian conflict are frustrated and limited by the systematic veto of Russia to its approval in the Security Council of the UNO.

Another great strategic preference of Putin is to extend his influence and enlarge the economic and diplomatic bonds with the nations in development, specially those who have «natural resources and primary crops», that are necessary for the manufacturing production, the supply and the general development of the nations. This has taken them and will take them even far beyond of his geographical borders of political or strategically military influences. Using the economy, one of the forces of the national strategy or great strategy of a country, helped by the diplomacy, another one of her potentials, Russia tries to create with the emergent countries «cores of action and shared prosperity». Initiated or cultivated in a world that Russia wishes and search that is «multipolarized» in diverse «cores and centers of geopolitical power». That reduce this way necessarily, by his mere existence, the influence of the great western powers, today «depending of the world trade «.

This national and civilizer geocentrism places Russia as central piece of the Eurasia megacontinent. Where only China might hinder him in his plans of recovery of the lost influences. At the west of China, next with his Sinkiang’s immense region (Xinjiang), in the Eastern Turkestan, is a rosary of ancient Socialist Soviet Republics of 2 thousand Kms of length, which reaches up to the oriental shore of the Caspian Sea. They are, from east to west, Kazajistan, Kirguistan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. And these countries form a monolithic set of several etnias, picked up in their names, but extended simultaneously over several countries, of Turkoman origin, of the central steppes of Asia, and also agglutinated by his belonging to the sunni Islam. All this forms a multinational defensive and refractory shield to the expansive activity and to the significant presence of the Chinese in his internal matters or in his exterior trade, that have political guardianship effects. These Turkoman Muslims are rather a potentials allied of the Great Russia. In all that he puts a bit of dedication and neatnessI in attract and attend them.

Resultado de imagen de Putin xI jINPING sign gas dealPUTIN AND XI JINPING SIGN THEIR NATURAL GAS DEAL IN PEKING.

With his habitual opportunity and operational agility, Putin signed with the president Xi Ji Ping on Wednesday, the 21st of May, 2014 a strategic contract (30 years of validity) to supply China with 38 billions of ms3 of Russian natural gas each year. Certain is that the negotiations of this transcendental contract have extended during a decade, but the opportunity of his signature for both partners is undeniable. Russia has determined his signature lowering a little the price of transfer, which has not leaked out, and that was the principal obstacle for the agreement between the Russian state entity Gazprom and the National Corporation of the Oil of China. It will be begun immediately the installation of a new gas pipeline between Siberia and China, which will cost $ 55 billion and which will be operative in 4 years. China obtains this way a stable supply of part of his energetic primary needs (about 25 %). Which will allow him to be reducing his strategic dependence of his national coal. Whose combustion is the principal generating one of the massive pollution that suffer nowadays the great cities and the industrialized coast of China. It is calculated, according to the official estimations, that China will need 400 billions of ms3 of gas by 2020, doubling the current consumption of gas. Which opens the possibility for new extensions of the Russian supply in the frame of this agreement. For his part, looking for alternative markets for his primary energy, Putin reduces transcendency and efficiency with this commercial operation to the stuttering actions of the European Union, to replace part of the supply of the Russian gas, using other hypothetical suppliers of across the seas. And, in addition, any strangulation of the current service to his buyers, will force the EU to increase his help to Ukraine, to compensate his «reduced income» for the passage of the gas along his territory.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE.

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

 

 

A little known example illustrates the omnipresent transcendence of logistics and the line of communication (more or less branched out) in operations and their final results. Between January 29 and mid-March 1943, the Soviets developed an operation called Donbass at the southwest of the Donetz. This operation forms part of what the Germans called the battle of the Donetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.

 

General Nikolai Fiodorovich Vatutin, commander of the Southwest Front, created a mobile corp (under the command of general Markian Mijailovich Popov) in the Soviet Front, to exploit the break its armies had achieved at the south-east of Kharkov. The Corp was like an Army of tanks (the Soviets had five Armies of tanks in their battle order). It was integrated by 4 tanks Corps of limited capacity (3rd, 10th, 18th and 4th of the Guard), each of which was reinforced by an infantry mobile division (in trucks). For support it had the mobile Front reserve, the tanks Corps (full up) 25th and 1st of the Guard. These reserves would, at the beginning of February, pursue a exploitation direction different from that of the Popov Group. Assimilating those tactical subordination divisions into the mechanized Corps, thus making them stronger in men and heavy equipment, was hoped to compensate for the specific lack of infantry and artillery of the Soviet tanks Corps.

GENERAL VATUTIN.

Popov Group initially crossed the Donetz from a southwest direction. Its 4th Guard tanks Corp reached Krasnoarmeiskaia on the morning of February 12, after a night march of 60 kilometers from Kramatorsk. During this march, the Corp used one of its tanks brigades, the 14ª of the Guard, as an “advanced detachment”, to eliminate the “tactical rubbing” in its advance sector and thus maximize its speed of advance.

GENERAL POPOV.

On February 15, General Vatutin employed his two reserve Corps in the Pavlograd-Zaporozhe direction, towards the mouth of the river Dnepr on the Black Sea. Zaporozhe was the Headquarters for the Don German Group of Armies (this Group had been called South until February 1, 1943) and the 4th Air Fleet (led by Marshal Von Manstein and General Von Richtofen, respectively) which were located in the low Dnepr.

The efforts of the Russians were aimed at trying to reach the coast and to cut the Germans’ land communications. But the Russians also stubbornly insisted on boasting. Their supporting forces (the rest of the Armies of the southwest Front, especially the 6th infantry and 1st infantry of the Guard) were not defending the advance sectors of their mobile forces. And these forces, advancing as fast as they could toward their ideal operational-strategic aim, stretched their communications lines to the maximum. And made them increasingly vulnerable by extending its length and, thus, the coverage required by antitank and anti-aircraft weapons supported with infantry.

The Soviets acted as if the speed of reaching the objective could, by itself, unhinge the German deployment, by cutting it off from its general Order of Battle and lines of communications towards the West. In reality, they were not given full credit to their enemy’s maneuver capacity, his ability to create and improvise resources and his still relatively powerful combat capacities, especially among his mobile and crack forces, in the operational zone.

THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMANDER.

Yet much of the pressure for a rapid advance came from Stalin. Probably through the Stavka, Stalin incited Vatutin to spur on Popov and the other mobile corps. Ultimately, this led to Stalin’s disenchantment (to the point of leading him to request a peace through Swedish diplomats) when the planned operations concluded. See Gerhard L. Weinburg. A World at Arms. Cambridge, 1944.

For their part, the Germans had difficulties in containing the Soviet’s winter offensive concentrated at the south of Belgorod. In the operational strategic zone of the Don Group of Armies, the Soviet forces overcame the Germans at a proportion of 8 to 1, whereas, in the case of the German Center and North Groups of Armies, that ratio was only 4 to 1.

Von Manstein maintained a front that was 750 kilometers long with 30 divisions. This left him vulnerable to envelopment on the north flank, in a maneuver that could reverse his front or turn his forces back in his operational or strategic rear. Or his forces could be broken through by a forceful action in any zone and he would be left without sufficient available mobile forces to launch an operational strategic counterattack. It was necessary to readjust the front, anchoring it on natural obstacles; and to push back the Soviet offensives toward Kiev (north flank) and the Black Sea or the Azov Sea, creating for it the necessary mobile reserves. Hitler, probably affected by the fall of 6th Army at the end of January in Stalingrad, compromised with Manstein’s requests to yield land in order to gain safety and mobility.

IN THE COVER OF «TIME» NEWSMAGAZINE…

Thus, during the first fortnight of February, the Hollidt Army moved back from the low Donetz, following the Rostov and Tangarov route and dug in again along the river Mius, approximately 80 kilometers to the west of Rostov. The 48 panzer Corps that were in action at the east of Rostov, moved to the north of Stalino, to join the 4th panzer Army of General Hoth and to form part of the mobile counterattack force.

In the middle of February, despite Hitler’s orders to resist at any price, the SS Army Kempf (formerly Lanz) evacuated Kharkov, when its north flank was enveloped by the Soviets from the direction of Belgorod. Meanwhile, the 4th panzer Army was moving back from the low Don toward positions to Stalino’s northwest. This was a difficult march of more than fifteen days over poor road conditions and railroad connections and lines. For its part, the 1st panzer Army, formerly part of the A Group of Armies in the Caucasus, could have moved back through Rostov, thanks 4th panzer Army hold on the front in the low Donetz area. And was taking positions in a front from north-east of Stalino up to the north of the Mius river.

THE GERMAN FIELDMARSCHAL’S COMMAND BATON.

With these maneuvers the Germans left the projecting in their front formed by the Don and Donetz rivers, readjusted their defensive front and managed to create an important operational maneuver force, formed by all three mentioned armies. It is important to emphasize that the Germans were not reacting to the Russians; they were adapting to the general conditions and the forces relations existing, with the expectation that they would act positively when the opportunity arose. This is probably the secret behind their operational blow (like a scythe blow) and the operational and strategic “stunning waves” that they were to unleash on the Soviet Armies, which reached the enemy’s Supreme Commander.

On February 22, the two armored Corps (48 at the right side and the SS panzer at the left side) of the 4th panzer Army of Hoth initiated an offensive movement in the northwest direction on the communications lines of Popov Group and both independent Soviet tanks Corps of the southwest Front.

The terrain was highly favorable for using armored vehicles. Its surface was slightly wavy, allowing for extensive sight control. The narrow creeks that interlaced it were frozen.

Simultaneously there was a convergent attack by the SS Army Kempf from the west, completing the operation of the other five panzer divisions (reduced). This Army also had to prevent the advance on the Dnepr of forces from other Soviet Fronts, either around Krasnograd and Dnepropetrovsk or around Poltava and Kremenchug. This soviet attack, that was aimed at Kiev, was of a larger scope and, therefore, had scantier prospects for success before the spring thaw. The army SS Kempf had limited capacity to reject it.

It is worth emphasizing that, at the time, the 4th Air Fleet of General Richtofen enjoyed air supremacy over the operations zone and his aircraft could support the objective of cutting the enemy’s communications with up to 1,000 daily sorties.

THE FÜHRER ADOLF VISITS HIM IN ZAPOROZHE, TO CALM DOWN.

The Russian armored vehicles and truck columns were moving back toward the north and north-east at a distance of between 15 and 20 kilometers from the Germans, making them prey to the German divisional and army Corps artillery and aviation.

It was not a question of the “surrounded bag”-style operations that the Germans had carried out in 1941. The area being covered was larger, the German combat capacity (mainly based on infantry forces with artillery and antitank weapons) was scanty and the Soviet forces were elite mobile units with great fire and shock capacities. And knew the danger presented by the loss of its logistical support, at least their commands.

On February 23 both armored army Corps (the SS and 48th) of the 4th panzer Army were converging on Pavlograd. They cut the communications line of the Popov group, which was situated around Grishino, and of the 25th and 1st of the Guard tanks Corps (the mobile reserve of the Southwest Front) which were already approaching Zaporozhe, although not yet in full force. Likewise, the Germans severely struck the 6th infantry Army (at the west of Isyum), following the Front’s mobile reserve, and the 1st infantry Guard Army, which was behind the Popov group, before they cross the Donetz, moving back to their rearguard.

This temporarily liquidated the combat capacity of the Southwest front (General Vatutin). Unless that front focused on reorganizing and re-equipping itself and covering its casualties. And also tried to revive its combat morale by encouraging cohesion and retraining its units and small units.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

 

THE ARMED DEFENSE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OR DAESH.

Introduction.

The Islamic State has the strategic advantage of his territorial unity, which allows him to support the fights following his interior communication lines. His enemies are dispersed by his borders and operate in multitude of combats sectors or strips. This advantage can be used to fix and keep his enemies, dispersed and operationally unconnected for the different countries and zones. This way, IS preventing them any concentration to attack him.

So, in his Mosul’s operational center, with approximately 2 million habitants, the major city under his power, and the third of Iraq, he keeps the Erbil’s peshmergas fixed, the capital of the Iraqi autonomous Khurdistan. These are not capable of throwing an individual offensive, to go snatching cities and zones from the ISIL and are kept at the defensive. They are Sunnis Kurds, that do not want to coordinate with the army of Iraq and the sectarian Shiites militias.

 ABU BAKER AL-BAGDADI.

In Anbar, the ISIL occupied al-Ramadi, its capital, where the Iraqi army went out, here also, at the disbandment, in an unforeseen and accelerated retrograde march. Los iraquíes culparon de sus desventuras operativas a una gran tormenta de arena, que facilitó la “marcha al combate” de los muyahidines del DAESH. And he threatens the western flank of Baghdad, which says to be training and concentrating forces to recover her, departing from the new base in Taqaddum, at 25 km from al-Ramadi, where are a reinforce of 450 new American soldiers of the four stars American general James Terry. Which acts as a bolt, a ground perpendicular obstruction, against the projection of the ISIL over Baghdad.

The Islamic State has now three great operational areas.

The first great zone includes all the south of the Caliphate, from Aleppo’s south-east up to al-Ramadi, following the course of the high Euphrates. In her, the ISIL is spreading and being consolidated, occupying Palmyra city, finishing the expelling of the National Syrian Army from Dar-ez-Zour’s province (his last troops in her are surrounded at the west of the capital) and the Iraqi soldiers and the Shiites militias from Anbar’s province. At the west of Palmyra are Tiyas and the military airports of the Shayrat, occupied by the NSA, which are vulnerable targets for the ISIL, capable of attacking them from two marching directions. With it, a western defensive flank, directed to Damascus, might be established.

In the north of Iraq, the ISIL keeps his positions in Nínive’s province and part of Saladin’s province, so being consolidated also in the high Tigris.

In Syria, at Aleppo’s north and north-east, along around 400 Kms. of the border with Turkey, up to Hasaka’s frontier province, the ISIL keeps a strategic base, using small offensives and tactical retreats, in a zone of great operational instability. Trying to debilitate the Front al-Nusrah (near the frontier Azaz), the Syrian peshmergas (in Kobani) and other opponents groups and to keep open the narrow frontier sectors, Ras al-Ayn, between others, where he realizes his exchanges of crude oil and derivatives, seized goods, armaments and new supporters. Also he wants to stop the offensive of the opposition in Aleppo, since the ISIL does not have now free means to exploit any destabilization in Aleppo, that would be produced this way. But in Hasaka he wants to be consolidated, to increase his geographical continuity, to protect his frontier passages with Iraq and Turkey, here is Tel Abyad, and to increase his strategic rear, reinforcing this way the Palmyra’s projection over Damascus.

 AN EXECUTION IN PALMIRA.

Turkey, which wants to keep in his south border a difficult military politic balance of power, suspects so much of the (Syrian) Kurds of the YPG and of the ISIL, both approaching in force to his territory. And Erdogan is considering to establish a safety zone of 10 Km. in depth in Syrian territory from the common border, occupying her with around 12 thousand Turkish soldiers. From her, the Turks might also partially control other more 25 or 30 Km. in depth, using his heavy artillery. It is a thorny and controversial topic, of international indefinite transcendence, so the command of the Turkish AA.FF. has asked Erdogan for a formal wrote order, that the President still has not granted.

The air bombardments of the Coalition of the 60 nations, assigned to the Operation «Inherent Resolve», erode and cause casualties to the Islamic State during almost one year. But they do not stop his military principal operations of fixation of his enemies and of increasing the territory of the Islamic State. At less that the western countries, including the USA, the NATO and the European Union, in any degree and practical necessary national combination, are ready and resolve to put on the Syrian and/or Iraqi territories a “sufficient investment of their own soldiers”, in the form of combined ground forces, distributed in the combinations adapted for the tasks that they will assume, the ISIL will not be beaten by his enemies of these Arabic infected countries. And it seems that the ISIL will possible be indefinitely defend from his frontier enemies. In the air raids in Syria take part Arabia, the USA, Bahrain, Canada, the Arab United Emirates and Jordan. In Iraq, asking for the authorities permission attack Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the USA and Great Britain.

The Geographical Scene of the Islamic State (ISIL).

This organization acts in a diffuse, not occupied, but controlled strip, of 300 thousand Km2., that spreads over Iraq and Syria, from Baghdad up to Aleppo and the mountains of the center west of Syria. The width changes along the route. The pillaged territory begins in Faluya, at 60 km to the west of Baghdad, and includes the nearby cities of Habbaniya and al-Ramadi and and Anbar’s extensive and desert province. And, following the Euphrates towards the northwest, it reaches the riverside cities of Haditha and Âna, before penetrating in Syria by Abu Kemal, leaving behind Níniveh and part of Saladin provinces. In the middle of the south and eastern desert of Syria, only relieved by the river, is Dayr al-Zawr. And continuing by the river, we come first to Raqqa, close to the river mouth of the river Belikh in the Euphrates. And then to the artificial lake al-Assad in the great meander of the Euphrates, to continue up to Aleppo and the Kurdish mountains of the center west, in the border with Turkey. Up to 10 million persons might be controlled by the ISIL in this territory.

EXECUTIONS OF ENEMIES OF THE DAESH

It is not easy to move by these lands, which are infertile, beyond the irrigations of the Euphrates and of the artificial lake of al-Assad, without leaving a «tactical fingerprint» of the march. The lands of this great strip lack concealments and natural covers, in the shape of forests, extensive bushes and mountains. This does that the most frequent refuges and stays for the yihadists groups are the villages and populations along his backbone: the Euphrates, his aluentes, as the Jaipur in Hanaka’s province, and his banks. For his defense and more lasting cover they have to disperse by them, forming one or several «muyahidins squads» of not more than 40 men each one.

Operational decisive possibilities.

In any case, the fight in the occupied territories by the Islamic State is an urban fight. It is not an area for a movements warfare. It was so in June, 2014, when the Islamic State spread out, uncontrollably and overwhelming, by the north and north-east of Iraq. And the 30 thousand Iraqi soldiers of the Niniveh and Saladin provinces, went out, afflicted and in stampede, towards Baghdad. Looking for protection and refuge between the walls of the gigantic city and his al-Sadr shii neighborhood, at the east of the Tigris (known as al-Sadr city). And it before the simple «march to the combat» of several hundreds muyahidins. Mounted in Toyotas pick-ups, half “roof opened”, without any armoured and armed with light cannons and heavy machine guns. Certainly, who does facilitate the always present Toyota vehicles to the muyahidines? Some neoconverted concessionaire to al-Bagdadi?

THEY LOVE TOYOTAS, WHOSE PAY IT?

The operational strategy of the irregular bands of the Islamic State centres on never let been got in combat by the Armies or other great forces in «lost in advance» combats. His technics and tactics are the constant and far-sighted mobility; the dispersion and the infiltration in the urban fight, going forward in a flexible and wearing out defense, with space cession; the small, dispersed and more or less simultaneous or sequential actions in an area; the flight by covered bounds; the fight with limited goals and in profitable temporaral conditions; the systematic giving up of positions, forcing the enemy to redeploy and to be prepared every time. They can win to the ISIL the necessary time to survive.

In the temporaral occupations of great populations, they extend his defensive positions beyond what it is necessary in the conventional defense. Covering this way a major surface. His «delaying points» are diffuse, secret and imperceptible to the strangers. It is necessary to enter the houses to detect perforated walls and to find alleys under a furniture or a carpet. The destruction that generates the vague heavy fire, reinforces his combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the accesses of the enemy. Except when they are reached by one direct impact. The “resistance nests” have more importance in this fighting form. Because the occupation of the defense zone is more tenuous, they cannot strengthen too much the positions, the sights are more short and there exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delaying points, to which they return if they are invaded or destroyed. Numerous “alternative positions” exist. This “resistance structure” allows to deceive the enemy, who attacks and burst, on the forward limit of the defense position: about his real extension, the limits of the sectors that form her and the interest of the rebel commands in the defense of the zone; and manages to disperse the heavy fire of the attacker.

THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAK AND SYRIA IV.

(FINAL)

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, nevertheless, has created his bases, from the beginning of his existence, next to his enemies and accessible to them. And they have not been attacked in force and disturbed by the shameful military disabilities of their regional enemies. And al-Baghdadi knew this and he has very well valued it, on having decided to create them this way, with a fine leader «command correct sense» and of the state strategy. Colonel C. M. Woodhouse established that «the art of defeating the guerrillas is the art of getting the people in opposition to them». And in the desert lands of the Islamic State is not necessary to establish how this can be achieved. Already al-Baghdadi is in charge of it, with a zeal worthy of better cause, to make enemies to the death with all that are not of his group or of his pleasure. So now, only motivated, trained and equipped men are absent to do a laborious, but not difficult mission… Already we have seen it. Will they be found by the Iraqis, the Syrians and the air Coalition of 60 countries?

Exemplary and Triumphant Counterguerrilla Campaigns.

In 1.948 the communist Greek guerrilla, in full world postwar period, were on the verge of forming forces semiregulars to openly attack the government. They also wanted to extend the “Steel Curtain” to the South-East of Europe. Their military, not decisive and badly interpreted successes, according to the correlation of forces and the strategic opportunity of the revolutionary communist process, decided them to already face the National Greek Army and to beat it. As did Mao, at the right moment of the Chinese civil war. This way, the Democratic Army of Greece (the DSE or Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados) congregated great part of his guerrilla detachments, which were spreading as a rosary from north to south over Greece, from the Peloponnese up to Macedonia, in the East, to form «regular» units, to which they called «brigades» and «divisions». But this «regular» rebel force, with 12-15 thousand militants, was only the tenth part of the Greek army. Their permanent or temporal bases were allowing them to realize sudden attacks, assaults and ambushes against the governmental authorities, policemen and military men. But, far from them, the bands were lacking sufficient supplies and popular supports for their operations. On the other hand, the guerrilla principal bases, placed in the zone of Vitsi and Grammos, at the northwest of the country, near the border with Yugoslavia, were vital for the revolutionaries for the receipt of the logistic support from this country.

  COMMANDERS POSE AFTER AN ENCOUNTER IN MOUNTAIN GREECE…

A Greek Army patrol sweeping in search of Communist guerrillas.

But they were constituting some orthodox, tangible and attainable targets for the heavy fire and the military force at the disposal of Greece. For this time, the break of Titus with Stalin and the Komintern was total and irreversible. And Titus already was not interested in promoting in the neighboring country a revolution that would derive towards “not revisionist positions”. The principal Yugoslavian faucet was closed and immediately afterwards Albania and Bulgaria also stopped their minor helps. Presented this way the clash, in a month of orthodox operations of march, assault, siege and annihilation, the Greek forces advised and supported by the British and with the military help of American material, occupied the mountainous zone of those guerrilla essential bases, in August of 1.949. That constituted a conventional, hard and definite aim, which had to be defended by the Popular Red «army». With it the Greek democrats stemmed definitively a communist insurrection of «national liberation», which was extending, insoluble and menacing, to a civil war from 1.945.

At the end of World War II, the British awarded Chin Peng the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his heroics in leading guerrillas against the Japanese. He became the leader of the Communist Party of Malaya.

The first attempts of the Malay guerrillas to create bases and establish in them the communist administration were in 1.945. The irregulars of the so called Army of the Malay People went out of the refuge of the jungles, where they were hiding of the Imperial Japanese Army. In 1.948 they initiated the military revolt against the British, establishing in isolated communities of Chinese colonists, seated in Malaya. The communists were expecting to attract to their cause the workers of the mines, plantations and estates and extending this way their bases. But their political propaganda was not tuned with the people in general. And, specially, with the not Chinese community, which was the great majority of the Malays. The general Henry Briggs took advantage of their weaknesses and attacked the lines of supply, preventing them from creating big detachments and forcing them to be dispersed. Briggs was possessing battalions of Gurkhas, of Malays, of British and of Chinese and soon realized that these units were too much heavy to operate against the bands. And with a part of them he formed platoons and companies of “guerrillas hunters”. That were penetrating in the surrounding jungles, were living on the ground, were gathering information of all kinds and were scourging, ambushing and attacking to the communist groups.

GENERAL BRIGGS

GENERAL TEMPLER

And his successor, the general Gerald Templer systematicly attacked them, and they already could not consolidated in any place. This way, the Chinese Malay communists never overcame the primitive stage of stray persecuted guerrillas and only could use the isolated assaults as principal tactics. The tenacity and the patience of the British, who did not propose to prevent them from creating directly bases, but to methodically destroy them, rooted out the guerrillas of the inhabited zones and thrown them again to the jungle and, finally, to the surrender. The following pacification of the infected zones by the communist bands, realized with firmness and consideration, with a strong fist sheathed in a velvet glove, consolidated the support of their habitants to the Greek government. The revolt was definitively suffocated in 1.955. The local communists wanted to imitate Mao and to fight an irregular protracted war. But they lacked two strategic means for get it: enough popular support and stable bases.

THE END.

AN UNSUCCESSFUL AND DEGRADED CALIPHATE III.

(FINAL)

The Islamic State of Syria, Iraq and Levante (southwest of Asia)

Al-Qaeda makes to the Sunnis great part of the difficult, despicable and awkward «fieldwork». And her existence and threat is a trick to play by the Sunnis. Always they can agree with the Shiite government to exercise more or less control over al-Qaeda in some areas. This was the function for general Petraeus re-turned them from 2007 into self-defense forces, the Sahwa militias (of the Sunni resurgence). Strategy that followed without counting with the government and paying the Americans the salaries of these appeased militias. With it, as only antiwestern visible enemy stayed the AQI and next the Islamic State of Iraq, that is to say al-Qaeda. The area of operations is as arid and difficult that that of Syria. The «groups» movements can be detected from the sky and for many eyes of chance observers. The targets of the «punctual assaults with explosives» are the mosques, the markets, the peregrinations, the concentrations of civilians and military men and Iraqi policemen and the frequent passages or in mass of the Shiites. In many of these places always are several members of the same family. The Network uses the uncontrolled violence and taken to her unnecessary, immodest and insanity extremes, not hesitating to sacrifice their «suicide muhaiddins». That will never have «expectations of life and promotion» within the terrorist organization. So, the Network betrays even their «more effective militants», as demonstrates the correlation of caused hurts and suffered losses.

And this is not all. These “fatherland sellers” terrorists are the principal persons in charge of the genocide (systematic extermination of a collectivity for reasons of religion, race or ideology) that the Christians suffer in Syria and Iraq. And that are provoking their massive exodus, probably without return, from their native lands. Where they were living and working from several centuries before the Islam flags were appearing in these Christian lands. Only a brushstroke, probably already forgotten. On Sunday, the 31st of October, 2010 the cathedral.of Our Lady of the Perpetual Help of Baghdad was assaulted during the celebration of the Eucharist by a group of the AQI. Blowing, shooting and throwing grenades, they attacked the present faithfuls and celebrators, in a delirious drunkenness of blood and horror. And shot the crucified Christ, who was presiding. Dozens of persons, major and children, and two priests, remained died in the sacred place, sacrilegiously profaned. This way, on following December 14, the cardinal Leonardo Sandri, Prefect of the Roman Congregation for the Oriental Churches, had to dedicate again the cathedral to the divine worship. It was the response of the Christian faith to the aggression of the subhuman assassins. The cardinal breathed the community to live through a response of love to all the Iraqis, under the protection of the Virgin of the Perpetual Help. In the first letter to the Corinthians, 1 can be read: » do not you know that you are God’s temples? So, that who profanes His temple, God will destroy him». The Justice belongs to God, the Wise , the Merciful, the Compassionate, which knows the deeds of all men and they will be pay for them the Day of the Resurgence…

At the beginning of 2014, the forces of the ISSIL invaded Faluya. «Already there is no presence of the Iraqi State in Faluya. The police and the army left the city. Al-Qaeda has taken off the Iraqi flags, has burned them and hung her own flags on all the buildings», exaggerating narrated a local journalist to “The Washington Post”. At the end of the Friday central prayer, the 3rd of January, followed even in the street by thousands of Muslims, dozens of jihadists, with the «black banners embroidered with the Shahada» of al-Qaeda, appeared in the downtown, to proclaim the establishment of an «Islamic emirate» in Faluya. The Shahada is the profession of faith of the Islam and his alone recitation turns the neophyte into Muslim. It is his Islamic personal and intimate baptism, without necessary presence of an imam. The Shahada is sometimes «adorned» with a cutlass extended to all the long of his text. Al-Ramadi is also partially occupied. There, the Government troops killed on Friday the local commander of the ISSIL, Abu Abdelrahman al-Bagdadi. In the combats of this day in these two cities of Anbar’s province, died more than 100 military men and jihadists.

The combats began on Monday, the 30th of December in al-Ramadi. There, the forces of Baghdad devastated a camp of anti-government protest, raised at the end of 2012 and considered as “al-Qaeda’ barracks», and untied an islamist counter-offensive, that they were not waiting. The march 2 years ago of the American forces, created a dangerous deterioration of the Iraq capacity to face the irregular insurgence, in his double aspect of military fight and civil action of development, education and politics. And this encouraged the Sunnis militias in general and the jihadists of al-Qaeda especially. The Sunni Iraqi minority is frustrated by her loss of rights and freedoms at hands of the Shiite government of the prime minister al-Maliki. The last elections dedicated the «democratic» right of the Shiite majority over her. And «Sunni Resurgence» of general Petreaus, is already without «stimuli». And the lack of perspectives to obtain civil advances in the negotiations with the majority, returned the latent and bellicose Sunni’s «local and regional forces of self-defense» to the active rebel rows.

The operational strategy of the jihadists groups centers in never get involve by the Army in combats lost in advance. Their technologies and tactics are the constant and beforehand mobility; the dispersion and the infiltration in the urban fighting, going forward in a flexible and wearing out defense, yielding space; the small, dispersed and more or less simultaneous or sequential actions in an area; the staggered flight; the fight with limited aims and in advantageous temporary conditions; the systematic abandon of positions, forcing once and again the enemy to deploy and prepare. They can win for the ISSIL the necessary time to survive in Iraq.

In the temporary occupations of large populations, they extend their defensive positions beyond the necessary in a conventional defense, covering a great surface. Their «delay points» are diffuse, disguise concealed and cover. So are imperceptible for the strangers. It is necessary to enter the houses to detect perforated walls and to find passages under a furniture or a carpet. The destruction that generates the heavy vague fire, reinforces their combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the enemy accesses, except when are reached by a direct impact. The resistance nests have more importance in this form of fight, because the occupation of the defense zone is more tenuous, they cannot strengthen too much the positions, the sights are more short and exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delay points and to them return if the nests are invaded or destroyed. Numerous alternative positions exist. This defense structure allows to deceive the assaulting enemy about the forward limit of the defense position, her real extension, the limits of the sectors that form her, the interest of the rebel command in the defense of the zone and to disperse the attacker heavy fire.

AN UNSUCCESSFUL AND DEGRADED CALIPHATE.

The Islamic State of Syria, Iraq and Levante (southwest of Asia)

Ayman al-Zawahiri disallowed at the beginning of February 2014 the use of the brand “al-Qaeda» by the ISSIL. This organization was using that “seal” as «guarantee of terrorism, robbery and anti-Christian unrestraint», in her raids and assaults in these countries and Lebanon. The mentioned managing director of «Terror International Partners» or “The Network” (al-Qaeda, in Arab) reached his incompetence level on having replaced, by premature and unexpected death, the founder of the «Consortium for the Islamic complete Terror». Lacking the charisma and the capacity of action that had Osama Ben Laden, the direction of al-Qaeda is today more an ideological «think tank», that a respectable and respected «strategic conductive command».

The Geographical Stage of the Islamic State.

This organization acts in a band of 100 thousand Km2., that spreads over Iraq and Syria and that forms a rectangle of 800 km length for 125 km width, from Baghdad up to Aleppo and the mountains of the west center of Syria. The width changes along the tour. The pillaged territory begins in Faluya, approximately 60 km west of Baghdad, and includes the nearby cities of Habbaniya and al-Ramadi. And, following the Euphrates towards the northwest, it reaches the riverside cities of Haditha and Âna, before penetrating in Syria by Abu Kemal’s city. In the middle of the desert of the south and east of Syria, only relieved by the river, is the Dayr al-Zawr city. And continuing for the river, we come first to Raqqa, close to the mouth of the river Belikh in the Euphrates. And then to the al-Assad artificial lake n the great meander of the Euphrates, to continue up to Aleppo and the Kurdish mountains of the west center, in the border with Turkey.

It is not easy to move in these lands, which are infertile, beyond the irrigations of the Euphrates and the lake al-Assad, without leaving a «tactical fingerprint of the march». Here are advised and prescribed the Obama’s drones and the profuse collection of information and analyses of his agencies of espionage. That can carry out a continuous exploration and follow-up labor on the human movements in the whole zone we treat. This, completed with the ground labor of collaborators and allied forces, allows to create a sufficient and constant intelligence on the plans, deployments, concentrations of the ISSIL’s forces.

The grounds of this great area lacks concealments and natural covers, like forests, extensive bushes and mountains. This does that the only refuges and stays for the yihadists groups are the villages and populations along its backbone: the river Euphrates and his banks. For their defense and cover they have to disperse in them, forming one or several «squads of muhaidins» of not more than 35 or 40 men each one. This irregular group is the major one that can be coherently commended by a local «arraez» or chief, with poor discipline and military formation.

The Jihadists in Syria and their Contradictions.

The deep crisis of the Syrian civil society and the mismanagement produced by a civil war «in crescendo», that already extends for three years, causing approximately 140 thousand deads, have allowed the jihadists groups in the Near East to settle in Syria. Their refuge zones or influence areas are not big, nor continue. They are rather dispersed, nearby between them, but split. And none of them would resist the serious harassment of the NSA (the National Syrian Army) or of the principal rebel forces: the SFA (Syrian Free Army), the recent “Islamic Front”, the newest “Army of the Syrian Mujahidins” anti al-Qaeda or the Kurdish forces, defending their frontier zone with Turkey. The occupied zones form as amorphous and fluent in evolution «spots», from which they withdraw if the military enemy pressure is strong and continued. To establish in alternative, as nearby as possible, positions, which allow them to keep a minimal operational connection with other temporal regional positions.

Since they do not have enough rooting between the Syrian, to leave their temporal positions does not suppose to abandon their habitants to the military or rebel enemies. The habitants of the occupied areas are not gained for the “Holy War”. These settlers are frightened, threatened and, at least, neutralized, in order that they give cover, subsistence and support to the jihadists bands and neither hinder, nor importune them in their activities. Only those that cooperated with the «Enemies of the Jihad» can be in real danger before them. When the jihadists occupy a population, always prepare their evacuation routes towards the suburbs of her, and of retreat, from those to the meeting points established nearby. To go from them to regional positions of reception and/or of occupation.

When they are liberated of the jihadist presence, many habitants, specially in the small towns, try to temporarily flee and shelter in the nearby major populations. The reason is that the imperious, inconsiderate and striking despotism of the jihadists, is joined by the heavy fires of their enemies, used during the recapture of the population. Both the military men and the rebel major groups prefer to avoid their losses and hurrying the eviction of the jihadists, using the aviation (only the government) and the artillery, if they have her. Even, the free flight hollow load antitanks missiles RPG-7V type (the poor artillery), launched in double or triple volleys, cause a devastating effect In the masonry or adobe buildings. This already would serve to make withdraw towards the town interior the security jihadists forces from their advanced and of observation positions, placed in the limits of the town or in adjacent points. And already finally, the military men, very occupied now, usually move back in a short time, to realize other missions; so, the constant, fluid and even reversible character of the irregular military operations; then, the jihadists can return and purge responsibilities. Because of it, many civilians think: «once and not more».

In Syria have proliferated the «groups of supporters» or bands of al-Qaeda. The reasons of which they have not been articulated in an only terrorist Syrian group are different. One is the distance and the lack of control and power of al-Qaeda’s «central core». This is the tails of her operational decentralization, which “the Network” is proud of and with what threatens to reach her timid enemies for half planet. The communist parties, specialists verified in the capture of the Power, always exhibited an ideological, operational and military monolithic unity, proper of warlike filled with enthusiasm monks, in their so called «national liberation fights» for three continents. Another reason is that these «separated brothers» hate between them. The egalitarianism derived from the brotherhood in the salafists sunnies doctrines, soon originates between the «equal ones», a purulent and contagious infection of envy, ill-will and rancor. And vice versa, the existence of a capable, just hierarchy, respected and accepted in an organization, favors the emulation and the ascent of many of the most capable members. A reason is also that the ambition, the audacity, the overflowing aggressiveness and the lack of scruples of his arms chiefs, sheiks, local maliks and peeled leaders, only are equalized by their scanty formation, a poor interpretive knowledge of the Koran and the Sunna and their broken military knowledge. Their first bitter enemy is neither the Army, nor the SFA or the self-defense militias of Kurds, Alauits, Christians or Druzes, according to the regions. Their more hated and fearful enemies are the commands of other jihadists groups of Syria. Because they are the most related, their rivals for the control and command, their competitors for the direction of the jihadist movement in Syria. This way, the foolishness (lack in the knowledge that supposes them and they need) of all the jihadists groups leads them to want to distribute the booty of war, before having put, at least, in reasonable conditions to aspire to conquer it.

On the other hand, touching already the strategies of the 2 groups pro al-Qaeda in Syria, the Front al-Nusrah seeks to establish only an «Islamic radical emirate» in Syria. The ISSIL, born in the guerrilla warfares fights in Iraq after 2003, wants to create a more extensive salafist caliphate. And to install it, for the moment, in Syria and Iraq. Though it has already done punishment assaults to the Lebanese Shiites, in response to Hezbola’s support to al-Assad. The first answers and goes in parallel to al-Qaeda’s strategy of favoring the creation and the functioning of national or regional «representative cores». That from his large physical distance and with the structural laxity of the Network, could be controlled by her, as for orders, strategies and operations and the use of the «al-Qaeda brand». But, the ISSIL looks for a functional independence and, probably also ideological, with «head office core» of the Network. Since it would act as a «leader operational command» in a supranational zone, which might include the whole southwest of Asia. This way, an administrator and absentee high headquarters would immediately be in the way to the ISSIL.

Ayman al-Zawahiri confirmed, as we said, the link of the Front al.-Nusrah with al-Qaeda and denied any relation with the ISSIL. And he had to intervene in other occasions to deprive al-Bagdadi of authority. «The ISSIL must be abolished, whereas the Islamic State of Iraq must continue working», al-Zawahiri declared In November, 2013. «Al-Bagdadi committed a mistake on having established the ISSIL without asking us for permission», and, continued, al-Golani the Syrian «has been wrong on having announced his rejection of the ISSIL, without our permission». Al-Zawahiri ordered then that the Islamic State of Iraq should circumscribe his operations to that country, whereas the Front al-Nusrah is “an independent branch of al-Qaeda, that reports before the general command (as a franchisee)». In addition, he recriminated both «brothers groups» for their violence acts against other Muslims. In response, and in spite that the original group «al-Qaeda in Iraq» (AQI) of Musab al-Zarkawi had sworn loyalty to al-Zawahiri, al-Baghdadi declared himself in rebellion towards him. Producing an important crisis of leadership in the Network, which they tried to relieve separating from al-Bagdadi. This could not less that debilitate the fight against al-Assad, as the jihadists groups were spreading in Syria and the army was centering towards the large populations. And during the recent clashes between the rebels, al-Golani offered to a mediation to the groups, which has not come to fruition, in order to give priority to plant face against al-Assad.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Western Defense and the Great Strategy of his Nations II.

(CONTINUATION)

This way, for us, to cut away in our National Defense is to damage, hurt or mutilate, according to the cases, the solidity, conviction, credibility and continuity of the internal and external projection of the Spain “seal». It is not a question of having up to an elite unit of «infantry on donkeys» (as «mountain dragoons»). To be able to clean an affront in Bolivia or in the Central African Republic. As the one that had needed Great Britain, when she wanted to avenge in the 19th century an offense from the Bolivians. That showed off her Ambassador mounted in a donkey. And found that neither the Royal Navy, nor her embarked infantry could coming up to lands so deep inland. But it is a theme that our Smart Defense, praised already by the NATO, supports and balanced and adequately distributes her budgets and means. In order that she can face the three mentioned kinds of wars, in the framework of the European and Western Joint Defense.

The modern units must be adapted for every type of fight and, at the same time, be bivalent or polyvalent. For example, the small elite units are suitable for their employment in the three types of wars. Their tasks are to attack diverse enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, using assaults with limited aims in his tactical or operative depth. Realizing always a study, the exposition and very rigorous tests of their insertion and extraction, which are their tactical weaknesses. The artillery units and the nuclear tactical missiles units are useful in the first phases of a nuclear conflict. And when the conventional war enters a serious conflict, which cannot get lost. Using them as part of a flexible response operational strategy and by successive steps. The modern anti ballistic missiles of the system AEGIS and the Patriots can serve to collaborate destroying the enemy missiles of any origin and in the three types of conflicts. Let’s remember that Saddam Hussein provoked repeatedly the Israelis in the War of the Gulf of 1991 (a regular war), using his different types of SCUD (ballistic antiquated missiles of calculable paths) with conventional heads. And that Hamas, in the totally asymmetric conflict at ends of 2012, was throwing with great profusion and diffusion theirs over Israel’s south and center. Managing to reach without any precision Tel Aviv’s beaches and the suburbs of Jerusalem, using the missiles facilitated by Iran. That is to say, almost all the types of existing units are necessary, incorporating them In a balanced and sufficient combination, to attend to the challenges of the different armed conflicts.

The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (not driven planes of exploration and of bombardment) also has content and usefulness here. But always operating as part of the «combined weapon sets». The planes without crew can substitute profitably one «reconnaissance long range patrol» (exploration patrol in the operational enemy zone). To confirm with the sights the presence of an eminent enemy chief, hidden between the walls and courts of his shelter residence, placed in a cultural and ethnically related to him country. An exploration patrol would assume undue risks in the deep interior of an hostile territory. And even they might precisely and cleanly execute him with the AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles. If it was not because the most probably of doing it (that belongs to God!), which is looked for by the «overkilling», «over liquidating» the enemy. In spite of the «dead and injured men and collateral property damages», that grow this way lateral and exponently. And the almost neurotic «body count» or checking the corpse or the remains, to properly value the mission. Both are «appearances» (or spiderwebs, as is preferred) taken root in the mind and know how of the commands and military doctrines of the USA.

For example, when they tried, with only a pure attrition action, to operationally destroy the long distance and distribution transports and the logistic support structures (stores and distribution centers towards the different enemy supply areas of its tour, sections with hard surfaces roads, vehicles repair centers, etc.) of the Route Ho Chi Minh. Using the «saturation bombardments» of the B-52 (a strategic bomber in constant tactical missions!) and the most precise attacks of their ground support bombers. These were principally the AC-130, with diverse variants, and the light bomber B-576, a highly improved device, designed from the British Canberra of the 50s of the 20th century. The Route allowed enough abaster to the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese forces in the «demilitarized zone», between both Vietnamese republics, and at the south of that. And it was thinking up from North Vietnam across this of Laos. The support bombers were attacking in the night the trucks’ rest parks and the trucks marching groups. And, following came the “body count”, using airplanes with cameras. Looking to measure and quantify the success of the missions of the Command Hunt (or Command for the Route). The problem was that, the following day, the whole attacked section of the route was turning out to be unpolluted, without debris, not even any residue. The junior Americans officials explained ironically it, speaking about the effective action of a «Great Laotian Truck Eater Monster». That was taking charge at dawn, stubbornly cleaning the route for the North Vietnamese. For 1972, the total of enemy vehicles destroyed in the Uncle Ho’s Route, according to the most rigorous body count, was overcoming in more than 50% the calculated by the Military Intelligence in the total North Vietnamese park.

And this has continued happening in the «stage» of the War called of the Information. Whose paradigm or principal metaphor, is the computer and its derivatives. It was supposed that, after the «dispersion» created by the introduction of the internal combustion engine in the operations, it should turn to give a major sensation of control and security in the area of their direction and control. And allow to automate many of the of the military operations’ phases. But, during the so called Kosovo’s War, the Serbian were high capable of teasing the ultramodern sensors of the NATO’s airplanes. Using for it cheap artifices of elementary technology: as were the diverse camouflages, the decoys or false targets and the fleeting emission of their machines. When the «fog» in the air operations vanished, their inefficiency, after 78 days of bombardments, was evident. And in this period, the NATO was encouraged by a false sensation of success. «Newsweek» published an article in the year 2000, where appeared an investigation realized by USA Air Force years ago, to «measure» the results of those air raids. So, they detected the rests of 14 tanks (of the 120 initially «targets reached»), of 18 armored infantry transport vehicles (for 220 «targets reached» declared) and of 20 towed or self-propelled artillery pieces, while they confirmed in its moment up to 450 «struck» pieces. More things of the electronics, optics and the great distance to the enemy…

THE END.

The Western Defense and the Great Strategy of his Nations

Since more than two decades, the USA has been systematically reducing his Defense budgets. Free of the threat of a global confrontation with the USSR and his allies of the Warsaw Pact, the USA has dedicated growing quantities of the contributors money to increase their squalid «social public expenditures». But, the USA is something more than a «continent in their self», only subject to the mercantile globalization. They are the principal pillar of the West Defense. And they are one of his two poles or vital, active, ideological and complementary nodes. And the other are Western and Oriental Europe, joined now with their anxieties of freedom and by a several social and economic systems, that are imperfect, but assumed and in development.

Development of the situation of weakness.

During the application of the Marshall Plan (known there as the European Recovery Program, name toked from the general of five stars George Marshall, chief of the High Staff of the US Army during the World War II and Secretary of State in 1947) for the reconstruction and development of Western Europa, this was nourished with the American assistances and investments. And before his voracious Red enemy «ad portam», that might cross theoretically the German plains in a few hours and reach Hamburg and the Benelux, the western Europeans did not have to realize relevant expenses for their Defense. Europe was entrusting it to the weapon systems and the soldiers of the USA. Which were covering and threatening the whole low abdomen of the Red Czars Empire. Forming so placed a protective insulating cordon, from the North Atlantic up to the Pacific Ocean and creating strategic alliances from the NATO to the SEATO (or South East Asia Treaty Organization). If we want to estimate how much money and effort the Europeans saved themselves, been able to do without these inevitable expenses of pure survival, we can see an example. The overwhelming weight of the military expenses that supported the USSR in his last ten years, was the necessary reason, though not sufficient, of their social economic asphyxiation. That took them to the inevitable precipice in 1989. A second range Soviet leader accepted later that, «we even did not have anything to eat».

But Europe also was contributing an ideological counterpoint, a psychological balance and a socio cultural magma to this transversal «mutual exchange» in the West. That were giving to the USA, continuity, sense and belonging to a tradition and to an active, enterprising, expansive, Christian and millenarian idiosyncrasy. That were taken root in the Greeks, the Romans, the Christian Revelation and the identities and baggages of the peoples westernized successively. This helps to constantly create and adapt the collective identity of the USA and his raison d’être as «primus inter pares» of this actual civilization. And this «double osmosis» of thoughts, experiences and identities, creates the modern western society, as we know her. That, with all his failures, mistakes and faults, continues being the «social identity and entity» more anticipated social, political and economically. And the one that more individual and collective rights recognizes to her citizens and inhabitants.

Now the purple and the control in West weighs to the USA. And, in the retreating phase of one of their vital cycles, they have partly forgotten their belonging to the Western Civilization » dependent of the international commerce». But this multi polar world is not safer than that of the two antagonistic irreconcilable, liberal and communist, social blocks, which disappeared almost 15 years ago. Let’s see several examples of prominent «nodes» in the actual «multi polar network» of nations and their associations and alliances. An expansionist China governed by the Communist Party, who looks for regional alliances, for the moment only with commercial interests towards the scanty and strategic materials, with the emergent countries of all the continents. And that tries to create her «sphere of influence and co prosperity» of great metropolis in the western Pacific Ocean. A full of contradictions Russia, a great power that always has reacted and has grown bolder with the dangers and vital difficulties, with an increasing importance and ambition. The South American and African continents, in that almost only the lack of leaders and effective elites, which are the principal antidote against the corruption and the lack of stable investments, hinder and stop an exuberant and endured economic and social expansion during decades. A Middle East and a north of Africa in full social boiling, that are guided by an expansive, global and exclusive religion in her more vindicator interpretations. More than for a few democratic «green buds», which do not have any tradition in their social idiosyncrasies.

A stationary and bureaucratized Europe, very advanced technologically and developed. But that is ideologically lethargic and without «reasonable illusions». That motivate and stimulate it to the social phase of motivation and expansion of a new cycle. And without having attacked to his time, still, the most difficult integration of his supranational institutions. To that there are opposed passively all the national and European bureaucracies, for his own inert existential weight, and in reason to the structural present and future complications and to the zones of power in game. That motivate and stimulate it to the phase of socials motivation and expansion in a new vital cycle. And without having undertook in time, still, the most difficult integration of her supranational institutions. To which are passively opposed all the national and European bureaucracies, by their own inert existential weight. And in reason to the structural present and future complications and to the zones of power in game. Because only when the belonging to a social superior entity produces social, political and economic tangible benefits, will be when the peoples, regions and many of their leaders appreciate, be interested and prefer the Joined Europe, to a commercialized and amorphous union of European nations.

Correction of the course of the Western Defense towards an expansion phase .

The USA and the countries of the old Europe must remember that the expansion and yet the maintenance of the civilizations begin with the arrival of the colonists, merchants and adventurers. That assume the first risks in interacting with local natives and create the first bonds between strangers. In order that all they start feeling interestedly complementary between them. And without nobody perceives between them a potential threat. That the falling back civilizations or yet «stable and crystallized», create an existential emptiness. That attracts and favors the penetration, deployment and new developments in the neighboring civilizations.

And that no healthy civilization cannot be supported without a sufficient Armed Forces. That must assume and face the different and yet contradictory challenges of the three classes of conflicts or modern wars: the regular, the nuclear and the irregular. In the European intervention in Libya, authorized only for the air protection of the civilians, was observed that the Europeans lack, for example, of airplanes of supply of fuel in flight. And these had to be facilitated by the USA, to carry out our air interdiction missions and of bombing the reinforced positions and the tanks of Libyan government. And the ground attacking French aviation to support the operations of the French and of Mali troops has also needed the airplanes of supply in flight of the USA. To be able to increase her attack to land capacities, in firepower, effective range and time of service and optimize his offensive flights. And to displace from Azawad’s Islamic Republic, in the north of Mali and with a surface of 600 thousand Km2. (The major European country, France, only has 550 thousand Km2.), all the radical islamist groups (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib, Ansar al-Dine and others), that established themselves in Mali at the beginning of 2012, when Gaddafi was eliminated. The significant European lacks are not corrected in reasonable time due to the national diminishing budgets, which we have to apply in an economic long stagnation phase. But, also, due to the own absence of an European sufficient, integrated and flexible Defense Politic.

Nevertheless, in May, 2012 a summit conference of NATO took place in Chicago, to define his joint strategy for Afghanistan and to deep into the «Smart Defense». And, on the occasion of its preparations, at the end of April, 2012, the General Secretary of the NATO, the Danish Anders Fogh Basmussen declared that: «I do not believe that Europe is being militarily threatened just now, during this crisis». Is it necessary to see the wolf’s ears to buy and to provide the shepherds with dogs and cudgels? How much time is necessary in creating new units in combat capacity and in designing, making and deploying new weapon systems?

(TO BE CONTINUED)

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN II.

(continuation)

The explosive Taliban: from the Jihad to the Garden of the Houris, without scales.

The suicidal mujaidin is a personally advanced weapon (just look for who has nowadays the fearlessness of removing itself from life, defending some ideals and a prize at the Other Side), abundant, nearby and cheap. It possesses the highest «combat specific capacity», (according to the parameters established by colonel Trevor Dupuy, which refer to real values of the different armies, calculated in conflicts and wars): many military men, policemen and civil authorities of the enemy are definitive losses for each own loss. And speaking in terms of the universal good administration principle of the scanty available resources, his actions (as «investments») have also a high ROMI; or (military) return over this marginal investment. The suicidal jihadist optimizes this way his asymmetry with the weapon and the highly available enemies. This soldier of «one use» knows, takes advantage of his opportunity, decides and acts. Because he can be a hallucinated fanatic, but he is not an idiot. For his personal and ideological character, his effective action raises the moral, the conviction and the decision of his companions, collaborators and sympathizers. The islamist suicide «appreciates» this way his enemies. Because they are his infallible key to «going out under canopy from this Valley of Tears «.

The explosive fighter is a common weapon of the Talibans. If the explosive charge, her characteristics and the vector are suitable, the sophisticated enemy sensors and the protective jackets are of little use against he. And the armored vehicles and the buildings also do not serve to be protected from he. The “trigger carrying agent” can be man or woman and adult or child. And can cooperate in his suicide attack, a bushes, a goods stand, a donkey, a bicycle or an engine vehicle. A «suicidal fighter of one use», is not a select marksman: he is not necessary to train militarily (basic, technical and tactical knowledge). His other complementary, fearsome and almost unbeatable weapons are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.

The aims preferred by the «explosives sworn-ins» are the enemy security forces, so much «unbelievers» as «traitors», and the Muslims belonging to the heterodox branch of the Islam (the Shiites and Alauites). To the enemy security forces they bring over disguised as recruits in formation, candidates for the enrollment, supplies personnel (outsourced services), companions, «collaborators» of the ISAF and civil innocent prominent figures. Their target is human always, because the property damages hurt less the regular enemy. And they are located in the policemen or the enemy armies agglomerations, in the barracks, recruitment centers and points of obliged and frequent passing and with motive of stops, farewells, ostentations and exhibitions, of those. To the Shiites they bring over taking advantage of their inevitable concentrations: the annual international peregrinations to his holy places, his stopping places in the different stages or the Fridays midday prayers, specially communities, in their mosques. Though the latter assaults take place rather in the bordering countries, Iraq (Shiite majority) and Pakistan (Sunni majority).

The great problem is that is very difficult to fight (to offset, stop or neutralize) against a few enemies, more or less isolated, determined to die and of another etnia and idiosyncrasy. And with the suicides this sharpens up to making it almost impossible to realize «a priori». Because they are combated with modern, technology and trained forces, prepared generally for wars of third generation. That would theoretically face similar forces or of the second generation. And their commands have almost as an unavoidable premise, preserve from physical (the principal thing), mental and moral hurts the men under their orders. The suicide must go unnoticed in the place chosen for the attack, by its age, genre, aspect and attitude. He has also to conceal perfectly his appliance and his equipment. To be able to approach his target and make exploit that one. His passport for the Garden of the Houris is to take with him the major number of dead and mutilated enemies.

The added human and material hurts to Muslims, caused around the explosion point, are “collateral damages”. The Sunnies jihadists looked for an overcomplicated, but sufficient «solution» in the practice, to ignore the Koranic rule «thou will not kill Muslims». On having lacked a clergy and an only religious doctrine, the interpretations of the Islam and, especially, his applications for the daily life, can be multiple. In effect, to calm the repugnances in producing them, an al-Qaeda «ideologist», Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a «religious» theory about the «not looked hurt». According to her, is allowed to the militants jihadists to kill Muslims, when is inevitable. And, even, when it is useful. And the mujaidins express their desire that the collateral dead men, should also be considered by Allah as martyrs of his «holy war». And to believe this, comes very well to the fanatics who direct the groups and to the insanities fanatics that follow or support them.

The motivations of these “explosive sworn-ins” are simple. An effective material motivation is their chronic loss of the basic natural needs: sustenance, family, safety, refuge and cover, expectations and reasonable progress. It is an effective spur to induce the employment of the liberating violence by a part of the society, specially the idealistic young men. The «positive» motivation would be the economic prizes that Talibans give to the families of the martyrs. And these are so much the fallen in combat as the suicides. The religious motivation is the powerful mean of persuasion and conviction. The suicides of the Jihad are methodically and intensely catechized. The Koranic verses related with the Jihad, are known by heart by them. The other suicides «example» surrounds them in their daily life. In the way of photos, manuscripts, testimonial videos and destiny companions. Their preachers clarify their doubts and encourage them to prematurely reach the Paradise. That is destined specially to the martyrs of the Jihad. Everything is like to the initiation functioning of a toxic sect: that destroys the personality of the lowest members. The universal character of the Muslims’ community, facilitates the flow and the insertion of «internationalist voluntaries» suicidal fighters from other countries.

The operational key of the Taliban are their innumerable local chiefs, with their small bands of radical irregulars. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching or catechizing, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets, on both sides of the border. The Taliban movement follows a constant elementary cycle of «teaching, training, supporting and delegating» between the small «sheiks» and his deputies. So that they obtain a certain rotation in the command and in its exercise. These local «maliks» are practically immune to the assault of the «drones» of the ISAF. That explore, attack the irregular enemy and execute his evident, it is supposed, out-standing commands.

The drones cannot follow and attack so many minuscule and evasive targets. From an enemy network that turns out to be profuse, diffuse and confused. They cannot substitute, as is claimed by extrapolation from a few first successes, the ground active and aggressive patrols of exploration or combat. That, together with the military units and the civic and political action groups, are destined to dispute and gain his “bases refuges” to the enemy and, later, the popular majority support. Like the «American saturation bombardments» could not cut the Route Ho Chi Minh, supplying the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese forces in the «zone demilitarized» and at the south of this. Going from North Vietnam across Eastern Laos to South Vietnam. And all was because their air attacks, were not accompanying a «ground action» over that Route. That was complementary, systematic and constant, not necessarily exhaustive, of the air action of pure attrition.

And waiting in peace death from sky does not scare, even not worry sufficiently the mentally normal people. This only happened to the imaginary chief of Asterix’s Gallic village. And is something like what Ramon Gómez de la Serna was saying to his acquaintances and less intimate friends in Buenos Aires: «Here I am, waiting for the cancer». The intimidating threat, which could change the conduct of an enemy chief, must be something real (that is tended to magnify), sufficient, felt and immediate or near. Like the sirens installed in the Stukas. In order that his precise diving bombardment terrifies in land all his possible human targets, which were not yet veterans. Or as the explosive mujaidins, whose behavior is for the enemy like a “gas”, without own volume or form and that can reach all the available sites.

THE SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY III.

(continuation)

THE TANKS ARMIES AS SUMMIT WEAPON OF THE ART SCIENCE OF THE SOVIET WARFARE.

Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

His tactical and operative employ in the marches and combats.

Once inserted the tanks army inside the enemy operational zone, his employ was generally much separating of the Soviet theory of the mechanized modern war of «maneuvers». The mechanized or tanks brigades were often used in untidy or even rash form. They were separated and simultaneously looked for many aims, using the maximum possible operating speed: To displace towards the west, pushing them, the major possible number of enemy units or other times, to cut off them. To liberate many populations, villas and places. And to attack in a too much broad sector, all the enemy units that were occupying defensive positions in it.

The logistics left a lot to be desired even for these elite units, as they were moving away from his lines and were consuming his initial resources. The units and small units were lacking equipments, armament, supplies, ammunitions and food. And the scanty and late restoration of the long-suffering falls, dead, injured and sick men, had very soon and almost permanently the units below his maximum authorized endowment. This tightened to the maximum the resources and men was leading to the units to a chronic lack of sufficient combat and operational movement capacities, in the spears of advance detached by the battalions, in the way of companies and even platoons. And without these combined joint capacities it is not possible to exercise a real, solvent and devastating “influence” on the enemy. That would move towards the units and their commands in the shape of “waves of commotion”, through the enemy rear. Except that, during a time, the enemy believes it or is in worse operational conditions that the attacker.

Frequently the offensive operations were realized without operational exploration, not even of combat, lacking the small attacking unit of information or intelligence about the enemy, his means and supports and his positions, and let’s not say on his intention. The formation of assault, even in these elite infantry units was usually the more or less thin line of advance (in «guerrilla»), formed transversely in the direction indicated by the chief of company command to the platoons chiefs, without any intentional deployment in depth and with scanty support of organic heavy machine guns or mortars. It is worth indicate that in last 2 complete years of war (spring, 1943 to spring, 1945) it was very normal, according to the above mentioned thing, that the endowment of a company was from 20 or 30 to 50 men, as the maximum.

When the aim was important or extensive, 2 companies were deployed by wings, serving the rough direction given as limit between their advance strips, to prevent them from intermingling the platoons. It was then very possible to count with artillery support from the brigade. For example, a battery of reactive artillery of 132 mm., the Katiuskhas, with 4 rockets launchers with 16 tubes each one on Zil 6X6 trucks, that were shooting more or less simultaneously, turning the surface target into a destruction zone. Or, in case of see or be waited enemy tanks, they were receiving the support of a 2 or 3 tanks T-34-85 platoon. Or, later, type JS-2 with the 122 mm. cannon, with a much slower shooting speed. Since, for industrial difficulties, it had the projection load separated from the perforation or explosive round. Already in 1944, with the foreign territory occupied by Germany very restricted, it was frequent to see the Tigers or Panthers or the assault or antitank cannons, supporting German small and fixed defense positions.

The German fortification works, in the great majority of his fixed rejection positions, were scanty and of circumstances, except in the big occupied populations. They consisted in more or less long trenches, infantry foxholes and shooting positions of the heavy weapons, and vertical cuts and reinforcements of the natural obstacles. Generally, they had too much reinforced and hided points, which could be used then as alternative positions, and they were lacking men to manned these. The usual ignorance of their enemy, was often leading that the attacking Soviet line, without noticing, was left to approach up to the last tens of ms. of the supposed defensive occupied positions. Then, it was counter-attacked from flank or reverse by one or two of German infantry platoons, commanded by an energetic official, that had slipped out of the defensive perimeter and were remaining hidden. The security lack to the flanks and of proper depth deployment of the attacking forces, as well as battalion reserves, provoked that the attacking unit was destroyed and repelled, with more or less falls. The Germans did not usually pursue. And sometimes, taking advantage of his enemy reverse, they get from their positions at full light and without major measures. And to retreat. And even, without being received, to move to another defense support point more in their rear.

Neither the Soviet tanks units were enduring too much better. They were using in their marches or even in the assaults, too much known and stereotyped deployments, and without taken care habitually of the exposed flanks. This could be taken advantage by some German veteran tanks unit. The count Hyazinth Strachwitz von Gross-Zauche and Camminetz is almost not known in West. For the simple reason he fought during almost 4 years of war in the East front. He managed to be rewarded with the Gentleman’s Cross of the Iron Cross (that was hung of the neck). And that he was successively adorning it with the Oak Leaves and the Diamond swords for her. He was one of the best commanders of a panzer regiment. And his successes might assume at equal parts, to a good tactical sense and a particular knowledge of the Russian idiosyncrasy. He gave his better tactical blow being already major general and commander of the panzers of the North armies group, in the autumn of 1944. His front sector was in calmness, being reorganized the Soviets, and Hyazinth Strachwitz sensed beforehand where they would attack on having renewed the offensive. With only 4 tanks he deeply penetrated behind the enemy lines and established an ambush over the supposed approximation zone of to the front. In its moment appeared at full speed a small Soviet tanks unit, completely ignorant of the presence of the German tanks, that was destroyed. More tank units were approaching and followed the same luck. Incredibly, the Soviet commanders allowed that the massacre should continue, without establishing the combat exploration or the march security or, at least, verify the origin of the enemy so precise fire. After about an hour of the first shot of German cannon, in the ambush zone (killing zone) were lying the smoking and deformed remains of 105 Soviet tanks. Almost equal of inexplicable was that the count returned behind his lines with his 4 intact tanks.

The Soviet great combats in the German rear.

When the Soviets were waiting the presence of the panzer corps or divisions, that were the only enemy great units that could attack their mobile corps with profit, the tanks army was advancing in the German operational zone with more prudence. His marching groups were forming a deployment that was guaranteeing tactical cohesion, protection against surprises and combat capacity.

The fuels supply was the first Achilles’ heel of the Soviet great mobile units. Though the infantry divisions of the Fronts were always continuing after their mobile corps, to support them, consolidate the enemies’ clear regions and garrison the populations, their pedestrian speed was insufficient to reach them rapidly. This way, sometimes a mechanized or tanks corps could remain aground and isolated. And on him were falling rapidly all the mobile reserves that the Germans could have to hand in the zone and which employment was not unprotecting other sector. On having known their near forced detention, the mobile corps were immediately going on to the defensive action and were establishing their campaign fortifications. The mechanized corps resisted well, in spite of the falls. But the tanks corps, smaller and less complete, were swept off easier by the panzer and their mechanized infantry. These cases happened even in 1944.

In these cases, always came a moment in which it was supposed that the Soviets had fought well and that already they could not win, nor get out of the combat and move back. Then, the crews and the soldiers of these elite units were dispersing in small groups, leaving behind their valuable heavy equipments and were trying to infiltrate up to their lines. And this was very difficult to get. But this was a war for the survival and mercilessly. And already Stalin had indicated the luck of the Soviet prisoners of war, if they were managing to survive the captivity in the deep rears of the Reich, his allies and the occupy countries. And that had surrendered too soon to the Germans, specially at the beginning of the war. Charging the enormous military national effort in their following comrades and the people. «Nothing will be forgotten, nobody will be forgotten”.

When the situation was difficult, the Soviets were not hesitating to spend an Army of tanks to stop the enemy by pure attrition.

In the tanks battle of for Prokhorsvka’s villa on July 12, 1943, as part of so called Kursk’s battle, faced the 5º tanks army of the Guard of the general Romistrov against 2º panzer army corps of the SS, commanded by general Hausser. The Soviets were counting with approximately 900 tanks and assault cannons, but were not joining any of the modern SU-152 assault cannons, the so called «beasts killer» (Tigers, Panthers) and the majority (around 500) of their tanks were T-34 76,2 mm, which could not distantly perforate the Tigers’ frontal shielding. The Germans had around 600 tanks (of them, approximately 100 were Tigers) and assault cannons. But none of these were of the Ferdinand or Elephant model. These only were used in the north attack on Kursk’s salient.

The Germans advanced towards the village with the Tigers forming the top of a great blunt wedge, with the Panzer IV and III covering the flanks and the assault cannons in its interior. The Soviets went to get them. The shock of the armored masses of both armies transformed in a fierce and chaotic whirlwind. The speed and the great maneuverability of the T-34 allowed them to very rapidly advance to reach the nearby fighting distances. Which would allow them to attack the Tigers with fruit and preferably at the flank. These would lose this way their advantage of being able to do effective fire at long distances and keeping the invulnerability of his frontal shield. The combat developed in multitude of small actions between 2 or 3 tanks.

The result of the battle was undecided. The Germans lost approximately 300 vehicles, including numerous Tigers, and the Soviets suffered the fall of approximately 450 vehicles. Though initially the Soviets moved back, remaining the Germans in control of the area, the Soviets recovered it little later. With what the Germans could not recover all their damaged or broken down tanks, which were total falls in their units.

The modern evolution lines of the Soviet operational strategy until 1989.

After the irruption of the Fronts or Soviet groups of armies in Eastern Europe and all the broad of the front of the East, the Soviet theoretics and the high commanders realized the need to change the structure of their tanks armies and corps. In effect, the urban, industrial and semi urban areas of the European East were demanding a major employment of the infantry support for the fight in them. They were new types of areas, full of obstacles to the advance and innumerable covers and/or «concealing relative heights», highly suitable to the active defense in depth. Here, the mechanized infantry (it was begun to call also motorized, though it was using the «combat» armored vehicles) was the principal weapon of the fighting. Also in the predictable future, a possible tactical nuclear war or not towards the Western Europe, would even accentuate this need of the motorized infantry.

It is not until 1965, 12 years after Stalin’s death, in which are started recognizing the contributions and the works of the mentioned theoretical purged military men. Assuming already to each person theirs ones and not as part of an ambiguous and impersonal Soviet military collective popular thinking school.

In turn the tanks armies and theirs corps and divisions units were adapting and changing. This way were created the so called «operational maneuver groups» (O.M.G.), destined to the exploitation in the lands of West Germany and Benelux in the decided operational directions. They could be formed by one or two tanks armies, reinforced in infantry and artillery. But their battle orders changed with the time and with the appearance of the atomic tactical weapon (missile, air and artillery). This brought the dispersion of the deployment after the irruption in several tanks and mechanized corps. That would advance very unfolded by all the attainable ground routes of the enemy area, to avoid to turn into an eligible target for the atomic fire. Also for they would have to approach with rapidity and unfolded to the “forward limit of the enemy positions”. The speed of march and the precision and range of the heavy direct fire would compensate their dispersion and the loss of shock. So achieving an effect of «crumbling of the enemy rear» thanks to the higher number of insertions and exploitations in the Western Front and its depth rear.

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN

If Plutarch was living today, surely he would write one of his «Parallel Lives» (one of two collections of his works), dedicated to trying and comparing the not crewed planes («death from above») and the suicidal yihadists («Allahu Akbar»). In effect, both are annoying and asymmetrical weapon, directed against the personnel and the mental and volitional factors of the enemy. That are not tactically decisive. And whose military effects are limited, but accumulative.

The Not Crewed Planes of exploration (reconnaissance) and ground recognition and of bombardment.

They are technologically advanced weapons, which began to develop several decades ago, destined to eliminate a minimum of «designated enemies», so much real as «ideological or potential «. And to minimizing the own losses. Which does irrelevant his economic cost for their rich owners. They have a highest effective range and are of the category of «intelligent». Though are not yet authorized to decide the moment to throw their missiles, once acquired the target. Their operational strategic use might be named the «War of the Drones».

The specific tasks that were distinguishing the CIA and the Pentagon, were intermingling during the first decade of the 21st century. This was owed to the operational and strategic failure of the USA in the long asymmetric wars of IV th generation (be read of guerrilla warfares and, be added or not, as be the hostiles, of national liberation) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Actions that they carried out after their short «armed conflicts» after 11/09/2001 against the masses armies (of second generation) of their tyrannical regimes. And using in them their trained and very technologically equipped forces (of III rd generation). Closed in false the Iraqi front and initiated the retreat in Afghanistan, the White House is endowing the CIA of more military means to give hunt to the salafists terrorists. So she has increased his drones or planes without crew fleet. And is considering to authorize an increase of the Pentagon’s spies’ network, to exercise a bigger control on the refuges of al-Qaeda in the Arabic peninsula and in the east and north of Africa.

These changes in the strategic and operational aims of the CIA and the Pentagon and the suitable endowment of means, culminated during the Barack Obama’s first mandate. The CIA has taken more active part in the eradication of the international jihadism, and has expanded notably his program of assaults with missiles thrown by drones. In the summer of 2011, Obama nominated the former director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, chief of the Pentagon. And the commander of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and chief of the Central military Command, David Petraeus, was nominated director of the CIA. Petraeus, before resigning 9/11/2012, for that of the erotic (his biographer) of the Power, asked Obama for a reinforcement of the drones fleet of the Agency. To be able to effect assaults beyond the habitual aims in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. The Agency and the Pentagon have their looks put in Mali and Libya, in view of the increase of the activity in the zone of the franchise «al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, the Ansar Dine group and the Anzawad’s Islamic Republic, seated at the north of Timbuktu. The tuaregs have changed his former employer Gaddafi for the salafists terrorists. To whom Gadafi accused of being his armed opposition. And that are destroying the universal heritage of Timbuktu, under the pretext that its monumental representations rival with Allah. Sources of the North American intelligence say that the drones fleet of the CIA does not excel 35 at the end of 2012 and Petraeus requested ten more.

The CIA has a list of «threats» to the USA, of which he has authorization to kill. In September, 2011 he got a famous success on having killed in Yemen the imam Anuar al-Aulaki, an American well-known personage of al-Qaeda. The Pentagon also has his «ist of authorized targets». That are checked every week by approximately 100 security analysts of the Administration. Their function is to recommend to the president the changes of names in the list. The procedure is semi officially called the «Tuesday of the terror» in the White House. The CIA and Joint Command of Special Operations of the Pentagon cooperate in many of these attacks. Their targets are supposed leaders and even simple militants of al-Qaeda and associate groups of jihadists. And the tactic is to exterminate them before they act. This is one more step in the foundations of the military doctrine of the USA. Determined for decades by the contradictory parameter of «not suffering losses in any war or conflict «.

The Obama’s «war of the drones» has much of «preventive» character”-– before that crime has been committed–and the executions are summary, without judicial sentence. And ,for this reason, it supposes attributing the right to realize extra judicial executions in any part of the world. So, Obama’s right hand in this theme, John Brennan, a veteran of the CIA, is called the «Czar of the Assassins». The program «Death of the Sky» (Death from Above) is legitimized only » by the person of the president «. The executions are legal, because the president decides and arranges them. Obama has obtained with the drones a weapon to appear «hard and effective» in the fight against al-Qaeda, without turning out to be unpopular with the voters. But, according to Christopher Griffin, in an article published by «Rolling Stone», «Obama’s secret war supposes the major air offensive not driven by human beings, never realized in the military history». And paraphrasing Churchill, he adds «never so few had killed so many people by remote control».

The Administration does not admit explicitly the existence of the program of drones, for safety motives. Though the White House declares in her calculated filtrations, that the not searched victims are almost non-existent. Not all the analysts accept this “surgical precision” without authentic information, attributed to these assaults from well away the horizon. An important problem is that the drones terrify entire areas, with some of them flying a lot of time over the settlements. On the other hand, as is the case of Pakistan, the «basic information» for the creation of intelligence for the mission, is facilitated by the local paid people. That also offers false information. More important and controversial is the question of the euphemistically so called «collateral falls», as if they had less importance on having been caused by the imprecisions and the operational mistakes. Some assaults with drones have caused tens of civilians deaths, including women and children, as is the case of Saleh Mohammed al-Anbouri in Yemen in December, 2009. And only in Pakistan, according to The Guardian, the drones would have killed around 3000 persons, of which a third were clearly civil, between 2008 and 2011.

The assaults against the human aims are realized by missiles thrown from drones. Since 2002, the USA has realized almost 450 missions of this kind in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. President Obama authorizes the assaults in Somalia and Yemen. But he is consulted only about a third of the missions in Pakistan. Where the «operational at charge» decide on the basis of “general received orders”. The Pentagon also uses the drones in his operations of exploration and of assault in Afghanistan. The CIA has his principal role in Pakistan. Where exists internally an ambiguity calculated of the FFAA, the intelligence services (the ISI is the most important, with much) and the Government in the relations and preferences towards: his foreign ally, the USA, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban and the pashtunes tribes of the frontier zones, near the former Durand line, and the southern baluchis (the Baluchistan). A strategic national aim for Pakistan is to support an important, preferably decisive influence, in the internal Afghan matters. And a strategic military aim at the east of the country is to have monitored, controlled and neutralized his own Taliban and other hostile minor groups, at the east of Peshawar’s meridian, and without they act at the east of the Indus river.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not accepted tacitly by both Parties, that «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military means) were carried on and were necessary, to keep away from the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the “foreign fundamentalist terrorism” of any origin, religion or ideology. This justified the post war occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with an exploded fiscal and exterior deficits and with a democrat Administration, is necessary for the USA to save more in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, the USA qualitatively lowers the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only not national violent enemy. This terrorist salafist internationalist «network», without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for the American forces and means of «rapid punctual incursion».

This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile area, attacks with limited aim by elite small units and small expeditionary forces and units of Marines amphibious assault, transported in «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and equipment for several years in a theater of operations, are rejected indefinitely by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense». This way, the Pentagon has to operationally center on the counter terrorist tactics and technologies. And he seeks to reinforce his own espionage branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The reason is simple and clear: as the CIA has been effective giving hunt to terrorists abroad, the Pentagon wants to be more like it, and less as an army at use, to adapt to the new aims and national strategies. In November, 2012, Panetta asked Obama to allows him to recruit 1600 new spies. It would double the size of the DIA. At the end of this month, the secretary of Defense declared that: «The campaign against al-Qaeda will take place out of “declared combat zones”. And using tactics that leave little track, with precision operations».

The principal not crewed planes are the Predator and the Reaper. And cost more than $13 millions of dollars per unit. The Pentagon possesses approximately 19000 for the tasks of espionage and combat. The CIA has his own fleet, with reserved information. The General Atomics makes the drones. Their weapon more devastating are the missiles AGM-114 Hellfire II, the Lockheed Martin. In October, 2012, the USA entrusted 24000 missiles for his use and that of allied authorized countries. There exist the variants of antitank hollow load (HEAT), antipersonnel (with diverse types of explosion and fragmentation, reinforced or not) and with self guided (fire and forget). Each one weighs 47 Kg., with 20 % of useful load (warhead), it is guided by laser with diverse technologies and has a range of 8 Km. The effect of a volley of several of them on a block of houses of adobe or masonry is devastating. But it guarantees the elimination of the human selected target.

The equipment of the base is very simple and highly elaborated: the remote control of the drones, several screens and a pedal, in front to the ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit their views to the pilots in land. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the controller of the camera, which form one «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during the whole day, checking his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, his family has gone shopping. In fact, all the «teams» talk about an «established intimacy» with the Afghan families, observed during up to weeks. Thing that, for example, the foreign soldiers of the ISAF on the area would not know. Neither it seems, according to the medical statistical studies realized, that the pilots and observers were affected by the enemies dead in an important way. Also they reject that their work is like a video game. Though some of them argue that they do not know any video game that is required to observe the aim for hours.

The US Air Force of the Pentagon possesses more than 1300 drones pilots, being employed at 13 bases in the USA. And he would need at once approximately 300 more, at least. The majority of the military missions are in Afghanistan. The Pentagon calculates that for 2015, the Air Force will have to count with 2000. Already he trains more pilots for drones that for the conventional flights: 350 in 2011. And from 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters or bombers, learning to direct a drone. The chief of the Air Force HHQQ, general Norton A. Schwartz, recognized that the pilots of drones might overcome the classic ones in the next years. The halo and the combat pilot’s profession change for that of “armchair screen viewer civil servant”. And air bases in the USA increasingly stop dealing with traditional flights «to «direct» drones.

In November, 2011, after an assault with drones in the border with Afghanistan, where died at least 24 Pakistanis soldiers of a control fort, Pakistan blocked the way of the logistic convoys of the NATO following the routes of Khyber and Shaman to Afghanistan, from Peshawar. They are two crucial routes in order that the soldiers of the ISAF, that have used them during the last 10 years of asymmetric combats, receive fuels, equipments, provisions and military material. The Pakistani Defense minister, Ahmad Mukhtar, indicated at the end of 2011, that they might reopen them to the ISAF, if they pay for it. And, according to sources of the Pentagon, Pakistan forced them to dismantle also a platform of drones installed in a base in the southwest of the country, principally manned by the CIA. Washington lost temporarily one of his more powerful weapon: the permission to throw missiles from the not driven planes against the insurgents in the provinces of the northwest of Pakistan, tactics that generalized there from 2008. In turn, Panetta, also indicated then that the USA is «coming to the limit of his patience» with Pakistan,»for his disability to act against the armed groups in the tribal zones». At the beginning of 2013 the drones pulverized the so called mullah Nazir in the province Pakistani of Southern Waziristan (in the tribal zones). The volley of rockets thrown to reach him, also killed two of his more nearby collaborators, Rafey Khan and Atta Ullah, who were accompanying him in the vehicle. Already the USA had previously realized several assaults to finish with his life. This guy belonged to the «neutral» Taliban in Pakistan. And, at least, it was giving cover, helps and logistic support to the members of al-Qaeda and to the Afghan Taliban, who operated at the other side of the border. And probably he was a collaborator of Pakistani «authorities» during some long periods. It is confirmed by the fact that in November, 2012 Nazir was object of an unsuccessful suicide attack at Wana’s market, the provincial capital.

In a declassified report of the Central Command of the Pentagon, published in December, 2011, is assured that «the catalyst of the assault was the opening fire by the PAKMIL (the Pakistani Army)”. But are added that «the cooperation and collaboration in the border were disabled by a mutual distrust climate»; that the orders given by the NATO «were lacking clarity and precision», and that the goal of the mission was «inadequate». The final result was that the Marines’ James Mattis, in charge of the Central Command, ordered a series of changes in the protocols for the frontier operations. And, would not it be that for routine and lack of commitment with the missions, those which existed were not fulfilled well? Finally, bureaucracy will kill the initiative and the inventiveness. And it will turn out that, as with the black greyhound of the Han Chinese, when, being tied, he was asked to catch unattainable hares…

The mutual distrust exists in all the cooperation areas between the USA and Pakistan. Since both countries were sealing an alliance after 11-S, to fight al-Qaeda, the Congress of the USA has sent $ 20000 millions as «economic aid» to Islamabad. The real and practical results of this «alliance» are lean and scanty and the loyalty of Pakistan to the interests of the USA, for which this collaboration is paid, is questionable. Because Pakistan keeps his firm loyalty to the aims of his great or national strategy. Several members of the USA Congress asked for a change of approach in his relations in this geostrategic region. The representative to the Chamber, Duncan Hunter, declared that «Afghanistan needs economic and political stability, to guarantee that the victory of the USA is lasting. And the relation between the USA and Afghanistan must be also a point of interest, not only for the future of Afghanistan, but for the whole region». And Frank Wolf indicated: «It is clear that to manage to triumph in Afghanistan, we must solve first a series of problems in Pakistan. To obtain a military victory in Afghanistan is a thing, but our general success depends on more factors».

The authorities of Pakistan and Yemen, allied of the United States against al-Qaeda, have protested several times, so much for the violation of theirs sovereignties with war actions, as for the death of people who did not have any relation with the conflict. And they warn that this war carried out secretly, destabilizes them and gives arguments to the jihadists.

(to be continued)

THE SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FROM 1920 TO 1990.

(continuation)

THE TANKS ARMIES AS SUMMIT WEAPON OF THE ART SCIENCE OF THE SOVIET WARFARE.

Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

The structure and combat capacities of the tanks armies.

They were formidable war machines. Each one was integrated by 2 tanks corps and a mechanized corp, with all the auxiliary services and necessary supports. Having a very variable personnel, between 40 and 65 thousand men, according to the availabilities of means and workforce and the needs of the different operational plans of the Stavka.

The first unit that was according to this concept was activated in June, 1943. Previously also existed “great mobile units” like so called. But they really were conglomerates of tanks brigades reinforcing infantry divisions, generally «of the Guard». The most famous was probably the «Group Popov», commanded by the general of this surname. At the beginning of 1943 was employed against the operational rear of the Don armies group of Marshall Erich von Manstein, that operated in all the south of the USSR. It was thrown by the Southwest Front of general Vatutin in the direction Pavlograd-Zaporozhe, towards the mouth of the river Dnepr in the Black Sea. Seeking to isolate and surround all the German forces at the east of the river, in a large-scale reproduction of Stalingrado’s Soviet ring, which had just fallen down in the Red Army‘s hands. The principal counterattack thrown by Manstein against the group Popov, was in charge of 48th panzer army corp and a SS panzer corp. Both forming the 4th panzer army under the command of the colonel general Hermann Hoth, which destroyed it. Erasing it from the Soviet Battle Order, until it was reformed and re-equipped and re-trained its units.

By 1944 existed up to 26 tanks corps and 11 mechanized corps in the Soviet army, but until January was not activated the 6º tanks army. Sometimes a tanks army had 2 mechanized corps, but this was very rare, because these were the most necessary great and scanty units of the operational Soviet strategy. On the other hand, for fighting in the areas of bad or difficult “transitability” (with more conceptual wealth that only «bad ongoing»), forests, mountains and snow covered or swampy zones, the Soviets were using a combination of a mechanized corp with other of cavalry. Of these mobile horse-mechanized armies never were more than 2 or 3 in the Soviet Battle Order. These and the tanks armies could be equivalent in power, punch and operational movement capacity to the German panzer army corps. But these were always more numerous, for example, even in the year 1944 the Germans were counting with between 10 and 18 panzer corps, it is true that with very different capacity, according with the available means.

The Soviet tanks corps was equivalent to the panzer division. It was formed by 3 battalions of main battle tanks and 3 infantry battalions, supposedly mechanized or motorized. It was completed by some artillery and heavy tanks or assault cannons and other auxiliary units. It theoretically had 240 tanks and assault cannons, while the panzer division had up to 150 vehicles of these types. Nevertheless, this one was better balanced as combined arms great unit. Possessing 12% more men (up to approximately 13.300) and 20% more infantry, better mechanized (approximately 4.500 men).

The mechanized corps was the major unit «type western division» formed by the Soviets. In relation to the panzer divisions, it was possessing 26% more of men, 17% more of infantry and 152% more of tanks and assault cannons, which were partly replacing certain deficiency in artillery, which was always towed, not self-propelled. It was much more than a panzer grenadiers division and was equivalent to the major panzer divisions. But his lack of motorized transport, 19% less, was making it less consisting in his operations that the German last mentioned.

For its part, the Soviet shock armies were great units formed by infantry divisions, generally of the Guard, reinforced by some artillery divisions and several tanks brigades of (that were equivalent to the mentioned «battalion» and had approximately 65 tanks) and engineers brigades, according to the plans of the Stavka. They were destined to assault the most strengthened and defended extensive positions in the German front. And to guarantee the irruption, without taking care so much their losses.

Their operational movement capacity was very deficient.

A great handicap of the Soviet tanks armies was the absence in them of the infantry combat vehicles or of transport (carriers), lightly armored and generally roof opened in this epoch, for the supposedly mechanized infantry. Destined to accompany the tanks, across all the grounds. Forming part of the mechanized or tanks brigades, which were the tactical subunits of those.

During their advance, the infantries in occasions had for their transport North American Studebaker, very resistant trucks. And other times they had to travel very much. Though the most frequent was that the infantry battalions mounted, as unexpected riders, on the tanks of the tanks battalion of their brigade. In any case, as the missions were many and divergent, in the operational surroundings of their aim, the infantries were dismounting and covering afoot the last tens of km up to his arrangement zones. These flying columns operating in depth in the German rear that was crumbling, were systematically attacked by the German aviation, which caused large devastations in they, at least in material. In addition, when they were going towards specially sensitive aims for the Germans, in which these were concentrating their tactical aviation, the mobile groups were forced not to circulate by day.

Why could this happen with so important units Soviet units? Because the Soviet fighters, which bases and airports were staying deeply behind his lines, did not have sufficient action range to watch and protect permanently all their journeys. And neither they were always carrying in their “marching groups”, organic anti-aircraft defense means. That would complicate more their weak and meager logistics. This was stopping them in that advance without consideration to the losses, which the middle and low chiefs were using

excessively. To fulfill the severe requirements that their Superiors were marking and the political deputies were monitoring about their fulfillment. It was frequent that in the attached epigraphs of the commanders orders, specially «of combat «, was including the paragraph «I will submit to a martial court the official who does not use to the maximum his means».

(to be continued)